Aisporna v.

CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was
issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M.
Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad
Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna,
Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189
of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the
soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office
of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true
agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy
was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to
renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note
on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found
Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14
August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-
GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974.  On
20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court
of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or
intent of the Insurance Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute
as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce harmonious whole.  In the present case, the first paragraph of Section
189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring
a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the
second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the
section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its
violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under
the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible
error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the
paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation
shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of
compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or
contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused
of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.