In Trump's World, Nukes Are Self-Defense - Foreign Policy

26/2/2019 In Trump’s World, Nukes Are Self-Defense – Foreign Policy
ARGUMENT
In Trump’s World, Nukes Are Self-
Defense
As the Japan-U.S. alliance weakens, could Tokyo drop its nuclear weapons ban?
BY WILLIAM SPOSATO | JANUARY 28, 2019, 11:25 AM
F
acing the reality of a nuclear North Korea, worsening relations with ostensible
ally South Korea, and an unpredictable partner in Washington, Japan’s
government is ramping up its military defenses, shedding many of its postwar
taboos. Could the ban on nuclear weapons also be sent to the scrap heap at the same
time as the country gets a real army? The idea seems far-fetched, but Japan is
increasingly alone in a fast-changing Asian security environment.
Since the advent of the atomic age, Japan has sat comfortably under the U.S. nuclear
umbrella, a key element in a defense alliance that is often touted by both U.S. and
Japanese officials as the strongest in the world. The treaty, first signed in 1951, provides
U.S. security guarantees for a country that had renounced the use of force in its post-
World War II constitution, which was largely drafted by Japan’s U.S. occupiers. In
exchange, Japan is home to extensive U.S. military bases that have helped to project
power into the center of East Asia. The alliance seemed unbreakable. But that was
before Donald Trump became U.S. president—a leader ostensibly willing to put
everything on the table, with a view of Japan seemingly stuck in the 1980s.
From the cost of military bases to the chronic trade deficit, Trump’s statements have
Japanese officials privately worried that the United States might take rash action that
would have been unthinkable in previous administrations—such as a deal with North
Korea that leaves Japan exposed.
Cementing the warming personal relations between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un
and Trump were recent comments from Kim ahead of their planned February summit.
“Kim Jong Un said that we will believe in President Trump’s positive way of thinking,
wait with patience and in good faith and, together with the U.S., advance step by step
toward the goal to be reached by the two countries,” North Korea’s official KCNA news
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The problem for Japan is what that might mean for its security. U.S. Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo told Fox News last week that “Chairman Kim continues to assure the
president of the United States he is intent on denuclearization”—but promises of
denuclearization on one side of the Sea of Japan are prompting backroom talk of going
the opposite way on the other.
That would be a huge step. The only country to have seen firsthand the devastation of
atomic weapons, Japan has long held a no-nukes policy based on three principles:
nonpossession, nonproduction, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons. It has been a
leading force at the United Nations for nonproliferation and the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons.
Trump has railed against Japan on numerous occasions, even as he seems to retain
some fondness for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But he has even kinder words
for Kim. Trump’s much-heralded North Korean deal is still up in the air, but he
famously declared when he returned to Washington from the pomp of the Singapore
summit that the United States was now safe. The choice of words was not lost on the
Japanese government, which rushed to ensure that it was not being left out in the cold
(or the rain).
The choice of words was not lost on the Japanese government,
which rushed to ensure that it was not being left out in the cold
(or the rain).
The concern in Tokyo is that Trump, badly in need of a clear victory in his North Korea
negotiations, may settle for a ban on intercontinental weapons, leaving nearby Asian
countries to sort out what to do about all the short-range missiles that Pyongyang has
deployed.
As many experts have noted, what the U.S.-North Korea commitment to denuclearize
the Korean Peninsula means is in the eye of the beholder. For Kim, it appears to mean
that the United States drops its strategic military alliance with South Korea. Given the
proximity to Japan and the fact that defense of South Korea is a cornerstone of the U.S.-
Japan military alliance, North Korea would likely insist that the same goes for Japan.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who took office in May 2017, has moved at a
breakneck pace to reduce the threat posed by Pyongyang. His administration has taken
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the lead in dealing with his unpredictable neighbor (and an unpredictable U.S. leader).
He has held three summit meetings with Kim, with the two leaders agreeing to reduce
the military capabilities along the border and Demilitarized Zone. Moon has also said
the South would provide financial and economic aid as soon as U.S. sanctions are lifted.
While a more relaxed Korean Peninsula should appear to be good news, the
rapprochement scenario poses its own risks to Japan. While South Korea is seeing a
steady improvement in relations with Pyongyang, the Koreas’ ties to Japan have been
worsening steadily.
Some have been more point scoring than policy disputes, such as Japan’s withdrawal
from naval maneuvers after South Korea demanded it not use the Rising Sun flag for its
naval ships.
Others are more serious, however, and play into a long-held Korean narrative that all
would be well if only Japan weren’t around. A long-running dispute over wartime
forced prostitution has come back despite a 2015 agreement with the previous South
Korean government. This has now been joined by lawsuits over forced labor for Japan’s
wartime industries. Japan says any legal action was settled in the 1965 peace treaty
between the two countries. South Korea’s Supreme Court has ruled that the treaty does
not cover actions by individuals, paving the way for seizure of Japanese assets.
Kim has taken the opportunity to pile on the abuse, warning this month that Japan’s
pressure over the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s
would mean that Pyongyang would raise its own complaints over wartime laborers.
Can this seemingly common cause run deeper? The idea of a single Korea has been a
long-standing dream of both countries and reiterated in their summit meetings. From
Japan’s perspective, it is important for South Korea to pledge today that any combined
Korea would swear off the idea of having nuclear weapons.
“Unless the South Koreans do so now, it would become difficult for them to say the same
thing when the unification becomes more realistic. In the worst-case scenario in which
a unified Korea inherits nuclear weapons from North Korea, Japan would become the
only major country in the region not to have nuclear weapons, creating a significant
reputational issue,” said Narushige Michishita, a professor at Tokyo’s National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies. “If it happens, Japan might be almost forced to acquire
nuclear weapons, wasting a lot of money and other precious resources.”
All this uncertainty plays into the hands of Japanese hawks, who have long complained
that Japan should turn its back on the postwar pacifist constitution and get to work on a
proper military force.
The 1947 U.S.-drafted constitution states that “the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes.” The wording is quite direct, but the government has shown
itself willing to stretch a point. While the document goes on to say that “land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” this has not stopped
the country from amassing formidable armed forces in everything but name. The
Japanese armed forces are considered one of the most advanced in the world and rated
among the top 10 by strategic groups.
Abe, who in his previous 2006-2007 term was the first Japanese prime minister not to
have lived through World War II, is leading this charge. He has pushed up defense
spending by more than 10 percent since taking office in 2012. For the new fiscal year
starting in April, the defense spending will rise to a record $48 billion, a 2.1 percent
increase. This has been done with little opposition, even though the government’s
continuing budget deficits have put public debt at around 225 percent of annual GDP,
making it among the most indebted countries in the world by most measures.
The most significant step is to refit Japan’s two helicopter carriers to be able to deploy
the F-35B fighter jet, the U.S. Marine Corps version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Pressed on why a purely defensive military force needs aircraft carriers, Defense
Minister Takeshi Iwaya said, “The planned modification to the Izumo-class carriers is to
increase their applications.” Given the sensitivities, the ships are also not called aircraft
carriers but are instead officially listed as “multipurpose escort destroyers.”
The budget will include the purchase of U.S.-made weapon systems, which will
conveniently help to reduce Japan’s trade surplus with the United States, another
recent source of irritation between the two countries. Aside from the F-35 planes,
totaling more than 80 overall, $2.1 billion will be spent for a ground-based version of the
Aegis missile tracking system. In doing so, Japan has weathered criticism from not only
North Korea but also China and Russia, which view the system as a way to block their
missiles as well.
There has also been a flurry of courtesy calls and maneuvers with various Japanese
allies, taking the country’s forces into areas that pretty clearly stretch the definition of
self-defense. The helicopter carrier Kaga last year sailed through the contentious South
China Sea, which is claimed by China, and the Indian Ocean to meet up with ally India
and stop in Sri Lanka. The Air Self-Defense Force held joint drills with Australia and the
U.K. Royal Navy, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force held its first joint
amphibious exercise in Japanese waters.
There has also been a flurry of courtesy calls and maneuvers with
various Japanese allies, taking the country’s forces into areas that
pretty clearly stretch the definition of self-defense.
All of this is what one security expert at a defense think tank called “securing the U.S.
presence while improving [Japan’s] own capability within the alliance.”
A long-running question for Japan has been whether the U.S. security guarantee is
actually a firm one. This is sometimes referred to as the “de Gaulle doctrine,” named
after French President Charles de Gaulle, in which he questioned whether the United
States would ever risk an attack on a major American city to protect Europe. At the same
time, a U.S. abandonment of Japan would face harsh opposition on both sides of the
Pacific. In the words of one security expert in Tokyo, a U.S. pullback from South Korea
or Japan would mean that Washington is in effect saying, “China, we don’t care about
Asia. Please take it.”
Yet from a technical standpoint, experts agree that acquiring nuclear weapons would be
fairly easy for Japan, taking anywhere from six months to a few years. It has stockpiles
from its nuclear power plants of 47 tons of plutonium, enough for around 6,000 nuclear
warheads, and the rockets developed for its civilian space program could be rebadged
for military purposes. Experts say, however, that developing a full-fledged operational
deterrent would be much more complex and much more expensive.
Japan defense scholars also stress that a decision to go nuclear would face a number of
political and geopolitical issues, chief among them domestic public opinion. “While
there has been a modest increase in support for an enhanced conventional defense
force, there is no sign of public support for acquiring nuclear weapons and is in fact at
its lowest level ever,” said Corey Wallace, an Asia-Pacific security expert and fellow in
the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin. He also notes
that China would be firmly opposed, with fairly serious repercussions on relations that
have been improving in recent years.
Changing public sentiment would likely be prompted only by a fundamental shift in
Japan’s perceived safety, such as direct threats by an emboldened North Korea (or a
unified Korea). “The Japanese public is skeptical about the utility of the use of power
projection and nuclear weapons in particular, but it is not blindly irrational or
idealistic,” Wallace said.
And where to obtain them? Michishita sees a fairly simple answer: Buy them from the
United States. “If they sell nuclear weapons to Japan, they can make some money and
can maintain influence in the situation,” he said. “If the Americans say no, we could go
talk to the French.”
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TAGS: ARGUMENT, EAST ASIA, JAPAN, NORTH KOREA, NUCLEAR, UNITED STATES COMMENTS
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