EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G.

JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Prospero Cresceni, Gancayco, Balasbas & Associates, Saguisag & Associates,
Balisado Law Office, and Lazaro Law Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at

the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Accused-appellant filed
a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
Accused-appellant insisted that having been re-elected by his constituents, he
had the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. According to him, his
covenant with his constituents cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraint arising from pending criminal cases. He asserted that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
When the voters of his district elected accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results, which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five days or more in a week virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. As such, an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
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 certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
The Court found the election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions, which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restrict in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. The Court was constrained to rule against the
accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any
other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
Instant motion was denied.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PRIVILEGES ARISING FROM BEING

ELECTED MAY BE ENLARGED OR RESTRICTED BY LAW. — True, election is the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a
free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the
common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is
the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
2. ID.; ID.; RULING IN AGUINALDO CASE (212 SCRA 768, AT 773) DOES NOT
APPLY IN IMPRISONMENT ARISING FROM ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW;
CONFINEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS NOT REMOVAL. — Accused-appellant's
reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that — "The
Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people," will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be
readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY
IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AND DETENTION; GRANTED IN A RESTRICTIVE SENSE
AND MAY NOT BE EXTENDED BY INTENDMENT, IMPLICATION OR EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION. — The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the
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 provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. — The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department: Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; . . .. Because of the broad coverage of
felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal. The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege
of immunity as follows: Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and
returning from the same. For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation
of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is
illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit: . . . but the Batasang
Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. The present
Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has
also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session. cEaCTS

5. ID.; ID.; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CANNOT COMPEL ABSENT MEMBERS TO

ATTEND SESSION IF REASONS FOR ABSENCE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. — The
accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions
is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution . . .. However, the
accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
6. ID.; ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; ALLOWING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO
ATTEND CONGRESSIONAL SESSIONS AND COMMITTEE MEETINGS WOULD BE A
MOCKERY OF THE PURPOSES OF CORRECTION SYSTEM; EMERGENCY OR
COMPELLING TEMPORARY LEAVES FROM IMPRISONMENT ARE ALLOWED TO ALL
PRISONERS AT DISCRETION OF AUTHORITIES OR UPON COURT ORDERS. —
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. What the
accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5)
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
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 appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are
the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: . . .
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS A DETAINEE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED TO DISCHARGE HIS DUTY AS MEMBER THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — No
less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he
attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has
been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated,
accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House
of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these
acts. When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,
they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They
did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

8. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; PERFORMANCE OF

LEGITIMATE DUTIES BY PUBLIC OFFICER IS NOT AN EXCUSE TO FREE A PERSON
VALIDLY IN PRISON. — The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with
the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION TO POSITION OF CONGRESSMAN IS NOT A
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. — The Court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. We, therefore,
find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AFTER CONVICTION IN REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, ACCUSED MAY BE DENIED BAIL AND THUS SUBJECTED TO
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 INCARCERATION IF THERE IS A RISK OF HIS ABSCONDING; RATIONALE BEHIND
CONFINEMENT; CASE AT BAR. — One rationale behind confinement, whether
pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must
protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person
charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which
State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the
complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be
denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place
of confinement. It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's
arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in
the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender
voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he
initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present
motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being
contrary to well-defined Constitutional restraints, it would be a mockery of the
aims of the State's penal system.
11. WORDS AND PHRASES; IMPRISONMENT, ELABORATED. — Imprisonment is
the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to
prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. More explicitly,
"imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is
personal to the accused. The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty
of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free
action according to his own pleasure and will. Imprisonment is the detention of
another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint
within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier." It can be seen from the
foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in
society. Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the
security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide
rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of
certain rights.

GONZAGA-REYES, J ., concurring opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; CONTINUED INCARCERATION

OF ACCUSED IS A VALID CURTAILMENT OF HIS RIGHTS TO PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION. — The Bill of Rights provides — All
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. This constitutional provision
denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
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 Procedure. The trial court found which accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina we
held that the trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of
guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration
of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his
rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY
IMMUNITY FROM ARREST; GRANT OF ACCUSED'S MOTION TO ALLOW HIM TO
ATTEND LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS CONSTITUTE AN UNJUSTIFIED BROADENING
THEREOF. — Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from
arrest to legislators provide legal justification for accused-appellant's motion. The
Constitution states that — A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof. I agree with the ponencia that to allow
accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified
broadening of the privilege from arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon
members of Congress. Neither the legislative history of this provision nor the
general principles of official immunity support an expanded interpretation of
such privilege.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSCRIBED BY NATURE OR GRAVITY OF OFFENSE
CHARGED; COULD ONLY BE INVOKED FOR RELATIVELY MINOR OFFENSES,
PUNISHABLE AT MOST BY CORRECTIONAL PENALTIES. — It was never the
intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member
of Congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus, despite the
widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, the privilege from arrest is still
circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the offense of which the accused is
charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by
afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of
the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by
correctional penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe, "when it comes to
freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE; REASON. — The
accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable
b y reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the
privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above stated
rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional
privilege is not in order.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABILITY THEREOF TO ACCUSED IS ALREADY MOOT AND
ACADEMIC; REASON. — Under the factual circumstances of this case, the
applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal
process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused
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 by means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely
being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and
convicted by the trial court.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICIALS; DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION
CANNOT APPLY TO CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH RE-ELECTED OFFICIAL MAY HAVE
COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM. — Accused-appellant's contention
that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an
expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police
power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec, Aguinaldo v. Santos and in
Salalima v. Guingona we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his
re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove therefor. This doctrine
of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected
official may have committed during his previous term. The administrative
liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal liability.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress

who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1 is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense. cdtai

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are
called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial
interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member
of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that —
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be
rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even
the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation
without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the
people.
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 4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to
be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions
of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges
a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when
allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He
states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He
calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of
the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government —
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to
high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of
general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption. cdll

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; . . ..

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
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 immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going
to and returning from the same. Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent
to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to
the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for
a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon
its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of
the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee
meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that
Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which
states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 2 which states,
inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason
of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the
above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It
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 removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It
does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified. cdasia

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final

conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 3 it is the injury to
the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury
to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may
be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his
absconding. 4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place
of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued,
he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to
the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned
which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal
system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City
Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the
Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical
Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this
case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the
purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)
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 planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his
own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area
and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist
in Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his

heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member
of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this
regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: 5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by
policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them
to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except
the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free
speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from
arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a
delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need
for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering
that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not
go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting
arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to
the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown
around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of
power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of
judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of

Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated
as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of
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 temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his
mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when
he is allowed to leave jail. dctai

We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he
attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has
been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated,
accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House
of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these
acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so
with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration,
if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full
term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws." 6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs
of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed,
the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise.
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 The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. 8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply
to all those belonging to the same class. 10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised
upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. 11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's
liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal,
and is personal to the accused. 12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of
his free action according to his own pleasure and will. 13 Imprisonment is the
detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion 14
and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of
restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual's status in society. 16 Prison officials have the difficult and often
thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well
as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into
the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights. 17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's
claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State. cdtai

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, JJ., concur in the main and
separate opinion.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.
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 Separate Opinions
GONZAGA-REYES, J ., concurring opinion:

For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-appellant Romeo G.

Jalosjos, who has been convicted by the trial court of two counts of statutory
rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently
pending appeal before this Court. As a member of the House of Representatives,
accused-appellant claims that his constituents are deprived of representation by
reason of his incarceration pending appeal of the judgment of conviction and that
he should therefore be allowed to discharge his legislative functions, including
attendance of legislative sessions and committee meetings.
I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago in holding that accused-appellant's motion is bereft of any legal merit.
Cdpr

The Bill of Rights provides —

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required. 1 (emphasis supplied)

This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz —
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape,
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina 2 we held that the
trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the
crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-
appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to
provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to
legislators provide legal justification for accused-appellant's motion. The
Constitution states that —
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof. 3
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 I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend legislative
sessions would constitute an unjustified broadening of the privilege from arrest
bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the legislative
history of this provision nor the general principles of official immunity support an
expanded interpretation of such privilege.
Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution 4 limited the privilege
from arrests to "all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace." This
provision was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which was in
turn based upon the American Constitution. In accordance with American
precedents, the words "treason, felony and breach of the peace" have been
construed to include all indictable offenses. 5 Thus, under the 1935 Constitution
the freedom from arrest only encompassed civil arrests.
Under the 1973 6 and 1987 Constitutions, the privilege was broadened to include
arrests for crimes punishable by imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the
expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress
immunity from arrest remained the same — to ensure that they are not
prevented from performing their legislative duties. 7 In fact, the 1986
Constitutional Commission rejected the proposal of one of its members to
expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity to include searches because,
unlike arrests, it was not demonstrated that the conduct of searches would
prevent members of Congress from discharging their legislative functions. 8
It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a necessary adjunct to
the vigorous and effective performance of official functions. Members of
Congress, in particular, who are called upon to exercise their discretion and
judgment in enacting laws responsive to the needs of the people, would certainly
be impeded in the exercise of their legislative functions if every dissatisfied
person could compel them to vindicate the wisdom of their enactments in an
action for damages or question their official acts before the courts. 9
It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to
shield a member of Congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus,
despite the widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, the privilege from
arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the offense of which
the accused is charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes
punishable by afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within
the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only invoke
the immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by
correctional penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe, 10 "when it comes to
freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same." dctai

The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is

punishable by reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled
to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above-
stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the
constitutional privilege is not in order.
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case,
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 the applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot
and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the
criminal process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the
accused by means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of
merely being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried
and convicted by the trial court.
Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his
mandate and that such an expression of the popular will should not be rendered
inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec,
11 Aguinaldo v. Santos 12 and in Salalima v. Guingona 13 we laid down the
doctrine that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot
apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during
his previous term. 14 The administrative liability of a public officer is separate
and distinct from his penal liability.
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since
the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application
of our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be
based upon an express constitutional grant. cdphil

I vote to deny the motion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.

2. 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].

3. 19 Phil. 208, 212.

4. Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].

5. 44 SCRA 37 [1972].

6. Art. III, Sec. 1.

7. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

8. Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.

9. See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.

10. See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155;
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission
on Elections, 96 SCRA 763 [1980]; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
11. Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
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 12. 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.]
C.C.C.A. Kan., 140 F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p.
470.
13. Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.

14. Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1087.

15. Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
16. Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights,
3rd ed., p. 121.

17. Ibid.
GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring:

1. 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.

2. 221 SCRA 209 (1993).

3. Art. VI, Sec. 11.

4. Art. VI, Sec. 15. — The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech and debate therein,
they shall not be questioned in any other place.

5. Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S.
425.
6. Art. VIII, Sec. 9 — A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the
same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess
or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do
so. A member shall not be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Batasan or in any committee thereof.

7. 1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.

8. Ibid., 178-185.

9. Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.

10. Supra.
11. Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.

12. 212 SCRA 768 (1992).

13. 257 SCRA 55 (1996).

14. Salalima v. Guingona, id.

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