1987 - When Speaking of Probability in Behavior Analysis PDF

When Speaking of Probability in Behavior Analysis
Author(s): Lisa M. Johnson and Edward K. Morris

Source: Behaviorism, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall, 1987), pp. 107-130
Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies (CCBS)
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Behaviorism, Fall 1987, Vol. 15, Number 2
WHEN SPEAKING OF PROBABILITY IN

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Lisa M. Johnson
Edward K. Morris
University of Kansas
ABSTRACT: Probability is not an unambiguous concept within the sciences or in vernacular language, yet it is
fundamental to much of behavior analysis. The present paper examines some problems this ambiguity creates in
general,as well as within the experimental analysis of behavior, in particular. As background material, we first
introduce the three most common theories of probability in mathematics and science, discussing their advantages
and disadvantages, and their relevance to behavior analysis. Next, we discuss the concept of probability as
encountered in the writings of B.F. Skinner and in the contemporary behavior analysis more generally, the latter
being based on material drawn from the professional literature and from a questionnaire survey. Although the
exercise is basically a descriptive one, we do conclude with some suggestions that may promote more effective action
on those occasions when behavior analysts speak of "probability."
Probability is the most important concept in modern science, especially as nobody has the slightest notion what it
means.
?Bertrand Russell
The concept of probability is fundamental to a broad and diverse range of scientif

in the physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. It is fundamental, for ins
discussions of relativity theory, predictions of inherited genetic characteristics, def
behavioral processes, and the use of sampling procedures and inferential statistics. D
frequent applications, and the vast literature on probability in the history and phil
science and mathematics (e.g., Ayer, 1946, 1962; Bridgman, 1936; Fine, 1973; G
Stebbing, 1937/1958; Todhunter, 1865/1965; see also Kendall & Plackett, 1977; O
Pearson & Kendall, 1970), controversy persists over its proper role in scientific
discourse (Korner, 1962; Popper, 1982). This has occurred, in part, because pr
defined and applied in a variety of ways in the sciences, both within and across sub
(see Kantor, 1950, pp. 204-264; Korner, 1962; Schoenfeld, 1969, p. 343), as well as in
language, from which it carries over "a miasma of irrelevant associations" (Hogben, 19
All of this is true in behavior analysis as well (see Michael, 1980, p. 47; Schick, 1
Verplanck, 1954, p. 299; see also Stevens, 1951, pp. 4447).
From a behavior-analytic perspective, the basis of this problem is this: Wh
communities, both from witthin and outside scientific disciplines, employ terms havi
forms, yet differing response functions, then verbal behavior and other activities rela
terms are likely to be mulitiply controlled in ways that lead to inconsistencies and lac
(Einstein & Infeld, 1938; Ferster, 1978; Von Mises, 1928/1957; see, e.g., Deitz & Arlin
on "punishment"). Behavior analysts have been concerned about such problems becau
difficulties created for both the general language of their science (e.g., Branch & Mala
107
JOHNSON AND MORRIS
Catania, 1969,1984; Deitz & Arlington, 1984; Hineline, 1980; Skinner, 1945) and the definitions
of their science's basic concepts, such as stimuli (Michael, 1980; Ray & Sidman, 1970; Skinner,
1935, 1938), responses (Notterman & Mintz, 1965; Schoenfeld, 1976; Skinner, 1935),
contingencies (Lattal & Poling, 1981), reinforcement (Higgins & Morris, 1984; Michael, 1975),
and operants (Catania, 1973; Schick, 1971; Staddon, 1967).
Interestingly, the concept of probability has been largely neglected by behavior analysts in
discussions of these language problems, even though it is often spoken of as fundamental to the
pursuit of a science of behavior:" [Our] basic datum is not the occurrence of a given response as
such, but the probability that it will occur at a given time" (Skinner, 1957a, p. 22; see also Marr,
1982, p. 205; Millenson & Hurwitz, 1961, p. 97; Skinner, 1947,1950,1953a, 1966a, 1974,1978, p.
116). Moreover, probability is central to definitions of such basic behavioral principles as
reinforcement (see Catania, 1984, p. 64; Rachlin, 1976, p. 234; Reynolds, 1975, p. 6; Skinner,
1953b, p. 83), punishment (e.g., Azrin & Holz, 1966, p. 381; Johnston, 1972, p. 1033), and
stimulus control (e.g., Ray & Sidman, 1970, p. 190). In light of ambiguities in the meaning of
probability, and because probability is frequently encountered in the analysis of behavior and is
said to be fundamental to that analysis, we examine in this paper what behavior analysts mean
when they speak of probability.
Skinner (1966a) has stated that "The task of an experimental analysis is to discover all the
variables of which probability of response is a function" (p. 214). The task of the present paper is
to describe some of the variables of which the response "probability of response" is a function.
Because the meaning of probability in the behavior-analytic literature is derived from its broader
meaning in mathematics and science in general, we first present background material on the
three most common theories of probability?classical theory, relative frequency theory, and
subjective theory?and discuss their advantages and disadvantages, as well as their relevance to
behavior analysis. Following that, we describe the nature and meaning of probability as
encountered (a) in the writings of B. F. Skinner and (b) in the contemporary behavior-analytic
professional literature and professional opinion, after which we provide a brief analysis of
problems associated with the term as currently employed in behavior analysis. Finally, although
our task is more descriptive than prescriptive, we do nonetheless offer some suggestions that
may help promote more effective action when speaking of probability.
THEORIES OF PROBABILITY
Kendall and Buckland's (1982) Dictionary of Statistical Terms defines probability as:
A basic concept which may be taken as undefineable, expressing in some way a "degree of belief, "or as the limiting
frequency in an infinite random series. Both approaches have their difficulties and the most convenient
axiomatisation of probability theory is a matter of personal taste. . .(p. 153)
Probability, then, has multiple meanings and uses, all with their respective advantages and
disadvantages. In order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings among them, however, the
"theory" of probability underlying a particular usage should be clearly specified beforehand
(Neyman, 1952, p. 1). That is, the historical and current context of scientific behavior with
respect to "probability" must be specified, for they are what give the term meaning and
significance (cf. Kantor, 1953). In this section of the paper, we examine the historical context
of the scientific and mathematical use of probability so as to evaluate and understand better
what the term may mean in contemporary behavior analysis?a sort of Machian exercise in
108
PROBABILITY IN BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
the analysis of a term's meaning (Mach, 1883/1942; see Kantor, 1960; Marr, 1985; Skinner,
1931). In presenting this material, we define and describe three major theories of probability
(i.e., the classical, relative frequency, and subjective theories), outline some of their uses and
limitations, and illustrate their relevance to contemporary behavior analysis. This material
will not be brief, for it is fundamental to understanding what probability means in behavior
analysis.
In discussing the limitations of these theories or models, we want to be especially clear
that the basis for our analyses follows from an unwillingness to formalize or reify probability
as an extant "thing" for which the only problem is its proper estimation. Probability is not a
property of an event, but rather is the outcome of scientific interactions which can take
various forms and routes (e.g., measures), no one of which represents any ultimate truth, but
some may be truer than others if they lead to more effective action (e.g., prediction) (see
Marr, 1986). These "forms and routes" are the theories of probability and the means of their
application.
The Classical Theory of Probability
The classical theory of probability is significant as a historical foundation for the other
theories, and is typically used to introduce the concept of probability in basic courses in
mathematics and statistics. For these reasons, and because an understanding of much of the
material is a prerequisite for what follows, our discussion is extended beyond what the theory
might otherwise seem to deserve given its infrequent use in contemporary behavior analysis.
To begin with, in the classical theory, probability is defined a priori as the ratio of the
number of instances that an event will occur to all equally possible outcomes (see Fisher, 1959, p.
31-34; Parratt, 1961, p. 4). For instance, the probability of obtaining heads in a toss of a fair coin
is one in two (1 /2) or 0.5. In compound cases, such as in the toss of a pair of dice, calculating the
probability of a particular sum is more complicated, but follows directly from theory. Here, the
sum is determined by counting the number of ways in which it can be obtained and dividing by
36. Thus, for example, the probability of obtaining "7" is 6/36 = 0.167 and the probability of
obtaining "2" is 1/36 = 0.028. Although the probability of obtaining a "2" is less than the
probability of obtaining a "7," the assumption of "equal likelihood" is not violated in that each
face on each die has an "equally likely" chance of occurring.
Advantages. The classical theory is useful in two primary respects. First, it illustrates
specialized classes of mathemathical probabilities derived from events such as card draws, coin
tosses, dice games, and computer-generated "random" numbers, all of which provide helpful
introductions to the conceptualization and application of probability in science and
mathematics. In classes of events such as these all possible cases can be specified in advance and
each outcome generally does, in the long run, turn up in an "equally likely" fashion.
A second advantage of the classical theory occurs when all that can be inferred about a set of
events is that a specific number of "equally likely" outcomes exist. Here, application of the theory
may produce the best prediction of a single instance of event's likelihood of occurrence. For
example, on a true-false test written in an unfamiliar language, the best estimate of the response
"true" being correct for a given question is 0.5, which might be useful information. This example,
however, also illustrates the application of " the principle of insufficient reason" which states that
the probabilities of events can be considered equal when no known reason exists for them to be
unequal (cf. von Kries, 1886, p. 6). In Boole's (1854) words, this principle may be thought of as
"the equal distribution of ignorance" (p. 370).
109
JOHNSON AND MORRIS
Disadvantages. The classical theory of probability has several limitations, the first of which
follows from the principle of insufficient reason mentioned above. To believe that ignorance of
an outcome can be a basis for calculating that outcome's probability or that any number of
events has an equal chance of occurring simply because insufficient information is available
seems both counter-intuitive and contradictory (cf. Boole, 1854; Boring, 1941; Hogben, 1955).
Fisher (1915, p. 9) attempted to resolve this difficulty by defining "equally possible cases" as cases
in which, after exhaustive analysis of the physical laws underlying the structure of the to-be
predicted event, predictions can be made on the assumption that no particular case will occur in
preference to any other. By restricting the application of probability in this fashion, Fisher's
definition clearly requires that statements of probability be based on positive evidence, rather
than on the absence of evidence, as the principle of insufficient reason would allow; even this
restricted definition, however, does not clarify what amount of knowledge is required before a
probability estimate can be made (cf. Boring, 1920). Interestingly, Fisher's modification states
that a probability (e.g., 0.5) should be assigned to an event (e.g., obtaining heads) only after
observing many outcomes in a series of repeated events (e.g., the toss of a coin); which modifies
the classical theory in the direction of a relative frequency theory, to which we turn shortly.
A second disadvantage of the classical theory is that equally possible outcomes do not exist
outside of theoretical mathematics or simple examples of events to which the theory can
appropriately be applied (e.g., card draws). Although these examples may provide a useful
introduction to the concept of probability, discussion often stops there rather than addressing
the more complex applications of probability useful to an experimental science. In most
experimental situations, the outcomes are not known a priori and do not have "equally likely"
chances of occurring.
The classical theory of probability has a third troublesome limitation: It cannot be applied a
posteriori to that which provides scientists with effective action?the results of their
experimental analyses. The classical theory restricts scientists to speaking about numerical
relations assigned a priori. In this sense, classical probability theory has at its roots what are
technically called "prior probabilities" (e.g., a 50-50 chance of obtaining heads), in
contradistinction to what might be called "posterior probabilities," that is, probabilities based on
actually observed events. In the classical theory of probability, the probability of an event (e.g.,
obtaining heads) always rests on prior probabilities, no matter what the results of an empirical
analysis. Thus although initially based on actual events (i.e., betting games) and derived from the
outcomes of those events (see David, 1955; Kendall, 1956; Todhunter 1865/1965), the classical
theory rests on prior probabilities, thereby creating problems for a science of behavior in which
change and variability appear to be essential characteristics (e.g., organismic and enviromental
contexts are continuously evolving). The classical theory of probability, then, may be said to be
deductive and relatively ahistorical in nature.
The classical theory of probability in behavior analysis. The classical theory of probability is
not frequently encountered in behavior analysis and is generally employed only in restricted
situations, in large part because of the limitations described above. The theory is generally
applied only in contexts where "equally possible" experimenter-defined outcomes have been
programmed to occur as, for example, in programming a computer to illuminate a red light on
one-half of a set of stimulus presentations and a green light on the other half. If the red and green
lights are programmed to occur "randomly," then on any given trial the light might be said to
have a 0.5 probability of being red and a 0.5 probability of being green. Behavior analysts,
however, rarely use the classical theory in isolation from actual events?programming
equipment and software are almost always tested against their predicted performance. In such
110
testing, a "relative frequency" model based on repeated observations is usually employed?the

second major theory of probability, and the one to which we now turn.
The Relative Frequency Theory
The relative frequency theory is the most commonly employed theory of probability in
science and mathematics (see any introductory probability or statistics; e.g., Cramer, 1955;
Feller, 1968; Hays, 1973). Speaking nontechnically, relative frequency theory defines probability
as the ratio of the number of instances an event occurs in relation to the number of opportunities
for that event to occur (cf. Bulmer, 1967, p. 4; Parratt, 1961, p. 4). Probabilities thus obtained
predict what is to be expected in the majority of cases within a sufficiently long sequence of
observations of the phenomenon of interest?that is, what will happen "in the long run" (cf.
Braithwaite, 1962; Neyman, 1952; Popper, 1962). Speaking more technically, the mathematical
definition of probability based on the relative frequency theory is, in simplest form: p(x) = limit
x/n as n approaches infinity, where x = the number of occurrences of the event of interest, n =
total number of observations, and p(x) = the probability of event x occurring. For example, if a
coin is repeatedly tossed 1000 times with an outcome of 800 heads and 200 tails, relative
frequency theory estimates the probability of obtaining heads is, on the average, 0.8, in that
p(heads) = (frequency heads obtained/ total tosses) = 800/1000, assuming, of course, that 1000 is
a sufficient number of tosses to obtain an accurate estimate.
Advantages. The major advantage of the relative frequency theory is that statements about
probability are derived from data and that probability estimates change as their empirical basis
dictates. The relative frequency theory requires that scientists rely on the outcomes of empirical
investigation as the best estimates of future occurrences, and hence that they appreciate the
importance of maintaining contact with actual events?a point that is difficult to overemphasize.
In sum, the approach is relatively inductive and historical in nature.
Disadvantages. According to most relative frequency theorists, probabilities derived by
means of relative frequency theory may not be ascribed to events that cannot be (or are not)
repeated. The theory does not provide estimates for single, unrepeated events (e.g., see Bayes,
1763/1958; Savage, 1968). As Von Mises (1957) has put this matter:
We can say nothing about the probability of death of an individual [on the basis of the relative frequency theory],
even if we know his condition of life and health in detail. The phrase "probability of death," when it refers to a single
person has no meaning at all for us. This is one of the most important consequences of [a relative frequency]
definition of probability. . .(p. 11)
In other words, the relative frequency theory may be applied to the flipping of coins or the
behaving of organisms (e.g., lever pressing) based on past occurrences of those events for
particular coins and behavior. The theory may not be applied, though, to an event that is not
repeated or that can only occur one time (e.g., an individual's suicide). The probability of
these latter events may certainly be estimated, but not in terms of their own relative
frequencies. For instance, the probability of a single, unrepeated event can be estimated on
the basis of a sample of those events as they occur in other domains (e.g., the general
population). This estimation, though, is not a figure based on the relative frequency of the
particular individual event of interest, but rather on the relative frequency for the larger
sample. The probability of a single unrepeated event may also be estimated in terms of the
relative frequency of repeatable subcomponents. For example, although a person may
commit suicide only once, an individual's act of suicide may be composed of a number of
111
JOHNSON AND MORRIS
episodes of depression and suicide attempts. Again, however, the relative frequency of the
latter cannot be applied to the former?the two are in different domains.
A second and related problem with relative frequency theory is that predictions cannot be
made about the probability of a particular event in isolation from the class of events of which it is
a member (i.e., to which it is relative), yet this often occurs. To speak of an event's probability is
not to speak of any given event's probability, but rather, to speak of its probability in relation to
the outcomes of the other possible classes of events. In other words, the probabilities obtained
with a relative frequency theory are ratios and should be expressed as such. Or, as Gilman
(1883/1970) put the matter some time ago:
Probability has to do not with individual events, but with classes of events; and not with one class, but with a pair of
classes?the one containing, the other contained, the latter being the one with which we are principally concerned.
We speak by ellipsis, of its probability without mentioning the containing class; but in reality probability is a ratio,
and to define it we must have both correlates given, (p. 49)
That is, both the universe of discourse (e.g., a deck of cards) and the event of interest (e.g.,
drawing an ace) common to at least one, but not all possible outcomes, need to be specified.
A third problem with the relative frequency theory, also related to the preceding, lies in
the specification of the procedures and variables involved in the calculation of probability
estimates. Unless the procedures and variables are clearly delineated, different probabilities
for the same event may be obtained by different individuals. Hence, statements about an
event's probability should not be made without reference to the methods employed for
deriving that probability.
The relative frequency theory in behavior analysis. The relative frequency theory is the most
frequently encountered theory of probability in behavior analysis (see e.g., Catania, 1984, p. 35;
Reynolds, 1975, p. 5; Skinner, 1953a; Staddon, 1977, p. 126). Here, however, as in science in
general, inconsistencies arise in its application, especially in specifying the universe of discourse
and the procedures and variables involved in deriving probabilities from data?problems
described above. For instance, in estimating the probability of behavior, investigators may fail to
specify appropriate denominators (e.g., time, lever presses, or opportunities to respond) or
numerators (e.g., response classes into which particular responses fall). Because of the potential
seriousness of such lack of information, and resulting inconsistencies in the application of the
relative frequency theory, we will provide an illustration below of how response probabilities can
be calculated in four different ways for a rat's lever pressing in a free operant situation?ways
that may yield different outcomes.
First, response probability could be calculated by dividing the rat's number of lever presses
by lever-presses-plus-all-other-behavior (e.g., + grooming, + drinking, + ... + the nth behavior).
To obtain a probability estimate using this definition, all the responses in the denominator must
be mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and specified in advance, which is often a difficult matter.
Second, probability has been estimated by dividing the number of lever presses of type A by the
number of responses of type A + B + C + ... + n. An example of this would be a situation in which
the number of presses to one lever is divided by the number of presses to that lever plus the
number of presses to another lever (see Herrnstein, 1970). This method differs from the first in
that the denominator does not represent all possible behavior. Third, probability can be
calculated by dividing the number of lever presses by the total number of lever presses possible,
whether physiologically possible for a particular organism (i.e., the asymptotic level of lever
pressing) or possible in a particular situation (e.g., interresponse times per opportunity; see
Anger, 1956). And fourth, probability can be estimated by dividing the number of lever presses
112
by unit time, thereby producing a rate, from which probability could be derived (see, e.g.,
Skinner, 1966a).
Given that these different methods for calculating response probability can yield different
results, then the meaning of "probability" is not clear. One might counterargue, though, that in
actuality the "real" meaning of probability is clear, and that what is unclear is how to specify the
calculation procedures and the definitions of the variables involved. This argument, however,
fails on three points. First, it reifies probability , thereby giving it the appearance of an extant
property of an event instead of the outcomes of an interchange between scientist and subject
matter. Second, if the meaning of a term (e.g., probability) is to be found in its calculation
procedures, then to the degree that these procedures differ from occasion to occasion, so too will
the term's meaning, thereby increasing the likelihood of inconsistent and confusing usage. Third,
and relatedly, the appropriate methods for calculating response probability are not always so
clear, even in the simplest of situations. This last point is an important one, so let us provide a
detailed example.
Before Anger's (1956) classic treatise on methods of describing interresponse-time (IRT)
distributions, researchers generally employed the second method of deriving response
probabilities discussed above: IRT's in a particular class interval were divided by the total
number of IRT's recorded to yield the probability of occurence of a particular IRT. Anger,
however, offered an often more accurate and predictive method. He employed an
IRT/opportunity measure in which response probability is calculated by dividing the number of
responses in an IRT interval by the number of occasions the organism paused long enough for
that interval to be reached. Even though both of these approaches are based on relative
frequency accounts of probability, the two methods of calculation yield different estimates of
response probability. Thus, altering the method of measurement can, and probably will, alter the
form of the calculated frequency distributions, and hence, the probability estimates. Finally, we
should point out that even though different IRT measures may depend on the same factors, the
measures may not depend on them in the same way.
As we hope is clear from the preceding material, behavior analysts are faced with various
methods for calculating probability. No one method, though, should be adhered to as the "true
method." Any such allegiance will probably distort the nature of the basic datum because no
single formulation is likely to describe behavior adequately for all occasions. Classical
probability may provide the best estimate in some cases (e.g., computer-generated stimuli),
whereas in other cases various types of relative frequency may yield the best estimate (e.g., rate of
keypecking). In still other instances, additional or different types of data may be useful for
providing the best estimate of future behavior (e.g., betting on the outcome of horse races). The
subjective theory of probability attempts to include events of this last sort, and is the third and
final theory we address.
The Subjective Theory of Probability
Subjective probability is most often defined as a degree of belief or opinion (see Bulmer,
1967, p. 5; Parratt, 1961, p. 2). Such probabilities take into account not only calculations of
frequencies of occurrence, but also other perhaps more subjective or personal contact with the
class of events or related events to be predicted (Anscombe, 1961; but see Diaconis & Zabell,
1982 for comments on more quantitative methods of determining subjective probabilities).
A standard example of the subjective theory is in betting at horse races. When making a bet
on a particular horse, sophisticated bettors do not employ the classical theory of probability
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because all horses are not equally likely to win. Nor would these bettors make simple use of the
relative frequency theory. Instead, or in addition, they would also take into account such
qualitative factors as the jockey, the weather, the turf, the other horses in the field?and
perhaps even "hunches" controlled by unknown variables. Some of these factors can be
quantified, others remain qualified, but in either case their inclusion and relative weighting are
"subjective" in the sense that they are modifiable on some basis other than frequency.
Even the simple matter of coin tossing, probability estimates may be subjective. For
example, if a coin is tossed 1000 times with an outcome of 800 heads and 200 tails, someone
might estimate the probability of the next toss being heads as 0.8, as per the relative frequency
theory. But, if that person had a long history of "even chances" for heads and tails, then the
probability estimate for heads might be 0.5, as per the classical theory. The subjective theory of
probability, however, allows another possibility: The probability estimate might be taken to be
an idiosyncratic combination of the previous two theories along with other factors. In general,
one might say that in comparison to probabilities derived from relative frequency and classical
theories, subjective probabilities appear to be more contingency-shaped than rule-governed.
Advantages. The subjective theory may be useful in situations where probability is not
intended to be, cannot be, estimated with quantitative or repeated measures, or when the best
probability estimate may result from taking into account information not derived from
frequencies alone (e.g., the intensity of verbal responses). Thus, just as the relative frequency
theory is useful and appropriate in situations where the classical theory is not (e.g., in situations
with unknown prior probabilities), the subjective theory is appropriate in situations where a
relative frequency interpretation is not?for instance, when samples are too small or
measurements too infrequent (e.g., suicide or verbal behavior) (see Braithwaite, 1962; Edwards,
Lindeman, & Savage, 1963; Shafer, 1986).
The major advantage of the subjective theory, then, is that probabilities can be assigned
when only a limited amount of information is available. Moreover, qualitative information (e.g.,
various aspects of an organism's history), as opposed to information that can only be quantified
as frequencies, may also be taken into account. Compared to the relative frequency theory, then,
fewer constraints exist in the application of the subjective theory with respect to the type and
amount of information that can enter into the calculation of probability (see Neyman, 1952, for a
discussion of these constraints).
Disadvantages. Just as the relative frequency determinations of probability are based on
data, so too are probability estimates resulting from applications of the subjective theory?but
often to a less quantifiable extent. Probabilities derived from relative frequency theory,
sometimes called "objective" probabilities, are often regarded as properties of certain physical,
biological, psychological, or social systems. In contrast, subjective probabilities are said to be as
much a function of the observer as they are properties of objects or organisms about which the
probability is to be predicted. As stated earlier, though, neither the organism nor the
environment possesses inherent properties. Thus, both the relative frequency theory and the
subjective theory represents degrees of belief about the probability of an event's occurrence as a
function of contingencies operating on the scientist's behavior. What distinguishes the objective
and subjective theories is that probability estimates derived from the latter are more a function of
private or difficult-to-access contact with events that influence the manner in which probability
estimates are derived (i.e., contingency-shaped behavior; cf. Kantor, 1950, p. 218).
In any case, the subjective theory of probability usually incorporates more qualitative and
less quantitative information than the relative frequency theory, and hence precise prediction is
often more difficult to achieve. Still, though, the subjective theory is similar to the relative
114
frequency theory, although quantitiatively less precise, and hence the same general
disadvantages hold for it as well. In other words, although both approaches are based on real
events, which is an advantage, problems arise in specifying classes of events (e.g., responses),
appropriate units of analysis (e.g., molar vs. molecular, IRT/op vs. traditional relative frequency
determination), and the circumstances under which the events occur (e.g., defining or assessing
"similar" conditions).
The subjective theory in behavior analysis. Although the subjective theory of probability is
formally encountered less often in behavior analysis than is the relative frequency theory,
probability is sometimes defined as a degree of belief (see, e.g., Kantor, 1950, p. 218; Skinner,
1957a, p. 159). Consider for instance, a passage from Skinner (1957a):
The relative frequency with which the listener engages in effective action in responding to behavior in the form of the
tact will depend upon the extent and accuracy of the stimulus control in the behavior of the speaker... Frequency of
effective action accounts in turn for what we may call the listener's "belief?the probability that he will take
effective action with respect to a particular verbal stimulus, (p. 88)
Here, the probability of the listener taking effective action with respect to a particular verbal
stimulus might be assigned on the basis of the subjective theory of probability, whereas the
probability of the listener taking effective action in responding to speakers'tacts in general
might be assigned by employing a type of relative frequency approach.
Conclusions
No matter what theory of probability is employed, the theory, its specific definitional
and derivational procedures, and the context in which the theory is used, need to be clearly
specified. What factors, whether explicit or implicit, in what combination, their relative
importance, and the extent to which they constitute similar or different conditions from
which generalizations about probability can be made should be described.(see Kantor, 1950).
Despite these complexities, some researchers have stated that probability is still not
difficult to define in a science of behavior (see Honig, 1966, p. 10). Others, however, have
suggested differently. For instance, according to Michael (1980):
In operant psychology "probability of response" often functions as an inferred basis for the direct measures of
behavior. Its use as a name for a direct measure is never clear without further specification, for example "proportion
of trials on which a response occurred." And even when thus specified it is difficult for writer and reader to avoid
blending direct measure with the inferential concept, suggesting a clear advantage to avoiding "probability" in
general, (p. 47)
We examine some of these issues more specifically in the remainder of the paper.
THE CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY IN BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
As described previously, the concept of probability originated in mathematics, physics,

philosophy, and in the culture at large (see Owen, 1976; Todhunter, 1865/1965), hence the
first contact most behavior analysts have with the term probably occurs outside the
behavior-analytic verbal community. In addition to whatever meanings may have accrued to
"probability" in these contexts, the behavior-analytic verbal community has added and
developed its own. In this section of the paper, we describe and briefly comment on how
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JOHNSON AND MORRIS
probability is spoken of in contemporary behavior analysis. We do so, first, by describing

Skinner's views and, second, by presenting the views of the more general behavior-analytic
verbal community as evident in the current professional literature and in professional
opinion.
Skinner on Probability
Skinner's views on the role of probability in behavior analysis are not the final word, but
his writings have probably had more influence than any others in the field. Thus, let us briefly
attempt to present what we take his position to be.
Skinner's discussions of probability have almost entirely to do with prediction, wherein
the goal of behavior analysis is to ascertain the probability of behavior (or response strength;
Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Skinner, 1953a, 1957b). This is seen in Skinner's writings in two
ways. First, perhaps Skinner's best known views have to do with statements that both
"probability" and the "rate of responding" are the basic datum for the science^of behavior
(Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Skinner, 1950,1953a, 1953b, 1957a, 1957b, 1963, 1966a, 1966b, 1974,
1978, pp. 113-126). This point is well illustrated in Skinner's rationale for choosing response rate
as the basis for estimating response probability:
Rate of responding appears to be the only datum that varies significantly and in the expected direction under
conditions which are relevant to the 'learning process'... It is no accident that rate of responding is successful as a
datum, because it is particularly appropriate to the fundamental task of a science of behavior... The business of a
science of behavior is to evaluate this probability [of response] and explore the conditions that determine it.
(Skinner, 1950, p. 198; see also Skinner, 1938, 1950, 1953a, 1953b, 1966a, 1978)
Skinner's interest in prediction is seen secondly in his linking of "probability" and "rate
of responding" with his definitions of basic behavioral principles (e.g., reinforcement). Here,
on occasion, he has defined the principles both in terms of response probability (cf. Skinner,
1953b, p. 83) and response rate (cf. Skinner, 1966b, p. 25). For example:
Among the conditions which alter rate of responding are some of the consequences of behavior.. .Any consequence
of behavior which is rewarding or, more technically, reinforcing increases the probability of further responding.
(1957b, p. 345)
In drawing these relationships between probability and rate, Skinner has at times
appeared to make them equivalent or interchangeable. But, according to him, this is not the
case, for he has stated elsewhere:
Rate of responding is by no means to be equated with probability of responding, as frequency theories of probability
and comparable problems in physics have shown. Many investigators prefer to treat rate of responding as a datum
in its own right. Eventually, however, the prediction and control of behavior call for an evaluation of the probability
that a response will be emitted. (Skinner, 1966b, p. 16)
This disclaimer aside, Skinner has nonetheless asserted that response rate is the best
estimate of response probability. For example, "Rate of responding is not a 'measure' of
probability, but it is the only appropriate datum in a formulation in these terms" (Skinner,
1950, p. 198). Or, "The basic datum in the analysis of behavior has the status of a probability.
The actual observed dependent variable is frequency of response" (Skinner, 1953a, p. 78).
Or, response probability is "the probability that a response will be emitted within a specified
116
interval, inferred from its observed frequency under comparable conditions" (Ferster &
Skinner, 1957, p. 731). Or, finally, as Skinner (1957b) has stated pragmatically, "Probability
of responding is a difficult datum. We may avoid controversial issues by turning at once to a
practial measure, the frequency with which a response is emitted" (p. 344).
In summary, Skinner's position on the relation between response probability and
response rate seems to be that although the two are not equivalent (cf. Skinner, 1950,1953a),
response probability can be inferred from response rate (cf. Ferster & Skinner, 1957;
Skinner, 1950, 1953a, 1966a, 1966b). Skinner's writings might be taken out of context to
suggest inconsistency here, but a careful reading of his work shows that his position is a
generally consistent and sufficiently qualified one of intuitive appeal. In any event, Skinner
remains clear that the concept of probability plays a central role in his science of behavior: "If we
are to predict behavior (and possibly to control it), we must deal with probability of response"
(Skinner, 1950, p. 198), and "The end datum in a theory of behavior, in short, is the probability of
action" (Skinner, 1947, p. 36).
Probability in Contemporary Behavior Analysis
The professional literature. Given the central role that probability plays in the analysis of
behavior, the contemporary behavior-analytic literature might be expected to provide further
guidance as to probability's meaning and measurement. Within the conceptual and theoretical
literatures, however, little more is available than Skinner's writings, aside from the few citations
and quotations presented earlier in this paper.
Within the experimental literature, however, discussions about reponse probability are
more frequent, which seems appropriate because this is where it enters into the "basic
datum" of the science. As befits that literature, the focus is not on conceptual analyses of
probability, but on the procedures for its quantitative and qualitative estimation. Here, as
elsewhere, though probability is approached in different and sometimes conflicting ways
such that its technical use is complex and, at times, inconsistent. Nonetheless, this literature
can be organized and clarified to some degree by ordering it on a continuum of four broad
classes of quantitativeness. In what follows, we describe these classes and discuss how they
relate to the three theories presented at the beginning of this paper.
In the first and most quantitative of these classes, response probability is estimated from
explicitly programmed probabilities of events (e.g., see McCarthy & Davison, 1979). For
example, if the probability of reinforcement is 0.75 for response X (RX) and 0.25 for response Y
(RY), then the probability of RX occurring might be estimated as 0.75, assuming that the only
two behaviors Y that can occur are RY and RX. This example is derived from the matching law
in a manner analogous to the derivation of probabilities from the classical theory of probability.
Second, response probabilities are sometimes represented by numbers obtained from
observed data, an approach that represents a high level of quantification and which is also
somewhat formalistic. Examples of this approach can be seen in (a) definitions of probability as
"absolute frequency or rate of occurrence" (Reynolds, 1975, p. 5) and "relative frequency of
response" (Catania, 1984, p. 35; Reynolds, 1975, p. 5); (b) graphic presentations of data in figures
whose Y axis is labelled "probability", yet whose figure captions refer to "relative frequency"
(e.g., Staddon, 1977, p. 126) or vice-versa (e.g., Zeiler, 1977, p. 227); and (c) the interresponse
time-per-opportunity (IRT/op) statistic (see Anger, 1956) and probabilities obtained (not
necessarily predicted) in choice studies (see Herrnstein, 1970). Most probability estimates that
fall into this class of quantitativeness are tied to the relative frequency theory.
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JOHNSON AND MORRIS
One problem that sometimes arises in this second approach deserves special mention:
Obtained frequencies are sometimes inappropriately equated with probabilities, as opposed
to being estimates of probabilities (e.g., see Stubbs & Dreyfus, 1981; Zeiler, 1986, p. 98).
According to Bernoulli's (1713/1899) theorem, which is a significant principle in relative
frequency theory, events tend to occur with relative frequencies proportional to their
probabilities, and thus it follows that frequency may be predicted from a given probability.
The converse, however, is not true: A probability may not be predicted exactly from a given
frequency. To say that a particular response will occur with 0.5 probability because that
response occurs on 50% of the trials is to equate probability and frequency. Probability may
be calculated from relative frequency or rate, but the two are not synonymous (cf.
Goldiamond, 1975).
A third approach to the application of probability in behavior analysis is one in which
the uncertainty inherent in probabilistic predictions is explicitly emphasized. For example,
probability is said to be " inferred from the relative frequency" (e.g., Holland & Skinner,
1961, p. 43; Rachlin, 1976, p. 65; see also Ferster, Culberston & Boren, 1975) or to be an
estimate of the likelihood of occurrence of a response (e.g., Schwartz, 1978, p. 48). The
important point here is that probability is not equated with an obtained frequency, but is said
to be inferred from it. Definitions of this type are closest to the relative frequency theory of
probability and are probably also closest to Skinner's views.
The fourth approach is the least quantitative and least formalistic and is seen more in the
related conceptual literature than in the experimental literature. Here, response probability
is equated with, for example, "response strength" (cf. Skinner, 1957a, pp. 22, 159; but see
Nevin 1974) and with "degree of belief or opinion" (Kantor, 1950, p. 218; Skinner, 1957a, p.
159). This approach is perhaps best applied in situations in which easily quantifiable data are
typically lacking (e.g., as in verbal behavior) and illustrates an application of the subjective
theory of probability.
In general, the probability of behavior may be derived in more than one way in behavior
analysis, but this may have to remain the case because no one approach may ever be able to
encompass all, or even most, of the usual applications (cf. Fine, 1973). In any event, as long as the
current use of probability encompasses more than one approach, behavior analysts should be
clear in describing the method(s) they employ in arriving at probability estimates so that
misapplications and inconsistencies can be avoided. To gain a better look at current use, let us
turn to contemporary professional opinion.
Professional opinion. Although we were able to derive four general approaches from the
experimental literature, these approaches, and the continuum along which they lie, may be a
function of our own idiosyncratic perspectives. In an effort to sample more broadly from the
field as a whole, we assessed contemporary professional opinion on this topic (though,
admittedly, formal assessment is subject to the personal views of those who construct the
assessment tool). To obtain these opinions, we sent questionnaires to the editorial staffs (editor,
executive editor, associate editors, governing boards, and board of editors) of the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB), The Behavior Analyst (TBA), The Journal of
Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA), and Behaviorism. The sample of respondents was
comprised of board members listed in the first issue of each journal in 1982. Of the 205 board
members, addresses were located for 204 (99.5%); six questionnaires were returned as
undeliverable. Out of a possible 199 respondents, four refrained from answering specific
questions, stating they were unfamiliar with the issues involved, leaving 92 (46.2%) completed
questionnaires. The answers of these respondents on each of the two questions are presented
below.
118
Question One. The first item on the questionnaire read: "What does the concept ot
probability mean to you?", for which respondents were asked to check one or more of the
following responses: (1) "strength of response," (2) "relative frequency of response," (3) "a
number obtained from observed data to predict future behavior," (4) "degree of belief or opinion
regarding the occurrences of a response," and/or (5) "other" with a request for specification.
Table 1 presents the percentage (and number) of the respondents by journal who checked each
response. The percentages in Table 1 were calculated by dividing the number of respondents
checking a particular response by the total number of respondents for a given journal and
multiplying by 100. For example, of the 21 respondents who were on the editorial board of
JEAB, 5 (24%) checked "strength of response."
Table 1
Number and Percent of Respondents Checking Each Response
by Journal Editorship
Journal
JEAB IAEA IRA Behaviorism Mult All

Psych Phil
Response (n=21) (n=25) (n=21) (n=9) (n=10) (n=5) (n=91)
Strength
% 24 20 43 50 10 80 32
(n) 5 5 9 5 1 4 29
Rel. Freq.
% 71 44 62 70 40 100 60
(n) 15 11 13 7 4 5 55
Number
% 38 52 43 50 40 80 47
(n) 8 13 9 5 4 4 43
Belief
% 29 16 19 40 50 60 29
(n) 6 4 4 4 5 3 26
Other
% 5 12 52 60 10 80 29
(n) 1 3 11 6 1 4 26
Note. See text for complete wording of responses
members of more than one editorial board.
For all journals combined, the response

frequent answer; 60% of the respondents
observed data to predict future behavior
respondents checked this definition. Finally
response" and about 29% checked "a degree
response." Interestingly, when these respon
described in the last section, the percentage
higher the item's level of quantitativeness.
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JOHNSON AND MORRIS
Twenty-nine percent of the respondents checked the "other" category or qualified the
previously mentioned categories. These responses fell into three classes. The first class included
restatements in terms of concepts such as likelihood, chance, tendency, and response potential,
with emphasis on the conditions, contexts, and circumstances controlling the occurrence of a
response. For example, one respondent stated that probability is a number inferred from relative
frequencies that describe the tendency for an organism to respond when exposed to similar
conditions in the future.
In the second class of "other" responses, a number of respondents emphasized that response
probability could be expressed as a ratio of target responses relative to opportunities to respond.
Again, some respondents went on to state that probability obtained in this manner could then be
used to aid in the prediction of future behavior, based on degree of situational similarity. One
respondent, for example, said that probability was a percentage figure derived from responses as
a function of opportunities to respond, and then applied to new settings as a function of their
degree of similarity.
The third class of "other" responses emphasized that, rather than attempting to define
probability in absolute terms, a more effective strategy would be to note the conditions under
which the verbal response "response probability"occurs.
The total percentages in Table 1 sum to more than 100% because respondent often checked
more than one answer. In fact, 51% of the respondents checked two or more responses, which
indicates that the term "response probability" not only means different things for different
people, but also that it means different things for the same person. These data are presented in
Table 2 where the percentage (and number) of respondents checking a particular response by
number of responses checked is listed. The percentages reported in this table were calculated by
dividing the number of times a particular response was checked in a given category (of number of
responses checked) by the total number of times that particular response was checked. For
example, of the questionnaires in which "strength of response" was checked (N = 29), three (10%)
of the respondents checked only strength. Overall, 49% of the respondents checked only one
response, 24% checked two, 14% checked three, 8% checked four, and 5% checked five.
Percentages in the total column in Table 2 were obtained by dividing the number of responses
checked in a particular category by the total number of responses checked. For instance, 29
(16%) of the total 179 responses checked were to "strength of response."
Question Two. The second question read: "Is 'probability of response' a useful concept in
the analysis of behavior? Why or why not? In what way is it useful? In what way is it not?"
Seventy-one percent of the respondents said the concept was both useful in behavior analysis,
17% said that it was not, and 12% said that the concept was both useful and not useful (see Table
3). Differential responding as a function of membership on a particular editorial board was not
significant (x2, df=6.16; P>10).
For those respondents who stated that the concept is useful, two reasons were most
frequently given. First, many respondents stated that the term was useful in the sense that it is a
convenient and meaningful summary term (e.g., for response strength, empirical data, or both).
Second, many respondents stated that the concept bridges the gap between description and
prediction, and thus is useful because it touches on the basic issue of whether or not behavior will
occur.
In the answers asserting that probability was not useful, two major themes emerged. Th
first was related to the ambiguity associated with the variety of connotations and definitions
the concept. One respondent, for example, stated that although the strict connotations of th
term are mathematical, probability is not useful in behavior analysis because of the term's ma
120
Table 2
Number and Percent of Responses in Each Category by
Number of Responses Checked
Number of Responses Checked

1 2 3 ~4~~ 5 Total
Response 49% 24% 14% 8% 5% (n=179)
Strength
% 10 17 31 24 17 16
(n) 3 5 9 7 5 29
Rel. Freq.
% 40 20 18 13 31
(n) 22 11 10 7 55
Number
% 28 23 21 16 12 24
(n) 12 10 9 7 5 43
Belief
% 12 27 15 27 19 14
(n) 3 7 4 7 5 26
Other
% 19 35 27 0 20 14
(n) 5 9 7 0 5 26
Note. See text for complete wording of responses.
Table 3
Number and Percent of Useful/Not Useful Responses to
Question Two by Journal Editorship
Journal
JEAfi IAEA ISA Behaviorism Mult All

Psych Phil
Response (n=18) (n=25) (n=21) (n=ll) (n=10) (n=5) (n=90)
Useful
% 78 76 67 55 70 80 71
(n) 14 19 14 6 7 4 64
Not Useful
% 11 16 19 36 10 0 17
(n) 2 4 4 4 1 0 15
Both Useful &
Not Useful
% 11 8 14 9 20 20 12
(n) 2 2 3 1 2 1 11
Note. See text for complete wording of quest

members of more than one editorial board.
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JOHNSON AND MORRIS
different connotationss, which lead to "its habitual misuse in EAB."

The second reason why probability was said not to be useful was that a "probability" cannot,
in practice, be observed. As one respondent commented, "It is a statistical term, which if
consistently used, would take away the emphasis on observable behaviors." Other respondents
emphasized that the probability does not convey the specificity of behavior or the importance of
environmental variables, and further that "the term implies a great deal of quantifiability which
is characteristically inaccurate."
Of those respondents who stated that probability was both useful and not useful, most said
that probability was useful only if it is operationally and /or empirically defined and found to be
of functional value, otherwise it is not useful because it is "conceptually confusing" and
"inexact." One respondent said that probability was "useful when it refers to rate as the measure,
but not useful when it refers to 'number of successes/number possible,' but number possible is
inexactly measured." Another respondent stated: " 'Probability of response' is useful if it is
restricted to observed frequencies, and not useful if it can be measured by a number of different
response measures (i.e., duration, latency, % of time, % of trials, etc.)?then it is a variable
equivalent to Hull's response strength."
Overall, these data illustrate that the use of probability in behavior analysis depends on the
experimental or conceptual approaches taken by particular scientists. Even among those with
presumably similar approaches to a subject matter (e.g., the JEAB board of editors), a great deal
of variation exists with respect to the appropriate conditions under which the term should be
employed. Admittedly, the survey did not distinguish between how "probability" was used and
how it ought to be used, but the variability obtained seems unlikely due to that alone.
Comments on Probability in Behavior Analysis
Although the purpose of this paper is primarily to describe how probability is spoken of in
behavior analysis, some summative and evaluative comments seem warranted as we near the
conclusion. We offer these comments, first, because several issues in the behavior-analytic
material seem especially deserving to mention and, second, because we hope that our comments
might set the occasion for others to provide a more thorough treatment of the topic.
First, the empirical fact is that response rate is not always the best measure of response
probability, as several studies have shown (see e.g., Blough, 1963; Hurwitz, 1957; cf. Ray &
Sidman, 1970). For instance, reponse probability can sometimes be more accurately estimated
by analyzing responses in terms of their sequential dependencies or conditional probabilities
(see, e.g., Frick & Miller, 1951).
Second, even if response rate alone were the best measure of response probability, how rate
translates into probability is not clear. Over forty years ago, Skinner (1944) criticized Hull (1943)
for attempting to calculate "habit strength" when no techniques were available for making the
necessary conversions from the observed data to the more general concept?a point that seems
directly pertinent to calculating the probability on the basis of a response rate: "Despite
numerous attempts, rate of responding has yet to be converted in a general and rigorous way into
a probability" (Dews, 1981, p. 116; see also Goldiamond, 1977; Verplanck, 1954). Moreover,
straightforward relative frequency definitions of probability (e.g., see Bush & Mosteller, 1955)
are, as Skinner (1956) has noted, "seldom applicable to behavior outside the laboratory, where
trials satisfying (Bush & Mosteller') definition are almost unknown" (p. 103). This general
problem is compounded when, for example, response rate (but not response probability) is taken
to be the appropriate measure in discrete trial procedures (see e.g., Appel & Dykstra, 1977). How
these "measures" of behavior are to be compared is not clear.
122
Third, when response rate is taken as the appropriate form of measurement, it is sometimes
also taken to be the appropriate unit of analysis (cf. Skinner, 1938, 1953b, 1974). But, the
appropriate unit of analysis for the study of behavior is not something that can or should be
determined a priori (see Thompson & Zeiler, 1986).
Fourth, although rate may sometimes be the most appropriate estimate of probability, a
rate of measure of behavior alone will often not be sufficient for ascertaining response
probability, particularly in complex situations (cf. Baer, 1986; Frick & Miller, 1951). For
instance, if rate were the proper estimate of probability, then equal rates of responding would
presumably yield equal response probabilities. But, the assumption that an absolute increase or
decrease in responses per minute produces equivalent changes in response probability seems
untenable. Such analyses will likely have difficulty producing accurate predictions of response
probability across situations, much less a complete analysis of "the behavior of organisms" (cf.
Boring, 1920; Kantor, 1950). Interestingly, in reviewing Skinner's (1957) Verbal Behavior,
Chomsky (1959, p. 35), raised just this point about the insufficiency of rate in deriving
probabilities for predicting behavior. We should note, though, that Skinner has not been
insensitive to these issues, and has commented that other measures of behavior may be necessary
on occasion as well. For instance, he has noted that the strength or probability of verbal behavior
will often have to be based on evidence other than overall frequency?for instance, energy level,
pitch level, speed and delay of emission (Skinner, 1957, p. 22; see also MacCorquodale, 1970, p.
88).
Fifth, and finally, even if other measures of responding were added to that of rate, the proper
estimation of response probability is still likely to be compromised by not taking into account
both the events maintaining behavior (e.g., types of behavioral consequences) and the current
contextual conditions of which those events are a function. Without reference to the latter
conditions, no one measure of behavior is likely to offer a sufficient probabilistic account (cf.
Kantor, 1950) because the physical characteristics (e.g., rate) of a response are less relevant to
understanding behavior (though not unimportant) than are the circumstances under which that
behavior occurs.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to describe probability in terms of how it is spoken in
behavior analysis, some means by which probability enters into the analysis of behavior, and a
few of the problems it entails?all in order to facilitate effective action, both experimentally and
conceptually. In other words, the major reason to be interested in probability is to aid in the
description, prediction, and control of behavior, whether it be the behavior of coins, dice, atoms,
particle waves, or, in the present case, the behavior of organisms.
As we have found, however, probability has a wide variety of referents in its theoretical and
conceptual basis and in its applications within science in general, thereby making the speaking of
probability a problem. Even at the most fundamental theoretical level, complications arise in
that the historical origins of probability are rooted in such disparate sources as the simple
calculations of chance (cf. Todhunter, 1865/1965) and complex philosophical attempts to justify
"nonrational logic" (e.g., indeterminism) (cf. Nisbet, 1926; Poincare, 1921). Thus, attempts to
find a unitary theoretical approach to probability (e.g., Reichenbach, 1938, 1949; VonMises,
1928/1957) seem unlikely to succeed (cf., Mehlberg, 1961).
As for the field of behavior analysis, probability clearly plays an important role in defining
the subject matter and its basic principles. But, as in the other sciences, problems have arisen with
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JOHNSON AND MORRIS
respect to specifying units of measurement, the dependent variables to be measured and their
classes, the relevant stimulus and contextual conditions, and the relative importance of each of
these factors. Moreover, probability is sometimes erroneously identified with the simple
occurrence of responses (e.g., the proper estimate of response probability is response rate or
relative frequency of response). A particular response measure, however, should never be
isolated from theee conditions under which it occurs. Rate interpretations of response
probability, in particular, lend themselves to relatively strong statements about response
probability, perhaps because of their highly quantified nature, and hence these interpretations
can unfortunately lead to ignoring other relevant information useful in predicting response
probability. Any situation involving the application of probability involves interactions among a
variety of relevant factors (Kantor, 1950), no one of which can be completely, or even
independently, separated from the others.
If the concept of probability does not enhance the description, prediction, and control of
behavior, then perhaps its role in the analysis of behavior should be re-evaluated. In other words,
to the extent that the speaking of probability does not promote effective action, then it, like any
other scientific term, concept, or theory, should be carefully scrutinized. The outcome of such re
evaluation may yield the following.
First, perhaps nothing should be done. Perhaps the use of probability in behavior analysis
does not restrict description, prediction, and control?at least to any appreciable degree. The
foregoing analysis, however suggests otherwise. Second, perhaps "probability" should be
restricted to clearly defined occasions where its quantitative implications are unambiguous and
where it contributes directly to description, prediction, and control. In other words, perhaps the
term should be operationally defined in the logical positivist fashiion. Third, perhaps behavior
analysts should resist the language of probability altogether, and speak more precisely about the
actual events of interest and their measurement. For instance, instead of speaking of response
probability and perhaps behavior analysts should simplify the response and its unit of
measurement, and hence, for example, speak specifically about the "rate of keypecking,"
"duration of lever press," and "IRT/opportunity." The closer the descriptions of behavior are to
the data, the better.
In restricting or resisting the language of probability, however, behavior analysis may lose a
general summary term of some usefulness. Probabilities deal with the estimation of future
behavior which seems so fundamental to so much of what is important in psychology (see e.g.,
habit strength, potentiality, disposition, propensity, etc.)?prediction is an important part of the
science of behavior. Thus instead of restricting or resisting the use of the term probability,
perhaps a new term might be selected. One such candidate is "propensity" (Popper, 1959, 1962,
1982). In describing propensity, Popper has (1962) pointed out:
Every experimental arrangement is liable to produce, if we repeat the experiment very often, a sequence with
frequencies which depend upon this particular experimental arrangement. These virtual frequencies may be called
probabilities. But since the probabilities turn out to depend upon the experimental arrangement, they may be
looked upon as properties of this arrangement. They characterize the disposition, or the propensity, of the
experimental arrangement to give rise to certain characteristic frequencies when the experiment is often repeated.
(p. 67)
"Propensity," then, makes clear the importance of context in affecting the outcomes that
probabilities are taken to predict, whether of the behavior of coin tosses or organisms. With
respect to the behavior of coins, for example, a biased coin will produce different outcomes
depending on the strength of the gravitational field in which it is tossed. In a weak
124
gravitational field, the bias will have little effect; in a strong gravitational field, the bias will
be enhanced. Likewise, with respect to the behavior of organisms, a propensity
interpretation emphasizes the contextual nature of behavior and takes probability to be a
characteristic of the experimental arrangement as a whole, not just a property of a sequence
of events without reference to other conditions. In this sense, a propensity interpretation is
compatible with an integrated-field approach to probability (cf. Kantor, 1950).
In any event, and in closing, scientific behavior is a function of the same processes and
variables that influence many other types of human behavior, and hence may occasionally be
distorted and inconsistent, as is other behavior, due to extraneous sources of multiple
control (Hineline, 1980; Kantor, 1953; Moore, 1981; Skinner, 1957 pp. 418-431; see also
Schrodinger, 1935/1957). When that occurs, effective scientific action is compromised.
Special care is required to keep scientific behavior clear and consistent (Observer, 1981;
Skinner, 1957, p. 420)). The speaking of "probability" in behavior analysis is no different. In
keeping it uncompromised: "There is only one rule, namely: that the descriptions should fit the
events being described'' (Kantor, 1941, p. 48).
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When Speaking of Probability in Behavior Analysis

Author(s): Lisa M. Johnson and Edward K. Morris

WHEN SPEAKING OF PROBABILITY IN

The concept of probability is fundamental to a broad and diverse range of scientif

The Classical Theory of Probability

testing, a "relative frequency" model based on repeated observations is usually employed?the

The Relative Frequency Theory

The Subjective Theory of Probability

THE CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY IN BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

As described previously, the concept of probability originated in mathematics, physics,

probability is spoken of in contemporary behavior analysis. We do so, first, by describing

Probability in Contemporary Behavior Analysis

JEAB IAEA IRA Behaviorism Mult All

For all journals combined, the response

Number of Responses Checked

Note. See text for complete wording of responses.

JEAfi IAEA ISA Behaviorism Mult All

Note. See text for complete wording of quest

different connotationss, which lead to "its habitual misuse in EAB."

Comments on Probability in Behavior Analysis

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Anscombe, FJ. (1961). Bayesian statistics. American Statistician, 15, 21-24.

Chomsky, N. (1959). Verbal behavior by B.F. Skinner. Language, 35, 26-58.

Gilles, D.A. (1973). An objective theory of probability. London: Methuen.

Hull, C.L. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Nisbet, R. H. (1926). The foundations of probability. Mind, 35, 1-27.

Poincare, H. (1921). 77**? foundations of science. New York: Science press.

Popper, K.R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.

Skinner, B.F. (1957a). Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

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