EN BANC

[G.R. No. 126252. August 30, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS GARCIA y

MANABAT , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Juan Antonio Reyes Alberto III for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

In an information led before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, herein accused-
appellant Jesus Garcia was charged with the crime of illegal possession of ve kilos of
marijuana. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial on the
merits, the court a quo rendered a decision on February 20, 1996 nding the accused-
appellant guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and sentenced him. to suffer the
maximum penalty of death. In this case, appellant impugned his conviction on the grounds
that: (a) the decision convicting him of the crime charged was not validly promulgated as
the promulgation was made four days after the retirement of the judge who penned the
decision; (b) the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecution witness is insu cient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ScTIAH

The Court a rmed appellant's conviction. The Court found that although the
effectivity of Judge De Guzman's disability retirement was made retroactive to February
16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision was promulgated on
February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC and has in fact, continued
to hold said o ce and act as judge until his application for retirement was approved in
June 1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting the appellant was
promulgated, Judge de Guzman was actually discharging his duties as a de facto judge.
On the issue of the credibility of the prosecution witness, the Court found the testimony of
the prosecution witness credible to sustain a judgment of conviction. With regard to the
penalty imposed, the court ruled that the death sentence originally imposed on appellant
was correctly modi ed by the trial court and reduced to reclusion perpetua as there was
no aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime. Accordingly, the
Court a rmed the conviction of the appellant but reduced his penalty to reclusion
perpetua and subject to the modi cation that the additional penalty of ne in the amount
of ten million pesos is likewise imposed on him.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; DECISION PROMULGATED

BY A DE FACTO JUDGE IN THE ACTUAL EXERCISE OF HIS OFFICE IS LEGAL AND HAS A
VALID BINDING EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — A decision promulgated after the retirement of
the judge who signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a decision
is valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. To
be precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally
constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally
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 appointed, duly quali ed and actually acting either de jure or de facto. A judge de jure is
one who exercises the o ce of a judge as a matter of right, fully invested with all the
powers and functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de facto is one who
exercises the o ce of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation of the o cer
he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the
particular time. In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated.
Although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s disability retirement was made
retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision
was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC,
Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said o ce and act as judge
thereof until his application for retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as of
February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de
Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his duties as a de facto judge. In fact, as of that time,
he has yet to le his application for disability retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we
laid down the principle that where the term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased
to act as judge, his subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business he left
un nished before the expiration of his term are void. However, in the present case, as
Judge de Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his o ce at the time
the decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said decision is legal
and has a valid and binding effect on appellant.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; IT RUNS COUNTER TO
COMMON EXPERIENCE THAT AN INNOCENT PERSON, WRONGLY ACCUSED OF A CRIME
AND SUBJECTED TO ALLEGED PHYSICAL ABUSE BY THE AUTHORITIES WOULD KEEP
MUM ABOUT HIS PLIGHT; CASE AT BAR. — We nd it altogether disturbing that appellant,
without compunction, acknowledged in open court that he lied when he initially claimed he
was kicked by the police o cers while under their custody. After testifying that he was
kicked and punched on the chest and thighs, appellant unwittingly declared that he
suffered no broken ribs or internal injury as a result of the alleged mauling. Realizing the
improbability of his claim of maltreatment, he promptly altered his previous testimony. He
sought to explain the lack of visible signs of physical abuse on his body by clarifying that
he was only punched, not kicked, by the police authorities. Lastly, it runs counter to
common experience that an innocent person, wrongly accused of a crime and subjected to
alleged physical abuse by the authorities would keep mum about his plight. Yet, appellant,
through all the sufferings he supposedly underwent, would have us believe that he has not
con ded to anyone, not even to his brother, his version of the incident, not to mention the
maltreatment he supposedly endured in the hands of the police authorities. In sum,
appellant's defense lacks the ring of truth.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS, IF POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE,
IS ENOUGH TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. — In sum, we nd the testimony of
Senior Inspector Enmodias credible to sustain a judgment of conviction. We reiterate the
familiar rule that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is enough to
convict an accused. For indeed, criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses
presented against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even one witness. It
bears stress that it is the quality, not the quantity, of testimony that counts. To be sure, a
corroborative testimony is not necessary where the details of the crime have been
testi ed to with su cient clarity. As there was nothing to indicate in this case that police
o cer Enmodias was inspired by ill-motive to testify mendaciously against appellant, the
trial court had every reason to accord full faith and credit to his testimony.
IcTEAD

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 DECISION

PUNO , J : p

For review is the conviction of accused-appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for

illegal possession of ve (5) kilos of marijuana for which he was initially sentenced to
death. The Information 1 against him reads:
"That on or about the 28th day of November, 1994, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control ve (5) kilos of compressed marijuana dried
leaves, without the authority of law to do so, in violation of the abovecited
provision of the law."

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pled not guilty.

The prosecution's case hinges on the testimony of Senior Inspector OLIVER
ENMODIAS. He recounted that on November 28, 1994, he and SPO3 JOSE PANGANIBAN
boarded a passenger jeepney from their o ce in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, en
route to Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while SPO3 Panganiban
sat opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When the jeepney reached Km. 4 or 5,
accused JESUS GARCIA boarded the jeepney carrying a plastic bag. He occupied the front
seat, beside the driver and placed the plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of minutes, the
policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from accused's bag. To con rm
their suspicion, they decided to follow accused when he gets off the jeepney. 2
The accused alighted at the Baguio City hall and the police o cers trailed him. The
accused proceeded to Rizal Park and sat by the monument. Half a meter away, the police
o cers saw the accused retrieve a green travelling bag from the back pocket of his pants.
He then transferred ve (5) packages wrapped in newspaper from the plastic bag to the
green bag. As the newspaper wrapper of one of the packages was partially torn, the police
o cers saw the content of the package. It appeared to be marijuana. 3 Forthwith, the
policemen approached the accused and identi ed themselves. The accused appeared to
be nervous and did not immediately respond. The policemen then asked the accused if
they could inspect his travelling bag. The accused surrendered his bag and the inspection
revealed that it contained ve (5) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
The police o cers then arrested the accused and seized his bag. The accused was turned
over to the CIS o ce at the Baguio Water District Compound for further investigation. He
was appraised of his custodial rights. At about 5 p.m., the arresting o cers left for the
crime laboratory at Camp Dangwa, Benguet, for chemical analysis of the items seized from
the accused. The next day, the policemen executed their joint a davit of arrest and
transferred the accused to the Baguio city jail. Veri cation by the arresting o cers of the
records at the Narcotics Command revealed that the accused's name was in the list of
drug dealers. 4 The result of chemical analysis of the ve (5) items seized from the
accused con rmed that they were dried marijuana fruiting tops, weighing a total of ve (5)
kilos. 5 LibLex

For his part, the accused admitted being at the locus criminis but denied possessing
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 marijuana or carrying any bag on November 28, 1994. He alleged that on said day, at about
8:00 a.m., he left his residence in Angeles City to visit his brother, NICK GARCIA, whom he
had not seen for ten (10) years. He arrived in Baguio City at 12:30 p.m. Before proceeding
to his brother's house, he took a stroll at the Rizal Park. At about 2:00 p.m., two (2) men
accosted him at the park. They did not identify themselves as police o cers. They held his
hands and ordered him to go with them. Despite his protestations, he was forcibly taken to
a waiting car 6 and brought to a safehouse. There, he was asked about the source of his
supply of illicit drugs. When he denied knowledge of the crime imputed to him, he was
brought to a dark room where his hands were tied, his feet bound to a chair, his mouth
covered by tape and his eyes blindfolded. They started mauling him. Initially, he claimed he
was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs. When asked further whether he suffered
bruises and broken ribs, he answered in the negative. Thereafter, he explained that there
were no visible signs of physical abuse on his body as he was only punched, not kicked.
Notwithstanding the maltreatment he suffered, the accused claimed he stood rm on his
denial that he was dealing with illicit drugs. 7
To corroborate accused's testimony, the defense presented MANUEL DE GUZMAN,
a resident of Baguio City and a neighbor of accused's brother Nick Garcia. He came to
know the accused in 1994 when accused visited his brother Nick, a few months before
accused was arrested in November that same year. He recounted that in the afternoon of
November 28, 1994, while he was walking along Rizal Park, he noticed two (2) men holding
the accused's hands and forcing him to a car. He was then about 8-10 meters away. He did
not see the accused or any of the two men carrying a bag. 8 prLL

In a Decision, dated January 29, 1996, RTC Judge Pastor de Guzman, Jr . 9 found the
accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and sentenced him to suffer the
maximum penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court nds the accused Jesus
Garcia y Manabat guilty of the violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as
amended by R.A. 7659, involving possession of marijuana weighing 5 kilograms,
beyond reasonable doubt.

"The penalty for the possession of marijuana weighing 5 kilograms as

provided under R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 is Death. The Court has no
recourse but to sentence the accused Jesus Garcia y Manabat to suffer the death
penalty. The law is harsh but it must be followed and obeyed, 'dura lex sed lex.'"
"SO ORDERED."

The decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996.

On February 26, 1996, the accused moved for reconsideration. 1 0 He reiterated his
position that the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Inspector Enmodias
was insu cient to establish his guilt. He further contended that he should only be
punished with reclusion perpetua.
On April 12, 1996 , Judge de Guzman, Jr. led an application for disability retirement.
This Court, in its en banc Resolution, 1 1 dated June 18, 1996, approved his application. The
effectivity of his retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996.
On August 6, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Eulogio Juan R. Bautista issued an Order
12 granting in part accused's Motion for Reconsideration. For lack of aggravating
circumstance, the accused's penalty for illegal possession of marijuana was reduced from
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 death to reclusion perpetua. LLpr

In the case at bar, appellant impugns his conviction on the following grounds: (a) the
decision convicting him of the crime charged was not validly promulgated as the
promulgation was made four (4) days after the retirement of the judge who penned the
decision; (b) the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Senior Inspector
Enmodias is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, we shall thresh out the procedural matter raised by appellant.
In his Motion for Clari cation , 1 3 appellant contends that since the decision under
review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, four (4) days after the approved retirement
of Judge de Guzman, Jr., his decision is void and has no binding effect. 1 4
We reject this contention. Undisputably, a decision promulgated after the retirement
of the judge who signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, 1 5 a
decision is valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge during his
incumbency. To be precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a
court legally constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge
legally appointed, duly quali ed and actually acting either de jure or de facto. 1 6 A judge de
jure is one who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully invested with all the
powers and functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de facto is one who
exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation of the o cer
he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the
particular time. 1 7 llcd

In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated. Although the
effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s disability retirement was made retroactive to
February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision was
promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC, Branch LX
of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said o ce and act as judge thereof until
his application for retirement was approved in June 1996 . Thus, as of February 20, 1996
when the decision convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr. was
actually discharging his duties as a de facto judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to le
his application for disability retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the
principle that where the term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as
judge, his subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business he left un nished before
the expiration of his term are void. 1 8 However, in the present case, as Judge de Guzman,
Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his o ce at the time the decision under
review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said decision is legal and has a valid and
binding effect on appellant. 1 9
On the merits, we likewise affirm appellant's conviction.
In his Memorandum 2 0 before the trial court, appellant insisted that the prosecution
was unable to discharge its onus of establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
maintained that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution's main witness, Senior
Inspector Enmodias, is incredible and unreliable. Firstly, appellant pointed out that if the
police o cers indeed smell the marijuana he was allegedly carrying while they were all on
board the jeepney, they should have immediately arrested him instead of waiting for him to
alight and stroll at the Rizal Park. Secondly, appellant faulted the procedure adopted by the
arresting o cers who, after the arrest, took him to the CIS O ce at the Baguio Water
District Compound for investigation instead of bringing him to the nearest police station,
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 as mandated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Finally,
appellant theorized that the prosecution's omission or failure to present the other
arresting o cer, SPO3 Panganiban, to corroborate the testimony of its witness Senior
Inspector Enmodias was fatal to the prosecution's case as the lone testimony of
Enmodias failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
These contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The prosecution was able to prove
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is nothing irregular in the manner
appellant was apprehended by the police authorities. On the contrary, we nd that, without
compromising their sworn duty to enforce the law, the police o cers exercised
reasonable prudence and caution in desisting to apprehend appellant inside the jeepney
when they initially suspected he was in possession of marijuana. They sought to verify
further their suspicion and decided to trail appellant when the latter alighted from the
jeepney. It was only after they saw that one of the packages with the torn wrapper
contained what looked like marijuana fruiting tops did they accost appellant and make the
arrest. At that precise time, they had obtained personal knowledge of circumstances
indicating that appellant had illicit drugs in his possession. They had reasonable ground
upon which to base a lawful arrest without a warrant. cdtai

Neither do we nd anything irregular with the turn over of appellant to the CIS O ce.
At the trial, it was su ciently clari ed that this has been the practice of the arresting
o cers as their o ce had previously arranged with the CIS for assistance with respect to
investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS o ce being more specialized in the area of
investigation. 2 1 Neither can the police o cers be held liable for arbitrarily detaining
appellant at the CIS o ce. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a
public o cer who shall detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the
proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable by a ictive or capital penalties . In
the present case, the record bears that appellant was arrested for possession of ve (5)
kilos of marijuana on November 28, 1994 at 2 p.m., a crime pun[ishable with reclusion
perpetua to death. He was detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting
o cers to the court in the afternoon of the next day . Clearly, the detention of appellant for
purposes of investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law, i.e., 36 hours from
the time of his arrest.
Coming now to appellant's defense, we nd that his simplistic version of what
transpired that fateful day utterly failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by
the prosecution. His testimony is not worthy of credence. Firstly, appellant insists he did
not bring any travelling bag or personal items with him. 2 2 However, we nd it ba ing that
one would visit a relative in a distant province and fail to bring clothes and other personal
belongings for the duration of his stay. Secondly, while appellant repeatedly emphasized
that he went to Baguio City to visit his brother whom he had not seen for ten years, 2 3 his
corroborating witness, de Guzman, adamantly insisted that the rst time he met appellant
w a s only months before the arrest. 2 4 Thirdly, we nd it altogether disturbing that
appellant, without compunction, acknowledged in open court that he lied when he initially
claimed he was kicked by the police o cers while under their custody. After testifying that
he was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs, appellant unwittingly declared that he
suffered no broken ribs or internal injury as a result of the alleged mauling. Realizing the
improbability of his claim of maltreatment, he promptly altered his previous testimony. He
sought to explain the lack of visible signs of physical abuse on his body by clarifying that
he was only punched, not kicked, by the police authorities. 2 5 Lastly, it runs counter to
common experience that an innocent person, wrongly accused of a crime and subjected to
alleged physical abuse by the authorities would keep mum about his plight. Yet, appellant,
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 through all the sufferings he supposedly underwent, would have us believe that he has not
con ded to anyone, not even to his brother, his version of the incident, not to mention the
maltreatment he supposedly endured in the hands of the police authorities. 2 6 In sum,
appellant's defense lacks the ring of truth. cdphil

Neither did the testimony of appellant's corroborating witness aid the defense as it
is equally awed. De Guzman testi ed that he saw appellant being held by two men and
being forced into a car, yet he never revealed what he saw to appellant's brother Nick. No
explanation was offered for this omission. Although de Guzman thought that the two men
harbored ill intentions in abducting appellant, he never reported the incident to the police
nor told Nick, appellant's brother, about what he witnessed. In fact, it was when Nick told
him that appellant was in jail that de Guzman allegedly mentioned to Nick what he saw
days earlier. 2 7
Treated separately, the incongruent details in the defense theory may appear
innocuous at rst blush. However, the inconsistencies eventually add up, striking at the
very core of appellant's defense — the real purpose of his presence at the crime scene. The
contradictions become disturbing as they remain unsatisfactorily explained by the defense
and unrebutted on record.
In sum, we nd the testimony of Senior Inspector Enmodias credible to sustain a
judgment of conviction. We reiterate the familiar rule that the testimony of a single
witness, if positive and credible, is enough to convict an accused. For indeed, criminals are
convicted not on the number of witnesses presented against them, but on the credibility of
the testimony of even one witness. 2 8 It bears stress that it is the quality, not the quantity,
of testimony that counts. 2 9 To be sure, a corroborative testimony is not necessary where
the details of the crime have been testi ed to with su cient clarity. 3 0 As there was
nothing to indicate in this case that police o cer Enmodias was inspired by ill-motive to
testify mendaciously against appellant, the trial court had every reason to accord full faith
and credit to his testimony. 3 1 cdrep

On a nal note: The death sentence originally imposed on appellant was correctly
modi ed by the trial court and reduced to reclusion perpetua as there was no aggravating
circumstance present in the commission of the crime. However, both the Decision and
Order of the trial court omitted to impose the penalty of fine. 3 2
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Order, dated August 6, 1996, a rming the conviction of
appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, but reducing his penalty to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED,
subject to the modi cation that additional penalty of ne in the amount of ten million
(P10,000,000.00) pesos is likewise imposed on him. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 5.
2. March 1, 1995 TSN, pp. 4-6, 12-13.

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 3. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 14-17, 19.
4. Ibid., pp. 6-8, 10-12, 20-23.
5. Testimony of forensic officer Police Senior Inspector Alma Margarita Villasenor,
February 2, 1995 TSN, pp. 3-10; Chemistry Report No. D-064-94, Original Records, p. 31.

6. April 25, 1995 TSN, pp. 2-6.

7. Ibid., pp. 7-9.
8. June 20, 1995 TSN, pp. 2-11.
9. Presiding Judge, Branch LX, Baguio City; Rollo, pp. 17-22.
10. Original Records, pp. 178-182.

11. "A.M. No. 8868-Ret.- Re: Application for disability retirement of Judge Pastor V. de
Guzman, Jr. — Acting on the application for disability retirement filed by Judge Pastor V.
De Guzman, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Baguio City, under R.A. No. 910, as
amended by R.A. No. 5095 and P.D. No. 1438, effective February 16, 1996 and it
appearing that applicant is: (a) over 69 years of age with more than 41 years of
government service and (b) suffering from Parkinson's disease, Stage IV, Hypertension,
Stage II, Organic Brain Syndrome, Mild to Moderate, a condition which falls within the
classification of permanent total disability per memorandum of Dr. Ramon S. Armedilla,
Medical Officer IV, dated April 2, 1996, concurred in by Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas, Director III
and Dr. Rosa J. Mendoza, Director I, this Court's Clinic, the Court resolved to APPROVE
the aforesaid application for disability retirement of Judge Pastor V. de Guzman, Jr.,
under the above-cited law, effective February 16, 1996, but payment of the benefits shall
be subject to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements."
12. Original Records, pp. 198-200.

13. Rollo, pp. 38-39.

14. In response to the Order of this Court for the filing of his Brief in this case, appellant
manifested that he adopts the contents of his Memorandum and Motion for
Reconsideration before the trial court as his Brief; See Adoption of Pleadings in Lieu of
Filing Appellant's Brief; Rollo, pp. 42-43.
15. Rule 120, Section 6.
16. Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, 37 Phil. 186 (1917).
17. Ibid.
18. Garchitorena vs. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675 (1918).
19. It is noteworthy that a different outcome would have resulted had Judge de Guzman,
Jr. applied for optional retirement instead of disability retirement. In cases of optional
retirement, SC Circular No. 16, dated December 2, 1986, specifically provides that the
application for optional retirement should be filed at least two (2) months prior to its
specified effective date (guideline #2) and when the specified date of retirement is
reached without the applicant receiving any notice of approval or denial of his
application, he shall automatically cease working and discharging his functions unless
directed otherwise (guideline #4); See also People vs. Labao, 220 SCRA 100 (1993).
20. Original Records, pp. 161-168; This was adopted by appellant as part of his Brief.

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 21. March 1, 1995 TSN, pp. 20 & 25.
22. April 20, 1995 TSN, p. 12.
23. Ibid., p. 11.
24. June 20, 1995 TSN, pp. 5-6.
25. May 3, 1995 TSN, pp. 5-7.
26. April 20, 1995 TSN, p. 11.
27. June 20, 1995 TSN, pp. 6-11.
28. People vs. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210 (1998); People vs. Correa, 285 SCRA 679 (1998).
29. Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 171 (1998).
30. People vs. Correa, supra.
31. People vs. Arellano, 282 SCRA 500 (1997).
32. Section 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, provides the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos for illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

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