Legal Ethics - Case 5

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5377 June 15, 2006
VICTOR LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment 1 filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on November 16,
2000. Complainant alleged that respondents, both notaries public, falsified certain public documents.
The case has its roots in a complaint for annulment of title with damages 2 filed by Isaac Villegas against complainant with the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 5036. Respondent Calubaquib signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping3 of the complaint as notary public and entered the same as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book
No. CLXXII; Series of 1996. Complainant alleges that this document was falsified because according to the records of the National
Archives, the document entered as Doc. No. 182; Page 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996 in respondent Calubaquib’s notarial
register was an affidavit of one Daniel Malayao. 4
The trial court decided Civil Case No. 5036 in favor of complainant 5 and, as a result, the plaintiff there, through respondent
Calubaquib, appealed it to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55837.
On file with the records of this case is a special power of attorney6 dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac Villegas appointing
respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to "enter into a compromise agreement under such terms and conditions acceptable
to him" which was notarized by respondent Baliga and entered as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of
1996.7 Complainant alleged that this special power of attorney was also falsified because, according to respondent Baliga’s notarial
register, Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996 pertains to an affidavit of loss of one Pedro Telan, 8 dated
August 26, 1996.
In addition, on January 2, 1995, respondent Baliga filed a petition for reappointment as notary public for and in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, which was notarized by respondent Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08, Book
No. CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register Book No. CXXX was for the year 1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31,
Page No. 08 was a cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11, 1996.
In his answer,9 respondent Baliga admitted the incorrectness of the entries and simply attributed them to the inadvertence in good
faith of his secretary to whom he had left the task of entering all his notarial documents.
Respondent Calubaquib’s comment,10 however, contained a much lengthier account of the alleged events leading up to this case,
the bulk of which was meant to cast complainant and his motives in a sinister light. In a nutshell, he made it appear that the reason
for the complaint was that he (respondent) thwarted a fraudulent attempt by complainant to grab a parcel of land. He also stated that
complainant had filed a case for falsification of documents against him with the Ombudsman but it was dismissed.
In the end, however, he (like his co-respondent Baliga) admitted to the mistaken entries and also ascribed the same to his "legal
assistants." Similarly, by way of defense, he pointed out that the Notarial Law "provides that only contracts need to have their copies
included in the notarial records. It does not require affidavits, verifications or subscriptions of petitions which are mere allegations of
facts to be entered in the Notarial Register, despite widespread practice to the contrary."
Upon receipt of respondents’ comments, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In the course of the proceedings before the IBP, complainant alleged that respondent Calubaquib, with the help of respondent
Baliga and several other persons, was trying to deprive him (complainant) of a parcel of land he had bought from Isaac Villegas’
mother-in-law. According to complainant, respondent impersonated Villegas, who was in hiding due to several civil and criminal
cases pending against him, by forging his signature in all documents and pleadings related to the civil case filed against him
(complainant). He pointed to the incorrect notarial entries as proof of this falsification.
He presented in evidence a motion for withdrawal 11 filed in the Court of Appeals, apparently by Villegas, disavowing any involvement
in the case filed by respondent Calubaquib.
To further buttress his allegations of falsification, complainant pointed out that respondent Calubaquib seemed unable to physically
produce Villegas. For example, when the Ombudsman ordered him to produce Villegas, respondent Calubaquib merely presented
an affidavit12 supposedly executed by Villegas and sworn to before a "highly regarded [Department of Justice] official."
In the IBP’s report and recommendation,13 dated December 7, 2001, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found respondents
"liable for inexcusable negligence" and recommended the revocation of the commission of respondents Calubaquib and Baliga as
notaries public for two years from receipt of the final decision. Commissioner Maala’s report did not touch on complainant’s
allegations of forgery.
When the IBP resolved14 to adopt Commissioner Maala’s report and recommendation, both complainant 15 and respondent
Baliga16 filed motions for reconsideration17 with this Court. Respondent Calubaquib opposed 18complainant’s motion for
reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration, complainant assailed the penalty recommended by the IBP as grossly inadequate. Reiterating his
allegation of forgery, he attached documents bearing Villegas’ allegedly forged signature as well as documents with his supposed
real signature19 for comparison.
In his opposition/comment, respondent Calubaquib refuted complainant’s scathing accusations of fraud and abuse of his public
position, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent Baliga decried the penalty
imposed as disproportionate to the infraction he had committed.
The respondents having admitted responsibility for the notarial entries, the question now is whether these were the product of a
mere mistake or evidence of larger scheme to defraud complainant whose allegations, if true, are serious enough to merit the
disbarment of both respondents.
The missing link, as it were, between the admitted infractions of respondents and the nefarious machinations alleged by
complainant is whether or not the latter was able to prove that Villegas’ signature on the documents notarized by respondents was
in fact forged.
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation thereof is not
evidence.20 One who alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same.21 We find that complainant failed to discharge this burden.
Complainant alleged mainly that Villegas could not possibly have signed the documents in question because he was a fugitive from
justice, with "several civil and criminal cases pending against him." Assuming this allegation to be true, it proved nothing. The mere
fact that Villegas was a fugitive from justice did not preclude the possibility that he might have secretly met with his lawyer for
purposes of filing a suit. It would have been different had complainant presented evidence that Villegas was, at the time the
questioned documents were executed, definitely somewhere else. But the bare argument that Villegas’ being a fugitive rendered it
impossible for him to sign some documents was simply too nebulous to inspire belief.
As additional evidence, complainant presented, as attachments to his motion for reconsideration, a number of documents
purportedly bearing Villegas’ real signature, the latest of which was the motion to withdraw allegedly filed by Villegas himself.
However, the veracity of the last of those documents was vigorously contested by an affidavit also purportedly filed by Villegas. The
two documents, both notarized, effectively cancelled each other out, absent some other credible proof.
It is true that there were dissimilarities between the signatures purportedly belonging to Villegas and his genuine signature on
the conforme of the general power of attorney22 executed by his wife in favor of his mother-in-law. However, the fact of forgery
cannot be presumed simply because there are dissimilarities between the standard and the questioned signatures. 23 If complainant
was so sure the signatures were fake, he should have submitted them for expert analysis to the National Bureau of Investigation,
the Philippine National Police or some other handwriting expert. The records are bereft of any such analysis or even any attempt to
have the signatures examined.
Furthermore, all the documents on which the contested signature appeared were notarized. Notarial documents carry the
presumption of regularity. To contradict them, the evidence presented must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.24 Complainant’s uncorroborated theory of an entire conspiracy of lawyers and government officials beholden to
respondent Calubaquib did not constitute such evidence.
The forgery of Villegas’ signature having remained unproven, we can only hold respondents liable for their omissions that have
actually been proved.
In this respect, we find that the recommendations of IBP Commissioner Maala adopted by the IBP were supported by the evidence
on record, particularly the documents themselves as well as the respondents’ own admission.
In response, on the other hand, to respondents’ feeble attempts to deflect the blame from themselves and onto their staff, we call
their attention to Sections 245, 246 and 249(b) of the Notarial Law.25
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register. ― Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall
be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person
applying for it and paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. — The notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument,
the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him
for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as
part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a
consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or
pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission.—The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the
discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his
notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to
their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation. 26 Respondents, especially
Calubaquib, a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner," should have known better than to give us such a simple-minded
excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that
interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the
public, the courts and the administrative offices in general. 27
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity.28 Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties. 29
Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should have been acutely aware of their responsibilities. Respondents’
acts did not amount to mere simple and excusable negligence. Having failed to perform their sworn duty, respondents were squarely
in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 30 and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga are hereby found guilty
of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of their lawyer’s oath. They are both
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately, with a warning that another infraction shall be
dealt with more severely.
Their present commissions as notaries public, if any, are hereby REVOKED, with DISQUALIFICATION from reappointment as
notaries public for a period of two years.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga, and
copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator and Office of the Bar Confidant for
dissemination to all courts nationwide.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 2984 August 31, 2007
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by
Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years.
The antecedent facts that led to Mejia’s disbarment are as follows.
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative
offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to
Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with
the registration of title of Bernardo to another property in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P,
par. 51, complainant’s affidavit dates October 4, 1989);
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo’s favor
(Annex Q, par. 52, id.);
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the
amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded. 1
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and hereby
imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidant’s Office, and
notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the
Courts concerned of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme
Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the
practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition. 2
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice
will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court
will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement.3
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession.1avvphi1 Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejia’s
name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for
reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a
legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a
religious organization and named it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind."
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of
disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that
Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy
of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he
has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its
duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law. 4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484 (A) March 17, 2000

(formerly OCA-IPI No. 99-779-RTJ)
JOSELITO RALLOS, JOSEFINA RALLOS VALLAR, SIMON RALLOS representing his deceased father CARLOS RALLOS,
TERESITA RALLOS YAP, and JOSELITO RALLOS, complainants,
vs.
Judge IRENEO LEE GAKO JR., RTC, Branch 5, Cebu City, respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484 March 17, 2000

(formerly OCA-IPI No. 99-779-RTJ)
Executive Secretary RONALDO B. ZAMORA, complainant,

vs.
Judge IRENEO LEE GAKO JR., RTC, Branch 5, Cebu City, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Partiality and dishonesty have no room in the administration of justice, for they contradict its very essence. Indeed, like Caesar's
wife, a judge must not only be pure, but must also be beyond suspicion.
The Case
Two administrative cases were filed against Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5. Filed by
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, the first is a Letter-Complaint charging him with ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
authority. Allegedly, respondent ordered the release of 25,000 sacks of imported rice to the claimants, notwithstanding the pendency
of seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Bureau of Customs.
The second was an Administrative Complaint filed by Joselito Rallos, Simon Rallos, Josefina Rallos Vallar and Teresita Rallos Yap.
They assailed the respondent's Order dated March 15, 1999, which had falsely stated that complainants, who were petitioners in
Special Proceedings Case No. 1576-R entitled "Intestate Estate of Simeon Rallos," were present during the hearing on the said
date.1âwphi1.nêt
After respondent filed his separate Comments to these two Complaints, the Court, in its September 1, 1999 Resolution, docketed
the two cases as administrative matters and referred them to Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for investigation,
report and recommendation.
After conducting hearings, the investigator submitted his findings and recommendations to this Court in a Memorandum dated
January 4, 2000.
The Facts
The antecedent facts in the first case, as summarized by the investigator,1 are as follows:
On December 8, 1998, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), the
Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine National Police (PNP) at the Port of Cebu withheld, for investigation, an
estimated 25,000 sacks of rice marked as "Snowman" on board the vessel, M/V Alberto. The sacks of rice allegedly came
from Palawan to be unloaded in Cebu. Likewise seized on the same date were nine cargo trucks to be used for carrying
the subject sacks of rice.
The EIIB then wrote to the Bureau of Customs, Cebu, stating that upon further verification, no proper voyage clearance to
sail from Palawan to Cebu was issued to the vessel, M/V Alberto. The EIIB then requested that a warrant of seizure and
detention be issued over the rice shipment.
On December 9, 1998, the Bureau of Customs issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against: a) the vessel M/V
Alberto used in the illegal transport of imported staple rice; b) the imported staple rice consisting of 25,000 sacks, more or
less, with the "Snowman" brand; and c) nine (9) motor-vehicle trucks used and utilized in the illegal transport of the rice.
The warrant was also directed to the owner of the M/V Alberto, ANMA Philippine Shipping Corporation, and the consignee
of the rice shipment, Mark Montelibano.
Thereafter, the claimants Mark Montelibano and Elson Ogario, on December 10, 1998, filed a complaint for injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining ordered and writ of preliminary injunction. The case, entitled "Elson Ogario and Mark
Montelibano vs. Bureau of Customs, EIIB, Philippine Navy, Maritime Command, Philippine National Police, Philippine
Coast Guard and All Enforcement Agencies" was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 23077 and assigned to Branch 5,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which is the sala of respondent judge. The complaint alleged that the acts of
defendants in intercepting the subject sacks of rice [were] unlawful, illegal and merely based on suspicion. Thus, plaintiffs
prayed for the quashal of the warrant of seizure and detention (dated December 9, 1998) issued by the Collector of
Customs, and for the release of the goods.
The Bureau of Customs filed a motion to dismiss on December 11, 1998, alleging that the trial court ha[d] no jurisdiction
over the complaint. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
The Bureau of Customs also pointed out that the appropriate seizure proceeding was already instituted on December 9,
1998, by virtue of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention. This had the effect of depriving the trial court of
jurisdiction over the matter.
On December 28, 1998, a hearing was held by respondent judge on both the motion to dismiss of the Bureau of Customs
and the complainants' application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties presented evidence in support of their
respective positions.
In a Resolution dated January 11, 1999, the respondent judge denied the Bureau of Custom's motion to dismiss and
granted complainants' prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x x x x x x x
In the subject resolution, the respondent judge also ruled that the Bureau of Customs ha[d] no jurisdiction because the
goods involved [were] neither imported nor smuggled and were apprehended outside the customs zone. As further basis,
it was ruled that plaintiff was able to present a certification issued by the National Food Authority that the subject rice
came from Palawan. Defendants, on the other hand, submitted no evidence that the subject bags of rice were imported or
smuggled. The issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention being arbitrary and without probable cause, it did not
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction.
The Bureau of Customs filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was subsequently denied in the trial court's Order
dated January 25, 1999. In this resolution, respondent judge ordered the defendants to release the 25,000 sacks of rice
without delay, the dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x x x x x x x
The Bureau of Customs, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51051, assailing the Resolutions dated January 11 and 25, 1999 of the respondent
judge.
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, the District Collector of Customs of Cebu City rendered a Decision in the seizure
proceedings (Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98) declaring the 25,000 sacks of "Snowman" rice as smuggled
and ordering their forfeiture.
On April 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision 2 denying the petition for certiorari field by the Bureau of
Customs and affirmed the questioned Resolutions dated January 11 and 25, 1999 issued [by] respondent judge.
In view of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent judge issued another Resolution dated April 26, 1999 reiterating the
release of the 25,000 sacks of rice, the dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x x x x x x x
A petition for review was then filed by the Bureau of Customs before the Supreme Court questioning the Decision of the
Court of Appeals. Upon application, a Temporary Restraining Order was subsequently issued by the Supreme Court on
May 17, 1999, "enjoining the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City or any
of his representatives and the respondents from enforcing or causing to be enforced the questioned Resolution dated 11
January 1999, the Order dated 25 January 1999, and the Resolution dated 26 April 1999, as well as all subsequent orders
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-23077 entitled Elson Ogario and Mark
Montelibano vs.Bureau of Customs, et. al.
x x x x x x x x x
Respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint.
1. In his Comment dated July 21, 1999 (Exh. 8), the judge in essence, sought to justify the issuance of the questioned orders on the
following propositions:
a. The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs of the Port of Cebu on December 9, 1998 was
based merely on a suspicion and not anchored on probable cause. Hence, the issuance of the Warrant was not valid and,
therefore, of no legal effect.
b. That the Bureau of Customs [of the Port of] Cebu . . . abused its authority or function in seizing the "25 thousand bags
of rice" on the basis of a suspicion that they were smuggled goods or illegally imported. The issuance of the Warrant of
Seizure and Detention was arbitrary.
c. That the Regional Trial Court Judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction, can issue an injunction to stop or prevent a
purported enforcement of a criminal law which is not in accordance with an orderly administration of justice, and also to
stop and prevent the Bureau of Customs from using the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and arbitrary manner. 3
In the second case, Deputy Court Administrator Ponferrada summarized the facts as follows:
On July 29, 1998, complainants, who are the legitimate children and compulsory heirs of the late Simeon Rallos, filed a
motion to remove and/or replace [the] administrator of the estate[,] Atty. Juan T. Borromeo. In an Order dated February
10, 1999, respondent judge did not categorically rule on the motion, and instead scheduled a hearing on March 17,
1999. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Borromeo, on March 10, 1999, filed a motion to deter [the] hearing set for March 17, 1999.1âwphi1 He scheduled the
hearing of the motion on March 15, 1999 at 2:30 p.m. On the said hearing date, Atty. Borromeo appeared but
complainants and counsel were not present. Respondent judge then issued the subject order (dated March 15, 1999)
stating:
When this case was called for hearing, only the administrator and his counsel appeared. The oppositors and
their counsel [were] also around.
The administrator and his counsel called the attention of the court that their Supplemental Inventory, including
the opposition thereto, ha[d] not been resolved yet and the favorable resolution of the court is very important for
them so they can move further for the settlement of the estate.
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Inventory, including the opposition thereto, is considered submitted for the
resolution of the court.
The administrator and his counsel are notified of this order in open court, including the oppositors and their
counsel.
SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, on March 17, 1999, complainants and their counsel, Atty. Expedito Bugarin, Jr. went to Branch 5 to
attend the hearing, only to be informed that the case was not calendared. Upon further inquiry from the staff of respondent
judge, they learned that [the] hearing of the case was conducted on March 15, 1999. They obtained a copy of the Order of
March 15, 1999 of respondent judge which stated that "oppositors (referring to the complainants) and their counsel are
also around", and this was also stated in the transcript of records.
The complainants, on the basis of the Order dated March 15, 1999, filed the instant administrative complaint before the
Office of the Court Administrator. Respondent judge was required to comment on the complaint.
In his Comment, respondent judge admitted that the inclusion of the sentence "the oppositors and their counsel [were]
also around" was mere error on his part. He points out that the sentence is inconsistent with the first sentence "only the
administrator appeared."
Nevertheless, he admits his error and states that it was not done intentionally, but was due to mental lapse and fatigue,
considering that he heard numerous cases on said date. He further alleged that complainants filed the instant
administrative complaint because he did not act on their motion to remove and/or replace the administrator; that he could
have rectified his error if only the complainants informed him of the same; that "there was no malice on his part since he
does not know personally the oppositors and the administrator; and that he is not a personal friend to their counsel; that
the subject order pertains only to the submission of the supplemental inventory and the opposition thereto for resolution of
the court, so no damage or prejudice was done to the herein complainants; that he has not even resolved the said
incident because he is still reading the voluminous court records." Respondent judge also stated that he already
voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the case.
Investigator's Recommendation
In his Memorandum, Deputy Court Administrator Ponferrada recommended that respondent be suspended for six months without
pay for the first case and fined in the amount of P5,000 for the second.
In justifying the penalty for the first case, the investigator ratiocinated as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the property subject of the warrant of seizure and
detention issued by the Bureau of Customs. In the case of Mison vs. Natividad, 4 the Honorable Supreme Court held that:
The court a quo has no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and detention. The respondent
judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order, granting the writ of
preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the control of the
Collector of Customs and depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent
judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector
of Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of
Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere
with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.
The Office of the Court Administrator also issued Circular 68-94 dated November 3, 1994, which reiterated the provisions
of Circular No. 13-93.
The aforesaid circulars were again reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 07-99 dated June 25, 1999 issued by Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide informing judges of the lower courts to exercise utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in
the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunctions to avoid any suspicion that its issuance or
grant was for considerations other than the strict merits of the case. . . . . 5
In the second case, respondent judge was found guilty of grave abuse of authority. The investigator explained:
Based on the evidence presented during the investigation, respondent judge appeared to be biased and prejudiced
against the complainants, as shown by the following:
a) On July 29, 1998, complainants filed a Motion to Remove and /or Replace Administrator. The respondent judge
required the administrator to file a comment or opposition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order. Complainants
counsel was also required to file [a] reply thereto, after which the incident [would be deemed] submitted for resolution.
In his Order dated February 10, 1999 respondent judge did not categorically rule on complainant's motion while the Order
stated that the "relationship between the heirs and the administrator can no longer see eye to eye with each other, then
it's about time for the Administrator to give [way] so as not to further delay the distribution of the estate." The respondent
judge chose to give priority to the administrator's compensation, and thus deferred a categorical ruling on the motion.
However, it may be stated that the matter of compensation can be pursued by the administrator as a claim against the
estate, and satisfaction thereto is not a pre-condition to the administrator's removal as such. The reason given by the
respondent judge has no basis in law. It appears as a ploy to delay further the ruling on the petition of the heirs to change
the administrator. With this actuation, the respondent exposed his bias in favor of the administrator. He became a true
picture of what a judge ought not to be.
b) The administrator, on March 10, 1999, filed a Motion to Defer the hearing of March 17, 1999 and set the hearing on
March 15, 1999. In the Order of respondent judge dated March 15, 1999, there was no pronouncement on whether the
hearing on March 17, 1999 was cancelled. Instead it discussed the issue of the inventory of the properties of
complainants by the administrator.
As to the Motion to Defer the hearing of March 17, 1999, respondent judge should have observe the procedure laid down
under Rule 15 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which provides that "[e]very written motion required to be heard and
the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three
(3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice." And the "good
cause" required was not even stated when the respondent judge advanced the hearing to March 15 1999, instead of
March 17, 1999 as originally scheduled. The only visible reason why it was transferred earlier to March 15, 1996 [was]
because it appear[ed] as the date suggested by the administrator.
The respondent judge evidently, did not consider the rights of the heirs of the sate Simeon Rallos, who appear[ed]
persistent in seeking . . . the removal of the administrator. With the confusion occasioned by such a blunder committed by
the respondent even on a simple motion to transfer hearing, it creates an impression that it was done deliberately to stall
the possible removal of the administrator upon petition by the heirs of a deceased person. Such unwelcome act coming as
it does from the judge certainly erodes the confidence and integrity of the judiciary.
Another [point] to be observed is that the hearing must specify the time and date which must not be later than ten (10)
days after the filing of the motion. This was not followed by the administrator. Complainants' copy of the motion was sent
by registered mail on March 10, 1999, and it was not received by the complainants in time for the March 15, 1999 hearing.
In spite of this, respondent judge heard the case on March 15, 1999 even without the presence of complainants and their
counsel, and despite the lack of proof that the latter were notified of the hearing on that day. Worse, he made it appear in
his Order that the complainants in this administrative matter were present. When in truth they were not.
c) Based on the testimony of Atty. Nollara, Ms. Estella was transferred to another Branch after she testified against
respondent judge. This [was] clearly an act of retaliation against Ms. Estella for her "unfavorable" testimony.
The evidence show[s] that the "March 15, 1999 Order" [was] not a "mere oversight' as respondent judge would like to
make it appear. The court stenographer testified that she had already prepared a draft of the order stating that the
complainants and their counsel were not around, but respondent judge modified this and made it appear that
complainants and their counsel were present.
Moreover it was not proper for respondent judge to push through with the March 15, 1999, hearing being requested by the
administrator, since there was no proof that complainants were notified of the requested change in the hearing date. At
the least, respondent judge should have heard the case on March 17, 1999.
The acts of respondent judge are therefore, contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
Canon 1 — a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. A judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. A judge should administer justice with impartiality and without delay.
The Court's Ruling
The first case should be held in abeyance, pending the resolution by this Court of the Petition for Review assailing the Orders that
are the very subject of this administrative case. In the second case, we believe that the fine recommended by the investigator
should be increased.
The First Case
Pending before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari 6 is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming respondent judge's
Orders dated January 11, 1999, and January 25, 1999 — the same Orders that are subject the present Complaint for gross
ignorance of the law. In view of the present peculiar circumstances, the disposition of this administrative case should be held in
abeyance. We must, however, emphasize that this action is motivated solely by considerations of the smooth and orderly
dispositions of the cases, for a decision on the merits of the Complainant herein would preempt the disposition of the Petition for
Review.
In so ruling, we are not in any way implying that an administrative case cannot proceed independently of the main one. 7 In light of
the facts of the present case, though, the Petition for Review constitutes a prejudicial question to the resolution of the Complaint of
Secretary Zamora.
The Second Case

Complainants attribute partiality to the respondent judge based on three points. First, he failed to resolve complainants' Motion to
remove the administrator. Second, he arbitrarily changed the date of hearing from March 17, 1999 to March 15, 1999 without
properly notifying the complainants. Worse, he made it appear in his March 15, 1999 Order that they and their counsel were
present. Third, he retaliated against Daisy Estella, the stenographer who had testified unfavorably against him.
On the first point, considering that the case had been pending before the trial court for a long time, 8 it was improper for the judge
not to resolve the complainants' Motion to remove or replace the administrator. 9 Moreover, the reason he proffered was wrong. The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) was correct in pointing out that the compensation of the administrator was not a
precondition for his removal.10 Indeed, the complainants' Motion raised several legal grounds, but these were ignored by the
respondent.11
However, by itself, this lapse was merely an error of judgment and does not merit disciplinary action against the respondent judge.
Not every error or mistake he has committed in the performance of his duties would render him liable, unless he is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.12
As to the second point, we must clarify at the outset that complainants are not questioning the resetting of the scheduled March 17,
1999 hearing to March 15, 1999.13 What they are stressing, and rightly so, is the apparent dishonesty of respondent judge in making
it appear that they were present during the March 15, 1999 hearing. We are not convinced by his claim that his Order was merely a
harmless error caused by mental fatigue. The phrase "[t]he oppositors and their counsel [were] also around" refers to a substantial
matter that cannot be overlooked, considering that it is inconsistent with the first sentence of the questioned Order. Notably, the last
sentence was also edited by respondent judge to make it appear consistent with the statement that the complainants were present.
Finally, regarding the third point, we agree with the OCA's conclusion that the transfer of Daisy Estella from the sala of respondent
judge was prompted by her unfavorable testimony against the latter. Indeed, the branch clerk of court 14 also testified that the judge
scolded Estella after she testified, and that her testimony was the reason for her transfer.
These three points, taken together, paint a picture of bias or partiality that calls for disciplinary sanction. Worse, respondent
manifested dishonesty when he altered his Order and made it appear that the complainants were present during a hearing that they
had not in fact attended.
Respondent judge violated Canon 115 and Rule 1.02,16 as well as Canon 217 and Rule 2.0118 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus,
he must be sanctioned.19 In this connection, we have said:
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence
repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a
partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free
of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent,
because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries
between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should
remain "free from any appearance of impropriety" and "should be beyond reproach." 20 (Footnotes omitted)
A review of past Decisions shows a wide range of penalty for cases of similar nature. These penalties include mere
reprimand, 21 withholding of salary,22 fine, 23 suspension, 24 and even dismissal. 25 This court feels that the P5,000 fine recommended
by the OCA is inadequate, considering the dishonesty displayed by respondent. Under the circumstances, we believe that a fine in
the amount of P10,000 is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and partiality aggravated by
dishonesty for which he is ordered to PAY a FINE of P10,000. He is sternly warned that a commission of similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. The Complaint filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora is hereby held in
abeyance.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195 February 26, 1997
Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A. NAZARENO, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE ENRIQUE M. ALMARIO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint dated 28 February 1994 for gross misconduct or acts unbecoming a judge filed against Judge Enrique M.
Almario, then presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, the spouses Romeo Y. Nazareno and Elisa A.
Nazareno averred:
We would like to narrate some instances where Judge Enrique M Almario took advantage of our situation in
order to force us to accede to his demands. They are as follows:
1. Sometime in the middle of 1990, when Judge Almario was still holding his office in Trece Martires City, he
saw me (Elisa) in the office of his Court and he invited me to his chamber. After a short conversation, Judge
Almario said to me that he was near to retire (sic) and so he needed plenty of money (Inday malapit no ako
magretire, kailangan ko ng maraming pera). Mrs. Nazareno was surprised and shocked to hear what the judge
said, but could not say anything but just smiled. However, before I (Mrs. Nazareno) left his chamber, Judge
Almario said to her to help him with this, and I (Mrs. Nazareno) assured him that she will raise some money for
him.
2. Then another incident happened when the Judge saw us (Romeo & Elisa Nazareno) in the offfice of his
Court, again Judge Almario invited us to his chamber. His office was still in Trece Martires City Hall. There, he
told my husband (Romeo Nazareno, the estate administrator) that he will change him as administrator of the
estate because of his conviction in a criminal case filed against him by his sister Natividad. Bur Romeo told
Judge Almario that it had nothing to do with the case as it was the same issue the other parry raised even
before the former Judge Gustilo of the same sala. Then he said that we have to be prepared for it. Then we left.
3. In 1992 when the office of Judge Almario was transferred to Naic, I was told that the Judge was at Rochelle
Restaurant. Thinking of the incident, I suspected that (Judge) was waiting for the money he was asking for. I got
P10,000.00 from my husband Romeo, wrapped it in a newspaper and I personally delivered the money to
Judge Almario at Rochelle Restaurant. He (Judge) asked me, (Mrs. Nazareno) how much was the money, I
replied, "P10,000.00 Judge". Seeing the Judge's facial expression (not contented, I (Mrs. Nazareno) promised
again to raise some money next time and he (judge) replied, "O, sige".
4. Sometime in the month of November, 1992, in Naic, Cavite, Judge Almario sent for us (sic) his employee Joe
to our place, Naic Cinema, and told us that the Judge was asking for food to be taken to the Seaside Beach
belonging to Mr. Dualan, because the one who promised him to bring food did not arrive. At about 6:30 P.M. of
that day, my husband (Romeo) and I went to Seaside Beach with the food Judge had asked. We ordered the
food at Rochelle Restaurant and it cost us no less than P2,500.00. There in the beach, he introduced us to Mr.
Dualan and to some of his visitors there. And after a while, silently handed the Judge the P10,000.00 as I
promised him the last time.
The following morning, a woman from Seaside Beach came to our place, Naic Cinema, and said, "Ate Naty, Ate
Naty, [n]adala ni Judge Almario "yung susi ng cottage, pakikuha n'yo nalang sa kanya." Surprised, I (Mrs.
Nazareno) replied. "Hindi ako si Ate Naty mo, siya "yung kalaban namin sa kaso, nandoon siya sa Dalisay
Theatre". Immediately the woman left. "Ate Naty" refers to Narividad P. Nazareno, the defendant in the case
heard by Judge Almario which was filed by the Estate, through Romeo P. Nazareno, as administrator.
5. During the month of December, 1992, also in Naic, Cavite, another employee of Judge Almario, by the name
of Roldan, came to our place, Naic Cinema, telling me that the Judge wanted to see me. So, I went with Roldan.
And when we reached the office of the Judge, he told Roldan to step out and closed the door. Judge Almario
again asked [for] some food, at least three (3) kinds, for the gathering of his staff at Aroma Beach. He
mentioned the time when he needed the food (lunch time). I told him (Judge) to pick-up the food.
But before I left, the Judge asked to change his salary check because he needed cash on that day. He asked
for the amount of P7,500. 00.00. So I went back to my place and get [sic] the amount from my husband
(Romeo) and returned to the office of Judge Almario. I gave the P7,500.00 for his check, but Judge Almario did
not hand over to me his check. I waited for the said check, but the Judge seemed to know nothing about the
check and did not bother to say something about the P7,500.00 but just received it. I was then shy to ask from
him the check in exchange of the cash I gave him, so I asked permission to leave which he okayed.
6. One time, Judge Almario asked us to change our lawyer because according to him, our lawyer has no
"pakikisama" to him. We did not follow his advice because we believe in our lawyer. For this reason, Judge
Almario always deny our motions and pleadings and he even dismissed Mr. Romeo Nazareno's appeal in a
criminal case on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time, but which the court of origin or
municipal trial court has approved and granted by transmitting all the records of the criminal case to his sala.
The criminal case now is pending before the Hon. Supreme Court.
In spite of our compliance of [sic] his personal demands, Judge Almario has repeatedly shown his bias acts and
partiality against us. 1
In his comment, respondent judge denied all the charges against him. 2
The spouses affirmed the truth of the averments in their complaint in a reply dated 24 May 1994. 3
On 14 June 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) based on findings that the matters/issues raised in the complaint are
factual in nature recommended that the charges against Judge Almario be assigned to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
for a full blown investigation.
On 27 July 1994, the Court approved the OCA recommendation and designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales to conduct an investigation and submit a report and recommendation.
The following persons appeared before Justice Uarpio Morales:
1. Elisa Nazareno — she testified and affirmed the truth of the allegations in the complaint..
She first narrated how respondent Judge Almario, on one occasion, asked her to enter his chamber after which he told Elisa, in the
Visayan dialect, how he needed money since he was nearing his retirement age and that she should help him ("tulungan mo ako").
She told the judge that she would see what she could do. Elisa then recounted that she later gave Judge Almario ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) on two (2) separate occasions. 4
She testified having given food for respondent judge on two (2) occasions; first, for, for a gathering of respondent judge's family and
friends at the Seaside Beach resort and another, for the Christmas party of the judge's court staff at the Aroma Beach resort. 5
Elisa also recounted how Judge Almario asked her to encash his salary check for P7,500.00 which she did but respondent judge did
not give her the salary check and she was hesitant to ask him to give it to her. 6
Finally, Elisa testified about the incident when respondent judge talked to them about replacing her husband (herein co-complainant
Romeo Nazareno) as administrator of the property subject of a pending case before respondent judge.
2. Romeo Nazareno — he testified that they had at least four (4) pending cases before respondent Judge Almario.7
Romeo corroborated the testimony of Elisa that Judge Almario met with them to discuss his decision to replace him as
administrator. Romeo added that respondent judge made them believe that he wanted the spouses to offer something to him.
Romeo also affirmed Elisa's testimony that they were forced to give a total of P20,000.00 to respondent Judge. 9
Romeo likewise testified about the incident when they brought food to the Seaside Beach Resort upon the request of respondent
judge as well as her wife having given P7,500.00 in cash to Judge Almario for the latter's salary check which he never delivered. 10
3. Remedios Antipuesto — she testified that she worked as a helper for complainant Mrs. Elisa Nazareno.
She recalled a time when Mrs. Nazareno asked her to help cook some food which respondent judge was asking for. She could not
remember the exact date but she recalled that an employee of the court where the judge was assigned, a certain "Joe", picked up
the food. 11
4. Roldan Alcantara — he testified that as a utility worker assigned to the sala of respondent judge, he sometimes encashed the
salary checks of Judge Almario.
Alcantara also testified having seen the Nazareno spouses at the Seaside Beach Resort on at least one occasion when respondent
judge and his sister-in-law were there. Alcantara stated that the Nazareno spouses brought food which they handed over to the
sister-in-law ("hipag") of respondent Judge Almario. 12
5. Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. — he stated that he worked as a legal researcher in the sala of Judge Almario.
He recalled an occasion when respondent judge asked him to go with him to the Seaside Beach Resort. At the resort he saw the
judge's sister-in-law talking with complainant Elisa Nazareno. He stated that Mrs.Nazareno left but returned after about half an hour
with a "casserola" (cooking pot) apparently containing what he supposed was"pansit". Mrs. Nazareno took the "casserola" to the
cottage occupied by the family of respondent judge.
Finally, Salvadora admitted having picked up some food from the food stall of Mrs. Nazareno for the Christmas party of respondent
judge's court staff at the aroma Beach Resort. 13
6. Respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario — he denied ever receiving any money from the Nazareno spouses. He maintained that
the allegations in the complaint against him are all fabricated and were filed because the Nazarenos had been receiving adverse
rulings and orders from him inseveral cases.
Judge Almario stated that he never talked to litigants without the counsel of all other parties being present. He added that he felt that
Atty. Dominguez, counsel of the Nazarenos, was trying to blackmail him into inhibiting himself from hearing their cases. 14
Finally, Judge Almario denied ever receiving any food from the Nazarenos. He stated that the food for the Christmas party of his
staff at the Aroma Beach Resort was contributed by friends and relatives of staff members.
7. Jacinto P. Dominguez — he testified that as counsel for the Nazarenos in cases pending before Judge Almario, there was an
occasion when he asked for a meeting with the latter inside his chambers in the presence of opposing counsel Atty. Roman C.
Cabading. The purpose of said meeting was to inform the judge that his clients (the Nazarenos) had talked to then Justice Secretary
Franklin L)rilon about the possibility of filing administrative charges against Judge Almario. Atty. Dominguez specifically referred to
charges that Judge Almario had: a) asked Mrs. Nazareno to encash a check which he did not give to the latter; b) accepted a total of
P20,000.00 from the Nazarenos; and c) requested for food for a Christmas party. 15
8. Roman C. Cabading — he testified that as counsel for the opposing party in the cases involving the Nazareno spouses, there was
an occasion when opposing counsel Atty. Jacinto P. Dominguez asked to see Judge Almario in his presence. Atty. Cabading
testified that Atty. Dominguez showed Judge Almario and himself a letter written by the spouses addressed to then Justice
Secretary Drilon about an alleged demand made by respondent judge for some amount of money. 16
After a close and careful study of the records of the proceedings before investigating Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Court
finds sufficient evidence to find respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario liable for gross dishonesty and misconduct. His conduct
undoubtedly is unbecoming a member of the bench.
The time honored rule is that a public official whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice, be he a judge of a lower court or
tribunal or a justice of the appellate courts, should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest.
It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to render decisions in actual controversies that a decision which correctly
applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal
believed to be less than impartial and honest. It is thus the duty of members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to
protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.
In the present case, respondent's denial of the charges leveled by complainants that he had asked for and accepted food
contributions on at least two (2) occasions from litigants (herein complainants) is contradicted by his own witnesses, Roldan
Alcantara and Jose R. Salvadora, Jr., who are both employees of the court. Nothing in the testimonies of these two (2) court
employees shows any motivation other than to tell the truth.
On the charge of having accepted P20,000.00 from the Nazareno spouses and receiving cash in exchange for his salary check
which he never gave to Mrs. Nazareno, the Court agrees with the conclusions of Justice Morales that complainant Elisa Nazareno
had convincingly proven having given: a) P10,000.00 to respondent judge on two (2) occasions and b) cash for respondent's salary
check. As correctly observed by Justice Morales, the testimony of Mrs. Nazareno was undented even when subjected to an
extended cross examination by respondent judge. 17
In sum, the Court finds the charges of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judge as having been sufficiently substantiated.
Judge Enrique M. Almario deserves no less than the penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, based on the records of this case, respondent judge had already compulsorily retired in July 1995. The proper penalty,
therefore, in lieu of his removal from office, is forfeiture of all his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Enrique M. Almario is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct and dishonesty, while in
office. The Court hereby ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits to which he may be entitled WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment in the government service, including government owned or controlled agencies or corporations.
SO ORDERED.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623 September 18, 2009

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1635-MTJ]
PROSECUTOR ROMANA R. REYES, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624

TIMOTEO A. MIGRIÑO and DOMINGO S. CRUZ, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Pasig City, Branch 69,Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625

ARMI M. FLORDELIZA, JULIET C. VILLAR and MA. CONCEPCION LUCERO, all of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69,
Pasig City, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, Presiding Judge Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1627

ANDREE K. LAGDAMEO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. P-09-2693

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-2048-P]
TIMOTEO A. MIGRIÑO, Branch Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City,Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638

FLORENCIO SEBASTIAN, JR., Complainant,

vs.
HON. JULIA A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 69, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees,
because the image of the judiciary is necessarily mirrored in their actions. 1
Five administrative cases against Judge Julia A. Reyes (Judge Reyes), Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 69 and one administrative case which Judge Reyes filed against her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migriño were
consolidated and referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for investigation,
report and recommendation, by this Court’s Resolutions of September 28, 20052 and December 12, 2007.3
Earlier, the Court preventively suspended Judge Reyes "effective immediately and until further orders," by Resolution of December
14, 2004 in A.M. No. 04-12-335-MeTC, "Re: Problem Besetting MeTC, Branch 69, Pasig City."
Records show that Judge Reyes’ whereabouts have remained unknown. She was issued an Authority to Travel to the United States
for the period from November 16 to 30, 2004. She appears to have left the country in December 2004 but there is no record showing
that she sought the Court’s permission therefor or filed any leave of absence for December 2004. 4
From an August 17, 2005 Certification from the Bureau of Immigration, the only entry in its database relative to the travel of Judge
Reyes was her departure to an unknown destination through Korean Air Flight No. KE622 on December 28, 2004. 5
Due to her absence, the Court declared Judge Reyes as having waived her right to answer or comment on the allegations against
her and to adduce evidence.
I. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1623 (PROSECUTOR ROMANA R. REYES v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
By letter-complaint of October 26, 2004, 6 Assistant City Prosecutor Romana Reyes (Prosecutor Reyes), the public prosecutor
assigned to Branch 69, charged Judge Reyes with grave abuse of authority and/or grave misconduct, the details of which follow:
On October 1, 2004 at past 6:00 p.m., Prosecutor Reyes accidentally met Judge Reyes at the office of Police Inspector Jovita V.
Icuin (Inspector Icuin), the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Branch of the Pasig City Police Station. Judge Reyes was there to
inquire about her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migriño (Migriño)7 who was earlier arrested for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1602 or the Anti-Gambling Law. When Judge Reyes was informed that Migriño was already released on orders of Judge
Jose Morallos, Judge Reyes asked Prosecutor Reyes to conduct an inquest against Migriño for malversation on the basis of a
photocopy of an affidavit of a certain Ariel Nuestro, purportedly executed and sworn to before Judge Reyes on September 15,
2004.8
Prosecutor Reyes informed Judge Reyes that the case of malversation may not necessarily fall under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court9 on Arrest without Warrant and thus cannot be the subject of inquest. Prosecutor Reyes explained that inquest could
not be conducted as it was already past 6:00 p.m. whereas inquest proceedings could be conducted only until 6:00 p.m. unless
authorized by the City Prosecutor. She added that since the crime was allegedly committed in 2003, Migriño would have to undergo
preliminary investigation. 10Prosecutor Reyes continued:
When she heard that if inquest is conducted he will be released for preliminary investigation, she was fuming mad and directed me
to conduct the preliminary investigation right then and there. It was really a surprise that a judge, a former prosecutor at the Rizal
Provincial Prosecution Office, would direct me to conduct preliminary investigation at the station without giving the respondent (Mr.
Migrino), at least the mandatory 10-day period within which to prepare for an intelligent answer/counter-affidavit.
She insisted that Mr. Migrino be detained on the weekend and the police detained him. He was the subject of inquest on October 4,
2004, Monday and was ordered release for preliminary investigation by the City Prosecutor.
xxxx
On October 5 and 6, 2004 I was not able to appear during the hearing of criminal cases in her sala but I made it a point to inform the
Court by calling, through cellphone, one of her staff on the mornings of October 5 and 6. I was having severe headache and chest
discomfort.
On October 11, 2004, I appeared at her sala to discharge my official function as public prosecutor assigned in her Court. Before the
hearing started, she asked for my Medical Certificate and I explained that to be candid, I did not personally see a doctor but called
[the doctor] to inform him of my condition and I was advised to rest and take my regular medication. Surprisingly, and to my
embarrassment, without any case for contempt filed and without being included in the day’s calendar, she brought up the
incident of October 1, 2004. I explained to her that unless I had been authorized by the City Prosecutor or Chief-Inquest, I could
not conduct inquest and inquest proceedings are being held in my position as a Prosecutor under the Department of Justice.
She insisted that I was "there as the Prosecutor assigned to this Court and who is assigned at the same sala and you refused to
conduct an inquest" forgetting her constitutional law that there is separation of powers among the three branches of government –
legislative, executive and the judiciary.
She issued in open court an order requiring me to explain in writing within twenty-four (24) hours why I should not be cited for
contempt for my refusal to conduct the inquest on October 1, 2004. I was all the more surprised when she gave the following
sweeping statement in open court:
"Don’t worry Prosec, I will not order your arrest today, because I know that the Pasig City Police Officer at the Pasig Police
Station, because your house is located in front of the Pasig City Station, there is no one who will arrest you. I will still
coordinate with the office of Gen. Aglipay to send me a police officer who will take custody of you pending contempt
proceedings."
The above-quoted statement, lifted from the transcript of stenographic notes of October 11, 2004 which is hereto attached as Annex
"A" to "A-5", only shows that she has already a pre-judgment of the contempt charge and no explanation, even if submitted, will
convince her to stop from declaring me with contempt.
I was hospitalized at the Medical City on the night of October 11, 2004 until October 14, 2004 due to chest pain and the Court was
informed of this fact. However[,] on October 13, 2004 when I was still confined, respondent issued an Order in open court stating:
" x x x without any valid explanation except for the word that she is presently confined at the hospital,which is hearsay at the
moment, in which case the same is just noted by the court. So for her failure to attend today’s proceedings, despite notice, as well
as for her failure to attend the proceedings yesterday as well as on October 5 and 6 without any valid explanation, and for her failure
to give any explanation after the lapse of 24 hours from the time she was ordered to show cause why she should not be cited in
contempt in open court last October 11, 2004, let warrant of arrest issue against the said Public Prosecutor. x x x Bail is set at
P1,000.00 per case in which there is a total of 119 cases delayed as a result of her absence since October 5 and October 6
as well as yesterday, October 12 and today, October 13. That means a bail of P119,000.00 as well as for two (2) counts of
apparent contempt which consist of misbehavior of an officer of the Court in the performance of her official duties as well
as for improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, and degrade the administration of justice to
which bail is set at P25,000.00 each,to set an example to the public especially, since she is actually the Public Prosecutor
presently assigned to this Court who committed such apparent act of indirect contempt."11 (Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
In another letter dated October 29, 2004,12 Prosecutor Reyes informed the OCA that during the October 27, 2004 hearing for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order in connection with her petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as SCA-
2732 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, four police officers served a warrant of arrest 13 purportedly issued on October 11,
2004 by Judge Reyes pertaining to Criminal Case Nos. 02164-02173, all entitled "People v. Prosecutor Romana R. Reyes."
Verification from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MeTC of Pasig City revealed, however, that there was no pending case
against Prosecutor Reyes and that the particular case numbers pertained to cases against 10 individuals for offenses ranging from
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 6 to Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property. 14
Prosecutor Reyes’ travails did not stop there, however. On October 27, 2004, at around 10:30 a.m., she received copies of two
Orders of October 11 and 13, 2004 of Judge Reyes directing Prosecutor Reyes in the later Order, to
x x x show cause within 24 hours from receipt of this Order why she should not be cited in contempt for her failure to submit her
explanation to date and for her failure to attend the proceedings of this Court without any explanation.
Considering the gravity of her responsibility as a Public Prosecutor, let warrant issue for her arrest. Bail is set atP2,000.00 per
case, or a total of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P238,000.00).15(Emphasis and capitalization in the
original; underscoring supplied)
On December 13, 2004, Prosecutor Reyes wrote another letter16 to the OCA charging Judge Reyes with Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, and Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, as follows:
On December 7, 2004, I arrived at the court room of MTC-Pasig City Branch 69 at about 8:30 a.m. to discharge my duties as the
trial prosecutor of the Branch. The hearing has not started, the Presiding Judge was not there yet and the litigants have not been
allowed to enter the courtroom. Hearing of cases on the Court does not promptly start at 8:30 a.m. but always been the hours of
9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. as the Presiding Judge, Julia A. Reyes, usually arrive past 8:30 a.m. and when she arrive[s], she still order[s]
the installation of her microphone and computer. In the meantime, litigants are not allowed to enter the courtroom but have to wait
outside until they are allowed entry by the staff.
I reviewed the court records to know if the parties had been notified of the scheduled hearings. After the recitation of the Centennial
Prayer and before the calendar of cases were called, Judge Julia Reyes called my attention and said that there was an Order of the
Court for me to explain my failure to appear on October 5, 6, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26 and 27 and up to now, I have not submitted
my explanation. I stood up and politely explained to her that the incidents she was referring to was the subject of the case I filed
against her for Certiorari, Prohibition & Mandamus, before the Regional Trial Court – Pasig City and there was an Order issued, a
copy of the Order had been served on her, that any and all warrant of arrest issued by her would not be enforced and/or
implemented by the police agencies. She did not hear my reason and said that this is a new order and is not covered by the Order
of Hon. Celso Lavina and she ordered that I be detained for one (1) day at the Pasig City Police Headquarters. I moved for a five (5)
minute recess to make a call to my lawyer and to fix myself as I was having palpitation then. She denied my motion and ordered the
start of the scheduled hearing of cases. She ordered the police officers to lock the door of the courtroom and not to let anyone go
out or come in. This was the first time, during my assignment at her branch, that the door of the court was locked and nobody is
allowed to leave the room or go inside. Though not convenient, as I was thinking of my health then, and the humiliation I felt in,
again, being declared in contempt in open court and ordered detained, I continued to discharge my duties as a trial prosecutor of the
branch until after the more than 40 cases had been called.
After the hearing of criminal cases and the case of contempt was called against Max Soliven et al., I was informed by PO1 Sandy
Galino, her security escort, that the police officers whom they have called for assistance were already outside the courtoom and will
be bringing me to the police station. They would not allow me to leave the place unless I go with them at the Headquarters. When I
was about to be escorted out of the court room, my lawyer, Atty. Hans Santos and my sister, Asst. Pros. Paz Yson, came and was
bringing with them a certified copy of the Order of Hon. Celso Lavina dated November 22, 2004 stating that any and all warrants
issued by Judge Julia Reyes will not be enforced by any police agencies. My lawyer showed the Order to PO1 Sandy Galino and a
certain PO1 Villarosa and they said that they are getting orders from Judge Julia Reyes. My lawyer then asked them if they have a
written Order from the Court, or a Warrant for my Arrest or a Commitment Order but they replied in the negative. My lawyer further
asked them if they are detaining me and they said no.
xxxx
On or about 12:00 noon of December 9, 2004, I have just alighted from a car and she was standing infront of the building when she
saw me. She immediately followed me and shouted "Arrest her! Arrest her! To the guards on duty at the entrance of the building. In
the presence of so many persons in the lobby and in high pitch she made calls, through her cell phone, to several police officers
telling them that she caught an escaped convict, a fugitive from justice and needs a battery of police officers to make the arrest. I
warned her to be careful with her language considering that I did not escape but was released by Hon. Executive Judge Jose
Morallos upon presentation of the Order dated November 22, 2004 of Hon. Judge Celso Lavina, RTC-Pasig Br. 71. She continued,
in the presence of people in the Lobby who had converged to see what was causing the commotion, that I am an escaped convict
and should be detained at the Pasig City Police Headquarters. She further said that it was Judge Jose Morallos who facilitated my
escape last Tuesday, December 7, 2004.
xxxx
While questioning the propriety of the order of Direct Contempt, considering that there is an order of November 22, 2004 stating that
any and all warrants she issued will not be enforced or implemented, and that she has to issue the necessary Commitment Order for
my detention, she slapped with me another seven (7) days of detention for Direct Contempt.
xxxx
At about 6:00 p.m., the Sheriff of Regional Trial Court-Pasig City, Branch 71 arrived and served a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction with an attached Order dated December 9, 2004 issued by Hon Judge Celso Lavina declaring my detention
illegal but the Headquarters would not release me until after they have conferred with their superior officers. After conferring with the
higher officials, I was finally released, over the written objection of Judge Julia Reyes in the copy of the Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory Mandatory Injunction and Court Order dated December 9, 2004, from the Pasig City Police Headquarters at about 7:00
p.m.
x x x x17 (Underscoring supplied)
II. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1624 (TIMOTEO A. MIGRIÑO AND DOMINGO S. CRUZ v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
By Complaint of October 16, 2004, 18 Migriño and Domingo S. Cruz charged Judge Reyes with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Oppression, Abuse of Authority, and Illegal Arrest and Detention, the details of which follow:
In July 2003, not long after her appointment as Presiding Judge, Judge Reyes began to exhibit "unexplained prejudice and hostility"
towards Migriño. In fact, without any reason at all, Judge Reyes told Atty. Reynaldo Bautista, the MeTC Clerk of Court, that Migriño
would be detailed at the Office of the Clerk of Court.19
On several occasions, the latest of which was on August 24, 2004, she barred Migriño from entering the court premises and the staff
room. During lunch break on October 1, 2004, Migriño, Deputy Sheriff Joel K. Agliam and Dandy T. Liwag were arrested without
warrant upon orders of Judge Reyes as they were allegedly caught inflagrante delicto playing "tong-its." Police Officer 1 Sandy
Galino (PO1 Galino), the security officer of Judge Reyes, arrested them and brought them to the Pasig City Police Station where
they were detained by virtue of the affidavits 20 of PO1 Galino and Judge Reyes.21
When an Order of Release22 was issued by Judge Morallos after the three posted bail, Judge Reyes tried to prevent their release
and insisted that she had a complaint against Migriño for malversation of public funds, infidelity in the custody of document and/or
qualified theft and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 23 allegedly committed in November 2002, and presented the
Affidavit24 of Ariel Nuestro and the Joint Affidavit25 she executed with court employees Remedios Diaz (Remedios) and Alma
Santiano.
Complainant Atty. Domingo S. Cruz (Atty. Cruz), counsel of Migriño, et al., intervened and demanded from Inspector Icuin the
immediate release of his clients since there was already an Order of Release. Atty. Cruz and Prosecutor Reyes also explained to
Judge Reyes that Migriño could not be detained on the basis of an alleged offense that occurred in 2002 yet, and that the alleged
offense was not covered by the rule on warrantless arrest.26 Migriño and Atty. Cruz continued:
15. …Judge [Reyes] insisted that complainant Migriño must not be released as the case is covered by the rule on warrantless
arrest, the alleged offense of malversation having been allegedly discovered only recently by respondent Judge and staff,
specifically at 4:30 P.M. of 01 October 2004. She then told Pros. Reyes to conduct an immediate Inquest/preliminary investigation.
16. It must be noted and emphasized that Nuestro subscribed and swore to his Sinumpaang Salaysay before respondent Judge
way back on September 15, 2004, and it could not be said that the alleged offense of malversation of public funds was discovered
only at 4:30 P.M. of October 01, 2004. What is certain is that respondent Judge timed the alleged discovery to suit her purpose…
27
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Unable to convince Judge Reyes, Atty. Cruz left the office of Inspector Icuin, but returned shortly with a warning that he would hold
them responsible for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention and abuse of authority unless Migriño was immediately released. Inspector
Icuin finally ordered the release of Migriño.
Migriño stayed in jail from October 1, 2004, a Friday, until he was released on October 4, 2004. Judge Reyes was determined to
send Migriño back to jail, however, by means of her contempt powers. In her October 4, 2004 Order, she stated:
x x x Timoteo Migrino, Clerk of Court, Branch 69, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City, is hereby ordered to show cause within twelve
(12) hours from receipt of this order why he should not be cited in contempt for the following acts: (1) illegal gambling during office
hours within the Court premises (2) infidelity in the custody of documents, (3) qualified theft and/or malversation for misappropriation
of the amount of PHP10,000.00 entrusted to him for "deposit" by one Ariel Nuestro in a criminal case filed before this Court, (4) for
violation of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, among others. He is likewise ordered to show cause why he
should not be cited in contempt for openly defying to submit to undersigned with respect to her complaint before the police
authorities for the said crimes and/or offenses which defiance appear to be "improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice" under Rule 71, Sec. 3(d) of the Rules of Court.
Set the hearing of this case on October 8, 2004 at 2:30 P.M. and said respondent is directed to make his explanation on said date
and time in open court with warning that should he fail to attend said hearing despite due notice a warrant for arrest shall be issued.
The Process Server of this Court with the assistance of a Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, is directed to send a
copy of this Order by personal service to respondent TIMOTEO A. MIGRINO. Any officer of the law is likewise directed to assist said
Process Server in the service of this Order to said respondent and isspecifically directed to take custody of said
respondent should he refuse to receive this Order and bring the same to this Court on October 8, 2004 at 2:00
P.M.28 (Capitalization in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Significantly, while in the said Order of October 4, 2004, Judge Reyes found Atty. Cruz, Prosecutor Reyes, Inspector Icuin and PO3
Jimenez to have also committed contumacious acts, she singled out Migriño and directed him to explain why he should not be
declared in contempt of court.
On October 8, 2004, Judge Reyes issued another Order29 giving her process server, the MeTC sheriff and any officer of the law
blanket authority to "take custody of [Migriño] should he refuse to receive this Order and bring him to this Court on October 11, 13,
14 & 15, 2004 at 2:00 P.M." Complainants further narrated:
41. To show that the respondent judge is using her contempt powers as a bludgeon to clobber her perceived enemies, instead of
using the same as a necessary tool for preserving the integrity of the court, the respondent issued another Order dated October 14,
2004 ordering complainant Migriño to show cause why "he should not be cited for at least 2,330 acts of indirect contempt". Repeat,
two thousand three hundred thirty. A copy of this Order is attached hereto as Annex "J".
The tyranny and despotism of the respondent judge is crystal clear in the following statements in said Order of October 14, 2004
(Annex "J"):
Moreover, respondent committed at least 1,510 acts of indirect contempt with respect to the case of People vs. Marcos Rivera
(Crim. Case No. 36172) which remains pending in the docket of this court to date, when he failed to act on or set for arraignment to
date, the said case filed herein on April 29, 1998. Considering that a total of around 1,510 working days has lapsed from the said
date of filing of said case up to the time that said respondent was barred from entering the court premises and the staff room on
August 24, 2004, herein respondent is hereby ordered to show cause why he should not be cited for 1,510 acts of indirect contempt
for all the working days that he failed to act on said case which appears to remain pending in the docket of this court to date."
Even assuming for purposes of argument that the failure of the respondent to set for arraignment the aforementioned case is
contumacious, it was one continuing act of omission, not 1,510 separate acts of commission. 30 (Emphasis in the original;
III. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1625 (ARMI M. FLORDELIZA, JULIET C. VILLAR AND MA. CONCEPCION LUCERO v.JUDGE JULIA A. R
EYES)
By verified31 letter-complaint of March 11, 2004, 32 Judge Reyes was charged by complainants Armi M. Flordelisa et al. who are court
employees at Branch 69, with the following acts: (1) residing in chambers; (2) borrowing money from staff; (3) instructing the
stenographer to collect a minimum amount for ex-parte cases; (4) frequently bringing some of her staff to her nighttime gimmick; (5)
unethical conduct; (6) conduct unbecoming a lady judge; (7) unfriendliness to litigants; (8) anti-public service; (9) inability to control
emotions during hearing; (10) uttering invectives in front of staff and lawyers; (11) conducting staff meeting in an unsightly attire; and
(12) gross inefficiency/laziness.
According to complainants, it was of public knowledge at the Pasig City Hall of Justice that Judge Reyes was residing in her
chambers where a big aparador she had placed therein was eventually removed after three Supreme Court lawyers investigated the
matter. She continued to sleep in the chambers after going out for evening "gimmicks" with some members of her staff. She would
usually be fetched by a certain Col. Miranda at 12 midnight and would return at 4:00 a.m.33
On two separate occasions in May 2003, Judge Reyes instructed complainant Juliet Villar (Juliet), branch legal researcher, to act as
her co-maker in her loan applications. Within the same period, Judge Reyes, who allegedly needed money for an ID picture,
borrowed P500 from Juliet who was forced to borrow the amount from Miguelito Limpo (Limpo), branch process server, which
amount remained unpaid as of the filing of their complaint.34 Judge Reyes also borrowed P20,000 from the "branch process server"
who, however, did not execute any affidavit out of fear,35 as relayed by Maria Concepcion Lucero (Maria Concepcion), branch in-
charge of civil cases.36 When Juliet informed Limpo of the plan of some staff members to petition for the removal of Judge Reyes,
Limpo remarked, "Bago nyo ipatanggal yun, hintayin nyo munang bayaran ako. Inutangan ako nyan ng P20,000.00, isinanla ko pa
yung alahas para lang may maipautang sa kanya."37
In her other affidavit,38 Juliet claimed that in October 2003, Judge Reyes stepped out of the chambers and told complainant Armi
Flordeliza (Armie),39 Court Stenographer I, "Armie, ang hina mo naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si Leah. Dapat pag tinanong ka
kung magkano, sabihin mo at least P2,000.00" Since then all ex-parte cases were assigned to court stenographer Leah Palaspas
(Leah). Judge Reyes further remarked, "Sino pa ba ibang pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw Oswald, sheriff." The sheriff only
smiled.
Complainants stated that Judge Reyes habitually invited her staff to go with her in night "gimmicks" from 10:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. the
following day, without regard to working days. This practice hampered the delivery of judicial services, as the employees who went
out with her the previous night either went on leave or arrived late the following day. 40
On December 23, 2003, upon the persistent request of Judge Reyes, Juliet joined her and company in a comedy bar in Quezon City
and stayed there until 4:00 a.m. of December 24, 2003. Judge Reyes brought her employees to their respective homes and then
went to sleep in her chambers.41
Maria Concepcion, in another affidavit, stated that on January 2, 2004, Judge Reyes repeatedly invited the staff for lunch at her
residence. While inside her house, Judge Reyes insistently gave her a glass of red wine, from which she pretended to take a sip,
after which Judge Reyes consumed the remainder. Judge Reyes joined the rest of the staff at the sala where they consumed "gin
pomelo."42
Complainants depicted Judge Reyes as very unethical. One time, in the presence of a stranger, Judge Reyes uttered, "Ano kaya
kung mag-hearing ako ng hubo’t hubad tapos naka-robe lang, pwede kaya?"43 At one time, Armie overheard Judge Reyes utter
over the phone "Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko na siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha!"44
Judge Reyes exhibited conduct unbecoming a judge for repeatedly inviting her staff and other court employees to join her to a
drinking spree in the courtroom after office hours on three consecutive Fridays in February 2004. On March 2, 2004, Juliet arrived at
the office at around 7:00 a.m. and saw Judge Reyes about to leave the office. Juliet was later informed by the guards and janitors
that they saw an inebriated Judge Reyes sleeping on the bench outside the office and found empty bottles of alcoholic drinks in the
garbage can.45
Judge Reyes was also unfriendly to litigants. On January 23, 2004 during the inventory of cases, as a litigant attempted to verify the
status of his case, Judge Reyes suddenly remarked, "Nag-iimbentaryo kami, bawal mag-verify. Pag hindi ka umalis, iko-
contempt kita!" However, when an employee from another branch referred a couple to Judge Reyes for solemnization of marriage,
Judge Reyes ordered the stopping of the inventory to give way to it. On March 4, 2004, Judge Reyes sent Leah a text message
advising her to reset the hearings as she was unavailable, but upon being informed by Remedios that there was a marriage to be
solemnized that day, Judge Reyes immediately arrived and even attended the wedding reception. In the months of December 2003
and January 2004, Judge Reyes was able to solemnize 1646 and 1447 marriages, respectively.
Complainants claimed that Judge Reyes was anti-public service. She instructed the staff to lock the door entrance to the room
occupied by the staff and not to answer phone calls during court hearings even if there were employees in the staff room to attend to
calls and queries.48
Judge Reyes lacked the ability to control her emotions during hearings. In one hearing, she failed to maintain her composure and
stormed out of the room while Assistant City Prosecutor Fernando Dumpit was still talking. 49Judge Reyes hurled invectives in front
of the staff and lawyers. On October 2, 2003, while with a lawyer friend from the Office of the Solicitor General, she remarked in
front of her staff, "Alam mo na ang dami intriga dito; nireportba naman na nakatira ako dito, ano kaya masama dun? Alam
ko staff ko rin nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA NILA, PUTANG INA TALAGA NILA!"50
Several times, Judge Reyes conducted staff meetings wearing T-shirt, slippers and faded "maong" folded a little below the knee, as
if she was in her house. Oftentimes, she would wear the same clothes she wore the previous day, which showed that she resided in
the chambers.51
Judge Reyes was lazy and inefficient, as she delegated decision-writing to Juliet. Since her appointment, she was able to
promulgate only three or four decisions of her own writing.
Complainants thus requested the conduct of judicial audit to determine her work output. 52
By Supplemental Complaint 53 of January 28, 2005, Armie added:
1. I was jailed on the strength of a warrant of arrest dated October 8, 2004 issued by Judge Julia A. Reyes in connection with the
ten (10) counts of Indirect Contempt of Court charges which she had initiated against me for gross misconduct in office and
insubordination;
2. The warrant of arrest of October 8, 2004 stemmed from my failure to attend the hearing of an Indirect Contempt of Court charge
she filed against me, then about to be heard on October 8, 2004 at 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon where I am supposed to explain my
side;
xxxx
5. I was served with a copy of the show cause Order dated October 4, 2004 signed by Judge Reyes where I was informed that I
committed acts constituting contempt of court as defined by Rule 71, Section 3 (a) and (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On
the basis of said show cause order, I was also directed by Judge Reyes to appear on October 8, 2040 at 2:30 pm in court and to
make further explanation with warning that should I fail to attend the hearing on said date despite due notice, a warrant for my arrest
shall be issued by the court. Plain copy of the Order dated October 4, 2004 is herewith attached and duly marked as Annex "A";
6. For fear of being arrested, I did not attend the hearing of October 8, 2004, despite notice, and hence, as earlier stated, a warrant
of arrest dated October 8, 2004 was issued by Judge Reyes against me;
7. I was apprehended and confined at the Pasig City Police Station, at Pariancillo, Kapasigan, Pasig City to my great damage and
prejudice and that of my family;
xxxx
11. What is worse is that Judge Reyes fixed the bail for my temporary liberty at two hundred thousand (P250,000.00) pesos which to
my mind is quite excessive and violative of my constitutional right to bail;
xxxx
14. Surprisingly, the warrant of arrest dated October 8, 2004 issued by Judge Reyes supposedly carries a docket number starting
from Case Number 02154 up to and including 02163 which correspond to ten (10) counts of Indirect Contempt of Court. However,
the said case numbers does not pertain to a person of Armie M. Flordeliza, nor with a case of Contempt of Court. Please see
Certification signed by Atty. Reynaldo V. Bautista, Clerk of Court IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Pasig City – Annex "B," and a copy of the Warrant of Arrest dated October 8, 2004 – Annex "C";
xxxx
21. Be it noted that in November 8, 2004, herein complainant filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail (Annex "D") from P250,000.00 to
P50,000.00 in cash which was not acted upon; the reason why the herein complainant suffered for a longer period inside the
detention cell;
22. On the same date (November 8, 2004), a Subpoena (Annex "D-1") was served upon the herein complainant alleging that a
hearing will be held in November 9, 10, 11 and 12. However, Judge Reyes never conduct[ed] the hearings in November 10, 11 and
12, 2004 which constitute an oppression and violation of human rights and grave misconduct;
23. In November 16, 2004, the 12th day the herein complainant was under the detention cell, was the day that I was released by
posting a cash bond of P50,000.00 granted by Hon. Divina Gracia Lopez-Peliño, Pairing Judge of Branch 69, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Pasig City as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 21065408 (Annex "E"); Order dated November 16, 2004 (Annex "F"); and
Order of Release (Annex "G")[.] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) 54
IV. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1627 (ANDREE K. LAGDAMEO v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
Complainant Andree Lagdameo (Andree) is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 42030 for physical injuries pending before
Branch 69. The case was originally set for promulgation of judgment on May 19, 2004 but was cancelled and repeatedly reset – to
July 13, 2004, September 14, 2004 and November 23, 2004. Andree thus filed an Urgent Motion to Set Promulgation of
Judgment,55 furnishing the OCA a copy thereof, which step, Andree believed, "must have courted [the judge’s] ire."
Judge Reyes moved the promulgation date from November 23, 2004 to October 20, 2004, only to reset the same to October 16,
2004. After eight postponements,56 the judgment was finally promulgated on December 7, 2004 during which Criminal Case No.
42030 was first in the calendar of cases. Andree narrated:
xxxx
However, before the start of court proceedings that day, there was a courtroom drama which unfolded before the surprised eyes of
all persons then inside the courtroom. The Honorable Judge Julia A. Reyes ordered the arrest and detention of Prosecutor Romana
Reyes. Judge Reyes ordered her personal close-in-security, whom I later came to know to be PO1 Sandy Galino, and PO2 Rolando
Lavadia, to implement her order. I was seated on the first bench and I had a clear view and could clearly hear the proceedings. I
heard Judge Reyes forbid Prosecutor Reyes from calling her lawyer under pain of another day of detention. I heard Judge Reyes
further order PO1 Galino and PO2 Lavadia to close the doors of the courtroom and to prevent Prosecutor Reyes from leaving the
same.
6. Judge Reyes then proceeded to order Leah Palaspas to promulgate judgment in my case, Criminal Case No. 42030. I was so
shocked by the intemperate and derogatory words Judge Reyes used to describe my person in the aforesaid judgment, so much so
that I left the courtroom immediately after the reading because I was so afraid that my face would mirror my emotions and I might be
cited for contempt, especially after witnessing Judge Reyes’ actions toward Prosecutor Romana Reyes. I am a mere layman and I
must indeed look puny to the high and mighty Judge Julia A. Reyes.
I was the complainant, not the accused, in the case and I cannot understand why the judge exhibited such kind of hostility against
me in the judgment just promulgated.
7. I then waited for the termination of the court proceedings, to request for a copy of the decision since I wanted to consult a lawyer
regarding Judge Reyes’ affront on my person. I was barred from re-entering the court room by PO1 Sandy Galino, the armed
personal security of Judge Reyes, pursuant to her orders.
xxxx
9. I then went back to the courtroom of Branch 69, and found Leah Palaspas and Alma Santiano, both employees of MTC Branch
69, together with PO1 Galino and PO2 Lavadia, sitting in the now empty courtroom. I could hear the raised voice of Judge Reyes
emanating from her chambers. I asked Leah Palaspas for a copy of the decision, and to examine and photocopy some documents
in the file folder of Criminal Case No. 42030. She told me to wait as the folder was in the chamber of Judge Reyes. I pointed to her
that the decision in this case had just been promulgated this morning and logically, the folder would be in the pile in front of her. She
insisted that it was in the judge’s chambers, and for me to wait.
10. I then stood and waited for about another half hour in the corridor fronting the courtroom of Branch 69 after which, I again
approached Leah Palaspas regarding my request. She called a co-employee, whom I later came to know to be Ms. Josefina
Catacutan to accompany me to the photocopying machine. While waiting in line, I noticed that the decision promulgated that
morning was not in the file. I pointed this out to Ms. Catacutan who proposed that we return to Ms. Palaspas and ask for a copy.
11. Accompanied by Ms. Catacutan, I returned to the Branch 69 courtroom where we found Ms. Palaspas standing in the corridor. I
pointed out to her that a copy of the decision was not in the file. She protested that it was almost noontime and that I should just
come back in the afternoon. I pointed out to her that it was still ten minutes to twelve and it was just a matter of handing a copy of
the decision to Ms. Catacutan, and besides, I had been waiting since early morning.
12. Ms. Leah Palaspas turned her back on me and stepped into the courtroom where Judge Reyes was sitting with Alma Santino,
PO1 Galino and PO2 Lavadia and declared "Eto ho Judge, las doce na ho e."
13. I followed Ms. Palaspas inside the courtroom but had hardly stepped inside when I stopped in my tracks as Judge Reyes
shouted "Don’t try me, come back at 1:00 PM, GET OUT! I was so shocked at the arrogance of Judge Reyes and the way she
shouted at me that I turned on my heels and left.
14. On my way out – probably out of sheer frustration at the way the judge treats people who happened to have business in her
court – I commented to Ms. Palaspas who was standing beside me: "O baka ma contempt pa ako" and continued walking away.
15. Either Ms. Palaspas told the respondent judge about my comment, or the judge herself overheard me, when I reached the area
in front of the door of the staff room PO1 Sandy Galino suddenly grabbed my arm and prevented me from moving. When I turned
my head, I saw Judge Julia Reyes in the lobby fronting her courtroom wagging her finger in the air and shouting, ‘HULIHIN NIYO
YAN, IKULONG NINYO YAN!" – thus letting loose her armed gorilla on a hapless victim like me.
16. I instinctively struggled to free myself from the grip of PO1 Sandy Galino, all the while asking Judge Julia Reyes, "Bakit, hindi
naman kita sinagot ah" who all the while was viewing the scene with a smirk of satisfaction on her face.
17. I was able to momentarily free my hand and was able to call a lawyer friend on my mobile phone who then advised me to
demand for any sort of written order to justify my arrest and detention. I was also advised to demand that the arresting officers
identify themselves and the unit to which they belong. PO1 Galino replied "A wala, basta utos ni Judge ito doon ka na
magpaliwanag at magtanong!"
18. A uniformed police officer carrying an armalite rifle, whose name I was not able to get, then arrived. PO1 Sandy Galino
addressed the latter: "Pare, pag pumalag, barilin mo." I never imagined that I – a simply citizen without any clout; a weak, educated,
woman who merely sought the assistance of our courts to redress a perceived grievance – would be treated like a common criminal
in this fair Republic of ours!
I then continued to demand a written order regarding my arrest but Galino repeated, "Hindi na raw kailangan, sabe ni Judge" and
proceeded to forcibly bring me out of the Justice Hall. When we reached the lobby I tried to go up to the office of Executive Judge
Morallos but PO1 Galino pulled me down the stairs.
xxxx
The fact of my arrest was then entered into the Blotter of the Pasig Station on Page 0393, Entry No. 1781, Date: Dec. 7, 2004 Time
12:30 PM which reads as follows:
"Brought-in
PO1 Sandy Galino y Abuyog, 33 years old, married of this station brought in one Andree Lagdameo y Kirkwood, legal age, widow,
res of 237 Marne St. San Juan Metro Mla. for direct contempt of court issued by Hon. Judge Julia Reyes of MTC B69 Pasig
City. Order will follow."
(Attached as Annex "B")
xxxx
20. At 5:00 PM of December 7, 2004, Atty. Atencia again demanded my release from detention since it was now the close of office
hours and Judge Julia Reyes had not issued any commitment order. Col. Galvan again refused and insisted that he was following
the orders of Judge Julia Reyes.
xxxx
22. I was finally released from detention after 24 hours. My release is entered on Page 0397 of the Pasig Police Blotter under Entry
No. 1799, Date: December 08, 2004, Time: 12:30PM which reads as follows:
"Released
In relation to Entry 1781 dated Dec. 7, 2004 one Andree Lagdameo was released from the custody of this station physically and
financially unmolested as attested by her signature below.
Note: Detained w/o written commitment order and released w/o written released order.
(signature)
Andree Lagdameo"
(Attached as Annex "C")
x x x x57 (Emphasis, capitalization and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Andree supplemented58 her December 22, 2004 Complaint59 to allege that she finally received a copy of the Decision60 in Criminal
Case No. 42030 on December 16, 2004, several days after she was illegally detained, and only after she wrote a letter to Judge
Reyes, furnishing then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and the OCA a copy thereof. 61
When she read the Decision, she was shocked on noting that Judge Reyes used very insulting language in referring to her as the
therein private complainant. Judge Reyes wrote that "[j]udging from the demeanor and character of the accused who appears to be
a quiet man with a pleasant disposition and that of the private complainant who looks loud, rash and even vulgar in language in her
dealings with the court personnel herein, this Court finds the version of the accused to be more credible." 62 Judge Reyes made a
misrepresentation for she merely relied on the records in writing the decision as she never had the chance to hear the testimonies of
the parties since Judge Alex Quiroz was the presiding judge when the case was tried.
V. A.M. NO. P-09-2693 (TIMOTEO A. MIGRIÑO v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
In an undated letter63 received by the OCA on October 4, 2004, Judge Reyes recommended that Migriño be separated from the
service on charges of illegal gambling during office hours, qualified theft and/or infidelity in the custody of documents, and violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Upon the recommendation of the OCA, it appearing that this case emanated from the same incident of illegal gambling obtaining in
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624, the Court, by Resolution of September 28, 2005,64 ordered the consolidation of the two cases. Hence, the
factual background of this case is reflected in the earlier discussed A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624.
VI. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1638 (FLORENCIO SEBASTIAN, JR. v. HON. JULIA A. REYES)
By verified Complaint-Affidavit of April 22, 2005, 65 complainant Florencio Sebastian, Jr. (Sebastian) charged Judge Reyes with
Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Inefficiency arising from the procedings in Criminal Case No.
19110, "People v. Florencio Sebastian, Jr., Alicia Ty Sebastian and Justo Uy," for falsification of public document pending before
Branch 69.
On February 18, 2004 at around 5:00 p.m., police officers arrived at Sebastian’s residence and served on him and his wife Alicia
(the couple) warrants of arrest66 issued by Judge Reyes on October 28, 2003. After an overnight detention at Camp Caringal in
Quezon City, the couple was presented to the branch clerk of court, and learned that the warrants of arrest were issued due to their
failure to appear in court on October 28, 2003 as directed in an August 15, 2003 Order 67 which was not received by them or their
counsel, Atty. Jaime Vibar.
A perusal of the August 15, 2003 Order reveals that the same suffers from grave infirmity. It reads:
The unsigned Order dated May 9, 2000 is reiterated as follows:
"Accused through counsel, having been [sic] filed a Manifestation and Request for Remarking and Formal Offer of Exhibits." The
Prosecution is given five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to make its comment thereto."
Set the same for hearing on October 28, 2003, at 8:130 [sic] A.M.
Send copies of this Order to the parties. (Emphasis supplied)

The prior Order being unsigned, there was no factual or legal reason for Judge Reyes to reiterate the same and set the case for
further hearing, notably since the case had long been submitted for decision.
Judge Reyes did not lift the warrant of arrest, even after Atty. Vibar filed, pursuant to the October 28, 2003 Order, a Motion for
Reconsideration, Compliance and Entry of Appearance.68
At the promulgation of judgment on September 7, 2004, the branch clerk of court read only the decretal portion of the decision
convicting the couple. Atty. Vibar requested a copy of the decision but Judge Reyes replied that the decision had not yet been
printed but she could give him a diskette which Atty. Vibar refused. After declaring that she would later re-promulgate the judgment
and that the couple should stay in court, Judge Reyes started calling out the other cases. Not wanting to be part of the irregularity
and due to other pressing commitments, Atty. Vibar left. At around 11:40 a.m. inside the chambers, Judge Reyes read the judgment
from a computer screen without giving the couple a written copy69 or computer print-out.
The couple raised on appeal that the trial court failed to comply with the mandate of Rule 120 70 of the Rules of Court and Section
1471 of Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that the decision must be written and signed by the judge with a clear statement of
the facts and the law on which the decision is based.72
THE EVALUATION OF JUSTICE ROMULO S. QUIMBO
By Consolidated Report of June 27, 2004,73 Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo evaluated the first five administrative cases, viz:
Migrino presented a certificate that there is no case against him pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. He admits,
however, that a case for illegal gambling was filed against him. That the same may have been dismissed does not totally exempt
him from administrative liability considering that gambling within the court’s premises is proscribed by Administrative Circular No. 1-
9974 issued by the Supreme Court. His act of playing "tong-its" with two others within the court premises makes him punishable
under said circular.
xxxx
The acts which appear to have been committed by respondent Judge against Ass’t. City Prosecutor R[o]m[a]na A. Reyes and
Andree K. Lagdameo were clearly unjustified and unwarranted. The respondent Judge’s orders to declare them in contempt and
issuing warrants for their arrest betray an abysmal lack of knowledge of the rules governing contempt. Her fixing an atrociously
excessive bail is a clear manifestation that respondent Judge wanted to exhibit her authority and fixing such a ridiculous amount of
bail was designed to prevent the complainants from obtaining temporary release. Her obvious ignorance of the rule governing
contempt and the jurisprudence that mandates that it be exercised as a protective not a vindictive power makes us wonder how,
despite the rigorous screening of candidates by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), a "lemon" such as the respondent Judge
managed to be nominated for appointment to such exalted position. How she was able to elude the psychiatric and psychological
tests under which she went is remarkable for it resulted in the appointment of one grossly ignorant of the law and more importantly
devoid of the temperament required of a judicial arbiter.
In the two cases mentioned above (A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623 and A.M. No. 06-1627), the acts of respondent Judge reveal a flaw in
her psychological makeup that disqualifies her from holding the position of Judge. She appears to be unaware of the
jurisprudence that has given meaning to the power of contempt.
xxxx
The Order dated 13 October 2004 (Exhibit G, Rollo, p. 27, A.M. MTJ-06-1623), betrays not only her gross ignorance as regards the
Rule on Contempt of Court, but it also shows her capricious arrogance and despotic nature, the antithesis of an ideal arbiter. It
betrays a flaw in her psychological makeup that disqualifies her from presiding a court and dispensing justice.
Respondent inofficiously demanded that complainant conduct an inquest at the police station for the purpose of preventing the
release of Timoteo Migrino who had earlier been arrested while allegedly engaged in illegal gambling and had posted the required
bail. Notwithstanding the explanation of complainant Reyes that she was not authorized to conduct said inquest outside her office
and the crime of malversation allegedly committed two years earlier could not be the proper subject of an inquest, respondent could
not be denied. She demanded and the police acquiesced to hold Migrino in jail over the weekend.
The prosecution of Prosecutor Reyes was not based on any law or rule but was purely the whim and caprice of the respondent.
After respondent Judge has held Prosecutor Reyes in contempt and ordered her arrest (Exhibit ["F"], A[.]M[.] No. MTJ-06-1623, p.
24.) she required an unconscionable amount of Php236,000.00 as bail knowing that it was practically impossible to meet.
Complainant R[o]m[a]na R. Reyes charges respondent Judge with falsification of public documents. It appears that respondent
Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of complainant. Since no case had been filed against complainant, respondent Judge
conveniently issued the warrant under Criminal Cases Nos. 02164 to 02173 (10 counts) which pertained to cases filed against
various persons during the year 1985. The Order of 13 October 2004 (Exhibit ["G"], Rollo, A.M. MTJ-06-1623) conveniently omitted
to show any case numbers.
The travails suffered by complainant Lagdameo likewise prove that respondent Judge was not guided by law or rule but rather by
whim and caprice. The record does not show any reason why respondent Judge could order the arrest of complainant. Assuming
that she had uttered the words "I am going because I may be declared in contempt", this could not be the basis for declaring her in
direct contempt because the court was no longer in session and she ma[d]e the remark outside the courtroom. It was not
"misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same". Neither could it be
considered disrespect towards the court. It is probably for this reason that respondent Judge did not issue any commitment order
but orally commanded the police to arrest Lagdameo. As can be seen from excerpts from the police blotter (Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-06-
1627, p. 9) Lagdameo was "brought in" on December 7, 2004 at 12:30 P.M. and was "released" on December 8, 2004, at 11[:]50
AM (ibid. p. 10). The same blotter states: "Note: Detained w/o written commitment order & released w/o written released." [sic]
(Emphasis and italics in the Report)
Respondent’s verbal order directed to members of the PNP to arrest and jail Lagdameo who languished in said jail for a day is
clearly a violation of Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code and respondent Judge is a principal by inducement.
The complaint filed by three personnel of Br. 69 charges respondent Judge with conduct unbecoming a judge which could be
considered pecadillos and are covered by circulars and other issuances of the Court and are punished by either fines or
suspensions or admonitions.
Considering respondent Judge’s acts complained of by complainants R[o]mana R. Reyes and Andree K. Lagdameo, together with
the acts committed by respondent Judge and subject of other administrative cases assigned to the undersigned, there can only be
one conclusion that respondent Judge is suffering from some undiagnosed mental aberration that makes her totally unfit to hold the
position she now occupies. Not only was her gross ignorance established but her resort to falsification was also proved.
The records show that respondent Judge was suspended and has abandoned her office of presiding Judge. She did this probably
because she felt guilty and could not find any justification for her actions so she fled.
In A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624, the harassment and ill treatment of complainant Migrino was clearly established. The fact that
respondent Judge followed Migrino to the police station and demanded that he be kept in custody despite the Order of Release
issued by Judge Morallos upon Migrino’s filing his bail both clearly shows her to be whimsical and capricious. The continued
detention of Migrino after he was ordered released under bond is likewise arbitrary and in violation of Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code and respondent Judge is a principal by inducement.
In OCA-IPI No. 04-2048-P, the record reveals that the respondent Migrino was indicted for illegal gambling having been allegedly
caught en flagrante by complainant Judge Julia A. Reyes. The record also reveals that a certificate was issued by the Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City that there is no pending case against Migrino. Even if we assume that the illegal
gambling case which was filed against Migrino and for which he had to file his bond was dismissed, it still remains that Migrino was
seen gambling within the court premises, an act which is proscribed by Administrative Circular No. 1-9975 earlier
mentioned.76 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Justice Quimbo thereupon recommended that Judge Reyes be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all her retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and that Migriño be fined in an amount equivalent to his one
month salary.
Meanwhile, in A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638, Justice Quimbo, by Report of September 25, 2006, 77 reiterated his recommendation after
coming up with the following evaluation:
The complaint mentions acts of respondent Judge which are similar, if not identical to those complained of in the following cases, to
wit: A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623 (Prosecutor Romana R. Reyes vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624 (Timeteo A. Migrino, et
al. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625 (Armi Flordeliza, et al. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-1627
(Andree Lagdameo vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes) which the undersigned had earlier investigated and reported on. Our conclusion
remains firm that respondent Judge is unfit to hold the position of Presiding Judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court.
In the present case, she is charged with ignorance because she had issued a bench warrant against the complainant and his wife
for their failure to appear on a date that respondent Judge fixed for the continuation of the trial. While she may be correct in
assuming that she had the authority to issue such warrant, said act was clearly unjustified. Firstly, it does not appear in the record of
the case that complainant or his wife received notice of said hearing. Neither does it appear that their counsel received a copy of the
Order of 15 August 2003 which contained the said setting. Secondly, there was no longer any trial to speak of because the case had
already been submitted for decision and the complainant (accused therein) had no longer any need for appearing. 78 (Emphasis and
THIS COURT’S RULING
The Court finds that Judge Julia Reyes should indeed be dismissed from the service.
As early as 1949, this Court emphasized that the administration of justice is a lofty function.
The administration of justice is a lofty function and is no less sacred than a religious mission itself. Those who are called upon to
render service in it must follow that norm of conduct compatible only with public faith and trust in their impartiality, sense of
responsibility, exercising the same devotion to duty and unction done by a priest in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies
of a religious liturgy.79
By judges’ appointment to the office, the people have laid on them their confidence that they are mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, members of the judiciary are expected to be fearless in their pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power, and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to
resist the temptations lurking in their office. 80Unfortunately, respondent Judge failed to resist the temptations of power which
eventually led her to transgress the very law she swore to protect and uphold.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law or procedure, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of
official duties should be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. Most importantly, the judge must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.81
Judge Reyes’ bad faith is clearly apparent from the above-related facts and circumstances in the consolidated cases. This Court
cannot shrug off her failure to exercise that degree of care and temperance required of a judge in the correct and prompt
administration of justice, more so in these cases where her exercise of the power of contempt resulted in the detention and
deprivation of liberty of Migriño, Andree, Sebastian and Alicia, and endangered the freedom of the other complainants. Tiongco v.
Salao82 is instructive:
Thus, the carelessness and lack of circumspection on respondent Judge’s part, to say the least, in peremptorily ordering the arrest
and detention of complainant, warrant the imposition of a penalty on respondent Judge as a corrective measure, so that she and
others may be properly warned about carelessness in the application of the proper law and undue severity in ordering the detention
of complainant immediately and depriving him of the opportunity to seek recourse from higher courts against the summary penalty of
imprisonment imposed by respondent Judge.
It is also well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the administration of justice. Judges, however, are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
and not for retaliation or vindication. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. Only
occasionally should the court invoke the inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a dispenser of justice, Judge Reyes, a lady judge at that, should have demonstrated finesse in her choice of words. In this
case, the words used by her was hardly the kind of circumspect language expected of a magistrate. The use of vulgar and curt
language does not befit the person of a judge who is viewed by the public as a person of wisdom and scruples. 84 Remarks such
as "Ano kaya kung mag-hearing ako ng hubo’t hubad tapos naka-robelang, pwede kaya?"; "Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko
na siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha!"; and "Alam mo na ang dami intriga dito; nireport ba naman na nakatira ako dito, ano kaya
masama dun? Alam ko staff ko rin nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA NILA, PUTANG INA TALAGA NILA!" have no place in the
judiciary.
Those who don the judicial robe must observe judicial decorum which requires magistrates to be at all timestemperate in their
language, refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting to the language of vilification. 85
Judge Reyes failed to heed this injunction, however. Her inability to control her emotions her act of walking out of the courtroom
during hearings, and her shouting invectives at her staff and lawyers indicate her unfitness to sit on the bench. They betray her
failure to exercise judicial temperament at all times, and maintain composure and equanimity. 861avvphi1
Judge Reyes’ questioned actions reflect her lack of patience, an essential part of dispensing justice; and of courtesy, a mark of
culture and good breeding. Her demonstrated belligerence and lack of self-restraint and civility have no place in the government
service.87
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (New Code of Judicial Conduct), which took effect on June 1, 2004,
mandates:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. 88
Respecting Judge Reyes’ frequent nocturnal "gimmicks," suffice it to state that her presence in the above-mentioned places impairs
the respect due her, which in turn necessarily affects the image of the judiciary. A judge is a visible representation of the judiciary
and, more often than not, the public cannot separate the judge from the judiciary. Moreover, her act of bringing some of her staff to
her weekday "gimmicks," that causes them to be absent or late for work disrupts the speedy administration of service. She thus also
failed to heed the mandate of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, viz:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by
the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office. 89
As for Judge Reyes’ act of borrowing money from her staff, the same constitutes conduct unbecoming a judge. While there is
nothing wrong per se with borrowing money, it must be borne in mind that she exerted moral ascendancy over her staff, who may
not have had the means but may have been forced to find a way in order not to displease her.
Judge Reyes’ comments like "Armie, ang hina mo naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si Leah. Dapat pag tinanong ka kung
magkano, sabihin mo at least P2,000.00" and "Sino pa ba ibang pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw Oswald, sheriff" smack of
commercialism. This is not expected of a judge, knowing that the aim of the judiciary is to deliver speedy and inexpensive justice. 90
Respecting Judge Reyes’ failure to put into writing her judgment, she having merely required the accused to read it from the
computer screen in camera without the presence of counsel, she violated the Constitution. She could have simply printed and
signed the decision. Offering to a party’s counsel a diskette containing the decision when such counsel demands a written copy
thereof is unheard of in the judiciary. A verbal judgment is, in contemplation of law, in esse, ineffective. 91 If Judge Reyes was not yet
prepared to promulgate the decision as it was not yet printed, she could have called the case later and have it printed first. A party
should not be left in the dark on what issues to raise before the appellate court.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and
against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost,
so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to in point the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. 92
If judges were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond the boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of
their office, then the law becomes meaningless. A government of laws excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
acting under its authority.93
In fine, this Court finds Judge Reyes unfit to discharge her functions as judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Julia A. Reyes, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, isDISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo A. Migriño is, for violation of Administrative Circular No. 1-99, by gambling in the court
premises, FINED in the amount equivalent to his one-month salary. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same act or the
commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Conducto v Monzon
Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law. He refused to suspend the mayor due
to criminal charges against the latter for the crime of unlawful appointment. The judge opined that an official
cannot be suspended for something that has happened in a previous term. Settled jurisprudence says this only
applies to administrative, not criminal cases.
Held: Fined for P5000. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional
mistakes or errors of judgment, it is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. A judge is
called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with the basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative
doctrines. Also, if he did the act deliberately, he violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a
judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that
he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. An RTC judge cannot overturn
a settled doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation would be endless.

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Legal Ethics - Case 5

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Republic of the Philippines

A.C. No. 5377 June 15, 2006

Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

This Resolution is immediately executory.

Adm. Case No. 2984 August 31, 2007

The antecedent facts that led to Mejia’s disbarment are as follows.

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484 (A) March 17, 2000

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484 March 17, 2000

Executive Secretary RONALDO B. ZAMORA, complainant,

Respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The First Case

The Second Case

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195 February 26, 1997

Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A. NAZARENO, complainants,

The following persons appeared before Justice Uarpio Morales:

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623 September 18, 2009

PROSECUTOR ROMANA R. REYES, Complainant,

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624

TIMOTEO A. MIGRIÑO and DOMINGO S. CRUZ, Complainants,

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1627

A.M. No. P-09-2693

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638

FLORENCIO SEBASTIAN, JR., Complainant,

By Supplemental Complaint 53 of January 28, 2005, Armie added:

(Attached as Annex "B")

(Attached as Annex "C")

x x x x57 (Emphasis, capitalization and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

VI. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1638 (FLORENCIO SEBASTIAN, JR. v. HON. JULIA A. REYES)

The unsigned Order dated May 9, 2000 is reiterated as follows:

Send copies of this Order to the parties. (Emphasis supplied)

THE EVALUATION OF JUSTICE ROMULO S. QUIMBO

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