Cuba's Impact in Southern Africa

Author(s): Owen Ellison Kahn

Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3, (Autumn, 1987),
pp. 33-54
Published by: School of International Studies, University of Miami
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165843
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 CUBA'S IMPACT
IN SOUTHERNAFRICA*
by OWENELLISONKAHN
THIS ARTICLEASSESSESthe impact of the Cuban military on
strategic,diplomaticand political relationshipsin southernAfrica.It
does not deal with why Cubaand its Sovietbenefactorhaveinterested
themselvesin the region,nordoes it discuss Sovietinfluenceon Cuban
foreignpolicy.1The aspects covered here include: (1) how Cubaand
Angolafit into the complex patternof regional relationsin southern
Africa;(2) an outline of the region'smainterritorialactorsandguerrilla
movements,along with a brief historyof Cuban involvementin the
area; (3) the response of South Africato this foreign spoiler of its
regionalhegemony;(4) regionalcooperationin southernAfricainso-
faras it is a response to SouthAfrica'smilitancyin the face of interna-
tional communism as represented in the region by Cuba;and (5)
Cuba'seffect upon the economy and polity of Angola and Mozambi-
que.
I. BACKGROUND
NEARLY 500 YEARSelapsed between the founding of Portugal'sfirst
tradingpost in southernAfricaand the grantingof independence to
colonies.Atthe end of thatperiodPortugalsuffereda military
Portugal's
coup which gave rise to a domesticturmoilthatmade its new govern-
ment even more hastyto jettisoncolonies thanhadbeen the case with
the otherEuropeancolonizers.In Angola,Portugalwas determinedto
transferpower to whatevercontending anti-colonialmovementcon-
trolledthe capitalthatday (11November1975).
One of the Angolan independence movements,the Movimento
Popular de Libertagao deAngola (MPLA), was able to call on Cuba to
help it win the day.The Sovietshad begun backing the MPLAin the
early-1960s,in keepingwith Khruschev'spolicy of supportfornational
liberation movements. Part of that assistance consisted of military
trainingprovidedby Cubanadvisors.2Since then, Cubahas continu-
ously supported the MPLA.The Soviets,by contrast,twice let their

Owen Ellison Kahnis AssistantProfessorof Politicsand PublicAffairsat

the Universityof Miami. He currentlyis workingon a book on international
tradein strategicminerals.
*The authorwishes to thankYorickFonseca, RobynPekelnyand, espe-
cially,EvanKosterforassistancein researchforthis article,JanetCooperfor
editorial help, and anonymousreviewersfortheir useful comments.
33
34 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

support lapse: the first time in 1963-64, in support of the Organization

of AfricanUnity's(OAU's)recognitionof a rivalmovement,the FNLA
(Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola); and the second time in
1973-74,due to differenceswith the MPLAleadership.In early 1975,
the Sovietsbegan airliftingarmsto the MPLA,while Cubasent military
advisors.By midyearthe MPLAcontrolledthe capitaland much of the
country.However,when aid from the United States,SouthAfricaand
Chinato a coalition of rivalgroups began to turn the tide, the MPLA
requestedfurtherassistancefrom Cuba,and the SovietUnionairlifted
Cubantroops into Angola.With their help, the MPLAprevented the
rivalcoalitionfromtakingLuanda,the capitalcity
The US has supported one of the MPLA'srivals,the Frente Nacional
de LibertagaodeAngola (FNLA),foraboutas long as the Sovietshave
supportedthe MPLA.The FNLAhad based itself in neighboringZaire.
Asthe struggleforsuccession intensified,the USdecided to help Zaire
assistthe FNLA.Indeed, Zaireantroopswere activein Angolaseveral
monthsbeforethe Cubansarrived.ButneitherZairenorthe FNLAhad
the muscle to dislodge the MPLA.The one militaryforce that was
willing andable to do the jobcould not be openly supportedbythe US.
South Africa'sdomestic policy had made her such an international
outcastthat overtsupportfor any South African-ledregionalventure
was thought likely to amount to diplomatic suicide for the United
Statesin sub-SaharanAfrica.
With quiet encouragementfrom the United States,South Africa
eventually invaded Angola in support of Uniao Nacional para a
Independencia TotaldeAngola (UNITA), the third contending libera-
tion movement- but by then the Cubanshad arrivedin force.It was
too late to oust the MPLAwithout a large-scalewar,which the US
Congresswould not contemplate,and which SouthAfricawas unwill-
ing to conduct in diplomaticand logisticalisolation.3
Angolais one of the continent'slargercountries,with an areaabout
the same as South Africa or Peru. Infrastructure is poor. Three uncon-
nected raillines traversethe countryeastwardsfromthe coast. One of
these is the famed Benguela line, which extends from Lobito,on the
coast, through Zaireto Zambia.It used to carrya good deal of both
Zaire'sand Zambia'scopperto the coast. However,sabotageby UNITA
has put it out of service for the last decade.4 Led by Jonas Savimbi,
UNITAwas initially supported by Zambia,other moderate African
states, and China. Todayit is backed openly by South Africaand,
increasingly,by the United States,which has recently (1985) reversed
its position banning the use of US funds for militarypurposes in
Angola.
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 35

Constantcivil warhas cost Angola'seconomy dearly.Grossdomes-

ticproduct(GDP) plummetedby40%between 1974and 1975,andhas
remainedat much the same level ever since. Economicdevelopment
opportunities,foregone by the need to pay for the civil war (which
includes the cost of Cuban protection), explains some of this eco-
nomic decay.5The MPLAis reluctantto send Cuba'sgarrisonhome
because of the threat still posed by UNITAand its backers,chiefly
SouthAfrica.
Angola, Cuba and South Africa connot be discussed without
including Angola'ssouthern neighbor,the territoryof Namibia(for-
merlycalled South-WestAfrica).SouthAfricacontinuesto administer
the territorydespite universal consensus that Namibia should be
independent.SouthAfricawould comply were it firstable to installa
governmentto its liking. This would mean a governmentnot con-
trolledby the SouthWestAfricaPeoples Organization(SWAPO),the
mostprominentof the independencemovements,whose partlysocial-
istic rhetoricfeeds SouthAfrica'sfearof being surroundedby regimes
hostile,not only to her domesticracialpolicy,but also to her capitalist
economic credo.
Foryears,SWAPOhas used Angolaas its home base for launching
guerrilla attackson Namibia.For almost as long, South Africa has
attackedSWAPObases in Angola.Tocomplete the tangle:SouthAfrica
assistsUNITAagainstthe MPLAand its Cubanprotectors,while UNITA
assists, or at least doesn't oppose, South Africa'scampaign against
SWAPO.In effect, South Africahas substituted UNITAfor the Por-
tuguese,who used to assisther againstSWAPO.
SouthAfrica'sconcernsoverthe make-upand policies of neighbor-
ing governmentsdepend, ultimately,on the attitudesof those govern-
ments towardsthe AfricanNationalCongress (ANC),the best-known
and longest-lived opponent of white minorityrule in South Africa.
SouthAfricais determinedto force surroundingstatesto deny refuge
to ANCguerrillas.Installinga governmentin Namibiawhich would
commit itself to this position following independence would suit the
SouthAfricangovernmentbest. Leastdesirablewould be a militantly
anti-apartheidNamibia under a SWAPOgovernment assisted into
powerbythe Cubansnow based in Angola.CooperationbetweenANC
guerrillasand Cubantroops anywherein southernAfricaconstitutes
one of theworstfearsof the SouthAfricanmilitary.Indeed, thereis little
doubt that the present SouthAfricanregime could be defeated mil-
itarilyonly if its adversariesreceived majoroutside assistance.
Mostcountriesin the subcontinenthavejoinedtwo groupsof states
36 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

designed largely for the purpose of pooling their resources against

SouthAfrica.The firstgroup,made up of the so-calledfrontlinestates,
includes Angola, Mozambique,Botswana,Zimbabwe,Zambia,and
Tanzania(see Figure1). It has never organizeditself formally,but its
majoraim has been to foster majorityrule throughout the region.
Begun by Tanzania,Zambia,and Botswana,the group had expanded
to 6 countriesby 1980, as the founding stateswere joined by Angola,
Mozambiqueand Zimbabwe after the latter gained their indepen-
dence.Namibiaand SouthAfricaarethe only holdoutsof minorityrule.
While some of the frontlinestates may havetheirreservationsabout a
large Cubanmilitarypresence in the neighborhood,forthe most part
anysupportagainstthe SouthAfricancolossus is welcomed.
The frontlinestateshavecommon goals despite differencesin their
respectivehistoriesand currentsituations.LikeAngola,Mozambique
received its independence from Portugalin 1975 and has suffered
economic stagnationand civil strife ever since. Both countries pro-
claim themselves socialist. Botswana, which used to be a British
protectorate,gained its independence in 1966and hassustainedone of
the most democraticpolities and fastestgrowingeconomies in Africa.
Zimbabwe,formerlycalled Rhodesia, gained majorityrule in 1980
through a protractedguerrilla conflict, after which Ian Smith was
replacedby RobertMugabe.Thoughbitterlyopposed to the apartheid
system, Mugabe'shands are tied by his country'seconomic depen-
dence on its southernneighbor.Zambia'slong economic slide down-
ward has been hastened by the low world price for copper, the
commoditywhich earnsalmostall of its foreignexchange.Zambiahas
also become dependenton SouthAfricanraillines and portsbecause
of closureof the Benguelaline throughAngolaand the unreliabilityof
the line throughTanzania.Partlybecause it has the fewest economic
linkswith the Republicof SouthAfrica,Tanzaniahas long been one of
the most vocal of thatcountry'scriticsworldwide.
The frontline states are all members of the second group, the
SouthernAfricanDevelopment CoordinationConference (SADCC),
which aims to reduce the economic dependence of its members on
SouthAfricaby coordinatingcommunication,transport,food produc-
tion, energy, industry,trade and overall development efforts.Other
membersinclude Malawi,the only Africanstateto haveofficialdiplo-
matic relationswith South Africa,and Lesotho and Swaziland,tiny
countriesdominatedeconomicallyby SouthAfrica.
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 37

Lobito
ANGOLA

INDIAN OCEAN

km 200 400 600

s 200 400
I 4 I I
fI
mis 200 400

Southern Africa
38 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

II. CUBAIN SOUTHERNAFRICA

THE RAPIDITY WITHWHICHthe Portuguesewithdrewfromtheir
colonies fulfilled one of the worst fears of the SouthAfricangovern-
ment:the creation,overnight,of a politicaland militaryvacuumon its
doorstep,which the SWAPOin Namibia,and localandforeigncommu-
nist forces in Mozambiqueand Angola, would rush to fill. Hostile
governmentsin these countries would permit the AfricanNational
Congressto launcharmedattackson SouthAfrica.
Cubahas been farless activein Mozambiquethanin Angola.Anti-
colonial activityin Mozambiquewas dominatedby the FrenteLiber-
taQaode Mozambique(FRELIMO), supportedearlyon by China,and
laterby the USSR,EasternEurope,and Cuba.In the mid-1980sthere
were some 700 Cubanmilitaryand 700 Cubancivilianpersonnel in
Mozambique,not enough to affect the balance of power in south-
easternAfrica,but enough to worrythe SouthAfricans.
Curiously,South Africadid little to stop FRELIMO from gaining
in
power Mozambique. Pretoria refused to back militantMozambican
whites who, unilaterally,sought to declareMozambiqueindependent
undertheirrule.Pretoriaprobablyassumed it could use its economic
leverage to keep a FRELIMOgovernment compliant. However,
Angola'seconomywas not tied in to SouthAfrica's, makingpunishment
and rewardwithin a relationshipof economic dependence unavail-
able. Consequently, South Africa escalated from occasional raids,
originatingfrom Namibiainto Angola in pursuitof SWAPO, to large-
scale invasion,while simultaneously increasing its support to non-
MarxistUNITAand FNLA.The Cubansthen responded by sending
troopsto preservethe MPLA's fragilegrip on power.In the face of US
vacillationover supportfor South Africa,internationalpressure,and
mountingmilitarycosts, the SouthAfricanswithdrewinto Namibiain
March1976.
Cuba'sinvolvementin the region did not end there.6Cubantroops
(and advisors)in Angolajumpedfrom5,000 in 1975to perhaps18,000
in 1976, subsequentlyrising to 35,000 by 1986 (see Table1). 35,000
Cubantroops and militaryadvisorsare roughlyas manyas are in the
regularAngolanarmy(excluding the militia,navy,airforceandborder
guards) and amount to about one third of the country'stotal armed
forces.7South Africa'sregulararmy has about 100,000 troops. Com-
paredwith the numberof Cubantroopsin Angola,the ratiois about2.8
SouthAfricansto 1 Cuban,a dramaticdisplayof Cubanstrengthagainst
the most powerful country in the region. Moreover,in recent years,
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 39

TABLE 1

FOREIGN TROOPS AND MILITARY ADVISORS IN ANGOLA

A) CUBANS B) Sovi eth C)GDR

1975- 5,000

1976- 15-18,000(March)
12-13,000(Nov ) d 200

1977- 19.000 *

1978- 18-20,000

1979- 18-20,000

1980- 19,000

1981- *

1982- 18-20,000 700 450

1983- 25,000 700 450

1984- 25,000 3-5,000 1,000

1985- 20,000(& 6,000 adv.) 700 500

1986- 27,000(& 8,000 adv.) 950-1500 500-3000

Others: (Bulgarians, 1984- 1,500

Palestinians, Portuguese, et.c ) 1985- 1,600

a: Troops and advisors are counted toget.her until 1985

b: Soviets and East Germans include milit.ary advisors and technicians
c: * = not. available
d: low point after Cuban withdrawal

SOURCES: William M. Leogrande, "Cuba's Policy in Africa", Inatitute

of International Studies (Univeraity of California, Berkeley, 1980.)
p- 20; Africa Cont.emporary Record, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85;
Defense and Foreiqn Affairs Handbook, 1985 (Perth Corporation,
Washington, D.C.); The Military Balance 1985-86, 1986-87,
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, London); Fred
Bringland, Savimbi (Mainstream Publishing: Edinburgh, 1986).
40 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

severalthousandSovietand EastGermanmilitarypersonnelhavealso
seen service in Angola.The numberof Cuban,Soviet,and EastEuro-
pean economic advisorshas also increased,averagingabout 9,000 in
the late 1970s to mid-1980s.Four-fifthsof these are Cuban (Defense
and ForeignAffairsHandbook,1985). While figures cannotbe exact,
thereis good evidence thatnearly45,000 Cubansarecurrentlyserving
in Angola.
III. CUBA'S EFFECTON SOUTH AFRICA
A. SouthAfrica'sPerceptionof "TotalOnslaught"

THE WITHDRAWAL of the South AfricanDefense Force (SADF)

fromAngolain 1976, and the inaugurationof FRELIMO in Mozambi-
que and the MPLAin Angolaended an era:no longer did a cushion of
friendly,white-ruledcolonial states separateSouthAfricafrom Black
Africa.SouthAfricanow had to deal with black neighborswho disap-
provedof apartheid,and who not only styled themselvesMarxist,but
also received Soviet,EastEuropeanand Cubansupport (Davies and
O'Meara,1985:188-189).Itwas also clearthatthe winds of change had
not yet spent themselves in the region:Rhodesiawould not lastmuch
longer under white rule; the global clamorfor the independence of
South WestAfrica(Namibia) from South Africancontrol would get
everlouder;andexclusivewhite controlof SouthAfricawould become
more and more difficultfor its Westernallies to justify.
Realignmentof forces in the region and the certaintyof more to
come provokeda "siege"mentalityin South Africanpolicy-making
circles: a conviction that external, as well as internal,pressures for
domestic political change were manifestationsof a "totalonslaught"
directedagainstthe SouthAfricanstatefromMoscow.Cuba'spresence
in the sub-continentwas simply the most telling evidence of the total
onslaught.8 How much of the total onslaught theory is genuinely
believed, and how much whipped up to justifySouthAfricanactions,
both internationallyand internally,is not known. Clearly,however,the
perception of a total onslaught did lead to substantivechanges in
South Africa'sforeign policy, not least in its regional policy, changes
designed in good partto counterCuba'spenetrationof the region.
B. SouthAfrica'sImplementationof "TotalStrategy"
The arrivalof the CubansprecipitatedSouthAfrica'sreconsidera-
tion of its objectivesin participatingin the Angolancivil war.Manyin
the Departmentof ForeignAffairshad believed thatthe wisest course
wasto adhereto the principleof non-interferencein the internalaffairs
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 41

of othernations(a principlewhich SouthAfricaconstantlyinvokeson

its own behalf), thatAngolashould be treatedwith the same restraint
as Mozambique,and thatthe gains from invasionwere not worththe
likelyinternationalrepercussions.
However,the SADFhad long feared that conflict among Angolan
liberationmovementswould createopportunitiesforforeigncommu-
nist involvementand forSWAPOpenetrationof Namibia.Itviewed the
MPLAas ideologicallyinclined to arm and supportopponents of the
SouthAfricangovernmentin Namibiaand, even, in SouthAfricaitself.
Therefore,the Cubanshad to be ejected fromthe region immediately
because of the damagetheycould do SouthAfrica'spolicyforNamibia,
and because of the likelihoodof theirassistingthe ANC.The military's
hard-lineapproach was adopted, and the invasion of Angola soon
mounted (Geldenhuys,1984:79, 295 andpassim).
Subsequently,a 1977 Defense White Paper,commonly thoughtto
have been authored by then Defense MinisterPW Botha, brought
togetherthe variousstrandsof regional policy under the rubricof a
"total national strategy."9Since the nation was facing a "total
onslaught,"from both within and without, the only appropriate
response was a correspondinglycomprehensivemobilizationof eco-
nomic,political,psychological,social and militaryresourcesto coun-
ter the danger.While it would be going too far to suggest that the
Cubanpresence elevated PW Botha from Defense Ministerto Prime
Minister,it is certainthatforeignmilitaryactivityin the region elevated
the importanceof the SADFin nationaldecision-makingand strength-
ened Botha'sbid forthe premiership.The effecton SouthAfrica'ssense
of security of a large Communist militaryforce in formerlyallied
Angolacan scarcelybe exaggerated.
"Totalstrategy,"in the regional context, pursued three sets of
objectives,correspondingto South Africa'slong, medium and short
termgoals (Price,1984).
Long term, the aim was to develop a "constellation"of friendly
bufferstateson SouthAfrica'sperimeter,therebycreatinga new genera-
tion of pro-SouthAfricansatellites. They would be kept compliant
througheconomic dependence, to be achieved by economic induce-
ment (such as loans), and/or by destabilization.The theorywas that
economic and politicalchaos would makecooperationwith the desta-
bilizer more inviting. Ensuring the dependence of neighbors also
meant impeding any attempts to reduce this dependence through
increasedregionalcooperation,such as thatprovidedby the Southern
AfricanDevelopmentCoordinationConference(SADCC).
42 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Medium term, the aim was to impose neutralityon neighboring

states:to ensure the internalsecurity of South Africaby preventing
unfriendlyneighborsfrom harboringANCguerrillas.In practice,this
meantboth defense of SouthAfrica'sbordersas well as attackson ANC
facilities and personnel in neighboring states, supplemented by the
threat - and use - of economic punishment to obtain compliant
behavior.
The primaryshort-termaimsof the totalstrategyare,first,to contain
the spreadof Soviet/Cubaninfluence in southernAfricaand, second,
to eliminatethe foreigncommunistpresence altogether.Some ambiv-
alence is attachedto these aims. On the one hand, SouthAfricafears
the Cubanpresence and wants to find ways to bring about its with-
drawal.The CubanshavepreventedSouthAfricafromhavingitswayin
Angola and have provided moral, if not material,support to both
SWAPOandtheANC.On the otherhand,Sovietand Cubanpenetration
worksto the advantageof SouthAfricabyprovidingan anti-communist
justificationfor its long-rangeobjectivesof destabilizingthe Angolan
and Mozambicanregimes,of retainingcontrolof Namibiauntil instal-
lation of a compliant government,and of preventing Angola from
realizing its economic potential as co-leader, with Zimbabwe, of
SADCC.
Equallyimportant,the Cubanpresence enables the Westto justify
its own toleranceof SouthAfricanactions in the region. At the same
time thatthe US governmentinstitutedsanctionsagainstSouthAfrica,
(overthe President'sveto), it reinstitutedaid to UNITAin Angolaas a
means of containing communism. Ironically,both South Africaand
Cubafind each otherto be convenientideologicalrivals.While South
Africajustifiesits aggressionby referringto godless communists,so
Cubalends legitimacyto its adventuringby referenceto wicked racists
and capitalists.Further,BlackAfricancriticismof Cuba'sexcursionson
the continenthas been muted, in partbecause of Cuba'sstandagainst
apartheid. 10
C. The Makingof SouthAfricanPolicy:The "CubanFactor"11
South Africa'stotal strategyemerged to counter the hostility of
newly independentblackstatesin the region, increasingANCactivity
at home, and increasing diplomatic isolation abroad. International
communismwas perceived as the source of this total onslaught.The
presence of Cubansin Angolafacilitatedadoptionof the totalstrategy,
increasedthe voice of the SADFin strategyconceptionand implemen-
tation,and furtherjustifiedthe results.A large,well-equipped, openly
hostile,foreign militaryforce assisting one's enemy and promotinga
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 43

rivalideology could hardlyhave elicited any otherresponse.

A keytacticalconsiderationin the totalstrategywas the appropriate
mix of militarypunishmentand economic rewardin keeping neigh-
boring governments compliant. Militarymeans could be counter-
productiveif punishment damaged a neighbor'seconomy so much
thatpromises of economic assistancebecame meaningless.The con-
stellationof states contemplatedrequiresthe SouthAfricanbusiness
communityto invest in its neighbors.However,no investmentcould
be expected in countrieswhose infrastructures hadbeen destroyedby
the SADE
In Angola'scase, however,SouthAfricahad virtuallyno economic
cards to play. Angola had never been integrated into the regional
economy dominatedby SouthAfrica.The countryhad its own ports,
was independent of South AfricanRailways,no longer sent migrant
workersto South Africaand, with the exception of diamonds, had
received verylittle direct investmentfrom SouthAfricanfirms.More-
over,Angola'soil made her relativelywell-off. Largelyimmune from
economic pressure,but harboringapparentmilitarythreats(SWAPO
bases, ANC training camps, Cuban troops), Angola seemed more
susceptible to the stick than the carrot. So South Africa'smilitary
acquired an increasingly loud voice in foreign policy-making,first
towardAngola,and then towardother neighboringcountries.
In the 1975 Angolanconflict, decisions were made ad boc. Regu-
larizeddecision-makingon regionalsecuritywas mandatoryfor total
strategyto work.The StateSecurityCouncil (SSC),which advises the
government on "national policy and strategy in relation to the security
of the Republic"(Geldenhuys,1984:92), was the obviousinstitutional
choice.It is directlyunderthe controlof the StatePresidentand enjoys
an extremelybroadmandate.The SSC'spermanentmembersinclude
the Ministersof Defense, ForeignAffairs,Justiceand Police,the heads
of the National Intelligence Service, Police, and Defense Force, and the
DirectorsGeneralof ForeignAffairs,and Justice (Geldenhuys,1984:
92).
The SSCpresidesovera pervasiveapparatusknownas the "national
security management system.' Some view that system as a conduit for
the prudent inclusion of security informationin national decision-
making at a variety of levels. Others see it as virtually a shadow
governmentin the wings, makingsure thatthe normalinstitutionsof
governmenthearwhatthe militarythinksshould be heard.12Whether
benign ordisquieting,the riseto prominenceof the militaryin national
decision-makingsuggests how seriouslythe total onslaughtis taken.
44 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Table 2

MILITARIZATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY SINCE 1973

Military Armed Forces ME as ME as

Expenditurea Thousand percent percent. of
(ME) of GNP Central
Const.ant 1983 US 8 Government
Expenditures

1973 1670 45 2.8 11.5

1974 1964 45 3.0 11.4

1975 2454 50 3.7 13.1

1976 3268 59 4.9 16.5

1977 3489 67 5.2 17.7

1978 3257 78 16.0

1979 3132 70 4.4 15-4

1980 3896 70 5.2 19.3

1981 3364 (eat..) 78 4.3 15.3

1982 2907 (eat.) 3.7 12.7

1983 3737 (et..) 77 4.9 15.6

1984 3422 (eat.) 4.2 13.2

SOURCE: Defense Program and Analysis Division, US Arms Control

and Disarmamelnt Agency World Military Expendit.ures and Arms
Transfers--1986 (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Washington, D.C.: 1987).

The effect of the Cuban presence extends beyond its effect on

South Africanstrategy/decision-making.Cuban success in limiting
the destabilizationof Angola, despite adoption of the total strategy,
convinced the South Africangovernmentthat a change in weapons
production and procurement was necessary. Prioritywas given to
developinga highly mobilized conventionalforce to be used against
neighboring countries, while also raising counterinsurgencycapa-
bility.Enhanced conventionalforces were augmented by reconnais-
sance commandounits for hit-and-runoperations.The SADFacceler-
ated its weapons development program in response to the
shortcomings in armaments (such as counter-insurgencyweapons
and mobile troopcarriers)evidentin the Angolancampaign,as well as
to the long-standingUN arms embargo the Westwas startingto take
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 45

more seriously.Under the direction of ARMSCOR,the state owned

armamentscompany, the drive for near self-sufficiencybecame a
nationalpriority.
Table 2 shows the substantialexpansion in resources and man-
power devoted to the armedforces since the Angolan conflict. From
1973 to 1984, the number of troops more than doubled and the
proportionof GNP devoted to the militaryincreased from 2.8%to
4.2%,averaging4.6%between 1976 and 1984. Much of this money
went to the local arms industry.As a result, by 1982, only 15%of the
defense budget was spent on imports (quoted in Geldenhuys,1984:
142).
IV SOUTHAFRICA'S
REGIONAL
RELATIONS
SINCE197513
IN 1978AND 1979, the SouthAfricangovernmentenergeticallypro-
moted its "constellationof southernAfricanstates."The aim was to
renderneighboringstatesso economicallydependenton SouthAfrica
that any type of political opposition would be unthinkable.The pri-
marymeanswas a privatelyfunded SouthAfricanDevelopmentBank
to finance the regional infrastructureon which the constellationof
states was to be based. The plan failed on several counts: the emer-
gence of the SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCoordinationConference
(SADCC)reduced the incentives to join SouthAfrica'sconstellation;
the defeatof Bishop Muzorewa,SouthAfrica'scandidateto lead Zim-
babwe to independence and into the constellation;and the lack of
enthusiasmof the SouthAfricanprivatesector forthe plan.
By 1982 SouthAfricahad scaled down its aims, but still relied on
destabilizationas the primarymeans to achieve its policy.Its firstaim
was to coerce surroundingstates (especially Angola, Mozambique,
Zimbabweand Swaziland)to denyrefugeto the ANC.SouthAfricawas
particularly anxiousto forestalleffectivecooperationbetween the ANC
and the Cubanmilitaryin Angola.SouthAfricapursuedan aggressive
campaign there which was presented to its western allies as one
designed to containcommunism.Second on the agendawas the effort
to frustrateattemptsby neighboringstates(viaSADCC)to reducetheir
reliance on South Africa.This frustrationpolicy extended as far as
economic sabotage.
Bythe end of 1982,the SADFvirtuallyoccupied the southernpartof
Angola.The aimwas to forcethe MPLAto forma coalitiongovernment
with UNITA,as well as to raise the costs of the Angolangovernment's
supportfor SWAPO.
Destabilizationdid succeed in neutralizingneighboringstates to
46 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

some degree. In 1984, South Africa and Angola signed the Lusaka
Agreement,a partialnon-aggressionaccord. South Africaagreed to
disengagefromAngolain exchange forMPLArestraintof SWAPO. Also
in 1984,SouthAfricaand Mozambiquesigned the NkomatiAccord,in
which both statespledged not to allow use of theirterritories- by any
state,government,or foreignmilitarypower - forpurposes of aggres-
sion on the territoryof the other,and which, further,requiredMozam-
bique to expel the ANC.
At firstthese agreementsraised SouthAfricanhopes of putting its
constellation plan back on track and, even, of breaking out of its
internationalisolation.However,SouthAfricahad underestimatedthe
priceof itsdestabilizationstrategy:unexpectedlyforcefulinternational
condemnation,potential escalation of the conflict by Cuban troops,
plus the direct economic costs of waging a large campaign farfrom
home. In addition,the SovietUnionwarnedSouthAfrica,late in 1983,
that it would not toleratethe fall of the MPLA(Davies and O'Meara,
1985:206). Finally,not only did SouthAfrica'swestern allies become
increasinglycriticalof the pace of the Botha government'spromised
domestic changes, but they also found it more difficultto ignore its
incursionsinto neighboringstates.
Increasedwesternpressure,atthe same time thatseveralfront-line
statesrenewed contactswith the ANCand called openly forsanctions
againstSouthAfrica,reinforcedthe "totalonslaught"mentality.This,in
turn,strengthenedthe handof Pretoria's foreignpolicy hawks.Fornow
even SouthAfrica's Westernfriendswere perceivedas ignoring,oreven
joining, the total onslaught. If the presence of the Soviets'Cuban
surrogatescould not move the West to see the danger to their own
interestsin the region, then SouthAfricawould simply have to stand
alone. South Africancommando teams and warplanes have raided
each of the frontline states, except Tanzania,in the last year; and
Pretoriahas given notice thatpressureon its neighborswill increase.
The SADF has strengthened its forces in Namibia, has recently
acquired new attack helicopters and fighter planes, has extended
military service requirements for white South Africans, and has
received a largebudget increase.

V REGIONALCOOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

IN THE 12 YEARSsince Cuban troops were introduced into the
region, the frontline states have tried to defend themselves against
SouthAfrica'spolicy of regionalde-stabilizationand domination.This
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 47

policy cannot be attributedto the Cuban presence directly.Rather,

Cubaadded fuel to the regionalfire of SouthAfrica'stotalstrategy- a
strategyto which the smaller countries found themselves forced to
respond. While most neighboring states have little recourse from a
belligerentSouthAfrica,Cubanassistanceto Angoladid demonstrate
thatSouthAfricacould at least be thwarted,if not defeated.
Establishedin 1979, SADCCbelieves regional cooperation will
reduce SouthAfricancontrolovermembereconomies and, thus,over
theirsovereignty.SADCCchallengesone of SouthAfrica'sfundamental
insurancepolicies:thatinternationalsanctionsagainstthe Republicof
South Africawill, or will be made to, damage her neighbors.Mere
establishmentof SADCCand statementof its goals have thwartedthe
grandioseconstellationinitiativeof SouthAfrica.Indeed, most of the
countriesSouthAfricaexpected would join its constellationbecame
membersof SADCC.
It is too early to tell whether SADCCwill be able to reduce
economic dependence on South Africa. Mozambique'sand Zim-
babwe'ssusceptibilityto SouthAfricaneconomic sabotageandpunish-
ment seem unchanged, and Angola appearsto have been too preoc-
cupied with its civil warto give anygreatconsiderationto the SADCC
program.The NkomatiAccordwith Mozambiquewasviewed by South
Africaas a blow to SADCCbecause it included talks on revivingand
increasingeconomic links between the two countries,giving South
Africa'sconstellation-of-statesinitiativeanotherglimmerof hope.
VI. CUBA'S EFFECTON ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE
A. EconomicConsequences

ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE have had dismal economic perfor-

mances since independence (see Table 3). Much of the failure is
attributableto the massivewithdrawalof Portuguesecapitaland skills,
combinedwith little economic controlby the indigenous population.
Angola'seconomic decline, which began even before indepen-
dence, has been greaterthanMozambique's. This maybe attributedto
the factthatcivil war in Angola has been more intense (at least until
recently).14Ironically,another reason may be that Angola had no
SouthAfricaneconomic or technologicalconnectionson which to fall
backonce the Portugueseleft.15The civil waris estimatedto consume
anywherefrom two-thirdsto three-quartersof the Angolan budget.
Militarypurchasesfrom the EasternBloc totalled close to $2 billion
overthe 1984-85period (Brooke,1986). However,it is unclearwhether
the largernumber of Cubantroops and advisorsthere has made for
48 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Table 3

EVOLUTION OF GDP IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE SINCE INDEPENDENCE

ANGOLA MOZAMBIQUE

GDP in change GDP in change

million in % from million in X from
conatant previous constant previous
1983 US S year 1983 US S year

1973 12328 6.8 6940 5.6

1974 11712 -5.0 6415 -7.6

1975 7220 5378 -16.2

1976 6481 -10.2 5121

1977 6631 5161

1978 6914 4.3 5203

1979 7072 2.3 5276 1.4

1980 7469 5.6 5406 2.5

1981 7297 -2.3 2.3

1982 6931 -5.1

1983 6731 -2.9 5000 -7.0

1984 6731 0.0 5338 6.8

SOURCES: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

Defense Program and Analysis Division, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfera--1986 (United Statea Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.: 1987); World Bank,
World Tablea Third Edition Volume 1: Economic Tables (Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 1983); African Development
Bank, African Development Fund, Annual Report.--1984 (Abid3an,
Ivory Coast: 1985).

Note: Unlike the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, African

Development Bank and World Bank sources calculate gross product
figurea for Angola which are lower than those for Mozambique.
This may be because different techniques are used for factoring
exchange rates. However, there are no significant differences
in the rates of economic growth derived from these sources.

additional economic hardship. Angola must pay for Cuban room and
board, and may be paying for Cuban military services, possibly with
hard currency. This expenditure denies resources to economic devel-
opment. On the other hand, were it not for the Cubans, Angola might
have had its oil fields shut down by UNITA and South Africa, which
would certainly have brought complete economic breakdown.
Perhaps the biggest economic impact of the Cuban presence in
Angola is in prolonging the civil war,making the MPLAand UNITAless
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 49

willing to negotiate a settlement:the MPLAthinks that,with enough

Cubansupport,it can still win; UNITAthinks that, once the Cubans
leave, it will prevail. Continuationof the civil war,persistent South
Africanincursions,and UNITA'shold over one-fourthof the country,
result not only in severe logisticalproblems,but also in sabotage of
economic developmentefforts.
However,with all these factorsoperating,Cuba'seffect on Angolas
economic woes is difficultto isolate.Moreover,the loss of Portuguese
capital and skills would have been devastatingunder any circum-
stances.It is even possible thatCubansmade up some of thatshortfall,
particularlyin the areaof healthand education.Sufficientinformation
to evaluateaccuratelyCuba'spositiveeconomic contributionto Angola
is, unfortunately,unavailable.
The net resultis thatAngola,which at independence had balanced
exportsof coffee,oil, diamonds,andfood, now importsfood (with just
2% of the arable land under cultivation), produces only half the
diamondsit did before independence,grows a mere one-twentiethof
the coffee it once did, no longer mines iron ore at all, and spends a
good deal of what it does earn on maintainingFidel Castro'stroops.
Cubahas never been very influentialin Mozambique.It played a
marginalrole,at most, in FRELIMO's acquisitionand consolidationof
power.Though FRELIMO still relies on the Soviet/Cubanbloc mil-
itarily,it hasrepeatedlyexpressed its disappointmentwith the quantity
andqualityof Soviet/Cubanaid. Indeed, Mozambiquerefusesto grant
the Sovietsany permanentmilitarybases.16Recently,FRELIMO has
sought to strengthenits linkswith the West,a move which has paid off
in moreWesterncreditsand grants.In short,Mozambique'sties to the
Sovietsand Cubanshavebecome weakerwithoutthe countrysuffering
any obvious disadvantage;its dependence was actually quite lim-
ited.17Because Cubaninvolvementin Mozambiquehas been mini-
mal, so has theireconomic impact.
B. External Relations
The Cuban presence has strained relations of both Angola and
Mozambique with the West. In fact, the United States has never
officiallyrecognized the Angolan government.While US-Mozambi-
que relations have warmed somewhat, US-Angolanrelations have
recentlyworsened:underthe ReaganDoctrine,US supportforUNITA
has increased;and US oil companies doing business in Angola have
been criticized(rightlyorwrongly) by the Administrationforsupport-
ing war - ratherthan - to
peace by helpingAngola pay forits armsand
Cubanhelp (Brooke,1986).
50 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

In 1986,approximately$15million in covertUS aidwas channeled

to UNITA(Gwertzman,1986). The Reaganadministrationinsists that
only a strengthenedUNITAcan push the MPLAto negotiate an end to
the civil war and, hence, an end to the need for Cubantroops.This
parallelsSouthAfrica'spublic position of linking supportforUNITAto
the need to counter the Cubans.Cuba, then, has put the US in an
embarrassingposition:it standsaccused of unwarrantedinterference
in a Third Worldcountry;its anti-communismappears to support
SouthAfricain that both countriesassist UNITA;and US association
with South Africa,in turn, alienates a number of importantAfrican
states.
A decade ago, the United States,GreatBritain,France,West Ger-
many and Canadaformed a "contactgroup" to try to resolve the
question of Namibianindependence.Though not originallystatedas
an objection,SouthAfricanow insistson the removalof Cubantroops
(who support SWAPO)before plans for Namibian independence
proceed. Angola accepts the idea of linkage, but reverses the
sequence: SouthAfricamustend its illegal occupationof Namibiaand
its attackson Angola,which, Luandaclaims, are the reasonswhy the
Cubanswere originallyinvited.
Surprisinglyperhaps,most Africanstates do not view the Cuban
presence as neo-colonialism. Cuba'scredibilitystems from its aid in
fightingthe hated SouthAfricanregime.By pittingitself againstSouth
Africa,Cuba has gained legitimacy for its foreign adventuring,in
Angolaand elsewhere.The SovietUnion has similarlymuted interna-
tionalcondemnationof its policy in southernAfricanby aligning itself
on the "correct"side in the regionalconflict.
VII. CONCLUSION
IN 1986ANGOLAANDSOUTHAFRICAseemed willing to negotiate
overthe Cubanpresence. PresidentBothaagreed to abideby the 1978
United Nations plan for Namibian independence in exchange for
withdrawalof Cuban troops from Angola (New YorkTimes, 1986b:
A-7). The plan mandates a ceasefire in Namibia,followed by with-
drawalof SouthAfricanforces and free elections in Namibia,super-
vised by a UN peacekeepingforce.However,a deal has since provedto
be as elusive as ever.
Meanwhile,the Reaganadministrationdecided to send stinger
missiles and otheraid to UNITAin an effortto put furtherpressureon
the MPLAto seek a negotiated settlementto the civil war (New York
Times, 1986a:A-30). However,the MPLA'stenuous hold on Angola,
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 51

continuedpressurefrom SouthAfrica,US hostility,and a rejuvenated

UNITAmay havepromptedfurtherCubanassistance.Table1 shows a
substantialincrease in Cuban (and Sovietand East German) troops
and militaryadvisorsonce aid to UNITAwas resumed. While cause-
and-effectcannotbe proved,this sequence fitsa long-standingpattern
of the MPLAseeking Cubanaid when threatsto its survivalmount.
Cubahas propped up the MPLAgovernmentin Angolaforthe last
dozen years and actively supported the MPLA,in opposition, for a
dozen yearsbefore that.While clearlyin no hurryto do so, there are
circumstancesin which the Cubansmight leaveAngola:if askedbythe
MPLA;if they decided to leave for reasons of theirown; if orderedto
leave by Moscow;or if forced out by enemies of the MPLA.None of
these alternativesseems likelyat the present time.
First,if Cubantroops came in response to a genuine call for help,
they will presumablyleave when the MPLAannounces it no longer
needs their services; for example, if the MPLAgains nation-wide
control,and therebyfeels sufficientlysecure to dispense with Cuban
assistance,or if the warringfactionsin Angolareacha modus vivendi.
Secondly,Cubacould decide to withdrawherforcesunilaterallyfor
any number of (unlikely) reasons:the troops are needed elsewhere,
the armyfinds the assignment demoralizing,the MPLAis no longer
deemed worthy of support, the Castrogovernment makes a major
concession in orderto mend fences with the US.
Third, if one assumes that Moscow exerts ultimate control over
Cubanforeignpolicy,then the Cubanswould leave if Moscowshould
order them out: as part of a detente deal with the West or, on the
contrary,because Luandahad ceased being sufficientlyMarxistto earn
Sovietsupport.
Fourth,the Cubansmight leaveif pushed out by some combination
of forcesfrom UNITA,FNLA,SouthAfricaand, though scarcelythink-
able,the United States.
Tosum up:first,Cuba'smilitaryassistancehas enabledthe MPLAto
cling to power,but not to consolidate its control over the whole of
Angola. Cuba'spresence has precipitated(or provideda pretextfor)
South Africansupport of UNITA,which opposes the Cuban-backed
MPLAgovernment. Cuba and South Africa, then, contribute to
Angolan instabilityand economic decline. Second, Cuba has pre-
vented South Africa from getting its way in Angola. South Africa
wanted UNITAin power,believing that UNITAwould deny SWAPO
bases in Angola.18SouthAfricawantsto preventSWAPOfromgaining
controlof Namibia,its lastbufferstate.Third,forPretoria,the presence
52 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

of Cubans in Angola is clear evidence of a "total onslaught" orches-

trated by international communism. From her neighbors' perspective,
of course, South Africa'sresponse to the "total onslaught" amounts to
the region's giant having run amok. In turn, South Africa'sneighbors
have tried to reduce their economic links with that country, in the hope
of becoming less vulnerable.

NOTES
1. These questions have been addressed by Valenta(1980 and 1981);
Deutsch (1980); Grabendoff(1980); and LeoGrande(1980a).
2. EarlierCubahad aided not only revolutionarymovementsin Portu-
gal's other Africancolonies of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau,but also
guerrillasin LatinAmericaand the Middle Eastas well.
3. In February1976,the ClarkAmendmentbecame law,which banned
spending US funds for any militarypurpose in Angola, except to gather
intelligence.
4. This has requiredboth Zambiaand Zaireto route much of theirrail
trafficthrough SouthAfricanports,giving South Africaadditional leverage
within the region. So UNITA'scutting of the rail line serves its own purpose
of destabilizingthe MPLAregime as well as SouthAfrica'swider purposes of
regional domination.
5. WhetherCubagets paid in hardcurrencyearned fromoil exportsis
unclear.The Angolan governmentinsists that,since the fall in oil prices, all
paymentsfor Cubancivilian assistance have been suspended. Neitherdoes
Angola admit to any payments for military aid, past or present. Conse-
quently,it is unclearwhether Castrohas everbeen paid forhis militaryhelp
and, if so, whether he was paid in hard currency.There is little doubt that
Angola does pay local costs forfeeding and housing Cubantroops.
6. See further,CubanStudies (1980).
7. Computed from US Departmentof State (1986), and US Central
Intelligence Agency (1978).
8. The phrase "totalonslaught"is widely believed to havebeen coined
by StatePresidentPW Bothawhile he was Ministerof Defense in the 1970s.
9. EarlierWhite Papershad referredto the "totalstrategy"idea, but the
1977White Paperwas devoted to spelling it out.
10. During his trip to Angola in September1986, Fidel Castrolinked
the withdrawalof Cuban troops to the ending of apartheid;such rhetoric
makes good public relations (see FBIS-MEA,1986).
11.See Geldenhuys (1984:91-96andpassim) and Grundy(1983).
12. Compare Geldenhuys (1984: 92) with The Weekly Mail (1986:
12-13).
13. See Davies and O'Meara,1985:197-207.
 KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA 53

14. In the last two years Mozambiqueand its economy have suffered
terriblyfromcivil war.
15.Forexample, SouthAfricahas been assisting (and at times interfer-
ing with) the operationof Mozambique'sports and railroadssince shortly
afterindependence. Mozambiquestill sends many thousands of miners to
workin SouthAfricanmines. Angola had no such links with its immediate
neighbors.
16. So,forthat matter,does Angola.
17. Whether the death of President Machel in October 1986 will
reversethis trendis unknowable.Forthe momentthere is little evidence that
Mozambiqueis courting either the Cubansor the Soviets.Mozambiquehas
alwaysreservedthe rightto call foroutside aid should the countrybe unable
to defend itself againstbanditry,meaning the South African-backedMNR.
18. Before independence, UNITAactually helped SWAPO.One can
only guess whether Angola run by UNITA,alone or in a coalition, would
continue to cooperate with SouthAfricaagainst SWAPO.

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