G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-
appellants, 
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102,
Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for
recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that
his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of
the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating
the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and
well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF
COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE
IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE
WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.
(page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such
indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.

1
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice
Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent
citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our
own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been
fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it
might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If
we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons
and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for
lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up
a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless
and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of

2
 responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so
that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia
that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited,
but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act.
Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification,
"not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text
of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the
term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to
said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a
new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice
Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations
of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it
is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article
2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of
Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to

3
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with
their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is
that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

4
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH,
BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION
AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution
dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa
Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said
carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her
minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the
following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and
existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza
Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former appears to be
the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to
plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant
SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. . .
.
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty as security
guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed
NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or
SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring negligence of
the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury,
while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid
the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No.
Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro
Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not
state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners'
filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua
non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).

5
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant
Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the
Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and
through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and
SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in
shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere
allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing
such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one
for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from
those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the verified
complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down by
the Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p.
110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but
also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist
that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their
negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own
liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
The civil action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code,
to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may
be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently
of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed
with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil

6
action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being
purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard. And since
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private
respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents
evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private
respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the
shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action
(Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of
the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover
damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act
of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano
v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein
the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as
"voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed
pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder

7
are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil.
94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries
but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the
Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not
liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established that the
instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee
(Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore
erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of
attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that the
allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action
exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218
SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of
the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that
Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on
duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does
not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless
and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the
private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and
whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each
party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial
on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses
that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained
an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as
well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-
89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, 
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA
SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built
through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang,
Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed,
which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and
directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the
same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the
trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an
order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-
82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the
disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of
the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court
which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the
questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in
its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-
748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to
be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title
or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right
side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right
portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of
its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also

9
 constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of
the said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower
portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole
or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed
by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that
of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant,
and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after
year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also
constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto
from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain
water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess
water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water conductors,
contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and
will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always
in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are
exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be
the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any
person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a
lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the
use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the
injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is
privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals
of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation
supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-
existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that
"the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO
UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting
fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores,

10
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the
criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be
conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order
of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel
R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This
decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.

11
G.R. No. L-4977             March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

CARSON, J.:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father,
his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city
of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila,
known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for
vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the
boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and
it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open
space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they
found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be
discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have
in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to
take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home.
After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the
home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into
an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for
a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match
to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his
hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his
wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how
long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident, during
the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used
in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the
time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car
line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a
considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as detective or
worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and
walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is
undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed
about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found.
There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's premises,
although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports.
Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after
his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a
salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both
mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the evidence of record,
and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's
allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property of the

12
defendant, or that they had come from its possession and control, and that the company or some of its employees left
them exposed on its premises at the point where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on the rule of law
which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that
plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his
allegations in this regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the McKinley
extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's
premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the company has a
storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of
electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company as a
sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting
charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the
absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where
they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was
either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the
evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its
employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the
ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this
may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees
either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including
children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that
young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which these conclusions are
based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the company's well and on its McKinley extension was
done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was
regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and immediately
under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record
that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this
point, and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his
own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged
contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively
employed on work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should have
introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it
was the owner of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the
agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts
the maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as
those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the
absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the
court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its property, and were left where they
were found by the company or some of its employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article
1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by
those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live
with them.
xxx             xxx             xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx             xxx             xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of
explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.

13
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do
not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles, and since we agree with this
view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous
to those raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be
involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United
States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must
establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the application of
these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where
they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's
premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut
open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's
premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident,
which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where
they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries
sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the
United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant
of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's
premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come,
and there found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which when
carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous
machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be
exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a railroad
company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of
amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on
which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere
strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from
responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of
an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in
regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he
must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several state
courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and
disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able
decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon
for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of
children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an
invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been
taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances
that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the courts in Connecticut
and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been questioned in
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.

14
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and approving the doctrine laid
down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord
with that announced in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a
unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered the
doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many of the
adjudged cases, both English and American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case
of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of
age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's
express permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose
existence he had no knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises without any fence around it or
anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of
passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety
and protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no
obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved to the facts in that case,
because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's contention
that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held
liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case now before us, they
require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in
the vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes
merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to
visit its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path
skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young, would often
assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and playing around the shaft house
in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children would have
suggested that they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except
when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be
burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the
plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to
whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited with flesh, in his
own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in
his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such
act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference,"
said Lord Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of his
instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference, in reason we may
observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of this village to visit the defendant's
coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to
permit them, without objection or warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the
case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note,
well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap
thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it
and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded
on his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it
by instincts equally strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich.,
507), said that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and others who are
chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and
which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they
should expect that liberty to be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit the premises of
another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise
when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where
they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it;
and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children,
the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)

15
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad Co. vs.
Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction
than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn
by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the
public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the
young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which
comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children
are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or
ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his
premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows
or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to
attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed
upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To
hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim
of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what
will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent
their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United
States all private property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal
rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to
infants of very tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we lived to
hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys and
girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence of the parent could
in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to recover in such cases — a point which we neither discuss
nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or
permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault
on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the
negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating
cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention
of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion
which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can
not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have
thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs.
Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury
resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard
to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the
reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of
responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of
age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly
different question whether such youth can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open
the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an
explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down
in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo"
and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor
judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the
nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his
denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The
series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present,
admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode
it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the

16
contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had
reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was
within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected
from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred;
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly,
and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be
held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate
the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in
the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will
necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such
ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him.
But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an
examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising
certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are of much
practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to
become responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal
Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally
responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an
extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain circumstances,
choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a
guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and females of 12 are
capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to
which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution
which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must
be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17
rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he can
not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be against
himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)
According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be against
himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law touching contributory
negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain,
and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in
the case at bar the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in point.
In that case the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a source of obligation
when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury
produced should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the
same, although such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the
immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or negligence is not sufficient
without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his Jurisprudencia del Codigo
Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence
gives rise to an obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if

17
 the damage caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make
good upon the latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is
shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured party himself.
And again —
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is apparent
that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and
March 18, July, and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail
the necessary points of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be
charged with the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or omission and the
damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is
necessary that the damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully;
"necessarily presupposing a legal ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. (Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo
Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this court in the
maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are many
cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate
cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in
Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to be given the
negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of
other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of
proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were
the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate
causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident
under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving
occasion for damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of
the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which
came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that
would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which
resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed
to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's premises the
detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect between the negligent act or
omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the
explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very
tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known fact
admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of
plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we
neither discuss nor decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below, without
costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated,
where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed
without day. So ordered.

18
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of
the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO,
DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR.,
RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO
DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David
Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually
helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close
their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying
said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the
goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family
in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being
the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino
who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose
Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding
of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order
the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted
municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court
erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor
which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the
imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged
the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages,
P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are
acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to
complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal
liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:

19
 xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed,
not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing
(sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants
suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING
PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT
SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO
UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN
HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS
TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER
HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE
CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER
CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO.
13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring
the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and
as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from
the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to
the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the
criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil.
748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra
Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457).
In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge
against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other
instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the
person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But
the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason
that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does
not allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that
the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is
entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into
trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by
the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111,
Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the
instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the
properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no

20
 showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action,
the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of
Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no
implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
(Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other
words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as
a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid
down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and,
where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising
from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused,
However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal
negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the
manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation
or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De
Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and,
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the
filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz
Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which
Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil
liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an
accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or
legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of
malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds
in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper

21
 accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and
in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be
proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due
process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional
presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a
keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of
the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused
was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the
defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained
in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the
premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the
removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken
out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods
were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to
the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the
demolished stall have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the
order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to
the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not
present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had
them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to
take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted
away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per
se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the
premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that
the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and
had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of
Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and
members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the
store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to
the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive
law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and
simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a
conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt,
but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with
the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of
the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting
the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil
action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the

22
 unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict,
or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code
should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act
or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved
in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the
reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable
doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and
separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no
pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the
accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and
separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and
oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is
entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or
injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of
acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case
the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same
criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil
action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive
permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding
damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the
criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which
civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled
for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the
justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not
possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a
separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,
and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from
each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party...
it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp.
45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced
or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a
judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

23
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory.The
employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for
a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 2000[2] and
the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first
Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED.[4]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum
of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a
month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00
as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum,
and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00
as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years
at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00
to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount
of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00
as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income,
and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss
earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00
for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual
damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual
damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00
as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount
of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of
the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules
of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and
provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice
of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29,
1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its

24
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8,
1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent
People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On
March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss.[6] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability
as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the
criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of
appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil
liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to
the instant case.[8]
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the
judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed
the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the
place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the
accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy. [9] Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground
that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. [10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also
appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of
conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
[11]

Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio,
dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.[12]
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they
surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does
so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in
absentiaproceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he
nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule
124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x[14]

25
 The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or
are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. [15] While at large, they cannot seek relief
from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.[16]

Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case

As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus,
he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some
general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests
lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
x x x x x x x x x
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal
action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it
prior to the criminal action.[18] Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[20] 33,[21]34[22]and 2176[23] of the
Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are
some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution,
since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not
extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se
(civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a
civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may
-- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.[25]

26
 This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the
outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion --
including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely
against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not
interpose an appeal.[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because
an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.[28] Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees
to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own
behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the
judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief[29] filed with the CA and from its
Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. [32] This is the risk involved when
the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.[33] Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or
modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus
follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become
subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by
jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final. [35] Having been a fugitive
from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final
and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc[36] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not
one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may
waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for
decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a position to
speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render
the judgment nugatory at his option.[38] Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee;
that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now
final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court
in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., [41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay v. Adil[43] do not apply to the present case,
because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their
employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed
rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic
tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.

27
 Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of
their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. [44] The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability --
Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable. [45] Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction
should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.[46] In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses
mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat
a final judgment rendered by a competent court.[48] By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating
the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated
from that of the employee.[49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1)
they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3)
that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the
latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based on
the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in
the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set
for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its
liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of
the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the proper
sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-
employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A
finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the
accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is
the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters
insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary
liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. [53] It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of
law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities
that can be discarded.[56] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. [57] In these times when court dockets are
clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the
orderly disposition of those cases.[58]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.[59]
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC;
thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not
denied its day in court.[60] In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived
petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only after
proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there
exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee

28
has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The
proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila,
a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident
in San Juan, La Union x x x.[61] Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the
accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

29
G.R. No. 74041               July 29, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused, 
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
YAP, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on February 17, 1986,
convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a ,Seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a
cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less.1
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio Ligon, was never
apprehended and is still at large.
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused, Fernando Gabat, was riding
in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The
Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the
driver, in the front seat by the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma
Street before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red.
While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales
for short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes.
While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly
moved forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and immediately
thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted, however, that
as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip
and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was
treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. He was behind the
Kombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to the
right").2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo
pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta
near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing
the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito
Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately
blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers,
Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion,
Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain
Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat.4The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police
District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. The
written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan. 5 Payuan
also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released
early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further
investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated December 6, 1983 charging
him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.7 Six months later, however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos
filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide.8 He filed the latter
information on the basis of a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo 9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and
Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23, 1983. 10These affidavits were already
prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr.
Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic,
bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, that Gabat grabbed
the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter
falling down and hitting the pavement. In its decision, the trial court summarized the testimony of Castillo as follows: At
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of October 23, 1983, Castillo was then driving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far
Eastern University, and at the intersection of Lerma and Quezon Boulevard, the traffic light changed from green to red.
The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi was right behind a Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the
traffic light to change to green, Castillo Idly watched the Volkswagen Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside
the driver, signal to a cigarette vendor. The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of the Kombi. While
Rosales was handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When the Kombi moved forward,
Gabat suddenly grabbed the cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran beside the Kombi and was able
to hold on to the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand. While Rosales was clinging to the windowsill, with

30
both feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely
following the Kombi, then saw Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell face down
on Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12
The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as follows: On the date and time in question,
Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi
had to stop at the intersection of Lerma Street and Quezon Boulevard when the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat,
who wanted to buy cigarettes, called a cigarette vendor who approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two
sticks of cigarettes and handed to the cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to change the P5.00 big, Rosales
placed his cigarette box containing assorted cigarettes on the windowsill of the front door of the Kombi between the arm
of Gabat and the window frame. Suddenly, the traffic light changed from red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the
vehicle forward, heedless of the transaction between Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle sped onward, the
cigarette box which was squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales
then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw the
cigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the right in order that Rosales could get off
at the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it could not be done because of the moving vehicular
traffic. Then, while the vehicle slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the
sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on the window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly
shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of
Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding along Dewey
Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought
to police headquarters, but neither of them executed any written statement.13
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took
or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the
Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the
right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already
been able to balance himself on the stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the
cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket the
change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their
trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to
change a peso bin given by a customer.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless it is
shows that the findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failed to consider certain material facts and
circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at bar, a careful review of the record shows that certain
material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result
of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to the court a quo,
"other than to see that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from doubt
because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower
in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.14Judicial notice may
also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying
approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly
what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which must be taken
into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor
during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a
distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His
testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the
windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering that this occurrence happened in just
a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening,15 Castillo did not mention that he saw
Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, although the police report prepared by the
investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same date, stated that when the traffic signal changed to green and
the driver stepped on the gas, the cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger Gabat
and "instantly the former clung to the door and was dragged at a distance while at the same time the latter punched the
vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus showing that during the police investigation Castillo must
have given a statement to the police which indicated that Gabat did something to cause Rosales to fall from the
Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit prepared by the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to by Castillo
before the Assistant City Fiscal on January 17, 1984 that this vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit was
made the basis for filing another information charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused
Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain
Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to
acquittal on reasonable doubt.

31
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt
of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence
is required in a civil action for damages.17 The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the
most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of
justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused.
The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different
from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the
part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil
liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence
establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer
civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to
buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat
(1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while
the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat
acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven facts
taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code20 for the damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. However, he is
hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs
of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses,
and P4,100.00 for funeral expenses. The alleged loss of income amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by
sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.

32
G.R. No. L-12191             October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.

FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila
Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the
province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the
company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to
ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from
his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the
steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise
with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a
distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio
Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform
begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped
off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train
the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single
light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially
to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it
was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to
the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The
testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of
the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the
platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he had
received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was
then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher
up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and
surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages
of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the
facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was
attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers
passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach
and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and
the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the
platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that
they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the
primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately
examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the
obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and
immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants,
imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not
to culpa contractual.

33
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this
distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7
Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive
and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any
legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of
the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon
employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not
bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were,
the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally — but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the
Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making
good the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant
of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful
servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and
direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he
is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by
the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the master
from liability for the latter's acts — on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa
says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission
which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who
exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess
for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby
performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by
reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage.
True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the
selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this
respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these
articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil.
rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for
the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after
citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the
American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of
the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it
is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of
article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa,
who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties
inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage
and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents,
when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere

34
presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care
in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in
the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these
relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in
character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general
duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify
the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract,
rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the
legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on
the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code
has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability
can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise
due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their
status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly
different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action
depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence — if he does not
his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it
is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his
pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his
servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the
burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case
of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and
that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p.
76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to the
negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious
that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the
contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means
of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of
agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one
delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its
destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract,
which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose
negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete
immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons
can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care
had been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral,
and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to
permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the
debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the
performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894;
November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action
arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a
defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those to
which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the
undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done by the negligent
acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants
has been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was not liable for the
damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that no evidence had been

35
adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any
knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant
for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of
defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp.
29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not
think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for the
personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which
defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the
automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the
driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the
court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the
injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The
express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent
acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law
creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the
presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort
rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs
shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the
practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant
was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared
that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant.
Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs
an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual
undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage
due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is
liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection
and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be
inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its
servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent
in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would have been a good
defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved
that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of contractual and
extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual
obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct
and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in
placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching
and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of
comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no
liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages
should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury
suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the contention,
that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this
doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the

36
experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of
person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept
its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury
whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence
(vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from
a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent
person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be
used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say
that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the
train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then
existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was
contributory negligence.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of
the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be
overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of
melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to
its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or
dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to
the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting
passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances
are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the
surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet
on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for
him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In
determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted
prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting
the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable
than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free
movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily
custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either
to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our
conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that
the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown
that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his
permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of
P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his
injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the
costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

37
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of
moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and
tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date
of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
"first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but
at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a
"better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said
Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it.
We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory
demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues
properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists
that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not
hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues
raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as
proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is
not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of
Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any
specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no
law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of
law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were
based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's
side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in
the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not
mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are
that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate
facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of
the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has
been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19
That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review
the questions of fact. 20

38
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its
judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But
petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said
respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class
ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under
its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for,
and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the
passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case
of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are
not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could
have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment
of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony,
see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga,
confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid
for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot
give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits
"A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued,
and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first
class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had
a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on
Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects.
We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that
affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from
prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to
be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from
all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point
would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the
Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial
court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that
seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an
airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees,
to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language;
that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air
carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral
evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals
predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok,
which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of
Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's

39
accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because,
as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from
Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at
Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is
planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or
bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in
the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the
latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as
defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour
of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to
the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the
plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class
accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's
employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments brought by
defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to
Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered
inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage
covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist
class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no
specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the
facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But
the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on
what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's
manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not
there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any,
was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of
bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air
France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has
been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made
by the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was
asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one
on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did
neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated —
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of
the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff
should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence
committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then
safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by
the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K."

40
appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr.
Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white
man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first
class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily
proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption
is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the
circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not
merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because
the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith".
But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso
from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat,
made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger
whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a
meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the
aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the
presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying
to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to
accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class"
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the
defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code
says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219
(10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And this,
because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part
of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a
right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand
payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this,
because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the
conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and
told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was
nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him
a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.1awphîl.nèt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said,
is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.

41
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me
and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist
class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to
note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I
went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my
notebook." He read it and translated it to me — because it was recorded in French — "First class passenger was forced to
go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your
Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First
class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is
predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best
evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence
was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment,
are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical
condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy
matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages — in
contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for
attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees
be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised — as it was here — should
not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00
as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these
amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good
sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness
thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote
to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.

42
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs.  MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late
NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27
April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late
Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al., which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the
EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the
platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming
in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro
Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-
claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a
demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August
1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and
Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.[1]
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed
decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and
Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death
of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his
death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[2]
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of
carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after
paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that
there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his
having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court
faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency
brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:

43
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL
COURT
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.[3]
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court by
holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common
carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on
the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented.The LRTA would add that the
appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis
because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed
created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling
Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA
and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public
policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. [4] The Civil Code,
governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of
the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons
with due regard for all circumstances.[5] Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it
not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be
in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and[8] by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to
still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9] In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on
how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption
would be that it has been at fault,[10] an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the
breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article
2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the
employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can
then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa

44
aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract.[16] Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is
concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x. This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he
must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a
juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18] It is an established rule that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.[19]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the
award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability.No costs.
SO ORDERED.

45
G.R. No. 147791             September 8, 2006
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO DATINGUINOO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the March 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46896, which
affirmed with modification the February 9, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case
No. R-82-2137, finding Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB) and Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) liable for damages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo
City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached their destination because their bus was rammed from
behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned
their knees to the seats in front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus and
extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical Center where the doctors diagnosed
their injuries to be as follows:
Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella
Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd
Lacerated wound, chin
Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3
Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher
Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg posterior aspect popliteal area and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with
severance of muscles. Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and antero-lateral
compartment of lower leg. Fracture, open comminuted, both tibial4
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo
Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who
were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and
CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees; (3)
that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave
danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5)
that they suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded
feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with justice, give respondents their
due, observe honesty and good faith which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they are entitled to
a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third-party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and
Insurance, Inc. (Phoenix).7
On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable for damages,
the dispositive portion of which, states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
In the Complaint –
1. In favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo, Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr., ordering said defendants,
jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees or a total of P89,254.43;
2. In addition, defendant Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines and defendant Espiridion
Payunan, Jr., shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher
and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rebecca Estrella;
3. On the counterclaim of BLTB Co. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo –
Dismissing the counterclaim;
4. On the crossclaim against Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and
Espiridion Payunan, Jr. –
Dismissing the crossclaim;

46
 5. On the counterclaim of Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) –
Dismissing the counterclaim;
6. On the crossclaim against BLTB –
Dismissing the crossclaim;
7. On the Third Party Complaint by Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines against
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Incorporated –
Dismissing the Third Party Complaint.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the safety of its passengers. It must carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is
injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents to
their destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage while its failure to rebut the presumption of
negligence made it liable to respondents for the breach.9
Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus from behind. Evidence showed
that CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time of the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised
the presumption that CDCP was negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of its employees which it failed to
rebut thus making it and its driver liable to respondents.10
Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the trial court, respondents moved that the decision be
reconsidered but was denied. Respondents elevated the case11 to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
trial court but modified the amount of damages, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated October 7, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
1. The interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages of P79,354.43 should commence to run from
the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the complaint on February 4, 1980;
2. Thirty (30) percent of the total amount recovered is hereby awarded as attorney's fees;
3. Defendants-appellants Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and
Espiridion Payunan, Jr. are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher the amount of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each as exemplary damages and P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to Rachel
Fletcher.
SO ORDERED.12
The Court of Appeals held that the actual or compensatory damage sought by respondents for the injuries they sustained
in the form of hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained. Accordingly, the 6% interest per annum should
commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the complaint and not from the date of
judgment. The Court of Appeals also awarded attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount recovered based on
the retainer agreement of the parties. The appellate court also held that respondents are entitled to exemplary and moral
damages. Finally, it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the claim of CDCP against Phoenix had already prescribed.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENTS BLTB AND/OR ITS
DRIVER WILFREDO DATINGUINOO SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HEREIN RESPONDENTS
FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE OR UNFOUNDED
DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LEGAL INTEREST TO RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENT PHOENIX LIABLE
UNDER ITS INSURANCE POLICY ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the
damages sustained by respondents; (2) whether the damages, attorney's fees and legal interest awarded by the CA are
excessive and unfounded; (3) whether CDCP can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix.
Petitioner contends that since it was made solidarily liable with BLTB for actual damages and attorney's fees in paragraph
1 of the trial court's decision, then it should no longer be held liable to pay the amounts stated in paragraph 2 of the same
decision. Petitioner claims that the liability for actual damages and attorney's fees is based on culpa contractual, thus,
only BLTB should be held liable. As regards paragraph 2 of the trial court's decision, petitioner claims that it is ambiguous
and arbitrary because the dispositive portion did not state the basis and nature of such award.

47
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly joined as a party. There may
be an action arising out of one incident where questions of fact are common to all. Thus, the cause of action based
on culpa aquiliana in the civil suit they filed against it was valid.
The petition lacks merit.
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.13 In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or
omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted
against the employer for an employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.14 In
the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual damages suffered by
respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was established that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of
the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the police investigator.
It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common
carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held, thus:
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff
was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an
accident. In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other
vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or
the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract
while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as
1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the
negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well
as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. x x x
xxxx
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against
the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it
was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be
liable on such causes of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover
twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both
the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally
liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.16 (Emphasis supplied)
In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint and several"
obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close that each of them must comply with or
demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation. In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation,17 we reiterated that
joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo,18 we held
that:
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present
action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable
for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it
is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons injured may sue all
of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are
jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort
was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are
jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might
exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement
generally operates to discharge all. x x x

48
 Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not
liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And
this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally.19
Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is ambiguous and arbitrary and
also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the body of the trial court's decision, it was clearly stated
that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr., are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
to respondent Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella.20 Moreover, there could be no double recovery because the
award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for actual damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner next claims that the damages, attorney's fees, and legal interest awarded by the Court of Appeals are
excessive.
Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.21 The award of moral damages in favor of
Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced since prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at
P50,000.00.22 While moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award
should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.23
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each. Exemplary
damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory damages.24 Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states
that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 25 In this case,
petitioner's driver was driving recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and
primary liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the selection and supervision of
its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,26 we held, thus:
ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be
proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. Exemplary Damages
are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations
Commission,27 that:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its
ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be
paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such
award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but
to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.28 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation as they may be
recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross
and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.29
Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the complaint, we held in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,30 that when an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages,31 subject to the following rules, to wit –
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance
of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest
due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under
and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per

49
 annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 32 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on February 9, 1993 when the trial court rendered judgment and
not on February 4, 1980 when the complaint was filed. This is because at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
amount of the damages to which plaintiffs may be entitled remains unliquidated and unknown, until it is definitely
ascertained, assessed and determined by the court and only upon presentation of proof thereon.33 From the time the
judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.
Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix, we affirm the findings of
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
As regards the liability of Phoenix, the court a quo correctly ruled that defendant-appellant CDCP's claim against
Phoenix already prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of P.D. 612, as amended, which provides:
Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this chapter shall, without any
unnecessary delay, present to the insurance company concerned a written notice of claim setting forth
the nature, extent and duration of the injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice
of claim must be filed within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed
waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought in proper cases,
with the Commissioner or Courts within one year from denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's
right of action shall prescribe. (As amended by PD 1814, BP 874.)34
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed within six months from the
date of the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six months from the date of the accident, its claim has
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46896 dated March
29, 2001, which modified the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is held jointly and severally liable to pay (1) actual damages in
the amount of P79,354.43; (2) moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each for Rachel Fletcher and Rebecca
Estrella; (3) exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each for Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher; and (4)
thirty percent (30%) of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees. The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this judgment. From the time this
Decision becomes final and executory and the judgment amount remains unsatisfied, the same shall earn interest at the
rate of 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

50
 LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., VS
GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and
R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION,

DECISION
  
MENDOZA, J.:
  
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled R&B Insurance Corporation v. Glodel Brokerage
Corporation and Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc., which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services,
Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of P1,896,789.62
representing the insurance indemnity which R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee,
Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia).
  
THE FACTS:
  
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment
of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the
vessel Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.
 
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the
subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its
delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
 
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas,
Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads
for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan,
however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes,
failed to deliver its cargo.
 
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes.Because of this
incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the
requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbiathe amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance
indemnity.
 
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of the
amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated to the right of the
consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss.[2]
 
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision [3] holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo
and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the plaintiff having established by preponderance of
evidence its claims against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the latter:
 
1.       To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P1,896,789.62 as actual
and compensatory damages, with interest from the date of complaint until fully
paid;

51
  2.      To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the amount equivalent to 10% of the
principal amount recovered as and for attorneys fees plus P1,500.00 per appearance in
Court;
3.      To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P22,427.18 as litigation
expenses.
WHEREAS, the defendant Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.s counterclaim for damages and
attorneys fees against plaintiff are hereby dismissed.
With costs against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
 
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision which reads in part:
Considering that appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to
appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be
paid by appellee Loadmasters.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED in that the appellee
Loadmasters is likewise held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the
insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been held liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation.
 Appellant Glodels appeal to absolve it from any liability is herein DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
 
Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court presenting the following
 
ISSUES
1. Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent Glodel in spite of the fact that the
latter respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it (Loadmasters)?
 
2. Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can petitioner Loadmasters
be legally considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel? [6]
To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters argues that it cannot be considered
an agent of Glodel because it never represented the latter in its dealings with the consignee. At any rate, it further
contends that Glodel has no recourse against it for its (Glodels) failure to file a cross-claim pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 
Glodel, in its Comment,[7] counters that Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-claim because the latter was grossly
negligent in the transportation of the subject cargo. With respect to Loadmasters claim that it is already estopped from
filing a cross-claim, Glodel insists that it can still do so even for the first time on appeal because there is no rule that
provides otherwise. Finally, Glodel argues that its relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter
(Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of delivering the merchandise. Thus, the diligence required in this case is
merely ordinary diligence or that of a good father of the family, not the extraordinary diligence required of common
carriers.
 
R&B Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have interposed a cross-claim against Loadmasters because it
was not prevented from presenting evidence to prove its position even without amending its Answer. As to the
relationship between Loadmasters and Glodel, it contends that a contract of agency existed between the two corporations.
[8]

 
Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so
that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or
securities.[9] Doubtless, R&B Insurance is subrogated to the rights of the insured to the extent of the amount it paid the
consignee under the marine insurance, as provided under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of,
the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the
person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover

52
 the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing
the loss or injury.
 
As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has the right to seek reimbursement from
either Loadmasters or Glodel or both for breach of contract and/or tort.
The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it
paid Columbia.
 
At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their
liability for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or
air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of
transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private
carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for
the general public.[10] The distinction is significant in the sense that the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract
of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.[11]
 
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel
was private in character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel.
 
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.[12]
 
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its
Memorandum,[13] it states that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering. It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by
this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., [14] a customs broker is also regarded
as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
 
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of
extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights. [15] This exacting standard imposed on
common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy
of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. [16] Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.[17] This presumption of fault or negligence,
however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.
 
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of
extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the
carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the
person who has a right to receive them.[18]
 
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to
R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
 
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or
R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is
liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
 
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

53
 Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix
Assurance Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc.[19]  where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of
a contractual relationship, to wit:
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao
Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The present action is based
on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging
to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the
rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal
and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Courts consistent
ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a liability for tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and
McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of service
but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging
to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and
Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to
establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied]
 
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
 
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
 x x x x
 
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck
driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be
made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering
the goods safely to the warehouse.
 
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in
eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[20] To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. [21] In this regard, Loadmasters
failed.
 
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters
would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. It should have
been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts
to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes.Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense
of force majeure is unavailing.
 
At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship between Glodel and
Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: By the contract of agency a person
binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or
authority of the latter. The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to
establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts
as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.[22]
 
Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties. Loadmasters never represented
Glodel. Neither was it ever authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that the basis for agency is
representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and
said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. On the part of the principal,
there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions, while on the part
of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it.[23] Such mutual intent is not obtaining in
this case.

54
  
What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the
total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not
relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the
damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in
the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals,[24]
 
X x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. [Emphasis supplied]
 
The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from Loadmasters, it having failed to file a cross-
claim against the latter.
 
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as the
latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial
sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a cross-claim against the
latter. Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of
R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.[25] Thus, a cross-
claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal.
 
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable
grounds. Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. [26] The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who
has been at fault or negligent.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED to read as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.
and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent R&B Insurance
Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and
ordering both parties to pay, jointly and severally, R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount
of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent
thereof for attorneys fees; and c] the amount of P22,427.18 for litigation expenses.
 
The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation against
petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

55
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA
DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs.  HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as
Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] dated March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and denying
their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death and
physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound
Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three
(3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers.
After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action,
no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December
17, 1998.[2]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file
a separate civil action.[3] They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons, prescription and
laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant
in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a separate action in this
case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no appeal
of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the
prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed.
According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four
(4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file
a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.[5]
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of the complaint as summons was served
through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department without mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi
delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.[6] The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners cause of action was
based on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more than
four (4) years after the vehicular accident.[7] As regards the improper service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its
ruling that the complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the choice or
mode of appeal.[8] The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if the
respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the
permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was brought within
the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.[9]
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal
will result in a judicial rejection of an existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of private respondents.
Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi
delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by
petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal
liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court to
exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil liability had
been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of prescription was in order. They point out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action

56
for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4) years should be
reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay
damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the
criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of Appeals via certiorari was improper as
petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other procedural
lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original
or certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names and addresses of
petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated September 14, 2002, while private respondents filed a Rejoinder[12] dated October
14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. [13] Such civil
liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages.
[14]
 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages
from the accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate
action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually
exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the institution of the
criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan,
did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action made in the
criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman.
Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising
from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same,
declaring that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years
from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners claim that the action
was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of
Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based
on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability
arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct

57
from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. [15] Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as
a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company[16] was decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La
Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff made an
express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted which conviction was affirmed by this
Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by the
trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus
company. The trial court dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the
filing of the action to enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily
liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of
indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead
allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in their
complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss[17] and motion for reconsideration[18] of the order of dismissal, insisting that
the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil
actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same
act or omission of the offender.[19] However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered
waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse
available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double
recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial court
instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be exempted
from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing substantial justice.
[20]
 We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment of
conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice.[21]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

58
G.R. No. 150157             January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners, 
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio
Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent
Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner
PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by
respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was
on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for
Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan,
Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the
jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila Central
University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred
to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89.
Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI
before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the identities of
the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the right
side where the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence
in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and
has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman,
Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She
narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month.
She went to her husband’s hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-
M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in
said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique
Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial
court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN 9 of the testimony of Donato
Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case
on the ground that he was already dead.

59
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of the testimonies of Donato
Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was the former
who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff
and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway
when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit
the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep.
In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the
Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them
and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also
overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to
the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus
so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of
plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question.
However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the
latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the
RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the
manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in
the operation of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and
PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay
plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the
materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court,
affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. They assign as
errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION
IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION
OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF
HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion
for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan,
Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting
petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries
attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.

60
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo
Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the
requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify;
(b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present
case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former
case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in
a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was
filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses
are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the
party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the
provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on
account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto,
it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. 26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even
offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case,
why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner
PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the
adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the
witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for
petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for
objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the
TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 28 admitted in evidence a TSN of
the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied due process. In
admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner
waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case
because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though
said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding
cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred
is more credible than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted
by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-
delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner
PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described motor
vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together
with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;

61
 "5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was
suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then
being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a
very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North
Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a consequence,
the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a
total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiff’s frail
physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the
medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as well as
bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio
Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of
existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic)
family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he was driving
bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed
while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accused-
appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on
reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a
civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding
that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this
second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this
case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether
it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there
is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility
arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

62
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of respondent’s.
Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning,
suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of
facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from the
general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner
Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the
version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of
who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another
jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was
testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this
Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he
should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would
be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement
and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should
be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the
collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was
given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day
difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan
having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of
Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the
unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention
in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in
question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep
should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on
the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was
running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening
process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the
supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that
it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience
and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures,

63
monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was
incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations
for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to
the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who
should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and
plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company policies on
safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from
negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the
recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in
the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting
its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of
its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company
regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to
them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should
behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is
not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made
responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner
PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth
in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular
supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to
do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and
regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually
informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages
representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep. 47 As regards the awards for moral and
exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as
moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award
of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced
to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

64
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution [1] dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner
Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an
accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in
the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which
can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7,
1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for
brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The
Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore
the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing
the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of
August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe that the accident was
caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal
case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator,
believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first
party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case.

The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-
shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal
case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the
proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.
They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-
delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya
further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to
avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of
dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether there is forum-
shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.

65
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal [5] that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless
the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the
same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of
the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. [8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or
more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought. [9] However, there is no forum-shopping
in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal
Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although
these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on
culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has
suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity)
expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can
be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed
the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to
file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and
the recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to
reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in
the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others.

66
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without
any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence.Also, the
offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising
from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action,
could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before
the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal
action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to
recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until
final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying
the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover
damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits
the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently

67
 The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case,
can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended
party to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.  As stated in Section 3 of
the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict
against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action
but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where the Court held that the
accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious
prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted
civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further
ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated
and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim
or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of
the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that any cause of action which could have
been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action. The
present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without
violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.  In most
cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another
case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons.First, the
accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused
from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to
deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of
dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the
decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil

68
Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code.  But
the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to
encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the
civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any
event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued
the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -x x x statutes regulating the procedure
of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999
and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

69