FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: List of Figures

FM Global
Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 7-49

September 2000
Interim Revision January 2016
Page 1 of 43
EMERGENCY VENTING OF VESSELS
Table of Contents
Page
1.0 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................... 3

1.1 Changes ............................................................................................................................................ 3
2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 3
2.1 Equipment and Processes .............................................................................................................. 3
2.1.1 Emergency Overpressure Relief Vent Sizing ........................................................................ 3
2.1.2 Design of the Emergency Overpressure Relief System ....................................................... 8
2.1.3 Overpressure Protection by System Design - Code Case 2211 and UG-140 .................... 15
2.1.4 Limitations ........................................................................................................................... 15
2.2 Operation and Maintenance .......................................................................................................... 15
3.0 SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................. 16
3.1 Comments ..................................................................................................................................... 16
3.1.1 General ................................................................................................................................ 16
3.1.2 Worst Credible Case ........................................................................................................... 17
3.1.3 Reducing Emergency Relief System Capacity Requirements for Reactive Processes ..... 18
3.1.4 Overpressure Protection by System Design - Code Case 2211 and UG-140 .................... 18
3.1.5 Manual Intervening Stop Valves Around Pressure Relief Devices ....................................... 19
3.1.6 Risk vs. Consequence Based Design for Reactive Systems ............................................. 20
3.1.7 Design of the Emergency Relief System ............................................................................ 22
3.1.8 Maintenance and Testing .................................................................................................... 24
3.1.9 Limitations of Emergency Pressure Relief Systems ........................................................... 24
3.1.10 Evaluating Existing Plants ................................................................................................. 24
3.1.11 Estimating Relief Area ....................................................................................................... 24
3.1.12 Prioritizing Equipment Needing Detailed Analysis ............................................................ 28
3.2 Loss History ................................................................................................................................... 29
4.0 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 29
4.1 FM Global ...................................................................................................................................... 29
4.2 Others ............................................................................................................................................ 29
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS ..................................................................................................... 30
APPENDIX B DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY ..................................................................................... 30
APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ...................................................................................... 31
C.1 Review of Current Technology ...................................................................................................... 31
C.2 DIERS Simplified Calculations ...................................................................................................... 33
C.3 Bench-Scale Apparatus ................................................................................................................ 34
C.3.1 Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA) Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) .................. 34
C.3.2 Confinement Pressure Vessel Test ..................................................................................... 35
C.3.3 Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC) ................................................................................. 36
C.3.4 Reaction or Heat Flow Calorimetry .................................................................................... 37
C.3.5 Vent Sizing Package (VSP) ................................................................................................ 37
C.3.6 Reactive System Screening Tool (RSST) ........................................................................... 38
C.4 Self Heat Rate Adjustment for Thermal Inertia ............................................................................. 40
C.4.1 Sample Problem ................................................................................................................. 41
APPENDIX D BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 41
List of Figures
Fig. 1a. Heat absorbed by surface exposed to fire (English units) ............................................................... 8
©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of Factory Mutual Insurance Company.
7-49 Emergency Venting of Vessels
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
Fig. 1b. Heat absorbed by surface exposed to fire (metric units) ................................................................. 9
Fig. 2. Rupture disk mounted under a relief valve ...................................................................................... 10
Fig. 3. Switching valve with rupture disks (or relief valves) ......................................................................... 11
Fig. 4. Support for relief valve discharge piping .......................................................................................... 13
Fig. 5. Vacuum support for rupture disk ...................................................................................................... 15
Fig. 6. Vapor and gas service—relative pressure levels for relief devices as related to set pressure ....... 23
Fig. 7a. Vent area/1000 lbs vs. self heat rate21 .......................................................................................... 26
Fig. 7b. Vent area/1000 kgs vs. self heat rate21 ......................................................................................... 27
Fig. 8. Pressure and temperature characteristics for a gassy system with relief vents open and closed19 . 33
Fig. 9. Pressure and temperature characteristics for a vapor system with relief vents open and closed19 . 33
Fig. 10. Importance of φ-factor illustrated by amine-initiated cyanide reaction19 ........................................ 35
Fig. 11. Schematic of Columbia Scientific Inc. Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC) ................................ 36
Fig. 12. Overall schematic of the VSP showing the test cell and containment vessel20 ............................ 38
Fig. 13. Overall schematic of the RSST showing the test cell and containment vessel22 ......................... 39
Fig. 14. Sample kinetics: self heat rate vs. temperature ............................................................................. 40
List of Tables
Table 1. Representative Data On Some Vapors And Gases At Standard Conditions .................................. 6
Table 2. Typical Insulation Conductance Values .......................................................................................... 7
Table 3. Effect of Different Upset Condtions on Self Heat Rate. Data obtained in the VSP
Bench Scale Apparatus (Leung and Fauske 4). ........................................................................... 17
Table 4. Risk vs Consequences Based Design For Reactive Systems ...................................................... 21
Table 5. Examples of Relative Types of Precautionary Measures ............................................................. 21
Table 6. Determining Screening Priority 9 .................................................................................................. 29
Table 7. Causes of Vessel Overpressure Losses, 1980–1991 (Gross Loss Over US$100,000) .............. 29
©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

Emergency Venting of Vessels 7-49
FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets Page 3
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet provides guidelines for the field evaluation of emergency overpressure protection systems.
It will permit evaluation of existing or proposed systems. A non-reactive system is generally straightforward
but reactive systems require special consideration. Detailed design should be left to specialists with particular
emphasis on use of the latest technology, which includes consideration of the possibility of two-phase relief
and the reaction events that could cause this to occur. One well-known methodology is often identified as
the DIERS (Design Institute of Emergency Relief Systems) method.
The data sheet addresses determination of the design basis for overpressure protection systems, highlights
some vent-sizing methods, identifies important design factors relative to piping, discharge, and containment
of materials, and identifies key maintenance and testing factors.
The procedures in this data sheet assume that steps to minimize the need for activation of the recommended
overpressure relief systems have already been taken.
Protection begins with the most fundamental elements of process design: selection of the process itself,
site selection, and decisions about hazardous materials inventories and plant layout. A focus on risk
elimination or reduction by careful selection of the basic process operating parameters is known as inherently
safe design. Unfortunately, even after this design philosophy has been applied to the fullest extent practical,
potential hazards often remain in many chemical processing facilities.
Exclusions:
This data sheet does not apply to hot water supply systems, boilers, condensate tanks, etc. (see Data Sheet
12-43, Pressure Relief Devices) or to vapor-air deflagrations, detonations, or similar high-velocity reactions
in a vessel.
The following data sheets provide relief venting criteria that supersede recommendations in this data sheet:
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations, Data Sheet 7-58, Chlorine
Dioxide, Data Sheet 7-84, Hydrogen Peroxide, Data Sheet 7-88, Storage Tanks for Ignitable Liquids.
1.1 Changes
January 2016. Interim revision.
Section 2.1.2.1.10 was modified and Section 2.1.2.1.11 was added to recognize the use of manual stop valves
on the inlet and/or outlet of pressure relief device with limitation comparable to what is permitted under The
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division I, UG-135 and Appendix M, Section M-5 (2015),
or National Board Inspection Code NB 23, Part 1 (2015). Section 3.1.5 was similarly updated.
2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 Equipment and Processes
2.1.1 Emergency Overpressure Relief Vent Sizing
2.1.1.1 General
2.1.1.1.1 Ensure the design of the relief device and vent system accounts for the possibility of vapor, liquid,
or mixed vapor-liquid (2-phase) relief. Two-phase relief is likely where reactive systems are involved.
2.1.1.1.2. Ensure the overpressure relief system design is based on the evaluation of worst credible case.
The worst credible case should be developed based on a thorough study of the process, possible upset
conditions, and factors that could cause an increase in operating pressure in the vessel.
In developing the worst credible case, one or more events could occur simultaneously; for example, loss of
electric power could cause a cooling system valve to close and result in loss of control of the chemical
reaction. The determination of worst credible case should include both human errors and equipment
malfunctions or failures.
2.1.1.1.3 Where overpressure relief for reactive systems in accordance with accepted codes cannot be
achieved practicably, evaluate other methods of property protection. When accepted by appropriate code

authorities, other consequence-mitigation methods could include reduced batch size, dumping vessel
contents to a safe/remote location, isolation, or barricades. (See Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 for additional
guidance.)
2.1.1.1.4 Where there is an unwetted metal surface exposed to fire, pressure relief devices alone may not
protect the vessel. The unwetted surface can be protected by insulation, mounding, water spray, or by
reducing stress on the metal by emptying the vessel contents to a safe location (for example; to a remote
catch tank, flare, etc.).
2.1.1.2 Non-Reactive Systems

2.1.1.2.1. Emergency relief vent sizing for low pressure (less than 15 psig [100 kPa]) storage tanks containing
stable, non-reactive ignitable liquids will normally be based on fire exposure and all vapor venting. The criteria
for vent sizing are indicated in Data Sheet 7-88.
2.1.1.2.2. Base emergency relief vent sizing for storage tanks containing LPGs on the criteria provided in
Data Sheet 7-55.
2.1.1.2.3. Base emergency relief vent sizing for non-reactive process systems where single-phase (gas or
vapor) venting is expected on formulas and tables supplied by the manufacturer. These methods are based
on one or more of the following formulas:
(In English Units)
CKAP1Kb (M)0.5 W (TZ)0.5

W= (1a) or A= (1b)
(TZ)0.5 CKP1Kb (M)0.5
(1.175)CKAP1Kb V (TZG)0.5
V= (2a) or A= (2b)
(TZG)0.5 1.175 CKP1Kb
Where:
W = Mass flow through valve or rupture disk in pounds per hour.
V = Volumetric flow through valve or rupture disk in standard cubic feet per minute at 14.7 psia and 60°F
C = Coefficient related to the ratio of the specific heats of the gas or vapor at standard conditions. This can
be obtained from Table 1. Where the ratio cannot be obtained, use C= 315.
K = Coefficient of discharge, obtainable from the manufacturer. Where information cannot be obtained, use
0.98 for valves and 0.62 for disks.
A = Discharge area of the device, in sq in.
P1 = Upstream pressure in pounds per square inch absolute. This is the set pressure (pressure at which
the valve opens) multiplied by 1.10 or 1.21 (depending upon the overpressure permissible and
determined by appropriate codes), plus the atmospheric pressure. (See Recommendation 2.1.2.1.1.)
Kb= Capacity correction factor due to back pressure. This can be obtained from the valve manufacturer. This
can be as low as 0.70 depending on the amount of back pressure and type of device. Use a factor of
1.0 if no other information is available.
M = Molecular weight of the gas or vapor. If the material is not a pure compound, this value should be obtained
from process data.
T = Absolute temperature of the inlet vapor in R (°F+460).
Z = Compressibility factor for the deviation of the actual gas from a perfect gas, evaluated at inlet conditions.
Where this factor is not available from process data, a conservative value of 1.0 is commonly used.
G = Specific gravity of gas, referred to air at 60°F and 14.7 psia.
C, (M)0.5, and (G)0.5 for some gases and vapors can be obtained from Table 1.
(In Metric Units)
CKAP1Kb (M)0.5 131.4 W (TZ)0.5

W= (3a) or A= (3b)
131.4 (TZ)0.5 CKP1Kb (M)0.5
CKAP1Kb 334V (TZM)0.5

V= (4a) or A= (4b)
334 (TZM)0.5 CKP1Kb

CKAP1Kb 1796V (TZG)0.5

V= (5a) or A= (5b)
1796 (TZG)0.5 CKP1Kb
Where:
W = Mass flow through valve or rupture disk in kg per hour.
V = Volumetric flow through valve or rupture disk in standard m3/min at 100 kPa and 15°C.
C = Coefficient related to the ratio of the specific heats of the gas or vapor at standard conditions, obtained
from Table 1. Where the ratio cannot be obtained, use C = 315.
K = The coefficient of discharge, obtainable from the manufacturer. When information cannot be obtained,
use 0.98 for valves and 0.62 for disks.
A = Effective discharge area of the device in sq cm.
P1= Upstream pressure in kPa absolute. This is the set pressure multiplied by 1.10 or 1.21 (depending on
the overpressure permissible and determined by appropriate codes) plus the atmospheric pressure. (See
Recommendation 2.1.2.1.1.)
Kb= Capacity correction factor due to back pressure. This can be obtained from the valve manufacturer. This
can be as low as 0.70 depending on the amount of back pressure and type of device. Use a factor of
1.0 if no other information is available.
M = Molecular weight of the gas or vapor. If the material is not a pure compound, this value should be obtained
from process data.
T = Absolute temperature of the inlet vapor in K (°C+273).
Z = Compressibility factor for the deviation of the actual gas from a perfect gas, evaluated at inlet conditions.
Where this factor is not available from process data, a conservative value of 1.0 is commonly used.
G = Specific gravity of gas referred to air at 100 kPa and 15°C.
C, (M)0.5, and (G)0.5 for some gases and vapors can be obtained from Table 1.
Note: These equations are based on the assumption of critical flow through the device. This assumption is
generally valid for set pressures exceeding 15 psig (100 kPa) with discharge to atmosphere.
For subcritical flow situations, use API Recommended Practice 520 or equivalent international standard.

Table 1. Representative Data On Some Vapors And Gases At Standard Conditions

Gas or Vapor C (M)0.5 (G)0.5
Acetaldehyde 331 6.633 1. 232
Acetic acid 332 7.746 1. 439
Acetylene 342 5.103 0. 948
Air 356 5.382 1. 000
Ammonia 348 4.127 0. 766
Argon 378 6.325 1. 217
Benzene 329 8.838 1. 643
Butadiene-1,3 329 7.355 1. 386
N-Butane 326 7. 63 1. 439
Iso-Butane 328 7. 63 1. 439
Iso-Butene 328 7. 47 1. 392
Iso-butylene 329 7. 49 1. 392
Carbon dioxide 347 6.634 1. 237
Carbon disulfide 338 8.726 1. 621
Carbon monoxide 356 5.292 0. 983
Chlorine 352 8.421 1. 565
Cyclohexane 326 9.174 1. 705
Decane 319 11. 92 2. 216
Dowtherm A — 12. 85 2. 386
Dowtherm E — 12. 12 2. 253
Ethane 334 5.483 1. 025
Ethylene 341 5.297 0. 988
Ethyl alcohol 330 6.787 1. 261
Ethyl benzene 323 10. 31 1. 916
Ethyl chloride 336 8.031 1. 492
Freon 11 331 11. 72 2. 177
Freon 12 331 10.995 2. 043
Freon 22 335 9.299 1. 727
Freon 114 326 13.073 2. 429
Helium 377 2. 00 0.3716
N-Heptane 321 10. 0 1. 868
N-Hexane 322 9.337 1. 723
Hydrogen chloride 357 6.039 1. 127
Hydrogen 357 1.414 0. 265
Hydrogen sulfide 349 5.838 1. 091
Methane 348 4.005 0. 745
Methyl alcohol 337 5.657 1. 054
Methyl butane 324 8.494 1. 578
Methyl chloride 337 7.105 1. 320
Natural gas 344 4.359 0. 810
Nitric oxide 356 5.477 1. 018
Nitrogen 356 5.292 0. 983
Nitrous oxide 347 6.633 1. 233
Nonane 320 11. 31 2. 105
N-Octane 321 10.687 1. 985
Oxygen 356 5.657 1. 049
N-Pentane 323 8.494 1. 578
Phenol 347 9.695 1. 808
Propane 330 6. 64 1. 245
Propylene 332 6.487 1. 214
Sulfur dioxide 346 8.004 1. 503
Steam 350 4.243 0. 789
Styrene 323 10. 21 1. 897
Toluene 326 9.592 1. 783

2.1.1.2.4. Where fire exposure is being considered as a potential cause of vessel overpressure, the
volumetric flow to be used in 2.1.1.2.3 above may be developed as follows:
A. Determine the heat absorbed (Q) from Figure 1A or 1B.
B. Multiply the heat absorbed (Q) by ONE of the protection factors below, if appropriate:
0.5 for adequate drainage to a remote area at least 50 ft (15 m) away. (Only for vessels with more
than 200 ft2 [61 m2] wetted surface area).
0.3 for Approved water spray installations.
0.3 for insulation with a conductance of 4 Btu/hr ft2 °F (23 w/m2—K).
C. Determine the vapor amount to be relieved as follows:
W=Q/L (6)
Where W=weight of vapor (lb/hr or kg/hr).
Q =heat absorbed adjusted for protection factor above, if appropriate (Btu/hr or J/hr).
L =heat of vaporization (Btu/lb or J/Kg).
Table 2. Typical Insulation Conductance Values

Conductance
Material Identification Btu/hr ft2 °F (per in. thickness) W/m2—K (per cm thickness)
Carboline Pyrocrete 241(1) 6.2 13.9
Concrete 2–6 5–13
Brick 8 17
(1) FM Approved fire protective coating for LPG storage tanks.
2.1.1.3 Reactive Systems

2.1.1.3.1. Base emergency relief vent sizing for storage tanks containing unstable liquids on a worst credible
case evaluation to determine the conditions that would result in a need for overpressure protection. If a
potential for uncontrolled exothermic reaction exists, ensure emergency relief system design is done using
the latest reactive system methodologies. (See 2.1.1.3.2.)
Exception: For chlorine dioxide, use Data Sheet 7-58; for hydrogen peroxide, use Data Sheet 7-84 and
manufacturer’s guidelines.
2.1.1.3.2. Emergency relief system design for reactive systems (storage or process equipment) should
include (but not be limited to) the following steps:
A. Classify the reaction system as gassy, vapor, or hybrid. This is best done by using small-scale tests
(RSST/VSP) developed by DIERS.
B. Determine the gas generation rates (gassy) or heat generation rates (vapor) for the reaction using
small-scale test procedures or other nearly adiabatic test methods. The data should be developed by
persons thoroughly familiar with emergency pressure relief system design and thermal hazard studies,
particularly where alternative test methods are used.
C. Calculate the relief area required using appropriate simplified equations, nomographs, or rigourous
computer programs where the additional kinetic and physical data that are needed are available. Some
of the simplified methods are detailed in Emergency Relief System Design Using DIERS Technology21.
D. Adjust the vent area for discharge line length and elevations to account for possible back pressure
effects.
E. Highly viscous (greater than 500 cp) or laminar flow in the relief system will require a substantial
correction in the relief area needed for adequate pressure relief. The methods discussed in this data sheet
cannot adequately handle a viscous flow situation. Experts in emergency pressure relief of a runaway
reaction involving viscous materials should be consulted for assistance when evaluating this type of
system.

82
0.
0 0A
,0
21
=
Q
8
.33 Q = 14,090,000
A
00
10,000,000
963,4
66
0.5 Q=
A
,300
99
=1
Q = heat absorption in BTU per hour
Q
A
00
,0
20
=
Q
1,000,000
1,00,000
10 100 1,000 10,000
(1)
A = exposed wetted surface area in square ft
(1) Wetted area as follows:

a) Any vessel less than 200 ft2, the entire vessel surface
b) Sphere—55% of vessel surface
c) Horizontal tank—75% of the vessel surface area
d) Vertical tank—total exposed vessel (surface up to 30 ft above ground)
e) For non-refrigerated low pressure storage tanks (less than 1 psig) over 2800 ft2 use Q = 14,090,000 Btu/hr.
For all refrigerated tanks (any pressure) and non-refrigerated tanks over 1 psig use 21,000 A0.82
(2) Segment 1 for up to 200 ft2
Segment 2 for 200 sq ft to 1,000 ft2
Segment 3 for 1,000 sq ft to 2,800 ft2
Segment 4 for over 2,800 ft2
Fig. 1a. Heat absorbed by surface exposed to fire (English units)
2.1.2 Design of the Emergency Overpressure Relief System
2.1.2.1 Pressure Relief Devices and Inlet Pipes

Pressure vessels used in chemical reaction processes and operating at more than 15 psig (100 kPa) are
often designed in accordance with American Society of Methanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
(B&PV) Section VIII (or equivalent). Pressure relief devices, such as rupture disks and relief valves, are

100,000
82
0.
6A
15
=
Q
8
0.33 Q = 14,870
0A
10,000 227
Q=
66
0.5
Q = heat absorbed in MJ/hr
7A
80
Q=
A
7
22
=
Q
1,000
100
1 10 100 1,000
(1)
A = exposed wetted surface area in sq m
(1) Wetted area as follows:
a) Any vessel less than 18.6 m2, the entire vessel surface
b) Sphere—55% of vessel surface
c) Horizontal tank—75% of the vessel surface area
d) Vertical tank—total exposed vessel (surface up to 9.1 m above ground)
e) For non-refrigerated low pressure storage tanks (less than 0.07 barg) over 260 m2 use Q = 14,870 MJ/hr.
For all refrigerated tanks (any pressure) and non-refrigerated tanks over 0.07 barg use 156 A0.82
(2) Segment 1 for up to 18.6 m2
Segment 2 for 18.6 m2 to 93 m2
Segment 3 for 93 m2 to 260 m2
Segment 4 for over 260 m2
Fig. 1b. Heat absorbed by surface exposed to fire (metric units)
addressed in Data Sheet 12-43 with basic information and recommendations under ″Relief Devices for Unfired
Pressure Vessels;″ however, some supplemental recommendations are presented below.
2.1.2.1.1 Size the pressure relief device to ensure the overpressures that might develop in a vessel are
limited as indicated below. Pressures may be less than those noted below due to process considerations.
(See also 3.1.7.1.)
When a single pressure relief device is installed, the ASME B&PV criteria require the following:

A. The set pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of the protected
vessel.
B. For internally generated pressure, the vessel pressure is prevented from rising more than 10% or 3
psi (20 kPa), whichever is greater, above the MAWP with the relief device flowing.
C. For pressure generated by fire exposure or other unexpected sources of external heating, the vessel
pressure is prevented from rising more than 21% above the MAWP with the relief device flowing.
D. The relief device set pressure includes the effects of static head and constant back pressure.
Note: When multiple devices provide overpressure protection, the ASME B&PV code requires only one
device set at or below the vessel MAWP and permits additional devices to have a set pressure up to 105%
of the MAWP. Refer to the appropriate local or international code for additional details.
2.1.2.1.2 Set the relief device to operate at as low a pressure as possible considering process conditions.
For valve-type devices, this will usually be about 10% above the normal operating pressure to avoid valve
leakage. For rupture disk devices, the set pressure may need to be about 20% above the normal operating
pressure.
Note: This suggested setting is good practice but there are processes and other considerations that would
require a higher value and could be acceptable.
2.1.2.1.3 For emergency relief systems using rupture disks under safety relief valves, ensure the rupture
disk is of the nonfragmenting type.
Fig. 2. Rupture disk mounted under a relief valve

2.1.2.1.4 For relief systems using rupture disks under safety relief valves (Fig. 2), provide a tell-tale indicator
in the space between the two devices. This will allow discovery of a leak and the subsequent pressure buildup
that would change the operating point of the disk. Also provide means for draining material from this area.
2.1.2.1.4.1 The tell-tale indicator may be a simple pressure gauge as indicated or pressure measurement sent
to the control room with an alarm to indicate the presence of pressure in the space.
2.1.2.1.4.2 Where the tell-tale indicator is a simple pressure gauge, conduct a visual recorded check prior
to the start of each batch, or with continuous process once a shift, and prior to any restart after a shutdown.
2.1.2.1.5 To facilitate proper care and servicing, arrange pressure relief devices for easy access and
removal.
2.1.2.1.6 Install pressure relief devices as close to the protected vessel as possible so the device will be
properly fed under flowing conditions. However, where pressure fluctuates rapidly or there are strong
vibrations, a more stable location may be advisable.
2.1.2.1.7 Mount relief devices in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations. Normally, a vertical
position is preferred to avoid induced misalignment of moving parts and accumulation of liquid in parts of
the device.
2.1.2.1.8 Design inlet piping to relief devices so pressure drop will not exceed 3% of the valve’s set pressure.
Also, ensure the minimum pipe size between the vessel and relief device is no less than the area of the
relief device inlet. For safety relief valves, excessive inlet pressure losses can result in chattering (rapid
opening and closing), which can reduce valve capacity and/or result in destruction of the valve.
2.1.2.1.9 Avoid long horizontal runs or trapped sections of inlet pipe where foreign matter may accumulate
and interfere with relief device operation or discharge flow.
2.1.2.1.10 Do not install manual stop valves (shutoff valves, isolation valves) on either the inlet or discharge
side of pressure relief devices (see Section 3.1.5).
2.1.2.1.10.1 If it is necessary to work on a pressure relief device while the protected equipment/system is
operating, install redundant pressure relief devices and provide valve operation controls to ensure that manual
stop valves in the pressure relief path are in their proper position (open or closed). This could include:
A. A three-way switching valve (so that one device always remains in service). See Fig. 3.
Switching
valve
Fig. 3. Switching valve with rupture disks (or relief valves)

B. Mechanical or instrumented interlocks designed to prevent valve operations that could result in blocking
the pressure relief path before an alternate path is put into service.
2.1.2.1.11 Installations with Intervening Stop Valves on Pressure Relief Devices
2.1.2.1.11.1 General
Where intervening manual stop valves are currently installed or proposed at the inlet or discharge side of
pressure relief devices protecting a vessel and/or piping system, adhere to all of following recommendations
(A through J):
A. Ensure P&IDs show all intervening stop valves in the pressure relief system.
B. Ensure stop valves are in the full open position whenever the pressure relief valve is in service.
C. Pre-plan and document procedures to isolate a pressure relief device from the vessel and/or piping
system to minimize the time required to inspect, test, repair, or replace the relief device.
D. Authorize only specifically trained personnel (including operators and maintenance staff) to open or
close a manual stop valve to isolate a pressure relief device from operating equipment or piping systems
using documented procedures.
E. Use a documented lock-out/tag-out system whenever any intervening manual stop valve is closed for
inspection, testing, repair, or replacement to ensure they are reopened promptly after completion of the
activity.
F. Verify the position of all intervening manual stop valves prior to any unit startup.
G. Design each intervening manual stop valve to have a full bore port larger than or equal in size to the
inlet and/or discharge (as applicable) of the pressure relief device.
H. Design, configure, and/or orient the intervening manual stop valve to prevent an internal failure of the
stop valve from closing and/or blocking the pressure relief path. For example, install gate valves with the
valve stem oriented at or below the horizontal position.
I. Design and install any intervening manual stop valves for the service conditions and so that the valve
position can be visually verified.
J. Secure all intervening manual stop valves in the open position using locks (with or without chains) or
car seals. Ensure the locks or car seals are suitable for the service conditions and installed so they must
be opened or broken to operate the manual stop valve.
K. Perform monthly inspections to verify the intervening manual stop valve is open and the lock or car
seal has not been removed or broken. Maintain and review the records of the inspections as part of the
site maintenance program.
2.1.2.1.11.2 Equipment/Piping Systems with Multiple Pressure Relief Devices
A. Adhere to all the recommendations in Section 2.1.2.1.11.1.
B. Provide each pressure relief device with a separate connection to the vessel and/or piping system,
or a single connection supplying multiple devices such that isolating one relief device will not reduce the
venting capacity below that required by the vessel operation (e.g., three relief devices where any two
can provide adequate relief capacity).
C. Provide interlocks or administrative controls (documented operating procedures) to prevent more than
one relief device being isolated during vessel operation.
2.1.2.1.11.3 Equipment/Piping Systems with Single Pressure Relief Devices
Where an intervening manual stop valve is installed on the inlet and/or discharge side of the only relief device
protecting a vessel or piping system, do the following:
A. Adhere to all the recommendations in Section 2.1.2.1.11.1.
B. During isolation of the pressure relief device for maintenance or repair during vessel operation, ensure
the following:
1. An authorized person continuously monitors the pressure in the vessel.

2.The authorized person is dedicated to this task and has no other duties when performing the task.
3.The authorized person is capable of responding promptly in the event of overpressure conditions with
documented, pre-defined actions covering all sources of possible overpressure that either stop the
source of the overpressure (e.g., stop filling the vessel) or open alternate means of pressure relief (e.g.,
a vessel dump valve).
4.The documented actions are capable of stopping the continuing overpressure condition. In the case
of runaway reactions, there must be time to accomplish this task; some runaway reactions occur so
fast that this cannot be achieved.
5.The documentation is specific to the impaired relief device, not generic to devices on many different
vessels with various operating conditions.
2.1.2.2 Discharge Piping

2.1.2.2.1 Ensure the discharge piping on the outlet of the relief device is as short and straight as possible.
Keep changes in direction and elbows to a minimum. The tip of the discharge pipe should face straight up
to improve vapor dispersion and should be provided with a loose fitting rain cover or other suitable method to
prevent rain accumulation without restricting the vent opening.
2.1.2.2.2 Provide the discharge piping close to the relief device with a method to permit drainage of
condensation or other accumulating liquids. If this method is direct atmospheric discharge via small holes
that could result in impingement of potentially burning vapors on the vessel during an emergency, provide
protection of the surface from overheating by insulation, water spray, or equivalent. Alternatively, a small elbow
on the hole could be used to redirect the discharge.
Discharge Weather
riser or protection
tail pipe cover
Tail pipe
support
Drain
Fig. 4. Support for relief valve discharge piping
2.1.2.2.3 Ensure discharge piping is designed, braced, or fastened with consideration of the thrust loading
and bending moments generated by the discharged fluid (Fig. 4). Design restraints for a dynamic load of
two times the steady-state load.
2.1.2.2.4 Design discharge piping so back pressure, which may develop upon the operation of any relief
device, will not reduce the relieving capacity of that device below that required to protect the vessel from
overpressure.

2.1.2.2.5 Put discharge piping together in such a way that it can be easily disassembled for cleaning and
inspection.
2.1.2.2.6 Ensure discharge piping materials and design are in accordance with ANSI/ASME B31.3 Code,
Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping, or equivalent international standard. At a minimum, it should
be capable of withstanding pressure and temperature conditions it will experience on operation of the relief
device.
2.1.2.3 Direct Atmospheric Release

2.1.2.3.1 Arrange direct discharge to ensure it will not create a localized hazard such as formation of
flammable mixtures at ground level or on elevated structures, ignition of the discharge, or corrosive or toxic
hazards. 2, 24
2.1.2.3.2 Ensure a velocity of at least 500 ft/sec (150 m/sec) at maximum discharge rate will be maintained
in relief systems to facilitate mixing with air and dilution below the flammable range when flammable vapors
are released.
2.1.2.3.3 Locate the discharge pipe venting flammable vapors at least 150 pipe diameters from building
openings or from any ignition source unless other calculations indicate dilution below the flammable range
can be achieved in less distance.
2.1.2.4 Containment and Disposal

2.1.2.4.1 When vessel contents cannot be safely discharged directly to atmosphere, a catch tank, knock-out
drum, scrubber, or other system may be used. A flare system may also be needed to dispose of the vapors.
Data Sheet 7-14 discusses important considerations for the installation of these systems.
2.1.2.4.2 Design knockout drums or catch tanks in accordance with industry standards, e.g., API
Recommended Practice 521 2. Ensure the drums or tanks are:
A. Rated to withstand a subsequent deflagration without rupturing. A typical hydrocarbon deflagration
will result in a pressure increase of about 8 times the initial absolute pressure. From atmospheric pressure,
this would mean 120 psia. U.S. industry practice suggests a vessel rated at 50 psig (450 kPa).
B. Provided with an emergency relief system design based on two-phase flow methodology routed to a
suitable discharge point.
C. Provided with sufficient volume to hold estimated liquid carryover (up to 150% of working vessel volume
for foaming liquids).
D. Provided with a method for removal of accumulated liquids and protected from freezing, if a factor.
2.1.2.5 Manifold Discharge Piping Systems

2.1.2.5.1 Size a discharge manifold, into which a number of relief devices are connected, for the device
having the greatest discharge capacity. However, if the simultaneous operation of two or more relief devices
is considered credible, design the discharge manifold to carry the discharge capacity of all relief devices
expected to operate.
2.1.2.5.2 To ensure that actuation of one relief system does not affect others connected to the manifold line,
fit each discharge pipe with a rupture disk just prior to the entrance to the manifold line. Set at a much lower
pressure than the primary device. Also provide tell-tale pressure indicator and a means for draining this
space.
2.1.2.5.3. If any relief devices are connected to a discharge piping manifold, vacuum supports or provide
special back pressure supports to prevent rupture of the disk by back pressure when some other relieving
device operates (Fig. 5).
2.1.2.5.4. Where materials can solidify in the manifold line at ambient temperatures, ensure the line is heat
traced in an appropriate manner.

Top section
Seal member Vacuum support
Fig. 5. Vacuum support for rupture disk
2.1.3 Overpressure Protection by System Design - Code Case 2211 and UG-140
2.1.3.1 Where a decision is made to provide overpressure protection via system design (containment) as
provided in UG-140 of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, instead of providing an
adequate relief device as required by the Code (or similar international codes), carefully review the design
philosophy, documentation, and supporting studies to confirm the vessel will not fail catastrophically under
″worst credible case″ conditions (see Section 3.1.3).
2.1.4 Limitations
2.1.4.1 Ensure the limitations of the emergency relief system for each vessel are clearly communicated by
the designer or evaluator of the system to the manager of the process. Parameter limitations that should
be reported for a specific reactive process include but are not limited to: maximum size of batch allowed,
setting of the relief device, maximum concentration of the reactants that can be used, and minimum
concentration of diluent to be used.
2.1.4.2 For nondedicated (multiple-use) vessels, base limitations on the most hazardous process to be
conducted in the vessel (i.e., the one that presents the most severe emergency relief conditions).
2.1.4.3 When process or service changes are considered, thoroughly review the limitations of the existing
emergency relief system to be sure the system remains adequate. Only then should the process manager
authorize the change.
2.2 Operation and Maintenance

2.2.1 Have pressure relief valves for new installations bench tested for proper settings, popping pressure,
etc., prior to installation. These may have been exposed to rough handling and a less than ideal environment
after being released by the manufacturer.
2.2.2 Ensure the following actions are performed:
A. Pressure relief valves on vessels containing dirty, fouling, or highly corrosive materials, or materials
susceptible to runaway reaction are tested annually.
B. Pressure relief valves in ‘‘clean’’ service are tested at least every three years.
C. Each valve is tested under a volume of fluid sufficient to allow it to fully ‘‘pop.’’
D. During testing, all moving and pressure-bearing parts are lubricated as well as provided any other
needed maintenance. Ensure lubrication is per manufacturer’s specification and lubricants are compatible
with process materials and in-service temperatures.

2.2.3 Replace rupture disks based on the disk manufacturer’s recommendations. Disks exposed to frequent
pressure cycling, high operating temperature, or fouling or corrosive atmospheres may require replacement
annually.
Visually inspect rupture disks whenever the vessel is inspected. If any cracking or material creep is
discovered, replace the disk prior to putting the vessel back into service.
2.2.4 Clean relief system piping and containment/disposal vessels after every actuation of the emergency
relief system.
2.2.5 Verify the structural integrity of the vessel, relief system, and bracing by frequent visual inspection.
Ascertain that the exterior of the process vessel and the relief system are in good condition. Report cracks
and other obvious problems promptly and have them corrected. Visual inspection frequency can be as often
as each shift for reactors to quarterly for storage tanks.
2.2.6 Ensure the inspection programs recommended above are thoroughly documented and reviewed
regularly to pinpoint problem areas and implement improvements.
3.0 SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Comments
3.1.1 General
The size of relief devices is specified for many cases, mostly non-reactive storage situations, by existing
codes and standards. These include National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), American Petroleum
Institute (API) and Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) for ignitable liquids; the Compressed
Gases Association (CGA) for gases; and the Chlorine Institute for chlorine. These codes are all based on
single-phase venting or testing of the specific system.
The sizing of pressure relief systems for reactive systems presents more difficulties due to many different
reacting systems and the possibility of two-phase fluid release. Overpressure protection (venting of reactive
systems) was studied extensively under the umbrella of the AIChE DIERS program starting in 1976, and
continues to be actively investigated and improved. The emphasis was the study of two-phase venting and
better small scale modeling of the reactive systems. It was generally concluded that the design of pressure
relief for nonreactive systems is not affected by these studies.3
For a nonreactive system, fire exposure is usually the design basis for the relief system. Determination of
vapor flow rate through the system is the controlling factor and depends on the stored material’s heat of
vaporization and the heat absorbed. Table 4 in Data Sheet 7-88 is based on the heat absorbed graphs (Figs.
1A, 1B) in this data sheet, with hexane as the fluid. Other methods (API, CGA, etc.) are similar, with major
differences in how the surface absorbing heat is defined and whether credit is allowed for drainage, insulation
and water spray. The actual vent device size is determined from manufacturer’s literature or related equations.
For reactive systems there are no rules of thumb or nomographs that permit determination of vent sizes
based on simple correlating factors such as vessel volume or reaction type. The methodologies developed
in the DIERS program are too complex to be used properly without special expertise, so this data sheet does
not attempt to provide guidance on such design. Where reactive systems are of concern, specialists must be
employed.
In using DIERS or other methods, determination of reaction rates under adiabatic (no heat loss to
surroundings) conditions is most representative of conditions in a large reactor. Some older small scale test
methods result in excessive losses to the test vessel, with the result that maximum temperature or rate
conditions are missed or poorly estimated. Also the type of reaction is important to properly determine the
amount and condition (one or two phase) of the material being discharged. Once these are determined, the
vent size for the full scale reactor may be determined.
Most DIERS evaluations have been based on batch reactors containing liquids.
The case of tubular or plug flow reactors presents special problems due to the excessive length-diameter
ratio, limited locations for relief devices due to concentric heat exchange equipment and vent areas limited
to reactor diameter. Sizing of relief devices for tubular reactors has been recently addressed based on
variations of DIERS procedures 23. Packed bed reactors also present some special problems, but are
generally handled using DIERS procedures with proper small scale test methods.

3.1.2 Worst Credible Case

The size of the relief system is strongly dependent on the type of runaway reaction, either the heat generation
or gas generation rates, and the type of flow through the relief system. The data in Table 3, as reported by
Leung and Fauske, show how different upset conditions can result in different runaway conditions and
requirements for emergency pressure relief. The self heat rate is directly proportional to the heat generation
rate and relief area required.
As the data in Table 3 show, the relief area requirements can differ by up to two orders of magnitude for
different upset conditions. Relief area design based on conditions that are not the worst expected could have
disastrous consequences. Therefore, it is imperative that the relief system be evaluated based on the
combination of factors that develops the most severe set of conditions for pressure relief.
Table 3. Effect of Different Upset Condtions on Self Heat Rate.

Data obtained in the VSP Bench Scale Apparatus (Leung and Fauske 4).
Self-
Relief Conditions
Heat
Pset Tset Rate
°C/min
psig barg °C
System at relief Comments
Phenol-HCHO-Caustic 100 6.9 179 <1 37.5 HCHO.
Phenol-HCHO-Caustic 15 1 130 70 50 HCHO.
Phenol-HCHO-Caustic 5 0.35 115 10-150 50 HCHO-low range reflects controlled addition.
Phenol-HCHO-Caustic 15 1 125 50-500 50 HCHO-upper range reflects catalyst mischarge
(double charge of caustic).
Methyl Methacrylate 25 1.7 131 0.3-170 Upper range reflects solvent mischarge and
double initiator.
Acrylate Monomer Mix 15 1 110 17-2000 Upper range reflects solvent mischarge.
Furfuryl Alcohol 15 1 125 0.3-20 Upper range reflects double catalyst charge.
Solution
Cumene 4 0.3 163 1.5- Tempered (reaction heat is removed by latent of
Hydroperoxide >200 heat vaporization) system at low concentration,
non-tempered at high concentration.
The first step in determining the worst credible case scenario is to identify the event, or combination of events,
that could result in vessel overpressure either by a simple physical process or by initiating a runaway reaction.
This should be accomplished using one of the formalized techniques for hazard identification now available.
A few of the commonly used techniques include Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and
Operability Studies (HAZOPS), Fault Tree Analysis, etc. There is much available in the literature to assist
in applying these methods.
Past experience indicates the following could be causes of overpressure:
• Closed valve Inadvertent open valve
• Heating system failure
• Cooling system failure
• Fire exposure
• Power failure
• Loss of diluent or solvent
• Scale-up errors
• Process control malfunctions
• Chemical reaction caused by contamination, mischarging of reactant, or catalyst, or loss of agitation
This is by no means a complete list. However, it can be used as a starting point for the types of upset events
that should be identified during a process study.

After the scenarios have been identified, the next step is to decide which scenarios are credible. This will
involve breaking each scenario into the sequence of events that cause it and comparing them to an
established credibility criterion. This credibility comparison can be accomplished either quantitatively or
qualitatively.
A quantitative analysis relies on data being available on the frequency and probability of the scenario or event.
Much of this data is only now being developed. A qualitative analysis simply compares a proposed scenario
with a predefined credible scenario with a judgement made on the proposed scenario’s ranking. This method
depends heavily on the expertise of the analyst.
After the various credible scenarios have been developed, the one creating the largest or fastest pressure
excursion would be identified as the worst and would be used in the appropriate design equations. Identifying
the worst case may rely on past history in operating plants or bench scale evaluations.
3.1.3 Reducing Emergency Relief System Capacity Requirements for Reactive Processes
Emergency relief system capacity requirements for new facilities may be impractical as initially designed.
At an existing facility, process changes may make the installed emergency relief system inadequate. There
are other steps that can be taken to protect property, for example:
A. Reduce the batch size to an amount that can readily be accommodated by existing emergency relief
systems.
B. Change the process to be inherently safe. An inherently safe process is one that will not produce
damaging conditions from even the most severe process upsets. These processes usually involve small
volume, continuous flow operations or process with safe chemistry where reactions are mild, easily
controlled or very stable. Inventories of the unstable chemical or reacting mixtures are small. Runaway
reactions in these vessels cannot generate the energy and pressure associated with runaway reactions in
large, batch-type process vessels, hence, damage and associated production loss due to an incident are
usually minimal.
C. Dump the vessel contents to an open basin or tank. It must occur by gravity or the pressure in the
vessel only. The dump basin/tank will usually contain a diluent to quench the reaction. Location of the
basin/tank should not expose important facilities.
D. Relocate a process with the potential for a severe runaway reaction to an area where other equipment,
buildings, or processes will not be affected by the damage associated with a vessel rupture. With the
size of the vessel and its pressure rating, spacing requirements can be estimated using information in
Data Sheet 7-14.
D. When the needed distances cannot be provided, barricading can be used as an alternative. Barricades
should be of blast and missile resistant construction. Design data for barricades is available from several
references given in Data Sheet 7-14.
3.1.4 Overpressure Protection by System Design - Code Case 2211 and UG-140
Code Case 2211 of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII (October 1999), determined that
system design rather than pressure relief devices could be an alternative method of protecting a vessel
against overpressure. The code case was adopted into the Code in the form of Section UG-140.
According to section UG-140, a pressure vessel does not require a pressure relief device under two broad
conditions:
A. The pressure is self-limiting such that the pressure is less than or equal to the MAWP; for example,
the maximum discharge pressure of a pump or compressor feeding the vessel is less than MAWP.
B. The pressure is limited by design (containment) such that no credible scenario can create a pressure
over the 116% of the MAWP times the ratio of the allowable stress value at the temperature of the
overpressure scenario to the allowable stress value at the design temperature (ref UG-140[b][5]).
3.1.4.1 Discussion
A code case is formulated to clarify existing requirements or provide rules not currently covered by the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Once approved, it becomes part of the code in the subsequent revision
cycle.

Code Case 2211 answered the following inquiry:

Under what conditions may a pressure vessel be provided with overpressure protection by system design
in lieu of a pressure relief device as required by UG-125(a) of Section VIII, Division 1 and by AR-100 of Section
VIII, Division 2?
Briefly, the code case conclusion, which is now implemented as section UG-140, allows the use of system
design with the following provisions:
A. The vessel is not in air, water, or steam service.
B. The decision to use system design is the responsibility of the user.
C. The user ensures that the MAWP of the vessel is greater than the highest pressure that can reasonably
be expected to be achieved by the system, and the user conducts a detailed analysis to examine all
credible scenarios that could result in an overpressure condition.
D. The analysis in (c) is performed by an engineer experienced in the methods and detailed documentation
is provided.
E. The results of the analysis are documented and signed by the person in responsible charge for the
management of operation of the vessel and maintained with other vessel documentation.
There are additional details in UG-140 required for compliance and these must be implemented by the user.
UG-140 suggests two sources to assist in developing this documentation:
• API Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure Relieving & Depressuring Systems, has a section
on ″Causes of Overpressure.″
• Welding Research Council Bulletin 498, Guidance on the Application of Code Case 2211 - Overpressure
Protection by System Design, provides detailed guidance on conducting the study, which should use an
organized, systematic, multi-disciplined approach such as HAZOP, Fault Tree, Event Tree Analysis, or
similar methodology.
The API RP 521 lists a number of possible causes of overpressure incidents.
Neither clearly addresses the potential for exothermic reactions, though the WRC document is otherwise
quite complete on the methodology and process for conducting this study.
Exothermic reactions, unless carefully evaluated and characterized, can lead to unexpected events that could
exceed the ″credible″ design pressure. Section 3.1.2 provides a similar list of possible causes of overpressure
and offers additional guidance on choosing a ″worst credible case″ for both reactive and nonreactive
systems. This data sheet also provides additional guidance on the installation of vessels with less than the
prescribed amount of overpressure relief.
UG-140 specifically exempts vessels in air, water, or steam service, probably the easiest service for which
to specify the worst credible case.
3.1.5 Manual Intervening Stop Valves Around Pressure Relief Devices

The use of manual stop valves (shutoff valves, isolation valves) on either side of pressure relief devices is
not considered generally accepted good practice.
However, intervening manual stop valves are sometimes installed for process functionality at the inlet and/or
discharge of pressure relief devices for inspection, testing, repair, or replacement purposes. When this is
done, additional precautions are needed to minimize the likelihood of unintended closure during equipment
operation (see Section 2.1.2.1.10).
The best option on the inlet side of pressure relief devices is a three-way switching valve (Fig. 3). A three-way
switching valve has an adequate inlet internal cross-sectional area for pressure relief and is designed to
prevent a flow path from being blocked without another path being simultaneously open. There is no
intermediate position that allows both pressure relief devices to be isolated from the protected vessel and/or
piping system at the same time.

Another example of the use of intervening stop valves is multiple pressure relief devices installed with
connection to the vessel and/or piping system (e.g., three relief devices where any two can provide adequate
relief capacity) with mechanical or instrumented interlocks to prevent all devices from being isolated
simultaneously.
The ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division I, UG-135 and Appendix M, Section M-5
(2015) or National Board Inspection Code NB 23, Part 1 (2015) provide criteria for the use of intervening
manual stop valves. This document provides guidance that is consistent with these code requirements (see
2.1.2.1.11).
3.1.6 Risk vs. Consequence Based Design for Reactive Systems
3.1.6.1 General
Overpressure protection as specified by various codes (ASME, API, ISO, etc.) should prevent any permanent
vessel damage. In some cases, vessel damage (either permanent deformation or rupture) may be accepted
when the consequences of such damage are recognized and minimized. These consequences should
include any health and environmental risks, but these issues are beyond the scope of this document.
Where overpressure protection of a reaction system is designed to allow pressures higher than code
requirements, the maximum pressures developed must be evaluated using the latest technology, particularly
consideration of the potential for two phase relief, and the local code authorities must accept the design
features.
3.1.6.2 Evaluation Procedure

To use this procedure for reactive systems, one must first determine the likelihood of a runaway based on
the nature and conditions of the reacting system and the level of precautionary measures or control available.
Once this is determined, the level of mitigation needed can be developed based on the consequences. This
is indicated by Table 4.
In Table 4, significant causes would primarily be those reactions that are highly exothermic, sensitive to
process conditions (reactants, diluents, catalysts, etc.), or operating at unstable temperatures, that is, near
their runaway initiation temperature. These temperatures can be determined by small scale tests, e.g., DTA,
DSC, ARC, etc.
A safe margin from the runaway temperature would include consideration of normal operating temperatures,
maximum utility heat input available and the adiabatic temperature rise from a potential undesired exotherm.
The safety margin needed is dependent on the process and cannot be easily generalized 11.
Once the causes and precautionary measures (Table 5) are determined, the likelihood of a runaway reaction
can be evaluated. Knowing the MAWP of the vessel and the pressures that might occur in a runaway, the
potential consequences would be evaluated and, from Table 4 the level of risk reduction effort needed.

Table 4. Risk vs Consequences Based Design For Reactive Systems

Any Significant Cause e.g., Reaction and No Significant Causes e.g., Reaction and
Reactor are Reactor are
Causes Normally at or Near Unstable conditions Normally at Stable Conditions
Precautionary
Measures Conventional Conventional or Other
Likelihood Considered Likely Considered Unlikely
Consequences:(1) <1.2 (MAWP) Damage to <1.2 (MAWP) Damage to
Potential Vessel No Damage Vessel But No Damage Vessel But
Damage at Maximum to No Leakage Vessel To No Leakage Vessel
Venting Pressure Vessel (2) Rupture Vessel (2) Rupture
Risk Reduction None Must Do Must Do None Consider Consider
Recommendations A1 or Doing Doing
A2 and A3
A1 Methods To Reduce NA Yes (3) Yes (3) NA Yes (3) Yes (3)
Maximum Venting Vessel
Pressure to <1.2 (MAWP)
A2 Protection NA Require Require NA Consider Consider
(In The Event of a Barricade Barricade Barricade Barricade
Runaway) From From From From
Personnel Personnel Personnel Personnel
and Location and Location
Remote Remote
From From
Facilities Facilities
A3 Additional NA Consider Consider NA Consider Consider
Precautionary Measures ‘‘Better ‘‘Extraordinary ‘‘Better’’ ‘‘Extraordinary
(To Reduce Likelihood of Precautionary Precautionary Precautionary Measures’’
a Runaway) (See Table 5) Measures’’ Measures’’ Methods
(1) Also consider health and environmental risks.
(2) If deformation suspected, inspect vessel to verify its suitability for continued use.
(3) Could include reduced batch size, increased vent size, process change, etc.
Table 5. Examples of Relative Types of Precautionary Measures

Conventional Better Extraordinary
Steam Heating Tempered Water Heating (Matching Specialized Early Instability Detection
Process Requirements)
Cooling Systems Emergency Cooling Quench Reaction With Water or Inhibitor
Process Interlocks Emergency Shutdown Interlocks (ESI) Redundant ESI Sensing Different
Conditions e.g., Pressure & Temperature
Fire Dept. Available (To Active Fire Protection (Sprinklers) Passive Fire Protection Such As:
Prevent Heating Chemicals to Fire Proofing Jacket
Runaway by Fire Exposure) High Temperature Insulation
Process Safety Writeup Better Understanding of Process New Technologies To Evaluate Process
(e.g., Non-adiabatic Tests)
Operator Training Specifically Trained Operator Operator With Frequent Certification
Redundant process controls (i.e., more than one way to measure the controlled parameter) can be used to
control conditions that could lead to a runaway reaction. They should be set to provide an alarm and/or take
corrective action when conditions conducive to a runaway reaction develop. For example, controls can be
interlocked to shut off reactant to the vessel.
Process controls will not prevent a runaway reaction in every upset incident, since control system failures
can happen. However, process controls with adequate redundancy can reduce the frequency of occurrence.
Where the consequences are small (for example, vessel deformation but no leakage), a reduced level of
overpressure protection might be accepted.

3.1.7 Design of the Emergency Relief System
3.1.7.1 Relief Device Operating Pressure Criteria

Set point for discharge of the emergency relief device is determined by criteria of the ASME, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, or appropriate international standard. Pressures lower than required by
the code would also be accepted.
In this data sheet, Section 2.1.2.1.1 indicates basic requirements and Figure 6 provides further details. In
all cases, the applicable local codes should be the final determinant of proper settings.
3.1.7.2 Discharge Piping

The discharge of a relief device imposes a reactive load on the relief system due to the reaction force of
the flowing fluid, causing the piping and/or vessel to recoil. Transient effects of reaction forces on piping and
the effects of thermal expansion or contraction should also be addressed in the evaluation. Discussion of
reaction force determination and thrust restraint design is given by Chambard 5 and Grossel 6,7.
Back pressure is also an important consideration when evaluating relief system discharge piping. For systems
using conventional relief valves, back pressure in the discharge pipe could cause the valve to flutter or
chatter. (Flutter refers to the abnormally rapid reciprocating motion of the movable parts of a pressure relief
valve in which the disk does not contact the seat. Chatter refers to the motion that causes the disk to contact
the seat and damage the valve and associated piping). Conventional pressure relief valves should typically
not be used when the built-up back pressure is greater than 10% of the set pressure at 10-percent
overpressure.
For balanced valves or other relief devices that function independent of back pressure, the resistance in
the discharge line should be considered in the system design; however, the limits should be in accordance
with manufacturer’s guidelines.
Flanged piping or mechanical couplings are preferred for relief systems because they are easy to disassemble
and clean. However, the fittings should have pressure ratings similar to the piping. Welded piping in relief
systems should be avoided since it is difficult to disassemble and clean but can be used when flanged
connections are provided to permit disassembly.
ANSI/ASME Code B31.3. Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping, specifies the type of pipe and the
corrosion resistance specifications that should be met for relief system piping. Schedule 40, carbon steel
pipe is the material most commonly used in relief systems. However, alternative pipe materials may be used,
provided they meet the above or any equivalent international code.
3.1.7.3 Direct Atmospheric Release

Short, direct routing to atmosphere is the preferred method of handling relief valve discharge. However,
environmental or other considerations may dictate discharge to a catch tank, scrubber, incinerator, etc. This
also could result in manifolding more than one relief device into a single discharge line. The factors mentioned
in Sections 2.1.2.3 thru 2.1.2.5 should be carefully considered in such situations.
When flammable vapors are discharged to atmosphere from a venting system, a mixture within the flammable
range will unavoidably occur downstream of the outlet, as the vapor mixes with air. If the vent discharge is
located a safe distance from other facilities, the material may be safely diluted by mixing with air, or the mixture
may be burned as a flare by providing a pilot ignition source. Where venting is done without a flare, the system
is normally designed to discharge at a high flow rate to facilitate turbulence and rapid dilution of the vapor
or gas with air. A flow rate of at least 500 ft/sec (150 m/sec) is normally specified in the design. At this velocity,
dilution below the explosive range is normally obtained within 150-diameters distance from the vent line
discharge point.
However, if the vent discharge contains significant quantities of a volatile ignitable liquid or its vapors, the
liquid can condense and accumulate at grade level, generating a cloud of flammable vapors in the area. This
will normally result in a decision to direct the release to a catch tank or knockout pot to reduce the hazard.

Pressure vessel requirements Vessel Typical characteristics of

pressure safety relief valves
Maximum allowable Maximum relieving

accumulated pressure 121 pressure for
(fire exposure only) fire sizing
120
Maximum allowable Maximum relieving

accumulated pressure 116 pressure for
for multiple-valve installation process sizing
(other than fire exposure) 115
Margin of safety Multiple valves
due to orifice
Single valve
selection
(varies)
Percent of maximum allowable working pressure (gauge)
Maximum allowable Maximum allowable set pressure
accumulated pressure 110 for supplemental valves
for single-valve installation (fire exposure)
(other than fire exposure)
Overpressure (maximum)
105 Maximum allowable set pressure

for supplemental valves (process)
Overpressure (typical)
Maximum allowable
working pressure 100 Maximum allowable set pressure
or design pressure Simmer for single valve (average)
(hydrotest at 150)) (typical)
Start to open
Blowdown (typical)
95 Seat clamping force
Reset pressure (typical)

for single valve
Usual maximum normal 90 Standard leak test pressure

operating pressure
{
Setting: +3 percent
Not specified by
Tolerances Blowdown
simmer { ASME code,
Section VIII
Tightness: API Std 527

85
Notes:
1. The operating pressure may be any lower pressure required.
2. The set pressure and all other related to it may be moved downward if the operating pressure permits.
3. This figure conforms with the requirements of Section VIII, Division 1, of the ASME Code.
4. The pressure conditions shown are for safety relief valves installed on a pressure vessel (vapor phase).
Fig. 6. Vapor and gas service—relative pressure levels for relief devices as related to set pressure

3.1.8 Maintenance and Testing

Efforts and capital spent designing and installing an emergency relief system to give adequate protection
are of little value if the system is not kept in working order. Therefore, a well documented and thorough
inspection and preventive maintenance program should be considered a necessity. The suggested test
frequencies should be considered minimums that could be increased in the case of adverse experience.
Testing of safety relief valves is needed to ensure the valve is in proper working order. Testing with sufficient
volume to allow the relief valve to ‘‘pop’’ should eliminate possible misalignment of moving parts and reduce
the probability of damaging the valve seat.
Bench testing is the preferred method for testing relief valves. This is due to the controlled environment.
However, if a valve is difficult or impossible to remove, it can be tested providing an adequate, mobile, test
apparatus is used and the relief system is set up for this testing.
Manual lift testing of relief valves is not recommended. A lift test can lead to a misalignment of the valve’s
operating mechanism and to damage of the valve seat. This can result in leakage.
3.1.9 Limitations of Emergency Pressure Relief Systems

It should not be assumed that a well designed and maintained emergency pressure relief system will always
prevent catastrophic rupture of a vessel. Vessels weakened by heat, corrosion, or mechanical impact may
rupture at pressures less than the operating pressure of the relief device. Proper design and construction of
the vessel along with inspection and maintenance should reduce the chances of this occurring.
3.1.10 Evaluating Existing Plants

Where overpressure protection has been provided in existing plants without consideration of worst credible
case or without some evaluation of possible runaway reaction events, the relief system may not be adequate.
The necessary evaluations are needed to determine adequacy.
The following list indicates typical situations where inadequacy might be expected in order of decreasing
priority to evaluate:
A. Exothermic reactions known to be highly reactive or difficult to control. Included would be nitrations,
bulk polymerizations, Friedel-Craft alkylations and Grignard reactions.
B. Other exothermic reactions where the relief device was sized for fire exposure without consideration
of possible reactivity effects.
C. Relief designed assuming all vapor flow where two-phase flow is likely. This would include vessels
operated more than 50% full or where contents have a viscosity over 500 cps.
D. Systems where the relief discharge line is long (L/D over 100 for tempered reactions or 50 for gassy
reactions), with numerous elbows, where the piping is smaller than the relief device or where discharge
is to a header. Calculations supporting the adequacy of such design, including probable two-phase flow,
should be available.
E. Design based on non-adiabatic test methods (DSC, DTA, etc.) where any single category in Table 6
is ‘‘high.’’ Re-evaluation using adiabatic methods is needed.
F. Reactions believed to be of the gassy type, i.e., pressure developed due to the production of
noncondensible gases, where small-scale vented tests have not been conducted.
3.1.11 Estimating Relief Area

When evaluating pressure relief devices for reactive systems in existing plants, Figure 7a or 7b should be
used.
These figures and procedures are based on Reference 21, Chapter VI. Use of the figure requires the
availability of self heat rate data (dT/dt). This data should be obtained from an adiabatic (φ = 1) test device,
preferably an RSST of VSP. Where a non-adiabatic (φ>1) test device is used, the actual self heat rate will
be larger. The data will need to be adjusted for this fact. The suggested procedure and a simple example are
included in Appendix C, Section C.4. Without correction for adiabaticity, the vent size estimated from the
figure could be too small in the full scale equipment.

Figures 7a and 7b are based on the following equation:
αD−αo
[ ][ ]
1⁄2
A 1 (dT/dt) Cp
= (7)
Mo 2 (FACTOR) (∆p) T 1−αo
Where:
A = Vent area, m2.
mo = Mass of vessel contents, kg.
dT/dt = Self heat rate, °C/sec (Note: nomograph abscissa is °C/min).
∆P = Pressure increase during venting, Pa (Note: psi×6900=Pa).
Cp = Heat capacity, J/Kg K (Note: J/Kg K is numerically equivalent to J/Kg °C).
T = Venting temperature, K.
αD, αo= Void fraction during venting, before venting, (no units).
FACTOR= Adjustments for rupture disk or relief valve discharge coefficients and line L/D.
The following assumptions have been built into Figures 7a and 7b:
αD = 1 (In other words, there is homogeneous venting and the vessel completely empties during venting.)
mo = The vessel mass is based on 1000 kg or 1000 lb.
∆P = Assumes a 20% pressure accumulation beyond the set pressure (on an absolute basis), i.e., ∆ P =
0.2 Pset
Example: Set pressure is 100 psig = 114.7 psia ∆P = 0.2 (114.7) = 22.9 psi
Specific Cp (2886 J/kg K = 0.69 Btu/lb °F) and T (373 K = 100°C = 212°F) are used.
Reactions are vapor type (tempered).
OR
Reactions are hybrid type where the relief device set pressure and the amount of non-reactive diluent (solvent)
in the vessel are sufficient to maintain a vapor type release throughout the runaway reaction.
The equation is not appropriate for gassy reactions unless homogeneous venting is ensured.
It should not be used for design, only for preliminary evaluation.
3.1.11.1 Adjusting the Graph Values

The vent area read from the graph (AN) can be adjusted (AERS) for a different ∆P and for several factors.
AERS=AN (CORRECTION) (8)
(Note: Since FACTORS is in the denominator of Equation 7, the CORRECTION figure is the inverse).
3.1.11.1.1 Pressure
The curve is based on ∆P of 20% overpressure (OP)
% OP Correction
10 2.0
20 1.0
30 0.67
Note: For overpressure greater than 30%, results can become nonconservative.
3.1.11.1.2 Discharge Line L/D

Figures 7a and 7b assume a nozzle with L/D = 0. The correction factors for other horizontal constant diameter
lines are as follows:

Sq in
1.0E+03
1.0E+02
e
ur
ess
t pr
se
ef
Reli
A
1.0E+01 P SI
20
A
P SI
40 A
P SI
80 A
P SI
50 A
1 P SI
0 IA
1.0E+00 30
0 PS
50
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1 10 100 1000
Self heat rate (°C/min)
Basis: Ideal ERS device area
Tempered reaction
Turbulent, flashing, HEQ, two-phase, choked flow
20% overpressure (absolute basis)
L/D=0 (nozzle)
No partial disengagement
Warning: Do not use for design
Fig. 7a. Vent area/1000 lbs vs. self heat rate21

Sq m
1.0E+00
1.0E-01
re
s su
pre
set
lief
Re
a
kP
0
1.0E-02 14
a
kP
2 75
a
kP
5 50 a
kP
35 kP
a
10
70 a
20 kP
50
1.0E-03 34
1.0E-04
1 10 100 1000
Self heat rate (°C/min)
Basis: Ideal ERS device area
Tempered reaction
Turbulent, flashing, HEQ, two-phase, choked flow
20% overpressure (absolute basis)
L/D=0 (nozzle)
No partial disengagement
Warning: Do not use for design
Fig. 7b. Vent area/1000 kgs vs. self heat rate21

L/D Correction
0 1.0
50 1.15
100 1.28
200 1.47
400 1.75
600 2.0
3.1.11.1.3 Rupture Disks

The ASME requires a discharge coefficient of 0.62 for a rupture disk. A correction = 1.61 should be applied
to AN.
3.1.11.1.4 Relief Valves

A typical relief valve has a discharge coefficient of about 0.98. ASME requires application of an efficiency
factor of 0.9. As a result, a correction = 1.13 should be applied to AN.
3.1.11.2 Example
Using the Analytical Method (Equation 7) and the figures, estimate the vent size for a 600 gal polymerization
reactor. A safety valve with a 20% overpressure allowance is needed. The following information is available.
mo = 1500 kg.
Cp = 2530 J/kg K.
T = 217°C (490 K) @ 80 psia (352,000 Pa).
dT/dt = 14.8°C/min (0.247°C/sec) @ φ = 1.
αD = 1.
FACTOR = 0.9 (0.98) = 0.88 (safety valve).
Substituting into Equation 7
AERS
1500
=
1
2
(0.247)
(0.88)(0.2) (5.52×105) [ 2530
490 ][ 1−αo
1−αo ]
AERS=0.0043 m2
Using Figure 7b at relief set pressure of 80 psia and self heat rate of 14.8°C/min, AN = 0.003 m2 per 1000
kg of reactant. This needs to be corrected for relief valve coefficient and adjusted to 1500 kg.
1500
AERS=AN(CORRECTION)=(0.003)(1.13) =0.0051m2
1000
The remaining difference is related to Cp and T.
3.1.12 Prioritizing Equipment Needing Detailed Analysis

If there are reactors or other vessels with potentially undersized emergency relief systems and some limited
thermal analysis data are available, a priority ranking for detailed re-evaluation can be developed. Priorities
can be based on data developed from methods such as DTA, DSC, ARC, etc. (Refer to Table 6.)
1. Low priority for re-evaluation if any or all of the following are true:
Low rates of pressure or temperature rise (dP/dt or dT/dt)
Low amount of decomposition gases produced (moles/mole of reactant).
Low probability of mischarging reactants or catalysts, introduction of contaminants, or other control errors.
2. Moderate priority for re-evaluation if any or all of the following are true:
Moderate rates of pressure or temperature rise (dP/dt or dT/dt)
Moderate amount of decomposition gases produced (moles/mole of reactant).
Moderate probability of mischarging reactants or catalysts, introduction of contaminants or other control
errors.

3. High priority for re-evaluation if any or all of the following are true:
High rates of pressure or temperature rise (dP/dt or dT/dt).
High amount of decomposition gases produced (moles/mole of reactant).
High probability of mischarging reactants or catalysts, introduction of contaminants or other control errors.
A re-evaluation index can be developed if points are assigned to the priority for each thermal data category
with Low = 1, Moderate = 2, and High = 3. Assuming all categories of data are available the index would
be:
Index = dT/dt points + dP/dt points + moles of gas points + ‘‘errors’’ points.
This index can be used for prioritizing reviews where many systems must be reevaluated.
A final important factor to be considered is the consequence of a failure of the emergency relief system.
Obviously, the more severe the consequence to either property or personnel, the higher the priority for an
up-to-date evaluation.
9
Table 6. Determining Screening Priority
Thermal Data—DTA/DSC/ARC Probability of
(dT/dt)max °C/min (dP/dt)max Moles of gas mischarge,
psi/min kPa/min moles of reactant contamination or

Priority operational error
Low <100 <100 <690 <0.1 Low
Moderate 100–1000 100–1000 690–6900 0.1–0.5 Moderate
High >1000 >1000 >6900 >0.5 High
3.2 Loss History

Table 7 provides a breakdown of FM Global client losses by most important cause, although nearly all had
two or more significant factors. In fact, two thirds of the losses could be considered due to an uncontrolled
or unexpected exothermic reaction. About 20% of the incidents had relief devices that operated to minimize
damage to the equipment.
Table 7. Causes of Vessel Overpressure Losses, 1980–1991 (Gross Loss Over US$100,000)
Cause Percent of Losses
Uncontrolled exotherm 30
Plugged/no relief 18
Scaleup 12
Unusual procedure 12
Contamination 8
Inadequate cooling 8
Instrument failure 4
Unknown 8
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 7-14, Fire Protection for Chemical Plants
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations
Data Sheet 7-58, Chlorine Dioxide
Data Sheet 7-84, Hydrogen Peroxide
Data Sheet 7-88, Storage Tanks for Ignitable Liquids
Data Sheet 12-43, Pressure Relief Devices
4.2 Others
ANSI/ASME B31.3 Code, Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping
ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII

APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Accumulation: The pressure increase over the maximum allowable working pressure of the vessel during
discharge through the pressure relief device, expressed in pressure units or as a percent. Maximum allowable
accumulations are established by applicable codes for operating and fire contingencies. (See also
overpressure.)
Adiabatic: A process, condition or operation during which there is no gain or loss of heat from the surroundings.
Critical flow: The flow rate of compressible fluid through an orifice that is unaffected by further reduction in
downstream pressure. This flow rate is reached at the critical pressure ratio, the ratio of downstream absolute
pressure to upstream absolute pressure. This ratio is typically between 0.5 and 0.6 and is a function of the
fluid’s specific heat.
Ignitable Liquid: Any liquid or liquid mixture that is capable of fueling a fire, including flammable liquids,
combustible liquids, inflammable liquids, or any other reference to a liquid that will burn. An ignitable liquid
must have a fire point.
LPG. Liquified petroleum gas: A material having a vapor pressure not exceeding that allowed for commercial
propane composed of the following hydrocarbons either by themselves or as mixtures: propane, propylene,
normal butane, isobutane and butylene (including isomers).
Overpressure: The pressure increase over the set pressure of the relieving device, expressed either in
pressure units or as a percent. It is the same as accumulation if the relieving device is set at the maximum
allowable working pressure of the vessel.
Reaction, gassy (non-tempered): Chemical reactions that generate pressure by the production of
noncondensible gases. The temperature of the reaction mixture will continue to rise, as there is little or no
vaporization to provide cooling and the reaction products do not inhibit temperature rise. An example is high
concentration cumene hydroperoxide decomposition.
Reaction, hybrid: Chemical reactions that generate pressure both by vaporization and production of
noncondensible gases. An example is hydrogen peroxide decomposition.
Reaction, vapor (tempered): Chemical reactions that generate pressure by vaporization of the reaction
mixture. When an adequately sized relief system activates during a runaway reaction, the temperature rise
will be stopped by the latent heat of vaporization removing the reaction heat. An example is caustic catalyzed
phenol formaldehyde reaction.
Relief system: The components of the overpressure protection system including inlet and outlet piping, the
relief device(s) and any containment or disposal devices.
Unstable liquid: A liquid that, in the pure state or as commercially produced or transported, will vigorously
polymerize, decompose, undergo condensation reaction, or become self-reactive under conditions of shock,
pressure, or temperature, e.g., vinyl chloride, styrene, ethylene oxide. These uncontrolled reactions are often
prevented by temperature control, inhibitors, etc., in normal storage conditions.
Valve, relief: An automatic pressure relief device actuated by the static pressure upstream of the valve, which
opens a further with the increase in pressure over the opening pressure. It is primarily for liquid service.
Valve, safety: An automatic pressure relief device actuated by the static pressure upstream of the valve, and
characterized by full opening pop action. It is used for steam, gas, or vapor service.
Valve, safety relief: An automatic pressure relief device suitable for use either as a safety valve or relief valve,
depending on the application.
APPENDIX B DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

January 2016. Interim revision.
Section 2.1.2.1.10 was modified and Section 2.1.2.1.11 was added to recognize the use of manual stop valves
on the inlet and/or outlet of pressure relief device with limitation comparable to what is permitted under The
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division I, UG-135 and Appendix M, Section M-5 (2015),
or National Board Inspection Code NB 23, Part 1 (2015). Section 3.1.5 was similarly updated.

October 2013. Section 2.1.2 on the various ASME-related guidance for relief device operating limits has been
clarified. Text and recommendations were modified to deemphasize DIERS as the only acceptable method
for sizing vents for reactive systems, and Section C.1 was updated with respect to software solutions for
two-phase venting.
January 2012. Terminology related to ignitable liquids has been revised to provide increased clarity and
consistency with regard to FM Global’s loss prevention recommendations for ignitable liquid hazards. A new
section 3.1.5 has been added with some comments regarding the use of manual shutoff valves in emergency
vent systems and reference to ASME guidance for this situation.
April 2011. Added Sections 2.1.4 and 3.1.4 to address implementation of former ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Case 2211 within ASME Section VIII.
September 2000. This revision of the document has been reorganized to provide a consistent format.
June 1993. Major update to implement technology of DIERS. The following changes were included:
1. Guidance is given for sizing overpressure protection for various types of equipment by cross-referencing
to the appropriate existing data sheets.
2. Guidance on calculation procedures for heat absorbed (and therefore vapor discharged) by a vessel from
fire exposure is changed to adopt NFPA 30 criteria, as represented by Figures 1a and 1b. The previous edition
of this data sheet used criteria from API 520. API 520 automatically includes a 50% reduction of heat
absorbed based on ‘‘good drainage.’’ On a similar ‘‘good drainage’’ basis, the two criteria are very close up
to 1000 ft2 (93 m3) wetted surface (approximately 25,000 gal [6.6 m3] horizontal tank). OSHA regulations
and API 2000 also follow the NFPA 30 guidelines.
3. Guidance for designing overpressure protection for reactive systems, which was developed in relation
to the AIChE DIERS project is incorporated mostly by reference. Some limited information on DIERS methods
is included as Appendix material. Design of DIERS based venting systems is complex and best left to
specialists in that field.
4. Reference is made to the importance of proper determination of the worst credible case as the design
basis for the vent system, and some factors that should be considered for the scenario.
5. Some key criteria on the design of overpressure relief system components, e.g., piping, containment and
disposal, manifolding and maintenance, have been included.
6. Emphasis is given to the need to communicate the overpressure protection system design criteria within
the user’s organization, to effectively manage change where process modifications are required.
7. Guidance is provided for the comparison of risk vs. consequences for reactive systems where relief venting
(existing or proposed) is inadequate.
8. Guidance is provided for the evaluation of existing facilities.
9. Information is provided on the various test procedures that can be used to develop data for vent sizing
via calculation or simulation and scale up.
January 1977. Original document issued.
APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
C.1 Review of Current Technology

As the loss experience shows, the overpressurization of a process vessel can cause severe damage.
Several methods have been developed to calculate the amount of area needed for adequate pressure relief.
These methods have ranged from empirical guidelines 13, to the assumptions of single phase flow, either
vapor only 14 or liquid only 15 entering the relief system. However, Boyle 15, Harmon and Martin 16, and Huff17
all reported that two-phase vapor-liquid mixtures entered the systems that they studied. In several of the
losses reported to FM Global over the past two decades, vapor-liquid mixtures were discharged from the relief
system.

Systems that exhibit two-phase flow can require up to 10 times as much area for adequate pressure relief
compared to a system that exhibits all vapor flow18. Additional area is needed for two-phase flow because
much more material enters the emergency relief system compared to what enters in an all vapor flow
incident.
Two-phase flow occurs when the level of the vapor-liquid mixture swells to the inlet of the emergency relief
system. Two-phase flow continues until the swell level is less than the freeboard volume in the vessel. A
common example of a two-phase flow system is a champagne bottle. Uncorking the bottle allows the carbon
dioxide pressurized inside to escape through the open top. The escaping gas entrains the liquid in the bottle.
This results in a ‘‘foamy’’ vapor-liquid mixture leaving the bottle. The foamy mixture escapes until the swell
level no longer reaches the opening. Depending on external conditions when the bottle is uncorked, a
significant amount of the contents may escape the bottle.
In 1976, the Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) was formed under the auspices of the
American Institute Of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). One goal of DIERS was to develop an improved
understanding of when two-phase flow into the system would occur, as well as the vapor-liquid phase ratio
entering the relief system for process and storage vessels. Another goal was to study the two-phase
hydrodynamic models for flow and pressure drop in the emergency relief system piping.
In 1985, the findings of the DIERS research project were released. This project was sponsored by 29
companies, one of which was FM Global Research.
Computer programs (SAFIRE and DEERS) were developed in the DIERS program to try to rigorously analyze
reactive systems. Determining the vent flow regimes proved to be very difficult and the thermokinetic and
thermophysical data required to run these programs is seldom available.
Reactive system venting can result in three flow regimes; no vapor-liquid disengagement, partial vapor-liquid
disengagement, and complete vapor-liquid disengagement. These three flow regimes are related to action
of the vapor and liquid phases in a venting situation. The no-disengagement case results in uniform mixing
of the phases in the reactor and vent system. This is also called homogenous flow, and results in the
maximum vent size requirement. The complete-disengagement case is where all the vapor separates from
the liquid in the vessel prior to the vapor entering the vent system. This results in the minimum vent size
requirement.
The SAFIRE and DEERS software are no longer available. SuperChemsTM for DIERS and SuperChemsTM
Lite computer programs (available for lease from AIChE) have been developed to assist in design of
emergency relief systems and incorporate the latest DIERS pressure relief design techniques and research
findings. Other software (CCFLOW, COMFLOW, and TPHEM) is available with the CCPS book Guidelines
for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems28.
The drawbacks in the available computer-based designs led to the development of the less complicated
but still realistic and conservative methods for the determination of the vent area needed for adequate
pressure relief. Runaway reactions had to be divided into three groups so that conservative treatment could
be given to all systems.
The first group of chemical reactions are those that generate pressure by the production of noncondensible
gases. After opening of the relief devices, the temperature of the reaction mixture will continue to rise even
though pressure rise is stopped as in Figure 8. Cooling by vaporization of the mixture is either insignificant,
and the products do not inhibit temperature rise. Runaway reactions exhibiting this behavior are called
non-tempered or gassy reactions.
The second group of chemical reactions includes those that generate pressure by the vaporization of the
reaction mixture. When an adequately sized relief system actuates during a runaway of this type, the
temperature rise will be stopped or tempered by the latent heat of vaporization, removing the reaction heat
as in Figure 9. Runaway reactions exhibiting this type of behavior are known as tempered or vapor systems.
The third group of runaway reactions are those that generate pressure by both the vaporization of the reaction
mixture and the production of noncondensible gas. Runaway reactions exhibiting this behavior are called
hybrid systems. An example of this type of system is the hydrogen peroxide decomposition reaction. Intensive
studies and computer simulations are needed for evaluating relief systems for these reactions. Fortunately,
very few reactions have been classified as hybrids.
Gassy systems almost always require larger relief areas than vapor systems. The larger relief area is needed
because a gassy system must be evaluated at the maximum reaction and gas generation rate and the relief

Temperature
Temperature or pressure
Pressure
Vent
opens
Time
Fig. 8. Pressure and temperature characteristics for a gassy system with relief vents open and closed19
Temperature or pressure
Closed
Overpressure
Vented
Vent
opens
Time
Fig. 9. Pressure and temperature characteristics for a vapor system with relief vents open and closed19
system is required to remove a large quantity of material in a short time. In contrast, a runaway reaction
involving a vapor system is controlled by the removal of heat by the vaporization of the mixture. Hence, vapor
systems can be evaluated at reaction and volatilization rates significantly less than maximum. This results
in the relief system having to remove much less material for adequate pressure control.
C.2 DIERS Simplified Calculations

The DIERS program developed some equations and related nomographs to enable calculation of
overpressure vents for reactive systems. These calculations are based on a few basic factors such as relief
device set pressure, allowable vessel overpressure and gas or heat generation rates. The key data to be
gathered are the generation rates (source terms). These should be developed using the small scale, nearly
adiabatic test vessel also developed by DIERS.

These simplified methods for vent sizing can be used for any system exhibiting homogenous flashing flow
in the vent system. DIERS test procedures are best for making this determination.
For additional detail on vent sizing calculations, and background information, see Emergency Relief System
Design Using DIERS Technology21 or other references.
C.3 Bench-Scale Apparatus

To identify the reaction type and determine the important data needed for vent system design, either extensive
kinetic and physical property data are needed for computer calculations or a small scale simulation is needed.
As accurate kinetic data are rarely available and expensive and time consuming to obtain, emphasis has
been expended on simulations.
Several key capabilities are needed to be able to successfully scale up from the bench to the process plant.
These include:
1. Ability to size relief systems by direct extrapolation from test data or by analytical methods.
2. Ability to operate close to adiabatic conditions as well as have test cells with thermal inertia close to unity.
3. Ability to operate over a large range of heat generation rates.
4. Ability to provide information on characteristics of the material released during venting with respect to
vapor-liquid disengagement.
5. Ability to use a small test sample for safety and ease of handling.
Thermal inertia, or φ factor is defined as:
Heat capacity of bomb+sample

φ=
Heat capacity of sample only
or
M B CB
φ=1+
M S CS
where MB and MS are the mass of the bomb and sample respectively, and CB and CS are the specific heats
of the bomb and sample respectively.
When φ exceeds unity, it means that some heat of reaction that could have gone to heating the sample was
‘‘wasted’’ to the sample bomb. The result is a reduced temperature rise from what would occur in process
equipment. This effect is illustrated in Figure 10, where the same reaction’s temperature-time function was
evaluated in three different apparatus. As φ goes from 1.05 to 1.35 the time to reach the exotherm changes
dramatically. (Note upper and lower time scales.) When the φ increases to 2.47, the exotherm is lost
completely.
Non-adiabaticity, or heat loss to the surroundings rather than being retained in the sample, is another
independent factor that could cause the simulation not to be representative of process situations.
C.3.1 Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA) Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC)

DTA and DSC are relatively quick and simple simulation techniques that are generally used to study the
thermal stability of reactive materials or mixtures. These techniques use small samples (typically a few
milligrams) in a sealed container to evaluate how a reactive mixture responds to heat input. This is done by
putting the sample, along with an empty reference container into an oven that heats up at a programmed
rate. The temperature of the sample container and the reference are measured by sensitive heat detectors
on which the containers sit. The DTA technique traces the temperature difference with time. The DSC
technique uses calibration factors to convert the temperature difference to heat evolved with time.
Kinetic parameters such as heat of reaction, activation energy, and frequency factor can sometimes be
determined from data reduction techniques applied to a series of tests, provided the reaction chemistry is
already known. These parameters can then be used to calculate the temperature and pressure responses to
an upset scenario. These calculations can then be compared to determine which scenario will generate the
worst case response.

Time, min.
0 10
306
-factor = 1.05
Temperature, ºC
162
-factor = 1.35
-factor = 2.47
Initiation
17
0 55 110
Time, min.
Fig. 10. Importance of φ-factor illustrated by amine-initiated cyanide reaction19
When the reaction pathways involved in an excursion are too complex or unknown, which is often the case,
a worst case determination can be made by comparing the results of the tests to determine which simulated
scenario generates the highest temperature or produces the most heat.
Unfortunately, there are some limitations to using the DTA/DSC techniques for determining the worst case
scenario. These include:
1. These techniques use a small sample in a container with a considerable thermal inertia in an oven at a
temperature much lower than the sample. Appreciable heat loss to the surroundings should be expected. This
heat loss may cause one to miss the high temperature reactions expected in the large vessel. Calibration
factors cannot correct this problem.
2. There is no agitation in the sample container. This can lead to nonrepresentative results, especially when
the sample contains immiscible materials.
3. The sample container must be sealed before the test. All materials must be added before testing. This
may lead to a non-representative sample being tested, especially in reactions whose pathways are dependent
on the order of addition.
4. The pressure in the sample container is not measured in most DTA/DSC equipment. An accurate pressure
response is not assured from temperature data, especially when the reaction produces noncondensible
gases.
C.3.2 Confinement Pressure Vessel Test

The Confinement Pressure Vessel Test, as described in ASTM E476, is designed to determine the exotherm
threshold temperature and the temperature, pressure and time history of a reaction mixture experiencing
a runaway. The test procedure calls for a 0.3 gram sample of the mixture to be placed in a 1.1 ml sample

container. The container is then placed in a bath heated at a constant rate. The temperature of the bath and
of the sample, and the pressure in the container are then measured. The temperature and pressure
responses for each tested scenario can then be compared to determine the worst case scenario.
There are several limitations that must be considered when using this method. Like the DTA/DSC techniques,
appreciable heat will be lost to the surroundings during the test. This may cause high temperature reactions
expected in the larger process vessel to be missed during the simulation. Also, the lack of stirring of the
sample and the inability to add reactants or remove products during the test can lead to nonrepresentative
samples being tested.
C.3.3 Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC)

The ARC was developed to characterize thermal stability and the time/temperature/pressure behavior of
chemicals and mixtures as they decompose or react under conditions representative of large-scale processing
units. To use the ARC (Fig. 11), a sample (approximately 2 grams) is placed in a small spherical container
(approximately 7 ml). This sample container is then placed in a calorimeter. The walls of the calorimeter are
heated to maintain them at the same temperature as the sample container, which will minimize heat losses
and create a nearly adiabatic environment for the sample.
During a test in the ARC, the sample is heated to a pre-set temperature and allowed to equilibrate. If a
temperature rise greater than 0.02°C/min is sensed, the unit’s controller maintains the heater at the current
setting and starts recording temperature and pressure data in the container as the sample is allowed to
runaway. This data can be adjusted for the thermal inertia of the sample container using a correction factor.
The adjusted data may be used to estimate kinetic properties of the reaction for calculation purposes, or it
can be used for comparing the results of different upset scenarios to determine which one causes the worst
case.
Septum
injector port
To pressure
transducer
Top zone
thermocouple
Heater Heaters
Bomb
Top thermocouple
zone
Jacket
thermocouple
Side Jacket
zone
Stirring
bar Spherical
bomb
Rotating
magnet Radiant
heater
Shaft Bottom zone
thermocouple
Fig. 11. Schematic of Columbia Scientific Inc. Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC)

As with the DTA/DSC and Confinement Pressure Vessel Test, the lack of stirring and the inability to add
reactants during the test may lead to nonrepresentative samples being tested. Another limitation is that the
sample container has considerable thermal inertia compared to the sample. The φ can range from 1.5 to
6 depending on construction material and fill fraction. Heat will be lost into the container and the calorimeter
during the test, since the container temperature is used as a reference for the calorimeter temperature. This
will result in a lower sample temperature, which will result in a slower reaction rate. The slower reaction rate
will slow down the heat generation and the temperature rise. It may also prevent highly exothermic reactions
that only occur at elevated temperatures from occurring. No calibration factor can adjust the results of one
of these simulations if one of these reactions is missed.
C.3.4 Reaction or Heat Flow Calorimetry

The purpose of reaction or heat flow calorimetry is to measure the amount of heat produced by a reaction
process. This technique involves placing a 0.5 to 2 liter sample in a jacketed reactor, usually glass, equipped
with a stirrer and internal heater. Reactants can be added or samples removed at any time during the test.
The reaction heat is removed by a heat transfer fluid flowing through the jacket. Temperature measurements
in the reactor and at the input and output of the jacket along with a flow rate measurement of the heat transfer
fluid and heat transfer coefficients are needed to quantify the heat production of the reaction. This
necessitates frequent calibration of the equipment to get accurate readings. This technique can be used to
establish cooling requirements for the reaction at specific temperatures of operation (Isothermal Tests) or
to determine the amount of heat produced in the reactor during a runaway reaction (Adiabatic Tests). Kinetic
parameters can be estimated from the data obtained from the adiabatic test for the reactions involved in
the runaway.
Even though this method is an advance over those previously discussed, there are still limitations. One
limitation is that the calorimeter’s response to temperature changes is slow, which will allow heat to escape
from the sample when doing the adiabatic simulation. This can cause expected temperatures to be
underestimated, with the result that highly exothermic side reactions which require elevated temperatures
may be missed. Another limitation is that most of the calorimeters are limited in temperature range (<300°C).
When glass reactors are used, there are strict pressure limitations. Also, with the size of the sample,
uncontrolled reactions have the potential for dangerous energy releases. Special safety precautions may be
needed in the area when this apparatus is operating.
C.3.5 Vent Sizing Package (VSP)

The VSP is a bench scale apparatus that was developed during the DIERS research program. Its purpose
is to gather the information needed to size an emergency relief system for a runaway reaction in a process
vessel. This information includes temperature, pressure and time data, reaction type expected (vapor, gassy,
hybrid), and viscosity characterization of vented material. Tests in the VSP are run in an adiabatic condition
so that all reaction pathways can be accounted for. A sketch of the VSP is shown in Figure 12.
The VSP has a 120 ml test cell with a 0.13 mm wall thickness. The test cell has a low thermal inertia (typically
φ = 1.05), so that little heat will be lost to the vessel. The inner heater is used to heat the sample and the
container to a temperature where an exotherm can be detected. The outer guard heater ensures that adiabatic
conditions are maintained, by keeping the temperature of the sample and the surroundings nearly identical.
Pressure equalization is used to prevent the weak sample container from rupturing. The entire testing
apparatus is enclosed in a pressure vessel rated at about 1900 psi (130 bar). The apparatus also has stirring
capability and the ability to add reactants and remove samples during the test.
The VSP was designed to have all the reaction simulation advantages of a flow calorimeter along with the
ease and safety of operation of a DSC. Its operation was validated by comparison to the large scale data
acquired during the DIERS research program.
The above information is based on the older VSP device, which has been replaced by an upgraded VSP2.
The new device is essentially the same construction, with magnetic stirring replaced by mechanical stirring,
and upgraded software and controls.
The limitations of the VSP are that it is relatively expensive to buy and set up, and somewhat complex to
use. Problems with equipment calibration and data acquisition have been experienced by several VSP
owners.

Containment
vessel
Bypass 245 cu in Exhaust
T T (4000 m) &
P
supply
P
Guard
Fill heater
Test 7 cu in
cell (120 ml) Inner
Outer heater
can
Insulation
Type l test cell Type ll test cell Type lll test cell
closed system open system open system
thermal data vent sizing & viscous effects
flow regime data data
Fig. 12. Overall schematic of the VSP showing the test cell and containment vessel20
C.3.6 Reactive System Screening Tool (RSST)

The RSST was developed as an inexpensive and reliable alternative to the VSP. Like the VSP, it can be
used to acquire the temperature, pressure and time data and the reaction type expected.
The basic features of the RSST include an open, small (10 ml) spherical glass test cell of a low thermal inertia
(φ = 1.04), which is placed in a 0.5 litre high pressure containment vessel. The containment vessel serves
both as a pressure simulator and safety vessel. The apparatus measures both sample temperature and
pressure.
The test cell includes thermal insulation and a single heater element used to both initiate a runaway reaction
and track the exotherm by adding heat to the surroundings to maintain adiabatic conditions. Pressure
equalization is used to prevent the glass test cell from rupturing. The apparatus includes reliable magnetic
stirring and allows for reagents to be added during a test. The RSST is compact, transportable, and reportedly
easily adaptable to any laboratory setting. A sketch of the RSST is shown in Figure 13.
The above information is based on the older RSST device, which has been replaced by an upgraded ARRST.
The new device is essentially the same construction, with a new feature to detect the difference between

Fig. 13. Overall schematic of the RSST showing the test cell and containment vessel22

foamy and non-foamy reactions, assorted mechanical improvements, and upgraded software and controls
that provide data that are more comparable to the VSP2.
The limitations of the RSST are the difficulty in contracting existing testing facilities that have the device.
This device could have agitation difficulties with viscous materials and have problems identifying vapor liquid
disengagement in venting scenarios.
C.4 Self Heat Rate Adjustment for Thermal Inertia

The adiabaticity of the DIERS Bench-Scale Apparatus (VSP) is currently quite good.
Test cells have a higher thermal inertia than full-size vessels. Thermal inertia limits the adiabatic temperature
rise and self-heat rate of closed or open experimental systems in a non-linear fashion. Peak heating rates
will occur at lower temperatures in test cells compared to full-size vessels. Experimental data must always be
examined and adjusted when required (see Fig. 14).
100
10
Adjusted
o = 1.0
Self heat rate (ºC/min)
Experimental
o = 1.05
1
.01
0.01
100 140 180 220 260 300
Temperature (ºC)
Fig. 14. Sample kinetics: self heat rate vs. temperature
Note: Heat rate data can be adjusted for thermal inertia (φ) for single, well characterized reactions as follows
21
:
a) Calculate an initial adjusted temperature (TAo) at φ = 1 using the initial measured temperature (TMo).
1 1 R
= + l n (φ)
TA0 TM0 E

Where: T =Temperature (K)

R=Gas constant (1.987 cal/gm mole K)
E=Activation energy (cal/gm mole)
φ=Thermal inertia (not necessarily constant during a closed or open test)
b) Calculate an adjusted temperature (TA) at φ = 1 for each measured temperature (TM) using the initial
adjusted (TA0) and initial measured (TM0) temperatures.
TA = TA0+φ(TM - TM0)
c) Calculate heat rates at φ = 1 using the activation energy (E), adjusted (TA) and measured (TM)
temperatures and heat rates at φ>1.
dT E 1 1 dT
A(φ=1)
= φ exp − M(φ>1)
dt R TM TA dt
CAUTION: This method applies only to single reactions. A more complex method is required for multiple
reactions.
C.4.1 Sample Problem

Adjustment of the peak dT/dt for φ (Fig. 14).
E = 20,000 cal/gm mole (known value)
To (°C) f T1 (°C) [dT/dt]max (°C/min)
Given (M): 100 1.05 262.02 10.51
(373.15 K) (535.17 K)
Find (A): Step 1 1.0 Step 2 Step 3
In the following calculations, subscripts M and A represent measured (φ = 1.05) and adjusted (φ = 1.0) values
respectively. Subscripts 0 and 1 represent the initial condition and the data point being adjusted respectively.
Step 1
1 1 +R 1 1.987
= l n (φ) = + l n (1.05)
TA0 TM0 E 373.15 20000
TA0 = 372.48 K (99.33°C)
Step 2
TA1 = TA0 + φ(TM1−TM0) = 99.33 + 1.05 (262.02−100.0)
TA1 = 269.45°C (542.60 K)
Step 3
[ ]dT
dt A(φ=1) =φ exp [ [
E 1
−
1
R TM1 TA1 ]][ dT
dt ] M1(φ>1)
[ ]
dT
dt A1 = 1.05 exp [ [
20000
1.987
1
535.17
−
1
542.60 ]] 10.51
dT
A1 = 14.28°C/min
dt
Steps 2 and 3 are repeated for additional points (TM and dT/dt) read off Figure 14 (φ = 1.05 curve) as needed
to construct the φ = 1.0 curve.
APPENDIX D BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1) American Petroleum Institute Standard 2000 (ISO 28300), ‘‘Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure
Storage Tanks (Non-refrigerated and Refrigerated),’’ 6th edition (November, 2009).
(2) American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 521, (ISO 23251), ‘‘Guide for Pressure-Relieving
and Depressuring Systems,’’ 5th edition (January, 2007).

(3) Fauske, H.K., ‘‘Emergency Relief System Design for Reactive and Non-Reactive Systems: Extension
of the DIERS Methodology,’’ Plant/Operations Progress, 7, No. 3 (July, 1988).
(4) Fauske, H.K., and Leung, J.C., ‘‘Runaway System Characterization and Vent Sizing Based on DIERS
Methodology,’’ Plant/Operations Progress, 6, No. 2, (April, 1987).
(5) Chambard, J.L., ‘‘Designing Process Pressure Relieving Systems for Safe Performance,’’ 3rd
International Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, Basle,
Switzerland (September 1980).
(6) Grossel, S.S., ‘‘Design and Sizing of Knock-Out Drums/Catchtanks for Reactor Emergency Relief
Systems,’’ Plant/Operations Progress, 5, No. 3 (July 1986).
(7) Grossel, S.S. ‘‘Containment, Disposal, and Mechanical Design,’’ Section V, Emergency Relief System
Design Using DIERS Technology21.
(8) Fauske, H.K., Grolmes, M.A., Clare, G.H., ‘‘Process Safety Evaluation Applying DIERS Methodology to
Existing Plant Operations,’’ Paper 73f presented at the AIChE National Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March
1988.
(10) Noronha, J.A. ‘‘Explosion and Venting Protection in Process Safety Reviews’’ Paper 77d presented at
the AIChE National Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March, 1988.
(11) Noronha, J. A. & Torres, A. J., ‘‘Runaway Risk Approach Addressing Many Dilemmas—Matching the
Potential Consequences with Risk Reduction Methods,’’ Proceedings of the 24th Loss Prevention
Symposium, AIChE National Meeting, San Diego, California, August, 1990.
(12) Hoefelich, T. C., & Thomas, R. C., ‘‘The Use/Misuse of the 100 Degree Rule in the Interpretation of
Thermal Hazard Tests,’’ pp. 74–85, International Symposium on Runaway Reactions, March 7–9, 1989,
(Cambridge, MA) Sponsored by CCPS, AIChE & Institute of Chemical Engineers (UK).
(13) Sestak, E.J., Venting of Chemical Plant Equipment, Eng. Bull. N-53 (withdrawn), Factory Insurance
Association, Hartford, Conn (1965).
(14) Diss, E., Karam, H., and Jones, C., ‘‘Practical Way to Size Safety Disks,’’ Chemical Engineering 68,
No. 19, pp 187-190 (September 18, 1961).
(15) Boyle, J.J., ‘‘Sizing Relief Area for Polymerization Reactors,’’ Chemical Engineering Progress, 63, No.
8, pp 61-66 (Aug., 1967).
(16) Harmon, G.W., and Martin, H.A., ‘‘Sizing Rupture Disks for Vessels Containing Monomers,’’ CEP Loss
Prevention Technical Manual, 4, pp 95-103 (1970).
(17) Huff, J.E., ‘‘Computer Simulation of Polymerizer Pressure Relief,’’ CEP Loss Prevention Technical
Manual, 7, pp 45-53 (1973).
(18) Leung, J.C., ‘‘Simplified Vent Sizing Equations for Emergency Relief Requirements in Reactors and
Storage Vessels,’’ AIChE Journal, 32, pp 1622–1634 (1986).
(19) Singh, J., ‘‘Sizing Relief Vents for Runaway Reactions,’’ Chemical Engineering, pp 105–111, June 1990.
(20) Fauske, H.K. and Leung, J.C. ‘‘New Experimental Technique for Characterizing Runaway Chemical
Reactions,’’ Chemical Engineering Progress, pp 39-46 (August, 1985).
(21) Fisher, H.G. et al, Emergency Relief System Design Using DIERS Technology—The Design Institute
for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) Project Manual, AIChE (1991).
(22) Fauske, H.K. and Creed, M.J. ‘‘An Easy and Inexpensive Approach to DIERS Procedure,’’ Chemical
Engineering Progress, pp 45–49. (March, 1990).
(23) Grolmes, M.A. and Yue, M.H. ‘‘Relief Vent Sizing and Location for Tubular Reactors,’’ 1992 Process
Plant Safety Symposium, AICHE South Texas Section, (February 1992).
(24) Bodurtha, F.T. ‘‘Vent Heights for Emergency Releases of Heavy Gases,’’ Paper 52B presented at the
AICHE National Meeting, Minneapolis, MN, (August 1987).
(25) Askonas, C.F., Burelbach, J.P., and Leung, J.C. ″The Versatile VSP2: A Tool for Adiabatic Thermal
Analysis and Vent Sizing Applications.″ North American Thermal Analysis Society. Oct. 2000.

(26) Burelbach, J.P. ″Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool ARSST.″ North American Thermal Analysis
Society. Oct. 2000.
(27) Welding Research Council, Bulletin 498. Guidance on the Application of Code Case 2211 - Overpressure
Protection by System Design. Welding Research Council, Inc. New York, NY. 2005.
(28) Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems, Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS), New York, NY, (1998).

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Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 7-49

EMERGENCY VENTING OF VESSELS

1.0 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................... 3

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 Equipment and Processes

2.1.1 Emergency Overpressure Relief Vent Sizing

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

2.1.1.2 Non-Reactive Systems

CKAP1Kb (M)0.5 W (TZ)0.5

CKAP1Kb (M)0.5 131.4 W (TZ)0.5

CKAP1Kb 334V (TZM)0.5

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

CKAP1Kb 1796V (TZG)0.5

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

Table 1. Representative Data On Some Vapors And Gases At Standard Conditions

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Table 2. Typical Insulation Conductance Values

2.1.1.3 Reactive Systems

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(1) Wetted area as follows:

Fig. 1a. Heat absorbed by surface exposed to fire (English units)

2.1.2 Design of the Emergency Overpressure Relief System

2.1.2.1 Pressure Relief Devices and Inlet Pipes

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

Fig. 1b. Heat absorbed by surface exposed to fire (metric units)

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Fig. 2. Rupture disk mounted under a relief valve

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

Fig. 3. Switching valve with rupture disks (or relief valves)

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

2.1.2.2 Discharge Piping

Fig. 4. Support for relief valve discharge piping

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

2.1.2.3 Direct Atmospheric Release

2.1.2.4 Containment and Disposal

2.1.2.5 Manifold Discharge Piping Systems

©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

Seal member Vacuum support

Fig. 5. Vacuum support for rupture disk

2.2 Operation and Maintenance

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3.0 SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

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3.1.2 Worst Credible Case

Table 3. Effect of Different Upset Condtions on Self Heat Rate.

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©2000-2016 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

Code Case 2211 answered the following inquiry:

3.1.5 Manual Intervening Stop Valves Around Pressure Relief Devices

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3.1.6 Risk vs. Consequence Based Design for Reactive Systems

3.1.6.2 Evaluation Procedure

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Table 4. Risk vs Consequences Based Design For Reactive Systems

Table 5. Examples of Relative Types of Precautionary Measures

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3.1.7 Design of the Emergency Relief System

3.1.7.1 Relief Device Operating Pressure Criteria

3.1.7.2 Discharge Piping

3.1.7.3 Direct Atmospheric Release