51. PHILIP MORRIS INC. VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GR.

158589

MP: The petitioners are not entitled to enforce trademark rights in this country. The country of the
petitioner is members of the Paris Union. However, this does not automatically entitle petitioners to the
protection of their trademark in our country without actual use in local trade because any protection
accorded has to be made subject to the limitations of Philippine laws.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply
the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior,
to national legislative enactments.

Facts: The petitioners are foreign corporations that are not doing business in the Philippines and are
registered owners of the trademarks ‘MARK VII’, ‘MARK TEN’, and ‘LARK’. They claim that an infringement of
their trademark had been committed by the respondent in the country.
Issues: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to enforce trademark rights in this country?
Ruling: No. They lack of evidence that their product is well-known in the Philippines. Petitioners may have the
capacity to sue for infringement without the need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the
Philippines. However, appellants failed to establish that their products are widely known by local purchasers
on the country or in other countries circulated locally. International law has been made part of the law of the
land.

52. MIJARES V. RANADA, GR. 139325

MP: The Philippine courts can enforce a foreign judgment. The Philippine legal system has long ago accepted
into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as
well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines

Facts: 10 petitioners filed a complaint to the estate of the former President Marcos, as the petitioners suffered
human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces
during the Marcos regime.

The Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals and the petitioners filed a Complaint with the
RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgement. However, Marcos Estate contended that the PHP
410 filing fee was incorrectly computed for they argue that the amount is too small to constitute
damages amounting to $2.25 billion.

ISSUE: Whether Philippine courts can enforce a foreign judgment?

Ruling: YES. There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the
procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is
embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In
the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its
current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as
the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there
may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise
that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international
practice. 

53. Pharmaceutical vs. DOH

MP: The law with regard the EO adopted from Article 11 of the international code of marketing and breastmilk
substitutes (international law) is not part of the law of the land. A Legislation is necessary to transform the
provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need
of a law enacted by the legislature.

FACTS: Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers
granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the clauses of the Milk Code states that the
law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.

WHA adopted Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.

In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed Revised Implementing Rules
andRegulations(RIRR). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement.

ISSUE: WON the law with regard to the EO adopted from Article 11 of the international code of marketing and
breastmilk substitutes (international law) is part of the law of the land and may be implemented in the
Philippines.

RULING: No, because under Sec.2.of Article 2 of the Constitution, international law can become domestic law
by transformation or incorporation. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force
for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article
21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to
any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
54. SOJ vs. Lantion

DOCTRINE: In the Philippines, statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they conflict with the Constitution.

FACTS: Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, signed the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. The DOJ received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day, petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the
case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to
Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but
the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.

RULING: No. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations
to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of
the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or
statute of the local state. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

55. Philip Morris vs. CA

GR 91332, July 16, 1993

“While international law is made part of the law of the land, it does not imply primacy of international law
over national law”.

Facts:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the
following issuances of the CA. Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of
the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from
manufacturing and selling “MARK” cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners’
respective symbols “MARK VII”, ‘MARK TEN”, and “MARK”, also for cigarettes, must be protected against
unauthorized appropriation.

 All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. They Invoked
provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property. As corporate
nationals of member-countries of the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of
trademarks, or for unfair competition, without need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the
Philippines, and without necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines.

Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages against Fortune Tobacco
before RTC-Pasig for manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the trademark “Mark” which is identical and
confusingly similar to Philip Morris trademarks. The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property
find applicability in cases of suit before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or for unfair
competition.

RULING:

No. Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement
of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash
is being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law
of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal
sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a
standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments.

A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-
requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.

 In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in
the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the
foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.

56. Vinuya vs. ES

GR 162230

FACTS:

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically
raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. As a result of the actions of their Japanese
tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and
disability, and mental emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women stations in the
Philippines. However, said officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual
claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also argued that the comfort women system constituted a
crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They alleged that the prohibition against these
international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as such, the Philippine
government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.

ISSUE

Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioner’s claims
for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING 

No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the
Court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a
claim on the individuals’ behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals’ rights that are being asserted, but rather,
the states own rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted,
to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.

                        The Court fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally
reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, it does not
automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes.
Absent the consent of the states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no
non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga
omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms
existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

57. Saguisag vs. ES

GR 212426

FACTS:

Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America was not a
treaty .In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply
with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military
bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications,
taxation, and nuclear weapons.

Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the
initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the provision in
question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate

Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the plain
meaning of the words in the particular provision. Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting
treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not
state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No, EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a valid
and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Reading the VFA along with the
longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such
as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.

Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal
regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our
military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for
Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.

58. Bayan vs. DND Sec. Gazmin

GR 212444

FACTS: The Motion for Reconsideration was sought to reverse the decision of the Court in Saguisag et. Al vs.
Executive Secretary questioning the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the Republic of the Philippines and the US. There this court ruled that the petitions be dismissed.
Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider, reverse and set-aside its Decision dated
January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision granting the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine
government, with the United States of America, unconstitutional and invalid and to permanently enjoin its
implementation.

Petitioners claim that the Decision did not consider the similarity of EDCA to the previous Military Bases
Agreement (MBA) as grounds to declare it unconstitutional. In disagreeing with the Court in respect of the
MBA’s jurisdictional provisions, petitioners cite an exchange of notes categorized as an “amendment” to the
MBA as if to say it operated as a new treaty and should be read into the MBA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.

RULING:

No. The motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the
Decision. It is correct to state that the MBA as the treaty did not give the Philippines jurisdiction over the bases
because its provisions on U.S. jurisdiction over the bases because its provisions on U.S. jurisdiction were
explicit. What the exchange of notes did provide was effectively a contractual waiver of the jurisdictional
rights granted to the U. S under the MBA, but did not amend the treaty itself. While it is a fact that our
country is now independent, and that the 1987 Constitution requires Senate consent for foreign military
bases, troops and facilities, the EDCA as envisioned by the executive and as formulated falls within the legal
regime of the MDT and the VFA.

59. IBP vs. Zamora

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING: No. the Deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. In
his case, it constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the Police Force.

60. Kulayan vs. Tan 675 SCRA 482 (2012)

FACTS:

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of
the ICRC in Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a
Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail were
seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The
leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News
reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then
organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee.

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from
different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was
embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties: the provincial
government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen.
Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the
Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the
municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be
achieved.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent governor is clothed with authority to convene the Civilian Emergency Force
(CEF) and to declare a state of emergency.

RULING: No. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at
his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared
a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of
Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.

61. Alih vs. Castro GR 69401, June 23, 1987

FACTS:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied
by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-out ensued after petitioners
resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners
were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection.
Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and
invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights on illegal seizure.
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting
under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order
problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners
and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence
against them.
RULING:
Yes. The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary
actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent
nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the
items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should
remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision
against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only.

62. People vs. Tranquilino Lagman

GR L- 45892

FACTS: Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being
Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the
military service between the1st and 7th of April of said year, even though they h ad been required to do so.
The two appellants were duly notified to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military
service but still did n ot register up to the date of the filing of the information. Appellants argue that they did
not register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill  or be killed. The Court
of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

ISSUE: WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was constitutional by virtue of
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that: SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military
or civil service.

RULING: YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. In US cases, it was stated that the
right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the
State; and, that a person may be compelled by force to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. What justifies compulsory military service is the defense
of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The
circumstances of the appellants do not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family
responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

63. People vs. Primitivo De Sosa

GR L-45893, July 13, 1938

FACTS:

In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are
charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is
alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully
and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year,
notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants
were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to
register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had
not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military
service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be
killed.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs.

In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is
impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines
provides as follows:

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.

RULING: Yes. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of
an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted
by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish
it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so
because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to
defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the
case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests,
and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it
was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense,
there is no right of property to an office or employment.

The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of war does not
make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the
defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The
circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to
present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for
determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

64. Kilosbayan vs. Morato

246 SCRA 540 (1995) and MR 250 SCRA 130

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or  at least P35,000
per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to
employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase
the equipment for P25 million. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the
Contract of Lease
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is
violative of the law regarding public bidding. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the
law of the case.
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the amended equipment lease agreement is null and violative of the law on public bidding of
contracts for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the Government.

RULING:
Yes. The challenged ELA must then be declared void for the following reasons: (1) it is a joint venture contract
prohibited; (2) it was entered into without the mandatory public bidding ; and (3) it is grossly disadvantageous
to the PCSO and private respondent since unlike in the old contract where nothing may at all be due the
PGMC in the event that the ticket sales, computed on an annual basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize
money, under the new ELA, the PCSO is under obligation to pay the rental equivalent to 4.3%of the gross
ticket sales.

65. Kulayan vs. Tan (Same no. 60)

675 SCRa 482 (2012)

FACTS:

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of
the ICRC in Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a
Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail were
seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The
leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News
reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then
organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee.

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from
different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was
embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties: the provincial
government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen.
Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the
Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the
municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be
achieved.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of State of Emergency and calling out the members of the AFP is valid.

RULING: No. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief Powers dictate that they are exercised by the
one president. As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. He is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces.

66. UCCP vs Bradford United Church of Christ Inc.

Facts: BUCCI disaffiliated from UCCP. The effectivity of the disaffiliation was made to retroact to 16 September
1990 when BUCCI severed its ties from CCI. This disaffiliation was duly ratified by BUCCI’s members in a
referendum held on 19 July 1992.1Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws
which provided for and effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same on 2 July 1993.
Thereafter, UCCP filed before SEC a complaint/protest for rejection/annulment of Amended Articles and
Incorporation and Injunction, claiming among other things that the issue at hand is purely ecclesiastical and
the State should not interfere therein.

Issue: Whether or not the separation between these two is purely ecclesiastical

Held: No. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the
adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government
of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of
membership.32 Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church
and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot
meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments
and other activities attached with religious significance. BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from
UCCP, possesses the freedom to determine its steps. Similarly, the case at bar concerns BUCCI’s sole
prerogative and power as a church to disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions, that may have
religious color and are therefore ecclesiastical affairs, the Court must respect and cannot review. 

67. Lim vs. Exec Secretary

Facts: Balikatan case. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty. Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-
1.”  On February 7, 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the “Balikatan” exercise wherein Vice-President
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented the Draft Terms of
Reference (TOR). Petitioners claim that this whole activity would enable the foreign forces to engage against
the ASG, which in effect will violate Independent Foreign Policy provision in our constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of the VFA. Under these auspices, the VFA
gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA
allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. We bear in mind the salutary
proscription stated in the Charter of the United Nations, The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations
powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” The purpose of
Balikatan is to train but to never engage against the enemies of the Philippines, internally.

68. Saguisag vs. Exec Sec

69. Bayan vs DND Sec Gazmin
Consolidated
Facts: The constitutionality of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between PH and US is being
challenged. Accordingly, the respondent bypassed the Senate vote requirement for a treaty to be part of the
law of the land in EDCA. EDCA will give access to US troops to agreed locations for some activities. EDCA was
considered as an executive agreement only, and not a treaty, which requires a Senate Voting. Petitioners claim
that EDCA should be treated as a treaty upon their review of the same, as echoed by the Senate themselves.

Issue: Whether or not EDCA is well within the power of the president to enter into executive agreement on
foreign military bases, troops and facilities.

Held: Yes, EDCA is a valid exercise of executive agreement. It is evident that the constitutional restriction
refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the
subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and
Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. VFA already allowed their
entry, and this agreement is merely an adjustment to the VFA.The President also carries the mandate of being
the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the
Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the
integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-
determinationexecutive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies,
rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a treaty; 209 (2) pursuant to or upon
confirmation by an act of the Legislature; 210 or (3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under
the Constitution.

70. Bayan vs. Zamora

Facts: The VFA is being challenged in this case, which was approved by Pres. Ramos and ratified by Pres.
Estrada, and was transmitted to the Senate for concurrence, which was actually concurred. Among other
things, petitioner contends that the nuclear capabilities of USA will translate into them bringing the nukes in
the Philippines, thus violating the constitutional provision against nuclear weapons.

Issue: whether or not the VFA violates the invoked provision.

Held: No. There was no clear indication of the VFA forces to bring in nukes, specially the fact that the VFA
expressly states that the US shall respect the above-invoked provision.

71. Calalang vs. Williams

Facts: It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue: Whether or not the delegation of power violates social justice insofar as it prohibits the transit or use of
the roads by animal-drawn vehicles.
Held: No. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained tof is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and
to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." To promulgate rules and
regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the re quirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. 

72. Roe vs. Wade

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes
were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney
from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable
to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of
her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion.
Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue: whether or not abortion is a right possessed by pregnant mothers as part of their right to privacy

Held: Yes. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.. The first is that the laws are the product of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by
neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore
the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the
situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s
interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant
woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in
ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the
mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where
necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the
potential life of the unborn child.

73. Meyer vs. Nebraska

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching
of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and
fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state
argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all
children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other
languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the
German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.
Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and
not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate.

74. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or
schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from
enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining
orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’
schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th
Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their
children are educated.

75. Wisconsin vs. Yoder

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion.
Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or
private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to public school after
completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked variance from
the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment hostile to their beliefs and takes
them away from their community during a crucial period in their life. The Amish do not object to elementary
education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance could result in not only great
psychological harm to Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community.
The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.
Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent
education in a privately operated system.
Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious beliefs that directly conflict
with the compulsory school attendance law.
Such education may be necessary for preparation for the modern society in which we live, but is not for the
separated agrarian community of the Amish faith.
The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must be protected by the
State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within
our society, producing productive and law-abiding citizens. The State also supports its position on the
possibility that some children will choose to leave the Amish community. This argument is highly speculative
on the record, and the practical agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that did
choose to leave.
The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed to not only
provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsin’s
interest in compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish children than for children generally.
The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s substantive right to
a secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae

76. Ginsberg vs. New York

Facts: Sam Ginsberg and wife operated a stationary and luncheonette in Long Island, New York. Due to
Ginsberg’s sale of girlie magazines to a 16-yr-old minor, which contained verbal descriptions and narrative
accounts of sexual excitement and conduct. It was in New York Penal Law which prohibits the sale of the
aforementioned materials to minors.

Issue: Whether or not the prohibition is justified insofar as the minor is concerned

Held: Yes. Some of the contents may not be obscene for adults, but the same would be so for children, which
will affect or hamper the growth of the child’s well-being, which is constitutionally protected.

77. Orceo vs. COMELEC

Facts: the validity of Resolution No 8714 insofar as it included airsoft guns and replicas as firearms, which in
turn put it in the coverage of the gun ban during the election period. Petitioner asserts that the intendment of
R.A. No. 7166 is that the term “firearm” refers to real firearm in its common and ordinary usage. Moreover,
petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members. Families are entitled
to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to
choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the
COMELEC.

Issue: whether or not the inclusion of airsoft guns and its replicas run counter to the Art. II, Section 12, as
invoked herein.

Held: No. Airsoft guns in the eyes of the laymen are similar to that of a real gun, which may cause unrest
during the conduct of the elections. The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
including airsoft guns and airguns in the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban
during the election period, with the apparent objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible
elections this year. However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the
term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714. The right to have bonding moments is not absolute as it can be
regulated as the State sees fit.

78. Imbong vs. Ochoa

Facts: Reproductive health law is being challenged, The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the
RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

Issue: Whether or not the RH Law is violative of Art. 2, Sec 12 of the Constitution.
Held: The Rh Law does not violate the right of an unborn child as guaranteed in. The question of when life
begins is scientific and medical issue that should not be decided without proper hearing and evidence. The
framers of the constitution intended conception as fertilization and protection is given upon fertilization. Not
all contraceptives are banned. Only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum are prohibited. The intent of
the framers was to prevent the legislature from passing a measure that would allow abortion. The IRR
redefinition of abotifacient in S4a of the RH lLaw is violative. S7 of the RH Law which excludes parental consent
incases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage is anti family and is
violative of s12 a2
Section 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports
92. GUINGONA V. CARAGUE
Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4B in automatic appropriation, of which P86.8B is appropriated for
debt service, and P155.3B appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act,
while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports amounted to
P27,017,813,000.00. The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education.

Issue: Whether the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
mandate to accord highest priority to education.

Ruling: No. Budget prioritization for education, culture and sports is not absolute as it still depends on the
needs of the Country. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the Congress
is not free to balance the demands of education against other equally important matters concerning the State,
much more to deprive the Government to respond to the imperatives of the national interest. Congress is
certainly not without power to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service the Country’s enormous
debt since the very survival of our economy is at stake.

93. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ

Facts: Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it
appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged
that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because
under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding.

Issue: Whether the appropriation is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional mandate to accord highest
priority to education.

Ruling: No. As held in the case of Guingona Jr. v. Carague, that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is
merely directory. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated
to 'assign the highest budgetary priority to education' in order to 'insure that teaching will attract and retain
its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment,' it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives.

Sec 18. Labor Protection

94. PNB v. DAN PADAO
Facts: Dan Padao, was a loan and credit officer of PNB. After due investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of
gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the Board of
Directors but he eventually instituted a complaint against PNB and its then AVP (Assistant Vice President) with
the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for reinstatement, backwages, illegal dismissal, and treachery/bad
Faith and palpable discrimination in the treatment of employees with administrative cases.
The ELA (Executive Labor Arbiter) found Padao’s dismissal to be valid but awarded a separation pay. Padao’s
appeal to the NLRC reversed the decision and found the termination to be illegal; he was to be reinstated and
provided with other monetary awards. PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC
and thus it filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether Dan Padao’s was illegally dismissed by PNB?

Ruling: No. He was terminated under an authorized or just cause as laid down in Article 282 (b - Gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties) of the Labor Code. He not only failed to perform what he was
employed to do, but also did so repetitively and habitually, causing millions of pesos in damage to PNB. PNB,
as an employer, has the basic right to freely select and discharge employees, if only as a measure of self-
protection against acts inimical to its interests. It has the authority to impose what penalty it deems sufficient
or commensurate to an employee’s offense.

Article II, Section 18 characterizes labor as a primary social economic force, and as such, the State is bound to
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare; however, it is the basic right of the employer to freely
select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest.

95. JMM PROMOTION v CA

Facts: Following the much publicized death of Maricris Sioson, former President Aquino ordered a total ban
against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however,
rescinded after the promise to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of
deployment. In its place the government through the Secretary of Labor, upon the Entertainment Industry
Advisory Council’s (EIAC’s) recommendation, issued Department Order No. 03 establishing various procedures
and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification
requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any
contract of employment by the POEA.

Petitioners contends that overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution and
avers that the alleged deprivation thereof, through the onerous requirement of an ARB, violates due process
and constitutes an invalid exercise of police power.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the order for requirements for overseas employment is valid

Ruling: Yes. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the
Constitution provides: “Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.” The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while
desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the
protection of our workforce, local or overseas.

The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows
the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from
prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices.

The Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be
prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The
tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and
entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.

96. PASE V. DRILON

Facts: DOLE enacted D.O. No. 1 series of 1988 which outlines the guidelines of temporary suspension of
Filipino domestic and household workers. Such order was contested by the Philippine Association of Service
Exporters Inc. (PASEi) on the bases of being discriminatory on both males and females, that it does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills.

Solicitor General however on behalf of the respondents secretary of DOLE and administrator of POEA filed a
comment on May 25, 1988 informing the court that effective March 8, 1988 the Labor Secretary lifted the
deployment ban in states where the department deems it appropriate. The enacted guidelines allow for
vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers to process with POEA and therefore not covered by the ban on
the condition that they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served
employment contract.

Issue: Whether D.O.1 is valid

Ruling: Yes. DO No. 1 is a valid regulation. The state gives a paramount importance to its labor force, as stated
in ARTICLE II. SEC. 18 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the state to protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare. The Department Order of DOLE aims to “enhance the protection of Filipina domestic
workers” in the midst of maltreatment of our workers have suffered abroad; a deployment ban will be for
their good and welfare.

The court believes that there is no undue discrimination between the sexes as stated by the petitioners since
the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions; furthermore it is preferred to be
applicable only to female domestic helpers since they are being ill-treated on massive instances validated by
tales and cases of maltreatment extending to even rape and various forms of torture. The court understands
that it is the state’s policy to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, which is why the court
backs up the government’s efforts to protect victims of exploitation.

Section 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

97. GARCIA V. BOI
Facts: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI for the transfer of its proposed plant site from Bataan to
Batangas and the shift of the plant's feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant from "naphta only" to
"naptha and/or liquefied petroleum gas. 1 year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation
applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from
petitioner Cong. Garcia and others,the BOI granted private respondent BPC's application, stating that the
investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital
for the project.

Issue: Whether BOI disregarded the national interest

Ruling: Yes. Affairs regarding the development of national economy must fuel the spirit of national interest.
The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the development and utilization of our
scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and
priorities are disregarded in the approval of the BOI of the investor’s request to amend. The BOI therefore has
disregarded the best interest of the Filipinos by adhering to the desires of this foreign investor; there is no
cogent advantage to the government shown in this transfer.

98. TANADA V. ANGARA

Facts: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, Secretary of DTI representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations. This was then adopted as a resolution No. 97 in the Philippine senate and signed by
the President.

Tanada et.al seeks for nullification of the World Trade Organization on the grounds that it violated the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO contravene Sec.19, Art II of the 1987
Constitution.

Ruling: No. The WTO agreement is not contravening with the provisions of the Constitution rather it aims to
be a surrogate of the state to fully develop its potential in national economic development. The agreement
does not undermine Art. II sec. 19, this charter provision has been merely set to be a general policy and is
therefore not self-executing. When read with other provisions particularly Sections 1 and 3 of Article XII, the
clauses cited in the WTO does not conflict with the Constitution, and that the agreement is embedded in itself
with sufficient provisions to protect the Philippines and other developing countries from sudden trade
liberalization.

99. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY

Facts: Petitioner filed a suit against the respondent ( an agency created by PD No. 232 as an independent
public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm
oil industry) in RTC of NCJR in Makati , Metro Manila to enjoin the respondent’s resolution in which it declares
that it will no longer require licenses for applicants of coconut processing as a condition in engaging in such
business The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and
unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in
congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities.

Issue: Whether the policy of free enterprise calls for a removal of protective regulations?

Ruling: No. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to
the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. Thus, an
inclusion of protective regulation in the application of coconut processing firms strongly corresponds to the
effective control of National Economy.

100. PHARMACEUTICALS VS. DUQUE

Facts: Petitioner posits that RIRR of EO 51 (Otherwise Known as the "Milk Code," Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes) is not valid as it contains provisions that
are unconstitutional. Petitioner also alleged that the RIRR sought to be implemented by the respondents is
unnecessary and oppressive, and is offensive to the due process clause of the Constitution, insofar as the same
is in restraint of trade and because a provision therein is inadequate to provide the public with a
comprehensible basis to determine whether or not they have committed a violation.

Issue: Whether the RIRR of EO No. 51 suppress the trade of milk

Ruling: No. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in
any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of
assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed
activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the
aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade.

Moreover, free enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective regulations’." It must be clearly explained
and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of
trade. The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of
regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests. Furthermore, despite
the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." Hence, such power
promoting general welfare coincides to having an effective control of National Economy.

Section 20. Role of Private Sector

101. MANILA RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner brought the instant suit, alleging, that Secretary Rainerio Reyes had been guilty of a grave
abuse of discretion upon the unveiling of the DOTC an P880-million maritime coastal communications system
project, designed to "ensure safety of lives at sea (SOLAS) through the establishment of efficient
communication facilities between coast stations and ship stations and the improvement of safety in
navigational routes at sea.

Petitioner argued that such Department cannot compete in the business of public correspondence, and rely
on the provision of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution. The Solicitor General, rebutted that, the
Government "cannot abandon its ministerial functions of rendering public services to the citizenry which
private capital would not ordinarily undertake, or which by its very nature is better equipped to administer for
the public welfare than by any private individual or entity.

Issue: Whether the petitioner can legitimately rely on Section 20, Art II of 1987 Constitution

Ruling: No. The petitioners cannot legitimately rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the
Constitution, to defeat the act complained of. The mandate "recognizing the indispensable role of the private
sector" is no more than an acknowledgment of the importance of private initiative in building the nation.
However, it is not a call for official abdication of duty to citizenry. The Constitution does not bar, however, the
Government from undertaking its own initiatives, especially in the domain of public service, and neither does
it repudiate its primacy as chief economic caretaker of the nation.

102. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. V. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN

Facts: This is an original petition for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order in the nature of a
continuing mandamus. Petitioner is a duly registered, non-stock domestic corporation. Respondent Philippine
Reclamation Authority(PRA), formerly called the Public Estates Authority, is a government entity created by
P.D. No. 1084.

The Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, issued Resolution No. 13 stating that it had learned that respondent
Province had filed an application with the DENR for a foreshore lease of areas along the shorelines of Barangay
Caticlan, and manifesting its strong opposition to said application, as the proposed foreshore lease practically
covered almost all the coastlines of said barangay, thereby technically diminishing its territorial jurisdiction,
once granted, and depriving its constituents of their statutory right of preference in the development and
utilization of the natural resources within its jurisdiction. The resolution further stated that respondent
Province did not conduct any consultations with the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan regarding the proposed
foreshore lease

Issue: Whether Resolution No.13 is valid

Ruling: No. The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement
of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the 
Municipality of Malay, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of respondent
Province. It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the promotion of tourism in
Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. 

In the case at bar, the national agency involved is PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local government
of Aklan, it is PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to
undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go through
respondent PRA and to execute a MOA (Memorandum of Agreement), wherein respondent PRAs authority to
reclaim was delegated to respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also
a national government institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC (Environmental Compliance
Certificate) that is a prerequisite to projects covered by environmental laws such as the one at bar.

Section 21. Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy

103. WILSON P. GAMBOA VS. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES
Facts: This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company
Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). 

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or
about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With this sale,
First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing
the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner,
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital
of a public utility to not more than 40%.

Issue: Whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the entire subscribed
common capital stock violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility

Ruling: Yes. The (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to
ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of
shares will not suffice but it must be shown that the legal and beneficial ownership rests in the hands of
Filipino citizens. Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the
beneficial ownership and the controlling interest.

Obviously, the intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and restrictions on fully
nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for Filipino nationals to be always in control of the
corporation undertaking said activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court’s ruling upholding respondents’
arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership structure of a public utility
corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred
stocks. If the common shares can be owned entirely by foreigners it will create an absurd situation wherein
foreigners, who are supposed to be minority shareholders, control the public utility corporation.
Section 24. Vital Role of Communications
104. PLDT vs NTC
Facts: Petitioners seeks to set aside and annul the decision of the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) signed by former NTC Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz as well as the order of the NTC  En Banc. Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Eastern) filed with the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, maintain and operate an International Digital Gateway Facility
(IDGF). The NTC granted provisional authority to ETCI (EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC) subject to
the condition that it shall enter into “interconnection agreement” with PLDT. PLDT elevated the case to the SC
pointing out ETCI’s defective legislative franchise to operate telecommunications system, among others.

Issue: Whether PLDT’s petition should prosper.

Ruling: No. Through the egregious interpretation urged by PLDT and, in some measure not yet fully clear,
unfortunately adopted by the majority in the instant case, PLDT seeks to monopolize the external transmission
and reception of telecommunications messages,  i.e., the sending and receiving of such messages across the
boundaries of the Philippines. 

The decisive consideration is public need, public interest, and the common good. Those were the overriding
factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional authority to ETCI. Article II, Section 24 of the 1987
Constitution, recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation building. It is likewise a
State policy to provide the environment for the emergence of communications structures suitable to the
balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country.

105. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. 180050, APRIL 12, 2011) Art 2, Sec 25.

FACTS:

Petitioners were former political leaders of Surigao del Norte challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355
which created the Province of Dinagat Islands. The Court dismissed the petition. Undaunted, petitioners, as
taxpayers and residents of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, would perpetuate an illegal act
of Congress, pointing out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area and population which failed
to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
ISSUE: W/N land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity

RULING: YES
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, contiguity and min land area requirements for prospective local government units should be
liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results; The land area requirement should be read
together with territorial contiguity. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are
exempt from the min land area requirement of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the
min land area criterion even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign
a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and
negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of
basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the
prescribed land area territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water.
Moreover, a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it defeats the
purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution.

106. BELGICA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2013)

FACTS:

The investigation was spawned as six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing
for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
for an entire decade. Petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute
their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.

ISSUE: W/N/ the 2013 PDAF Article and similar forms are unconstitutional?

RULING: YES

The Court finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal
the unequal." In particular, it observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on
the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters
of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the
former.  With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate a project
on his own. Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article and similar forms are unconstitutional.

107. PAMATONG VS COMELEC, 427 SCRA 96

FACTS:

Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President but Respondent refused to give due course to it. The
COMELEC denied his motion for reconsideration too.
Petitioner now seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to
"equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose
their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates.
ISSUE:W/N Section 26 mean that everyone has a right to be a candidate for President

RULING: NO

The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason
for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts. Also, it is within the power of the state to limit the number of qualified candidates
only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.

108. NERI vs SENATE (G.R. 180643)

FACTS:

Petitioner testified before respondent on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN
Project"). Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed Pres. Arroyo of the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. When probed further on their discussions relating to the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege" to 3 questions: (a) W/N President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) W/N she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)W/N she directed him to
approve it. Respondent persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these 3 questions by requiring him to
appear and testify once more but, petitioner did not appear upon the President’s orders invoking executive
privilege.
ISSUE:W/N the claim of executive privilege will violate Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure) 
RULING: NO
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions involves the President’s dealings with
a foreign nation this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not
only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her
close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. The right to information
is not an absolute right. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may
be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. But, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to
such rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information. For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision
did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is
to respect matters that are covered by executive privilege.
109 is not related to the topic

110. POLLO VS CHAIRPERSON KARINA DAVID

FACTS:

An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson David asking for an investigation as a
person have been lawyered by one of the attorneys in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team which backed-up all files in the hard disk of computers. It was
found that most of the files were copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner were
draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals for and on
behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in admin. Pet. was a Supervising Personnel
Specialist.

ISSUE: W/N a no-privacy expectation is present upon the use of government property.

RULING: YES (Disclaimer: This is the opinion of Justice Carpio as the right to privacy is the case’s main focus)

The CSC’s computer use regulation, which opens to access for internal scrutiny anything CSC employees
"create, store, send, or receive in the computer system," has a statutory basis that "[g]overnment x x
x property shall be x x x used solely for public purposes." In short, any private use of a government property,
like a government-owned computer, is prohibited by law. Office regulations mandating no-privacy
expectation such as the CSC regulation in question cannot justify access to sensitive government
information traditionally recognized as confidential. Thus, insulated from the reach of such regulations are
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, draft decisions of judges and justices,
executive sessions of either house of Congress, military and diplomatic secrets, national security matters,
documents relating to pre-prosecution investigations by law enforcement agencies and similar confidential
matters.

111. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK AND PASCUAL GARCIA III vs SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT

FACTS:

Petitioners sought to nullity the Resolution of respondent which granted the prosecution's requests for
subpoenas to PSBank them to testify and produce before the Impeachment Court documents relative to the
foreign currency accounts that were alleged to belong to then Suprerme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
They then filed to withdraw the petition averring that subsequent events with the termination of the
impeachment proceedings against former Chief Justice, they are no longer faced with the dilemma of violating
Republic Act No. 6426 (RA 6426) or being held in contempt of court for refusing to disclose the details of the
subject foreign currency deposits.
ISSUE: W/N the impeachment court could order the disclosure of the information of the foreign currency
deposits

RULING: The petition has become moot and academic due to the supervening conviction of Justice Corona.

No executive privilege was invoked in this case. However, in RA 6426, All foreign currency deposits
authorized as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD No. 1034, are declared as and considered
absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall
foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or private. With RA
6426 in mind, like the executive privilege, the rule on a full disclosure of information is no an absolute rule
as it is subject to exceptions.

112. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS, 14 FEBRUARY 2012

FACTS:

During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested in a
COMPLIANCE dated January 27, op that it would present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand
documents, to be secured from both private and public offices. The list of proposed witnesses included
Justices of the SC, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of which are internal to
the Court. The letters asked for the examination of records, and the issuance of certified true copies of the
rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations, as above described, for purposes of Articles 3 and 7 of
the impeachment complaint.

ISSUE: W/N the Members of the Supreme Court have a privilege that is akin to or equivalent to the
executive privilege?

RULING: YES

Specifically, the Internal Rules of the SC prohibits the disclosure of (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the
actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session, and (3) the
deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it. [t]he information x x
x like internal deliberations of the SC and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal
branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making. This
privilege is called the deliberative process privilege. All the great branches of government are entitled to
this treatment for their own decision and policy making conversations and correspondence.