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The Crime of Direct Assault: explained in its


two forms
It is often overlooked that the crime of direct assault actually has two forms which
are:

1. That the offender employs force or intimidation with the aim to attain of any of
the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects in the crime of sedition
without public uprising; and
2. That the offender either makes an attack, employs force, makes a serious
intimidation, or makes a serious resistance against a person in authority or his
agent and at the time of the assault, the latter is engaged in the actual performance
of official duties, or that he is assaulted by reason of his past performance of
official duties and with knowledge that the person assaulted is a person in
authority or his agent without rising publicly.
An illustration in the first form of direct assault is where a chief of police
accompanied by four other policemen who are all armed, went to the house of the
municipal president and compelled him by force to the municipal building, where they
kept him for four hours because they have not been given their salaries were held
guilty of direct assault. The Supreme Court held that the accused herein used force
without rising publicly. Further, the purpose of the accused in detaining the municipal
president, they inflicted an act of hate or revenge against a public officer which is one
of the objects of the crime of sedition. (U.S vs. Durain)

One main distinction between the first form and the second form of direct assault is
that in the first form, it is not necessary that the offended party is a person in authority
or an agent of the latter. It is sufficient that the aim of the offender is to attain an
object of sedition or the purpose of rebellion.

In the old case of Clarin vs. Justice of the Peace, it was held that the act of the accused
in preventing by force of a popular election in certain precincts, without public
uprising, is direct assault in its first form.

Going to the second form of direct assault, there are several ways of committing the
same which are the making of an attack, employing force, making serious
intimidation, or making a serious resistance.
It is worthy of note that the modality of intimidation and resistance are qualified with
the word “serious”. An example of serious intimidation as held in the case of People
vs. Diama is when the accused pointed a gun at a military police captain who is in the
performance of his duty. On the contrary, the act of threatening to give a fist blow to a
policeman when the latter was arresting the accused is not constitutive of direct
assault by intimidation.

For this purpose, a person in authority is a person who is directly vested with
jurisdiction which is otherwise known as the power and authority to govern and
execute the laws. It is also important to emphasize that the status of a person in
authority is a matter of law as such, ignorance thereof is not an excuse.

On the other hand, an agent of a person in authority is one who, by direct provision of
law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property.

Notes on the Justiciable and


Political Questions
In the case of Casibang vs. Aquina, Justice Makasiar stated that a purely justiciable
question implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of
right. On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Sanidad vs. COMELEC that
political questions are associated with the wisdom and not the legality of a particular
act.

It is worthy of note that a justiciable question has been expanded by the 1987
Constitution which not includes that duty of the courts to determine whether nor not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

For this purpose, questions and considerations which affect the wisdom, efficacy, or
practicability of a law should come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.
An illustration of this is one of the grounds for impeachment which is “other high
crimes” the interpretation of which is lodged in the Congress as they are the sitting
judges on an impeachment case. Even if the Supreme Court might have a contrary
view, it would not be competent for it to insist on its own thinking and substitute it for
the decision of the legislature.

Another illustration of a political question was seen in the case of Custodio vs, Senate
President where a taxpayer challenged the validity of certain provision of a general
appropriations law that compensated the members of the Congress for services
rendered during the Japanese Occupation was held to be a pure political question as
the same affects the wisdom and propriety of the law.

In correction with the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to
interfere over matters which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Executive or Legislative Branch. A more specific rule is that the courts will not
interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing
an information in the absence of abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by a law.

The determination of abuse of discretion lodged upon the judiciary does not make it
superior to either the Legislative or the Executive Branch. As with cases of
nullification of a certain law, the Supreme Court held in the case of Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management that in order to
justify such a nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt, or insufficiency of evidence for
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to
invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of
the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. This
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there is an indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

However, as held in the case of Petitioner Organizations vs. Executive Secretary,


where there are serious allegations that a law has indeed infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only a right but the duty of the Court to look into the allegation and when
warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.

What is an Agency by Estoppel?


The rule on Agency by Estoppel is contained in Article 1873 of the Civil Code which
states that:
“If a person specially informs another or states by public advertisement that he has
given a power of attorney to a third person, the latter thereby becomes a duly
authorized agent, in the former case with respect to the person who received the
special information, and in the latter case with regard to any person.

The power shall continue to be in full force until the notice is rescinded in the same
manner in which it was given.”

Jurisprudence holds that one who clothes another with an apparent authority as his
agent and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to dent the
authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of third persons dealing
with such apparent agent in good faith.

In the case of Litonjua Jr. vs. Eternit Corp., the Supreme Court laid down the
requisites for an agency by estoppel to exist, to wit:

1. The principal manifested a representation of the agent’s authority or knowingly


allowed the agent to assume such authority;
2. The third person, in good faith, relied upon such representation; and
3. Relying upon such representation, such third person has changed his position to
his detriment.
The case of Yun Kwan Byung vs. PAGCOR further clarified the rules on agency by
estoppel by holding that an agency by estoppel, which is similar to the doctrine of
apparent authority, requires proof of reliance upon the representations, and that, in
turn, needs proof that the representations predated the action taken in reliance thereto.
Contrary to an implied agency, in an agency, there is no agency at all, but one
assuming the act as agent has apparent, although not real, authority to represent
another.

What is the party-list system and how are


party-lists elected into office?
In the famous case of Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political
parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives.
In its technical term, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.

The sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisher-folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. In summation, secirals parties are those which are either “marginalized
and underrepresented” or “lacking in well-defined political constituencies”.

In the case of BANAT vs. COMELEC, the Court stated that for every four district
representatives, the Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list
representative. In the same case, the Supreme Court also laid down the rules on the
election of party-list representatives, to wit:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
As to the qualifications of a party-list representative, he shall have the same
qualifications as the other members of the House of Representatives. In addition to
such requirements, the party-list representative must be a bona fide member of the
party he seeks to represent at least ninety days before the day of the election. Lastly,
with respect to a sectoral party-list representative, one must either “belong to the
sector represented or have a track record of advocacy for such sector”. In cases of
youth representatives, the individual must not be more than thirty years old.

How is Bribery Committed?
How is Bribery Committed?

There are two types of Bribery: Direct Bribery and Indirect Bribery. Direct bribery is
committed by either a) by a public officer who agrees to perform or by performing, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present – an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties; b) by accepting a gift in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in
connection with his official duty; and c) by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from
doing something which it is his official duty to do, in  consideration of a gift or
promise.

On the other hand, indirect bribery is committed by any public officer who shall
accept gifts offered by him by reason of his office.

The two crimes are separately defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code
and its distinctions are:

1. In direct bribery, there exists an agreement between the public officer and the
giver of the gift or present, whereas in indirect bribery, usually, no such agreement
exists.
2. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform, performs, or refrains to do an
act in connection with his official duties because of the gift or promise. On the
other hand, in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do any
particular act in connection with the gift or promise.
Another important category of bribery is qualified bribery. A bribery is considered
qualified under the following circumstances:

1. That the offender is a public officer entrusted with law enforcement;


2. That the offender refrains from arresting or arresting or prosecuting an offender
who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death; and
3. That the offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting the offender in
consideration of any promise, gift or present.

What is Psychological Incapacity relative to the Family Code?

Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the


Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical —
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
In the famous case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Supreme Court
laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.
In the later case of Marcos vs. Marcos, narrowed down these requirements and stated
that “The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Piracy, under the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who, on the
high seas or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seaize a vessel or, not being a
member of its implements nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.
Piracy is different from mutiny. The main distinction between the two is that in
piracy, the persons who attack or seize its cargo are strangers to said vessel; while
in mutiny, they are members of the crew or passengers.
Piracy is qualified, under the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of Piracy is
committed under any of the following circumstances: a) whenever they have seized
the vessel by boarding or firing upon the same; b) whenever the pirates have
abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves; or c) whenever the
crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries, or rape.

The Doctrine of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree postulates that evidence will be
excluded if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an illegal arrest,
unreasonable search or coercive interrogation, or violation of a particular
exclusionary law.
This Doctrine is otherwise known as the Exclusionary Rule which is embodied in
Section 3 (2), Article 3, of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.” This provision prevents the government from
using pieces of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, particularly the
provisions on the Bill of Rights. It aims to protect its citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures conducted by the State through its agents like the military
and other law enforcement agencies. The provision tells us that evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures is
deemed polluted, stained or contaminated and should be excluded for being a fruit
of the poisonous tree.
Hence, it is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of
the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.

The Stop-and-Frisk Rule otherwise known as the Terry Doctrine from the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, consists of two parts – a valid “stop” by and
officer requires that he has reasonable and articulable belief that a criminal activity
has happened or is about to happen. The “frisk” made after the” stop” must be
done because of a reasonable belief that the person stopped is in possession of a
weapon that will pose a danger to the officer and others. The “frisk” must be a
mere pat down outside the person’s outer garment and not unreasonably intrusive.
This rule serves two purposes – 1) the general interest of crime prevention and
detection; and 2) the safety of the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals with is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
be used against him.
Because of the important interest in protecting the safety of police officers, the
Court held that a law enforcement officer has the authority to stop someone and do
a quick surface seach of their outer clothing for weapons. This is allowed if the
officer has a reasonable belief based on a genuine reason, and in the light of the
officer’s experience and the surrounding circumstances, that a crime has either
taken place or is about to take place and the person stopped is armed and
dangerous.

The practice of law is a profession as compared to a money-making trade. And, as


a practice of law is a profession, it is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant.
As held by the Court in the case of Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practice of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character
and outcome.
Verba Legis is a rule in statutory construction that if the stature is clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.
If the language of the statute Is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a
single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be
the meaning which the legislature intended. This plain meaning rule rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a stature correctly
expresses its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.
In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable vs. NLRC, the Court held that the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as found in the statute.

Treason is defined under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code and is committed
by any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of
the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to
their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere.
The nature of the crime of treason, in its general sense, is the violation by a subject
of his allegiance to his sovereign or to the supreme authority of the State.
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in the
time of peace. While there is peace. There are no traitors. Treason may be
incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during
peace. But there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense
and self-preservation. It is an emergency measure and remains dormant until the
emergency rises. But as soon as a war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect.

Legal separation is the separation of spouses from bed and board. While it permits
the partial suspension of marital relations, the marriage bond still exists as the
marital bonds are not severed as in the case of annulment or petition for nullity.
It differs from declaration of nullity of marriage which applies to marriages that are
null and void from the beginning (void ab initio), due to the absence of at least one
of the essential or formal requisites of marriages. Legal separation is also different
from annulment of marriage which applies to marriages which are valid and
existing until annulled.
If a legal separation decree is issued by the proper court has the effect of allowing
the spouses to live separately from each other. Further, the property relations of the
spouses shall be dissolved and liquidated. The offending spouse in a case of legal
separation shall also be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
virtue of intestate succession. A decree of legal separation shall also have the effect
of awarding to the innocent spouse the custody of minor children except for
children under seven years of age who shall not be separated from his/her mother.

The determination of probable cause may be executive or judicial. The first is


made by the public prosecutor, during preliminary investigation, where he is given
wide discretion to determine whether such probable cause exists for the purpose of
filing a criminal complaint.
The second one is made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. As such, the judge must satisfy himself that,
on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
It is also worth noting that the judge is not bound by the resolution of the public
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain
from the latter’s findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exist
for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest.

Libel, according the to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is "the public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead"
In the case of Novicio vs. Aggabao, the Supreme Court held that in determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety
and taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by person reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
Further, in the crime of libel, it is not the intention of the writer or speaker, or the
understanding of the plaintiff or of any hearer or reader by which actionable
quality of the words is to be determined, but the meaning that the words inf fact
conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion and
candor, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances which were
known to the hearer or reader.

Bigamy is committed when a legally married person who contracts a second or


subsequent marriage which has all the essential requisites of marriage without his
or her first marriage being legally dissolved or if his or her spouse is absent, the
latter could not be presumed dead under the Civil Code.
It has now been settled that the fact that the marriage is void ab initio is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. In the case of a voidable marriage, there must be a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. As can be recalled in Article 40
of the Civil Code, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgement declaring such
previous marriage void.
It is also worthy of note that the second and allegedly illegal marriage must have
all the essential requisites of a valid marriage as stated in Article 3 of the Family
Code. As held in the case of People vs. Lara, when the second marriage took place
one day before the issuance of the marriage license is void ab initio. Therefore, if
the marriage is void ab initio, there is no bigamy.
The crime of bigamy is not a private crime, thus, it is immaterial whether it is the
first or the second wife who initiates the action therefore, for it is a public offense
which can be denounced not only by the person affected but even by another who
has knowledge of the same.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
This writ is intended to insure the human right privacy by requiring the respondent
to produce the necessary information to locate the missing person or such data
about him that have been gathered in secret to support the suspicion that he has
been taken into custody in violation of his constitutional right, or worse, has been
salvaged without the benefit of trial.
The writ of habeas data may also be sought to secure destruction of secret
information gathered in violation of one’s right to privacy to justify summary
action against him by the government or any private entity.

Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall but, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall but
and sell or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object, or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
In fencing, mere presumption of any good, article, item, object or anything of value
which has been subject of robbery or theft shall be considered as prima facie
evidence for such crime.
Also, in the crime of fencing, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew or
should have known that the item he acquired and later sold was derived from theft
or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.

Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. On
the other hand, intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.
Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence, need not be proved for
purposes of conviction. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive
appears to be good or bad though no motive is proven. A good motive does not
prevent an act for being a crime. In mercy killing, the painless killing of a patient
who has no chance of recovery, the motive may be good, but it is nevertheless
punished by law.
Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a
conviction if there is no reliable evidence from which it may be reasonably
deduced that the accused was the malefactor.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. This writ usually provides more protection compared to a writ of habeas
corpus and the courts will be more diligent in the protection of the life, liberty, and
security of the desaparecido and can order the respondent to exert more and actual
effort in location the missing person and showing that he is in good condition and
has not been maltreated by the authorities.
Under the case of Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, the high court held that the
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP can be declared responsible and
accountable for extrajudicial killings in the context of an amparo proceeding.

Can there be an attempted stage in adultery?


Yes, there can be an attempted stage in the crime of adultery as the essence of the
said crime is sexual intercourse. An instance where attempted adultery was
committed is when the offenders were caught undressing.
Concomitantly, there can be no frustrated stage in the crime of adultery as
mentioned that the essential element of the crime is sexual intercourse – as such, it
is an instantaneous crime and completed upon the moment of carnal union.

Can Parricide be committed through reckless imprudence?


First, let us discuss the elements of Parricide. Parricide is committed by the killing
of a person by another and the deceased is the latter’s father, mother, child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate or other legitimate ascendant or descendant or
the legitimate spouse of the accused.
To answer the question, yes, parricide may be committed through reckless
imprudence. This is because intent to kills is not an essential element in order to
consummate the crime of parricide.
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Recote, a husband, while
struggling for the possession of a gun with his children, without intent to kill
anyone, accidentally pulled the trigger and killed his wife is guilty of parricide
through reckless imprudence.

The principle of the separation of church and of the State is expressed in Section
V, Article III which states that “no law shall be respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting in the free exercise thereof.”
The idea of this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and thus avoid encroachment by one against the other because of a
misunderstanding of the limits. This doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the state
that is prohibited from interfering in pure ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is
likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.
In the case of Imbong vs. Ochoa, the high court stated that the establishment clause
principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and
the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. Therefore,
freedom of religion includes freedom from religion; the right to worship includes
the right not to worship.

The Doctrine of Parens Patriae: an in-depth


look on the State’s duty to protect
its people:
Parens Patriae otherwise known as the guardian of the rights of the people is one of
the most essential duties of the State. In the landmark case of Philippine Islands vs. El
Monte De Piedad, the Supreme Court held that the government being the protector of
the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will
promote interest.
An example of the exercise of the State in its power as parens patriae, the Supreme
Court held in the case of Cabanas vs. Pilapil, the government acting for the State
as parens patriae chose the mother of an illegitimate child as against his uncle to be
the trustee of the insurance proceeds left him by his father, who has expressly
designated the uncle. The court further emphasized that the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot remain insensible to
the plea of the mother.
The Supreme Court, in the same case, cited a US Supreme Court jurisprudence which
stated that this prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.
In the case of Soriano vs. Laguardia, the Supreme Court rejected the argument of the
petitioner who question the lawfulness of the suspension of his religious television
program where it found that said petitioner uttered expletives in the course of the
same, which was regularly aired during a time when children had easy access to and
watch it. The court said that the petitioner’s statements have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable to everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and
State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae.
 In summary, the doctrine of parens patriae postulates that the welfare of the people
must always be protected by the State to which they are under. This is also in
consonance with certain state policies contained in Section II of our Constitution. It is
may also be connected with the famous quote “those who have less in life, should
have more in law”.
On a final note, we must ask ponder on this important State duty and if our current
government, with all its might and unlimited resources, doing everything it can to
uphold the interests of the masses?

Libel, according the to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is "the public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead"
In the case of Novicio vs. Aggabao, the Supreme Court held that in determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety
and taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by person reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
Further, in the crime of libel, it is not the intention of the writer or speaker, or the
understanding of the plaintiff or of any hearer or reader by which actionable
quality of the words is to be determined, but the meaning that the words inf fact
conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion and
candor, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances which were
known to the hearer or reader.

Bigamy is committed when a legally married person who contracts a second or


subsequent marriage which has all the essential requisites of marriage without his
or her first marriage being legally dissolved or if his or her spouse is absent, the
latter could not be presumed dead under the Civil Code.
It has now been settled that the fact that the marriage is void ab initio is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. In the case of a voidable marriage, there must be a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. As can be recalled in Article 40
of the Civil Code, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgement declaring such
previous marriage void.
It is also worthy of note that the second and allegedly illegal marriage must have
all the essential requisites of a valid marriage as stated in Article 3 of the Family
Code. As held in the case of People vs. Lara, when the second marriage took place
one day before the issuance of the marriage license is void ab initio. Therefore, if
the marriage is void ab initio, there is no bigamy.
The crime of bigamy is not a private crime, thus, it is immaterial whether it is the
first or the second wife who initiates the action therefore, for it is a public offense
which can be denounced not only by the person affected but even by another who
has knowledge of the same.

Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall but, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall but
and sell or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object, or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
In fencing, mere presumption of any good, article, item, object or anything of value
which has been subject of robbery or theft shall be considered as prima facie
evidence for such crime.
Also, in the crime of fencing, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew or
should have known that the item he acquired and later sold was derived from theft
or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.

Oposa vs. Factoran


This case stems from the complaint of forty-four children, through their parents, to
make the DENR Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right
to a healthful and balanced ecology and are entitled to protection by the State on
the latter’s capacity as parens patriae. The defendants, on the other hand, look to
dismiss the complaint of the petitioners on the ground that the latter have no legal
standing and no cause of action against him.
The court further enunciated that every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology and that this carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
The high court ruled that the petitioners do have legal standing to sue and their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.
Lastly, the court highlighted that even though the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is not found in the Bill of Rights unlike other well-known personal rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
— aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners.
The case of Oposa is a beautiful read – one which is worthy of reading it not only
for academic compliance. Oposa discusses the importance of environmental
protection – a duty often overlooked by both the public and private sectors. It helps
us contemplate on the upcoming generations, in that we are duty-bound to protect
our environment, not because of some positive law which dictates it but for the
benefit of the unborn children yet to enjoy the beauty of the trees.

There are two rules relative to a state’s jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard
foreign merchant vessels. First is the French rule, where such crimes are not triable
in the courts of that country, unless their commission affects the peace and security
of the territory or that the safety of that state is endangered. On the other hand,
under the English rules such crimes are triable in that country unless they merely
affect things within the vessel or the internal management thereof.
Under Philippine jurisdiction, we follow the English rule. Thus, it has been held in
the case of U.S vs. Look Chaw that mere possession of opium aboard a foreign
merchant vessel in transit is not triable in Philippine courts because that fact alone
does not constitute a breach in public order. However, smoking opium aboard a
foreign merchant vessel is considered to be a breach of public order because it
causes such drug to produce pernicious effects within our territory and is thus
triable within our courts.

What is the Doctrine of Incorporation?


The Doctrine of Incorporation states that every State is, by reason of its
membership in the family of nations, bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of its own laws.
As held in the case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care association vs. Health
Secretary, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
The court also cited in the same case that the generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtues of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive treaty obligations.

The system of checks of balances is concomitant with the doctrine of separation of


powers. The system of checks and balances states that each one of the main
departments of the government if allowed to resist encroachments upon its
prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments.
The theory rests upon the belief that the ends of the government are better achieved
through the exercise by its agencies of only the powers assigned to them, and
subject to the reversal in proper cases by those constitutionally authorized.
Although this system authorized the executive, legislative and judicial branch to
rectify the excessive acts of one and the other, said function is usually exercised by
the judiciary with its expanded power to resolve not only actual controversies but
also to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion on the of any
government branch or agency.
However, there will be some instances where the judicial branch cannot check a
certain act of the government – that is when the question before them is purely a
political question and may be resolved only by either the executive branch or the
judicial branch. Only justiciable questions are within the realm of the judiciary or
those questions which implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanction by
law, for said breach of right. On the other hand, a political question which deal
with the wisdom of a particular act and not simply its legality.
How justifying circumstances differ from exempting circumstances?
Justifying circumstances are those which are enumerated in Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code. These are circumstances where the act of the person is said to
be in accordance with the law, so that such a person is deemed not to have
transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liability. Here, the law
recognizes the non-existence of a crime by stating that the persons mentioned
therein do not incur any liability.
On the other hand, exempting circumstances are those grounds for exemption from
punishment because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any of the conditions
which make the act voluntary or negligent. The basis of exempting circumstances
is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused.
In justifying circumstance, the circumstance affects the act, not the actor. In an
exempting circumstance, it affects the actor, not the act. In a justifying
circumstance, the act is done within legal bounds, hence there is no crime
committed. In an exempting circumstance, the act is felonious and hence a crime
but the actor acted without voluntariness.

We usually hear the words habeas corpus in articles, news, and even in films and
television series but we are often uninformed of what it actually means and its
purpose.
The writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ of the liberty employed to test the
validity of a person’s detention. If he is restrained of his liberty, he or someone
acting on his behalf may file a petition for habeas corpus to secure his release.
This writ is directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of
his caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and receive whatever the court or
judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf.
What is the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus? The ultimate purpose of this writ
is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is as speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from any unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of
personal freedom. So prized is the liberty of the individual that no less than this
swift proceeding is prescribed by our laws to guarantee that his release, if
warranted, is not unduly postponed.

What is an impossible crime?


An impossible crime is any act which would have been an offense against persons
or property if it were not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or no
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Hence, a person, with intent to kill, stabs another who is already dead not knowing
that such person is indeed already lifeless is guilty of an impossible crime because
of the legal impossibility of killing an already dead person.
They key element here is the perpetrators evil intent. Therefore, a person who
shoots another with knowledge that such person is already dead cannot be held
criminally liable for an impossible crime.
The reason why an impossible crime is punished is that in order to suppress
criminal propensity or criminal tendencies. Objectively, the offender has not
committed a felony, but subjectively, he is a criminal.

Mala in se are those crimes which are inherently evil, thus, criminal intent is an
essential element. Concomitantly, when such intent is required in crimes under
mala in se, good faith is a valid defense. Mala in se crimes are those found in Book
II of the Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, mala prohibita is not inherently bad or evil but only the
existence of a positive law which prohibits such acts to be done and classifying
them as crimes. In crimes under mala prohibita, good faith cannot be used as a
defense as the mere act of doing these prohibited acts consummates them.
Examples of mala in se crimes are theft, murder, robbery, and homicide. On the
other hand, examples of crimes under mala prohibita are illegal possession of
firearms, illegal possession of drugs, and other crimes which are punished by a
special law.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The
equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual
class or privilege.
The requirements of tin order for the equal protection to apply are the following: a)
it must be based upon substantial distinctions; b) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; c) it must not be limited to existing conditions; and d) it must
apply equally to all members.

What is the Doctrine of State Immunity?


Pursuant to our Constitution, the State many not be sued without its consent. The
reasons for the non-suability of the State are: a) that such suits will impair the
dignity of the State; b) based on a logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right decisions;
and c) It will divert the time and resources of the State from more pressing matters.
The consent of the State to be sued may be given express or implied. Express
consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. On the
other hand, implied consent may be given when the State itself commences
litigation or when it enters into a contract.
However, consent to be sued is not equivalent to a consent to liability Thus, even if
the case is decided against the State, an award cannot be satisfied by writs of
execution against public funds.

Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused
injury to another. He is not, however, criminally liable, because he did not act with
criminal intent. The requisites for this doctrine to apply are as follows: a) that the
act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believe them to
be; b) that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful; and
c) that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
This doctrine is made famous by the renowned case of US vs. Ah Chong where the
defendant, being afraid of bad elements and sleeping alone in his room, was
awakened by someone who was forcefully opening the door, struck the intruder
with the knife when he entered which turned out to be his roommate. The Court
held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an offense or act due to
ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to negligence or bad faith. Such
ignorance of the fact is sufficient to negative the particular intent which under the
law, is an essential element to the crime of murder charged cancels the
presumption of intent and works for an acquittal. In the case, the defendant struck
the fatal blow on the belief that the intruder was a robber, on which his life and
property was in danger.
But this doctrine did not apply in the case of People vs. Oanis where a policeman,
under the instructions to arrest an escaped convict and if overpowered, to get him
dead or alive. When he proceeded to the suspected house, he saw a man sleeping
and instantly fired at him without certifying his identity which turned out to be an
innocent man. The defendant, having found the victim while sleeping, had ample
time and opportunity to effect a bloodless arrest. Therefore, his acts would have
not been lawful if the facts were what the defendant believed them to be.

A pardon has been defined as an act of grace which exempts the individuals on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law inflicts for the crime he
has committed. On the other hand, amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself.
As to their effects, pardon abolishes and forgives the punishment for the offense
committed and for that reason, it does not work for the restoration of the rights to
hold public office or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored
by the terms of the pardon. Meanwhile, a grant of amnesty overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which the individual is charged that the person released
by such amnesty stands before the law as though he has committed no offense.
Therefore, pardon does not alter the fact that the accused is a recidivist while
amnesty makes an ex-convict no longer a recidivist because it obliterates the very
offense committed.
In relation to the president who grants these acts, pardon is a private act of the
President and must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned; while amnesty
being a proclamation of the Chief Executive or a sovereign act requires the
concurrence of the Congress.
As to their scopes, pardon includes any crime and is exercised individually by the
President and amnesty is a blanket pardon to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses.
As to when they may be executed, pardon is exercised when the person is already
convicted and amnesty may be exercised even before trial had begun.

Robbery is defined as the taking of personal property, belonging to another, with


intent to gain, by means of violence against, or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon anything. On the other hand, theft is defined as the taking of personal
property belonging to another, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon anything, without the consent of the latter.
As can be seen, the main distinction between the two crimes is that in robbery,
there must be that circumstance of violence against or intimidation or force upon
anything. This may be manifested by pointing a gun against the victim or breaking
through the home of another with the intent of taking personal property therein. In
theft, no violence, intimidation or force should be present. Therefore, when a
person takes a watch belonging to another, without the consent of the latter, such
would be considered as theft. But if this person breaks through the house of the
victim and subsequently takes such watch – his taking would be considered
robbery with force upon things. The controlling circumstance is always the
presence of violence, intimidation, or force upon anything.

The Clear and Present Danger Rule is one of the tests in order to determine the
limitations of an individual’s freedom of expression in that when the words are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right
to prevent. If they do, the speaker shall be punished; otherwise, not.
The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the
substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time
element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. Therefore,
the danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the High Court held that “at
the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and
punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for
damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.”
The case of Cabansag vs. Fernandez et al. further discussed this rule by stating that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented.
And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This
test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
advocacy will harm the administration of justice.
The plain view doctrine applies when a law enforcement officer who is in search of
evidence and having the prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area, discovers therein evidence in plain view and
that it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of ma crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
As held in the case of People vs. Calantiao, the doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the
prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure.
Thus, it is clear that an object is in plain view if the object if plainly exposed to
sight. However, if a certain package proclaims its contents, whether by distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then
the content are considered to be in plain view and may therefore be seized.
However, in the case of People vs. Bolasa, the Supreme Court held that the seizure
of the police officers of the evidence were illegal as it was discovered that the said
officers, in order to seize such evidence, had to peeped through a small window
where they saw a man and a woman repacking marijuana and therefore, not in
plain view.
In summary, the plain view doctrine must apply only when seizing evidence
invertedly and further, that such seizing officer has prior authority to make the
intrusion in the place where the seizure was made.

Homicide is defined as the killing of another, with intent to kill and absent the
circumstances of either parricide, infanticide, or murder and without any justifying
circumstances. On the other hand, murder is also the killing of another person,
likewise with intent to kill but the difference lies in that the killing of such person
is attendant in any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure
impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or
of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any
other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Therefore, if A kills B, his father, even if is attended by any of the circumstances
of that qualifies the killing as murder, still the crime would that of parricide. Also,
the killing of a child less than three days old, if made with cruelty, the crime would
still be infanticide.
We must therefore look into either the relationship of the parties, the qualifying
circumstances, or the age of the victim as in the case of an infanticide. By taking
these into due consideration, we may easily identify what crime was actually
committed.

Under this doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political


offense, are divested of their character as common offenses and assume political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
A political crime is a crime directly against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. In such a
crime, the decisive factor is the intent or motive.
An illustration of this doctrine is held in the case of People vs. Ferrer where the
killing is held to be not of murder but a political offense. Here, the appellant admits
that he was a member of the NPA – the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines. Therefore, there is no question that the killing of Apolonio Ragual by
the appellant was politically motivated.

Impeachment is an extraordinary means of removal exercised by the legislature


over a selected of number of officials, the purpose being to ensure the highest care
in their indictment and conviction and imposition of special penalties in case of a
finding of guilt, taking into account the degree of nature of the offense committed
and the high status of the wrongdoers.
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President,
the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman. This list is exclusive and may not be increased
or reduced by legislative enactment.
The grounds for impeachment are as follows:
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. Treason;
3. Bribery;
4. Other high crimes;
5. Graft and Corruption;
6. Betrayal of public trust.
As to the nature of impeachment, it is essentially a non-legislative prerogative and
can be exercised by the Congress only within the limits of the authority conferred
upon it by the Constitution.
As to the process of impeachment, it is the House of Representatives alone that can
initiate an impeachment case by a vote of at least one-third of its members. On the
other hand, the sole power to try and decide such a case if conferred on the Senate,
which can convict only by a vote of at least two-thirds of its members.

The short answer is yes. Men may be victims of rape under the new expanded
meaning of the crime. Men can be victims of rape through sexual assault. This kind
of rape has three kinds which are: a) instrument or object rape, which is committed
by inserting an instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person; b) rape through oral intercourse, which is committed by inserting his penis
into another person’s mouth; and c) rape through sodomy, which is committed by
inserting his penis into another’s anal orifice. Therefore, such kinds of rape may be
committed even against the male gender.
As held in the case of Ricalde vs. People penned by Justice Leonen, Rape under
the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape," "gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through
sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice."
Also, in People vs. Soria, the Supreme Court dismissed that a victim need not
identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find
that rape through sexual assault was committed. What is important and relevant is
that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require the victim to
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be
contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.

What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?


The Archipelagic Doctrine postulates that an archipelago shall be regarded as a
single unit, so that the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the state, and are subject to its exclusive sovereignty.
The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial interests
of an archipelago, that is, the territorial integrity of the archipelago. Without it,
there would be “pockets of high seas” between some of our islands and islets, thus
foreign vessels would be able to pass through these “pockets of seas” and would
have no jurisdiction over them.
To put the Archipelagic Doctrine in practice and to emphasize that an archipelagic
state is a single unit, an imaginary single baseline is drawn around the islands thus
joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of such state with straight lines
and all islands and waters enclosed within the baseline form part of its territory.

Malversation is committed by a public officer, who, being accountable for public


funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, appropriates the same, or
take or misappropriates, or consent to the taking thereof by another person or
permits him to take it through abandonment or negligence.
On the other hand, illegal use of public funds or property otherwise known as
technical malversation is committed by any public officer who applies a public
fund or property under his administration to any public use other than that for
which such fund or property was appropriated by some law or ordinance.
As to its nature, malversation is mala in se or is inherently immoral. It is tainted
with dolo or malice, thus, good faith may be invoked as a defense for such crime.
Technical malversation, on the other hand, is mala prohibita, meaning that this
prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because of
a positive law which forbids it. Therefore, good faith is not a defense in technical
malversation.
It is also worthy of note that the two crimes are not a parcel or piece of one another
and they are completely distinct criminal offenses. Thus, an accused acquitted of
malversation cannot be convicted of technical malversation since the latter does
not include, or is not necessarily included in the former changed in the information.

What is a Writ of Kalikasan?


According to the Rules for Environmental Procedures, a Writ of Kalikasan is a
remedy available to any person whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology to violated or is threatened to be violated.
The origin of the writ stems from the initiative of the then Chief Justice Reynato
Pun and issued during his tenure the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
containing said writ. He also added that while the writs of habeas corpus and
amparo originates from England and Latin America, the writ of Kalikasan is
proudly Philippine made to deal with cases in the realm of ecology.
The writ’s nature and purpose were also discussed by the Supreme Court in the
case Segovia et al. vs. The Climate Change Commission in that the writ of
Kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such
magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitant in two or
more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord
a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a
speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one’s
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political
and territorial boundaries and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-
scale ecological threats.
This writ has been issued quite a few times in past recent years such as the
issuance of the Supreme Court for the protection of the Scarborough Shoal,
Ayungin Shoal, and Panganiban real in order to pretext, preserve, rehabilitate and
to restore the marine environment of such places.
Many laymen are unaware that a writ of such character even exists under our
jurisprudence and knowing our rights, and how to invoke them, especially during
times like these is crucial.

An overview of constructive and actual possession relative to Republic Act No.


9165
Under the Comprehensive Dangerous Act and the cases decided relative thereto,
there are two types of possession: a) actual possession which exists when the drug
is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of
the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found. Although, RA 9165 being a special penal law and is thus,
mala prohibita, where criminal intent is necessary, the prosecution must still prove
that the accused had the intent to possess the drugs.
Thus, where an accused is proven to be not in the actual possession of a drug, he
may still be found guilty of possessing the same if he is to be found under the
constructive possession of it.

What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency?


This doctrine is also known as the alter ego doctrine was first laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of Villena vs. The Secretary of Interior. Said doctrine
essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the
alter egos of the President, and, thus, the action taken by such heads in the
performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the
President himself should disapprove of such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of
the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations are
adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive
functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the
Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical
necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to personally perform
the multifarious functions of the executive office (Manalang-Demigillo vs.
TIDCORP, GR No. 168613)
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."

Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a person cannot be arrested


without a valid warrant of arrest. Such warrant of arrest can only be issued upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant he may produce. However, as with every
general rule, there are certain exceptions.
A person may be arrested even without a warrant of arrest under the following
circumstances, which are, to wit: a) arrest in flagrante delicto; b) arrest in hot
pursuit; and c) when the person to be arrested is an escapee. All instances,
however, still require the existence of probable cause on the person arresting and in
the first instance, that the person is actually committing, has just committed, or is
trying to commit an offense.
So, a verbal order to arrest a person is not valid and goes against our constitution.
A warrantless arrest without probable cause on the part of the person arresting is
also unconstitutional. This is very crucial especially during these times where the
government arm that is supposed to protect us is acting arbitrarily, capriciously,
and with grave abuse of discretion. Being informed and knowing our rights may be
the best shield against unwarranted violence of the authorities. We encourage
everyone to remember the key points discussed above and invoke these
constitutional provisions whenever the situation permits you to do so. As aptly said
in the film “V for Vendetta”, “People should not be afraid of their governments,
governments should be afraid of their people".

The Rule of Justice vs. The Rule of Law


Is the law just or can injustice be achieved through the rule of law? These are
certain dilemmas one may encounter when realizing the ends of a particular law.
To some, even to those learned in the law, it sounds counterintuitive that the law
produces injustices or it does not produce the goal which manifested it to its very
existence – that is, to bring justice. However, history has dictated that what is legal
is not necessarily just.
A common example in our jurisprudence is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Lito
Corpuz vs. People wherein the accused, Corpuz, was sentence to a penalty based
on the value of money way back when the Revised Penal Code was enacted in
1932. It is quite evident that the value of Philippine money has substantially
declined in the years in between. It would be of great legal, logical, and economic
injustice if such penalty would still be imposed during the present day. Although
the pertinent provision has been revised since then which harmonized the value of
peso today to its equivalent in the 1930s, the fact remains that a punishment which
was legal conjured an unfathomable injustice.
To our present day, this elusive equilibrium between morality and law is rarely
found. There is both immorality in the law’s application and morality found in
transgressing our laws. Harmonizing these two is quite a daunting task. So, a law
student must always bear this in mind. He must make use of his knowledge not
only to dogmatically apply the laws he has learned, but most importantly, to be
moral and just when doing so. He must not be blinded by the power he possesses
but must remember to always be kind and emphatic. Knowledge is only useful
when wielded by a master not only in his craft but also his conscience. As the Code
of Commission put it, “Every good law draws its breadth of life from morals, from
principles which are written in the words of fire in the conscience of man.”
To end this post, I will leave you with a quote from the ever intriguing and
insightful Justice Leonen – “like all other human creations, law is susceptible to
human failings. Thus, what is legal is not necessarily just. Oftentimes, what is legal
is a tentative temporary accommodation made to concretize a ruling power. Law is
likewise violent – that you can turn an entire machinery of the State in favor of
your client”. Lastly, Justice Leonen stated that, while the Supreme Court may be
final, being the land’s last arbiter, it is not infallible. Ultimately, it is the people
who matter.

David v. SET, Poe-Llamanzares G.R. No.


221538, September 20, 2016 – J. Leonen
Foundlings, Citizenship, the Constitution
FACTS:

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a foundling whose biological parents are


unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo and
found by Edgardo Militar on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. He later turned
her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. She was issued by the Local Civil
Registrar a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate with the name Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.

In 1974, she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces).
Her name was changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. The adoption was
noted on Senator Poe’s foundling certificate.

Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, but
eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree.

Senator Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national
since birth. 

For some time, Senator Poe lived with her husband and children in the United
States.

Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18,
2001. She was subsequently given a United States passport.

In 2004, her adoptive father FPJ died. She decided to return home in 2005.

On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines.

Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine


Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. She also “filed applications for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen
(18) years of age at that time.”

The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

Senator Poe made several trips to the US between 2006 and 2009 using her United
States Passport. She used her passport “after having taken her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010.

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on
August 31, 2006.

In 2010, President Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the


MTRCB. On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship.
Senator Poe ran for Senator in 2013. She won and was declared as Senator-elect on
May 16, 2013.

Rizalito Y. David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) a Petition for Quo Warranto  contesting the
election of Senator Poe for failing to “comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution.”

The SET promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-
born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.

The SET ruled that Senator Poe is a “natural-born citizen under the 1935
Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987
Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship”.

Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and,


therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or


with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen.

RULING:

The Senate Electoral Tribunal’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life
to all the aspirations of all its provisions.

Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship
status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one’s father
or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a
constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.

Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established
personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked the
impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool’s errand to
establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private
respondent’s parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.

Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof


required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not
proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but “substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a
complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on
citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children,
guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public
service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-
born status for select public offices.

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status’ commencement from
birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this
status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she
reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act
No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of


discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted
nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and
render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine
their development.

Taxation Jurisprudence by J. Leonen TAX


EXEMPTION, NATURE OF EXCISE
TAX, POWER OF TAXATION,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE TAXATION, BIR
AND CTA and TAX AMNESTY
BIR AND CTA 

CIR v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25,
2017

While estoppel generally does not apply against government, especially when the
case involves the collection of taxes, an exception can be made when the
application of the rule will cause injustice against an innocent party.
Respondent had already acquired a vested right on the tax classification of its San
Mig Light as a new brand. To allow petitioner to change its position will result in
deficiency assessments in substantial amounts against respondent to the latter’s
prejudice.

The authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to overrule, correct, or reverse the
mistakes or errors of its agents is conceded. However, this authority must be
exercised reasonably, i.e., only when the action or ruling is patently erroneous or
patently contrary to law. For the presumption lies in the regularity of performance
of official duty, and reasonable care has been exercised by the revenue officer or
agent in evaluating the facts before him or her prior to rendering his or her decision
or ruling-in this case, prior to the approval of the registration of San Mig Light as a
new brand for excise tax purposes. A contrary view will create disorder and
confusion in the operations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and open the
administrative agency to inconsistencies in the administration and enforcement of
tax laws.

This Court accords the highest respect to the factual findings of the Court of Tax
Appeals. We recognize its developed expertise on the subject as it is the court
dedicated solely to considering tax issues, unless there is a showing of abuse in the
exercise of authority.  We find no reason to overturn the factual findings of the
Court of Tax Appeals on the amounts allowed for refund.

TAX AMNESTY

ING BANK N.V., ENGAGED IN BANKING OPERATIONS IN THE


PHILIPPINES AS ING BANK N.V. MANILA BRANCH v. CIR G.R. No.
167679, July 22, 2015

Qualified taxpayers with pending tax cases may still avail themselves of the tax
amnesty program under Republic Act No. 9480, otherwise known as the 2007 Tax
Amnesty Act. Thus, the provision in BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 19-
2008 excepting “[i]ssues and cases which were ruled by any court (even without
finality) in favor of the BIR prior to amnesty availment of the taxpayer” from the
benefits of the law is illegal, invalid, and null and void. The duty to withhold the
tax on compensation arises upon its accrual.

Contrary to respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s stance, Republic Act


No. 9480 confers no discretion on respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The provisions of the law are plain and simple. Unlike the power to compromise or
abate a taxpayer’s liability under Section 204 of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code that is within the discretion of respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, its authority under Republic Act No. 9480 is limited to determining
whether (a) the taxpayer is qualified to avail oneself of the tax amnesty; (b) all the
requirements for availment under the law were complied with; and (c) the correct
amount of amnesty tax was paid within the period prescribed by law. There is
nothing in Republic Act No. 9480 which can be construed as authority for
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to introduce exceptions and/or
conditions to the coverage of the law nor to disregard its provisions and substitute
his own personal judgment.

Republic Act No. 9480 provides a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the
cases specifically excepted by it. A tax amnesty “partakes of an absolute . . .
waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it[.]”
The effect of a qualified taxpayer’s submission of the required documents and the
payment of the prescribed amnesty tax was immunity from payment of all national
internal revenue taxes as well as all administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities
founded upon or arising from non-payment of national internal revenue taxes for
taxable year 2005 and prior taxable years.

Finally, the documentary stamp tax and onshore income tax are covered by the tax
amnesty program under Republic Act No. 9480 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Moreover, as to the deficiency tax on onshore interest income, it is
worthy to state that petitioner ING Bank was assessed by respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not as a withholding agent, but as one that was
directly liable for the tax on onshore interest income and failed to pay the same.

TAX EXEMPTION, NATURE OF EXCISE TAX, POWER OF TAXATION,


CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE TAXATION

LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY V. CA  G.R. No. 125346,


November 11, 2014

Excise tax is a tax on the production, sale, or consumption of a specific commodity


in a country. Section 110 of the 1986 Tax Code explicitly provides that the “excise
taxes on domestic products shall be paid by the manufacturer or producer before
[the] removal [of those products] from the place of production.” “It does not matter
to what use the article[s] subject to tax is put; the excise taxes are still due, even
though the articles are removed merely for storage in some other place and are not
actually sold or consumed.”159 The excise tax based on weight, volume capacity
or any other physical unit of measurement is referred to as “specific tax.” If based
on selling price or other specified value, it is referred to as “ad valorem” tax.

Taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception. Accordingly, statutes granting tax
exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing authority. The cigarette manufacturers must justify their
claim by a clear and categorical provision in the law. Otherwise, they are liable for
the specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco found in their possession pursuant to
Section 127 of the 1986 Tax Code, as amended.

The power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked


only by the legislature. Moreover, this plenary power of taxation cannot be
delegated by Congress to any other branch of government or private persons,
unless its delegation is authorized by the Constitution itself. 
Hence, the discretion to ascertain the following — (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax;
(b) person or property that is subject to tax; (c) exemptions and exclusions from
tax; and (d) manner of collecting the tax — may not be delegated away by
Congress.

However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the
enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case.

The authority of the Secretary of Finance to prescribe the “conditions” refers only
to procedural matters and should not curtail or modify the substantive right granted
by the law.

The contention that the cigarette manufacturers are doubly taxed because they are
paying the specific tax on the raw material and on the finished product in which the
raw material was a part is also devoid of merit.

For double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense to exist, “the same
property must be taxed twice, when it should be taxed but once.” “[B]oth taxes
must be imposed on the same property or subject- matter, for the same purpose, by
the same . . . taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during
the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or character of tax.”

At all events, there is no constitutional prohibition against double taxation in the


Philippines. This court has explained in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte:

There is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared
unconstitutional on the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the
delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the taxes over which
local taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has exclusively
reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is
not forbidden by our fundamental law, since We have not adopted as part thereof
the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United
States and some states of the Union. Double taxation becomes obnoxious only
where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity
or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case where one tax is
imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.

“It is something not favored, but is permissible, provided some other constitutional
requirement is not thereby violated, such as the requirement that taxes must be
uniform.”

Excise taxes are essentially taxes on property because they are levied on certain
specified goods or articles manufactured or produced in the Philippines for
domestic sale or consumption or for any other disposition, and on goods imported.
In this case, there is no double taxation in the prohibited sense because the specific
tax is imposed by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two different articles or
products: (1) on the stemmed leaf tobacco; and (2) on cigar or cigarette.

Can an illegitimate child, who was acknowledged by his father in his birth
certificate and in effect used his father's surname, revert in using his mother's
surname? If yes, what is the remedy available?

If it falls squarely in the Alanis case, then you can use Rule 103

a legitimate child who is entitled to use either parent's surname. This involves an
illegitimate child's family name vis-a-vis Revilla Law

oh yes. I stand corrected. The grounds appearing under R.103 must be observed to
be allowed to carry the surname of his/her mother. Since the Revilla law only used
"may", hence permissive to carry the surname of the father.

so it may be yes or no depending on the circumstances?

yes. You need to persuade the judge to justify to use the surname of the mother. It
is not ministerial on the part of the judge to grant the change of surname because it
is a substantial change. Talking about the law on succession and law on family
relation. But the petition is under R.103

Change of surname under rule 103. It must have a good reason.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given
to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in
certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable,
or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible (In Re: Petition For Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
vs Cebu City Civil RegistrarG.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005).
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME)
using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose
or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. (Republic v.
Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 637-638 (1996), cited in RP v. Magpayo, G.R. No.
189476, February 2, 2011).

There must be legal reason why there is need to revert to his mother's surname, and
should fall under any of the legal grounds stated above.

Addition: what if the father and mother did not end in good terms. Father
abandoned the child and eventually married another woman. The child might carry
a family name from a person whom he haven't met yet. This happens in reality, and
I am just curious. 

yes, this really happens..im very much interested about this topic sir, hope i could
get the right answer..

Worse: if the child predeceases the father, the latter could have successional rights
from his illegitimate child. (Correct me if I'm wrong)

If change of name does not change the family relations of the parties..the petitioner
will remain the child of his father regardless.

The father cannot inherit anymore if he abandons the child. See Article 1032 par.1
of the Civil Code

exactly sir, we could never tell the fortune of a child when he grows up, and given
the circumstances, it would be too unfair on the part of the mother if the 'father'
would just come out from nowhere and claim his 'rights' over the legitime of the
child..

The child needs to file a petition in court to change the surname. More so if the
child is already of legal age. Courts will generally grant it For as long as the child
can substantiate that she has no criminal record..or no bad record at all. The law..if
you are to read it says " primarily use the surname of the father" not "exclusively".
Hence the person is given by law the choice as to what surname he or she want to
use again on the premise that he or she is of legal age.

Yes, the illegitimate child can use the surnamw of his biological father. The Court
rules that the word primary is not equal to exclusive. Hence, illegitimate chikd can
use the surname of either of his biological parents.

The said child shall file a petition in court. The surname is substantial changes
need with must be done in court as the law said.

Yes. As GR illegitimate child (IC) is required to use the surname of his mother.
But he/she may acquire the right to use the father's surname if the latter expressly
recognized the IC.

In one of the cases decided by SC, the Court clarified that Art. 176 of FC gives IC
the right to decide if he/she wants to use the surname of the father or not. The use
of "may" in the provision shows that acknowledge IC is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father.

The IC may file a petition before the Court for the use of his mother's surname
again.

G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

vs.

PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent

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