Bayan Muna vs.

Secretary Ermita

Read only the portion where the Court said that the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response did not meet
the sufficient standard test.

Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not
act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not
produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and
part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date
can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show
a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the
authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be
peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people,
especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their
prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against
the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the
weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy
presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny."26

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot
be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates
the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
"maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors
of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear
and present danger" standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under
B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the
law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom
parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only
requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination
and orderly activities.

People vs Jalosjos

Read the portion of the decision why after his conviction, Representative Jalosjos cannot invoke
the privilege of freedom from arrest.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position.
In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement
of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by
Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

prisoners.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners,
at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee

meetings will virtually make him a free man

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time,
he may no longer serve his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5

days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that
of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue
favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. (People vs. Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000)

Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters

Discussion in close-door Cabinet mee3ngs.

NO. The people’s right to informa3on is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, the cons3tu3onal guarantee to informa3on “does not open every door to any and
all informa3on.” It is limited to maFers of public concern, and is subject to such limita3ons as may
be provided by law. Likewise, the State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transac3ons
involving public interest, and is further subject to reasonable condi3ons prescribed by law.
NOTE (Do not copy):
Two requisites must concur before the right to informa3on may be compelled by writ of
mandamus. Firstly, the informa3on sought must be in rela3on to maFers of public concern or
public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the opera3on of the
cons3tu3onal guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a par3cular
informa3on is of public concern or public interest. As such, is leN to the proper determina3on of
the courts on a case to case basis. As for the second requisite, the respondents claim (and the
court agrees) exemp3on on the ground that the May 23, 2005 mee3ng was classified as a
closeddoor Cabinet mee3ng by virtue of the commiFee’s composi3on and the nature of its
mandate dealing with maFers of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the
informa3on withheld was within the scope of the exemp3on from disclosure because the CTRM
mee3ngs were directly related to the exercise of the sovereign preroga3ve of the President as the
Head of State in conduct of foreign affairs and the regula3on of trade.