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Consti Case Laws
Consti Case Laws
RESERVATION
Article 20(3)
15. State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad 1962
Brief facts Of the CaseThe ,respondent was charged, alongwith another person, under s. 302, read
with s. 34 of the 1. P. C., as also under s. 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act (XI of 1878). The Trial Court
found him guilty of those charges-and sentenced him to imprisonment for life under s. 302, read with
s. 34 of the |.P.C. and to. a term of two years rigorous imprisonment for the. offence under the Arms
Act.
Legal Issue
The impressions of the appellant’s palms and fingers taken from him after his arrest, which were
compared with the impressions on the glass panes and phials, were not admissible evidence in view
of the provisions of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.
(3) Whether a direction given by a Court to an accused person present in Court to give his specimen
writing and signature for the purpose of comparison under the provisions of 5.73 of the Indian
Evidence Act infringes the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 20 (3) 0f the Constitution.
Observation
Section 27 provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of Information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody, of a police officer, so much of the
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved. It cannot be disputed that by giving such information the accused
furnishes evidence and therefore is a ”witness” during the investigation. Unless however he is
"'compelled” to give the information he cannot be said to be “compelled” to be a witness; and so Art.
20(3) is not infringed. Compulsion is not however inherent in the receipt of information from an
accused person in the custody of a police officer. There may be cases where an accused in custody is
compelled to give the information later on sought to be proved under 5.27. There will be other cases
where the accused gives the information without any compulsion. Where the accused is compelled to
give information it will be an infringement of Art. 20(3); but there is no such infringement where he
gives the information without any compulsion. Therefore, compulsion not being inherent or implicit
in the fact of the information having been received from a person in custody, the contention that s. 27
necessarily infringes Art.20(3) cannot be accepted. A question was raised in the course of the
discussion as to when a person can be said to have been "'compelled” within the meaning of
Art.20(3).this question does not arise for consideration in view of our conclusion that in any case the
accused does not become a "’witness against himself by giving his Specimen signatures or
impressions of his fingers or Palms.
Decision
Held, that there was no infringement of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution in compelling an accused
person to give his specimen handwriting or signature, or impressions of his thumb, fingers, palm or
foot to the investigating officer or under orders of a court for the purposes of comparison. Section 27
of the Indian evidence act did not offend Art 20(3) unless compulsion is used.
Principles laid down as to guarantee
(i) the guarantee includes not only oral testimony given in court or out of court but also
statements in writing which incriminate the maker when figuring as an accused person;
(ii) the words "to be a witness" in Art.20(3) do not include the giving of thumb impression or
impression of palm, foot or fingers or specimen writing or exposing a part of the body by an
accused person for identification;
(iii) "self-incrimination" means conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the
given and does not include the mere mechanical process of producing documents in court which
do not contain' any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge;
(iv) in order to come within the prohibition of Art. 20(3) the testimony must be of such a character
that by itself it should have the, tendency to incriminate the accused; and
(V) to avail of the protection of Art. 20(3) the person must have stood in the character of an
accused person at the time he made the statement .
16. Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani and Ors. 1978
Facts
The Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Cuttack, filed a complaint against the appellant,
the former Chief Minister of Orissa, under section 179 of IPC before the Sub-divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Sadar, Cuttack. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued summons for
appearance to the appellant. Aggrieved by this, the appellant moved the High Court challenging the
validity of the proceedings on the grounds that the charges against her were because of the
appellant’s failure to police interrogation and that the appellant’s refusal to do so was covered under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution and section 161(2) of Cr.P.C. The High Court dismissed the petition
and the appellant preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Hon’ble Court held that: ‘To be witness against oneself is not confined to particular offence
regarding which the questioning is made but extends to other offences about which the accused has
reasonable apprehension of implication from his answer. This conclusion also flows from ‘tendency
to be exposed to a criminal charge’. ‘A criminal charge’ covers any criminal charge than under
investigation or trial or imminently threatens the accused.’
The Hon’ble Court took into consideration M.P.Sharma’s case and held that the guarantee under
Article 20(3) would be available to those persons against whom a First Information Report has been
recorded as accused therein. It would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary
documents which are reasonably likely to support a prosecution against them. The prohibitive sweep
of Article 20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation-not, as contended, commencing in
court only.
While deciding the ambit of article 20(3) of the Constitution with regard to the fourth issue, the
Hon’ble Court held that insistence on answering is a form of pressure especially in the atmosphere of
the police station unless certain safeguards erasing duress are adhered to.
The term section 161 of Cr. P. C includes accused persons as well as witnesses. Section 161(2) was
held to be an extension of article 20(3) as it provides an accused the right against self-incrimination.
The appeal was allowed and the prosecutory proceedings were quashed.
17. Smt Selvi & Ors vs. State of Karnataka 2010
Facts
The bone of contention involved in the case is the involuntary administration of the impugned
techniques which prompts questions about the protective scope of the ‘right against self
incrimination’ under article 20(3) of our constitution.
MAIN LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED
Whether narcoanalysis, brain mapping, FMRI and polygraph test could be used as a constitutionally
valid method of gathering evidence.
Whether these evidence gathering scheme result in dilution of constitutional rights such as the ‘right
against self-incrimination under article 20(3)
Whether the procedure undertaken be considered violative of “substantive due process”.
DECISION BY THE JUDGES
In our considered opinion, the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques
violates the `right against self- incrimination'.
The test results cannot be admitted in evidence if they have been obtained through the use of
compulsion.
We are also of the view that forcing an individual to undergo any of the impugned techniques
violates the standard of `substantive due process' which is required for restraining
personal liberty.
We have also elaborated how the compulsory administration of any of these techniques is an
unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual.
Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by
themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious
control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or
material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results
can be admitted, in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
`Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused' in
2000.
(i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An
option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
(ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the
physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his
lawyer.
(iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.
(iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly
represented by a lawyer.
(v) At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is
made shall not be a `confessional' statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement
made to the police.
(vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention
and the nature of the interrogation.
(vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a
hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on
record.
18. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India 1978
The Supreme Court in Satwant Singh[1] held that right to travel abroad is well within the ambit of
Article 21. Therefore, to combat the above laid down law the Parliament enacted Passports Act 1967.
Passport Act, 1967 empowers the authorities to impound the passport of certain individual if such
action is necessary in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly
relations of India with any foreign country, or general public.[2] The reasons of such impoundment
are also to be communicated the affected party however in the interests of the general public these
reasons can be withheld.[3] In the immediate case the authorities on July 4th 1977 issued a notice of
impoundment of the passport of Petitioner who was a known journalist citing reasons as in the
interest of general public. As soon as the petitioner got the notice of such impound she reverted back
to the authorities asking for specific detailed reasons as to why her passport shall be impounded. The
authorities however, answered that the reasons are not to be specified in the interest of the general
public. Therefore, the petitioner approached Supreme Court u/a 32 for the enforcement of
Fundamental Right mentioned u/a 14 against the arbitrary action of the authorities. The petition was
further amended and enforcement of Article 21 i.e. Protection of Life & Personal Liberty, Article
19(1)(a) i.e. Right to freedom of speech & Article 19(1)(g) i.e. Right to freedom of
Movement.Among the major reasons contended for the filing of such petition, the petitioner
contended that the impugned order is void as it took away the petitioner’s right to be given a fair
hearing to present her defense.
The major findings of the court were as follows:
The court while delivering this landmark judgment changed the landscape of the Constitution by
holding that though the phrase used in Article 21 is “procedure established by law” instead of “due
process of law” however, the procedure must be free from arbitrariness and irrationality.
The court overruled Gopalan by stating that there is a unique relationship between the provisions of
Article 14, 19 & 21 and every law must pass the tests of the said provisions. Earlier in Gopalan the
majority held that these provisions in itself are mutually exclusive. Therefore, to correct its earlier
mistake the court held that these provisions are not mutually exclusive and dependent on each other.
The court held that the scope of “personal liberty” is not be construed in narrow and stricter sense.
The court said that personal liberty has to be understood in the broader and liberal sense. Therefore,
Article 21 was given an expansive interpretation. The court obligated the future courts to expand the
horizons of Article 21 to cover all the Fundamental Rights and avoid construing it in narrower sense.
The right to travel abroad as held in Satwant Singh is within the scope of guarantees mentioned
under Article 21.
Section 10(3)(c) of Passport Act 1967 is not violative of neither Article 21 nor Article 19(1)(a) or 19
(1)(g). The court further held that the said 1967 provision also not in contradiction of Article 14.
Since the said provision provides for an opportunity to be heard. The court rejected the contention of
petitioner that the phrase “in the interests of the general public” is not vague.
The court held that Section 10(3)(c) & 10(5) is an administrative order therefore, open to challenge
on the grounds of mala fide, unreasonable, denial of natural justice and ultra vires.
The court also suggested government to ordinarily provide reasons in every case and should rarely
use the prerogative of Section 10(5) of the 1967 act.
The rights discussed under 19(1)(a) & 19(1)(g) are not confined to the territorial limits of India.
Article 25& 26
19. The Commissioner, Hindu ... vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Math, 1954
The constitutionality of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 was
challenged on the ground of infringement of Article 26. The legislation was enacted for the purpose
of acquiring control over the ‘secular' activities of the Religious Endowments, namely.
Many provisions of the enactment were struck down by Court on different counts, it upheld the
inspection of accounts and even inspection of temples by the State authorities since, according to the
court; it did not interfere with the essential aspects of religion.
Court defined the scope of ‘secular' activities using ‘essential principles test'. It was held that for
defining social welfare content the judiciary can distinguish essential from the non-essential activity.
“What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the
doctrines of that religion itself”
Section 56 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Act 1951 empowered the
Commissioner, at any moment, to deprive the ‘mahanta’, of his right to administer the property even
if there was no negligence or maladministration.
Although the State’s right under 25(2)(a) will generally trump the denomination’s rights under 26(c)
(d), the court held that the state's ability to encroach upon the denomination’s rights should be
reasonable. The state can regulate but not completely take away a denomination's right to own and
administer property. In this case section 56 was held as violating Article 26(c)(d) as it completely
extinguished the denomination's right under 26(b).
a denomination is “a collection of individuals, classed together under the same name. Thus if a body
has a: 1. Common Faith, 2. Common Organisation, 3.Distinctive Name; it categorises as a religious
denomination.
20. Sri Venkataramana Devaruand Others v.The State of Mysore and Ors.
In this case, trustees of the temple of Shri Venkataramana of Moolky Petta challenged the Madras
Temple Entry Authorisation Act, which allowed entry of Harijans in the temple, as breaching the
right to manage its own affairs.
Here an appeal to the HC decision was filed by the trustees of the temple of Sri Venkataramana of
Moolky Petta demanding to uphold the ban of entry Harijan into the temple premises. The Temple of
claimed to be a religious denomination having an absolute right to manage its own affairs with
respect to its religious practice and outside the purview of governmental control. The High court
maintained the prohibition only certain instance of special ceremonies but however upheld the public
right to worship. The Supreme Court when dismissing the appeal reasoned that Article 25(2) (b)
must be read harmoniously with Article 26 i.e. it must be given a liberal interpretation to benefit the
public. It also declared that Article 26 is not an absolute right and yields to the restrictions found in
Article 25. The scheme in Article 26 was further read down by extending the application of the
essentiality principle to clause (b) ‘matters of religion.’ The entry of Harijans was allowed with the
exception of some special ceremonies when entry could be restricted.
21. Nikhil Soni vs. Union of India
Santhara or Sallekhana is a religious practice among the Jain community where it is believed to be a
medium through which moksha(salvation) can be attained it involves a person undertaking fast unto
death when he has completed all the purposes of his life, or his body is not functioning.
It had been stated in the PIL that Santhara amounts to self destruction and therefore amounts to
suicide under section 309 of IPC and is also violative of Right to life as Right to death is not
provided by part III of the constitution.
The judgement of the High Court also holds Santhara as not an essential practice under the Jain
religion and therefore it cannot be granted the protection of the constitution under religious freedom.
The court says there is no dignity whatsoever in the act of fasting, and that therefore, there exists no
freedom to practice Santhara as an extension of one’s right to life under Article 21.
The Supreme Court in its appeal was satisfied that the practice of Santhara is different from that of
suicide under section 306 of IPC and stayed the decision given by the Rajasthan High Court
declaring Santhara as an offence.
22. Sheshamal vs. State of Tamil Nadu
An act was passed which made certain hereditary religious offices non-hereditary and prescribed
certain qualifications for them irrespective of caste, creed or race. The Act was passed with an object
of social reform measure, and was challenged on the ground of violation of Article 25(1) and 26 (b).
Petitioner contended that under the law a trustee could appoint any one as priest if he possessed
requisite qualifications irrespective of his being a Savaite or Vaisnavite which constituted a violation
of freedom of religion.
The Court held that the appointment of a priest was a secular act and appointment of priest on
hereditary principle despite its religious usage was not an integral part of religion. The Court upheld
the validity of the law.
23. Commissioner of Police vs. Jagdishwarananda Avadhut
The commissioner of Police, Calcutta imposed a ban on Tandava Dance performed in public place
and streets
Commissioner’s order was challenged by the followers of Anand marga as infringing their rights
under Article 25 and 26.
The court went through the origins of Ananda Marga and found the Tandava performed bby carrying
trident in public is not an essential part of Anand Marga.
24. Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Others v. The Government of Tamil Nadu & Another
The case Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Others v. The Government of Tamil Nadu &
Another 1 (hereinafter Adi Saiva) revived the issue of temple Archakas (priests) customarily being
appointed from within certain Brahmin sects within the broader religious denomination. The matter
involved a Tamil Nadu State Government Order (hereinafter G.O) that sought to break the monopoly
of the Brahmin priests over what was a public office under the powers of appointment of an agent of
the State, the temple trustee, by making all Hindus irrespective of caste eligible for the office of
Archaka. This, according to the appellants, violated their freedom to religious practices protected by
Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The Bench comprising of Justices Ranjan Gogoi and N.V
Ramana, having heard the competing claims observed that the appointment of Archaka could not be
in contravention to the constitutional principles, referring to equality and freedom from caste
discrimination.
However, they acknowledged the claims of the appellants insofar as Archaka appointments could not
be made in contravention to diktats imposed by the Agamas, the religious scriptures that governed a
Hindu temple. Despite engaging in a critical analysis of the established jurisprudence on the matter,
the Court curiously did not provide any conclusion to the central question at hand that of the
constitutionality of the challenged order, rather held that its validity would be adjudged on a case-to-
case basis.
25. Indian Young Lawyers Associations vs The State of Kerala, 2018
The Sabarimala temple is one of Kerala’s most famous temples and it is dedicated to the worship of
Lord Ayyappa, who is also referred to as ‘Dharmashastha’ or Lord of Dharma and is worshipped as a
‘Naishtika Bramhachari’ or a celibate for life. Therefore, as per a notification by the Devaswom
Board that manages the temple, women belonging to the menstruating age are not permitted to enter
the temple. The Sabarimala temple is managed by the Travancore Devaswom Board. The centuries-
old restriction that restricts women of menstruating age from temple entry had been challenged now
and then.
Kerala High Court upheld an age-old restriction on women of a certain age-group entering
Sabarimala temple. A two-judge bench decreed (on April 5) that the prohibition by the Travancore
Devaswom Board that administers the hill shrine does not violate either the Constitution or a
pertinent 1965 Kerala law.
The India Young Lawyers Association filed a PIL with the Supreme Court, contending that Rule 3(b)
of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules 1965 that states
“Women who are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship shall not be
entitled to enter or offer worship in any place of public worship” violates constitutional guarantees of
equality, non-discrimination and religious freedom.
According to the court, Sabarimala temple is not a separate religious denomination because it does
not satisfy the requirement of a distinctive name. It is controlled by the States under Article 290-A of
the constitution and regulated by a statutory Board constituted under Travancore-Cochin Hindu
Religious Institutions Act, 1950.
Further, this cannot be saved under Article 26(b) since it is controlled by article 25. Barring of the
menstruating women is violative of their right to equality (Article 14), right to freedom of religion
(Article 25) and is patent discrimination on grounds of sex(Article 15(2)).
26. Shayara Bano vs Union of India, 2017.08.23
Talak-ul-Biddat which is the issue of controversy. This is known as Tripe Talaq which was
challenged before the SC in this case. Talak-ul-biddat is although banned in Shias.However, in
Hanafi School is thought as sinful but is practiced by a large Muslim community who follow Hanafi
school. In this type of Talaq the Husband does not follow the approved form of Talaq i.e. talaq-ul-
sunnat and he neither waits for iddat period nor to the abstention from sexual intercourse. This was
an escape route developed by the Islamic patriarchal society to avoid their marriage.
In this form of Divorce husband repudiates his wife by three divorces in one sentence. The biggest
problem with this type of talaq is that it is one of irrevocable nature unlike its counterparts.
This immediate appeal was filed in the apex court by ShayaraBanoa victim of this demonic practice.
She claimed the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights mentioned under Article 14. In the mean-
time there were numerous petitions challenging the same issue therefore, SC clubbed all the petitions
in one and heard it. Various NGO’s and even union government was supporting the cause.
The Supreme Court laid down this judgment on August 22, 2017 in 3:2 majority holding the practice
of Triple Talaaq unconstitutional.
While the majority upon lengthy discussion came to the conclusion that Triple Talaq is not an
essential religious practice but minority bench found this practice to be an essential religious
practice.
Under Article 25 of the Constitution the state cannot take away the essential religious practice of a
person. Therefore, if a practice which is arbitrary and not an essential religious practice it will be hit
by the exception laid down u/a 25. Therefore, the whole issue was whether or not the practice is an
essential religious practice of Islam
Therefore, as per majority it was held that the Triple Talaqor Talaq-e-biddatis not protected by the
exception laid down in Article 25 i.e. the court found the said practice not an essential element of
Islamic religion. The court justified its point of view in the sense that although it si practiced by the
Hanafi School but it is considered sinful in it.
Article 25 in it carries the right of every person to freely practice and propagate any religion of
choice and such practice is only restricted in the context of the following exceptions:
a) Public Order
b) Health
c) Morality
d) Other Provisions of Part III of the Constitution
Although the said practice has no relevance to the first three exceptions but the said practice is surely
against other provisions of Part III namely Article 14. The said practice is in violation of the
Fundamental Right of equality since it is against the rights of women as they have no say in the
declaration of divorce unlike in other religions
Essential religious practices are those on which the religion is founded upon. Essential religious are
those which are fundamental to the profession and propagation of the religion. If taking away of a
practice causes a substantial change in the religion then such practice can be called as ‘an essential
religious practice.’ Only such practices are protected in Article 25(1).
Article 29 and 30
27. Re Kerala Education Bill
The Supreme Court opined that while it is easy to say that minority means a community which is
numerically less than 50 per cent.
The Court has ruled that a minority has to be determined, in relation to the particular legislation
which is sought to be impugned. If it is a state law, the minorities have to be determined in relation to
the state population.
Supreme Court has observed: "The right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to
administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute right". It has to be read with
regulatory power of the state. Regulations which do not affect the substance of the guaranteed rights,
but ensure the excellence of the institutions and its proper functioning in matters educational, are
permissible.
The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minority cannot
surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings.
The right conferred on minorities to establish education institutions of their choice doesn’t mandate
that religious minorities need to establish schools that impart teaching of their religion, or linguistic
minorities schools that teach their language.
It leaves the choice up to the minorities to determine what kind of schools they need in order to
preserve their religion, language, or culture, and in order to give a thorough general education to
their children.
Establishment can also involve recognition and affiliation of an educational institution. Affiliation
and recognition cannot be denied or subjected to conditions that would rob the minorities’ right
under Art. 30(1) of its substance.
An institution established by a minority and receiving aid from the state would not lose its minority
character by admitting members of any other community.
The right conferred on religious and linguistic minorities to administer educational institutions of
their choice, though couched in absolute terms, is not free from regulation.
28. D.A.V.college vs. State of Punjab 1971
The Arya Samaj is a reformist movement, believes in one God and in the Vedas as. the books of true
knowledge, It has a distinct Organisation the membership of which is open to all those who subscribe
to its aims and objects.
The Dayanand Anglo Vedic College Trust, formed to perpetuate the memory of the founder of the
Arya Samaj runs various institutions in the Country. The petitioners-colleges managed and
administered by the Trust and the Managing Society were, before the Punjab Reorganisation Act,
affi- liated to the Punjab University constituted under East Punjab Act 7 of 1947.
In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 5 the first respondent specified the districts in the State of
Punjab over which the University was to exercise its power and notified the date on which the
colleges in the areas so specified ceased to be affiliated to the Punjab University and were to be
associated with and admitted to the privileges of the new university.
In petitions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution it was contended that the main object of the Act
was to propagate Sikh religion and to promote Punjabi language in Gurumukhi script and that since
the petitioners institutions belonged to a minority based on religion and language their compulsory
affiliation violated Arts. 29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution.
A reading of Arts. 29(1) and 30(1)would lead to the conclusion that a religious or linguistic minority
has a right to establish and administer educational institutions of its choice for effectively conserving
its distinctive language script or culture subject to the regulatory power of the State and cl. (2) of Art.
29. While this is so, these two articles are not inter-linked nor does it permit of their being always
read together.
Religious or linguistic minorities are to be determined only in relation to the particular legislation
which is sought to be impugned; if it is State Legislature these minorities have to be determined in
relation to the population of the State.
linguistic minority for the purpose of Art 30(1) is one which must at least have a separate spoken
language; it is not necessary that the language should also have distinct script.
34. P.A. Inamdar & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 12 August, 2005
35. Ashok Kumar Thakur vs. UOI