 The United States v. Toribio, G.R. No. L-5060 (1910).

Significance: This case highlights the State’s Police Power to further the general welfare of the Filipino
people.

[What is the prevailing statute/ rule?

Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. The respondent
violates the Sections 30 and 33 of the Act which prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural
work or other draft purposes for human consumption without permit.

-The respondent contends that the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private
property.

- the court says that the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural
work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use,"
- The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-
100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested
with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy
the requisites of a valid exercise of police power.
- The court affirmed.

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]
POLICE POWER-The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same. (The United States v. Toribio, G.R. No. L-5060 (1910).

POLICE POWER - "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of

(1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property,

(2) in order to foster the common good.

It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, GR 81958)1988

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost

impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the
State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be coextensive with self-
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active

of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is

it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of

nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of

police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and

public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human

foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public

interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot

delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the

State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not

define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth

the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the

equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following

provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection

of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and

freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in

their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class

privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not

intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is

directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those

persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,

and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within

such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in

pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public

welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the

legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient

foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a

capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the

means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These

are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and

equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and

the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said,

the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic

society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny.

Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So

the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process

of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given

the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police

power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a

reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and

classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the
courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the

constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining

the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,

adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the

police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve

public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual

liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of

the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent

or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover,

courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the

wisdom of the law.

Case: Ichong V Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995 (1957)

  Churchhill & Tait v. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572 (1915).

Significance: This emphasizes the value of sight to public welfare and the State’s power to declare a
billboard as a nuisance.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing
any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign,
signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond
given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the
commencement of this action.

A source of annoyance and irritation to the public does not minister to the comfort and convenience of
the public. And we are of the opinion that the prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of
billboards which are offensive to the sight.

. But we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or
billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public.

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]

There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to
the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature
which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes
with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act
is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it
should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper
in the premises for those of the Legislature. In Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.S., 113), the United States
Supreme Court states the rule thus: "If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such statute, then
we may declare this one void because in excess of the legislative power of this state; but if it could, we
must presume it did. Of the propriety of legislative interference, within the scope of the legislative
power, a legislature is the exclusive judge."

“Section 5: Regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Collector of Internal Revenue shall have
the power, and it shall be his duty, to make regulations, not inconsistent with law, necessary to carry
this Act into full effect and to secure a harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the
service. Such regulations may be either general or local in application and shall become effective as law
when approved by the Department Head and published.”
http://www.philippinephilatelist.net/Reading/Revenues/warren/chapter21/c20p8.html
Article Four - Barangays

SEC. 152. Scope of Taxing Powers. - The barangays may levy taxes, fees, and charges, as provided in this
Article, which shall exclusively accrue to them:

(d) Other Fees and Charges - The barangay may levy reasonable fees and charges:

(1) On commercial breeding of fighting cocks, cockfights and cockpits;

(2) On places of recreation which charge admission fees; and cralaw

(3) On billboards, signboards, neon signs, and outdoor advertisements. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

OF THE PHILIPPINES
  Rubi et al v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).

Significance: This is an important case as it shows how the government can discriminate against certain
people and impinge on their liberty especially since majority consisted of Christians.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]
  Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 (1927).

Significance: This embodies the Principle of Separation of Powers specifically, the power to appoint as
an executive function.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]
  Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025 (1929).

Significance: This declares the right of a person against self-incrimination particularly, the rule against
the act of requiring an accused to do an act which is not purely mechanical.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

-The Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le
obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our
Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.

-As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law,
which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." -- the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to
compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in
short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.

-The court orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]

- JONES LAW 1916 (PAR 3)

That no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law; and no person
for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.

- Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

  Angara v. The Electrical Commission, 63 Phil. 134 (1936).

Significance: This case stresses on the system of checks and balances, specifically judicial
review/supremacy and jurisdiction of electoral tribunal.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]

Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution: (The legislative power was vested in National Assembly)

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

Section 4, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: (The legislative power shall be vested in congress)

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall
serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he
was elected.
  Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-46496 (1940).

Significance: This case enunciates the right of workers to administrative due process.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

Commonwealth act no. 103, sec 1:

There is hereby created a Court of Industrial Relations, which shall have jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter, controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or
farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of this Act. The Court shall keep a record of all its proceedings and shall be presided over by-a
Judge to be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly. The Judge of the Court shall hold office during good behavior
until he reaches the age of seventy years,-or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office
His qualifications shall be the same as those provided in the Constitution for members of the Supreme
Court and he shall receive an annual compensation of ten thousand pesos and shall be entitled to
traveling expenses and per diems when performing official duties outside of the City of Manila. The
Department of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Court.
(PAR 2, SEC4 ) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to
reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.

-Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 103 (1936)

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 103 - AN ACT TO AFFORD PROTECTION OF LABOR BY CREATING A COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS EMPOWERED TO FIX MINIMUM WAGES FOR LABORERS AND MAXIMUM
RENTALS TO BE PAID BY TENANTS, AND TO ENFORCE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BETWEEN
EMPLOYEES OR LANDLORDS, AND EMPLOYEES OR TENANTS, RESPECTIVELY; AND BY PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION OF ITS ORDERS

ARTICLE XIII (1987 CONSTITUTION)

LABOR

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to
investments, and to expansion and growth.
  Cristobal v. Labrador et al., 71 Phil. 34 (1940).

Significance: This highlights the executive power to grant an absolute pardon restoring full political and
civil rights.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]

Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of 1935Constitution,

"(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem pro to impose. He shall have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly."

1987 constitution:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.

 Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945).

Significance: This case shows the kinds of de facto governments and the corresponding operation of
laws during their time.
[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]

 United States v. Ah Chong (1910)

Significance: This case provides mistake of fact as an exempting circumstance.

[What is the prevailing state/ rule?

How did this change interpretation of laws and prevailing jurisprudence/ present era?]
Tala Realty Services Corporation, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals and Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank

G. R. No. 130088, 7 April 2009

No right is created where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision.

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) filed before 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTC) 17
complaints for reconveyance of different properties against Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala
Realty) et al.

Banco Filipino‘s complaints commonly alleged that in 1979, expansion of its operations required the
purchase of real properties for the purpose of acquiring sites for more branches; that as Sections 25(a)
and 34 of the General Banking Act limit a bank‘s allowable investments in real estate to 50% of its capital
assets, its board of directors decided to warehouse some of its existing properties and branch sites.
Thus, Nancy L. Ty, a major stockholder and director, persuaded Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas
Aguirre, both major stockholders of Banco Filipino, to organize and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and
purchase real properties in trust for Banco Filipino; that after the transfer of Banco Filipino properties to
Tala Realty, the Aguirres‘ sister Remedios prodded her brother Tomas to, as he did, endorse to her his
shares in Tala Realty and registered them in the name of her controlled corporation, Add International.

Thus, Nancy, Remedios, and Pedro Aguirre controlled Tala Realty, with Nancy exercising control through
her nominees Pilar, Cynthia, and Dolly, while Remedios exercised control through Add International and
her nominee Elizabeth. Pedro Aguirre exercised control through his own nominees, the latest being Tala
Realty‘s president, Rubencito del Mundo.

In the course of the implementation of their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of
its properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to Banco Filipino the properties for 20 years, renewable
for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty
decided to sell them.

Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals,
deposits, and goodwill, with a threat to eject Banco Filipino. Thus arose Banco Filipino‘s 17 complaints
for reconveyance against Tala Realty.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the trust agreement is void

HELD:

In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court, by Decision
dated November 22, 2002, ruling on one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against Banco
Filipino arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance cases subject of the present
petitions, held that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced.

An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as the Court has held that
“where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.”

The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its
purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it “warehoused” its branch site holdings to Tala
to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in
Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the
General Banking Act which it had already reached.

Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking
Act and that its “warehousing agreement” with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus,
the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its
right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a “first preference to buy” at the “same
transfer price.” This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus,
while the Court finds the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties,
the Court cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. In the words
of the Court in the Ramos case, “the courts will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by
enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the ‗clean hands‘ doctrine.” The Bank cannot thus
demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship with Tala.