CASE Macariola Vs Asuncion-Arigo Vs Swift-Magallona Vs Ermita

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE,
JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS,
VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA,
JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE,
VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY
KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO,
JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK
TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO,
MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA,
and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY,
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA
9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of
which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in
1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for
legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land
ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of
application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522
reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris 11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522
opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty
of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the
case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the
propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG
or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and
economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to
the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the
rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to
declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges
neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient
interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating
urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants
possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting
citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of
the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part
of petitioners.18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of
judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to
test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. 20 Issues of constitutional import
are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry
such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and
pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be
reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the
definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional
definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the
territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners
argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds
of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal
and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community
of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely,
the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular
area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA
9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn
from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution
of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to
measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that
area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines
results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of
maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view. 1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of
baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding
RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this
purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly
unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29
Extent of Extent of
maritime area maritime area
using RA 3046, using RA 9522,
as amended, taking into
taking into
account the account
Treaty of Paris’ UNCLOS III (in
delimitation (in square nautical
square nautical miles)
miles)
Internal or
archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive
Economic
Zone 382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way
beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are
overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime
boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws
do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim
of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse
legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First,
Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the
baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the
foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are
outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the
provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil
malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international
law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which
[we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong
malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa
natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka
hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits. The need to shorten this baseline,
1avvphi1
and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by
respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime
zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A.
3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical
miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that
"The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number
of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines
system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey
methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later
found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. 35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of
islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. 37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North
Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the
baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis
supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts"
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage
under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as "archipelagic waters" under
UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic

baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the
status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent
passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 43 thus automatically incorporated in
the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage
that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea
lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition
of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in
exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic
States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their
islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters
between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these
waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative
guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x." 49 Article II
provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph
251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to
the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds
the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space –
the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States
to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless,
the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option
comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will
find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf
is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the
country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely
avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in
RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ,
JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R.
PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya,
GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR,
Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON,
PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign
Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN,
Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast
Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO
0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US
Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the
US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which means "long reef
exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie
Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley
are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan. 1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa
City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a
World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of
pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for
internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an
important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant
on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance. 2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural
3
Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological,
sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and
future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human
activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within
the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole
policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy
in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty." On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for
4
fuel in Okinawa, Japan. 1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January
17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press
statement. Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign
5
Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy
Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the
ship." By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from
6
the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift
in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS
Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US
respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T.
Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources),
Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine
Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General
Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to
cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized
entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30);
damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail
certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the Guardian
grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear
guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to assume
responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage under the Visiting
Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited commercial
activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and
an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to
forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on [environmental
guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings
against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S.
personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for
damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other
States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and
production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to the
grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition of all
cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or
plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement
approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local
Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined
under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian
in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar grounding
incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and
accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of
negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider
whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for
damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged areas of
TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces
Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of
nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine
Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just and
equitable under the premises. (Underscoring supplied.)
7
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution
8
and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents. 9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production orders,
respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait
accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and
substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the
damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." Specifically, it is "a party's personal and
10
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged,
and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this
11
Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
13
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
1âwphi1
impairing the environment. 14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary
citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their
own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come. (Emphasis supplied.)
15
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now
enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the
Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature." 16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has
jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is 17
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:
18
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our
land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that
''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non
habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B.
171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the
state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. (Emphasis supplied.)
19
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction
20
of local courts, as follows:

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international
law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to
the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed
to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in
whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would rec
1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not
been formally impleaded. (Emphasis supplied.)
21
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise
of territorial jurisdiction.
22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark
23
Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was
eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for
damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that
petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given
its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts
(Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity,
State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. 24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals, we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
25
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers
by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State,
he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak
of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
26
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing
official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this
case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the
US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS,
as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case
of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. 27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the uses of
the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public
international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans." The UNCLOS is a multilateral
28
treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines
in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the
principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest
29
customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees
30
over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive
economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending
on where the vessel is located. 31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the
UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as
to its bed and subsoil.
32
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
33
following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to
leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules
of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A
foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case,
the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the
world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately
voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions
contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states
cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton
administration, which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton
transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite
consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the
Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its
progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in international
institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full
Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS
by the 112th Congress. 34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will
"recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long
as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states",
and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to
traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional
uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their
coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their
internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was centered on
its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed
commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the ratification of the
UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones, including a
maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage
rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and
reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability of the US to
assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of
the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles,
and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone. 35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard
the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
"international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the
damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into
account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty
upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State,
and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in
the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common law
tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to
promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials
and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF
36
A which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives
of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions
such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the
Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude
the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of
the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and
beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether
such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from
the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same
violation of an environmental law. 37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the
salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse
from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture
and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the
fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating
with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the
following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute
resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they have
settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to
the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the
clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral to
mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the
scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for
the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they
shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a
consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and public
policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle in accordance
with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran
aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After spending $6.5
million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in
settlement over coral reef damage caused by the grounding. 38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific
team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in
Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage
and remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government
entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities." 39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be
obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other
litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the
control of the court.
1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the
context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to
nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the
41
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties
are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is
42
not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the
privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a
judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred
on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla
Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the
deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a)
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal
heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of
Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the
deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all
the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were
acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made,
those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated
solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other
half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a

preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1)
Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3)
Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145
as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and
Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5)
Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being
the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of
one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner
of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a
manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes
Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of
two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from
the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro,
O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment
shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the
parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved;
(10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola
to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and
two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the
parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a
project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the
fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective
counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23,
1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval
the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this
Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita
Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern
part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western
part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions
awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares,
provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively
to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above

which is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this
Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective
parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made
after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the
above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that
they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court,
therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such
papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of
the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective
parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective
properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform
such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of
giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer
certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh.
U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof
with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive
property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the
plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when
the project of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs.
F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the
Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of
around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which
particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At
the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia
Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with
Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The
Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging
four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case
No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce,
Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of
judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is
not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16,
1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second
cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in
business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be
exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted
an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R.
Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of
partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It
appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio
Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed,
having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the
remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant
Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc.
Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez,
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and
Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and
authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two
Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral
damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary
damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR

HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased
Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL.,

WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.
Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection
of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of
action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.
3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of
litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The
Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA
641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed
an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.
Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended
order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8,
1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the
plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and
the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold
on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for
taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of
their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in
which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is
of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his
two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer
subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the
aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and
consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not
during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this
connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by
respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of
which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order
of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the
Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence
whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him
and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr.
Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses.
Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I
believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration
from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp.
391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition
although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as
follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to
Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola,
That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24,
January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by
respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs.
Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh.
A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral
Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of
title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered
and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola
on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco
Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of
said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No.
3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition
dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an
amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs.
Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22,
1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot
1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth
of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth
was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not
adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of
partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as
per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the
cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr.
Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been
kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated
to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any
direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of
the real properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area,
location, kind, the assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is
nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him
to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that:
"A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to
have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and
caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such
transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the
faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.
In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and
render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no
longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the
litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which
he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or
another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil
case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1
and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in
business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in
active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge
or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate
territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is
part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public
corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some
modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic
of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where
there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the
new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a
conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the
prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion,
Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior
sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief
during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26
U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of
the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the
government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the
newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x x x x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,

contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from
having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that
respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent
participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not
that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was
held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition
on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his
official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by
reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in
contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A.
40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business
operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or
another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant
except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein
the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge
Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of
his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary
from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not
contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage
in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district
judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore
stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is
political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a
property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent
Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No.
3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of
litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959
prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or
law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in
private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt
practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules,
We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder,
particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of
Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act
No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the
Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion,
or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly,
the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of
inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the
existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any
subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year
without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII
is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial
Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself
state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and
under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X,
1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary
action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the
discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their
removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all
administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided
by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and
regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong
to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not
covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No.
2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is
clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his
judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967
from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid
corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation
of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized
that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife
therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it
became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent
Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of
her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising
attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not
appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all
the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for
disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa
Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with
his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but
natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face
value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at
baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon
of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence
his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible
convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa
Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or
that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor
said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid
suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in
itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social
relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405,
rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any
law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by
joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the
Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY

REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

CASE Macariola Vs Asuncion-Arigo Vs Swift-Magallona Vs Ermita

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CASE Macariola Vs Asuncion-Arigo Vs Swift-Magallona Vs Ermita

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the Threshold Issues

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

fuel in Okinawa, Japan. 1âwphi1

the coral reef.

p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;

and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents. 9

Respondents' Consolidated Comment

The Court's Ruling

impairing the environment. 14

expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

of local courts, as follows:

or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

We are not persuaded.

(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL.,

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

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