I.

Fundamental Powers of the State

A.Police Power

1. Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon (G.R. No. L-81989, June

30, 1988)
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
YES. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity.  13 In the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives
for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another
person or group of persons

2. Ichong v. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-7998, May 31, 1957)

Sec. 1 Art. III. These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual
liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly
universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality.
The, equal protection clause. merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
The due process clause. —
has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police
power.
The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and
a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or
his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the
lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor
immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this
country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the
earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and
countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such
utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it
has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a
genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to
general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries
that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest
in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to
continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over
the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to
hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and
the other.
a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is
without reasonable basis.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258,
Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power
of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

3. Lutz v. Araneta (G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955)

At any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling
out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation
Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure tax measure, it cannot be said that the
devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar
production, utilization of by-products and solution of allied problems, as well as to the
improvements of living and working conditions in sugar mills or plantations, without any
part of such money being channeled directly to private persons, constitutes expenditure
of tax money for private purposes,
4. Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No.
89572, December 21, 1989)
Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients
may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The
three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is
entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved;
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students
and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The
medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same
delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

5. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)
WON the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness.
there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example,
bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on
human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of
the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be
summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be
cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy
restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may
be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved
or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present
danger.

The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far
outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows
him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often
unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some
relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper
but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi
est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No.
626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the
reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely
on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on
these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it
had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the
live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional.

6. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta (G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983)
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
No. the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power is
defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his
property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote
the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government
for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which
empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation.

B. Power of Eminent Domain

1. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (G.R. No. 14335, October 31,
1919)
In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear
proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?
It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain
is presented to the legislative department of the government and that department
decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the right in a particular
case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of the
legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But, when
the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken,
 then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts.
Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court,
the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limene.
Certainly, the legislative declaration relating to the advisability of granting the power
cannot be converted into a declaration that a necessity exists for its exercise in a
particular case, and especially so when, perhaps, the land in question was not within
the territorial authority was granted.
But when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their
property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof
upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority.
although the legislature must necessarily determine in the first instance whether the use
for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a public one or not,
their (municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to correction by the
courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it shall clearly
appear that the use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking of private property is
in reality not public but private."
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or
convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of
eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate.
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the
right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or
not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the
right to inquire into.

And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely
decided that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described
in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7, and E clearly indicate that the municipal board
believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed improvement,
thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead.
Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the
defendants further contend that the street in question should not be opened through the
cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery is public property. If that
allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for public use.
The city of Manila can only expropriate private property.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a
cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is
used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood.
. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason
that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public
property.
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the
city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.

2. Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (G.R. No. L-18841, January
27, 1969)
the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and
that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that the real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the
PLDT’s lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone
systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden
for public use and benefit. If, under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State
may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a
public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is
paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

3. People v. Fajardo (G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958)

In 1950 Municipal Ord. No.7 was enacted prohibiting construction of building without permit.

On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the
proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza . appellants
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a
place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon
and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has
absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or
to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by
requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated.
It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The
ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or
deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid
(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv.
Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)
Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates
to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property
without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard
the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general
welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property
and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be
erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the
ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from
the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle
and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character.
To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation
and an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used

for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized
as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between
restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the
burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that
burden. Mun. Ord. No. 7 declared null and void. Appellants acquitted.

4. Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974)

"‘Taking’ under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon
private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of
legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment thereof."
First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and
occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that
in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and
deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
We hold, therefore, that the "taking’ of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as
of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of
lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did
not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when
the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. (Republic v. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1
SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959.
The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed.

5. Amigable v. Cuenca (G.R. No. 26400, February 29, 1972)

Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 with an area of 6,167 square
meters evidenced by TCT issued by RD Cebu City in 1924. In 1959, Amigable filed for
the recovery of ownership and possession. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved. Road
widening happened in 1924 or 1925.
whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of
the case.
in a case involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the
widening held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner
for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated
sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion
of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land
in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it has been and is now being used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for
the land appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the price or value thereof
at the time of the taking.
The owner of the land is entitled to damages in the form of legal interest on the price of
the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the
government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of
which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

6. Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-119694, May 22, 1995)
PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground
that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its
agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions
specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to
specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the
period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a
week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial
indeed.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes.
Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently
the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought
to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper
publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or
perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and
magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the
purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does
not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will,
in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec
purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.

whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of

the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to

7. Sumulong v. Guerrero (G.R. No. L-106440, January 29, 1996)

WON socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the
purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a
handful of people, bereft of public character."
The "public use" requirement for and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the
statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that
a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking
is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing
is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution
made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further.
See Art. 2 and Art XIII sec 9.
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since
it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the
general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because
units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy
prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide
housing for are who need it, all at once.

In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within
the confines of "public use". It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph
(d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing,
or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the
public purpose of the project.
In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land
meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the
NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to
low-salaried government employees.
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the
particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how
much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross
abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate, the Court will give
due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the
project. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their
judgment some other property would have been more suitable, or just as suitable, for
the purpose. The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is
tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered.

This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as
amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of
expropriation. However, as previously held by this Court, the provisions of such decrees
on just compensation are unconstitutional; and in the instant case the Court finds that
the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing
immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process.

8. Manosca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-106440, January 29, 1996)

Petitioner Manosca inherited a land in taguig, 492-square-meter parcel of land
which declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national historical
landmark, when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of
1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark.

WON the expropriation of the birthsite of Manalo is within the term public use?
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be
considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. 
This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration,
for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences
that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker
is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the
culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the  Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains
to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence
and character of public use.

9. EPZA v. Dulay (G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987)

whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed
and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in
determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis
should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower. , is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional?

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of
justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro
and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just
compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the instant
petition for lack of merit.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile
in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the
power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable
decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is
seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before
the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings
would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence
in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the
judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just
compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to
determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to
this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination of
just compensation on the value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined
by the Assessor, whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the landowner's
right of due process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as mandated by
the Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123). The tax declaration under the Real
Property Tax Code is, undoubtedly, for purposes of taxation."
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the
decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-
established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should
live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights."
Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just
compensation.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.
To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the
first place.

10. Municipality of Paranaque v. VM Realty Corp. (G.R. No. L-127820, July 20,
1998)
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The
Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for
the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the
Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does
not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the
legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of
1993 is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180
[sic] in the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III
of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals 28 to show that a resolution may
suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. 29 This case, however, is
not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local
Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, 31 the present Local Government Code
which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly
required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.
An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general
and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two
are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. 33
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the
local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of
eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are
properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also
true of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs. De Knecht, 49 the Court ruled
that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not
diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be
expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its
authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not
only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social
justice.