PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

TOPIC: Marital rape



FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex
with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated
her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started
to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his
sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed
but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the
bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to
instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to
her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the
bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant
by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As
he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges
as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up
her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.



HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.



The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-
marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either
based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply
unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution
for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right
to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the
accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and
wife unless the contrary is proved.

 According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual
violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration,
defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.


CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)

March 31, 1971

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years
after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at
the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-
law relationship.

HELD:


Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses
during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.

However, the lack validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila does not necessarily mean
that the Cornelia will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between
Felix and Petronila were legitimated by marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil
Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other
half. (Matabuena vs. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971)


Agapay v. Palang

G.R. No. 116668, 28 July 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. In 1972, Miguel returned to the Philippines for good
but did not choose to live with his wife and daughter Herminia. In July 1973, then 63 years old Miguel
contracted his second marriage with 19 years old Erlinda Agapay.

In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Upon the death of Miguel in 1981, Carlina
and Herminia filed a case to recover the ownership and possession of the Agricultural land in
Pangasinan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void marriage
(Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid marriage (Carlina and Miguel).

RULING:

Yes. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel
and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and had a
sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, SC
finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.




Docena vs. Lapesura Case Digest
Docena vs. Lapesura
G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001

Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on
occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The trial court
ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial
court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in
Intervention of Abuda was dismissed.

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in
issuing the Writ of Demolition.

Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife
always act together.

Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of
the court in proper cases. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband
alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued
against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of
the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. The signing
petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar
to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal
proceeding involving real property




Uy vs CA
Uy vs. CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a
petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to
sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest
that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such
decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made
by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As
such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it
should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further
reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband
and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that
this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the
appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering
him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that
subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the
conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of
the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.