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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223

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‘‘I think it, therefore it’s true’’: Effects of self-perceived objectivity

on hiring discrimination
a,* b
Eric Luis Uhlmann , Geoffrey L. Cohen
a
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sherdian Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
b
Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0345, USA

Received 28 July 2006

Available online 7 September 2007
Accepted by Scott Highhouse

Abstract

A sense of personal objectivity may prompt an ‘‘I think it, therefore it’s true’’ mindset, in which people assume that their own
beliefs and introspections are, by definition, valid and therefore worthy of being acted on. In the present studies, priming a sense of
personal objectivity increased gender discrimination, particularly among decision-makers who endorsed stereotypic beliefs or who
had stereotypic thoughts made cognitively accessible through implicit priming. Implications for discrimination in organizational
contexts, and for theories of attitude–behavior consistency, are discussed.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Hiring evaluations; Workplace; Discrimination; Objectivity; Naı̈ve realism

Hiring discrimination persists despite societal, orga-
nizational, and personal ideals to judge job candidates
on the basis of their merit rather than their group mem-
berships. Egalitarianism is an important value in many
contemporary cultures, and the use of stereotypes pro-
vokes social censure. Corporations, which recognize
the importance of gender equality to the maximization
of human capital, spend millions of dollars each year
in efforts to reduce workplace discrimination. Addition-
ally, egalitarian ideals are often internalized, such that
people feel self-critical and guilty when they exhibit ster-
eotypic biases (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot,
1991).
But at the same time, studies document gender and
racial discrimination in hiring decisions, both in the lab-
oratory and in real-world job settings (Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan, 2004; Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997;
Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999). For traditionally male, high-status jobs,
*
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: e-uhlmann@northwestern.edu (E.L. Uhlmann).
women are less likely to be hired (Eagly & Karau,
2002; Glick, Zion, & Nelson, 1988), are paid less
(Jacobs, 1992; Jost, 1997), given less authority (Lyness
& Thompson, 1997; Reskin & Ross, 1995), and pro-
moted less often (Lyness & Judiesch, 1999) than their
male colleagues. The factors that ‘‘disinhibit’’ discrimi-
nation in organizational contexts are not yet fully
understood.
Identifying such disinhibitors of hiring discrimination
in organizational contexts is important at many levels.
Most Americans are broadly committed to the ideal that
individuals should be judged based on their merits, not
based on the social groups they happen to belong to
(Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000). As a result, discrim-
inatory hiring evaluations sully the social reputation of
the decision-maker and the organization in question.
Indeed, discriminating against an individual based on
the perceived characteristics of his or her group is illegal
in many cases, and biased hiring evaluations leave orga-
nizations vulnerable to legal action. There can also be
major economic consequences of discrimination. For
example, companies that fail to hire qualified female

0749-5978/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.07.001
208 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
applicants may find themselves unable to compete with
companies that enforce egalitarian social norms (Becker,
1957). More generally, failure to provide women the
same professional opportunities as men eliminates much
of a society’s human capital and is highly correlated
with poverty (World Bank., 2001). Identifying factors
that increase hiring discrimination allows us to antici-
pate when decision-makers are most likely to discrimi-
nate, and further suggests interventions that managers
and other leaders can use to ensure that hiring evalua-
tions are fair and unbiased.
Contemporary theories propose that the ambiguity
and subjectivity of the judgment-making situation facil-
itates discrimination (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003;
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaert-
ner, 2002; Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979).
Ambiguous, subjective contexts are those that contain
incomplete or conflicting information. These can be con-
trasted with objective contexts, in which considerable
and non-conflicting information is available. In ambigu-
ous contexts, stereotypes and prejudices are more likely
to color judgments and guide actions. For example,
White students avoid sitting next to a Black confederate
only under ambiguous contexts, for instance in contexts
in which their preference can be attributed to having a
different movie preference (Batson, Flink, Schoenrade,
Fultz, & Pych, 1986; see also Snyder et al., 1979).
We propose that an important disinhibitor of dis-
crimination is decision-makers’ sense of personal objec-
tivity. When people believe that they are objective, they
feel licensed to act on biases whose influence they may
have otherwise suppressed due to personal and social
inhibitions. Discrimination increases not only with the
ambiguity of the situation but also with decision-makers’
sense of their own personal objectivity and invulnerabil-
ity to bias. A sense of personal objectivity, we suggest,
gives rise to an ‘‘I think it, therefore it’s true’’ mindset:
People assume that their thoughts and beliefs are, by vir-
tue of being theirs, valid and therefore worthy of being
acted upon. To the extent that individuals harbor stereo-
typic thoughts and beliefs, as many do (Devine et al.,
1991), such a state of self-perceived objectivity may
increase gender discrimination.
Our theoretical contention dovetails with research on
naı̈ve realism (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995)
the ‘‘bias blind spot’’ (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004;
Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002), and illusions of objectivity
(Armor, 1999; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). The gist
of this research is that people tend to see themselves as rel-
atively objective and unbiased. Insofar as individuals
believe themselves to be objective perceivers of the world,
moreover, they view their beliefs as valid, and they per-
ceive those who hold different views as poorly informed
or biased (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Pronin et al.,
2004; Ross & Ward, 1996). Previous theorizing also sug-
gests that, to the extent that people feel assured of their
personal objectivity, they perseverate in their beliefs, dis-
missing belief-disconfirming evidence, accepting with lit-
tle scrutiny belief-confirming evidence (see Lord, Ross,
& Lepper, 1979; Ross & Ward, 1996). Additionally, peo-
ple also see themselves as above average with respect to
their susceptibility to common judgmental biases and illu-
sions (Armor, 1999; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Pronin,
Kruger, Savitsky, & Ross, 2001; Pronin et al., 2002).
For example, they accurately estimate that others will
show the hindsight bias (i.e., the tendency to decide after
the fact that one ‘‘knew it all along;’’ Fischhoff, 1975), but
erroneously report that they themselves are relatively
immune (Pronin et al., 2001; Pronin et al., 2002).
Taken together, this research suggests that self-per-
ceptions of objectivity increase people’s faith in the
validity of their beliefs and thoughts, and perhaps even
in the validity of their feelings and intuitions (cf. Pronin
& Kugler, 2007). A sense of objectivity might thereby
increase people’s confidence in the validity of stereotypic
beliefs, thoughts, and intuitions they have, and thereby
increase their likelihood of acting on them. Research
on attitude formation and change (Tormala & Petty,
2004; see also Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004; Petty, Bri-
ñol, & Tormala, 2002) lends indirect support to our con-
ceptual analysis: People are more likely to act on an
attitude or thought when it is held with confidence or
certainty (see also Fazio & Zanna, 1978). This suggests
that the conviction that one is objective (and by exten-
sion, that one’s beliefs and thoughts are as well) should
increase the likelihood that an individual will act on his
or her stereotypic beliefs and thoughts. Additionally,
people confident in their own objectivity may overesti-
mate their invulnerability to bias (Pronin et al., 2004),
and thus fail to correct for the influence of stereotypic
biases that they might have otherwise been careful to
monitor.
The foregoing analysis suggests that a sense of per-
sonal objectivity should moderate the extent to which
people act on their stereotypic thoughts and beliefs in
an employment setting. Specifically, when people feel
objective, their hiring judgments should be relatively
more influenced by stereotypic beliefs and thoughts.
Self-perceived objectivity seems particularly fruitful to
pursue as a moderator of discrimination, as many orga-
nizational contexts seem to encourage a sense of per-
sonal objectivity—e.g., through the use of impersonal
titles like ‘‘director’’ and ‘‘judge’’ that suggest that the
individual in question is impartial. Indeed, by simply
advancing in the organizational hierarchy, people might
acquire increasing faith in their good judgment, freedom
from bias and delusion, and objectivity in general.
To the extent that many people in America have ste-
reotypical biases favoring men over women in high-sta-
tus careers, a sense of personal objectivity may increase
discrimination against women in organizational con-
texts. However, the impact of self-perceived objectivity
 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
should be particularly evident among individuals who
hold negative stereotypes about women’s capacities in
the workplace. Additionally, like most self-perceptions,
a sense of personal objectivity is not always cognitively
accessible (Higgins, 1996). Accordingly, we expected
that self-perceived objectivity would be more influential
when situationally primed. Experiments 1–3 investigated
the effects of priming a sense of personal objectivity on
gender discrimination in hiring evaluations. Experiment
1 tested the ‘‘main effect’’ of priming participants on a
sense of their personal objectivity and assessed whether
this would in and of itself increase their level of gender
discrimination. Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that
priming a sense of personal objectivity would increase
gender discrimination particularly among evaluators
who endorsed stereotypic beliefs. That is, personal
objectivity priming should make evaluators more likely
to discriminate to the extent that they hold stereotypic
beliefs.
Finally, Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that per-
sonal objectivity priming would lead evaluators to act
not simply on their beliefs, but on introspections that
had, through non-conscious priming, been made accessi-
ble. We tested whether people led to feel objective would
subsequently be more influenced by non-consciously
primed gender stereotypes in their hiring evaluations.
Like other recent investigations (e.g., Norton, Vandello,
& Darley, 2004), the present research focused largely on
the hiring evaluations of male evaluators, as most indi-
viduals in a position to hire applicants for high-status
jobs are men (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Glick et al.,
1988). Stated more formally, we hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 1: Priming self-perceived objectivity
would increase gender discrimination, primarily among
evaluators who endorsed stereotypic beliefs.
Hypothesis 2: Priming self-perceived objectivity
would increase gender discrimination, primarily among
evaluators for whom gender stereotypes had been made
cognitively accessible.
Experiment 1
The primary objective of Experiment 1 involved test-
ing the hypothesized causal effect of self-perceived objec-
tivity on group-based discrimination. Some participants
were primed with a sense of their own objectivity. This
was accomplished simply by having them complete a rel-
atively subtle and non-reactive manipulation of self-per-
ceived objectivity—questionnaire items pertaining to
their self-perceived objectivity (Armor, 1999). Prior
work demonstrates that using scale items to prime ideas
is a subtle but effective means of influencing people’s
social judgments (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988; Sniderman
& Piazza, 2002). Participants’ evaluations of male and
female job applicants were subsequently assessed. Based
209
on the assumption that most members of the general
populace endorse at least some stereotypic beliefs (Bier-
nat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Rud-
man, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto,
1999), we expected that people would evaluate the
female applicant less favorably than the male applicant
after being primed to view themselves as objective.
For exploratory purposes, participants also rated the
applicants’ specific traits and the importance of those
traits to the job at hand. Personal objectivity priming
could lead to a relatively uninhibited form of discrimina-
tion, wherein social perceivers evaluate the traits of
female applicants less positively than those of male
applicants. On the other hand, to the extent that individ-
uals primed with a sense of their own objectivity feel
compelled to justify their evaluation to themselves or
others, they may give men and women equivalent trait
evaluations and instead use the subtler strategy of con-
structing hiring criteria to favor male applicants (Hod-
son et al., 2002; Norton et al., 2004; Uhlmann &
Cohen, 2005). They might downplay the occupational
importance of the idiosyncratic traits that a female
applicant has, or inflate the occupational importance
of the idiosyncratic traits that a male applicant has.
Methods
Participants and design
Sixty-five adult men participated in the study for pay
($6). The study featured a 2 (personal objectivity prime
condition vs. control condition) · 2 (male job applicant
vs. female job applicant) between-subjects design.
Materials
Personal objectivity prime. Participants were primed
with a sense of personal objectivity by asking them
to complete (ostensibly as part of a separate study)
four self-perceived objectivity questionnaire items.
These items were ‘‘In most situations, I try to do what
seems reasonable and logical,’’ ‘‘When forming an
opinion, I try to objectively consider all of the facts
I have access to,’’ ‘‘My judgments are based on a log-
ical analysis of the facts,’’ and ‘‘My decision making is
rational and objective’’ (0 = very strongly disagree,
10 = very strongly agree; see Armor, 1999). Half the
participants completed the personal objectivity items
before making their hiring evaluations. The other half
did so after making their hiring evaluations. The
manipulation was not necessarily designed to increase
evaluators’ conviction in their own objectivity, which
would be difficult given that most people already see
themselves as objective (Armor, 1999; Pronin et al.,
2002). Indeed, in each of the present studies, over
88% of the participants rated themselves as above
average in objectivity. Rather, consistent with previous
research on priming, the manipulation was aimed at
210 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
increasing the temporary accessibility and influence of
personal objectivity (Higgins, 1996).
Hiring scenario. Participants were provided with a hiring
scenario entitled ‘‘Hiring a Factory Manager.’’ They
were asked to imagine being a company executive eval-
uating an applicant for the job of factory manager. The
factory manager would be responsible for increasing
worker satisfaction and productivity, providing perfor-
mance reviews to employees, negotiating conflicts,
responding to consumer complaints, and increasing
profits. The success or failure of the new factory man-
ager, participants were informed, would heavily influ-
ence company profits, and whether they, in turn,
would keep their job. The present research examined
evaluations of applicants for high status, traditionally
male jobs because the social problem to which it is most
relevant is the exclusion of women from important (and
usually stereotypically male) leadership positions.
Applicant descriptions. The job applicant was described
either as male (‘‘Gary’’) or as female (‘‘Lisa’’). These
names were selected from pairs of male and female
names identified by Kasof (1993) as equal in attractive-
ness, intellectual-competence connotation, age connota-
tion, and racial connotation. The applicant was
presented as technically proficient and as having strong
organizational skills, but as lacking interpersonal skills.
The applicant was described as strong when it came to
some traits but weak on others, so that we could exam-
ine whether participants assigned the traits differential
levels of importance as a function of the applicant’s
gender (i.e., whether they constructed job criteria in a
biased manner). We made the applicant descriptions as
unambiguous as possible, such that it was difficult to
view the applicant as anything but technically proficient
and organized, yet interpersonally unskilled. But at the
same time, the information about the applicant could
be characterized as ambiguous in the sense that some
information was favorable and other information
unfavorable.
Applicant ratings. Participants rated the strength of the
applicant’s credentials along each of a series of traits.
The technical–organizational traits were: technical
expertise and organizational skills. The interpersonal
traits were ability to build good work relationships and
getting along well with others. Ratings were made on sep-
arate scales ranging from 1 (extremely weak in this area)
to 11 (extremely strong in this area).
Importance ratings. Next, participants’ hiring criteria
were assessed. Participants rated the importance of each
of the traits noted above in determining success as a fac-
tory manager. Responses were provided on separate
scales ranging from 1 (makes success as a factory man-
ager much less likely) to 11 (essential to success as a fac-
tory manager).
Hiring evaluation. Participants responded to three items
assessing the extent to which they believed the applicant
‘‘would be successful as a factory manager’’ (1 = not
successful at all, 9 = extremely successful), was ‘‘a good
fit’’ for the position (1 = an extremely bad fit, 9 = an
extremely good fit), and ‘‘should be hired’’ (1 = should
definitely not be hired, 9 = should definitely be hired).
Procedure
Participants completed the experimental materials
while sitting in a booth. The measures were completed
in the order in which they are described in the methods
section, with one important exception. Specifically, par-
ticipants in the personal objectivity prime condition
completed the four self-perceived objectivity items at
the very beginning of the study, whereas control partic-
ipants completed the self-perceived objectivity items
after their hiring evaluations. The objectivity question-
naire was presented to participants as part of explor-
atory research involving a different study from the
primary packet of materials. All participants read the
hiring scenario and applicant description, and subse-
quently provided their applicant ratings, their impor-
tance ratings, and their hiring evaluations.
Results
We carried out a 2 (objectivity prime condition vs.
control condition) · 2 (applicant gender: male vs.
female) ANOVA for each measure.
Self-perceived objectivity
The four items used to prime a sense of self-perceived
objectivity formed a reliable index (a = .78). Personal
objectivity primed participants (who completed the
self-perceived objectivity items at the beginning of the
study, as primes) and control participants (who com-
pleted the items at the end of the study, after making
their hiring evaluations) did not differ in self-perceived
objectivity (Ms = 8.05 and 7.77, SDs = 1.18 and 1.30,
respectively), F < 1. There was likewise no significant
effect of applicant gender, or interaction between per-
sonal objectivity priming and applicant gender, Fs < 1.
Hiring evaluations
The three hiring evaluation items formed a reliable
index (a = .90). There was no main effect of personal
objectivity priming, F(1, 61) = 2.84, p = .11, or of appli-
cant gender, F < 1. As expected, however, there was a
significant interaction between personal objectivity
priming and applicant gender, F(1, 61) = 5.54, p = .02,
d = .60. As displayed in Fig. 1, participants in the
control condition gave the male applicant and female
 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
7 Hiring Evaluations
Male applicant
6
Female applicant
5
4 through which a sense of personal objectivity contrib-
3 sonal objectivity priming did not influence the subtle
2 Instead, it led participants to see overt differences in
Objectivity primed Control
participants participants
Fig. 1. Experiment 1: Hiring evaluations as a function of objectivity
priming and applicant gender. Higher numbers indicate more positive
evaluations of the applicant.
applicant similar evaluations (Ms = 3.24 and 4.05,
SDs = 1.88 and 1.00, respectively), t(30) = 1.27,
p = .21. By contrast, in the personal objectivity primed
condition, participants favored the male applicant
(M = 5.06, SD = 2.18) over the female applicant
(M = 3.75, SD = 1.70), t(32) = 2.14, p = .039, d = .76.
Applicant and importance ratings
Did participants primed on a sense of personal objec-
tivity use the subtle strategy of constructing hiring crite-
ria (e.g., by downplaying the occupational importance
of a female applicant’s areas of strength) or did they
simply evaluate the female applicant less favorably than
the male applicant? They appear to have done the latter.
The ratings of the applicant’s technical–organiza-
tional and interpersonal traits were averaged into sepa-
rate indices (as = .69 and a = .96, respectively). For
applicant and importance ratings, the only significant
effect was an interaction between personal objectivity
priming and applicant gender for the two-item index
assessing the perceived strength of the applicant’s inter-
personal skills, F(1, 60) = 4.78, p = .033, d = .56. Partic-
ipants primed on personal objectivity rated the male
applicant as more interpersonally skilled than the female
applicant (Ms = 3.12 and 1.94, SDs = 1.80 and .83,
respectively), t(31) = 2.39, p = .023, d = .86. In contrast,
control participants rated male and female applicants
comparably (Ms = 1.86 and 2.54, SDs = 1.12 and 2.70,
respectively), t < 1.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 support the hypothesis
that a sense of personal objectivity can contribute to
group-based discrimination. Specifically, priming a
sense of personal objectivity led male evaluators to dis-
criminate against female (relative to male) job appli-
cants. One noteworthy aspect of this effect is that it
211
was induced with a relatively subtle manipulation of
self-perceived objectivity. Merely four short questionnaire
items proved sufficient to prompt statistically sizable levels
of gender discrimination (almost .70 standard deviations’
difference in the hiring evaluations assigned to male ver-
sus female applicants).
Results also shed some initial light on the mechanism
utes to discrimination in organizational contexts. Per-
tactic of defining hiring criteria in a biased manner.
the strengths of the male versus female applicant, even
though these two applicants were identically described.
This finding is striking given that the applicants’ traits
were described unambiguously, which generally reduces
group-based influences on impression formation (Kun-
da & Thagard, 1996; Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hep-
burn, 1980; Locksley, Hepburn, & Ortiz, 1982). A sense
of personal objectivity appears to have led to relatively
overt gender discrimination.
Like other recent investigations (e.g., Norton et al.,
2004), the present study focused on the hiring evalua-
tions of male evaluators, as most individuals in a posi-
tion to hire applicants for high-status jobs are men
(Eagly & Karau, 2002; Glick et al., 1988). But at the
same time, it was of interest to examine how female eval-
uators would respond to our objectivity priming manip-
ulation. To this end, we recruited 77 female participants
from the same location and ran them through the proce-
dure described in Experiment 1. No theoretically mean-
ingful effects of objectivity priming were observed.
Among these female participants, we found only evi-
dence of ingroup bias, such that female applicants
received more positive evaluations than did male appli-
cants (Ms = 3.74 and 4.16, SDs = 1.50 and 1.70),
F(1, 73) = 3.99, p = .049, d = .47. There was no main
effect of objectivity priming, F(1, 73) = 1.20, p = .26,
and no interaction between objectivity priming and
applicant gender, F < 1. Thus, female participants
responded to objectivity priming in a manner different
from the way male participants did. We return to the
issue of potential gender differences in response to objec-
tivity priming in General discussion.
A notable shortcoming of Experiment 1 is that ster-
eotypic beliefs were not assessed. A more precise state-
ment of our prediction is that self-perceived objectivity
should lead people to act on their preexisting beliefs
about social groups. The tendency for personal objectiv-
ity priming to increase discrimination against women
should thus be found primarily among evaluators who
endorse stereotypic beliefs. Stated more precisely, per-
sonal objectivity priming should lead to a greater corre-
spondence between one’s stereotypic beliefs and one’s
hiring evaluations. Experiment 2 investigated this
possibility.
212 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we sought to provide a more direct
test of the hypothesis that a sense of personal objectivity
leads people to act on stereotypic beliefs they hold.
Accordingly, we assessed beliefs about men’s superiority
relative to women in the workplace. We hypothesized
that stereotypic beliefs would be more predictive of hir-
ing evaluations after participants had been primed with
their own objectivity. Hiring criteria and perceptions of
the strength of the applicant’s credentials were again
assessed.
Methods
Participants and design
Thirty-five male undergraduates participated in the
study in return for either course credit or payment
($6). The study featured a 2 (personal objectivity prime
condition vs. control condition) · 2 (applicant gender:
male vs. female) between subjects design.
Materials
Personal objectivity prime. Participants were primed
with a sense of their own objectivity by asking them
to complete (ostensibly as part of a separate survey)
seven self-perceived objectivity questionnaire items
(Armor, 1999): ‘‘How realistic is your view of the
world?’’, ‘‘How objective are you when making judg-
ments and decisions?’’, ‘‘How even-handed are you
when weighing evidence that is relevant to your deci-
sions?’’, ‘‘I try to act in accordance with what seems
like the reasonable and logical thing to do’’, ‘‘When
forming an opinion, I try to objectively consider all
of the facts I have access to’’, ‘‘My judgments are
based on a logical analysis of the facts’’, and ‘‘My deci-
sion making is rational and objective.’’ Responses were
made on appropriately labeled 11-point scales. Half the
participants completed the personal objectivity items
before making their hiring evaluations, the other half
afterward.
Hiring scenario. Participants were provided with a hiring
scenario entitled ‘‘Hiring a New Police Chief.’’ They
were asked to imagine that they had recently been
elected mayor of a town, and that during the election
they had promised to appoint a new police chief who
would clean up scandal in the police department and
reduce crime. The success or failure of the new police
chief, participants were told, would heavily affect their
re-election as mayor.
Description of applicant credentials. The job applicant
was again described either as male (‘‘Brian’’) or as
female (‘‘Karen;’’ see Kasof, 1993). The applicant was
presented as well-educated and skilled in administration,
but as having little ‘‘street’’ experience in terms of mak-
ing arrests and pursuing criminals.
Applicant ratings. As in Experiment 1, participants
rated the strength of the applicant’s credentials along
each of a series of traits. The ‘‘educated’’ traits were:
well-educated, administrative skills, organizational skills,
experienced as an administrator, detail-oriented, com-
puter skills, ability to communicate with the media,
and has kids. The ‘‘streetwise’’ traits were: streetwise,
tough, and has made a large number of arrests. (The
applicant description provided unambiguous informa-
tion about the applicant’s standing along each of these
traits.) Ratings were made on scales ranging from 1
(extremely weak in this area) to 11 (extremely strong
in this area).
Importance ratings. Next, participants rated how
important each of the streetwise and educated traits
noted above was in determining success at the job
of police chief (1 = makes success as a police chief
much less likely, 11 = essential to success as a police
chief).
Hiring evaluation. Participants responded to three items
assessing the extent to which they believed the applicant
‘‘would be successful as a police chief’’ (1 = not success-
ful at all, 9 = extremely successful), was ‘‘a good fit’’ for
the position (1 = an extremely bad fit, 9 = an extremely
good fit), and ‘‘should be hired’’ (1 = should definitely
not be hired, 9 = should definitely be hired). These three
items were averaged to form a measure of overall evalu-
ation of the applicant.
Stereotypic beliefs. The stereotypic beliefs items were:
‘‘Sometimes it’s the objective thing to do to hire a
man rather than a woman,’’ ‘‘It’s a fact that men are
better suited for some jobs than are women,’’ and ‘‘It’s
a fact that men are better suited for the job of police
chief than are women’’ (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree).
Procedure
Participants completed the experimental materials
in a private laboratory room. Participants in the
personal objectivity prime condition first completed
seven self-perceived objectivity items. All participants
then read the hiring scenario and applicant descrip-
tion, provided their applicant and importance rat-
ings, and made their hiring evaluations. Control
participants further completed the self-perceived
objectivity items at this point. All participants then
returned the completed packet of questionnaires to
the experimenter, who gave them a second packet
containing the questionnaire used to assess stereo-
typic beliefs.
 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
Results
Unless otherwise specified, we carried out a 2 (objec-
tivity prime condition vs. control condition) · 2 (appli-
cant gender: male vs. female) ANOVA for each
measure.
Self-perceived objectivity
The seven self-perceived objectivity items used as
primes formed a reliable index (a = .87). Notably, per-
sonal objectivity primed participants (who completed
the self-perceived objectivity items at the beginning of
the study, as primes) and control participants (who com-
pleted those items after making their hiring evaluations)
did not differ in self-perceived objectivity (Ms = 7.36
and 7.33, SDs = 1.72 and 1.33, respectively), F < 1.
There was likewise no significant effect of applicant gen-
der, and no interaction between personal objectivity
priming and applicant gender, Fs < 1.
Stereotypic beliefs
The stereotypic beliefs measure was reliable (a = .77),
and the mean (M = 4.52, SD = 1.59) was marginally
higher than the neutral point of the scale, paired
t(34) = 1.95, p = .06, d = .67. Specifically, 57% of partic-
ipants displayed overall agreement with the stereotypic
beliefs items, 6% were neutral, and 37% disagreed. Nota-
bly, no effects of personal objectivity priming were evi-
dent with regard to stereotypic beliefs (Ms = 4.67 and
4.42, SDs = 1.52 and 1.68 in the personal objectivity
prime and control conditions, respectively), F < 1. There
was again no significant effect of applicant gender, or
interaction between personal objectivity priming and
applicant gender, Fs < 1.
Mean effects of personal objectivity priming on
discrimination
The three hiring evaluation items formed a reliable
index (a = .91). A marginally significant interaction
between personal objectivity priming and applicant gen-
der emerged, F(1, 31) = 4.09, p = .052, d = .73. As seen
in Fig. 2, whereas control participants gave the male
applicant and female applicant equivalent evaluations
(Ms = 5.37 and 5.73, SDs = 1.88 and 1.22, respectively),
t < 1, participants primed with a sense of personal objec-
tivity again favored the male applicant (M = 5.67,
SD = 1.32) over the female applicant (M = 3.94,
SD = 1.53), t(13) = 2.21, p = .031, d = 1.23.
Relationship between stereotypic beliefs and hiring
evaluations
We used regression to assess the effects of personal
objectivity priming on the hiring evaluations of partici-
pants high and low in stereotypic beliefs. We contrast-
coded the experimental manipulation (personal objectiv-
ity prime condition = 1, control condition = +1) and
213
Hiring Evaluations
7
Male applicant
Female applicant
6
5
4
3
Objectivity primed Control
participants participants
Fig. 2. Experiment 2: Hiring evaluations as a function of objectivity
priming and applicant gender. Higher numbers indicate more positive
evaluations of the applicant.
applicant gender (male applicant = 1, female appli-
cant = +1) and centered stereotypic beliefs by standard-
izing it. We then predicted hiring evaluations from
objectivity prime condition, applicant gender, stereo-
typic beliefs, and the interactions between them. All
two-way and three-way interactions were included in
the regression analysis. The theoretically expected
three-way interaction between personal objectivity prim-
ing, applicant gender, and stereotypic beliefs emerged,
B = .80, t(27) = 3.93, p = .001. Among participants
low in stereotypic beliefs (i.e., 1 standard deviation
below the sample mean), there was no interaction
between personal objectivity prime and applicant gen-
der, B = .26, t(27) = .90, p = .37. However, among
participants high in stereotypic beliefs (i.e., 1 standard
deviation above the sample mean), a significant personal
objectivity prime · applicant gender interaction
emerged, B = 1.40, t(27) = 4.77, p < .001. Further exam-
ination revealed that participants high in stereotypic
beliefs who were primed with a sense of personal objec-
tivity gave male applicants more positive hiring evalua-
tions than female applicants, B = 1.93, t(27) = 4.26,
p < .001.
Trait and importance ratings
Of additional interest was whether participants
primed with a sense of personal objectivity subsequently
perceived the female applicant less favorably or engaged
in the more subtle strategy of constructing their hiring
criteria in a biased manner. The ratings of the appli-
cant’s educated and streetwise traits were averaged into
separate indices (a = .49 and a = .80). The low reliability
of the educated trait composite is potentially problem-
atic. However, two factors lessen our concern with this
low reliability. First, the low reliability of the composite
occurred only in this study. In the research reported by
Uhlmann and Cohen (2005), the same trait items formed
a highly reliable index (a = .87). This suggests that the
214 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
low reliability found in this study was an anomaly. Sec-
ond, the low reliability of this measure would presum-
ably work against our obtaining the predicted
condition effects. That is, the noisiness of the measure
should make it relatively more difficult to detect reliable
condition effects along it. As in Experiment 1, the only
significant effect involved overt evaluations of the appli-
cant. Specifically, personal objectivity priming led to less
favorable perceptions of the female candidate relative to
the male candidate along educated traits. For the edu-
cated set of traits, the personal objectivity prime · appli-
cant gender interaction was significant, F(1, 30) = 5.63,
p = .024, d = .87. Participants primed on a sense of per-
sonal objectivity perceived male applicants (M = 9.42,
SD = .63) as better educated than female applicants
(M = 7.23, SD = 1.96), t(12) = 2.99, p = .011, d = 1.73.
Control participants did not (Ms = 9.11 and 8.78,
SDs = .74 and 1.04), t < 1.
Discussion
Judgment makers primed with a sense of personal
objectivity were more likely to discriminate against the
female applicant for the job of police chief. Consistent
with our theoretical analysis, however, the effect of per-
sonal objectivity priming occurred only for evaluators
who endorsed stereotypic beliefs. Once again, personal
objectivity priming led to a relatively uninhibited form
of discrimination, leading evaluators to perceive the
male candidate as having better credentials than the
female candidate, even though the credentials of the
male and female candidates were identically and unam-
biguously described.
The results of Experiment 2 are open to an alternative
explanation based on theories of cognitive consistency
(Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1957). Specifically, rather than
licensing judgment makers to act on their beliefs, per-
sonal objectivity priming may lead them to rationalize
their hiring evaluations by changing their stereotypic
beliefs. For instance, after evaluating a male applicant
more positively than a female applicant, a manager
might justify his evaluations by endorsing the stereo-
typic belief that ‘‘there are some jobs that men are better
suited for than women.’’ The pressure to be consistent
might prove more acute after judgment makers are
primed to view themselves as objective. While this alter-
native explanation cannot account for the finding that
personal objectivity priming increased pro-male gender
discrimination in Experiment 2, but had no effect on
the level of stereotypic beliefs, it could potentially
explain the positive correlations between hiring evalua-
tions and stereotypic beliefs observed among personal
objectivity primed participants.
Accordingly, we carried out a supplemental study,
designed to demonstrate heightened correspondence
between stereotypic beliefs and hiring preferences under
conditions ruling out such post-hoc justifications. A
total of 70 adult men participated in exchange for pay-
ment ($6). The hiring scenario was the same as that used
in Experiment 3 (discussed below), and therefore is not
described in depth here. Participants selected between
two equally qualified candidates (one male, one female)
for a high-status job. Half the participants reported their
stereotypic beliefs at the beginning of the study, half at
the end. Notably, whereas the average level of stereo-
typic beliefs in Experiment 2 had fallen on the ‘‘pro-
male’’ side of the scale, it fell at the neutral point in this
supplemental study, paired t < 1. Specifically, 42% of
participants displayed overall agreement with the stereo-
typic beliefs items, 18% were neutral, and 40% dis-
agreed. The supplemental study thus yielded a sample
with a more balanced range of stereotypic beliefs than
did the previous study, encompassing not only individu-
als with ‘‘pro-male’’ stereotypic beliefs but also many
individuals who strongly rejected such beliefs. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to either a personal objec-
tivity prime condition or to a control condition.
Because of the non-normal distribution of hiring
evaluations, they were first rank-transformed and then
subjected to ordinal regression (as described in Experi-
ment 3; parametric procedures yielded virtually identical
statistical significance levels). We predicted hiring pref-
erences from objectivity prime condition, stereotypic
beliefs, and the interaction between them. As predicted,
there was a significant interaction between personal
objectivity priming and stereotypic beliefs, B = .78,
Wald(1) = 11.06, p = .001. This critical interaction was
not moderated by the order of the stereotypic beliefs
questionnaire, F < 1. Replicating the results of Experi-
ment 2, participants high in stereotypic beliefs favored
the male applicant (relative to the female one) more in
the personal objectivity prime condition than in the con-
trol condition (medians = 8.00 and 6.00, respectively),
B = .74, Wald(1) = 5.41, p = .02. Interestingly, partic-
ipants low in stereotypic beliefs (i.e., who expressly
rejected stereotypes favoring men over women in the
workplace) showed the opposite effect. They favored
the male applicant (relative to the female one) less in
the personal objectivity primed condition than in the
control condition (medians = 6.00 and 8.00, respec-
tively), B = .81, Wald(1) = 6.50, p = .011. Because ster-
eotypic beliefs were measured at the beginning of the
session for half of our participants, this study ruled
out post hoc changes in stereotypic beliefs as an expla-
nation for the increased correspondence between stereo-
typic beliefs and hiring preferences in the personal
objectivity prime condition.
These findings also distinguish the effects of personal
objectivity from those of nonsexist credentials (Monin &
Miller, 2001). Prior research finds that providing people
with the opportunity to affirm their nonsexist identity
(e.g., by disagreeing with blatantly sexist statements)
 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
leads them to discriminate against women more. While
both credentialing and personal objectivity effects
address the factors that reduce inhibitions against using
social stereotypes, they are not the same. In our supple-
mentary study, individuals who rejected stereotypic
beliefs and who were primed with a sense of personal
objectivity became relatively less likely to favor the male
applicant, and relatively more likely to favor the female
applicant. Such individuals appear to have become more
likely to apply their egalitarian beliefs in making their
hiring evaluations. While a direct comparison cannot
be made because individual differences in stereotypic
beliefs were not a focus of the Monin and Miller
(2001) work, there is little theoretical basis to expect
nonsexist credentials to produce such a pattern of
results. Nonsexist credentialing is theorized to exert a
uniform effect—it increases discrimination against
women. In contrast, personal objectivity priming can
either increase or decrease discrimination against
women, depending on the decision-makers’ prior beliefs.
Importantly, to the extent that negative stereotypes are
widely endorsed, or to the extent that such stereotypes
are simply made cognitively accessible in the hiring situ-
ation (an issue addressed in Study 3), personal objectiv-
ity priming will tend to produce, on average, a main
effect increase in discrimination against women.
Another difference between nonsexist credentials and
self-perceived objectivity lies in whether evaluators act
in a manner contrary to their self-perceived state. Sug-
gesting to evaluators that they are objective leads them
to do what they believe to be objective (as measured
by stereotypic beliefs items such as ‘‘Sometimes it’s the
objective thing to do to hire a man rather than a
woman’’)—a consistency effect. In contrast, suggesting
to evaluators that they are nonsexist makes them more
sexist—an ‘‘ironic’’ effect. Additionally, a sense of per-
sonal objectivity may have general effects beyond the
moral domain. It may affect not only gender discrimina-
tion, but domains such as consumer choices and voting
behavior, that is, any domain where a sense of personal
objectivity might increase the consistency between peo-
ple’s beliefs, thoughts, and intuitions on the one hand
and their behavior on the other.
Experiment 3
A strong form of our hypothesis is that an ‘‘I think it,
therefore it’s true’’ mindset leads people to act not sim-
ply on their beliefs, but on cognitive content that is tem-
porarily accessible—even if that content issues not from
personal beliefs but from incidental environmental stim-
uli. That is, people made to feel objective might assume
that because they have a thought, that that thought is,
by virtue of being theirs, valid and therefore worthy of
being acted on. That is, when people assume that they
215
are objective, they may naturally infer that their
thoughts and beliefs are, by definition, objective reflec-
tions of reality.
In Experiment 3, the cognitive accessibility of stereo-
typic thoughts was manipulated by priming participants
with words representative of common gender stereo-
types via a sentence-unscrambling task (Banaji, Hardin,
& Rothman, 1993; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Srull
& Wyer, 1979). Research indicates that unobtrusively
priming concepts in this manner can have dramatic
effects on subsequent judgments and behaviors (Bargh,
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001;
Bargh et al., 1996; Devine, 1989; Dijksterhuis & Bargh,
2001). For instance, priming stereotypes of the elderly
(‘‘Florida’’, ‘‘gray’’) led participants to walk more
slowly as they left the experiment (Bargh et al., 1996)
and priming dependence caused evaluators to perceive
a female target (but not a male target) as dependent
(Banaji et al., 1993). (Consistent with previous research,
by ‘‘nonconscious’’ priming, we mean that participants
are unaware of the influence of the prime on their
actions, not that the prime stimuli themselves are sub-
liminal or processed outside of awareness; Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000). We expected that non-consciously
priming gender stereotypes would increase discrimina-
tion against a female applicant, particularly among eval-
uators led to view themselves as objective.
Experiment 3 also tested the robustness of the effects
of personal objectivity priming by asking participants to
select between a male and a female applicant. Evaluating
alternatives at the same time tends to reduce judgmental
biases, because such biases are relatively easier to detect
in such contexts (Baron 1994; DeSteno, Bartlett, Braver-
man, & Salovey, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986;
Greenwald, 1976; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973). There-
fore, it was of interest to assess whether personal objec-
tivity priming would increase the expression of
stereotypic bias even in a hiring context where judgment
makers had to choose explicitly between a male and a
female applicant.
This study further explored the psychological pro-
cesses underlying the effects of personal objectivity prim-
ing on hiring evaluations. Perhaps evaluators led to view
themselves as objective trust their first gut instinct as the
correct one, or experience a heightened need for closure
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Such effects could lead
them to deliberate less carefully, and such relatively
shallow processing could facilitate the use of stereotypic
beliefs (Banaji et al., 1993). On the other hand, it is pos-
sible that people who feel confident in their objectivity
think in greater depth than they otherwise might. To
address these exploratory issues, we included a thought
listing measure in which participants were asked to list
all the thoughts they had had about the two job candi-
dates and to record the valence of each thought with
respect to the two candidates (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981;
216 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Chaiken &
Maheswaran, 1994).
Methods
Participants and design
Thirty-eight (21 male, 17 female) undergraduates par-
ticipated in the study in return for pay ($6). Participants
first completed a sentence unscrambling task that
primed them either with words related to gender stereo-
types or with control words. They were further ran-
domly assigned to either a personal objectivity prime
condition or a control condition. They next read a hiring
scenario that obliged them to choose between a male
and a female applicant for the job of company represen-
tative. To avoid having participants choose between
applicants who were identical, we created two distinct
applicant profiles for the hiring scenario (e.g., one appli-
cant for company representative was creative but disor-
ganized, and the other applicant was organized but
uncreative). We counterbalanced, between subjects, the
pairing of applicant profile with applicant gender.
The study took the form of a 2 (gender stereotype
prime vs. control prime) · 2 (personal objectivity prime
condition vs. control condition) · 2 (participant gen-
der) · 2 (pairing of applicant gender and applicant pro-
file) between-subjects design.
Materials and procedure
All measures were completed in the order described.
Gender stereotype prime. Participants completed a 11-
item sentence unscrambling task at the very beginning
of the study (Srull & Wyer, 1979). For each item, partic-
ipants were presented with five words—four of which
comprised a viable sentence—in a nonsense order. They
were instructed to unscramble these words to make a
viable sentence (while ignoring the one word that did
not belong). For instance, the nonsense sentence ‘‘ate
house the new is’’ could be unscrambled as ‘‘the house
is new’’ after dropping the word ‘‘ate.’’ In the gender-
stereotype prime condition, 6 of the 11 items contained
a word relevant to gender stereotypes (pink, gossiped,
Barbie, make-up, nurse, and emotional). None of the gen-
der stereotype words was the word that had to be
crossed out. In the control condition, the 6 items con-
tained neutral words (e.g., gallons, store, chair, building,
curtain, train). This unobtrusive priming procedure
served as our experimental manipulation of gender ste-
reotype accessibility (see Banaji et al., 1993; Bargh
et al., 1996; Devine, 1989).
Personal objectivity prime. Participants were then
primed with a sense of their own objectivity by asking
them to complete (ostensibly as part of a separate study)
the same personal objectivity items used in Experiment
1. Participants assigned to the control condition rated
themselves in response to four alternative items: ‘‘I con-
sider myself a morning person,’’ ‘‘I prefer light colors to
dark colors,’’ ‘‘I enjoy listening to the radio,’’ and ‘‘I
usually get a full night’s sleep’’.
Hiring scenario. The scenario, entitled ‘‘Hiring a Com-
pany Representative,’’ was based on a scenario created
by Monin and Miller (2001). Participants were asked
to imagine being an executive evaluating an applicant
for the job of representative of a manufacturing com-
pany. The company representative would be responsible
for negotiating contracts with foremen and contractors,
for settling business conflicts, and for increasing profits.
The success or failure of the new company representa-
tive, participants were informed, would heavily affect
company profits, and would thus determine whether
they kept their job.
Applicant descriptions. The two applicants were named
Lisa and Gary (Kasof, 1993). One applicant had three
years of experience as a representative for a company
that manufactured appliances. This applicant was
described as creative and as good at keeping up with
technical developments, but as having trouble managing
accounts and as occasionally missing important meet-
ings. The other applicant had six years of experience
as a representative for a company that manufactured
auto parts. This applicant was described as extremely
well-organized, but as half-hearted at keeping up on
technical developments and as not an especially creative
or innovative thinker. Pairing of applicant description
with applicant gender (Lisa or Gary) was counterbal-
anced between subjects.
Hiring evaluations. After reading the applicant descrip-
tions for each scenario, participants selected the person
they would hire for the job (i.e., 1 = Lisa is better suited,
6 = about the same, 11 = Gary is better suited).
Thought listing measure. Participants were asked to list
all their thoughts about the candidates and to indicate
with a ‘‘G’’ thoughts that supported hiring Gary (the
male candidate) and with an ‘‘L’’ thoughts that sup-
ported hiring Lisa (the female candidate).
The total number of thoughts listed was used to
assess the extent to which evaluators deliberated care-
fully about their hiring evaluations (i.e., the depth of
processing). Another way to assess the deliberateness
of hiring evaluations involves examining the correlation
between participants’ ‘‘thought valence’’ and their final
hiring evaluation (see Cacioppo et al., 1986; Chaiken
& Maheswaran, 1994; Cohen, 2003). To the extent that
hiring evaluations are cognitively elaborated (i.e., based
upon a deliberate and systematic evaluation of appli-
cants), hiring evaluations should follow from thoughts.
 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
That is, support of the male (relative to the female)
applicant should correlate with the positivity of one’s
thoughts toward the male (relative to the female) appli-
cant. To examine this issue, we assessed the correlation
between thought valence and hiring preferences.
Funneled debriefing. Finally, we probed participants’
awareness of the influence of the gender stereotype
primes on their evaluations (Bargh & Chartrand,
2000). For instance, participants were asked ‘‘Did the
sentence unscrambling task you completed influence
which candidate you decided to hire in any way?’’
(1 = Definitely Not, 5 = Not Sure, 9 = Definitely Yes).
If they responded affirmatively, participants were asked
to describe the influence of the primes. We expected
that, as in prior work (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996), few if
any participants would report being influenced by the
words embedded in the scrambled-sentences task.
Results
Hiring evaluations
The distribution of hiring preferences was highly non-
normal and in fact bimodal, such that the modes were
three and eight, as most participants chose one of the
two job candidates rather than asserting neutrality.
Accordingly, we used a non-parametric test robust
against violations of normality (Conover & Iman,
1981). Hiring preferences were ranked and subjected to
an ordinal regression. Medians rather than means are
reported for analyses involving this ranked hiring pref-
erences variable (notably, non-parametric Mann–Whit-
ney U tests—also robust against violations of
normality—yielded virtually identical significance levels
for the reported contrasts, as did ordinary parametric
procedures).
We conducted an ordinal regression predicting hiring
preferences from objectivity prime condition, stereotype
prime condition, and the interaction between them.
There was no significant effect of personal objectivity
priming on whether participants preferred the male or
female applicant, B < 1. However, the theoretically
expected interaction between the personal objectivity
prime and the gender stereotype prime emerged,
B = .63, Wald(1) = 4.34, p = .037. As displayed in
Fig. 3, among participants primed with a sense of per-
sonal objectivity, activating gender stereotypes led to
discrimination against the female applicant (relative to
the male applicant), B = 1.10, Wald(1) = 5.71,
p = .017. By contrast, for participants who had not been
primed with their own objectivity, activating gender ste-
reotypes had no influence on hiring evaluations, B = .26,
Wald(1) = .37, p = .54.
Adding main effects and interactions involving partic-
ipant gender to the model left intact the personal objec-
tivity prime · gender stereotype prime interaction,
217
8 Hiring Preferences
Gender stereotype primed
7
Control
6
5
4
3
2
Control condition
Objectivity primed
condition
Fig. 3. Experiment 3: Hiring preferences as a function of objectivity
priming and gender stereotype priming. The numbers displayed are
medians, with higher numbers reflecting more positive evaluations of
male applicants than of female applicants.
B = .82, Wald(1) = 5.05, p = .025. Interestingly, there
was no three-way interaction between personal objectiv-
ity priming, gender stereotype priming, and participant
gender, B = .29, Wald(1) = .67, p = .41. However, an
exploratory analysis suggested the significant interaction
between personal objectivity priming and gender stereo-
type priming was driven by male participants. No such
interaction was found among female participants,
B = .47, Wald(1) = .76, p = .38. By contrast, among
male participants a significant personal objectivity
prime · gender stereotype prime interaction emerged,
B = 1.10, Wald(1) = 4.69, p = .03. This exploratory
analysis of participant gender differences was based in
previous work showing that men are more likely than
women to endorse sexist and/or gender stereotypic
beliefs (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). Of course,
the lack of a statistically significant three-way interac-
tion involving participant gender advises considerable
caution in interpreting this tentative finding. However,
they do tentatively suggest that the effects of objectivity
priming were relatively more robust among men than
women.
Thought listings
Depth of processing. To the extent that the personal
objectivity manipulation increased gender discrimina-
tion by heightening needs for closure or triggering shal-
low, heuristic processing, personal objectivity priming
should have decreased the number of cognitive
responses (i.e., number of thoughts about the hiring
evaluation). This did not occur. There were no main
effects either of personal objectivity priming or of gender
stereotype priming on number of thoughts, and no inter-
action between the two priming manipulations, Fs < 1.
If anything, participants primed with a sense of personal
objectivity listed slightly more thoughts about the appli-
cants (M = 5.98) than did control participants
(M = 5.38). (Interestingly, the only condition in which
218 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
relatively shallow processing tended to correlate with
greater discrimination was the control condition in
which no experimental treatments had been adminis-
tered, r = .65, p = .078; all other rs < |.22|, ns.)
Valence of processing. Our measure of processing
valence was also informative with respect to the psycho-
logical effects of the experimental manipulations. We
computed an index of thought valence—i.e., the extent
to which thoughts favored hiring the male relative to
the female applicant—by computing the ratio of favor-
able thoughts about the male applicant to favorable
thoughts about the female applicant (adding one to each
value to avoid divisions by zero).
We found a significant effect of the gender stereotype
prime. Participants had relatively more favorable
thoughts about the male (relative to female) applicant
in the gender stereotype prime condition (M = 1.27)
than in the no prime condition (M = .84), F(1,
33) = 5.07, p = .031, d = .78. No other effects were sig-
nificant, Fs < 1.
Hiring evaluations were highly cognitively elaborated
(i.e., based upon systematic processing) regardless of
personal objectivity prime condition. We examined the
correlation between thought valence and hiring prefer-
ences, holding constant participant gender. Overall,
the partial correlation was sizable, r = .71, p < .001.
Contrary to the possibility that personal objectivity
priming led to relatively shallow or heuristic judgments,
the correlation was higher in the condition where partic-
ipants discriminated most. That is, for participants who
had been primed on a sense of personal objectivity, and
for whom gender stereotypes were activated, there was a
near perfect partial correlation between thought valence
and hiring preference, r = .97, p < .001. This suggests
that if these participants favored the male over the
female applicant in their thoughts, that they were very
likely to select the male over the female applicant for
the job. The relevant correlation was lower in the other
three conditions, r = .63, p < .001, with the difference
between the two correlations proving significant,
z = 2.81, p < .01.
Funneled debriefing
No participant indicated that his or her responses
might have been influenced by the sentence unscram-
bling task (i.e., rated the prime’s influence as above
the midpoint of 5 on the 1–9 scale).
Discussion
Non-consciously priming gender stereotypes led to
discrimination against a female job applicant, but only
among participants made to feel objective. That is, it
was only the dual combination of gender priming and
objectivity priming that produced gender bias. A sense
of personal objectivity made evaluators more likely to
act on their stereotypic thoughts, even though those
thoughts arose from a contextual manipulation rather
than from their long-held beliefs.
It was not the case that self-perceived objectivity
made evaluators less deliberate information processors
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Langer, 1989). Instead, a sense
of personal objectivity made people more likely to use
their thoughts (which had been non-consciously shaped
to favor the male over the female candidate) in arriving
at their hiring evaluations.
Experiment 3 did not yield a significant main effect of
personal objectivity priming on gender discrimination
(i.e., participants overall were no more or less likely to
hire the female applicant when primed with a sense of
personal objectivity). Notably, this study used a scenario
in which participants chose between a male and female
applicant, as opposed to evaluating either a male appli-
cant or a female applicant (as in Experiments 1 and 2).
Such choices heighten careful monitoring and reduce
the influence of judgmental biases (Baron, 1994).
Indeed, our supplementary study reported earlier, which
used the same within-subject hiring scenario as Experi-
ment 3, likewise found no significant main effect of the
personal objectivity prime, B < 1. At the same time, it
is notable that in both studies, personal objectivity prim-
ing led participants to act on their stereotypic biases
even when they explicitly chose between a male and
female applicant.
While Experiment 1 documented a main effect of per-
sonal objectivity priming on gender discrimination (such
that it increased discrimination against women),
together each of the subsequent studies makes it clear
that this effect occurs under the predicted theoretical
conditions: when judgment makers hold at least mod-
estly stereotypical beliefs and/or when stereotypic
thoughts are experimentally manipulated to be cogni-
tively accessible for judgment makers (as they were in
this final study).
General discussion
When people see themselves as objective, they may
adopt an ‘‘I think it, therefore it’s true’’ mindset (see
also Armor, 1999; Pronin et al., 2004; Robinson et al.,
1995; Ross & Ward, 1996). They may see their
thoughts and beliefs as, by definition, objective and
as therefore worthy of being acted on. The present
studies explored the consequences of this mindset for
gender discrimination in an organizational context.
Consistent with expectations, a sense of personal
objectivity led people to act on group-based biases
they might have otherwise suppressed or held with
greater tentativeness. These effects were found
with both college students (Experiments 2 and 3)
 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
and laypeople (Experiment 1), when male and female
applicants were evaluated separately (Experiments 1
and 2) and at the same time (Experiment 3), and
for hiring evaluations involving several different jobs
(police chief, factory manager, and company represen-
tative). Experiments 2 and 3 further showed that per-
sonal objectivity priming led to discrimination
precisely under the conditions where it theoretically
should—i.e., when individuals endorsed stereotypic
beliefs (Experiment 2) and when gender stereotypes
had been made cognitively accessible (Experiment 3).
Ironically, feeling objective made people more
subjective.
That self-perceived objectivity can facilitate hiring
discrimination has both theoretical and pragmatic impli-
cations. It suggests that organizational contexts in which
evaluators are encouraged to view themselves as objec-
tive may lead them to express their personal biases.
For example, the practice of wearing lab coats in labo-
ratory settings may make people feel that they are dis-
passionately rational, leading them to act on
stereotypic beliefs and thoughts that they might have.
And the use of certain formal titles in professional and
organizational contexts (e.g., sir, director, professor)
may implicitly instigate a sense that one’s judgmental
tendencies are above reproach. Simply advancing in
the corporate hierarchy may further give rise to a sense
of objectivity. This may be beneficial in contexts where
one’s beliefs and intuitions have proven to be accurate,
profitable, or otherwise adaptive. But it may be detri-
mental when over-extended, in contexts where one’s
beliefs and intuitions are biased by prejudices. Given
this, it may be important to teach people to view their
beliefs and intuitions as subjective and subject to bias.
Doing so may contribute to a more egalitarian
workplace.
More generally, the present results indicate that the
rational actor ideal can exacerbate bias when it is
applied descriptively. When people believe that they
are objective, rational actors, they may be more likely
to do what they think is correct, and at the same time
less likely to take into account alternative viewpoints.
However, as Study 3 indicates, what people think is cor-
rect can arise not simply from stereotypic beliefs, but
from incidental, environmentally primed concepts like
‘‘pink’’ and ‘‘Barbie’’.
A sense of personal objectivity may help explain why
and when people act their biases—whether those biases
arise from social stereotypes, moral intuitions (Haidt,
2001; Sunstein, 2005), or decision-making errors such
as the sunk cost fallacy (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). In addi-
tion, a sense of personal objectivity may partly account
for a number of different licensing effects (i.e., variables
that lead people to feel disinhibited about expressing
their biases; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sechrist & Stangor,
2002).
219
The potential role of self-perceived objectivity in other
licensing effects
It seems possible that self-perceived objectivity plays
a role in other circumstances known to disinhibit social
behavior, such as situational power (Fiske, 1993; Good-
win, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner, Gruenfeld,
& Anderson, 2002). For example, first writing about a
time when they felt powerful increased the likelihood
that participants would turn off an annoying fan left
on by the experimenter (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee,
2003). Individuals made to feel powerful by sitting in an
administrator’s chair were more likely to act on their
preexisting competitive or communal impulses (Chen,
Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). Men prone to sexual harass-
ment who were subliminally primed with words related
to power found a female confederate more physically
attractive (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995).
And in general, men in positions of power tend to ste-
reotype female subordinates (Vescio, Gervais, Snyder,
& Hoover, 2005; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003). Power
may increase the correspondence between private beliefs
and public behavior partly by inducing a sense that one
is objective. Having attained a position of power implies
that one is especially qualified to make the judgments
and decisions associated with the obtained role. This
message may explicitly or implicitly prime a sense of per-
sonal objectivity, licensing powerful individuals to act
on their personal beliefs.
Past research also shows that the perceived norma-
tiveness of one’s attitudes has a large influence on atti-
tude–behavior correspondence (Sechrist & Stangor,
2002). When individuals believe that others agree with
their attitudes, they act on them more. For instance,
White students told that most other college students
agreed with their racial attitudes evidenced a highly sig-
nificant correlation between their racial attitudes and the
distance they sat from a Black confederate. But when
the normativeness of participants’ racial attitudes had
not been conveyed, little attitude–behavior correspon-
dence was found (Sechrist & Stangor, 2002). One very
likely reason for such effects is that people are more will-
ing to act on their private attitudes when they have little
basis to fear public censure. Alternatively, finding out
that others agree with one’s opinions may validate them
as objective (Festinger, 1954). Future research should
examine what role, if any, self-perceived objectivity
plays in the effects of situational power and of perceived
consensus on the disinhibition of behavior.
The present discussion also pertains to the contro-
versy over when attitudes predict behavior (Ross &
Nisbett, 1991). Initial findings suggested that attitudes
make only a trivial contribution to actual behaviors
(Kelman, 1974; LaPierre, 1934; Wicker, 1969). How-
ever, later work demonstrated that properties of the atti-
tude, such as its accessibility (Fazio & Williams, 1986),
220 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
importance (Krosnick, 1988), and specificity (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1977) moderate attitude–behavior correspon-
dence. The present findings, together with those of Kelt-
ner et al. (2002) and Sechrist and Stangor (2002),
indicate that properties of the person and situation alike
influence whether an individual’s attitudes find expres-
sion in his or her actions. Much of the time, external
and internal pressures make people cautious about
expressing their views. However, when placed in a posi-
tion of power, convinced that others agree with them,
and feeling objective, people more readily act on their
attitudes and beliefs. Conversely, a lowly social position,
perceived lack of consensus, and sense of personal sub-
jectivity ought to reduce attitude–behavior consistency.
Limitations and future directions
In the present research, a sense of personal objectivity
was primed by asking participants to complete question-
naire items asking about their objectivity. This manipu-
lation was designed to increase the temporary
accessibility of personal objectivity beliefs (Higgins,
1996), given the likely difficulty of making people feel
more objective than they already do (Armor, 1999; Pro-
nin et al., 2002). Prior work demonstrates that using sur-
vey questions to prime ideas is both valid and effective
(e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988; Sniderman & Piazza, 2002).
Additionally, this relatively subtle manipulation pro-
duced statistically sizable effects—suggestive that the
process is particularly potent when more impactful
real-world events and organizational contexts foster a
sense of personal objectivity in their populace.
The effects of affirming a sense of personal objectivity
differ from the effects of affirming other self-concepts
(see Sherman & Cohen, 2006, for a discussion). Previous
research indicates that affirmations of personal values
generally reduce discrimination (Fein & Spencer, 1997)
and mitigate the cognitive accessibility of stereotypes
(Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). However,
future research should investigate other means of
manipulating a sense of personal objectivity, for
instance through false feedback on an ostensive test of
rationality, or through subliminal conditioning of objec-
tive self-perceptions (Dijksterhuis, 2004).
Additionally, the present studies focused mainly on
male evaluators (see also Norton et al., 2004). Experi-
ment 3 and one of our supplementary studies found little
to no effects of personal objectivity priming on the hir-
ing evaluations of female participants. This could be
due to reluctance on the part of female participants to
discriminate against an ingroup member, perhaps as a
consequence of egalitarian beliefs or feminist motiva-
tions. However, these are tentative speculations at this
point. Future work should more closely examine the
effects of self-perceived objectivity on the hiring evalua-
tions of female evaluators.
Some ambiguity remains as to whether gender dis-
crimination among some participants primed with a
sense of personal objectivity is driven by favoritism
towards male applicants or negativity towards female
applicants. In Experiment 1, gender discrimination by
personal objectivity primed participants issued from
favoritism toward the male applicant. But in Experi-
ment 2, such discrimination issued from negative
responses toward the female applicant. It thus remains
unclear whether personal objectivity priming is more
closely linked to evaluations of male or female job can-
didates. In the real world, however, it arguably makes
little difference if gender discrimination arises from posi-
tive responses to male applicants or negative responses
to female applicants. The effect—inequality in allocation
of jobs and resources—is the same. In this respect, the
findings are quite consistent. A sense of personal objec-
tivity can increase discrimination in favor of male rela-
tive to female job candidates, particularly among
evaluators who endorse stereotypic beliefs or who have
been non-consciously primed with gender stereotypes.
It would be interesting to examine whether a sense of
personal objectivity can lead evaluators to discriminate
against male applicants for jobs that women are stereo-
typically better at (e.g., a kindergarten teacher, nurse, or
nanny). We hypothesize that to the extent that evalua-
tors believe women would be on average more effective
at a job than men, a sense of personal objectivity should
lead to favoritism towards female applicants.
The present studies focused largely on hiring judg-
ments (i.e., hiring evaluations) rather than actual
choices, which prior work has demonstrated can vary
from judgments in systematic ways. For example, decoy
effects are more readily observed in choices than in judg-
ments (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000). Future work should
directly compare judgments and choices made in hiring
contexts. Future research should further examine how
both judgments and choices play out in hiring situations
in actual organizations. Some aspects of real-world situ-
ations, such as accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999),
may reduce the expression of stereotypic beliefs. On the
other hand, people may also be less likely to monitor
their judgments outside an experimental context, where
their judgments are unlikely to be subjected to careful
scientific scrutiny. This might amplify the effects of both
gender stereotypes and temporarily accessible objectiv-
ity beliefs in real-world contexts.
One potential mechanism of the ‘‘I think it, therefore
it’s true’’ effect that is worth investigating is the tendency
to automatically assume that information is true (Gilbert,
Krull, & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone,
1993; for a review, see Gilbert, 1991). As Gilbert and his
colleagues have elegantly demonstrated, comprehending
new information requires an initial acceptance of its valid-
ity; disbelieving it requires a second step of mental correc-
tion. People initially believe information is true and only
 E.L. Uhlmann, G.L. Cohen / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 104 (2007) 207–223
later decide that it is false. When it comes to evaluating the
ideas that come to mind, individuals convinced of their
objectivity may be less likely to get to take that second
step. Thus, basic properties of how the mind comprehends
and validates information may be implicated in the ten-
dency for judgment makers convinced of their objectivity
to act on their biases. Future research should examine this
and other potential mediators of the effects of self-per-
ceived objectivity.
Conclusion
Current theories emphasize the ambivalent (Katz &
Hass, 1988), covert (Snyder et al., 1979), and repressed
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) nature of contemporary
attitudes towards social groups. The present studies
complement this work by examining when people feel
licensed to express their biases. When people feel that
they are objective, rational actors, they act on their
group-based biases more rather than less. The research
presented here is among the first to demonstrate—
through experimental manipulation—a causal link
between self-perceived objectivity and judgmental bias.
This is a relationship posited in previous research on
naı̈ve realism (Pronin et al., 2004; Robinson et al.,
1995). Feeling objective appears to makes people more
likely to act on their stereotypic biases. Indeed, from
the actor’s perspective, it may seem rational to act on
stereotypic thoughts that, though they may arise from
incidental environmental cues, subjectively feel like
objective reflections of reality (see also Pronin & Kugler,
2007). Such psychological licensing helps to explain the
persistence of discrimination in organizational contexts
despite personal and institutional pressures towards
egalitarianism.
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