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important early legal expert. His supposed role is that of an arbiter between the two camps, i.e,
the ahl-al-ḥadīth, and the ahl-al-ray. According to the dominant view, early legal reasoning was
arbitrary and unsystematic. The proponents of considered opinion, especially, were considered
too subjective in their arguments. On the other hand, the proponents of ḥadīth were too rigid,
marginalizing the role of reason and considered opinion, and relying exclusively on tradition.
As-Shafi’i is given credit for making peace between the two camps, by formulating objective
criteria for the derivation of Islamic law. His four-source theory of law bolstered the claims of
the ahl-al-ḥadīth, by giving authority to the solitary connected ḥadīth as a source of law next to
the Quran. At the same time, it conceded to the ahl-al-ray the validity, although limited, of
reason. The use of reason was limited to analogy with relevant authoritative texts like verses
from the Quran or authentic ḥadīth. Wael Hallaq refers to Shafi’i as the “master architect” who
brought about this “great synthesis”. Christopher Melchert similarly calls this the “grand
compromise”.
However, this overall viewpoint has been challenged recently by Muslim writers such as Dr.
Umar F. Abd-Allah. He contends that such generalizations are not corroborated by the evidence
and in fact obscure the true picture of early Islamic legal thinking. Scholars should not consider
early legal thinking as arbitrary simply on the basis of polemical writings such as an early work
Ikhtilaf Malik wa Shafi. This work was possibly written by one of Shafi’i’s students, and presents
the two Imams as if they were face to face, having an argument. The Shafi’i protagonist
denounces Imam Malik’s reasoning as arbitrary and unsystematic. He gives examples of what he
certain Companion of the Prophet while rejecting another statement by the same companion. If
we take the Shafi’i protagonist at his word, such examples would indeed seem to show
inconsistencies in Malik’s reasoning. However, scholars must never judge on the basis of one
side only. A careful analysis of Imam Malik’s reasoning by Umar F. Abdallah in fact reveals a
system with remarkable inner consistency and sophistication. The same is true for the other
We can better understand this by making a distinction between positive law, which is the law
as it is applied in various aspects of life, and legal theory (usul ul fiqh), which developed later.
As-Shafi’i made significant contribution to the science of usul ul fiqh, for which he rightly
deserves credit. However, by As-Shafi’i’s time, the schools that grew up around the other Imams
had already developed distinctive bodies of positive law and the methodologies used to derive
the law. The followers of those distinct methodologies continued to defend and uphold them,
despite Shafi’i’s criticisms. As-Shafi’i’s views were opposed by the followers of these other
schools, with the result that As-Shafi’i laid the foundation for a distinct school himself. The view
that As-Shafi’i’s so-called “compromise” was welcomed by all parties is fundamentally wrong.
One of Shafi’i’s principles is the independent authority of solitary ḥadīth. Isa Ibn Aban, an early
Muslim scholar asserts that, on the contrary, rejecting solitary ḥadīth because of their irregular
implications was so common that it was virtually a matter of consensus among the early jurists.
As-Shafi’i does not acknowledge the validity of such sources as praxis, preclusion, discretion,
“the unstated good”, etc. These sources were acknowledged as valid and made use of by jurists
before and after Shafi’i. As Shafi’i insisted that the sunna be derived only from authentic
connected ḥadīth. Imam Hanbal and Imam Malik and their students after them, on the other
hand, regarded post-Prophetic reports, rulings of companions, disconnected ḥadīth, and other
because it simplifies the range of methodologies that existed at the time of Shafi’i into two
camps: the ahl al ḥadīth and ahl al ray. In actual fact, not all ahl al ḥadīth rejected reason
outright, and not all ahl al ray rejected ḥadīth. There were a range of subtle positions between
these two extremes, and some, like Imam Malik himself, may readily be associated with both
groups. Imam Hanbal is usually portrayed as belonging to the ahl ḥadīth. It is true that he
employed the largest variety of textual sources in his reasoning. However, he considered non-
textual sources such as praxis, preclusion, discretion, the “unstated good”, etc as valid in the
absence of any explicit texts. Imam Abu Hanifa and his Kufan school is considered by many to
be champions of ray. However, closer inspection reveals them to rely extensively on texts like
A further misconception in Islamic studies is that early legal arguments were violent and that
different regions were pitted against each other, eg, the Medinese against the Kufans, in bitter
rivalry. According to this view, these early “battles” were fought because each reason possessed
conflicting bodies of ḥadīth. As-Shafi’i’s contribution, accordingly, was to settle the disputes, by
insisting that only authentic, connected, ḥadīth be used in arguments, on which everyone could
agree. The problem with such a picture is that most major early legal arguments were not about
conflicting ḥadīth at all, but the different ways that jurists interpreted those ḥadīth. Imam Malik,
for example, would often narrate a ḥadīth in his Muwatta, but then state that it is contrary to
praxis and therefore must not be followed. The authenticity of the ḥadīth is not the issue: it is
whether such a solitary text can be valid basis of a ruling or not, especially if it goes contrary to
praxis. Imam as-Shafi’i is famous for his saying: If the ḥadīth is authentic, take my madhab and
dash it against the wall. Al-Qarāfī, a 13th century Maliki states in his book The Stored Treasure,
that if, by this, al-Shāfiʿī means that he will follow the implications of authentic ḥadīths
whenever there are no other legal arguments contradicting their implications, then there is no
difference between him and any other jurist. But, if by these statements, he means that he will
always follow the implications of an authentic ḥadīth despite the presence of strong, contrary
legal arguments against its overt implications, then, al-Qarāfī asserts, al-Shāfiʿī went against the
In conclusion, the view of Shafi’i as the “master architect” is based on several false
assumptions. It portrays the early period as one of violent conflict, whereas actually historical
evidence shows that it was often characterized by deep respect and a culture of openness. The
picture of ḥadīth vs ray dichotomy is also problematic, because it assumes that some centers, like
Kufa, were ray-oriented, while others, like Medina, were ḥadīth oriented. This is simply not true.
Jurists of a range of dispositions were found in all centers, and the regions themselves were not
monolithic but rather diverse. For example, the Muwatta contains many references to issues of
disagreement among Medinese scholars. Imam Malik respects those differences of opinions and
gives them voice. Imam as-Shafi’i historical role is better seen as a continuation of that legacy of
differences of opinion. His viewpoint was one amidst many. He did not convince all sides to
adopt his “solution”. A careful analysis shows, instead, that the emergent schools of Imam Abu
Hanifa, Ibn Hanbal, and Imam Malik had already developed distinct trajectories that they
followed, before and after As-Shafi’i. As-Shafi’i himself pioneered a different trajectory, but it