PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

RUFINO MALLARI
G.R. No. 145993, June 17, 2003

Facts:
On 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., Joseph admonished Rufino and his
brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while passing by Joseph’s house.
Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered, challenged Joseph to a
fight. The latter just ignored the challenge; and, instead he and his own brothers
Radi and Manny asked apology from Rufino.

Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball
game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then
carrying bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was
able to run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded
and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing
Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.

An information for Murder was filed and Mallari was convicted.

Issue:
Whether or not, use of motor vehicle should be considered as qualifying
circumstance.

Held:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing
Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of
which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means
used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph. The truck itself was used to
kill the victim by running over him.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another
by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle
qualifies the killing to murder.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT
G.R. No. 123819, November 14, 2001

Facts:
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, driver of Whisenhunt, reported
for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latter’s condominium unit at San Juan. He brought
Elsa to accused-appellant’s condominium unit.

After a few days, while Demetrio was in the servants’ quarters watching
television, accused Whisenhunt came in. He asked Demetrio how long he
wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him
forever, and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-
appellant shed tears and embraced Demetrio and told him that Elsa was dead.

The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center

and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black and gray. When
they returned to the condominium, accused asked Demetrio to help him wrap
the body in the black garbage bags. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded
it in the trunk of accused-appellant’s car. After that, they boarded the car.
Demetrio took the wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him in front.

It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the
condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and
Tagaytay City where they disposed the victim’s body parts and belongings.

Issue:
Whether or not, Whisenhunt is guilty of Murder.

Held:
The qualifying circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the
victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the
victim’s head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus
qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only
beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed
the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving
them to rot on the ground.

Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the

crime of murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victim’s person or
corpse. This circumstance was both alleged in the information and proved
during the trial.
 PEOPLE vs. DONATO CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS,
JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE, and
several other DOES
G.R. No. 100801-02, August 25, 2000

Facts:
On April 21, 1989 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, the car of U.S.
Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG for brevity), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial investigation by the Central Intelligence
Service (CIS for brevity), National Capital District Command, Camp Crame,
Quezon City which was led by Capt. Gil Meneses, Assistant Chief of the Special
Investigation Branch, CIS, shows that on the date and time of the ambush, Col.
James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being
driven by Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of Tomas Morato
Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on their way to the JUSMAG
Compound along Tomas Morato Street when gunmen who were on board an old
model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and
seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the
gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it sped away from the
site of the ambush.

Issue:
Whether or not, accused are guilty of the crime of Murder and Attempted
Murder.

Held:
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was
attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The
evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by
the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime without the least danger
unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant
Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited
for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner
of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any
warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon
reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James
Rowe during the said ambush is murder.

With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of Joaquin
Vinuya, it appears that the said victim sustained injuries on his scalp, on the left
shoulder and on the back portion of the left hand from the ambush. Under
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a felony is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The evidence adduced by the
prosecutio is not sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This
Court notes that the wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but
merely superficial wounds. The records disclose that Joaquin Vinuya managed to
drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the JUSMAG Compound which is 200 meters
away from the site of the ambush.[76] It also appears that Vinuya was treated for
his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga
after which he was brought back to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to
recuperate. Hence, the crime committed as against him is only attempted
murder.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO S. ANTONIO,
SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR.
G.R. No. 128900, July 14, 2000

Facts:
On November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani,
then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker
session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by
Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after
waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play “pusoy dos”, a game
for two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only
when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around
9:00 o’clock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.

When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the
loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the
defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and
sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause,
Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close
range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The
pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose
Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles
occurred.

On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the
testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was
caused by Tuadles’ refusal to pay Antonio’s winnings. In the middle of a heated
altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonio’s
gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached
for Tuadles’ hand and they grappled for possession of the gun. As they
wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio
was left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the trigger. In fine,
Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to
defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the prosecution’s eyewitness,
averring that SG Bobis could not have seen the actual shooting since he (Bobis)
and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were alerted by Antonio’s yells,
reached the scene when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the
floor.

On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the
crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1
Honorio Cartalla, Jr.

Issue:
 Whether or not, treachery is employed by Antonio which qualifies the
killing to Murder.

Held:
There is no basis for the trial court’s conclusion “that accused Antonio
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself.”[34] It ruled that
treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain the basis
for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a sudden attack and
the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. There was no
treachery in this case.

It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There
must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific
purpose.

All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a
spur of the moment crime.

It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles
in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which
neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because treachery
requires that the mode of attack must have been thought of by the offender and
must have sprung from an unforeseen occurrence.

It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to
pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with
treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In treachery, on
the other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously and deliberately.
One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-control, cannot
consciously employ a particular means, method or form of attack in the
execution of the crime. Thus, the killing of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not
attended by treachery. Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of
Homicide under Art. 249 of RPC.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995

Facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at
Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went
with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a
block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did
not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to
walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-

type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind
them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car,
approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino
handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to
look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked
accused: “Why are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his
shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered
for a moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the
sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to
get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He
pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and
took a step backward.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she
became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: “Oh,
my God, he’s got a gun. He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the
while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the
latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino
obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away
from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She
strayed to the side of accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen
circled around accused’s car, trying to put some distance between them. The
short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and
repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally
sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them
again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the
sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw
Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw
accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and
shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against

accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the
killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When
Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and
during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was
amended to MURDER.

Issue:
Whether or not, Teehankee is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder.

Held:
According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, he claims
the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting
incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare the
bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered
from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the
gunman’s car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver metalic gray.
Fourth, the accused could not have been the gunman, for Mangubat said that he
overheard the victim Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: “Please, don’t shoot
me and don’t kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy.” The accused also contends
that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto
Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: “Daddy don’t shoot. Don’t.” Fifth, the
NBI towed accused’s car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which
proved that the same was not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the
paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.

The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN,

since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard
Maureen plead to the gunman: “Huwag, Daddy.”; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO,
another resident of Dasmariñas Village, who had a white Lancer car, also
bearing license plate number 566.

The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because

the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered his
involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule has long been laid to rest.
The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In dealing with
evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court examines its damaging quality
and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the weight of
the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.

In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the
linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting
the accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted mainly because of his
identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high credibility.

The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal
gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however,
cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the
evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused.

There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car was
not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI
towed his car from Dasmariñas Village where it was parked to the NBI office.
Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said car was
towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the
possession of the accused. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in
running condition. Even the accused’s evidence show that said car could run.
After its repairs, the accused’s son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the
repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it
was parked.

Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the

eyewitnesses’ description of the color of the gunman’s car. Leino described the
car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white (“medyo puti”);
Mangubat declared the car was white; and Cadenas testified it was silver
metallic gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of
differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white,
somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking
nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution
eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.

The accused’s attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. The accused
cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the
gunman: “Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy.” The evidence on record, however,
demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was
clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two
(2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman
as “Papa,” not “Daddy.” Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion.
While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were
looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT
the gunman. Leino is a reliable witness.

The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was
negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has
“. . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely
establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be
established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the
discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of
substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as
explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as
peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or
nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco.” In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several
factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands
of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears
gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against
the gunman at the time of firing. In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist,
Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing
of hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder
nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after
more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a
reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by
washing or perspiration. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the accused was
tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from
the time of the alleged shooting.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORBERTO MANERO, JR.,
EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO,
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO,
ROGER BEDAÑO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR.,
JOHN DOE and PETER DOE
G.R. Nos. 86883-85, January 29, 1993

Facts:
11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers,
along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger
Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were conferring
with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan,
Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number
of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. On the same occasion, the
conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill
Fr. Peter Geremias.

Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the
four (4) others, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil",
which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia and without any
provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil".
"Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of
his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was
extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again
fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however managed to
seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr., ordered
his men to surround the house and not to allow anyone to get out so that "Bantil"
would die of hemorrhage.

At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his
motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his
co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway.
Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned
the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced.

Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. In a
flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the
ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if
that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark,
Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and
fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali,
causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the
terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the
delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the
victim from possible assistance.

Issue:
Whether or not, accused are guilty of Murder and Attempted Murder by
conspiracy.

Held:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit a crime and decide to commit it. 22 It is not essential that all the accused
commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. 23 It is enough
that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of
purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24

The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed
a community of design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused.
Thus —

The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were
positively identified with Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the
carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00
o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 morning . . . they were outside of the
carinderia by the window near the table where Edilberto Manero, Norberto
Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the
airborne from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they all went
to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were seen
again with Edilberto Manero and Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of that day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto
Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where
Robles fled and hid, but later left when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as
Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez'
house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle of Fr. Favali and
later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when Edilberto Manero
shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto
Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest.

From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants
were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating
the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by
the Manero brothers and their militiamen. Accused all assumed a fighting stance
to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest.
They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other
occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage.
Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the
crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in
concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino
Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots
themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the
criminal acts.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO UNLAGADA
G.R. No. 141080, September 17, 2002

Facts:
On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel
left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a
public dance. At around 11:00, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from
dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once
outside, they decided to have a drink and bought two (2) bottles of beer.

Not long after, Danilo left to look for a place to relieve himself.
According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from Danilo who was
relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached
Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant
with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men
numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted
weapons. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any
medical assistance.

Trial court convicted the accused for the crime of Murder.

Issue:
Whether or not, the lower court erred in convicting the accused of Murder
instead of Death in Tumultuous Affray.

Held:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several
persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a
confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such
person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.

A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several

persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of
which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.[5] The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of
individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of
the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense
suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised
Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where several persons not comprising
definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized
manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.
 Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving
himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused
walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the
side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was
completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no
chance to put up any defense.