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1. That the offender employs force or intimidation with the aim to attain of any of
the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects in the crime of sedition
without public uprising; and
2. That the offender either makes an attack, employs force, makes a serious
intimidation, or makes a serious resistance against a person in authority or his
agent and at the time of the assault, the latter is engaged in the actual performance
of official duties, or that he is assaulted by reason of his past performance of
official duties and with knowledge that the person assaulted is a person in
authority or his agent without rising publicly.
An illustration in the first form of direct assault is where a chief of police
accompanied by four other policemen who are all armed, went to the house of the
municipal president and compelled him by force to the municipal building, where they
kept him for four hours because they have not been given their salaries were held
guilty of direct assault. The Supreme Court held that the accused herein used force
without rising publicly. Further, the purpose of the accused in detaining the municipal
president, they inflicted an act of hate or revenge against a public officer which is one
of the objects of the crime of sedition. (U.S vs. Durain)
One main distinction between the first form and the second form of direct assault is
that in the first form, it is not necessary that the offended party is a person in authority
or an agent of the latter. It is sufficient that the aim of the offender is to attain an
object of sedition or the purpose of rebellion.
In the old case of Clarin vs. Justice of the Peace, it was held that the act of the accused
in preventing by force of a popular election in certain precincts, without public
uprising, is direct assault in its first form.
Going to the second form of direct assault, there are several ways of committing the
same which are the making of an attack, employing force, making serious
intimidation, or making a serious resistance.
It is worthy of note that the modality of intimidation and resistance are qualified with
the word “serious”. An example of serious intimidation as held in the case of People
vs. Diama is when the accused pointed a gun at a military police captain who is in the
performance of his duty. On the contrary, the act of threatening to give a fist blow to a
policeman when the latter was arresting the accused is not constitutive of direct
assault by intimidation.
For this purpose, a person in authority is a person who is directly vested with
jurisdiction which is otherwise known as the power and authority to govern and
execute the laws. It is also important to emphasize that the status of a person in
authority is a matter of law as such, ignorance thereof is not an excuse.
On the other hand, an agent of a person in authority is one who, by direct provision of
law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property.
It is worthy of note that a justiciable question has been expanded by the 1987
Constitution which not includes that duty of the courts to determine whether nor not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
For this purpose, questions and considerations which affect the wisdom, efficacy, or
practicability of a law should come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.
An illustration of this is one of the grounds for impeachment which is “other high
crimes” the interpretation of which is lodged in the Congress as they are the sitting
judges on an impeachment case. Even if the Supreme Court might have a contrary
view, it would not be competent for it to insist on its own thinking and substitute it for
the decision of the legislature.
Another illustration of a political question was seen in the case of Custodio vs, Senate
President where a taxpayer challenged the validity of certain provision of a general
appropriations law that compensated the members of the Congress for services
rendered during the Japanese Occupation was held to be a pure political question as
the same affects the wisdom and propriety of the law.
In correction with the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to
interfere over matters which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Executive or Legislative Branch. A more specific rule is that the courts will not
interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing
an information in the absence of abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by a law.
The determination of abuse of discretion lodged upon the judiciary does not make it
superior to either the Legislative or the Executive Branch. As with cases of
nullification of a certain law, the Supreme Court held in the case of Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management that in order to
justify such a nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt, or insufficiency of evidence for
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to
invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of
the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. This
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there is an indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
The power shall continue to be in full force until the notice is rescinded in the same
manner in which it was given.”
Jurisprudence holds that one who clothes another with an apparent authority as his
agent and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to dent the
authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of third persons dealing
with such apparent agent in good faith.
In the case of Litonjua Jr. vs. Eternit Corp., the Supreme Court laid down the
requisites for an agency by estoppel to exist, to wit:
The sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisher-folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. In summation, secirals parties are those which are either “marginalized
and underrepresented” or “lacking in well-defined political constituencies”.
In the case of BANAT vs. COMELEC, the Court stated that for every four district
representatives, the Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list
representative. In the same case, the Supreme Court also laid down the rules on the
election of party-list representatives, to wit:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
As to the qualifications of a party-list representative, he shall have the same
qualifications as the other members of the House of Representatives. In addition to
such requirements, the party-list representative must be a bona fide member of the
party he seeks to represent at least ninety days before the day of the election. Lastly,
with respect to a sectoral party-list representative, one must either “belong to the
sector represented or have a track record of advocacy for such sector”. In cases of
youth representatives, the individual must not be more than thirty years old.
How is Bribery Committed?
How is Bribery Committed?
There are two types of Bribery: Direct Bribery and Indirect Bribery. Direct bribery is
committed by either a) by a public officer who agrees to perform or by performing, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present – an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties; b) by accepting a gift in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in
connection with his official duty; and c) by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from
doing something which it is his official duty to do, in consideration of a gift or
promise.
On the other hand, indirect bribery is committed by any public officer who shall
accept gifts offered by him by reason of his office.
The two crimes are separately defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code
and its distinctions are:
1. In direct bribery, there exists an agreement between the public officer and the
giver of the gift or present, whereas in indirect bribery, usually, no such agreement
exists.
2. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform, performs, or refrains to do an
act in connection with his official duties because of the gift or promise. On the
other hand, in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do any
particular act in connection with the gift or promise.
Another important category of bribery is qualified bribery. A bribery is considered
qualified under the following circumstances:
Piracy, under the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who, on the
high seas or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seaize a vessel or, not being a
member of its implements nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.
Piracy is different from mutiny. The main distinction between the two is that in
piracy, the persons who attack or seize its cargo are strangers to said vessel; while
in mutiny, they are members of the crew or passengers.
Piracy is qualified, under the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of Piracy is
committed under any of the following circumstances: a) whenever they have seized
the vessel by boarding or firing upon the same; b) whenever the pirates have
abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves; or c) whenever the
crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries, or rape.
The Doctrine of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree postulates that evidence will be
excluded if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an illegal arrest,
unreasonable search or coercive interrogation, or violation of a particular
exclusionary law.
This Doctrine is otherwise known as the Exclusionary Rule which is embodied in
Section 3 (2), Article 3, of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.” This provision prevents the government from
using pieces of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, particularly the
provisions on the Bill of Rights. It aims to protect its citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures conducted by the State through its agents like the military
and other law enforcement agencies. The provision tells us that evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures is
deemed polluted, stained or contaminated and should be excluded for being a fruit
of the poisonous tree.
Hence, it is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of
the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.
The Stop-and-Frisk Rule otherwise known as the Terry Doctrine from the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, consists of two parts – a valid “stop” by and
officer requires that he has reasonable and articulable belief that a criminal activity
has happened or is about to happen. The “frisk” made after the” stop” must be
done because of a reasonable belief that the person stopped is in possession of a
weapon that will pose a danger to the officer and others. The “frisk” must be a
mere pat down outside the person’s outer garment and not unreasonably intrusive.
This rule serves two purposes – 1) the general interest of crime prevention and
detection; and 2) the safety of the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals with is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
be used against him.
Because of the important interest in protecting the safety of police officers, the
Court held that a law enforcement officer has the authority to stop someone and do
a quick surface seach of their outer clothing for weapons. This is allowed if the
officer has a reasonable belief based on a genuine reason, and in the light of the
officer’s experience and the surrounding circumstances, that a crime has either
taken place or is about to take place and the person stopped is armed and
dangerous.
Treason is defined under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code and is committed
by any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of
the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to
their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere.
The nature of the crime of treason, in its general sense, is the violation by a subject
of his allegiance to his sovereign or to the supreme authority of the State.
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in the
time of peace. While there is peace. There are no traitors. Treason may be
incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during
peace. But there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense
and self-preservation. It is an emergency measure and remains dormant until the
emergency rises. But as soon as a war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect.
Legal separation is the separation of spouses from bed and board. While it permits
the partial suspension of marital relations, the marriage bond still exists as the
marital bonds are not severed as in the case of annulment or petition for nullity.
It differs from declaration of nullity of marriage which applies to marriages that are
null and void from the beginning (void ab initio), due to the absence of at least one
of the essential or formal requisites of marriages. Legal separation is also different
from annulment of marriage which applies to marriages which are valid and
existing until annulled.
If a legal separation decree is issued by the proper court has the effect of allowing
the spouses to live separately from each other. Further, the property relations of the
spouses shall be dissolved and liquidated. The offending spouse in a case of legal
separation shall also be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
virtue of intestate succession. A decree of legal separation shall also have the effect
of awarding to the innocent spouse the custody of minor children except for
children under seven years of age who shall not be separated from his/her mother.
Libel, according the to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is "the public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead"
In the case of Novicio vs. Aggabao, the Supreme Court held that in determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety
and taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by person reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
Further, in the crime of libel, it is not the intention of the writer or speaker, or the
understanding of the plaintiff or of any hearer or reader by which actionable
quality of the words is to be determined, but the meaning that the words inf fact
conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion and
candor, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances which were
known to the hearer or reader.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
This writ is intended to insure the human right privacy by requiring the respondent
to produce the necessary information to locate the missing person or such data
about him that have been gathered in secret to support the suspicion that he has
been taken into custody in violation of his constitutional right, or worse, has been
salvaged without the benefit of trial.
The writ of habeas data may also be sought to secure destruction of secret
information gathered in violation of one’s right to privacy to justify summary
action against him by the government or any private entity.
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall but, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall but
and sell or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object, or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
In fencing, mere presumption of any good, article, item, object or anything of value
which has been subject of robbery or theft shall be considered as prima facie
evidence for such crime.
Also, in the crime of fencing, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew or
should have known that the item he acquired and later sold was derived from theft
or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.
Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. On
the other hand, intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.
Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence, need not be proved for
purposes of conviction. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive
appears to be good or bad though no motive is proven. A good motive does not
prevent an act for being a crime. In mercy killing, the painless killing of a patient
who has no chance of recovery, the motive may be good, but it is nevertheless
punished by law.
Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a
conviction if there is no reliable evidence from which it may be reasonably
deduced that the accused was the malefactor.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. This writ usually provides more protection compared to a writ of habeas
corpus and the courts will be more diligent in the protection of the life, liberty, and
security of the desaparecido and can order the respondent to exert more and actual
effort in location the missing person and showing that he is in good condition and
has not been maltreated by the authorities.
Under the case of Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, the high court held that the
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP can be declared responsible and
accountable for extrajudicial killings in the context of an amparo proceeding.
The principle of the separation of church and of the State is expressed in Section
V, Article III which states that “no law shall be respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting in the free exercise thereof.”
The idea of this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and thus avoid encroachment by one against the other because of a
misunderstanding of the limits. This doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the state
that is prohibited from interfering in pure ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is
likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.
In the case of Imbong vs. Ochoa, the high court stated that the establishment clause
principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and
the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. Therefore,
freedom of religion includes freedom from religion; the right to worship includes
the right not to worship.
Libel, according the to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is "the public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead"
In the case of Novicio vs. Aggabao, the Supreme Court held that in determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety
and taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by person reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
Further, in the crime of libel, it is not the intention of the writer or speaker, or the
understanding of the plaintiff or of any hearer or reader by which actionable
quality of the words is to be determined, but the meaning that the words inf fact
conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion and
candor, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances which were
known to the hearer or reader.
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall but, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall but
and sell or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object, or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
In fencing, mere presumption of any good, article, item, object or anything of value
which has been subject of robbery or theft shall be considered as prima facie
evidence for such crime.
Also, in the crime of fencing, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew or
should have known that the item he acquired and later sold was derived from theft
or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.
There are two rules relative to a state’s jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard
foreign merchant vessels. First is the French rule, where such crimes are not triable
in the courts of that country, unless their commission affects the peace and security
of the territory or that the safety of that state is endangered. On the other hand,
under the English rules such crimes are triable in that country unless they merely
affect things within the vessel or the internal management thereof.
Under Philippine jurisdiction, we follow the English rule. Thus, it has been held in
the case of U.S vs. Look Chaw that mere possession of opium aboard a foreign
merchant vessel in transit is not triable in Philippine courts because that fact alone
does not constitute a breach in public order. However, smoking opium aboard a
foreign merchant vessel is considered to be a breach of public order because it
causes such drug to produce pernicious effects within our territory and is thus
triable within our courts.
We usually hear the words habeas corpus in articles, news, and even in films and
television series but we are often uninformed of what it actually means and its
purpose.
The writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ of the liberty employed to test the
validity of a person’s detention. If he is restrained of his liberty, he or someone
acting on his behalf may file a petition for habeas corpus to secure his release.
This writ is directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of
his caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and receive whatever the court or
judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf.
What is the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus? The ultimate purpose of this writ
is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is as speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from any unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of
personal freedom. So prized is the liberty of the individual that no less than this
swift proceeding is prescribed by our laws to guarantee that his release, if
warranted, is not unduly postponed.
Mala in se are those crimes which are inherently evil, thus, criminal intent is an
essential element. Concomitantly, when such intent is required in crimes under
mala in se, good faith is a valid defense. Mala in se crimes are those found in Book
II of the Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, mala prohibita is not inherently bad or evil but only the
existence of a positive law which prohibits such acts to be done and classifying
them as crimes. In crimes under mala prohibita, good faith cannot be used as a
defense as the mere act of doing these prohibited acts consummates them.
Examples of mala in se crimes are theft, murder, robbery, and homicide. On the
other hand, examples of crimes under mala prohibita are illegal possession of
firearms, illegal possession of drugs, and other crimes which are punished by a
special law.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The
equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual
class or privilege.
The requirements of tin order for the equal protection to apply are the following: a)
it must be based upon substantial distinctions; b) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; c) it must not be limited to existing conditions; and d) it must
apply equally to all members.
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused
injury to another. He is not, however, criminally liable, because he did not act with
criminal intent. The requisites for this doctrine to apply are as follows: a) that the
act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believe them to
be; b) that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful; and
c) that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
This doctrine is made famous by the renowned case of US vs. Ah Chong where the
defendant, being afraid of bad elements and sleeping alone in his room, was
awakened by someone who was forcefully opening the door, struck the intruder
with the knife when he entered which turned out to be his roommate. The Court
held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an offense or act due to
ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to negligence or bad faith. Such
ignorance of the fact is sufficient to negative the particular intent which under the
law, is an essential element to the crime of murder charged cancels the
presumption of intent and works for an acquittal. In the case, the defendant struck
the fatal blow on the belief that the intruder was a robber, on which his life and
property was in danger.
But this doctrine did not apply in the case of People vs. Oanis where a policeman,
under the instructions to arrest an escaped convict and if overpowered, to get him
dead or alive. When he proceeded to the suspected house, he saw a man sleeping
and instantly fired at him without certifying his identity which turned out to be an
innocent man. The defendant, having found the victim while sleeping, had ample
time and opportunity to effect a bloodless arrest. Therefore, his acts would have
not been lawful if the facts were what the defendant believed them to be.
A pardon has been defined as an act of grace which exempts the individuals on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law inflicts for the crime he
has committed. On the other hand, amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself.
As to their effects, pardon abolishes and forgives the punishment for the offense
committed and for that reason, it does not work for the restoration of the rights to
hold public office or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored
by the terms of the pardon. Meanwhile, a grant of amnesty overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which the individual is charged that the person released
by such amnesty stands before the law as though he has committed no offense.
Therefore, pardon does not alter the fact that the accused is a recidivist while
amnesty makes an ex-convict no longer a recidivist because it obliterates the very
offense committed.
In relation to the president who grants these acts, pardon is a private act of the
President and must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned; while amnesty
being a proclamation of the Chief Executive or a sovereign act requires the
concurrence of the Congress.
As to their scopes, pardon includes any crime and is exercised individually by the
President and amnesty is a blanket pardon to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses.
As to when they may be executed, pardon is exercised when the person is already
convicted and amnesty may be exercised even before trial had begun.
The Clear and Present Danger Rule is one of the tests in order to determine the
limitations of an individual’s freedom of expression in that when the words are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right
to prevent. If they do, the speaker shall be punished; otherwise, not.
The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the
substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time
element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. Therefore,
the danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the High Court held that “at
the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and
punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for
damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.”
The case of Cabansag vs. Fernandez et al. further discussed this rule by stating that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented.
And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This
test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
advocacy will harm the administration of justice.
The plain view doctrine applies when a law enforcement officer who is in search of
evidence and having the prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area, discovers therein evidence in plain view and
that it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of ma crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
As held in the case of People vs. Calantiao, the doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the
prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure.
Thus, it is clear that an object is in plain view if the object if plainly exposed to
sight. However, if a certain package proclaims its contents, whether by distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then
the content are considered to be in plain view and may therefore be seized.
However, in the case of People vs. Bolasa, the Supreme Court held that the seizure
of the police officers of the evidence were illegal as it was discovered that the said
officers, in order to seize such evidence, had to peeped through a small window
where they saw a man and a woman repacking marijuana and therefore, not in
plain view.
In summary, the plain view doctrine must apply only when seizing evidence
invertedly and further, that such seizing officer has prior authority to make the
intrusion in the place where the seizure was made.
Homicide is defined as the killing of another, with intent to kill and absent the
circumstances of either parricide, infanticide, or murder and without any justifying
circumstances. On the other hand, murder is also the killing of another person,
likewise with intent to kill but the difference lies in that the killing of such person
is attendant in any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure
impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or
of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any
other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Therefore, if A kills B, his father, even if is attended by any of the circumstances
of that qualifies the killing as murder, still the crime would that of parricide. Also,
the killing of a child less than three days old, if made with cruelty, the crime would
still be infanticide.
We must therefore look into either the relationship of the parties, the qualifying
circumstances, or the age of the victim as in the case of an infanticide. By taking
these into due consideration, we may easily identify what crime was actually
committed.
The short answer is yes. Men may be victims of rape under the new expanded
meaning of the crime. Men can be victims of rape through sexual assault. This kind
of rape has three kinds which are: a) instrument or object rape, which is committed
by inserting an instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person; b) rape through oral intercourse, which is committed by inserting his penis
into another person’s mouth; and c) rape through sodomy, which is committed by
inserting his penis into another’s anal orifice. Therefore, such kinds of rape may be
committed even against the male gender.
As held in the case of Ricalde vs. People penned by Justice Leonen, Rape under
the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape," "gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through
sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice."
Also, in People vs. Soria, the Supreme Court dismissed that a victim need not
identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find
that rape through sexual assault was committed. What is important and relevant is
that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require the victim to
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be
contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.
In 1974, she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces).
Her name was changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. The adoption was
noted on Senator Poe’s foundling certificate.
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, but
eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree.
Senator Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national
since birth.
For some time, Senator Poe lived with her husband and children in the United
States.
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18,
2001. She was subsequently given a United States passport.
In 2004, her adoptive father FPJ died. She decided to return home in 2005.
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines.
Senator Poe made several trips to the US between 2006 and 2009 using her United
States Passport. She used her passport “after having taken her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010.
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on
August 31, 2006.
Rizalito Y. David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) a Petition for Quo Warranto contesting the
election of Senator Poe for failing to “comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution.”
The SET promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-
born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.
The SET ruled that Senator Poe is a “natural-born citizen under the 1935
Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987
Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship”.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Senate Electoral Tribunal’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life
to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship
status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one’s father
or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a
constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established
personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked the
impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool’s errand to
establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private
respondent’s parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a
complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on
citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children,
guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public
service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-
born status for select public offices.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status’ commencement from
birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this
status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she
reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act
No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
CIR v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25,
2017
While estoppel generally does not apply against government, especially when the
case involves the collection of taxes, an exception can be made when the
application of the rule will cause injustice against an innocent party.
Respondent had already acquired a vested right on the tax classification of its San
Mig Light as a new brand. To allow petitioner to change its position will result in
deficiency assessments in substantial amounts against respondent to the latter’s
prejudice.
The authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to overrule, correct, or reverse the
mistakes or errors of its agents is conceded. However, this authority must be
exercised reasonably, i.e., only when the action or ruling is patently erroneous or
patently contrary to law. For the presumption lies in the regularity of performance
of official duty, and reasonable care has been exercised by the revenue officer or
agent in evaluating the facts before him or her prior to rendering his or her decision
or ruling-in this case, prior to the approval of the registration of San Mig Light as a
new brand for excise tax purposes. A contrary view will create disorder and
confusion in the operations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and open the
administrative agency to inconsistencies in the administration and enforcement of
tax laws.
This Court accords the highest respect to the factual findings of the Court of Tax
Appeals. We recognize its developed expertise on the subject as it is the court
dedicated solely to considering tax issues, unless there is a showing of abuse in the
exercise of authority. We find no reason to overturn the factual findings of the
Court of Tax Appeals on the amounts allowed for refund.
TAX AMNESTY
Qualified taxpayers with pending tax cases may still avail themselves of the tax
amnesty program under Republic Act No. 9480, otherwise known as the 2007 Tax
Amnesty Act. Thus, the provision in BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 19-
2008 excepting “[i]ssues and cases which were ruled by any court (even without
finality) in favor of the BIR prior to amnesty availment of the taxpayer” from the
benefits of the law is illegal, invalid, and null and void. The duty to withhold the
tax on compensation arises upon its accrual.
Republic Act No. 9480 provides a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the
cases specifically excepted by it. A tax amnesty “partakes of an absolute . . .
waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it[.]”
The effect of a qualified taxpayer’s submission of the required documents and the
payment of the prescribed amnesty tax was immunity from payment of all national
internal revenue taxes as well as all administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities
founded upon or arising from non-payment of national internal revenue taxes for
taxable year 2005 and prior taxable years.
Finally, the documentary stamp tax and onshore income tax are covered by the tax
amnesty program under Republic Act No. 9480 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Moreover, as to the deficiency tax on onshore interest income, it is
worthy to state that petitioner ING Bank was assessed by respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not as a withholding agent, but as one that was
directly liable for the tax on onshore interest income and failed to pay the same.
Taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception. Accordingly, statutes granting tax
exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing authority. The cigarette manufacturers must justify their
claim by a clear and categorical provision in the law. Otherwise, they are liable for
the specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco found in their possession pursuant to
Section 127 of the 1986 Tax Code, as amended.
However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the
enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case.
The authority of the Secretary of Finance to prescribe the “conditions” refers only
to procedural matters and should not curtail or modify the substantive right granted
by the law.
The contention that the cigarette manufacturers are doubly taxed because they are
paying the specific tax on the raw material and on the finished product in which the
raw material was a part is also devoid of merit.
For double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense to exist, “the same
property must be taxed twice, when it should be taxed but once.” “[B]oth taxes
must be imposed on the same property or subject- matter, for the same purpose, by
the same . . . taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during
the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or character of tax.”
There is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared
unconstitutional on the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the
delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the taxes over which
local taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has exclusively
reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is
not forbidden by our fundamental law, since We have not adopted as part thereof
the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United
States and some states of the Union. Double taxation becomes obnoxious only
where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity
or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case where one tax is
imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.
“It is something not favored, but is permissible, provided some other constitutional
requirement is not thereby violated, such as the requirement that taxes must be
uniform.”
Excise taxes are essentially taxes on property because they are levied on certain
specified goods or articles manufactured or produced in the Philippines for
domestic sale or consumption or for any other disposition, and on goods imported.
In this case, there is no double taxation in the prohibited sense because the specific
tax is imposed by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two different articles or
products: (1) on the stemmed leaf tobacco; and (2) on cigar or cigarette.
Can an illegitimate child, who was acknowledged by his father in his birth
certificate and in effect used his father's surname, revert in using his mother's
surname? If yes, what is the remedy available?
If it falls squarely in the Alanis case, then you can use Rule 103
a legitimate child who is entitled to use either parent's surname. This involves an
illegitimate child's family name vis-a-vis Revilla Law
oh yes. I stand corrected. The grounds appearing under R.103 must be observed to
be allowed to carry the surname of his/her mother. Since the Revilla law only used
"may", hence permissive to carry the surname of the father.
yes. You need to persuade the judge to justify to use the surname of the mother. It
is not ministerial on the part of the judge to grant the change of surname because it
is a substantial change. Talking about the law on succession and law on family
relation. But the petition is under R.103
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given
to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in
certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable,
or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible (In Re: Petition For Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
vs Cebu City Civil RegistrarG.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005).
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME)
using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose
or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. (Republic v.
Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 637-638 (1996), cited in RP v. Magpayo, G.R. No.
189476, February 2, 2011).
There must be legal reason why there is need to revert to his mother's surname, and
should fall under any of the legal grounds stated above.
Addition: what if the father and mother did not end in good terms. Father
abandoned the child and eventually married another woman. The child might carry
a family name from a person whom he haven't met yet. This happens in reality, and
I am just curious.
yes, this really happens..im very much interested about this topic sir, hope i could
get the right answer..
Worse: if the child predeceases the father, the latter could have successional rights
from his illegitimate child. (Correct me if I'm wrong)
If change of name does not change the family relations of the parties..the petitioner
will remain the child of his father regardless.
The father cannot inherit anymore if he abandons the child. See Article 1032 par.1
of the Civil Code
exactly sir, we could never tell the fortune of a child when he grows up, and given
the circumstances, it would be too unfair on the part of the mother if the 'father'
would just come out from nowhere and claim his 'rights' over the legitime of the
child..
The child needs to file a petition in court to change the surname. More so if the
child is already of legal age. Courts will generally grant it For as long as the child
can substantiate that she has no criminal record..or no bad record at all. The law..if
you are to read it says " primarily use the surname of the father" not "exclusively".
Hence the person is given by law the choice as to what surname he or she want to
use again on the premise that he or she is of legal age.
Yes, the illegitimate child can use the surnamw of his biological father. The Court
rules that the word primary is not equal to exclusive. Hence, illegitimate chikd can
use the surname of either of his biological parents.
The said child shall file a petition in court. The surname is substantial changes
need with must be done in court as the law said.
Yes. As GR illegitimate child (IC) is required to use the surname of his mother.
But he/she may acquire the right to use the father's surname if the latter expressly
recognized the IC.
In one of the cases decided by SC, the Court clarified that Art. 176 of FC gives IC
the right to decide if he/she wants to use the surname of the father or not. The use
of "may" in the provision shows that acknowledge IC is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The IC may file a petition before the Court for the use of his mother's surname
again.
vs.