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PLATON

("Philosophy is the science of free men")

Biography:

Origin: Athens, 429/7-347 BC)

Real name is Aristocles. Plato is a nickname that means 'the broad-shouldered one'.
From a noble (aristocratic) family. Father, Ariston, descendant of King Atticus Codro;
mother, Perictione, descendant of Dropides, relative of Solon. He had the most careful
education that could be given to a young man. He showed a marked interest in poetry
and politics when, at the age of 20, he met Socrates, a decisive encounter for his life
and thought.

After the tragic death of Socrates, Plato settled for a while in Megara with another
disciple of Socrates, Euclid, the mathematician. He then travels to Egypt to enrich his
experience of the world and ideas. Finally he ends up in Athens, after a disastrous
political experience in Syracuse, where he had been invited by Dionysius the Elder. He
then founded the Academy, in the gardens dedicated to the Athenian hero Academos,
in 387 BC.

He does not abandon his interest in realizing his ideas politically. Thus, he returns
twice to Syracuse, this time invited by Dionysius the Younger, with the intention of
founding an ideal Republic there. Involved in partisan struggles without destination,
with the danger of his life, he flees from Sicily, this time never to leave Athens again.

The injustice of the oligarchic order and the errors of democracy led Plato to direct his
thought towards finding a solid foundation for establishing a just order: "Then I felt
irresistibly moved to praise true philosophy and to proclaim that only in its light can
one recognize where justice lies in public and private life. Thus, there will be no end to
evil for men until the race of pure and authentic philosophers comes to power or until
the heads of the cities, by a special grace of the divinity, do not truly begin to
philosophize".

Plato's works can be divided into three groups:

a) Youth dialogues, linked to the life, process and death of Socrates: Apology,
Chriton, Euthyphron, Alcibiades, Protagoras and others

b) Intermediate dialogues: Georgias, Menón, Banquete, some books of La República,

and others.

c) Last dialogues: some books of La República, Timeo, Las Leyes, Critias, etc.

Plato's writings

When confronted with the study of most ancient thinkers (especially pre-Socratic,
Sophist, Epicurean and Stoic) we are faced with the problem posed by the total
absence of sources, limiting ourselves to a handful of fragments and testimonies from
later authors. In the case of Plato and Aristotle, it is no longer a question of a shortage
of texts, but of a superabundance. This is why Plato's work poses two types of
problems: a) The authenticity and attribution of his works: it is necessary to separate
dubious and apocryphal works from the works that traditions attribute to him. b) The
chronological order of the works.

The problem of the classification of Plato's works already comes from antiquity.
Diogenes Laertius informs us of four systems of classification of Plato's works. The first
divides the Dialogues into two classes according to their intrinsic characters: the
dialoguesdidactic, which have as their object the teaching of truth, and the
dialogueszethiques, which have as their object the art of discovering it (ζητητιόν =
research). The second considers more the form than the substance, and classifies the
dialogues into three series: dramatic, narrative and mixed.others, and among them
Aristophanes of Byzantium, divided the dialogues into trilogies. Finally, the
classification attributed by Trasilo to Plato himself grouped his works into nine
tetralogies (thirty-four dialogues, the Apology, and the Letters).

We have mentioned lastly Trasilo's classification because, by virtue of its attribution to

Plato, it has been the dominant one in the editions of his works until the beginning of
the 20th century: J. Burnet's Greek edition, Platonis opera (1900), still preserves the
structure of the tetralogies. Here are the tetralogies of Trasilo: I (Euthyphron, Apology,
Chriton, Phaedon); II (Cratil, Teetetus, Sophist, Politician); III (Parmenides, Philebus,
Banquet, Phaedrus); IV (Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Hippocrates, Lovers); V (Teages,
Karmids, Laks, Lysis); VI (Eutidemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Mennon); VII (Hippia major,
Hippia minor, Ion, Menexenus); VIII (Clithophon, Republic, Timaeus, Critias); IX (Minos,
Laws, Epinomis, Letters).

Trasilo's classification leaves out of Plato's works a collection of Definitions and some
dialogues considered apocryphal from Antiquity (Of the Just, Of Virtue, Demodocus,
Sisyphus, Erixias, Axioco). But among the works included in the tetralogies there are
some of dubious attribution and others completely spurious. Therefore, the problem
of authenticity and attribution of his works is an essential aspect of the Platonic
problem. Philological criticism has used various criteria to judge the authenticity of
Platonic works:

1) Tradition and ancient testimonies. That ancient writers have considered a writing to
be authentic is always a presumption of authenticity. A work is considered authentic if
Aristotle or Cicero attribute it to the philosopher, or if quotations from one work are
found within another. Ancient commentaries and criticisms of Plato's works also have
evidential value, although with some reservations, since these testimonies sometimes
obey school criteria: Proclo declared the Republic, the Laws and the Letters
apocryphal.

2) The doctrinal content. A writing will be attributed to Plato if it harmonizes with his
philosophy. But this procedure raises the problem of the dialect: to define Plato first in
order to be able to judge the works later.
3º) The stylometric method. It consists of measuring the frequency with which certain
Greek words appear in order to determine a "style" of Plato's that allows to
authenticate a work according to its linguistic form. The stylometric method will also
be used to determine the chronological order of Plato's dialogues.

From the joint application of these criteria it can be said that there are a number of
works whose authorship is doubtful: Hippie Major, Clithophon, Epinomis, Letters
(except VI, VII and VIII whose authenticity seems beyond doubt). The authenticity of
other dialogues that appear in the tetralogies is generally rejected. The following
dialogues are spurious: Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Hipparchus, Lovers, Teages and
Minos, in addition to the collection of Definitions and the apocryphal dialogues that
the ancients had already rejected.

Plato's dialogues are not dated and critics have not been able to agree on a rigorous
timeline. Proof of this is the number of lists offered in the order of the dialogues by
Arnim, Lutoslawski, Raeder, Ritter, Wilamowitz, Cornford, Leisegang, Praechter,
Shorey, Taylor, Crombie and Ross.

The criteria frequently used to establish the chronology are the following: a)
references in the works to known historical events, b) references to each other, c)
relationship of dependence with respect to other works of the time whose date is
known to us, d) the doctrinal content, e) the stylometric method that takes the style
and vocabulary of the Laws (the last work Plato left unpublished according to news
from Diogenes Laertius) as patterns, and the affinity of the other dialogues with them
is examined. The application of all these criteria allows us to group the dialogues into
different periods, without expressing the chronological order within each period. To
these it is necessary to add the Letters.

a) Socratic or youthful works (393-389): Euthyphrus, Socrates' Apology, Criton, Ion,

Karmids, Lachrythos, Lysis, Protagoras.Plato reproduces in these works the ideas of his
master Socrates, without any reference to the theory of ideas.
(b) Transition dialogues (388-385): Minor Hippia, Major Hippia, Gorgias, Menexen,
Euthyde, Menon, Cratil. Along with the Socratic themes, the first outlines of the theory
of ideas appear. Analysis of language and Orphic themes of Pythagorean influence.

(c) Mature or dogmatic dialogues (385-371): Banquet, Phaedon Republic, Phaedrus.

The theory of ideas is consolidated as the basis of Platonic epistemology, ethics and
politics. Organization of the State and the theory of love. The great Platonic myths also
appear.

(d) Critical dialogues (370-347): Parmenides, Teetetus, Sophist, Politician, Timaeus,

Critics, Philebus, Laws, Epinomis They sometimes adopt a self-critical tone in the face
of their old conceptions. The ontological aspect of the theory of ideas loses importance
in front of its logical aspect. Socrates ceases to be the main character.

http://www.filosofia.org/bio/platon.htm
THE SOURCES

Platonic thought was formed in response to the seemingly hopeless problems left by
the old Heraclitus and the new problems created by his disciples on the principle of
universal flow. There was, on the other hand, and as an inalienable demand, the
principle formulated by Parmenides: that what is truly, must be one, immobile,
uncreated, imperishable, etc. But in the so-called 'real' world, the world in which we
live, nothing has the characteristics of the Parmenidian demand; on the contrary,
everything is subject to change and corruption, so it seems that the theory of universal
flow is undeniable.

If the theory of flow had been limited to natural phenomena and things, perhaps
neither Socrates nor Plato would have entered the controversy, as radically as they
did. But, if this flow is truly universal, as it is claimed, it must also be applied to man
and his acts and, also, to man's knowledge of things. And it is here that first Socrates,
then Plato, violently clashed with the Sophists, mostly Heracliites, who had transferred
the thesis of the master-everything flows into the conception of human life. In fact,
many Sophists maintained that, if Heraclitus' thesis was exact, if it was true that there
is nothing stable in things, then it is false to say, for example, that I know Socrates,
because when I knew him, Socrates was one thing, and now that I say 'I know
Socrates', Socrates is already something else.

And so do I. This means that any affirmation that compromises a reality beyond the
immediate instant in which it is presented to me, is an affirmation about something
that I no longer know, since both the one who knows (the cognoscenti) and the known
have changed, have become something else. Thus, only the sensation and the
judgment that refers to it will reflect the current state of things, their truth
(sensualism). But, this leads even further: the sensations Peter experiences are
different, and even opposite, to those experienced by John. And according to the
saying that only the sensation and the judgment coming from the sensation are true-
we will also have to accept that Peter and John are at the same time in the truth, even
if their judgments are openly contradictory. We will have to accept that the same
things are at the same time sweet and bitter, important and vain, sad and happy, just
and unjust, etc., for 'the

man is the measure of all things. Heraclitus' thought was developed in its implications
to the point where it became with the Sophists in subjectivism and relativism. And it is
said that the conviction that everything flows reached such an extreme that Cratilo,
Heraclitus' disciple, did not want to speak any more: to speak is to retain in words
what in reality is only a process; therefore he limited himself from that moment on to
indicate things with his finger.

As we have already said, may the Heavens and the Earth never have rest and be at
every moment a new Earth and new Heavens, this would not have greatly disturbed
Plato's thought, provided we concede that there is an entity capable of referring
yesterday's change to today's and tomorrow's; an entity that preserves in its soul the
continuity of itself and, because of this, the continuity of the world. In a word: as long
as the human soul is excluded from this universal process. However, if the soul of man
is nothing more than a sensation that is always different and at every moment
irrecoverable, then each individual is many souls, without any connection between
them, and ephemeral as the things of the world. And then, knowledge is an impossible
fact. Plato had contacts with a religious sect of lying origin] - the Orphics - by which he
was deeply influenced. From this contact derives perhaps Plato's sharp separation
between the reality of the body and that of the soul and the conviction that the latter
is indestructible, immortal.

How then to attack the Sophists in order to assert this conviction, the touchstone of
their philosophy? Like Socrates, by attacking the root of Rus's claims: heraclitism.

Plato will have to show first of all that change in this world of ours is not absolute; that
is to say, that in every alteration there is something that remains. Secondly, that unity
is by nature prior1 to multiplicity; that, for example, justice is by nature prior to the
multiplicity of just acts. And for this reason it is clear: because we call certain acts 'just'
insofar as they have something of the being of justice. Socrates had already
established this. Plato will masterfully apply, on a cosmic scale, what for his master
was only valid in the area of ethical acts.

CHANGE AND STABILITY

If we follow the history of any person or anything, we will have to recognize that at a
certain distance of time, most or even all of its visible physical properties (color, size,
shape, etc.), by which we recognized it as such a person or such a thing, have changed.

And if the sensitive properties in the thing have changed, then there must be other
sensations that we now have of these changing things. And up to this point the
Heracliteans would be right: if knowledge is limited to what we see, to what we touch,
in short if it is merely sensitive, such knowledge cannot guarantee that in two different
periods we are faced with 'the same thing'. However, guided by the mere meaning of
the words, we must recognize that all change is change that occurs in something, that
is, that what changes is an aspect of something that remains; for example, a change
that occurs in Peter, throughout his personal history, or a change that occurs in the
human race, throughout its slow evolution. In both cases, Peter continues to be Peter
and the human race continues to be human, through their respective changes and in
spite of them. It is undoubted," says Plato in El Cratilo, "that things possess by
themselves a certain permanent being, which is not relative to us and does not depend
on us. But neither is 'this permanent being' sensitive, since the sensitive is subject to all
sorts of changes.

There is, then, in each thing, something non-sensitive that remains identical (idem),
the same, throughout all the sensitive changes of the thing that changes. Something
for which we identify it (idem), recognize it and name it - 'Socrates', 'man',
'eucalyptus', etc. - despite all the changes it undergoes over time. That which remains
the same and for which the thing continues to be what it was and not something else,
is what Plato calls 'ousia', esse (being), and is defined as: that which makes a thing
continue to be what it was (despite all its changes). When we perceive a thing, not only
does it produce in us a sensation that is variable and different from all the others; it
also produces the apprehension of that which is stable and does not depend on us; this
is the apprehension of ousia (later translated as 'essence') which maintains the identity
of that which changes and which, as far as we are concerned, allows us to recognize it,
define it, name it.

THE THEORY OF IDEAS

We have so far gained the concept of ousia, of essence: the non-sensitive aspect that
keeps a thing in identity with itself. Let's go a step further. This or that individual, from
birth to old age, despite all the changes it experiences, maintains its identity as a man.
He is a man. We have seen that it is essence-what remains the same' in alteration or
change-that is the foundation of such an identity through time. But we men are
mortal. There is a moment when alteration1 triumphs-and definitely triumphs-over
identity: the individual Peter dies, and then he is no longer Peter, he is no longer man.

However, before they have been born, now they are being born and in the future
other men will be born, different from the Peter who died, different insofar as Peter
had such and such exclusively personal characteristics, but, identical insofar as they are
men. Thus, 'humanity' which is one and the same thing, repeats itself and multiplies
itself in an indefinite collection of men of flesh and blood, different from one another
in this or that, but who share the unique fact of being men. PARTICIPATE, Plato will
say, in the same way or, better, in the same Idea.

It seems to me that if there is anything beautiful besides beauty itself, it is not

beautiful for any other reason than that it participates in beauty, and so I say of
anything else ... No other cause makes it beautiful except the presence of, or
communion with, that beauty, however that may be, for I do not know for certain...
(Plato, Phaedon, XLIX, 100).

Thus, individual things -be they men of flesh and blood, be they trees, be they
beautiful things, etc.- form a multiplicity in space and time; however, inasmuch as they
participate in the same Idea ('Humanity', 'Beauty') they represent the same thing; and
the same is true of Justice, by whose unique presence certain acts are just; or of
Equality, by whose unique presence certain things are said to be equal. And so it is
with anything: we glimpse in it a form, whose presence makes it what it is, and to have
a common being, unique with other things: that is its Idea.

We are used to forging a particular idea for a multiplicity of things, to which we apply
the same name ... Let us now take the one you want from these multiplicities; for
example, if you want, there are many beds and many tables ... But, the ideas of this
furniture are two; one of bed and the other of table ... (Plato, REPUBLIC, x, 1596 aj)',

Let us leave, then, well established that while this or that kind of things (men, plants,
trees, actions, tables, beds, etc.) unfold and disperse in a multiplicity here and there,
yesterday and today, the Idea, by whose presence they are what they are, is one and
unstoppable.

It is something far from the case with this newspaper that I am reading: I see that it is
the same one that my sitting neighbor reads and the same one that is displayed at the
corner kiosk. What does it mean that it is the same one? It means that, for example, it
is El Comercio of 26 January 1979; that, therefore, each copy has identical content,
even though it is made of different sheets of paper. Strictly speaking, the content is
one and unstoppable, present, however, in each of the copies published that day.

Now, someone could destroy, paste, burn all the copies of the newspaper El Comercio
corresponding to January 26, 1979. Not because of that, however, would they burn the
ideas expressed there (the content); even less, the facts referred to by such ideas. All
that would somehow remain.

Let's go back to our own: in a distantly similar way, Ideas are immune to the ups and
downs that occur to things. Just acts or free expressions may disappear from a society,
and this does not mean that the Idea of Justice or the Idea of Freedom will no longer
be what they are. And the very fact that we say, for example, 'There is no longer
Justice in this world', is revealing to us that Justice is something whose being must be
recovered for the world; it reveals to us that even when it is something not realized
(not yet real) it exists with the force of demand: what it should be.
If we compare, then, the Ideas with the objects of which they are Ideas, we see that
they possess Unity in relation to the multiplicity of objects in which they are present;
we see, moreover, that they remain unaltered in relation to objects that are always
changing and transforming. Let us say something else: Ideas are the measure
-controlled by human intelligence- of the being of each thing. In fact, only by knowing
what the ideal Equality is can we correctly judge whether two things are more or less
equal (for they never will be exactly equal); or by knowing what the ideal Beauty is can
we judge whether that form or that body is truly beautiful.