CONTENTS

Mustang Lumber Inc. vs Court of Appeals / G.R. Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784 / June 18, 1996
Motoomull vs Joffre Dela Paz / G.R. No. L-45302 / July 24, 1990
Guerrero v. Comelec / G.R. No. 137004 / July 26, 2000
Sanciangco v. Rono / G.R. No. 68709 / July 19, 1985
Buenaseda v. Flavier / G.R. No. 106719 / September 21, 1993
People vs Santiago / G.R. No. 17663
Cebu Institute of Technology vs Ople / 156 SCRA 629
Parayno vs Jovellanos / G.R. No. 148408
Mapa vs. Arroyo / G.R. No. 78585 / July 5, 1989
People vs. Tamani / G.R. No. 22160 / Jan. 21, 1974
United States vs. Victor Santo Nino / March 11, 1909 13 / Phil 141 G.R. L – 5000
Mercado vs. NLRC / G.R. No. 79869 234 / SCRA 678 / September 5, 1991
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance / 235 SCRA 671
 CHAPTER 5
Mustang Lumber Inc. vs Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
June 18, 1996
Petitioner: Mustang Lumber Inc

Respondent: Court of Appeals

FACTS:

 April 1, 1990: acting on an information that a huge stockpile of Narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard.
 In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions.
 Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the
team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound
at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.
 The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
 April 3, 1990: the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano
R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof,
the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra
shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
 April 4, 1990: the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner
failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.
 The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting
arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be
used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.
ISSUE:
 Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber?
– NO

HELD:
 The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber.
 While the former is included in forest products as defined in Section 3, the latter is found
in another paragraph of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."
 Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
 The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage.
 In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."
 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning.
 And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we.
 CHAPTER 5
Motoomull vs Joffre Dela Paz
G.R. No. L-45302
July 24, 1990

Petitioner: Latchme Motoomull, Manuel Lacson

Respondent: Joffre Dela Paz et al

FACTS:

 The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading
Corporation
 The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance unissued stocks on a one is
to one basis to its stockholders.
 The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on
a two is to one basis to is stockholders payable on August 31, 1974
 Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the
enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of appeal
 The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads:
o “Appeal shall not stay the award, order ruling, decision or judgment unless the
officer or body rendering the same of the court, on motion, after hearing, and on
such terms it may deem just, should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay
granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or
judgment may be raised only by motion in the main case”

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals - YES
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision
HELD:

 Yes, the word court refers to the trial court.

 “The law unequivocally stated it’s declared objection that appeal shall not stay the
appealed decision, award, order.”
 The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same, or the court in
motion, after hearing should provide otherwise.
 The law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body
rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main
case
 More importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is actually
susceptible of various meanings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to
associate words
 Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not
in accordance with the legislative
 CHAPTER 5
Guerrero v. Comelec
G.R. No. 137004
July 26, 2000

Petitioner: ARNOLD V. GUERRERO

Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., as the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, 11th Congress, HON. ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, as
the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, 11th Congress, RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS
and GUILLERMO R. RUIZ

FACTS:

 May 8, 1998: Fariñas filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting
candidate Chevylle V. Fariñas who withdrew on April 3, 1998.
 May 9, 1998: Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the
COMELEC, attaching thereto a copy of the Certificate of Candidacy of Fariñas.
 May 10, 1998: In dismissing Ruiz's petition, the Second Division of the COMELEC stated,
"[T]here is none (sic) in the records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak
of without the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be
cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified.”
 May 11, 1998: the elections pushed through. Fariñas got a total of 56,369 votes
representing the highest number of votes received in the first district. Fariñas was duly
proclaimed winner.
 May 16, 1998: Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Fariñas could not
validly substitute for Chevylle V. Fariñas, since the latter was not the official candidate of
the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent candidate.
 Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Thus, Fariñas' certificate
of candidacy claiming to be the official candidate of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V. Fariñas
was fatally defective, according to Ruiz.
 June 3, 1998: Fariñas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives.
 June 10, 1998: petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention.” Petitioner averred that
he was the official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) and stood to be adversely affected by
the case.
 Guerrero contended that Fariñas, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or
before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Fariñas illegally resorted
to the remedy of substitution provided for under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.
  Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of the first district of Ilocos Norte
be declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of
Fariñas.
 January 6, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Ruiz's motion for reconsideration for
lack of jurisdiction.
 Petition:
a. Comelec gravely abused discretion in refusing to rule on validity of candidacy.
b. Gravely abused discretion to rule on validity of candidacy of Fariñas to House of Rep.
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) creating vacuum and rendering petition without remedy.
c. Gravely abused discretion in not rendering a ruling based on facts in assailed resolution
disqualifying Fariñas and considering him candidate without filing of certificate.
d. Gravely abused discretion to call for a special election.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.

RULING:
 Dismissed
 In the present case, no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held
that its jurisdiction had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Fariñas as
Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte.
 While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of
candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption
of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the
COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET).
 Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives.
 Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins.
 Thus, the COMELEC's decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable.
 HOWEVER, petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET is limited only to the
qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
Consequently, he claims that any issue which does not involve these constitutional qualifications
is beyond the realm of the HRET. The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a statutory
qualification under the Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale of the HRET, according to him.

 Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The

word "qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the term
"constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts
should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law
where none is indicated. For firstly, the drafters of the fundamental law, in making
no qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must have intended no
distinction at all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish where there are facts
or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification.
In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent.

 Whether respondent Fariñas validly substituted Chevylle V. Fariñas and whether

respondent became a legitimate candidate, must likewise be addressed to the
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we demonstrate fealty to
the Constitutional provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress
shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members."
 CHAPTER 5
Sanciangco v. Rono
G.R. No. 68709
July 19, 1985

Petitioner: NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO

Respondents: THE HONORABLE JOSE A. ROÑO, Minister, Ministry of Local Government; THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF OZAMIZ CITY; THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. FUENTES,
Vice Mayor of Ozamiz City and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz
City; THE HONORABLE ANTONIO G. CABALLERO, JESUS S. ANONAT, MANUEL T. CORTES,
IRENE S. LUANSING, REMEDIOS J. RAMIRO, DOMINADOR B. BORJE, FILOMENO L. ROMERO,
FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, and HARRY S. OAMINAL, Members, Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Ozamiz City

FACTS:

 Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the May 17,
1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the
President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines
as a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
 March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance.
He was not successful in the said election.
 Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 (supra), petitioner informed
respondent Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as member of that body.
 The matter was elevated to respondent Minister of Local Government Jose A. Roño, who
ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his
appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
 Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground that since Section 13(2) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 697 makes no distinction between elective and appointive officials, the legislative
intent is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said
provision.
 Petitioner avers that the fact that he is merely an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City "is really of no moment since subsection 2, Section 13, B.P. 697,
 makes no distinction between elective and appointive officials, and at any rate, legislative
intent makes clear that appointive officials are deemed covered by the provision

Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.

(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active officers and
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police, as well as
officials and employees of government-owned and government-controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy: Provided, however, That the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the
Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall continue in the offices they presently
hold notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials shall, upon
filing certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, who ran for the
position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be considered
as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.

RULING:
 No grave abuse of discretion, petition dismissed.
 There is no question that petitioner holds a public appointive position. He was appointed
by the President as a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having
been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils.

This was pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the
elective or Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes), which
provides that:

Sec. 3. Cities. — There shall be in each city such elective local officials as provided in their respective
charters, including the city mayor, the city vice-mayor, and the elective members of the
sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom shall be elected by the qualified voters in the city. In
addition thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang panglungsod members consisting of the
president of the city association of barangay councils, the president of the city federation of the
kabataang barangay, and one representative each from the agricultural and industrial labor
sectors who shall be appointed by the president (Prime Minister) whenever, as determined by the
sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in the city to warrant
representation.

 The appointive character of petitioner's position was reiterated in Section 173 of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), reading as follows:

Sec. 173. Composition and Compensation. — (1) the sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang
panlungsod members, and the members who may be appointed by the President of the Philippines
consisting of the presidents of the Katipunan panlungsod ng mga barangay and the Kabataang
barangay city federation." (Emphasis supplied)
 Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed
his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
 Nor perceived any violation of the equal protection clause, as petitioner contends, since
Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all persons subject to such legislation under like
circumstances and conditions.
 Neither can petitioner justifiably contend that he was removed from office without due
process of law since it was of his own choice that he ran for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa.
The consequence that followed his unsuccessful attempt at the elections arose from law.
 Although petitioner, by filing his certificate of candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa
ceased, ipso facto, to be an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he
remains an elective Barangay Captain from which position he may be considered as having
been on "forced leave of absence." He also continues as President of the Association of
Barangay Councils but will need a reappointment by the President, as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks of "members who may be
appointed by the President.”
 CHAPTER 5
Buenaseda v. Flavier
G.R. No. 106719
September 21, 1993

Petitioner: DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR. ENGR. CONRADO REY
MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ

Respondents: SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and NCMH

NURSES ASSOCIATION

FACTS:
 Petitioner seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners, Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Bañez,
Jr.,Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of
Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the
National Center for Mental Health.
 The petitioner also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul
Arnaw (for partiality and bias) and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the
Ombudsman (without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed
against them), from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against
petitioner.
 Petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition and an "Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation",respectively, averring developments that transpired after the filing of the
petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.
 September 22, 1992, the Court resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the
meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the
original supplemental manifestation.
 September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992
 In a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association
submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation including motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to
disbar them.
 The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:
(1) "unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda, et
al.,to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their
preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman ...";
(2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order.
(3) Violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and
unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by
committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings.

 November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment alleging that:

(a) Despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain
the status quo,respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of
petitioners' preventive suspension;
(b) The clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance
the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of
the filing of the instant petition;
(c) Respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed
to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992
(d) Therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid
resolution.

 Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order,
stating inter alia,that: It appearing that the status quo ante litem motan petitioners were
then actually occupying their respective positions, and allowed petitioners to perform the
duties of their respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may
be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their
authority desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned
Resolution of September 22, 1992 until further orders from the Court.
 Solicitor General commented:

(a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct
power to suspend;"
(b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or
employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said
conditions have not been met in the instant case.”
  In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor
General that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees
connected with his office.
 Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel and to
cite them for contempt.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

RULING:
 Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
 When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the
suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a
punitive measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision
referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under
the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the
other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
 Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance
with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative
charges.
 CHAPTER 5
People vs Santiago
G.R. No. 17663

FACTS:
Plaintiff- appellant - People of the Philippines

Defendant- appellee - Isauro Santiago

 Santiago was alleged to have committed the crime of Libel

 Oct. 5, 1959, Manila, Santiago maliciously publicly called Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson in his
political speech delivered at Quiapo thru the medium of an amplifier system before a
crowd of people.
 Injuring the name and honor and reputation of the latter and opening him to public hatred,
Santiago alleged that Lacson raped a woman.
 Statements were false and defamatory with no good intentions and justifiable motive but
to injure name and reputation of Lacson and expose him to public hatred and ridicule
 Santiago assailed that crime was oral defamation not libel which was already prescribed
the act being committed on Oct 5, 1959, or more than 6 months prior to the filing of info
on August 11, 1960.
 Court of First Instance, Manila granted motion

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Art. 358 of
RPC, or Libel under 355 in relation to Art. 353 of RPC.

HELD:
 Facts alleged in the info constitute oral defamation punished under Article 358 of RPC.
 CHAPTER 5
Cebu Institute of Technology vs Ople
156 SCRA 629

Petitioner: Cebu Institute of Technology

Respondent/s: Hon. Blas Ople (Minister of Ministry and Employment) et. Al

FACTS:

 The case centers on the interpretation of section 3(a) of PD No. 451 which states, “That no
increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved unless sixty (60%) per
centum of the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the
faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the balance for institutional
development, student assistance and extension services, and return to investments.”
 SEPT 11, 1982 BP BLG. 232/ Education Act 1982 was promulgated which states “Each
private School shall determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. The rates
and charges adopted by schools pursuant to this provision shall be collectible, and their
application or use authorized subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports.”
 The controversy was the aftermath of the claims of some school personnel for allowances
and other benefits and the refusal of the private schools concerned to pay said allowances
and benefits on the ground that said items should be deemed included in the salary
increases they had paid out of the 60% portion of the proceeds from tuition fee increases
provided for in PD 451
 Petitioners assail the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Sports, which deviates from the provisions of such law. section 3 (a) of Pres.
Decree No. 451.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Sports,pursuant to PD 451 is valid. - NO
 Whether or not the implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Sports, pursuant to BP232 is valid. - YES
HELD:
 No. The alleged implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the then MECS to the
effect that allowances and other benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of the
proceeds of tuition fee increases provided for in Section 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 451 and
therefore not binding. The power does not allow the inclusion of other items in addition
to those for which 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee increases are allocated under Section
3(a) of the Decree.
 Yes. The statutory grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies like the Secretary
of Education is a valid exception to the rule on non-delegation of legislative power provided
two conditions concur, namely:
o 1) the statute is complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed by the
agency, and
o 2) said statute fixes a standard to which the latter must conform.
 CHAPTER 5
Parayno vs Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408

PETITIONER - Concepcion Parayno (petitioner)

RESPONDENT - Jose Jovellanos and Municipality of Calasiao Pangasinan

FACTS:

 Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In

1989, residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for
the closure or transfer of the station to another location.
 The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health
Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the
Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of
petitioner's gasoline station.
 Resolution 50 stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station in question.
 Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was then denied. She then filed a special civil
action for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was
not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits gasoline
service stations which are within 100meters away from any public or private school, public
library, playground, church, and hospital based on the straight line method measured from
the nearest side of the building nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the
nearest pump of the gasoline station
 Petitioner contended that hers was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling
station" governed by Section 21.
 The RTC ruled against petitioner by applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a
“gasoline filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by the
petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a gasoline
service station as provided for in Section 44 of the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem
Generis.
HELD:
 The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear
distinction between a gasoline service station and a gasoline filling station as found in
Section 21 and Section 42 of the said ordinance.
 It was made clear that the two terms were intended to be distinguished from the other,
which the respondent further admitted.
 Respondent municipality cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem generis which means "of
the same kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the legal maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of others.
 With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service
station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21.
 CHAPTER 5
Mapa vs. Arroyo
G.R. No. 78585
July 5, 1989

FACTS:

 Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years
 Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant
reminders by Labrador
 Latter informed Mapa that the contract to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked
Caluse 20 of the four contracts
 Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots except those
requiring the services of a public utility company or government within 3 years
 Petitioner contends that P.D 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities, improvement,
and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development” if offered and inidicated
in the approved subdivision plans.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Clause 20 of the said contract include and incorporate P.D 957 through
the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of the sale
incorrect

RULING:
 No, Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of the sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of
the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa
 P.D 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts
involved and other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was
made by the developer
 The words “which are offered ad indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans”
refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities, improvements and
infrastructures”
 The word “and” is not meant to separate words, but is a conjuction used to denote a
joinder or a union.
 CHAPTER 5
People vs. Tamani
G.R. No. 22160
Jan. 21, 1974

FACTS:

 After the appellant had filed his brief. Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that the notice of appeal was forty-seven days late
 The lower court’s decision convicting defendant, Tamani was promulgated on February 14,
1963
 He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963 or forty eights days from July 24th

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the 15-day period within which to appeal a judgement of conviction in a
criminal action is counted from the date of the promulgation of the judgement

RULING

 Yes, Sec. 22, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “an appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of judgement or order appealed from.”
 The court held that the 150-day period should be counted form the promulgation and not
from the receipt of copy of judgement
 The word “promulgation” in Sec 6 sho9uld not be construed as referring to “judgement”
under Sec 6 of Rule 120, while the word “notice” should be construed as referring to
“order”. That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singular singulis
 Therefore, when the order denying the appellant’s motion for reconsideration was
registered mail on July 13th on appellant’s counsel, he had only one (1) day within which
to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days
 Appellant, Tanami’s notice of appeal, filed on Sept 10, 1963 was fifty-eight days late
 CHAPTER 5
United States vs. Victor Santo Nino
March 11, 1909 13
Phil 141 G.R. L - 5000
Plaintiff- appellant THE UNITED STATES
Defendant- appellee VICTOR SANTO NIÑO

FACTS:

 On or about 16th day of August 1908, in the city of manila.

 Victor Sto. Nino voluntarily, unlawfully and criminally had in his possession and concealed
about his person a deadly weapon
- 1 iron bar
- About 15inches in length
- Provided with an iron ball on one end
- And the string on the other to tie to the wrist
 Which weapon has been designed and made for use in fighting and as a deadly weapon

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Victor Sto. Nino is violating Section 26 of the act 1780 of the philippine
commission
 Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows:

"An Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to
prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act."
 Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows:
 It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife,
dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon:
 Provided, that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons
who have secured a license therefor or who are entitled to carry same under the
provisions of this Act.
RULING
 A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below and the Government has
appealed.
 The words "or other deadly weapon" only signify a kind of weapon included within the
preceding classification
 In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis must be applied in the interpretation of this
law, which rule is as follows:

"The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic terms of
the same nature are employed in the same act, the latter following the former. While in
the abstract, general terms are to be given their natural and full signification, yet where
they follow specific words of a like nature they take their meaning from the latter, and
are presumed to embrace only things or persons of the kind designated by them."

 The court below held that the carrying of a revolver concealed about the person would
not be a violation of this Act
 The rule of construction above referred to is resorted to only for the purpose of
determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law.
 If that intent clearly appears from one parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly
manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by application of the rule of
ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.
 In this case the proviso to the Act clearly indicates that in the view of the legislature the
carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a violation of the Act.
 By the proviso it manifested its intention to include in the prohibition weapons other
than the armas blancas therein specified.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. So ordered.
 CHAPTER 5
Mercado vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 79869 234
SCRA 678
September 5, 1991

PETITIONERS FORTUNATO MERCADO, SR., ROSA MERCADO, FORTUNATO MERCADO, JR.,

ANTONIO MERCADO, JOSE CABRAL, LUCIA MERCADO, ASUNCION GUEVARA, ANITA
MERCADO, MARINA MERCADO, JULIANA CABRAL, GUADALUPE PAGUIO, BRIGIDA
ALCANTARA, EMERLITA MERCADO, ROMEO GUEVARA, ROMEO MERCADO and LEON
SANTILLAN

RESPONDENTS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), THIRD DIVISION;

LABOR ARBITER LUCIANO AQUINO, RAB-III; AURORA L. CRUZ; SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE
BORJA and LETICIA DE BORJA; and STO. NIÑO REALTY INCORPORATED

FACTS:
 Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision of the respondent national
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
 8 August 1984 which affirmed the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P.
Aquino with the slight modification of deleting the award of financial assistance to
petitioners
 And the resolution of the respondent NLRC dated 17 August 1987, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
 This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave
benefits, emergency cost of living allowances and 13th month pay, filed by above
named petitioners against private respondents Aurora L. Cruz, Francisco Borja,
Leticia C. Borja and Sto. Niño Realty Incorporated, with Regional Arbitration
Branch No. III, National Labor Relations Commission in San Fernando, Pampanga.
 Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized
by private respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares
of ace land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter that Fortunato
Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private respondents since
1949
  Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado since 1972 and the rest of the
petitioners since 1960 up to April 1979, when they were all allegedly dismissed
from their employment
 The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
 The Labor Arbiter held that the petitioners were not regular employees and the
NLRC affirmed this ruling.
 Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied
that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she
engaged their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa
Mercado their "mandarols", that is, persons who take charge in supplying the
number of workers needed by owners of various farms
 But only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary in rice production
and/or sugar cane production, after which they would be free to render services
to other farm owners who need their services.
 The other private respondents denied having any relationship whatsoever with
the petitioners and state that they were merely registered owners of the land in
question included as co respondents in this case.

ISSUE:
A. whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and
therefore entitled to the benefits which they pray for
B. whether or not said petitioners were illegally dismissed by private respondent

RULING
A.
 They are project/seasonal employees. A project employee is one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
termination has been determined at the time of engagement where work
or service is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the
season.

B.
 Petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal
employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project
or the season.
 The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an
illegal dismissal
 The petitioners are free to contract their services to work for other farm
owners

 On the grounds of equity respondent Labor Arbiter awarded petitioners

financial assistance by private respondent Aurora Cruz, in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be equitably divided among an the
petitioners except petitioner Fortunato Mercado, Jr. who had manifested
his disinterest in the further prosecution of his complaint against private
respondent

 Both parties filed their appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commissions (NLRC).

 Petitioners questioned respondent Labor Arbiter's finding that they were

not regular and permanent employees of private respondent Aurora Cruz
while private respondents questioned the award of financial assistance
granted by respondent Labor Arbiter

 The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of

the respondent Labor Arbiter, with the modification of the deletion of the
award for financial assistance to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the NLRC reads.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino dated March

3, 1983 is hereby modified in that the award of P10, 000.00 financial
assistance should be deleted. The said Decision is affirmed in all other
aspects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the National Labor

Relations Commission affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, under review, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED
 CHAPTER 5
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 671
PERITIONER ARTURO M. TOLENTINO
RESPONDENTS THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
 The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision
dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded ValueAdded Tax Law. The motions, of which there are
10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.
 The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the
press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
against the press. At any rate, it is averred

“Even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is

unconstitutional”
Citing in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

 Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand,
asserts that R.A. No. 7716
1. Impairs the obligations of contracts
2. Classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and
3. Violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall
“evolve a progressive system of taxation”

 Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to
adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present
Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives
 To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional
RULING
 No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted
the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution
 The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
 Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax
burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject
 The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against
the press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed
freedom is unconstitutional.”
 The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which,
unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation.
 Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the
exercise of its right.
 The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax.
 It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
 It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes
 To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more
than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate
its freedom under the Constitution
 Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though
such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person
and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and
release the burdens of another.
 Still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it
impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense
 It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as
the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary
services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential
 The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are
essential goods and services was already exempt under

Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716.

 Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these
transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT.
 Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which
provides that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation”
 Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class be taxed at the same rate.
 The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation.
 To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation.
 Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes
which, like the VAT, are regressive.
 What it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”
 The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are
to be preferred and as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.”
 The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system
 As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying
that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation.
 Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt
from taxation: charitable institutions, churches, and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28
(3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, S4 (3)
 With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no
constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld.