Training & Convention Division

University of the Philippines Law Center

SUGGESTED ANSWERS
to the
2018 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN
LEGAL ETHICS

The lawyer’s oath is a source of any lawyer’s obligations and its violation
is a ground for the lawyer’s suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action.
Without stating your name and other circumstances that will identify you,
substantially write down the lawyer’s oath that a person who has passed the bar
examinations is required to take and subscribe to before the Supreme Court.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

II
In a complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Cirilo Celis, a senior citizen, it was shown that: a) he failed to pay
his IBP dues for six (6) years; b) he indicated uniformly in his pleadings for three
(3) consecutive years “IBP Muntinlupa OR No. 12345” as proof of payment of
his IBP fees; and c) he did not indicate any Professional Tax Receipt number. to
prove payment of his professional dues.

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 In his defense, Atty. Celis alleged that he is only engaged in a “limited”
law practice, and his principal occupation, as disclosed in his income tax return,
is that of a farmer of a 30-hectare orchard and pineapple farm in Camarines Sur.
He also claimed that he believed in good faith that, as a senior citizen, he was
exempt from payment of taxes, such as income tax, under Republic Act No.
7432 which grants senior citizens “exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes provided that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the NEDA for that year.”

As a member of the IBP Board of Governors, decide on the following:

(a) the validity of his claim that, being engaged in a limited practice of
law and being a senior citizen who is exempt from the payment of
taxes, he is not required to pay his IBP and professional dues;
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) In accordance with Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A, Atty. Celis
can engage in the practice of law only by paying his IBP dues,
and it does not matter that his practice is “limited”. While it is
true that R.A. No. 7432, Sec. 4, grants senior citizen exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes provide that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year, the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues, which is not a tax
(Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas, 322 SCRA 529 [2000]).

(b) the obligations, if any, under the Rules of Court and the Code of
Professional Responsibility that Atty. Celis may have violated.
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility – A lawyer shall at

all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated Bar.
Sec. 9, Rule 139 – A, Rules of Court. “Every member of
the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court.”

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 Sec. 10, Rule 139-A, Rules of Court – “Subject to the
provision of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
members in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.”

III

Carina was dismissed by her employer for breach of trust and confidence,
and for willful violation of company rules and policies. She filed an action for
illegal dismissal claiming that her termination was without legal basis. The Labor
Arbiter found that she was illegally dismissed and awarded her the amount of
PhP 80 million. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
the award was reduced to PhP 40 million as separation pay, plus PhP 5 million
for the value of her stock option plans which would have vested if she were not
illegally dismissed from her job. Unsatisfied with the NLRC’s decision, she
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) the amount of monetary award granted by
the NLRC. She engaged the services of Casal, Casos and Associates to handle
her appeal. Her retainer agreement with Casal, Casos and Associates provided
for contingent fees equivalent to 10% of her claim for separation pay and 10% of
the value of stock options to be awarded to her.

The CA decision was not favorable to Carina, so she appealed the same to
the Supreme Court (the Court). While the case was pending appeal with the
Court, Carina entered into a compromise agreement with her employer to
terminate the case upon payment to her of the full amount of PhP 40 million, less
the PhP 15 million previously paid to her by her employer. Before the
compromise agreement was finalized, Carina terminated the services of Casal,
Casos and Associates and asked them to withdraw from the case pending before
the Court. The parties negotiated the compromise agreement without the
participation of their lawyers since the employer imposed the condition that no
lawyers should be involved in the compromise negotiation. She, together with
her employer, then filed the Compromise Agreement for approval by the Court,
and sought the termination of the case, with prejudice.

Casal, Casos and Associates filed a motion to intervene in the case

pending with the Court, praying that Carina be ordered to pay them PhP 4
million, representing 10% of the amount received by Carina from her employer
in settlement of the case, plus 6% legal interest from the date of filing of the
motion for intervention, until fully paid. The intervenors claimed that they were
dismissed without justifiable cause prior to the signing of the compromise
agreement for the reason that Carina, their client, wanted to evade payment of
their legal fees. Carina claimed they were dismissed because Attys. Casal and
Casos, who personally handled her case, had resigned from the law firm to join
the government, and because of the negligence and failure of her lawyers to

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attend to her case. In reply, the intervenors said that the engagement was with the
law firm and not with individual lawyers. The law firm also presented letters
signed by their client commending them for work done well in the case.

(a) May lawyers legally charge their clients based on contingent fees?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Yes, Rule 21.01 (h) of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides the contingency or certainty of compensation as one of
the factors in determining fair and reasonable fees. A
contingent fee is intended to enable a poor person to avail of the
services of a lawyer to protect his rights or redress his
grievances.

(b) Should Casal, Casos and Associates be allowed to intervene in the

case pending before the Court in order to collect their fees from
Carina? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Yes. A lawyer is as much entitled to the judicial protection

against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of the client, as
the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. Rule 16.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility permits the registration
of a lien although the lawyer concerned does not finish the case
successfully in favor of his client, because “a lawyer who quits
or is dismissed before the completion of his task is as much
entitled to protection of the rule” (Palanca vs. Pecson, G.R. Nos.
L-6334 and L-6346, February 25, 1954). He may enforce his
right to his fees by a separate action or intervention in the same
case he handled. The latter recourse is the better practice since
the judge is already conversant with the nature and extent of his
services.

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 (c) Can Carina refuse to pay attorneys’ fees on the ground that the
lawyers who personally handled her case had already resigned from
the law firm with which she had contracted? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(c) When a client engages a law firm to represent him, his contract
is with a law firm and not with the individual lawyers. The
resignation, illness or inability of some of their lawyers will not
affect the ability of the law firm to continue its services.
Certainly, it cannot be used to evade payment of attorneys’ fees
due to the law firm.

(d) May Carina’s employer, defendant in this case, be held solidarily

liable with Carina for the payment of the attorneys’ fees of Carina’s
lawyers? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(d) If the evidence shows that the employer of Carina imposed the
“no lawyers in the negotiation of the compromise agreement
rule’ because of connivance in evading payment of Carina’s
lawyers, then the defendant employer should be held solidarily
liable in the payment of attorneys’ fees to Carina’s lawyers.
When the other party to the case is also guilty of fraud in the
payment of legal fees, he becomes a joint tortfeasor and should
be held solidarily liable with Carina. By participating in the
fraud, Carina’s employer also becomes liable even if Casals,
Casos and Associates was hired only to represent Carina
(Malvar v. Kraft Foods, G.R. 183952, Sepember 8, 2013).

(e) May the intervenors collect legal interest in addition to their

attorneys’ fees? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(e) Legal interest cannot be imposed on attorney’s fees. This is

because even if parties are free to stipulate the amount of

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 attorney’s fees, the payment of attorneys’ fees is different from
ordinary obligations and contracts. The Civil Code provisions
on payment of legal rate of interest in the event of default apply
only to ordinary obligations and contracts (Bach v. Ongkiko
Kalaw Manhit and Acorda Law Office, G.R. No. 160334,
Sepember 11, 2006).

IV

Atty. Cornelio Carbon, 36 years of age, had always dreamed of becoming

a judge, and eventually, a justice, but his legal career took a different turn. Upon
graduation, he joined a government-owned financial institution where he worked
in the Loans and Claims Division. He also taught Negotiable Instruments Law in
a nearby law school at night. He has been active in his IBP Chapter and other
law organizations. However, in his 12 years of practice, he has never done trial
or litigation work.

(a) Is Atty. Carbon engaged in the “practice of law”? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Yes, he is engaged in the practice of law, which has been defined
as “any activity in or out of court which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience”
(Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 [1991]). Work in the
government that requires the use of legal knowledge is
considered practice of law (Lingan v. Calubaquib, 727 SCRA 355
[2014], Fajardo v. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016).
Lawyers who teach law are considered engaged in the practice
of law (Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC,
March 8, 2011).

(b) Is Atty. Carbon qualified to become a Regional Trial Court Judge?

(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Yes, as long as he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at

least 35 years of age, and has practiced law or held public office

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 requiring practice of law for at least 10 years. There is no
requirement that he should have done actual trial or litigation
work.

Carlos contracted two marriages: the first was with Consuelo, whom he
left in the province, and the second was with Corinne in Manila, with whom he
had six (6) children. Both women were unaware of Carlo’s marriage to the
other.

When Carlos entered law school, he met Cristina, a classmate, to whom he

confided his marital status. Not long after, Carlos and Cristina became involved
in an extramarital affair, as a result of which Carlos left Corinne and their
children. During Carlos and Cristina’s senior year in law school, Consuelo
passed away. After their admission to the bar, Atty. Carlos and Atty. Cristina
decided to get married in Hong Kong in a very private ceremony. When Corinne
learned of Carlos and Cristina’s wedding in Hong Kong, she filed a disbarment
case against Atty. Carlos and Atty. Cristina on the ground of gross immorality.
Atty. Carlos and Atty. Cristina raised the following defenses:

a) the acts complained of took place before they were admitted to the
bar; and

b) Atty. Carlos’ marriage to Corinne was void ab initio due to his

subsisting first marriage with Consuelo, and they were free to marry
after Consuelo died.

Rule on each defense. (2.5% each)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) It is not important that the acts complained of were committed

before they were admitted to the bar. The possession of good
moral character is both a condition precedent for admission to
the bar and a continuing condition to remain a member of the
legal profession. In the case of Garrido v. Garrido, (A.C. No.
6593, February 4, 2010), involving the same facts, the Supreme
Court held as follows:
“Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint,
into any question concerning the mental or moral

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 fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.
Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
p resu m p t ion th a t th e ap p l ican t h as al l th e
qualifications to become a lawyer, this may be refuted
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even
after admission to the Bar.”
(b) In the same Garrido case, the defense of the second marriage
being void while the third marriage is valid, was also raised. The
Supreme Court held as follows:
“While Atty. Valencia (third wife) contends
that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea
(second wife) was null and void, the fact remains that
(s)he took a man away from a woman who bore him
six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have
required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as
he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man
with both marriages subsisting at that time, she
should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very
start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty.
Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia,
away from legitimizing his relationship with
Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this,
because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness,
Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six
children for a third marriage with her. This scenario
smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the
prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s
expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage
to Maelotisea was invalid, hence, she felt free to
marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in
the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by
the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s

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 marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the
honesty of this expressed belief.”

VI

Mrs. Conchita Conchu engaged the services of Atty. Carlo Colorado to act
as private prosecutor to handle a criminal case against persons suspected of
slaying her husband. Atty. Colorado performed his duties -he interviewed
witnesses to build up his case and rel igiously attended hearings. However, he
failed to attend one hearing (allegedly because he did not receive a notice) in
which the court, over Mrs. Conchu’s objections, granted bail to all the accused.
Mrs. Conchu belligerently confronted Atty. Colorado about his absence. Stung
by Mrs. Conchu’s words, Atty. Colorado filed with the court a “Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel”. The motion did not bear the consent of Mrs. Conchu, as
in fact, Mrs. Conchu refused to sign her conformity to Atty. Colorado’s
withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearing in the criminal case continued, but Atty.
Colorado no longer appeared at the hearings nor did he contact Mrs. Conchu.
Mrs. Conchu then filed a complaint seeking disciplinary sanctions against Atty.
Colorado. Atty. Colorado cited “loss of confidence” and “serious differences”
with the client as his reasons for withdrawing his services unilaterally.

Can Atty. Colorado be sanctioned for his actions? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Atty. Colorado can be sanctioned for his actions. Under the Rules of
Court, an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates
to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from the
court’s approval of his motion to withdraw based on a good cause.
Furthermore, being an officer of the court in whose favor a lawyer owes the
duty to assist in administering justice, he may not withdraw or be permitted
to withdraw as counsel in a case if such withdrawal will work injustice to a
client or frustrate the ends of justice (Orcino v. Gaspar, 279 SCRA 479
[1997]).

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 VII

Atty. Celso Casis’ relationship with Miss Cory Cerrada began when he
represented her in several criminal cases for estafa and violation of B.P. 22. His
expertise and diligence in personally assisting and facilitating her release on bail
and other legal actions saved her from many legal predicaments. Despite her
initial resistance, Miss Cerrada, convinced by Atty. Casis’ sincerity and
representation that he was separated from his wife and was taking necessary
steps for the annulment of his marriage, began to live with him openly as
husband and wife. One day, Atty. Casis’ wife suddenly entered Miss Cerrada’s
home and assaulted her, inflicting injuries. Miss Cerrada then filed a complaint
with the IBP charging Atty. Casis with gross immorality and gross misconduct.
However, shortly afterwards, upon Atty. Casis’ pleas, Miss Cerrada filed a
motion to withdraw the complaint. The IBP had required Atty. Casis to file an
answer but he did not do so, relying on Miss Cerrada’s withdrawal of the
complaint against him. Can the IBP continue to investigate Atty. Casis and
recommend the imposition of sanctions against him, and for the Court to impose
sanctions, if warranted, notwithstanding Miss Cerrada’s filing of the motion to
withdraw the complaint against him? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The IBP can continue to investigate Atty. Casis. A disbarment

proceeding is sui generis, neither a civil or a criminal action. Not being a
civil action, the complainant is not a plaintiff nor the respondent a
defendant. It involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievances. A disciplinary action is in reality an investigation by the court
into the misconduct of its officer or an examination into his character.
Desistance or withdrawal of the disbarment case does not exonerate the
respondent. If the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the deistance of the complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges (Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93[1998]).

VIII

Judge Celso Camarin posted in the bulletin board of his sala for two
weeks, an advertisement which says: “Wanted attractive waitresses, personable
waiters and cooks who may be interested in applying for employment in my
family’s restaurant business. Interested applicants may submit applications to
Branch XXX, RTC of Camarines Sur.” The screening of some applicants was
also conducted in the Judge’s office. What provisions, if any, of the Code of
Judicial Conduct did Judge Camarin violate? (2.5%)

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

In the case of Dionisio vs. Escano, 302 SCRA 411, February 1, 1999,
involving the same facts, the Supreme Court found the erring judge to have
violated the following rules of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
Canon 11, Rule 2.00 – A Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Canon 5, Rule 5.02 – A judge refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere
with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement
with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A Judge should so
manage investments and other financial interest to minimize the number of
case giving grounds for disqualification, and if necessary divest such
investment and interests. Divestment shall be made within one year from
the effectivity of this Code or from appointment, as the case may be.
Rule 5.03 – Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge
may hold and manage investment but should not serve as an office, director,
advisor, or employee of any business except as director, or non-legal
consultant of a family business.
The corresponding provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary would be:
Canon 4, Section 1 – Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities.
Section 7 – Judges shall inform themselves about their personal
fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be
informed about the financial interest of the members of their family.
Section 8 – Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance their private interest, or of those of any member of their
family or of anyone else, no shall they convey or permit others to convey the
impression that anyone is in special position to influence them in the
performance of their judicial duties.

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 IX

In a case pending before the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan justices

themselves actually took part in the questioning of a defense witness and the
accused. The records show that, while a witness was asked 16 questions on
direct examination by the defense counsel and six (6) questions by the prosecutor
on cross-examination, one justice interjected a total of 27 questions. After the
defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, another justice asked 10
more questions. With respect to one of the accused, both justices asked a total of
67 questions after cross-examination, and with respect to the other accused, a
total of 41 questions after cross-examination. More importantly, the questions of
the justices were in the nature of cross-examinations characteristic of
confrontation, probing, and insinuation.

Is this manner of questioning proper? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

“This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question

witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which
presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only
should his examination be limited to asking “clarificatory” questions, the
right should be sparingly and judiciously used, for the rule is that the court
should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening
in the conduct of the trial. Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly
in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself
with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in
proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-
examined the witnesses, their cross-examination supplementing those made
by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter’s questions in length.
The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due process was
certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its
overzealousness, assumed the dual rule of magistrate and advocate”
(Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]).

X
In a complaint for disbarment, Connie alleged that she engaged the
services of Atty. Cesar Corpuz in the preparation and execution in her favor of a
Deed of Sale over a parcel of land from her common-law husband.
Subsequently, Atty. Corpuz filed a civil case on behalf of Constancia, the legal
wife of Connie’s common-law husband, for the annulment of the Deed of Sale,
impleading Connie as defendant.

In his defense, Atty. Corpuz asserted that, with the permission of

Constancia, he wrote a letter to Connie informing the latter of Constancia’s
adverse claim and urging her to settle the same, but Connie ignored his letter.
He also said that Connie did not object to his handling of the case on behalf of
Constancia; and therefore, he felt free to file the complaint against her. Is Atty.
Corpuz guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests? (5%)

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a

lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Atty. Corpuz was
clearly guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests. Not only
did Atty. Corpuz agree to represent one client against another client in the
same action, he also accepted a new engagement that required him to
oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal service
had been previously retained. Atty. Corpuz did not qualify for the exception
under Canon 15. He did not make a full disclosure of facts to Connie and
Constancia before he accepted the new engagement from Constancia. He
failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients as required under
Canon 15 (Josefina M. Aniñon v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No.
5098, April 11, 2012).

XI

Atty. Claire Cortez, a member of the Philippine Bar who was also
admitted to the New York Bar, was disbarred from the practice of law in New
York for violation of Anti-Money Laundering laws of that State. She returned to
the Philippines in order to resume her Philippine law practice.

Can she also be disbarred from practicing law in the Philippines for the
same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, she can, if the ground for which she was disbarred in New York
is also a ground for disbarment in the Philippines. But she is entitled to due
process and she can be disbarred here only after notice and hearing. The
disbarment decision in New York will only constitute prima facie evidence of
her guilt (In re: Maquera 435 SCRA 417 [2004]).

XII

From February to November 2004, Atty. Calumpang, in fraudulent

connivance with brokers, convinced Corinna to deliver to him advance money
for the titling of a beachfront property in Caramoan. Six months had elapsed and

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Atty. Calumpang had made absolutely no progress in the titling of the land. He
also could not return the advance money paid by Corinna because he had
converted the money to his personal use. After almost a decade, and the property
could still not be titled in Corinna’s name, she filed an action with the

Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) in 2014 for deceit, malpractice, and

conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar. In his defense, Atty. Calumpang
asserted that, since the acts complained of took place more than 10 years ago, the
case had already prescribed.

Rule on the defense of Atty. Calumpang. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A disbarment proceeding is imprescriptible. Unlike other proceedings,

it is not subject to the defense of prescription. The ordinary statutes of
limitations have no application to disbarment proceedings (Calo v. Degamo,
20 SCRA 1162 [1967], Frias v. Bautista-Lozada, 489 SCRA 349 [2006], Heck
v. Santos, 423 SCRA 329 [2004]). However, an unexplained long delay in
the filing of an administrative case creates suspicion on the motives of the
complainant (Salamanca v. Bautista, 8 SCRA 459 [1963], Valdez v. Valera, 81
SCRA 246 [2015]).

XIII

Dr. Cielo is a well-known medical doctor specializing in cosmetic surgery.

Dr. Cielo, together with a team of doctors, performed a surgical buttocks
enhancement procedure in her clinic on Ms. Cossette Concio (Concio).
Unfortunately, after a couple of years, the implant introduced during the
enhancement procedure caused infection and Concio became seriously ill.

Concio filed a criminal action for medical malpractice against Dr. Cielo
which was eventually dismissed for failure to prove that Dr. Cielo was negligent.
Concio was represented in this action by Atty. Cogie Ciguerra (Ciguerra). After
they lost the medical malpractice case, Ciguerra started writing a series of posts
on his Facebook (FB) account containing insulting and verbally abuse language
against Dr. Cielo. Among others, Ciguerra called Dr. Cielo a quack doctor,
“reyna ng kaplastikan at kapalpakan”, and accused her of maintaining a payola
or extra-legal budget to pay off prosecutors and judges in order to win her cases.
He also called on patients to boycott the clinic of Dr. Cielo.

Dr. Cielo filed a disbarment case against Ciguerra for posting on his FB
account, sexist, vulgar, and obscene comments, and language disrespectful of
women in his FB posts. Ciguerra’s defense is that his FB posts were private
remarks on his private FB account and only meant to be shared among his FB
friends, and Dr. Cielo was not part of them. He also claimed that the disbarment

14
case was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy. The
Court, however, found that Ciguerra’s FB account did not have privacy settings.

Can Ciguerra be disbarred for the series of posts in his FB account against
Dr. Cielo? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. In the case of Ma. Victoria G. Belo-Henares v. Atty. Roberto

“Argee” C. Guevarra, A.C. No. 1394, December 1, 2016, involving the same
facts, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, first of all debunked the
respondent lawyer’s defense of privacy by pointing out that he failed to
prove that he used the privacy tools of Facebook to limit his messages to his
“friend”. Even if he did so there is no guarantee that his friends will not
pass on his messages to their friends.
With regard to the defense of freedom of speech, the Supreme Court
ruled:
“Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of
speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected
rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the
Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the
constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed
of to broadcast lies, half-truths, insult others, destroy their
names, reputation of bring them into disrepute”.

XIV

Cacai, a law student, filed an administrative complaint against RTC Judge

Casimiro Conde, her professor in law school, based on the following allegations:

(a) In a school convocation where Judge Conde was the guest speaker,
Judge Conde openly disagreed and criticized a recently-decided
Supreme Court decision and even stressed that the decision of the
Supreme Court in that case was a serious violation of the
Constitution.

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 (b) In his class discussions, Judge Conde named Cacai’s mother, an
MTC judge, as one of the judges involved in a marriage scam. At
that time, the case against her mother was still pending. Judge
Conde also included in his class discussion Cacai’s brother whom
he referred to as a “court-noted drug addict.”

Cacai asserted that the acts of Judge Conde were open displays of
insensitivity, impropriety, and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and
abusive conduct. She also alleged that Judge Conde acted with absolute
disrespect for the Court and violated the “subjudice rule” when he discussed the
marriage scam involving her mother because, at that time, the case was still
pending.

In his defense, Judge Conde argued that the case he discussed in the
school convocation was already of public knowledge and had been published
after it had become final. He also said it was part of his academic freedom to
openly discuss and criticize a decision of the Court since it was already decided
with finality, was patently erroneous, and clearly a violation of the Constitution.
With respect to discussions in class about Cacai’s mother, he said that the
marriage scam where her mother was charged scandalized the Judiciary and
became public knowledge when the Office of the Court Administrator held a
press conference on the matter and, that as a citizen, he could comment thereon
in the exercise of his rights to freedom of speech and expression. He also
asserted that his discussions in both fora could not be the subject of an
administrative complaint because they were not done in the performance of his
judicial duties.

Rule on each of the charges raised by Cacai, and the corresponding

defenses raised by Judge Conde. (2.5% each)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges, like
any other citizens, are entitled to freedom of expressions, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such right, they shall
always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality of the
judiciary. Judge Conde, however, should not have criticized in
public the Supreme Court decision as a serious violation of the
Constitution. He should have avoided any discussion in order to
preserve the traditional non-involvement of the judiciary in
public discussion of controversial issues (In re: Query of the
MTC Lawyers of Zamboanga del Norte, A.M. No. 86-11-3690).

16
 (b) Judge Conde is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge in
using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending
to project Cacai’s mother as a corrupt and ignorant judge and
her brother as a drug addict (in his class discussion). While the
Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes the right of judges to
freedom of expression, this freedom should be exercised in a
manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and
respect for himself and judiciary as a whole. A magistrate
should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered
petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments. Judge Conde can be held administratively
liable even though his improper comments were made in his
class discussions because ethical conduct is expected of him as a
judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in
his professional and private activities as well. A judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s
official life cannot be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Judge Conde also violated the subjudice rule which
restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings in order to avoid obstructing the administration of
justice. At the time Judge Conde discussed the marriage scam,
the case was still pending (Tormis v Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-
2366, February 4, 2015).

XV

Charo Conti engaged the services of Atty. Cesar Compostela for the
registration of a property located in Cebu, and which property she had inherited
together with her siblings. It was agreed in writing that Charo would pay Atty.
Compostela PhP 20,000 as acceptance fee and PhP 2,000 as appearance fee.
During the last hearing of the case, Atty. Compostela demanded an additional
amount of PhP 20,000 for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said
would further strengthen Charo’s position, plus 20% of the total area of the
property as additional fees for his services. Charo did not agree to Atty.
Compostela’s demands since they were contrary to their agreement. Besides, the
property was co-owned with her siblings and she could not agree to Atty.
Compostela’s demands without the consent of her co-heirs.

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 Four (4) years later, the petition for registration was approved and the
Land Registration Authority notified Charo that the decree of registration and the
original of the owner’s duplicate copy of the title had already been transmitted to
the Register of Deeds (RD). When Charo went to the RD, she was surprised to
discover that the owner’s duplicate copy of the title had already been claimed by,
and released to, Atty. Compostela. Despite demand, Atty. Compostela refused to
deliver the title to Charo until she paid the additional attorneys’ fees that he was
demanding. Charo then instituted a complaint for disbarment against him. In his
defense, Atty. Compostela claimed that:

(a) he had a right to retain the owner’s duplicate of the title as his
retaining lien; and

(b) he was entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on the

basis of the principle of quantum meruit.

Rule on Atty. Compostela’s defenses. (2.5% each)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) A lawyer has a right to retaining lien only of there is an

agreement as to the amount his fees. In this case, there is no
agreement as to Atty. Copmpostela’s claim for additional fees.
In fact, the client is opposed to the lawyer’s proposal for such
additional fees.
(b) A lawyer is entitled to fees on the basis of quantum meruit only
in the following cases:
1. There is no agreement between the lawyer and the client as
to the former’s fees;
2. There is an agreement but it is void;
3. There is an agreement but it has been set aside by the
parties themselves;
4. There is an agreement but the court has set it aside because
it found the fees to be unconscionable;
5. There is an agreement but the services of the lawyer were
terminated by the client for just cause.
None of these instances exist in this case. Atty. Compostela is
not entitled to additional fees on the basis of quantum meruit.

18
 XVI

On March 1, 2017, sisters and business partners Carmina and Celeste

Corominas borrowed PhP 500,000 from Carmen Carunungan. It was agreed that
the amount will be paid in full one year after, or on March 1, 2018, with interest
at the rate of 10% per annum, without necessity of a demand. They also agreed
to be bound jointly and severally. For this purpose, they executed a promissory
note, secured by a postdated check in the amount of PhP 550,000 drawn from
their joint account, which check was dated March 1, 2018.

When the debt became due, Carmen deposited the check but it was
dishonored for insufficient funds. Carmen then sued Carmina and Celeste for
estafa through falsification of a commercial document. After finding probable
cause, the prosecutor filed a criminal case in court, where the sisters were
required to file their joint Judicial Affidavit. In their affidavit, they raised the
defense that they could not be guilty of estafa because: (i) the check was issued
only as a form of security; (ii) even if issued as payment, it was for a pre-existing
debt; and (iii) it was only upon Carmen’s insistence that they issued the check.

Before the case could be decided, the sisters offered to settle their debt
through a dacion en pago. They offered a Honda CRV which they jointly owned
in full settlement of the loan. Carmen agreed.

Prepare the following documents in legally acceptable and enforceable

forms, based on the above facts:

(a) The Promissory Note (5%);

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Promissory Note

“ For value received, We jointly and severally promise to

pay Carmen Carunungan or order the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), with interest thereon at 10% per
annum, on or before March 1, 2018, without necessity of
demand.
To secure payment, we attach herewith ____ Bank Check
No. __________ in the amount of P550,000.00, postdated March
1, 2018, and payable to Carmen Carunungan.

Manila, March 1, 2017.

(Sgd.) Carmina Corominas (Sgd.) Celeste Corominas

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 (b) The Judicial Affidavit (10%); and

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Republic of the Philippines )

Metropolitan Manila ) s.s
City of ______________ )

JOINT JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT

OF CARMINA COROMINAS and CELESTE COROMINAS

WE, CARMINA COROMINAS and CELESTE

COROMINAS, of legal age and residents of
___________________, after having been duly sworn, hereby
depose and state:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

We are being examined by Atty. “A” with address at

__________________. The examination is being held at
_________________ in the presence of ABC. WE are answering
the questions fully conscious that WE do so under oath and may
face criminal liability for false testimony.

Questions and Answers

Q1. Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

A1. WE are CARMINA COROMINAS and CELESTE
COROMINAS both of legal age, single and residents of
_________________________.
Q2. Why are you executing this Judicial Affidavit?
A2. We are executing this Judicial Affidavit to support our
defenses in the criminal case of estafa filed against us.
Q3. Why were you charged with such case?
A3. We were charged with estafa because we issued a check in
favor of Carmen Carunungan which eventually bounced
for insufficient funds.

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Q4. In answer to Q2, you mentioned that you are executing
this Judicial Affidavit to support your defenses in the
criminal case of estafa filed against you. Why do you
believe you are not guilty?
A4. We are not guilty because of the following reasons:
i the check was issued only as a form of security;
ii Even if issued as payment, it was for a pre-existing
debt, and
iii It was only upon the Carmen Carunungan’s
insistence that We issued the check.
Q5. Is there anything else you want to add to the above?
A5. No more sir.

AFFIANTS FURTHER SAYETH NAUGHT.

Manila, November ____, 2018.

CARMINA COROMINAS CELESTE COROMINAS

Affiant Affiant

Witnesses:

___________________________
ABC

ATTESTATION

I, Atty. “A” with office address at ____________ do

hereby attest as follows:
1. I personally conducted the examination of Carmina
Corominas and Celeste Corominas in question and answer
form.
2. I faithfully recorded the questions asked Carmina
Corominas and Celeste Corominas and the corresponding
answers they gave, and

21
 3. Neither I nor any other person then present coached
Carmina Corominas and Celeste Corominas regarding their
answers.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto affixed my
signature this ___ day of November 2018 at ________________.

Atty. “A”
Address
IBP OR No. place and date of issuance
PTR OR No. place and date of payment
MCLE Exemption ____________
Date of Issue _______________
Valid until _________________

JURAT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ____

day of November 2018 at ________________, affiants Carmina
Corominas, Celeste Corominas exhibiting to me their
competent evidence of identity, consisting of a Driver’s License
No. _______________ expiring on _________, and a Driver’s
License No. ___________ expiring on ___________, respectively,
and affiant Atty. “A”, with Voter’s ID issued by the
Commission on Elections on ____________.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.

Notary Public

Doc. No. _____;

Page No. _____;
Book No. _____;
Series of 2018.

22
 (c) The Dacion en Pago (10%).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This instrument, executed by CARMINA COROMINAS,

of legal age and a resident of ____________________, and
CELESTE COROMINAS, of legal age and a resident of
____________________, hereafter referred to as the DEBTORS,
and CARMEN CARUNUNGAN, of legal age, and a resident of
_______________, hereafter to be referred to as the
CREDITOR,

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the DEBTORS are indebted to the

CREDITOR in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P550,000.00);
WHEREAS, the DEBTORS are the owners of a motor
vehicle located in __________________, and more specifically
described as follows:
Make : Honda CRV
Model : 2018
Motor No. : 12345
Chassis No. : 56789
CR No. : ___________

WHEREAS, the DEBTORS are willing to give the said

motor vehicle to the CREDITOR as full payment of their
aforesaid indebtedness to the latter; and
WHEREAS, the CREDITOR is willing to accept the said
motor vehicle as full payment of the indebtedness of the
DEBTORS;
NOW, THEREFORE, premises considered, the
DEBTORS have transferred and conveyed, as they hereby
transfer and convey, the aforesaid motor vehicle to the
CREDITOR as payment in full of their indebtedness to her, and

23
the CREDITOR hereby accepts the said vehicle as full payment
of the said indebtedness to her,

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed

these presents, at the City of Manila, on ____________, 2018.

CARMINA COROMINAS CELESTE COROMINAS

Debtor Debtor

CARMEN CARUNUNGAN
Creditor

WITNESSES:

____________________ ____________________

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

In the City of Manila, this ___ day of ________, 2018,

before me personally appeared:
CARMINA COROMINAS, with Philippine Passport No.
_______ issued at __________________ on
___________________ and expiring on ___________________;
CELESTE COROMINAS, with Philippine Passport No.
________ issued at __________________ on
____________________, and expiring on
____________________, and

CARMEN CARUNUNGAN, with Senior Citizen’s Card

No. ____________ Issued at _______________ on
______________;
personally known to me to be the same persons who executed

24
 the foregoing instrument, and they acknowledged to me that the
same is their free and voluntary act and deed.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2018
Doc. No. ____
Page No,____
Book No. ____
Series of 2018.

*NOTE: No Dacion en Pago in bar syllabus. This item should be given as

bonus.

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

25