1. KURODA VS JALANDONI
](2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
Rules and regulations of the Hague and  Geneva conventions form part of  and
are wholly based on the  generally accepted principals of international law.
They form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive  in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of  rules and principles of international law as contained in  treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be  a signatory.
Facts:
 A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive
Order 68 of the President of the Philippines, which was issued on July
29, 1947. This is an act establishing a
national war crimes office and prescribing rules and regulationgoverning
the trial of accused war criminals.- Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a
Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from1943-
1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully
disregarded and
failed"to discharge his duties as such command,  permitting them to comm
it brutalatrocities and other high crimes  against noncombatant civilians
and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws
and customs of war".- Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American
lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA.- Kuroda
challenges the legality of the EO  No. 68 and the  personality as
prosecutors of Hussey and Port.- Kuroda’s arguments were:
 EO No. is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of
our constitutional law but also our local laws;
 Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because
the Philippines is not asignatory to the first and signed the second only
in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with “crime” not based on law,
national or international; and
 Husseyand
Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not
qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules  of
court and the appointment of said attorneys
as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid because it is
based on the generally accepted principles of international law which form
part of our laws.
Conventions form part of  the law of the nation even if Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes, they form part of  our
laws.](3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of
this case?[Yes, they can.]
 Ratio:
 The order is valid and  constitutional. Article 2 of  our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that- The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of  the nation.
 In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law
of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Conventio
n andsignificant  precedents of international  jurisprudence established by 
the UnitedNation,  allthose person military or civilian who have been guil
ty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses  consequential and incidental thereto
in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization 
are heldaccountable therefor
 Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order
No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of our
Constitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by
the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces
as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently,
the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate
this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war
criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No.
68.
 Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of
and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the
two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were
signatories to the two Conventions.
 Such rule and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if thePhilippines was
not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, forour Constitution
has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scopeand is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of inte
rnational law as contained in treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory.
 Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed the Philippines was
under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
 together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation
contained in the treaties  between the belligerent countries.(3) There is
nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel
appearingbefore said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice  away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were
law in thePhilippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent
Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special
law and not by the Rules of  court which govern ordinary civil court.
Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative
of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper
thatUnited States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against  judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
hergovernment  and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allo
wedrepresentation in the trial of those very crimes.  If there hasbeen anyr
elinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by
the United 
States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of he
renemies.
2. CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN KEH
Facts of the case:
 Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the
American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case,
saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and
nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and,
without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation
were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he
declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those
courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio:
 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic
of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto
governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws
of war.
 Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or
changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the
existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do
not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
proclamation abrogating them.
 The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase
“processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of
de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has
been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial
processes, which would be in violation of international law
 A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or
great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume
that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by
clear and unequivocal words.”
 Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the
dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be
construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any
other governments.
 In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued
in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and
courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of
nations, laws and courts of Japan.
 It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues
until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY
BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative
act creates a change.
 Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines,
and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts
and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until
now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over
cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until
abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the
said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue
even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on
judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
4.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and
control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the
rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)
3.GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he
and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay.
Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization
Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business.
Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection
clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the
business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be
given equal opportunity.

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No.
3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and
corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They
add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency
from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may
import rice under its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute
valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA
2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American
jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements
has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not,
by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted
prior thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180.
The equal protection of the law clause “”does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced””; and, that the equal
protection clause “”is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.””
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls
in the Pasay city market.
5. LO CHING V ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA
Facts:
 On August 30, 1940, the Archbishop of Manila through the Bank of the
Philippine Islands leased a farm to Lo and So Yun Ching Chong Co. with Nos. 1095 with
1101 R. located at de la Calle Hidalgo, Manila, under a monthly income of P500 by the
end of three years counting from the first of September 1940, extendable to two years
(two years upon agreement of the parties). The tenant took the property by setting it in a
hotel.
 In February 1942, the Japanese army echoed the tenants of the property and
delivered the latter to German Otto Schulze who worked until January 1945 at the
advent of the liberation army.
 In early February 1945, tenant reoccupied the property and paid the monthly
rental fee. Before the end of August of that year, the landlord required the tenants to
vacate the property, however, they refused.
 Therefore, the landlord on September 8, 1945 filed for an application for
eviction in the Municipal Court of Manila. On October 8, 1945, it ordered the tenants to
vacate the property and pay its monthly rent of P625 from the first September 1945, plus
damages in the amount of P500 and legal expenses.
 The appellants contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three
full years, the occupation must be effective, and continuous material, which should not
be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property, and the appellants are entitled to
deduct that period of three years, all the time that no longer have the lease available to
the Japanese army.
Issue:
WON Hague Convention of 1907 allows occupation and seizure of private lands. WON
Japanese soldiers occupied the farm in dispute.
Held:
No. The Hague Convention of 1907 does not allow an occupying army to seize private
property in the territory invaded. In contrast, states that: "Family honor and rights, the
lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must
be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated." (Article 46).
The farm is not even used as army barracks, and there is no evidence that it was seized
by military necessity, what can be deduced that the Japanese soldiers disposed of the
property, not in the legitimate exercise the authority of an occupying army, but spurred
on by uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire to take over other people.
6. VICTOR BOROVSKY vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
Victor A. Borovsky, petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of
Russian parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided herein ever since, if the
period of his detention be included.
On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the
petitioner was arrested for investigation as to his past activities. A warrant for deportation was
issued by the Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been found to be an undesirable
alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard.
Petitioner was deported to China but he was not provided with an entry visa because he was
not a a national of China. He was therefore brought back to Manila and was confined to the
new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. On December 8, 1947, was granted provisional release by
the President through Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before the expiration of
that period, the Immigration department rearrested him and brought him to Cebu for the
purpose of placing him on board a Russian vessel carrying out the deportation order issued
against him. However, said deportation failed to materialize as the captain of the ship refused
to take him on board without permission from the Russian government. As such, petitioner
was again detained. The Immigration Officials however alleged that while in detention, they
have been taking steps regarding the disposition of those foreigners subject to deportation
while awaiting availability of transportation or arrangements to the place where they may be
sent.
Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to which the court denied as mainly on the
ground that such detention was merely temporary. Over two years had elapsed since the
decision was promulgated, but still the Government had not found ways and means of
removing the petitioner out of the country. Hence this second petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending deportation
HELD:
NO.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Soewapadji vs.
Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner
claims to be. Foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been
formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The
protection against deprivation of liberty, without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the
country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is
unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need not decide. There is no allegation that
the petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference from
the pleadings and the Deportation Board's findings is that he came to and lived in this country
under legal permit.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10,
1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human
beings were proclaimed. lt was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal
in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law"
(Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.
7. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v RALPH C. LANTION
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the
extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant
for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with
the request. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to
be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the
extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice
denied request on the following grounds:
He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that
point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition
Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of
the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the
documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge
Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested
papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize
them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules
of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
8. LLDA V CA
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order
to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces and towns.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to
grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…”
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and
the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the
lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological
stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:
(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March
31, 1993 are declared illegal;
(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for
Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of
RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issue
Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns
and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake
and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Held
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.
The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the
authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose
of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government
Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
9. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of
the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed
impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity
as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to
the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in
1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines
ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed
of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR
which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations
under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members
with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule
to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by
states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions
into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the
law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature
10. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people
that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its
legitimacy.
Rulings:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding
that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause
of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government.
11. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. GREGORIO PERFECTO
Facts:
On September 7, 1920, Gregorio Perfecto published an editorial for the newspaper La Nacion,
about the loss of documents in the Senate. The said documents were records of witness
testimonies regarding the investigation of Oil Companies. The Philippine Senate deemed the
editorial of Mr. Perfecto to be libellous and in direct violation of Article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code, which states, "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in
the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the
offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor,". Defendant argued whether Article 256 is still in force with
the new American occupation. Defendant was found guilty in the municipal court and also in
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not Mr. Gregorio Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
Held:
No. It is a general principle that whenever there is acquisition of new territory, the previous
political relations are totally abrogated, although some laws from the Spanish Penal Code are
still used in force, it was only done so because of convenience. However, with the new
American occupation all laws that are inconsistent with the democratic nature of the new
government are displaced without the need for any declaration.
Article 256 is a law that is monarchical in nature, aiming to protect ministers of the crown and
persons of authority as representatives of the king of Spain, upholding said officials as higher
from the general population and protecting them from contemptuous or dissatisfied statement
from the public. It is completely against the nature and the spirit of the American System of
Government which states that every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal
right with every other man.
12. Vilas vs City of Manila 42 Phil 935
Facts
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner
Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the
sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed
its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its
contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been
extinguished.
Issue
Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of
Manila to its creditor?
Held
No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense
the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of
the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental
functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new
City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the
creditors of the old City of Manila.
13. HOLY SEE V ROSARIO
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the
name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio,
which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy,
for his residence.
Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold
lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-
propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila,
not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal
are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot
not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed
accordingly.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because
both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent
Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See
says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this,
Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance
and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that
petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for
certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-
suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles
of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land
as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that
diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited
diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local
jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this
Court.