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Many scholars, both Muslim and non-Muslim, do indeed regard as-Shafi’i to be the most

important early legal expert. His supposed role is that of an arbiter between the two camps, i.e,

the ahl-al-ḥadīth, and the ahl-al-ray. According to the dominant view, early legal reasoning was

arbitrary and unsystematic. The proponents of considered opinion, especially, were considered

too subjective in their arguments. On the other hand, the proponents of ḥadīth were too rigid,

marginalizing the role of reason and considered opinion, and relying exclusively on tradition.

As-Shafi’i is given credit for making peace between the two camps, by formulating objective

criteria for the derivation of Islamic law. His four-source theory of law bolstered the claims of

the ahl-al-ḥadīth, by giving authority to the solitary connected ḥadīth as a source of law next to

the Quran. At the same time, it conceded to the ahl-al-ray the validity, although limited, of

reason. The use of reason was limited to analogy with relevant authoritative texts like verses

from the Quran or authentic ḥadīth. Wael Hallaq refers to Shafi’i as the “master architect” who

brought about this “great synthesis”. Christopher Melchert similarly calls this the “grand

compromise”.

However, this overall viewpoint has been challenged recently by Muslim writers such as Dr.

Umar F. Abd-Allah. He contends that such generalizations are not corroborated by the evidence

and in fact obscure the true picture of early Islamic legal thinking. Scholars should not consider

early legal thinking as arbitrary simply on the basis of polemical writings such as an early work

Ikhtilaf Malik wa Shafi. This work was possibly written by one of Shafi’i’s students, and presents

the two Imams as if they were face to face, having an argument. The Shafi’i protagonist

denounces Imam Malik’s reasoning as arbitrary and unsystematic. He gives examples of what he

considers to be inconsistencies in Imam Malik’s thinking, such as relying on one statement of a

certain Companion of the Prophet while rejecting another statement by the same companion. If
we take the Shafi’i protagonist at his word, such examples would indeed seem to show

inconsistencies in Malik’s reasoning. However, scholars must never judge on the basis of one

side only. A careful analysis of Imam Malik’s reasoning by Umar F. Abdallah in fact reveals a

system with remarkable inner consistency and sophistication. The same is true for the other

Imams, Abu Hanifa, and Ibn Hanbal.

We can better understand this by making a distinction between positive law, which is the law

as it is applied in various aspects of life, and legal theory (usul ul fiqh), which developed later.

As-Shafi’i made significant contribution to the science of usul ul fiqh, for which he rightly

deserves credit. However, by As-Shafi’i’s time, the schools that grew up around the other Imams

had already developed distinctive bodies of positive law and the methodologies used to derive

the law. The followers of those distinct methodologies continued to defend and uphold them,

despite Shafi’i’s criticisms. As-Shafi’i’s views were opposed by the followers of these other

schools, with the result that As-Shafi’i laid the foundation for a distinct school himself. The view

that As-Shafi’i’s so-called “compromise” was welcomed by all parties is fundamentally wrong.

One of Shafi’i’s principles is the independent authority of solitary ḥadīth. Isa Ibn Aban, an early

Muslim scholar asserts that, on the contrary, rejecting solitary ḥadīth because of their irregular

implications was so common that it was virtually a matter of consensus among the early jurists.

As-Shafi’i does not acknowledge the validity of such sources as praxis, preclusion, discretion,

“the unstated good”, etc. These sources were acknowledged as valid and made use of by jurists

before and after Shafi’i. As Shafi’i insisted that the sunna be derived only from authentic

connected ḥadīth. Imam Hanbal and Imam Malik and their students after them, on the other

hand, regarded post-Prophetic reports, rulings of companions, disconnected ḥadīth, and other

types of reports as also potential indicants of the sunna.


The picture painted by scholars of Shafi’i enacting a “grand compromise” is misleading

because it simplifies the range of methodologies that existed at the time of Shafi’i into two

camps: the ahl al ḥadīth and ahl al ray. In actual fact, not all ahl al ḥadīth rejected reason

outright, and not all ahl al ray rejected ḥadīth. There were a range of subtle positions between

these two extremes, and some, like Imam Malik himself, may readily be associated with both

groups. Imam Hanbal is usually portrayed as belonging to the ahl ḥadīth. It is true that he

employed the largest variety of textual sources in his reasoning. However, he considered non-

textual sources such as praxis, preclusion, discretion, the “unstated good”, etc as valid in the

absence of any explicit texts. Imam Abu Hanifa and his Kufan school is considered by many to

be champions of ray. However, closer inspection reveals them to rely extensively on texts like

well-known ḥadīth, much more so than the Medinese.

A further misconception in Islamic studies is that early legal arguments were violent and that

different regions were pitted against each other, eg, the Medinese against the Kufans, in bitter

rivalry. According to this view, these early “battles” were fought because each reason possessed

conflicting bodies of ḥadīth. As-Shafi’i’s contribution, accordingly, was to settle the disputes, by

insisting that only authentic, connected, ḥadīth be used in arguments, on which everyone could

agree. The problem with such a picture is that most major early legal arguments were not about

conflicting ḥadīth at all, but the different ways that jurists interpreted those ḥadīth. Imam Malik,

for example, would often narrate a ḥadīth in his Muwatta, but then state that it is contrary to

praxis and therefore must not be followed. The authenticity of the ḥadīth is not the issue: it is

whether such a solitary text can be valid basis of a ruling or not, especially if it goes contrary to

praxis. Imam as-Shafi’i is famous for his saying: If the ḥadīth is authentic, take my madhab and

dash it against the wall. Al-Qarāfī, a 13th century Maliki states in his book The Stored Treasure,
that if, by this, al-Shāfiʿī means that he will follow the implications of authentic ḥadīths

whenever there are no other legal arguments contradicting their implications, then there is no

difference between him and any other jurist. But, if by these statements, he means that he will

always follow the implications of an authentic ḥadīth despite the presence of strong, contrary

legal arguments against its overt implications, then, al-Qarāfī asserts, al-Shāfiʿī went against the

consensus of other jurists.

In conclusion, the view of Shafi’i as the “master architect” is based on several false

assumptions. It portrays the early period as one of violent conflict, whereas actually historical

evidence shows that it was often characterized by deep respect and a culture of openness. The

picture of ḥadīth vs ray dichotomy is also problematic, because it assumes that some centers, like

Kufa, were ray-oriented, while others, like Medina, were ḥadīth oriented. This is simply not true.

Jurists of a range of dispositions were found in all centers, and the regions themselves were not

monolithic but rather diverse. For example, the Muwatta contains many references to issues of

disagreement among Medinese scholars. Imam Malik respects those differences of opinions and

gives them voice. Imam as-Shafi’i historical role is better seen as a continuation of that legacy of

differences of opinion. His viewpoint was one amidst many. He did not convince all sides to

adopt his “solution”. A careful analysis shows, instead, that the emergent schools of Imam Abu

Hanifa, Ibn Hanbal, and Imam Malik had already developed distinct trajectories that they

followed, before and after As-Shafi’i. As-Shafi’i himself pioneered a different trajectory, but it

must be seen as only one amid others.

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