CONTENTS

1. Geluz v. Court of Appeals / G.R. No. L-16439 / July 20, 1961

2. Joaquin v. Navarro / G.R. Nos. L-5426-28 / 93 PHIL 257-270 / May 29, 1953
3. Standard Oil Company of New York / Villanueva / G.R. No. 5921 / 19 PHIL 363-372 / July
25, 1911
4. Martinez v. Martinez / G.R. No. 445 / March 31, 1902
5. Poe vs. Comelec / G.R. No. 221697 / March 8, 2016
6. Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections / G.R. No. 119976 / September 18,
1995

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 1
Geluz v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-16439
July 20, 1961
PETITIONER
ANTONIO GELUZ

RESPONDENT
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO

FACTS:

 Nita Villanueva was impregnated by her present husband before they were legally
married
 To conceal her pregnancy from her parents she underwent abortion
 The abortion was done by Antonio Geluz
 After she got married she got pregnant again but was aborted again by Geluz because
she was then employed in COMELEC
 Less than 2 years later, she got pregnant again and aborted the two-month old fetus but
without her husband’s consent
 Oscar Lazo, the husband sued Antonio Geluz for the damages from the third abortion

ISSUES:

 Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn
child?

RULING:

 Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality.

It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be
considered as never having possessed legal personality
 An action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents
or heirs of an unborn child
 The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations
 In this case, however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his wife,
clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes
and expectations
 The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed

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 2
Joaquin v. Navarro
G.R. Nos. L-5426-28
93 PHIL 257-270
May 29, 1953
PETITIONER
RAMON JOAQUIN

RESPONDENT
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO

NATURE

 This 3 proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary
settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased.
 All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single
decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals
 Whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the
Supreme Court for review.
 The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the
deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children
 All of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in
February 1945.

 The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order:
- 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad;
- 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.;
- 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro
- 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr.

 The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela
Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived
his mother.
 It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the
petitioner.
 The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., or vice versa

 Lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the
present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and
adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.

FACTS

 February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging
 The spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three
daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the
latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as
the German Club at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City.
 During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around,
and the Club was set on fire.
 Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building,
especially those who were trying to escape.

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 The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven.
 They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them
 Joaquin Navarro Sr, Joaquin Navarro Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a
friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice.
 As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped.
 The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets.
 Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside,
presumably including Angela Joaquin.
 "Joaquin Navarro, Angela Conde and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid
shelter nearby
 They stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to
leave the shelter because the shelling tore it open.
 They fled toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately
met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and Angela
Conde his daughter in law.
 At the time of the massacre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70
 Wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old
 Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30
 Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother
 While the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23
and 25
 The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez Who
miraculously survived the holocaust
 And upon them the Court of Appeals opined that:
 "As between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence
of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient"
 And the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its
conclusion is thus stated:
 "It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof
of the death of only one of the parties but that there must be adequate proof that one
was alive when the other had already died.
 Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the
company of his father and the witness and that the burning edified entirely collapsed
minutes after the shooting of the son
 but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer
the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the
instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died.
 All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left
her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after,
from a variety of causes.
 She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams
from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the
exploding shells.
 We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point.
 All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her side, and that there
is no proof when she died.
 Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died later than her
son
 Indeed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be
precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these.

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  Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his
mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69,
subsec. (ii), Rules of Court)
 The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question
whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity.
- There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the
deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila.
- A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle
are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a
variety of cause of death can operate in the source of combats.
- During the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or
drowning. It is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle
as an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
 The trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled
that son outlived his mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the son/mother died first before the other.
(If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession.)
(If mother died first, respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit)
HELD:

 It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive.
 Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain.
 It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence.
 In speaking of inference the rule cannot mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never
certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
 In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is
based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in
the evidence.
 The opposite theory that the mother outlived her son is deduced from established facts
which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong
probability.
 Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided,
this inference ought to prevail.
 The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from
which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen,
undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those
conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to look into.
 As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857,
"Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible
witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted.

 But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case
is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the
judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
 The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is
to be invoked is a question of law.

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 The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to
decisions supported by substantial evidence.
 By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which
reasonable men may disagree.
 Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the
exception to the general rule.
 We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution
of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial
court.
 This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal"
which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death
preceded that of her son. Without costs.

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 3
Standard Oil Company of New York
Villanueva
G.R. No. 5921
19 PHIL 363-372
July 25, 1911
PLAINTIFF - APELLEE
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK

DEFENDANTS
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS

APELLANT
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA

FACTS

 Dec. 15, 1908: Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara Del Pino (as principals)
 Along with Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva
 The Chairman Siy Ho (as sureties)
 Assumed obligation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff appellee the sum of
P3,305.78
 For 3 months from this date, plus an interest at P1 per month.

 April 5, 1909: The standard oil sued five debtors for payment of sum
 Together w/ the interest at rate of 1% per month from date assumed obligation
(12/15/08)
 And the costs Defendants were summoned, w/ record that showed summons was
served on Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17.

 Aug. 23: The court of 1st Instance (of the city of Manila) sentenced all defendants
 To pay (jointly and severally) to Plaintiff Company the aforementioned sum, w/
interested at 1% a month from Dec.15, 1908 until complete payment of principal plus
costs.

 While judgment was in course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva

 (the wife of Vicente), appeared and alleged the ff:
- July 24, 1909: latter was declared to be insane by Court of 1st Instance (manila)
- She was appointed his guardian by the same court
- Oct. 11: she was authorized by the court as his guardian to institute the proper legal
proceedings in the present cause
- She as the guardian was not aware of the proceedings had against his husband and was
only by chance informed of it
- When his husband gave the bond, he was already permanently insane and was in such a
state when summoned and still continued to do so.

 In conclusion, she petitioned to the court to relieve her husband from compliance
 And to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence on his behalf, with respect to his
capacity at the time of the bond’s execution.

ISSUE

A. Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the

conclusion that the person does not have the capacity to act
B. Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into contract at the time the
bond was executed on Dec.15, 1908

7
HELD

A. The court granted the petition, thus trial was reopened for introduction of evidence.
And after due consideration, the court decided that Vicente Villanueva executed bond in
question, he understood perfectly the nature and consequences of the act performed
by him.
The Supreme Court held that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, and
therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a contract.

B. For the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that at the date of giving of the
bond, (Dec.15, 1908), the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity.

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 4
Martinez v. Martinez
G.R. No. 445
March 31, 1902

FACTS:
 Pedro Martinez Illustre (son, legal compulsory heir, plaintiff-apellant)
Filed a declaration of prodigality against Francisco Martinez Garcia (his father)

 Allegations of Pedro (son/P.A):

 That his father is dissipating (spend/ use up foolishly and wastefully) and
squandering his estate through donations made to his second wife Doña Anastacia
Ilustre and to her parents of properties amounting to $200,000
 That his father has turned over the administration of his estate to the
management of his wife
 That his father has a propensity for litigation (preference towards court trials) and
has instituted groundless actions against his son so that his wife and her relatives
may acquire his property.

 Counter Arguments of Francisco(father, defendant)

 That he has executed general power of attorney where his son has administered
the community estate for several years.
 That Plaintiff (son: Pedro) registered ships that belonged to the estate under his
name (Germana, Don Francisco, Balayan) without his consent; and is
misappropriating and mismanaging the estate’s property
 And that the litigation brought about him against his son was due to his son’s
attitude who revoked the power of attorney, also refused to render an account of
his administration.

 The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff (son/Pedro) and
adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to the court.

ISSUES:

 Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?

RULING:

 The court dismissed the petition of prodigality against defendant.

 Acts that constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of
applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different
situations of persons.

 The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action

(En juicio contradictorio). (Art. 221 of the Civil Code.)

 Under our law it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of
mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely
to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their
undisposable part of the estate.

 Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All
persons who can contract and dispose of property may make donations.
(Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)

 Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such as is required
for the support of the donor in a condition corresponding to his circumstances. (Art. 634

9
 of the Civil Code.) And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more
than what he can give by testament.

 Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed
upon the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are
required by public policy may well be regarded as unjust and tending in a contrary
direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property

 The father's estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of certain vessels,
two of which are steamships. There is no evidence offered to show any transfers by sale
or mortgage of these properties. Donations of real property must be made in a public
deed (art. 633 of the Civil Code), and the acquisition of vessels must also be included in a
written instrument, and produces no effect with regard to third person if not recorded in
the Commercial Registry. (Art. 573 of the Code of Commerce.)

 There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or other personal
property, the transfer of which could not be easily traced. The son has been in possession
of a greater part of the estate since November, 1897, collecting the revenue from the
ships and rents from the city property. The farms have been non-productive on account
of the disturbed conditions of the country, and the revenue from even these has been in
part collected by the son.

 While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased
since her marriage, there is no evidence to show that there has been any perceptible
diminution of the defendant’s property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds
that the father, so far from being a prodigal (incompetent), is still in the full exercise of
his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the
accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the
plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.
 A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff
himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to
his father.

10
 5
Poe vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 221697
March 8, 2016
FACTS:

 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a

newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo)
on 3 September 1968.

 Three days after, petitioner was registered as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.”

 At 5 years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.

 On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." However, the lawyer failed to
secure new birth certificate but her mother issued new birth certificate on May 4, 2006.

 At 18, petitioner was a registered voter at San Juan City and applied passport at DFA 2
years after.

 She pursued degree in Developmental Studies at UP Diliman and continued study in

abroad at Boston College and finished Political Studies in 1991.

 Married his husband, Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (PH and US citizen) at
Sanctuario De San Jose Parish in San Juan City.

 Gave birth to eldest son in 1992 in US while two daughters born in PH in 2008 and 1994.

 Oct. 18, 2001, petitioner became naturalized American Citizen and obtained US
Passport.

 April 8, 2004, came back to the PH to support father’s presidential candidacy and gave
birth to youngest daughter.

 They returned to US in July 8, 2004.

 Dec. 13, 2004, rushed back to the PH when petitioner’s father died and decided to stay
in PH until Feb. 3, 2005.

 In the first quarter of 2005, the petitioner decided to move permanently in PH and
prepared for resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will
be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; coordination with property
movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to
the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be
followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.

 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.

 Petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete
pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.

11
 In 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. 29 She travelled back
to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.

 In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of
the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. The family home was
eventually sold on 27 April 2006.

 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the
country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July
2006.

 In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home and to this day, is where the
couple and their children have been residing.

 On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003.

 She filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor
children on 10 July 2006.

 18 July 2006, the BI declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.

 On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson

of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).

 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of

Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship."

 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI and
took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Petitioner stopped using her
American passport.

 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."
 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October
2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.

 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the
U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from
May 2005 to present.

 On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.

 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months"
to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
Proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013

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Estrella Alamparo’s petition:

 Raffled to Comelec Second Division

 Believes Comelec has jurisdiction over her petition.
 Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because she is a foundling so she cannot
reacquire Filipino citizenship under RA 9255 because not a natural born Filipino to begin
with.
 Committed material representation when petitioner stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and resided 10 years and 11 months as of May 9, 2016
elections.
 Even petitioner is a natural-born Filipino, she lost status when became American citizen
and natural-born must be continuous from birth.
 Petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six (6) years and six
(6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
 Assuming petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225,
she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her
residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired
Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner’s response to Alamparo:

 COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition
for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke
the BI's July 18, 2006 Order
 The petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations
which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
 Did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and
residency qualifications

1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution: The Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is GRANTED.
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which
the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.

Other complaints:

Francisco S. Tatad
 Foundling is excluded and not included as natural-born Filipino citizen.
 Burden lies on petitioner to prove citizenship.
 No standard state practice confers foundlings as natural-born citizens.
 Cannot reacquire citizenship.
 Did not comply with 10-year residency requirement. Petitioner acquired domicile in QC
after American citizenship was renounced in 2010 or 2011.

Amado Valdez:
 Petitioner did not meet 10-year residency requirement.
 Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because she is a foundling so she cannot
reacquire Filipino citizenship under RA 9255 because not a natural born Filipino to begin
with.

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Antonio P. Contreras:
 Petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not
possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made
false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.
 Reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from
18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was
approved by the BI.
 Petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an
American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.

Petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of
an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the
exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. (NO)

RULING:
 Temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC.

 The COMELEC cannot itself, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

 The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated
are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

 The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National
Elections.

 Article VII, Section 4 provides that SC as the sole judge.

 The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before

an authority properly vested with jurisdiction.

 If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering

from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate
of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications.

 The petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable.

 The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.

 That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and
is therefore a natural-born Filipino.

 The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos (Section 4, Rule 128)

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 6
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 119976
September 18, 1995

FACTS:

 Petitioner: Imelda Romualdez - Marcos

 Respondent: Commission on Elections
 Imelda filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.
 March 23, 1995: Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.
 In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months
to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
 May 11, 1995: COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte.
 The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.
 In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the
one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative – YES

RULING:
 The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
 Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution.
 An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences
in different places.
 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness
as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed incurred.
 It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
 It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
 Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25 are set aside.
 Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte

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