REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V.

CASTELLVI

FACTS:

In 1947, a parcel of land in Pampanga owned by Castellvi has been rented and occupied by the
government through the Armed Forces of the Philippines under a lease of year to year contract.

In 1956, owner Castellvi decided to terminate the contract. AFP refused because of the
permanent installations and facilities thus, respondent instituted ejectment proceedings. AFP, in
return commenced expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE:

W/N the determination of jus compensation will commence in 1947 or 1959

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that “taking” should not be considered in 1947 and the just
compensation should not be based on the value of the property that year because requisite no. 2
and 5 for “taking” are not attendant in this case.

1. The expropriator must enter a private property.

2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.

The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property

should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited
lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic,
through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that
the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to
year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the
time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was
to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease
contract.

3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
 The entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did
not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained
as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal
of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the
Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither
was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it
filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should be reckoned as of the year
1959.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint.