G.R. No.

197546               March 23, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For review is the conviction for the crime of Murder of accused-appellants BAYANI DE LEON
(Bayani), ANTONIO DE LEON (Antonio), DANILO DE LEON (Danilo), and YOYONG DE LEON
(Yoyong) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),  in Criminal Case No. Q-02-113990, which
1

Decision  was affirmed with modifications by the Court of Appeals.

2

The accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide under an Information which
reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to
gain, by means of violence and/or intimidation against [sic] person, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one EMILIO A. PRASMO, in the following manner, to wit: on the date
and place aforementioned, while victim/deceased Emilio A. Prasmo was walking along A. Bonifacio
Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, this City, together with his wife and daughter in-law,
accused pursuant to their conspiracy armed with sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal. revolver
rob EMILIO A. PRASMO and took and carried away ₱7,000.00, Philippine currency, and by reason
or on the occasion thereof, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
accused with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and employ personal violence upon EMILIOA. PRASMO
by then and there shooting and hacking the victim with the use of said weapons, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Emilio A. Prasmo.
3

When arraigned, all the accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty except accused Antonio.
Thus, the RTC ordered a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is concerned.

Evidence of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Erlinda A. Prasmo (Erlinda), wife of the victim, Emilio Prasmo (Emilio),
who testified that on 2 March 2002, while they were walking along Sta. Lucia Street, Novaliches, on
their way to RP Market, the accused-appellants, who are siblings, blocked their way. Accused-
appellant Danilo, armed with a "sumpak", suddenly hit Emilio with a "bakal" while accused-appellant
Antonio, who was armed with a "samurai", hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead
pipe at the right back portion of his legs and middle back portion of his torso. Accused-appellant
Danilo then took Emilio’s money in the amount of ₱7,000.00 and thereafter aimed the "sumpak" at
the lower portion of Emilio’s chest and fired the same, causing Emilio to slump on the ground.
Accused-appellant Yoyong also hit Emilio with a lead pipe at the back of the neck and middle portion
of his back.

As accused-appellants attacked and mauled Emilio, Erlinda, seeing her husband sprawled
motionless on the ground, shouted for help, but nobody dared to help because accused-appellant
Bayani, armed with a gun, was shouting "walang lalapit". The accused-appellants immediately left
and Emilio was brought to the FEU Fairview Hospital, where Emilio died.

Gina Prasmo, Emilio’s daughter, testified that at the time of the incident, she was at their house
when she was informed of the news. She immediately went to the hospital where she learned that
her father was already dead.

The testimony of Dr. Editha Martinez, a medico-legal officer of the Medico-Legal Division, Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was dispensed with because she was
not the one who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Emilio, but nevertheless, she identified
such documents as Medico-Legal Report, Autopsy Report, Sketch of the head showing contusion,
anatomical sketch showing the gunshot wound on the right portion of the chest, and the anatomical
sketch of Emilio.

Evidence of the Defense

Carmelita de Leon (Carmelita), sister of the accused-appellants, testified that on the evening of 1
March 2002, she was at her house when her brothers, accused-appellants Danilo and Antonio,
arrived. Upon observing that the heads of Antonio and Danilo were bleeding, she was informed that
Emilio and his son, Edgardo Prasmo (Edgardo), attacked and mauled them, which caused their
injuries. They reported the incident to a "tanod" in the barangay hall, Julio Batingaw, who told them
to return in the afternoon so they could have a meeting with Emilio and Edgardo. When they
returned, Emilio and Edgardo did not appear.

In the evening, at around 7 o’clock, fifteen (15) men carrying firearms, who included Jerry and
Edgar, sons of Emilio, stormed her house looking for accused-appellants and threatened to kill her if
she will not disclose their whereabouts. To support her testimony, the defense offered in evidence
the medical certificates for the injuries sustained by accused-appellants Antonio and Danilo dated 1
March 2002 and the entry in the barangay blotter book dated 2 March 2002,about the mauling of
accused-appellants Antonio and Danilo.

The accused-appellants gave their testimonies that follow:

Jose de Leon, also known as Yoyong, was at the house of his brother-in-law, Willie Bandong, in
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City to discuss the schedule of the "pabasa". He stayed there between
8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the evening. Danilo, at that time, was with his mother in Pugad Lawin in
Quezon City, to accompany his mother in doing her work as a "manghihilot". They left Pugad Lawin
between 8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the evening and went home. Bayani, a police civilian agent, at the
night of the crime, was at the Police Station No. 5 in Fairview, Quezon City, talking to a police officer.

Antonio, in the morning of 2 March 2002, went to the barangayhall with his mother, Carmelita, and
accused-appellant Danilo, to file a complaint against Emilio and Emilio’s son, Edgardo, due to the
mauling incident the previous evening. In the barangayhall, they were told to return in the afternoon
so they could have a meeting with Emilio and Edgardo. They returned as told. Emilio and Edgardo
did not.

On the way home, accused-appellant Antonio met Emilio, Erlinda, and Gina, Emilio’s daughter,
walking along A. Bonifacio Street. Emilio, upon seeing Antonio, immediately opened his jacket and
tried to pull "something" out. Antonio then instantlytried to grab that "something" from Emilio. While
grappling for the possession of that "something", which turned out to be a "sumpak", it fired.
Bernaly Aguilar, while on her way to the market in Sta. Lucia, witnessed a fight involving accused-
appellant Antonio and another man, who were grappling for the possession over a "bakal". After
walking a few meters away from the incident, she heard a shot.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

According to the accused-appellants, Erlinda is not a credible witness and that her testimony is
barren of probative value for having grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies, as opposed to
accused-appellant Antonio’s testimony which supposedly established the presence of all the
essential requisites of self-defense. Accused-appellants referred to the inconsistency between
Erlinda’s court testimony and her Sinumpaang Salaysay. In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, she
identified accused-appellant Antonio as the one who fired the "sumpak" at the lower chest of Emilio
and took Erlinda’s money. However, during her direct examination, she testified that it was accused-
appellant Danilo who shot Emilio with a "sumpak" and thereafter, took his wallet.

Accused-appellants further argued that Erlinda could not have mistaken Danilo for Antonio, because
she knew them both as they reside six (6) houses away from the house of the Prasmos and that
accused-appellant Antonio has a distinctive feature — having a cleft palate or is "ngongo".

The RTC rejected accused-appellants’ contentions. According to the RTC, Erlinda’s narration of the
incident is clear and convincing. While her testimony has some inconsistencies, they refer only to
collateral and minor matters, which do not detract from the probative value of her testimony.

The trial court found established the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery,
abuse of strength absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery: 4

These requisites are obviously present in this case considering that the evidence shows that after
Danilo suddenly fired at Emilio’s lower portion of the chest accused Antonio and Yoyong ganged up
on Emilio, with Antonio hitting him with a lead pipe on the right back portion of his legs and in the
middle back torso and hacking him with a samurai, and accused Yoyong hitting also (sic) him with a
lead pipe on the right back leg and middle portion of his back. Said action of the four (4) accused
rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself.
5

However, citing People v. Nimo,  the RTC ruled that because robbery was not duly established, it
6

cannot convict accused-appellants for robbery with homicide. It relied on the principle that in order to
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing
itself.  Thus, as opposed to the Information which charged the accused-appellants of the crime of
7

Robbery with Homicide, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder by conspiracy. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE
LEON and YOYONG DE LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided by law
and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the late EMILIO PRASMO the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. 8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellants. Contrary to the accused-
appellants’ contention that the trial court committed a reversible error when it gave credence to
Erlinda’s testimony, the Court of Appeals considered Erlinda’s recollection of the events as direct,
positive and convincing manner, unshaken by a tedious and grueling cross-examination. 9

With regard to the crime charged, the Court of Appeals agreed that the accused-appellants are guilty
of the crime of Murder instead of Robbery with Homicide. As borne by the records, the only intent of
the accused-appellants was to kill Emilio. The "accused-appellants had an axe to grind against
Emilio x x x. The means used by the accused-appellants as well as the nature and number of
wounds - debilitating, fatal and multiple – inflicted by appellants on the deceased manifestly revealed
their design to kill him. The robbery committed by appellant Danilo [was on] the spur of the moment
or [was] a mere afterthought."10

Also, the Court of Appeals found accused-appellant Danilo guilty of Robbery for unlawfully divesting
Emilio of ₱7,000.00, which it considered as an action independent of and outside the original design
to murder Emilio. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the
appealed Decision dated May 25, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto with the added MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Danilo de Leon is
also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery defined under Article 293 and
penalized under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and seven (7) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ordered to return to the heirs
of Emilio Prasmo the cash of ₱7,000.00, representing the amount he took from said victim. 11

Now, before the Court on automatic review, accused-appellants contend, by way of assignment of
errors, that the appellate court gravely erred when:

1. it gave full credence to the inconsistent testimony of the alleged eyewitness Erlinda
Prasmo; and

2. it disregarded the self-defense interposed by Antonio De Leon and the denial and alibi
interposed by Bayani, Danilo, and Yoyong, all surnamed De Leon. 12

Our Ruling

The accused-appellants’ attempt to discredit Erlinda’s testimony must fail. Inconsistencies between
the declaration of the affiant in her sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness;  it is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. In fact, contrary to the defense’s
13

claim, discrepancies erase suspicion that the witness was rehearsed or that the testimony was
fabricated. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, despite minor inconsistencies, Erlinda’s
narration revealed each and every detail of the incident, which gave no impression whatsoever that
her testimony is a mere fabrication. As we already enunciated in previous rulings, "[i]t is a matter of
judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands
greater weight."14

Before us is a reversed trial. As one of the accused-appellants, Antonio, pleaded self-defense, he

admitted authorship of the crime. At this juncture, the burden of proof is upon the accused-appellants
to prove with clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself,  which the defense
15

failed to discharge.
Unlawful Aggression

Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner,
which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not
suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon. 16

Applying the aforesaid legal precept, Emilio’s act of pulling "something" out from his jacket while he
was three (3) to four (4) meters away from accused-appellant Antonio cannot amount to unlawful
aggression. Neither can the act of pulling "something" out amount to physical force or actual use of
weapon, or even threat or intimidating attitude. Even if accused-appellant Antonio’s account of the
incident is truthful, that Emilio had motive to kill accused-appellant Antonio, giving accused-appellant
reasonable grounds to believe that his life and limb was in danger, and that the "something" was
indeed a "sumpak", it can hardly be recognized as unlawful aggression to justify self-defense.  There
17

is no showing that accused-appellant Antonio’s life was in peril by the act of pulling "something" out.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "it must be noted that appellant never said that Emilio
aimed or pointed the "sumpak" at him or at least made an attempt to shoot him".  The threat on
18

accused-appellant Antonio’s life is more imagined than real. As we already held in a catena of
cases, the act of pulling "something" out cannot constitute unlawful aggression. 19

Accused-appellant Antonio cannot allege that it was Emilio who instigated the incident; that Emilio’s
fate was brought about by his own actuations. There is no sufficient provocation, nay, provocation at
all in the act of pulling "something" out.

Contrary to accused-appellant Antonio’s contention that he acted in self-defense, the Medico-Legal

Report No. M-685-02 dated 12 March 2002 proved otherwise. As borne by the records, Emilio
sustained numerous wounds, including the fatal gunshot wound in the chest, which belie accused-
appellants’ defense that Antonio was alone at the scene of the crime and acted in self-defense. The
Medico-Legal Report No. M-685-02 dated 12 March 2002 revealed that the victim sustained the
following multiple injuries:

HEAD AND NECK:

1. Lacerated wound, right parietal region, measuring 4 x 3 cm, 7 cm from the mid-sagittal
line.

2. Contusion, right mandibular region, measuring 11 x 2 cm, 7 cm from the anterior midline.

3. Contusion, nasal region, measuring 3 x 2.5 cm, along the anterior midline.

4. Hematoma, left parietal region, measuring 5 x 4 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline.

5. Contusion, left cheek, measuring 11 x 3 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline.

6. Contusion, left lateral neck region, measuring 6 x 3 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline.

7. Lacerated wound, occipital region, measuring 5 x 1.8 cm, bisected by the anterior midline.

8. There is a scalp hematoma at the right parieto-occipital region.

9. There are subdural, sub arachnoid hemorrhages at the right celebrum.

 10. The right parietal bone is fractured.

TRUNK AND ABDOMEN:

1. Gunshot wound, right chest, measuring 2.6 cm x 2.3 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline,
112 cm from the right heel, directed posteriorwards, downwards, and slightly lateralwards,
fracturing the 6th and 7th ribs, lacerating the lower lobe of the right lung, diaphragm, right
lobe of the liver with the deformed plastic wad embedded, right kidney with 2 lead pellets
found embedded and the aorta with 3 pellets embedded thereat and 2 lead pellets found at
the right thoracic cavity.

2. Contusion, right shoulder region, measuring 12 x 3 cm, 8 cm from the posterior midline.

3. Abrasion, right shoulder region, measuring 3.5 x 2 cm, 12 cm from the posterior midline.

4. Contusion, left shoulder region, measuring 4 x 2 cm, 6 cm from the posterior midline.

EXTREMITIES:

1. Contusion, left elbow, measuring 8 x 2 cm, 5 cm medial to its posterior midline.

2. Abrasion, dorsal aspect of the left hand, measuring 0.6 x 0.3 cm, 3 cm medial to its
posterior midline.20

As we already held, the nature and location of wounds are considered important indicators which
disprove a plea of self-defense.  A perusal of the evidence would depict the presence of a deliberate
21

onslaught against Emilio. The means used by accused-appellants as shown by the nature, location
and number of wounds sustained by Emilio are so much more than sufficient to repel or prevent any
alleged attack of Emilio against accused-appellant Antonio. Evidently, the accused-appellants’ intent
to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by Emilio. The wounds
sustained by Emilio indubitably reveal that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a
homicidal aggression on the part of accused-appellants.  Double Jeopardy
22

The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the
Information, but found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder. According to the RTC, contrary
to the charge of robbery with homicide, the accused is guilty of the crime of murder because the
prosecution failed to establish the crime of robbery. The RTC, citing People v. Nimo,  ratiocinated
23

that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as
conclusively as the killing itself.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC and found
all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the findings of the RTC with
regard to the crime of robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and found
accused Danilo guilty of the separate crime of robbery. We find that the appellate court erred for
violating the constitutional right of Danilo against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.  If an act is
1âwphi1

punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. 24
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. 25

In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid
Information for robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted
Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from
which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery
was not proven. The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of
robbery with homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the
crime of robbery alone.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded from ruling on the innocence
or guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on the innocence or guilt of the accused
of the same crime transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any person "twice x x x in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."  As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery
26

based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of
double jeopardy.  A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot, even
27

an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal of the trial
court  due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant, who has
28

been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government oppression through the abuse of
criminal processes.  The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the
29

acquittal of the accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-Appellants BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE
LEON are hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellants are
ordered to pay Emilio Prasmo's heirs the following amounts: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for Emilio
Prasmo's death, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality until fully
paid.

January 17, 2018

G.R. No. 225642-43

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 17 February 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
HC Nos. 01226-MIN and 01227-MIN affirming in toto the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of Davao City (RTC). The RTC found Juvy D.
Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G. Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different
charges of rape.

THE FACTS

The two (2) Informations in this case read:

Criminal Case No. 64,964-09

That on or about February 10, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after boxing
her legs.3

Criminal Case No. 64,965-09

That on or about February 11, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after
grappling her.4

These two (2) cases were jointly tried before the RTC, and Amarela and Racho's appeals, although
separate, were consolidated in the CA on 13 November 2015.5

The RTC summarized the factual milieu of this case:

Prosecution presented [AAA], single, housekeeper and a resident of [XXX], Calinan, Davao City. On
February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was watching a beauty contest with
her aunt at Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. The contest was being held at a
basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only lights available were those coming
from the vehicles around.

She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong
Cooperative near the basketball court. Between the cooperative building and the basketball court
were several trees. She was not able to reach the comfort room because [ Amarela] was already
waiting for her along the way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was
shocked and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day
care center. He punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed
her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He
placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull
movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.

The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her.
So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around,
she proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first
to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed
behind So Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead.

xxxx
[AAA] then said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to
lie down. When she refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking
him but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of
[AAA]. [Racho] then inserted his penis into [AAA]'s vagina. After consummating the act, [Racho] left
her. So [AAA] went home alone.

When she reached home, her parents were already asleep. She went inside her room and cried.
The following morning, she decided to leave home. Her mother was surprised at her decision until
eventually, [AAA] told her mother about what happened to her. She told her [eldest] brother first who
got very angry.

They reported the matter to the police and eventually [ Amarela] and [Racho] were arrested.6

For the defense, Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what
happened with AAA:

Defense presented [Amarela] who confirmed the fact that on February 10, 2009, he attended the
fiesta celebrations in Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. He said he met private
complainant, [AAA], at the cooperative building at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [AAA] asked
him if he knew a person by the name of Eric Dumandan who was allegedly her boyfriend. After a
while, Eric Dumandan passed by and so he told him that [AAA] was looking for him. Then he left.

Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez. While drinking, he felt dizzy
and fell down from the bench. So Sanchez brought him to the house of his elder brother Joey in
Tawan-tawan. He did not know what happened next because he slept and woke up at six o'clock in
the morning.7

On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping her:

Defense also presented [Racho], a resident of Sitio Maligatong, Barangay Tawan-tawan, Baguio
District, Calinan, Davao City. He testified that he was at the house of his mother on February 10,
2009. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, [AAA] arrived with Godo Dumandan. [AAA] was asking
for help while crying because she was allegedly raped by three persons in the pineapple plantation.

His mother advised her to just take a bath and change clothes and sleep at his brother's house. But
[AAA] wanted to go home. Since he was the only one who was not drunk, Racho was instructed by
[his] mother to accompany [AAA] in going to her aunt's house.

When they reached Caniamo, [AAA] did not want to be brought to her aunt's house because she
knows the latter would just scold her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to their house at Ventura.
Since Ventura was far, Racho did not go with her and instead went back home.

When asked about the charge of rape against him, Racho said he could not have done that because
his hand is impaired while showing a long scar on his left arm. This was a result allegedly of a
hacking incident on September 21, 2008. He offered a Medical Certificate (Exh. 1) issued by Dr. Lugi
Andrew Sabal of the Davao Medical Center which indicates that Racho was confined in the said
hospital from September 21, 2008 up to October 1, 2008 after an operation on his left forearm. He
said that his left arm was placed in a plaster cast but that he removed the cast after three (3)
months. He said that even after he removed the cast, his arm was still painful and he could not move
it around.
Racho said he was surprised when policemen came to his house on February 11, 2009 and invited
him to the police station because there was a complaint for rape against him.

Anita Racho testified that she was at home in the evening of February 10, 2009 together with her
husband and sons Bobby and [Racho]. Godo Dumandan arrived together with [AAA] who was
allegedly raped by three (3) men. [AAA] appeared madly and wet so she advised her to take a bath
and not to go home anymore since it was late. [AAA] insisted on going home, so she asked her son
[Racho] to accompany her. [Racho] at first refused pointing to his elder brother Bobby to accompany
her. He eventually brought [AAA] home. He came back at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and
then he went to sleep.

The following day, she was surprised when [Racho] was arrested allegedly for raping [AAA]. [Racho]
denied raping [AAA].8

Ruling of the Trial Court

In its joint judgment, the RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho,
to be clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their
denial as these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and
Racho were convicted as follows:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 64964-09 finding
[Amarela] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 64965-09, judgment is hereby rendered finding [Racho] GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.9

The Assailed CA Decision

Before the CA, Amarela and Racho pointed out that although there were other witnesses, the only
material testimony on record was that of AAA. They argued that there were several circumstances
casting doubt on AAA' s claim that she was raped because her testimony does not conform to
common knowledge and to ordinary human experience.

In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto finding no reason to reverse the
trial court's factual findings. It held:

[AAA] has testified in a straightforward manner during her direct examination and remained steadfast
in her cross-examination that Amarela sexually abused her on February 10, 2009, and [Racho]
abused her five hours later. The first rape incident took place in the daycare center. She was pulled
by Amarela while she was on her way to the comfort room located at the back of the x x x
cooperative building. Private complainant, full of mud and wet, with dress tom, took refuge at the
house of her boyfriend and sought for help. Her boyfriend's father took her to the house of the in-
laws of her cousin. [AAA], who was still wet and muddy, begged the mother-in-law of her cousin that
she be taken to the house of her aunt. While the in-laws of her cousin helped her by having escorted
her to her aunt's house, it turned out however, that [Racho] her escort had another plan in mind.
[Racho] sexually abused [AAA], who had no more strength to fight him.

The records render no reason to reverse the factual findings of the court a quo. Both of the
appellants' denials miserably fail in contrast to [AAA's] positive identification of the accused-
appellants as the person who sexually abused her. There is no doubt in our mind that both
appellants had carnal knowledge of [AAA]. Her credibility is cemented by her lack of motive to testify
against the two appellants, Amarela and [Ra.cho]. There is no evidence to suggest that she could
have been actuated by such motive. The People has ably demonstrated the existence of the
elements of Rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, which states:

xxxx

The Court sees no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that in matters of credibility of
witnesses, the assessment made by the trial court should be respected and given preponderant
weight. [AAA's] ordeal is so traumatic that she would rather forget the whole incident. But once a
rape victim has decided to seek justice, that means she is willing to recall the dastardly detail of the
animalistic act committed on her person.

[Racho] would have us believe that the charge against him was merely fabricated because,
according to him, being raped by two different assailants, on two different occasions and only hours
apart, is contrary to the normal course of things.

We are not convinced.

The Supreme Court has once said that rape in itself is prompted by the abnormal need of a man to
overpower and control a woman by way of sexual abuse. There is no typical mode, norm, or
circumstance in committing rape or sexual abuse for the evil in man has no conscience. In fact, in a
catena of cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that rape is no respecter of time or place. Thus, we
cannot agree with [Racho]'s argument that just because [AAA] had been raped five hours earlier, the
possibility that she might get raped again is nil.

Undeterred, appellants posit that [AAA's] testimony is not substantially corroborated by medical
findings as the medical certificate does not show any physical injuries resulting from the alleged use
of force by the appellants.

We do not agree.

The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not
militate against the claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth,
honesty, and candor. It must be stressed that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on
the victim depends on the degree of force employed by the accused to consummate the purpose
which he had in mind to have carnal knowledge with the offended woman. Thus, the force employed
in rape need not be so great nor of such a character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force
used by the accused is sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose.
Appellant Amarela also argues that [AAA] could not have identified her assailant because it was very
dark at the place where [AAA] was allegedly pulled by her assailant and the place where she was
allegedly raped.

[AAA], in her re-direct examination, testified that she knew it was Amarela who raped her because
she saw Amarela's fact while Amarela brought her from the cooperative building to the daycare
center.

Time and time again, the High Court has repeatedly ruled that positive identification prevails over
denial, a negative defense that is inherently unreliable. We have no reason to doubt [AAA's]
unwavering assertions positively establishing the identities of the two accused-appellants. We find
the guilt of each of the accused-appellants to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto. 10

OUR RULING

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape
cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In
doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly
admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor. 11 However, this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the
accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice.

The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case
of People v. Tana, 12 the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns
raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador,
said:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused
unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor.
We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place
unless it did actually take place.13

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would
have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault;
today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic
role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent
and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.

In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or
cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused
may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.14 Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable
doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to
the credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely
on the observations of the trial court who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly,
examination.15 It has since become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial
court be accorded great respect by this Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based
on reasonable discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of
belief.16 Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are
affirmed by the appellate court,17 this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, and
misinterpreted.

We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us, to wit:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC' s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments
and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.18

After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable doubt
lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following circumstances,
particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story
appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not
have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first
time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage against her
will; and (4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any
signs of forced entry.

First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd at the
beauty contest and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing:

Q: Now, you said that you watched the beauty contest at around 7:00 in the evening on Feb. 10,
2009. After that, Ms. Witness, while watching, what did you do?

A: I was on my way to the CR.

Q: And where is the CR located?

A: Near the coop.

Q: Can you please tell us the name of that cooperative?

A: Cooperative.

Q: Can you recall the exact name?

A: Maligatong Cooperative.
Q: And, where is this Maligatong Cooperative, Ms. Witness, in relation to the basketball court where
the beauty contest was held?

A: It's near.

xxxx

Q: Now, between the basketball court and the cooperative you referred to, what separates these two
buildings?

A: Durian trees and cacao.

Q: You said that you were going to the CR located at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative to
relieve yourself. And, were you able to go to the CR at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative?

A: Nomore.

Q: Why not?

A: [Amarela] was waiting for me.

Q: Exactly, can you please tell us the location where he was waiting for you?

A: At the back of the cooperative.

Q: And, upon seeing [Amarela] at the back of the cooperative, Ms. Witness, tell us what happened?

A: He pulled me.

Q: Going to what place?

A: Going towards the day care center.19

Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away from the beauty
contest stage to the day care center:

6. At around 6:00 in the afternoon, I, my aunt [BBB] together with her siblings and grand children
went back to Maligatong Cooperative Building to watch a beauty contest. My companions stayed at
the multicab at the parking area of said building, while my cousin [CCC] and I went closer to the
stage. While at there, the person of [Amarela], drunk, suddenly appeared and introduced himself to
me. I resisted to get his hand on my hands because he is holding it tightly and forcibly brought me to
the back portion of the building. I asked for help but nobody heard me maybe because of the high
volume of the sound system.

7. While at the back of said building I saw my boyfriend Eric Dumandan coming and [Amarela] told
him, "Ran (Eric's palayaw) naa si gemma diri!" and Eric responded, "ahh! tinga-a."

8. When Eric left us, [Amarela] grabbed me going to the purok beside the daycare center of Sitio
Maligatong, Brgy. Tawan-Tawan, Baguio District [more or less] 20 meters away from the
[cooperative] building. I shouted for help but still nobody heard me.20
It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex parte are usually
incomplete and inadequate.21 We usually brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and
do not impair the credibility of the rape victim. 22 In this case, however, the version in AAA's affidavit-
complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she
was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to
the rest room when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction
because it goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.

If we were to take into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of
the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her
will. Thus, AAA's version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away
from the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA
was being taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was
grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story that differs from her court
testimony? To our mind, AAA's testimony could have been concocted to just make her story
believable rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her
away from the stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it casts
some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth - that she was abducted against her will before
she was raped.

Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts
AAA's credibility in question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on
the lone testimony of the victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and
consistent with human experience. We must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the
testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable.

Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole
incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not
illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's face:

Direct Examination

Q: Now, what separates this beauty contest from what you were testifying a while ago as the
daycare center?

A: Coconut trees, durian trees, and cacao.

Q: ·what else?

A: Several trees.

Q: How about grass?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, can you please tell us the illumination in that place?

A: It was dark.

Q: Why is it that it was dark?

A: Because there was no lighting.23

Cross-Examination

Q: Since it was already night time, it was very dark at that time, correct?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And when you went to the CR to relieve yourself which CR was located at Maligatong
Cooperative building, it was also dark on your way?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now, while under the makeshift stage of that day care center, it was dark, very dark?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And you cannot see the face of [Amarela], was not clear to you because it was very dark,
correct?

A: Yes, ma' am.24

Re-Direct Examination

Q: At the time that you said that while [Amarela] was undressing you could not see his face, would
you confirm that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about his body?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why, Ms. Witness?

A: It was dark.

xxxx

Q: Now, at the time that you were raped you said that it was too dark, how did you then identify that
[Amarela] was the one who raped you?

A: I know him when he brought me from the Coop.

Q: From the Coop. to the day care center that was the time that you identified him?

A: Yes, sir.25
From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting
conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela
while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as
to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care center was
dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again draw
reservations from AAA's testimony.

Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. The
identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.26

Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then
raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience. She said:

Q: At the day care center, where exactly did he bring you?

A: Under.

Q: Under what?

A: Under the makeshift stage.

Q: You said there was also a makeshift stage at the day care center?

A: Yes.

Q: Was it finished makeshift stage or not?

A: Not yet finished.

Q: You said that he brought you under that makeshift stage?

A: Yes.

Q: Please tell us how did you fit in that makeshift stage?

A: Because the flooring is about 2 feet high.

Q: Since you said he pulled you towards that makeshift stage, what was your reaction, Ms. Witness?

A: I was scared.

Q: And what did you do?

A: I did not know what to do then.

xxxx
Q: Now, after that, what happened, Ms. Witness?

A: He pushed me under.

Q: What happened after that?

A: He [punched] me in my abdomen.

Q: What else did he do to you?

A: I felt weak.

Q: After that what happened?

A: He undressed me.

Q: While he was undressing you, what did you do, Ms. Witness?

A: I was just lying down.

xxxx

Q: What else did he do to you while you were resisting his advances?

A: He boxed my upper left thigh.

Q: .What did you feel when he boxed your left thigh?

A: I felt numbness.

xxxx

Q: Now, you said that he undressed you, Ms. Witness, and you said he also undressed himself.
What, then, [did he] do to you?

A: He placed himself on top of me.

Q: What did he do after that?

A: He inserted his penis in my sex organ.27

From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and
place himself on top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for
two human beings to move freely under a stage, much more when the other person is trying to resist
sexual advances. Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift
stage without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held against her will, AAA
could have easily called for help or simply run away.
Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico-
legal officer. The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that AAA had no
pertinent physical findings/or physical injuries:28

FINDINGS
GENERAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS
Height 5 feet & 4 inches Weight 44 Kg
Awake, afebrile, not in respiratory
General Survey
distress
Conscious, coherent, respond well to
Mental Status questions when asked and maintained
eye to eye contact
Pertinent Physical Findings/Physical Normal Findings
Injuries
ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
External Genitalia Normal findings
Urethra and Periurethral Area Normal findings
Perihymenal Area and Fossa (+) Hyperemic/Erythematous
Narvicularis perihymenal area.
(+) Complete laceration at 9 o’clock
Hymen and 3 o’clock positions with minimal
bloody secretion on the lacerated area.
Perineum Normal findings
Discharge None
Internal and Speculum exam Not done
Anal Examination Good Sphincteric tone
DIAGNOSTIC AND EVIDENCE GATHERING
Pending laboratory results
Forensic Evidence and Laboratory
(Spermatocyte determination gram
Results
staining).
IMPRESSONS
Anogenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.29

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that a medico-
legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in
nature.30 In convicting rapists based entirely on the testimony of their victim, we have said that a
medico-legal report is by no means controlling.31 Thus, since it is merely corroborative in character, a
medico-legal report could even be dispensed with.32

A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only
infer possibilities and not absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual
incident, cannot testify on what exactly happened as his testimony would not be based on personal
knowledge or derived from his own perception. Consequently, a medico-legal's testimony cannot
establish a certain fact as it can only suggest what most likely happened.

In the same way, a medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged
rape victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical
examination on AAA, she diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force or
penetrating trauma.

In a study conducted by Radostina D. Miterva,33 the most common sites for lacerations were
determined, "in rape victims with ring-shaped hymens, lacerations were most commonly located as
followed at dorsal recumbence of the patient: (1) one laceration at 6 o'clock position in 42.02% of
cases; (2) two lacerations at 5 and 7 o'clock positions in 24.55% cases; (3) three lacerations at 3, 6
and 9 o'clock positions in 45.36% of cases; and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock positions
in 25% of cases."

These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury resulting
from sexual abuse.34

However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-consensual intercourse, the
authors discovered that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration are almost the
same.35 Their findings suggest that the injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual
intercourse.36

From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish
consensual from non-consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the
frequency of lacerations and whether they are located in different positions) to determine whether
the sexual act was consensual or not. If the frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of
the vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand,
if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest
consensual intercourse.

In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the
hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the probability
that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's thighs-when she
said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have had consensual
intercourse.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the
female.37 It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is
alleged and shown to be without her consent.38 Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is
not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving
consent.39 The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to
penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals,
prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.40

Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, We must bear in
mind that the burden of proof is never shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits. Whether the accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It
is fundamental that the prosecution's case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.41
As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases.1âwphi1 This
means that both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. When we rely on
the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases, we require that her testimony be entirely
credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially when
it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the victim's testimony as a whole does not pass the test
of credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider
her testimony against Racho under the same light.

In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's house, but
instead forced her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho supposedly
boxed AAA's abdomen, undressed himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into
AAA's vagina. Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go home by herself.42

We find it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo Dumandan's
house to seek help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told Neneng Racho
what happened. Again, instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA insisted that she be
brought to her aunt's house nearby. This is way beyond human experience. If AAA had already told
other people what happened, there was no reason for her not to report the incident to the proper
authorities.

Faced with AAA's doubtful narration before she went home alone, we are inclined to believe Racho's
version that they parted ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. To begin with, Racho
did not even want to bring AAA to her aunt's house nearby. 43 If he had the intention to have sex with
AAA, Racho would not have declined her mother's instruction. To add, Racho said he left AAA by
herself because he did not want to bring AAA to her house since this was in another town from her
aunt's house.44 His reason for leaving AAA to go home alone is supported by the fact that he was
able to immediately come home right after he left with AAA. Unlike AAA's testimony, the version
offered by Racho is corroborated by the testimony of his mother.

Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we
have dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not,
uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt's house, but he
said he left her when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. Racho's mother corroborated this
part of the story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily
raised these defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise
covered up this story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed
Racho raped AAA that night, the best defense available for him was alibi which he thought he did not
have to raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself to go home. To our
mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be telling the truth.

In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported
by proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty. 45 Absolute guarantee
of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least,
be moral certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of
the offender.46 Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.47

The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether
AAA's ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its
part to convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the
government to present a logical and realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the
best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what
happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution's duty to
properly evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.

Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of
lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an
acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11 of Davao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 64964-09 and 64965-09, as well as the 17 February
2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226 and 01227-MIN are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the charge of rape
on the ground of reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered
unless they are being held for other lawful cause.

G.R. No. 130784 October 13, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO LOTEYRO AGUINALDO, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision imposing the death penalty on Rodrigo Loteyro
Aguinaldo for committing the crime of rape. 1

The Information against appellant Aguinaldo reads:

That on or about the 24th day of June, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, to
wit: by then and there pointing a pointed object at the side of one Jeannette Aguinaldo y Yap and
threatening to kill her, have carnal knowledge of said Jeannette Aguinaldo y Yap, a minor, 17 years
of age, without her consent and against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant, who is complainant's father, waived his right to a pre-trial and pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. 2 The trial court initially subpoenaed the complainant Jeannette 3 on October 8, 1996
as the prosecution's first
witness. 4 She failed to appear and the case was reset to November 20, 1996. 5

On November 20, 1996, Jeannette appeared and answered questions relating to her personal
circumstances, i.e., she is a 17-year-old resident of 2541 Sulu St., Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila;
she is called Net; she graduated from high school and appellant is her father. She claimed that at
10:00 p.m. of June 24, 1995, something happened while she was sleeping at home. Asked what
happened, Jeannette hedged. The trial judge encouraged her to answer but she kept silent. She was
on the verge of tears. The trial judge inquired if she wanted the appellant to leave the courtroom.
She agreed.1âwphi1.nêt
After the appellant left the courtroom, Jeannette was again queried why she woke from her sleep
that night.

Still, Jeannette stayed as silent as a sphinx. This prompted the defense counsel de oficio 6 to move
for the dismissal of the case. The trial judge asked Jeannette if she wanted the case dismissed and
if she would like to pardon the appellant. Failing to elicit a response from her, the trial judge ordered
the prosecutor to talk to Jeannette. The prosecutor then asked Jeannette if she executed a
statement to the police 7 and Jeannette responded positively. She acknowledged her signature on
the statement and affirmed its truthfulness. The prosecution then adapted her sworn statement as
her direct testimony. Her sworn statement narrated how she was forced to have sexual intercourse
with the appellant.

On cross-examination, Jeannette claimed that her parents had long been separated. She, her elder
brother and younger sister stayed with their father. On the night she was allegedly raped, she slept
with her father in a room upstairs while her brother slept downstairs. Her sister was not around at
that time. She confided to Tita Nelia, a family friend, that her father raped her. However, she could
not tell when she revealed the incident to Tita Nelia. She admitted that she did not immediately
undergo any physical examination after the incident. 8

On redirect examination on November 27, 1996, the prosecutor asked Jeannette what woke her up
on the night she was allegedly raped. She did not answer but merely muttered, "I'm afraid . . ." She
alleged it was only on February 24, 1996 that she divulged the incident to her tatay-tatayan, a
neighbor, because appellant again mauled her. She stated that she understood the term "ginahasa"
in her sworn statement to be the Tagalog word for "rape." When asked what appellant did that
prompted her to execute a sworn statement using the term "ginahasa," she did not again respond.

On recross-examination, Jeannette admitted that she was mad at her father for mauling her.
However, she denied she filed the rape charge because of her maltreatment. 9

The prosecution was obviously disappointed with the timid testimony of Jeannette. At the trial on
December 3, 1996, it manifested that Jeannette was willing to narrate the details on how she was
raped. In the interest of justice, the trial court allowed the prosecution to recall Jeannette as a
witness. She declared that she woke up when she felt appellant lying down beside her. He placed a
blanket over her but in the process, held her breast and touched her private part. She asked him
why he did that and he explained that he was just "putting blanket" over her. He then turned off the
light and they continued to sleep. She woke up for the second time when she felt someone was
licking her face. She thought it was her dog but found out that it was appellant doing it. She asked,
"Bakit po, Pa?" Appellant told her to keep quiet, mounted her and held her shoulder as she pushed
him away. He mashed her breast and threatened to kill her. Then he "penetrated" her with his organ.
She was wearing a T-shirt and shorts when she slept but when he started raping her, she found that
appellant had removed her shorts. She said she felt pain as appellant raped her. Her efforts to resist
proved futile. His lust sated, appellant slept while she cried until the morning. Appellant was drunk
that night. 10

On February 25, 1996, Senior Inspector Eliseo I. Canares, Jr. of the Western Police District
Command requested the NBI Medico-Legal Officer to conduct a physical examination on
Jeannette. 11 In his report for Living Case No. MG-96-308, 12 NBI Medico-Legal Officer Valentin T.
Bernales made the following findings:

EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURIES:

Contusions, light blue: nipple, right, upper-outer quadrant, 3.0 x 2.5 cm.; leg, right, upper third,
anterior aspect, 4.0 x 4.0 cm.

Abrasions, healing, with black scab formation; linear; back, scapular and supra-scapular areas, both
sides, multiple, sizes ranging from 2.0 cm. to 4.0 cm; arm, left, middle third, postero-lateral aspect,
multiple, whitish, sizes ranging from 4.0 cm to 7.0 cm; with tenderness' thigh, right, middle third,
anterior aspect, linear, 3.0 cm.

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hair, short, fine and scanty. Labia majora, gaping and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense.
Vestibule, pinkish. Hymen, short, thick and intact. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube of 1.0 cm. in
diameter with marked resistance Vagina walls, and rugosities cannot be reached by an examining
finger.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The above described physical injuries were noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.

2. Hymen, intact.

Dr. Bernales opined that there was no penetration of the complainant's hymen as it was intact and
that complainant was physically a virgin. He explained that the complainant's hymen could not admit
a tube with 1.0 cm. diameter, which implied that the opening was "too small for a complete previous
penetration."

With respect to the extragenital physical injuries sustained by the complainant, Dr. Bernales
declared that these could have been produced by direct contact of the skin with a hard object. The
injuries could also be produced by a rough surface and these would have been inflicted "a week or
two before" the examination on February 25, 1996. 13

The defense interposed denial. Appellant, a commercial artist and barangay official in-charge of
twenty five (25) tanods, branded as a lie his daughter's accusation. He admitted he was in their
house at 10:00 p.m. of June 24, 1995. He said if he had no drinking session, he would sleep before
9:00 p.m., wake up at 12:00 midnight to check on the attendance and the equipment of the barangay
tanods on duty and would be back home before sunrise. He denied he was drunk that fateful night
because he did not have money except for the "allowance for the house."

On cross-examination, appellant stated that he lived in his house with his three children. His house
had two stories with two bedrooms upstairs. As he was renting out one of the rooms, he and his son
slept downstairs while his daughters slept in the vacant room. In the evening of June 24, 1995, his
son slept on the sofa while he slept on the floor downstairs. He admitted beating up Jeannette
because of "her attitude" of going out in the morning and coming home only at night. She would also
go out at night without any permission but their neighbors would always tell on her.

On redirect examination, appellant charged that Jeannette had a "split personality" — one time she
would be sweet to him and her siblings and then, for no reason at all, she would be mad at all of
them. He claimed that he could not understand her although he knew that she was intelligent
(matalino siyang masyado). Jeannette stopped schooling in 1995 because she spent her enrollment
money.
Appellant's eldest child, Boy (Roy) Aguinaldo testified in his favor. He stated he slept between 11:00
and 12:00 midnight on June 24, 1995 at the ground floor of their house with his father and a friend.
According to him, his sister Jeannette "is a very good person but once in a while she is irritable"
(may sumpong). He opined that she could file an unfounded rape case against their father because
his sister is a "100% liar." 14

On August 7, 1997, the trial court 15 rendered a 3-page Decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to death. Holding that a broken hymen is
not an essential element in rape, it concluded that the complainant's testimony was "strong enough
to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused and establish his guilt." It held further that
it was "unthinkable and unnatural" for the complainant to"invent" a story and charge her own father
with rape. The trial court convicted appellant of the crime under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which imposes the death penalty on an accused who
is the parent of a complainant below eighteen years of age. It disposed of Criminal Case No. 96-
147936 as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of R. A. No. 7659, and he is
sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection and the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs. On the civil liability of the accused, he is further sentenced to
pay the complainant moral, nominal and exemplary damages in respective sums of P50,000.00,
P100,000.00 and P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Before this Court, appellant contends:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON

THE UNCORROBORATED, DOUBTFUL, UNRELIABLE AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS
OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE RENDERED BY DR. VALENTIN BERNALES, NBI MEDICO-
LEGAL OFFICER, FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

To start with, the trial court wrongly imposed on appellant the death penalty considering the nature of
the crime charged in the information. The information charged the appellant with the crime of simple
rape. It did not qualify that appellant is the father of the complainant or that complainant is the
daughter of appellant. This qualification is very material in determining the nature of the crime for
which the accused should be held liable and the corresponding penalty under the law. Thus,
in People v. Ilao, 16 a rape case where the relationship between the minor complainant and the
accused was not alleged in the information, this Court ruled:

Adopting our pronouncements in People v. Ramos, we perforce have to rule that appellant can only
be convicted of simple statutory rape and cannot be held liable for qualified rape for want of the
allegation of relationship in the present information. Even if relationship was duly proved during the
trial, still such proof cannot be considered to convict appellant of qualified rape and to consequently
impose on him the death penalty since he would thereby be denied his constitutional and statutory
right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him.

To emphasize such substantial and procedural irregularity in simple terms of dialectics, to charge
appellant with rape in one of its simple forms and then try and convict him of rape in one of its
qualified forms would be a prosecution which leads to a trial and conviction without a valid
accusation.

We repeat, therefore, that the attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 must be
specifically pleaded in an information for rape in order that the same may correctly qualify the crime
and to justify the penalty prescribed by the law. If it is the prosecution's goal to have appellant
adjudged guilty of raping his minor daughter, such conviction is not possible under the wordings of
the information herein. With the failure of the information to state the qualifying circumstance of
relationship between appellant and Jonalyn, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon appellant,
just as in People v. Ramos.

For this reason alone, the trial court should not have imposed the death penalty on the appellant. But
this is not all the error of the trial court. In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided
by three principles: First, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond
reasonable doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction.
Second, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Third, the
disposition of rape cases are governed by the following guidelines: (1) an accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution, and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense. 17

Prescinding from these principles, we acquit the appellant. As correctly pointed out by appellant's
counsel, the complainant's conduct on the witness stand did not evince truthfulness. 18 Instead of
being straightforward, she hesitated, and even refused, not only once but twice, to give testimony on
the alleged rape. The records show that she failed to appear in court the first time the case was set
for hearing. On the re-scheduled hearing where she was presented as the first witness, she balked,
flatly refused to answer the questions propounded by the prosecutor as well as the questions of the
trial court on the alleged sexual assault by the appellant. This led the trial court to strongly admonish
and mildly berate her for her uncharacteristic silence on a critical point in the prosecution's case.
Instead of dismissing the case as suggested by the defense, the trial court encouraged further the
prosecution and hence, complainant was made to affirm her sworn statement that served as her
direct testimony. At the next date for redirect examination, complainant once again refused to
answer the prosecutor's questions notwithstanding the trial court's effort encouraging her to talk. It
was only on December 3, 1996 that complainant broke her silence on the witness stand. This
hesitance of the complainant to testify on the very meat of her case against appellant certainly
evokes disbelief in her sworn statement. More so because her testimony is a mere parroting of her
sworn statement.

The Solicitor General justifies complainant's hedging as natural for a "naive barrio lass" who is
"incapable of hatching such a devious scheme" against her own father. 19 The records show,
however, that complainant is a city-bred teenage girl who grew up in the Sta. Cruz district in the
heart of Manila, the country's capital where, as in any other city, both progress and decadence exist.
She is a high school graduate and already seventeen (17) years of age at the time the alleged crime
was committed. That she was less than lily white in virtues was testified to by her brother who
charged her as a "100% liar." Such negative testimony from a brother who is naturally expected to
throw his support to his own sister but did not, says much about her character and raises serious
doubts as to the truthfulness of her testimony.1âwphi1.nêt

Moreover, evidence of her wayward ways demonstrated by complainant's leaving home without her
father's permission, nocturnal escapades and joyrides with jeepney drivers that elicited harsh
disciplinary action from appellant has remained unrebutted. Hence, the Solicitor General's
conclusion that "the moral ascendancy of appellant as a father of private complainant while on the
witness stand all the more instilled fear in the latter" is not appropriate in this
case. 20 Appellant's moral ascendancy or influence as a father is negated by proof of complainant's
notoriously defiant and recalcitrant behavior towards him.

It is true that in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
complaining witness provided such testimony is credible, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the course of things. 21 In the case at bar, however, the complainant lacked candor and
spontaneity as a witness. Her demeanor, composure and manner of testifying revealed heavy traces
of insincerity and falsehood even to one who is simply reading the transcripts of her testimony. Thus,
complainant alleged in her sworn statement that she bled after her private part was fully penetrated
during the sexual assault, viz:

. . . Hinawakan niya ako sa balikat at pinapatungan, pero itinutulak ko siyang palayo sa akin,
hanggang sa manghina ako at natatakot sa sinasabi niyang papatayin ako. Hanggang sa naipasok
na niya ang titi niya sa puki ko. Nasaktan po ako. Gumalaw-galaw siya at nilalamas niya ang suso
ko. Tapos, tumigil siya at inalis niya ang titi niya at nahiga na siya uli at natulog. Ako naman ay
umiyak hanggang umaga. Noong bigla akong tumayo, may biglang may tumulo pero hindi ko na
tiningnan, pero ang alam ko dugo dahil hanggang kinabukasan ay may dugo ako . . . . 22 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Complainant affirmed her sworn statement during direct examination as follows:

PROSECUTOR EDAD TO WITNESS:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: What else did he do aside from mashing your breasts?

A: He penetrated me with his penis.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: What are you doing at the time or how did you feel at the time that you father inserted his organ
on (sic) you?

A: It was painful.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: How did you know that it was his penis that was insert to your vagina?

A: I felt it. 23 (Emphasis supplied.)

On the witness stand, complainant never testified as to her having bled after that sexual intercourse.
More importantly, her claim in her sworn statement that she bled because of full penetration of her
sex organ is belied by the medical record which revealed that her hymen was "short, thick and
intact," that the hymenal orifice could admit a tube with 1.0 cm. in diameter only with "marked
resistance" and that the vaginal walls and rugosities "cannot be reached by an examining
finger." 24 Fortifying his report, Dr. Valentin T. Bernales, NBI medico-legal officer, testified as follows:

Q: Doctor, is it possible that the hymen remain intact despite (stop) is it possible that the hymen shall
remain intact despite the penetration of an object on (sic) the vagina?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A: It is possible that the hymen is still intact but there would be difference upon examination that it
could be shown or be noted that the hymen could not admit a tube of 1.0 cm. in diameter that this
opening is too small for a complete previous penetration (sic).

Q: So there was no complete penetration that could not have happen base on your (sic) (interrupted)

A: Examination.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: There could have not been a complete penetration?

A: Yes.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: If there is a penetration only of a portion of the head of the penis that would not have cause(d) the
break up of the hymen of the victim?

A: That is possible, Your Honor. 25

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: So in this particular case it was possible for the victim to have a sexual intercourse even her
hymen is intact? (sic)

A: No, Your Honor. In this particular case, it admit (stop) the hymen, the opening of the hymen only
admits a 1.0 cm. tube.

THE COURT:

Yes.

A: That is a very small compared to 2.5 average size penis (sic). So it only shows that there is no
previous contact or no previous sexual intercourse because the orifice or the opening remain to 1
cm. (sic).
Needless to state, complainant's claim that she bled implies that there must have been laceration of
her sex organ. Unless there is evidence that she underwent "cosmetic" surgery to restore the
hymen's virginal state 26 before the NBI medico-legal officer examined her, complainant's claim of
bleeding is a manifest falsehood. When physical evidence runs counter to testimonial evidence,
conclusions as to physical evidence must prevail. Physical evidence is that mute but eloquent
manifestation of truth which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 27 The inevitable
conclusion therefore is that complainant was lying through her teeth when she swore that appellant's
organ penetrated hers and that she felt pain and was bleeding even until the morning. That material
lapse in her testimony destroys her credibility.

The other bruises and contusions her body sustained could have been the result of maltreatment by
her father. However, that matter is completely divorced from her allegation of rape. The medico-legal
officer affirmed that complainant's injuries were new and could not have been sustained
simultaneously with the alleged rape that was committed eight (8) months before she was physically
examined.

As a rule, delay in the reporting of a rape incident istreated leniently by the courts in view of the ill
effects that forcible defloration usually brings upon both the accused and the accuser. Such delay
may become even longer when the rape committed is incestuous for the reason that our culture
shields from the public embarrassing intrafamilial sexual incidents. Thus, the court shall not discredit
the victim as a witness simply because it took her months to report her having been the victim of
sexual abuse considering her tender age, the moral ascendancy of the accused and his threats
against the victim. 28

In this case however, complainant's delay in reporting the alleged rape incident tolls negatively on
her credibility. If indeed appellant ravished her, she would not have lost time to reveal the incident to
her brother, her other relatives, her neighbors and the police. It is worth noting that she could not
even tell when she related the alleged incestuous coitus to her Tita Nelia or to her tatay-tatayan
(surrogate father). Complainant waited eight (8) months before she reported the rape and only as an
obvious afterthought to the maltreatment by appellant.

Indeed, complainant's motive for charging appellant with the crime of rape is suspect. From the
unrebutted testimonies of appellant and complainant's brother, she had an axe to grind against her
father. It appears that the mauling incident before her physical examination triggered the complaint.
Having suffered contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body, she went to the authorities
to report the maltreatment and, in addition, the alleged rape incident that took place eight (8) months
before or on June 24, 1995. Fed up with physical abuse, complainant had a reason to exact revenge
from a father she perceived as cruel. That complainant was actually motivated by anger and
revenge, rather than the call for justice, in reporting the alleged rape is buttressed by her brother's
testimony that she was a 100% liar and that her charge of rape against their father was a mere
fabrication.

In sum, complainant's version of the alleged incident cannot withstand objective scrutiny. This Court
will not affirm a conviction for any crime, much more one for which the death penalty may be
imposed, on an account that permits the entertainment of a reasonable doubt as to the culpability of
the accused. A reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt having been created by an appraisal of the
prosecution evidence alone, a detailed examination of appellant's defense is rendered
unnecessary. 29

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 96-147936 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XVIII, is REVERSED and appellant Rodrigo Aguinaldo y Loteyro is ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of rape.
Nocosts.

The Director of the NBP is required to report to this Court the proper implementation of this Decision
within ten (10) days from its receipt.1âw

G.R. No. 172607               April 16, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appelle,

vs.
RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

In our Resolution dated 26 October 2007, this Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then
recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules)1 in a case pending before us – this
case. We remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance with the
terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the first
application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor
the manner in which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic
reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.

To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito (Umanito) was
found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. Umanito was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of ₱50,000.00. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito appealed the decision of the appellate court
to this court.

In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and
the defense."2 At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted
in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, a
well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not
Umanito is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal. The Court then
observed:

x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined
with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. If he is not, his acquittal may
be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not
sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal
on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate
decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and her child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules),
which took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.3

The RTC of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, presided by Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, upon receiving the
Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007, set the case for hearing on 27 November 2007 4 to
ascertain the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b), (c)
and (e) of the DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years old) testified during the hearing. They
also manifested their willingness to undergo DNA examination to determine whether Umanito is the
father of BBB.5

A hearing was conducted on 5 December 2007, where the public prosecutor and the counsel for
Umanito manifested their concurrence to the selection of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
as the institution that would conduct the DNA testing. The RTC issued an Order on even date
directing that biological samples be taken from AAA, BBB and Umanito on 9 January 2008 at the
courtroom. The Order likewise enjoined the NBI as follows:

In order to protect the integrity of the biological samples, the [NBI] is enjoined to strictly follow the
measures laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the instant case to wit:

Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the
samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne in the records, i.e.; that the samples are
collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their sample
collection appointments; that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that
all persons in possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for
tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he performed in relation
thereto.

The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore,
enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results.

The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other
information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such
time as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.6

Present at the hearing held on 9 January 2008 were AAA, BBB, counsel for Umanito, and two
representatives from the NBI. The RTC had previously received a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of
the New Bilibid Prisons informing the trial court that Umanito would not be able to attend the hearing
without an authority coming from the Supreme Court. 7 The parties manifested in court their
willingness to the taking of the DNA sample from the accused at his detention center at the New
Bilibid Prisons on 8 February 2008.8 The prosecution then presented on the witness stand NBI
forensic chemist Mary Ann Aranas, who testified on her qualifications as an expert witness in the
field of DNA testing. No objections were posed to her qualifications by the defense. Aranas was
accompanied by a laboratory technician of the NBI DNA laboratory who was to assist in the
extraction of DNA.

DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor,
the counsel for the defense, and DCA De la Cruz. On 8 February 2008, DNA samples were
extracted from Umanito at the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge
Fe, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the Court and the
New Bilibid Prisons.9

The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination within thirty (30) days after
the extraction of biological samples of Umanito, and directed its duly authorized representatives to
attend a hearing on the admissibility of such DNA evidence scheduled for 10 March 2008. The
events of the 28 March 2008 hearing, as well as the subsequent hearing on 29 April 2008, were
recounted in the Report dated 19 May 2008 submitted by Judge Fe. We quote therefrom with
approval:
2. That as previously scheduled in the order of the trial court on 09 January 2008, the case was set
for hearing on the admissibility of the result of the DNA testing.

At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana, presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a
Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified on the examination she
conducted, outlining the procedure she adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that
using the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood
stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine whether
or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete
Match in all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Milalres and [BBB];
That based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y
Millares is the biological father of [BBB] (Exhibits "A" and series and "B" and series).

After the cross-examination of the witness by the defense counsel, the Public Prosecutor offered in
evidence Exhibits "A" and sub-markings, referring to the Report of the Chemistry Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Manila on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino
Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] and Exhibit "B" and sub-markings, referring to the
enlarged version of the table of Exhibit "A," to establish that on the DNA examination conducted on
[AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito for the purpose of establishing paternity, the result is
99.9999% probable. Highly probable.

The defense did not interpose any objection, hence, the exhibits were admitted.

1. That considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case
was set for reception of evidence for the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the presumption
that he is the biological father of [BBB].

During the hearing on April 29, 2008, the accused who was in court manifested through his counsel
that he will not present evidence to dispute the findings of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation.

The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation
whose qualifications as an expert was properly established adopting the following procedure:

a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the reference sample form. Thereafter,
the chemists informed them that buccal swabs will be taken from their mouth and five (5) droplets of
blood will also be taken from the ring finger of their inactive hand;

b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI Chemist;

c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3) times;

d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to serve as label of the three buccal
swabs placed inside two (2) separate envelopes that bear their names;

e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand of the subject sources;

f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown envelope for air drying for at least one
hour.

g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional identification;

h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.

i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria
Nenita A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as witnesses to the reference sample forms and
the finger prints of the subject sources.

j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA papers were placed inside a white
envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI Chemists;

k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor
Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI Chemist, affixed their signatures on the sealed white
envelope;

l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger prints on the sealed white envelope;

m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope and placed it in a separate brown
envelope;

n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on their identification places and
reference forms.

The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic Chemists of the NBI in the taking of DNA
samples from the accused, Rufino Umanito at the New Bilibid Prison in the afternoon of February 8,
2008.

Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness testified that at the NBI the sealed envelope was presented to
Ms. Demelen dela Cruz, the supervisor of the Forensic Chemistry Division to witness that the
envelope containing the DNA specimens was sealed as it reached the NBI. Photographs of the
envelope in sealed form were taken prior to the conduct of examination.

With the procedure adopted by the Forensic Chemist of the NBI, who is an expert and whose
integrity and dedication to her work is beyond reproach the manner how the biological samples were
collected, how they were handled and the chain of custody thereof were properly established the
court is convinced that there is no possibility of contamination of the DNA samples taken from the
parties.

At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation, the envelopes containing the
DNA samples were opened and the specimens were subjected to sampling, extraction, amplification
and analysis. Duplicate analysis were made. The Forensic Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused the
examination of the blood samples and the buccal swabs were separately processed by Mrs.
Demelen dela Cruz.

In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists adopted the following procedure: (1)
Sampling which is the cutting of a portion from the media (swabs and FTA paper); (2) then subjected
the cut portions for extraction to release the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the solution, it
was further processed using the formarine chain reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of
using the Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the DNA samples. The
Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target, DNA is multiplied,
the amplified products are analyzed using the genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16
markers at the same time. It is highly reliable as it has already been validated for forensic use. It has
also another function which is to determine the gender of the DNA being examined.

Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her testimony explained that the DNA found in all cells of
a human being come in pairs except the mature red blood cells. These cells are rolled up into minute
bodies called "chromosomes," which contain the DNA of a person. A human has 23 pairs of
chromosomes. For each pair of chromosome, one was found to have originated from the mother, the
other must have came from the father. Using the Powerplex 16 System Results, the variable
portions of the DNA called "loci," which were used as the basis for DNA analysis or typing showed
the following: under "loci" D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of [AAA] is 15, 16, the genotype of
[BBB] is 15, 16, one of the pair of alleles must have originated and the others from the father. The
color for the allele of the mother is red while the father is blue. On matching the allele which came
from the mother was first determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16 but in the geno type of [BBB], 15
was colored blue because that is the only allele which contain the genotype of the accused Rufino
Umanito, the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In this marker [BBB] has a genotype of 15, 16,
16 is from the mother and 15 is from the father.

The whole process involved the determination which of those alleles originated from the mother and
the rest would entail looking on the genotype or the profile of the father to determine if they matched
with those of the child.

In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not included
because this is the marker that determines the gender of the source of the loci. The pair XX
represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino Umanito has XY amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX
amel. For matching paternity purposes only 15 loci were examined. Of the 15 loci, there was a
complete match between the alleles of the loci of [BBB] and Rufino (Exhibits "A" and "B").

To ensure reliable results, the Standard Operating Procedure of the Forensic Chemistry Division of
the NBI in paternity cases is to use buccal swabs taken from the parties and blood as a back up
source.

The said Standard Operating Procedure was adopted in the instant case.

As earlier mentioned, DNA samples consisted of buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the
parties by the forensic chemists who adopted reliable techniques and procedure in collecting and
handling them to avoid contamination. The method that was used to secure the samples were safe
and reliable. The samples were taken and handled by an expert, whose qualifications, integrity and
dedication to her work is unquestionable, hence, the possibility of substitution or manipulation is very
remote.

The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation in analyzing the samples was in accordance with the standards used in modern
technology. The comparative analysis of DNA prints of the accused Rufino Umanito and his alleged
child is a simple process called parentage analysis which was made easier with the use of a DNA
machine called Genetic Analyzer. To ensure a reliable result, the NBI secured two (2) DNA types of
samples from the parties, the buccal swabs as primary source and blood as secondary source. Both
sources were separately processed and examined and thereafter a comparative analysis was
conducted which yielded the same result.
The National Bureau of Investigation DNA Section, Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing
laboratory in the country which maintains a multimillion DNA analysis equipment for its scientific
criminal investigation unit. It is manned by qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who are
experts in the field, like Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness in the instant case, who is a licensed
chemists, has undergone training on the aspects of Forensic Chemistry fro two (2) years before she
was hired as forensic chemists of the NBI and has been continuously attending training seminars,
and workshops which are field related and who has handled more than 200 cases involving DNA
extraction or collection or profiling.

The accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of their sub-markings.
He did not also present evidence to controvert the results of the DNA analysis.

Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or
higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Division on the buccal
swabs and blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB] and Rufino Umanito y MillAres for
DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB]
gave the following result:

"FINDINGS: Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis using the

Powerplex 16 System conducted on the
above-mentioned, specimens gave the
following profiles;

xxx

xxx

There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino
Umanito y Millares and [BBB].

REMARKS: Based on the above findings, there is a

99.9999% Probability of Paternity that
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological
Father of [BBB]"

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court).

The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted
and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the
results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to
rebut the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court rules that based on the result of the DNA
analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Division, RUFINO UMANITO y
MILLARES is the biological father of [BBB].10
Umanito’s defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had courted AAA they
were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part that he did not engage in sexual relations
with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by
AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day
she said she was raped by Umanito.

Still, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009. By filing such motion,
Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him
guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of ₱50,000.00. Given that the results of the
Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is
presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny
Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed final if the appeal is not withdrawn.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009 is GRANTED. The instant
case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.

September 6, 2017

G.R. No. 208625

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMON FRANCIA y NAVALTA, Accused-appellant

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

No amount, especially not the ₱50.00 paid by the accused for sexually abusing his 11 -year-old
victim, will ever compensate for her trauma. The depravity of a grown man in taking advantage of a
child's trust and innocence and her family's poverty to repeatedly rape her rightfully deserves
condemnation and the most severe punishment that can be meted out under the law.

This Court is asked to review the February 22, 2013 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 03929. This Decision affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Ramon Francica
(Francica) for three (3) counts of statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, and imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.2

This Court restates the facts as found by the lower courts.

On February 3, 2005, in Criminal Case No. 05-1287-FC-H, an Information3 was filed against

Francica before Branch 209, Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City. This Information read:

That on or about the 2nd day of February 2005, in the city of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of [this Honorable Court,] the above-named accused, being the neighbor of the
victim, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], a
girl eleven (11) years of age, by then and there inserting his private part into [the] latter's vagina, all
against the latter's will, which acts [sic] debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the victim (a child) as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned,5 Francica pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him.

On September 20, 2005, in Criminal Case Nos. MCOS-1483-FC-H and MCOS-1484-FC-H, two (2)
additional Informations were also filed against Francica before Branch 209, Regional Trial Court,
Mandaluyong City. The second Information read:

That on or about the 19th day of January 2005, in the city of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of [this Honorable Court,] the above-named accused, motivated by carnal lust
and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with [AAA], a girl eleven (11) years of age, a child within the meaning of R.A.
7610, by then and there inserting his private part into the latter's vagina, all against the latter's will,
which acts [sic] debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim (a child)
as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The third Infonnation read:

That sometime in the month of March 2004, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction [of this Honorable Court,] the above-named accused, motivated by carnal lust and by
means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [AAA], a girl eleven (11) years of age, a child within the meaning of R.A.
7610, by then and there inserting his private part into the latter's vagina, all against the lattev's will,
which acts [sic] debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim (a child)
as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

On October 26, 2005, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the three (3) charges of rape.8

Francica also pleaded not guilty to the two (2) other charges of rape agamst him.9

Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the child victim, AAA, who was then 11 years old and a Grade 6 student
at a public school in Nueve de Pebrero in Mandaluyong City.10

AAA testified that she lived with her parents and five (5) siblings in Mandaluyong City near Cardinal
Sin. AAA claimed that she knew Francica because he was their neighbor.11

AAA testified that Francica was a good person because he would sometimes give her money
whenever he touched her.12 When asked how Francica touched her, AAA answered that he licked
her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina.13

She claimed that Francica started touching her sometime in March 2004 and that this went on many
times. He would sometimes even give her ₱50.00 after touching her.14
The next prosecution witness was BBB, AAA's grandmother. BBB testified that AAA lived on the
ground floor of her house in Nueve de Pebrero while she lived on the second floor. BBB claimed to
know Francica because he had been her neighbor for many years.15

BBB testified that she had two (2) bathrooms at the back of her house. 16 In the afternoon of February
2, 2005, she was using one (1) of them when she heard a voice say, "May tao. Si Mamang yata yun"
from inside the other lavatory.17 When she went out, she saw someone run out of the other
bathroom. She quickly looked inside the washroom and saw AAA. She ran after the other person
and when he looked backed, she recognized him as Francica.18

She was unable to catch Francica and when she returned to her house, she saw her other
grandchild, CCC, talking with AAA. CCC was outside the bathrooms when the commotion happened
and CCC told BBB that she saw AAA pulling up her underwear inside the lavatory after Francica ran
out.19

BBB claimed that she had heard rumors that Francica and AAA regularly had sexual intercourse and
that she had confronted AAA about this before, but AAA never confirmed these rumors.20

After she saw AAA and Francica inside the bathroom, BBB told Josephine, AAA's aunt, about what
happened. AAA and Josephine then went to the barangay hall to report the incident.21

BBB testified that she was summoned to the barangay hall later that afternoon to confront Francica.
She claimed that Francica admitted the accusation against him, for which he was mauled inside the
barangay hall.22 After the barangay investigation, BBB and AAA went to the police station to execute
their respective affidavits.23

BBB testified that AAA's family was very poor and that AAA's mother could not look after her children
because she had a gambling problem. BBB admitted that she would prefer that AAA be placed
under the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development because she was already
overtaxed with looking after and providing for several other grandchildren and could no longer take
care of AAA.24

The third prosecution witness was Carlos C. Gojo (Gojo), a member of Task Force Anti-Vice. He
testified that after BBB reported AAA's rape, Task Force Anti-Vice teamed up with Bantay Bayan of
Addition Hills that same day to arrest Francica. The two (2) groups went to Francica's house where
they found and arrested him. Gojo attested that Francica was informed of his constitutional rights to
be silent and be represented by a lawyer during his arrest.25

Gojo admitted that they had no warrant of arrest when they arrested Francica since they relied on
the complaint lodged against Francica.26

Both parties agreed to stipulate27 on the testimony of POI Jocelyn Samson, who investigated the
case and endorsed the complaint against Francica to the Office of the City Prosecutor.

The trial court then ruled that the prosecution waived its right to present as its witness medico-legal
PSI Pierre Paul Carpio, M.D. (PSI Carpio), who examined AAA, because of his repeated failure to
attend the hearings.28

The last prosecution witness was Court Social Worker Leonor Laureles (Laureles), who conducted
the Social Case Study Report29 on AAA upon the trial court's directive. 30 Laureles testified that she
interviewed AAA, who opened up about the abuse she underwent because of Francica. 31 Laureles
also averred that she had recommended that AAA be referred to an institution as she was neglected
by her parents.32

Francica was the only witness for the defense and he denied that he ever had sexual intercourse
with AAA. He claimed that he was only set up by AAA's family after he found out from Nora, AAA's
other aunt, that AAA had a relationship with her uncle. Francica stated that he told AAA's parents
about her relationship with her uncle, but they ignored him. Francica further claimed that he was
made a scapegoat after he revealed AAA's relationship with her uncle.33

Francica did not deny being inside the bathroom with AAA, but he claimed that it was a common
facility and that he was urinating when AAA went inside to wait for her tum to use the toilet. It was at
this point when AAA's cousin and BBB saw them inside the lavatory.34

On March 3, 2009, the trial court rendered judgment 35 finding Francica guilty of three (3) counts of
statutory rape and meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.36

The trial court ruled that all the elements of statutory rape were established with AAA's credible and
candid testimony, corroborated by BBB's testimony.37

The trial court also held that it was immaterial that the prosecution failed to present the testimony of
medico-legal PSI Carpio, since "a medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of
rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction for rape is proper."38

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused RAMON FRANCICA y NAVALTA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Statutory Rape and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of three (3) reclusion perpetua to be served successively. The accused is
further ordered to pay the victim, for each count of rape, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

COSTS against the accused.

SO ORDERED.39

Francica filed a Notice of Appeal.40 In his appeal,41 he claimed that the prosecution's failure to
present medico-legal PSI Carpio was fatal to the prosecution's case because there were matters that
should be clarified by the examining physician.42

On February 22, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision43 affirming Francica's conviction.

The Court of Appeals held that AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay and her testimony in court were
consistent in showing that she repeatedly had sexual intercourse with Francica, sometimes in
exchange for ₱50.00.44

In upholding the trial court's assessment on the credibility of the witnesses, the Court of Appeals
stated that "the trial judge enjoys the peculiar advantage of observing firsthand the deportment of
witnesses while

testifying, and is, therefore, in a better position to form accurate impressions and conclusions."45
The Court of Appeals emphasized that a conviction for rape based on the sole testimony of the
victim is possible, as long as the victim's testimony is competent and credible.46

Finally, the Court of Appeals asserted that a medical examination of a rape victim is not
indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, as it is merely corroborative in nature.47

The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
court a quo dated 3 March 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.48 (Emphasis in the original)

On March 21, 2013, Francica filed a Notice of Appeal 49 with the Court of Appeals, which was given
due course in the Resolution50 dated April 23, 2013. Hence, this appeal was instituted.

In the Resolution51 dated October 23, 2013, this Court notified the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. However, both parties manifested52 that they were
dispensing with the filing of their supplemental briefs.

In his appellant's brief:53 Francica denies the accusations of rape against him and insists that he was
merely made a fall guy to cover up AAA's sexual relationship with her uncle.54

Francica also claims that the lower courts erred in declaring that the prosecution's failure to present
the medico-legal officer was not fatal to the case since it affects the reliability of AAA's allegations.55

Francica points out that the alleged rape on February 2, 2005 happened at 1:30 p.m. and AAA was
examined that same day at 5:53 p.m.56 However, the initial medico-legal report submitted by PSI
Carpio showed shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00 positions.57 Francica maintains that if
AAA was indeed raped that afternoon, the lacerations should either be fresh bleeding laceration or
"fresh healing with fibrin formation and with edema of the surrounding tissue" 58 and not healed
lacerations as stated in the medico-legal report.

Francica likewise asserts that not all lacerations in the vagina are caused by sexual acts because
normal activities like jumping and running can also lead to lacerations or injury. He opines that the
initial medico-legal report failed to describe the degree and location of the laceration, thereby
creating doubt that the laceration was indeed caused by a sexual act.59

On the other hand, the prosecution emphasizes that given the nature of rape cases, conviction
usually rests on the sole testimony of the victim.60 The prosecution contends that AAA's credibility as
a witness survived strict scrutiny since she was credible and straightforward during her testimony.
She positively identified Francica and testified with specificity what transpires between them.61

The prosecution underscores that jurisprudence is consistent that when a child victim says that she
has been raped, her testimony should be given full weight and credence.62

Finally, the prosecution contends that the filing of a healed laceration instead of a fresh bleeding or
fresh healing laceration is irrelevant, as this Court ruled in People v. Espino63 that full penile
penetration of the vagma is not an element of rape.64
The only issue to be resolved by this Court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape as defined under Article 266-A(l
)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, 65 in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610.66

This Court affirms Francica's conviction.

This Court notes that in the Information67 dated February 3, 2005, Francica was charged with rape
under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610, while he was charged with rape under Article 266-A(l) under the two (2)
other Informations.68

Rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any ofthe following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

For a charge of rape under Article 266-A(l) to prosper, it must be proven that "(1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or
when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age
or was demented."69

On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A(2) is described in Ricalde v. People70 as "'instrument or
object rape,' 'gender-free rape,' or 'homosexual rape.' The gravamen of rape through sexual assault
is 'the insertion of the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another person's genital or anal orifice."'71

Francica was charged with rape under Article 266-A(2) in the Information dated February 3, 2005,
yet even a cursory reading of this Information shows that the allegations and the acts or omissions
complained of pertain to rape under Article 266-A(l)(d) or carnal knowledge of a girl below 12 years
of age:

That on or about the 2nd day of February 2005, in the city of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of [this Honorable Court,] the above-named accused, being the neighbor of the
victim, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], a
girl eleven (11) years of age, by then and there inserting his private part into [the] latter s vagina, all
against the latter's will, which acts [sic] debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the victim (a child) as a human being.72 (Emphasis supplied)

It is well-established that the nature of a criminal charge is determined "by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information" 73 and not by the caption of the information
or the provision of the law claimed to have been violated. 74 Thus, the lower courts did not err in
treating and trying all charges against Francica as rape through carnal knowledge under Article 266-
A(1)(d).

II

Rape under Article 266-A(l)(d) is also called statutory rape as "it departs from the usual modes of
committing rape."75 The child victim's consent in statutory rape is immaterial because the law
presumes that her young age makes her incapable of discerning good from evil.76 People v.
Gutierez77 explained the elements of statutory rape:

Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation;
whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud
or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was
sexual intercourse.78

The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 11 years old at the time of the incidents. Her birth
certificate79 was presented into evidence before the trial court and was not questioned by the
defense. What only needs to be proven, therefore, is whether AAA and Francica had sexual
intercourse.

AAA testified as follows:

Q [FISCAL TRONCO]: Kilala mo ba iyong akusado sa kasong ito si

Ramon Fran[c]ica?

A: Opo.

Q: Bakit mo siya kilala?

A: Kapit-bahay po namin.

....

Q: Mabait ba siya sa 'yo?

A: (Witness nodded in the positive).

....

Q: Bakit sinabi mo mabait siya sa 'yo?

A: Kasi po binibigyan niya ako ng pera.

Q: Palagi ka ba niyang binibigyan ng pera?

A: Minsan lang po.

Q: Ito bang perang binibigay niya sa 'yo may kapalit?

A: Opo.

Q: Ano ang kapalit noon?

A: No answer.

Q: Naiintindihan mo ba iyong tanong o gusto mong ibahin? Bakit ka niya binibigyan ng pera?

A: Ginagalaw niya po ako.

Q: Binibigyan ka ba niya ng pera dahil ginagalaw ka niya?

A: Opo.

Q: Magkano ang binibigay niya sa 'yo?

A: ₱50.00 po.

Q: Sa natatandaan mo, ilang beses ka na niyang ginagalaw at binibigyan ng pera.

A: Marami na po.

Q: Alam mo ba kung kailan nagsimula iyon? Alam mo ba na kailangan mo dito na magsabi ng

katotohanan lamang at bawal magsinungaling?

A: Opo.

Q: So, yung sinasabi mo ngayon totoo yan lahat?

A: Opo.

Q: Kailan nga nagsimula yung paggalaw niya sa 'yo?

A: Mga March 2004 po.

Q: 'Pag sinabi mong "ginalaw ka niya'' ano ang ginalaw niya sa 'yo?

A: Dede ko po at ari kop o [sic].

Q: Paano niya ginagalaw yung dede mo?

A: Dinidilaan po niya.

Q: Eh yung ari mo paano naman niya ginagalaw?

A: Pinapasok po niya yung ari niya88

AAA's testimony is consistent with her Sinumpaang Salaysay: 81

T: Bakit ka na ririto [sic] sa amin[g] opisina?

S: Para po sabihin yung ginawa sa akin ni Amon (victim refer[r]ing to suspect identified as one
Ramon Francisca) [sic]

T: Ano ba ang ginawa sa iyo ni Amon?

S: Dinidilaan niya po yung dede ko po at yung ari po nya ay pinapasok niya sa pepe ko.

T: Kailan nangyari ang insidente?

S: Kanina lang po, mga 1 :30 po sa banyo po.

T: May sinabi ka sa akin kanina na matagal nya nang gin[a]gawa sa iyo ito. Naaalala mo pa ba kung
kailan nag sinmula [sic]?

S: Opo. Noon pong March 2004 po.

T: Sabihin mo nga sa akin kung paano nagsimula ang insedente?

S: Nandoon po ako sa Bulatao (Bulatao Compound) at naglalaro, lumapit siya (Ramon Francisca)
[sic] sa akin at sinabi niya na punta ka na <loon sa banyo. Nagpunta naman po ako[,] tapos po ay
pinapasok nya ako sa loob ng banyo at pumasok din sya. Tapos po ay dinilaan nya ako sa dede ko
tapos po yung ari nya ay ipinasok nya sa pepe ko. Umiyak po ako sa sobrang sakit. Nang matapos
po ay binigyan nya ako ng pera. Tapos po ay naging madalas na po.

T: Magkano naman ang ibinigay nyang pera sa iyo?

S: Fifty pesos (50.00Php) po.

T: Kailan naman yung mga sumunod na insedente.

S: Yung iba po ay hindi ko na matandaan pero noong January 19[,] 2005 ng gabi ay tinawag nya uli
ako at pinapunta nya sa bahay nya at ginawa nya uli yung ginagawa nya sa akin.

T: Hindi ka ba nag sumbong sa magulang mo?

S: [N]agsumbong po ako sa mama ko pero hindi po sya naniniwala sa Akin

T: Yung insedente kanina, maari mo bang sabihin sa akin?

S: Kanina naman po ay nasa Bulatao uli ako at naglalaro tinawag nya po ako pinapunta nya ako sa
banyo at dinilaan nya ang dede ko at pinasok ang ari nya sa pepe. 82 (Emphasis in the original)

As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a straightforward and categorical manner
what transpired between her and Francica. In a long line of cases, 83 this Court has given full weight
and credence to the testimony of child victims, holding that their "[y ]outh and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity." 84 Compared to AAA's candid and categorical testimony,
Francica's defense of denial must fail. Imbo v. People85 emphasized that the selfserving defense of
denial falters against the "positive identification by, and straightforward narration of the victim."86 This
Court has likewise repeatedly held that the lone yet credible testimony of the offended party is
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.87

Francica's defense that he was merely set up to become the fall guy so that AAA's family can hide
her sexual relationship with her uncle is not worthy of belief. Additionally, Francica's expose is
primarily hearsay in character since it was supposedly relayed to him by AAA's aunt Nora, who was
not presented as a witness before the trial court to corroborate his testimony. Thus, this Court
concurs with the trial court when it held that "[t]he 'secret' is too specious a motive for one to file not
only one but three serious charges of rape against the accused."88

BBB also corroborated AAA's testimony on the sexual abuse committed on February 2, 2005:

Q: What did you see inside the bathroom which is being done to your granddaughter, Madam
Witness?

A: When I was inside the bathroom which is just beside the other room, I heard noise inside that
bathroom.1âwphi1 I don't know whose [sic] inside. My other grandchild who was about to throw or
dispose something at that time [was] standing at that time, and when I went out [of] the bathroom
that was also the time that someone who was inside the other bathroom also went out, ma'am.

Q: What did you see when you got out of the bathroom?

A: When I went out of the bathroom that was the time that the person went out of the bathroom and
that person who went out of the bathroom ran but I saw my grandchild inside the bathroom and then
I ran after the person who ran and then when we were running looked back and then I saw the
person's face, and then I uttered, "Walang hiya ka ikaw pala!"

Q: What did you exactly see your grandchild doing at that particular time, Madam Witness?

A: She was standing but when I asked my other grandchild who was outside at that time what my
grandchild saw, she told me that she was pulling up her underwear, ma'am.

Q: Just for clarification, Madam Witness, the grandchild that you saw inside the bathroom, are you
referring to the victim in this case?

A: Yes, Ma'am. Her name is [AAA].89

The trial court found AAA's testimony to be worth believing, being both positive and credible, thus:

(AAA] is a credible witness. She has not obtained enough experience and maturity to concoct such a
story of rape. Her testimony, considering her very young age, was straightforward and candid. Thus,
it is sufficient to convict the accused.90
The Court of Appeals likewise found that "AAA made sensible, straightforward and categorical
answers to the substantial, relevant and material questions."91

The rule is settled that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of witnesses' credibility and
testimony should be entitled to great respect unless it is shown that the trial court may have
"overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance."92

Francica's argument that the presence of healed hymenal lacerations belies AAA's accusation that
he sexually abused her on February 2, 2005 must fail in light of the fact that hymenal laceration is
not an element of rape. People v. Araojo93 expounds on the evidentiary weight of a hymenal
laceration in a charge of rape:

The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an element of the crime of
rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a compelling proof of defloration. What is
more, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the
findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable
in a prosecution for rape; the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. 94 (Citations
omitted)

Despite the absence of the medico-legal officer as a witness, the presence of healed lacerations
corroborates AAA's testimony as it "is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration."95

It is well-established that "[p ]hysical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses."96 The physical evidence of the healed lacerations in AAA's
vagina strongly corroborates her testimony that she was sexually abused by Francica.

Beyond reasonable doubt, Francica took advantage of AAA's youth and naivete to repeated1y
sexually abuse her.

Article 266-B97 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed in cases of rape stated in the first paragraph of Article 266-A where there are no
aggravating or qualifying circumstances present. This corresponds with Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 7610, which also provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua if the rape victim is below 12
years old:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -

....

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age

shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The lower courts correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of statutory
rape. However, this Court increases the amount of civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00,
moral damages of ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, and exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 to ₱75,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.98

In addition, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum

shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.99

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 03929, finding accused-appellant Ramon Francica y Navalta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accusedappellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) reclusion perpetua to be served successively and is
ordered to pay AAA, for each count of rape, the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

January 23, 2017

G.R. No. 215331

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
LUDIGARIO BELEN y MARASIGAN, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision1 dated July 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 05610, affirming the Decision2 dated December 20, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, which convicted Ludigario Belen y Marasigan (appellant) of
two counts of simple rape.

On February 2, 2006, appellant was charged with qualified rape under Article 266-A (1) (a), in
relation to Article 266-B (6) (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
8353 and in further relation to Section 5 (a) of RA 8369 in two separate informations, the accusatory
portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 9563

That sometime in July 1999 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his
moral ascendancy, with intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, through the use of a deadly weapon - a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of AAA,3 an eight (8)-year-old minor, against her will and without
her consent; the crime having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationshipthe
complainant being the daughter of his common-law wife, and minority, thereby raising the said crime
to that of QUALIFIED RAPE, which is aggravated by the circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of the said
victim.

Contrary to Law. 4

Criminal Case No. 9564

That sometime in July 1999 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his
moral ascendancy, with intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, through the use of a deadly weapon - a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of AAA, an eight (8)-year-old minor, against her will and without
her consent; the crime having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationshipthe
complainant being the daughter of his common-law wife, and minority, thereby raising the said crime
to that of QUALIFIED RAPE, which is aggravated by the circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of the said
victim.

Contrary to Law. 5

Appellant, assisted by counsel, was arraigned6 on April 1 7, 2008 and pleaded not guilty to each
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

The prosecution presented AAA, Police Senior Inspector Dean C. Cabrera (PSI Cabrera), the
medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and BBB, AAA's
mother.

AAA testified that she was 8 years old in 1999 and that appellant is the husband of her mother but
they were not married; 7 and that they were all then living in Purok I, Buntong Palay, San Mateo
Rizal. 8 At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1999, she was playing outside their house when she was
called by appellant to go inside the house. Once inside, appellant locked the door and poked a knife
at her and ordered her to remove her clothes to which she complied. 9 Appellant instructed her to
bend over and he inserted his penis into her vagina. 10 Thereafter, appellant placed himself on top of
her, moving up and down while she was crying. 11 The rape incident happened for about half an hour
in her mother's room. 12

At 7 o'clock in the evening of the second week of July 1999, while her mother was at work and she
was then sitting at home, appellant entered the house and told her to undress to which she complied
as he threatened her not to make noise or tell her mother. 13 Appellant asked her to bend and
inserted his penis into her vagina 14 then she was told to lie down and appellant went on top of her
and inserted his penis in her vagina and started moving up and down. The rape incident happened
for about half an hour while she was crying.15 Appellant raped her several times more which only
stopped when her grandmother took her to her uncle's house in Divisoria.16 It was only in 2005,
when confronted by her mother as to the truth that she was raped by appellant, that she had finally
told her that she had been repeatedly sexually molested by appellant. 17 She had never told her
mother about her ordeal before because appellant threatened her. 18

PSI Cabrera testified that he conducted a physical and genital examination on AAA on December 8,
2005 as requested by the Chief of Police of San Mateo, Rizal, 19 and in this connection, he issued a
Medico Legal Report stating that the victim sustained deep-healed laceration of the hymen at 6:00
position.20 He stated that the finding of laceration on the hymen would hardly give any proof to the
number of times that a sexual abuse had taken place. 21

BBB, AAA's mother, testified that appellant is her live-in partner for 10 years, 22 and that she was
staying with AAA and appellant in the latter's house in July 1999. On November 11, 2005, AAA told
her that appellant had molested her but kept silent because of appellant's threat that he would kill
them. 23 Her mother took AAA after the latter finished grade 2 and brought her to an uncles' house in
Divisoria.24 AAA was 8 years old and in grade 2 at the time of the rape incidents.25

Appellant denied the charges and claimed that AAA is the daughter of BBB, his live-in partner with
whom he separated in 1999;26 that in 1999, his mother-in-law brought AAA, who was then 7 years
old, to Manila to study, and did not visit her since then; 27 that BBB was masungit, so he left their
house and lived alone in another house; and that BBB got mad when he left her and told him that
she would file a case against him.28 They filed a case against him to get his property. 29

On December 20, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 9563, accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the victim the amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2. In Criminal Case No. 9564, accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the victim the amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No pronouncement as
to cost.

Accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is to be credited for the time spent for his preventive detention
in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 6127 and EO 214.
Accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is hereby ordered committed to the National Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinlupa City for service of sentence. 30

The RTC found that AAA gave a detailed recount of her sexual ordeal in a candid and
straightforward manner; that the medico-legal report stating a deep healed laceration at 6 o'clock
position with conclusion that "genital examination reveals remote history of blunt force or penetrating
coma" clearly bolstered AAA's allegation that appellant sexually molested her in her younger years.
The RTC, however, did not find the two rape incidents as qualified rape even if AAA's birth certificate
was marked and offered, since the Local Civil Registrar of San Mateo, Rizal had presented a
certification that it had no record of AAA's birth, thus, failing to prove her minority.

Appellant filed his appeal with the CA. After the Solicitor General filed his Appellee's Brief, the case
was submitted for decision.

On July 11, 2014, the CA rendered its Decision which denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Both parties manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs as they had already
exhaustively argued their issues in their respective briefs.31

Appellant argues that the prosecution miserably failed to overthrow the presumption of innocence in
his favor. He contends that the bulk of AAA' s testimony was supplied by the prosecutor who even
made presumptions and legal conclusions even before hearing the evidence. He claims that AAA's
testimony is doubtful as it is inconsistent with the medico-legal report findings of only one laceration
in the victim's hymen.

We affirm the lower court's conviction of appellant for two counts of simple rape.

Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, states the elements of the crime of rape as
follows:

Article 266 -A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.

We have scrutinized the records of this case and are convinced that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA with threat and intimidation, thus, against her will and without her consent. AAA categorically
declared that in two separate instances, appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina while she
was crying. Her testimony on the first rape incident, to wit:

Q. Where were you sometime in the month of July 1999 around 4:00 in the afternoon which is the
subject of this complaint?

A. I was in our house at Purok I, sir.

Q. What were you doing at that time?

A. I was playing, sir.

Q. You were then, as you said, 8 years old?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at that time who were there in your house?

A. Ludigario Belen, sir.

Q. While you were playing outside your house, what, if any, transpired at around 4:00 in the
afternoon?

A. He called me, sir.

Q. Who called you?

A. Ludigario Belen.

Q. And what did you do after you were called?

A. I approached him, sir.

Q. And what happened next after that?

A. He asked me to go inside the house.

Q. What happened next after that?

A. He locked the door, sir.

Q. And after locking the door of your house, what, if any, did he do if he had done anything?

A. He told me to remove my clothes, sir.

Q. Did you comply?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you comply?

A. Because he threatened me, sir.

Q. How did he threaten you?

A. He poked a knife at me, sir.

Q. You said that you had undressed, what were you wearing then at that time?

A. Iwas wearing shorts, sir.

Q. And what were your undergarments?

A. Shorts and panty, sir.

Q. What were your upper garments at that time?

A. T-shirt, sir.
Q. You said that you removed your clothes.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Including your undergarments?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After that what transpired next after that?

A. He asked me to bend over, (pinatuwad) sir.

Q. Thereafter, what did he do to you?

A. He removed his shorts, sir.

Q. After he removed his shorts, what did he do ifhe had done anything?

A. That was the time he raped me, sir.

Q. How did he rape you, can you describe what he did to you?

A. He inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.

Q. After inserting his private part into your private part, what did he do to you?

A. He moved on top of me, sir.

Q. How did he move, can you describe it?

A. In an up and down movement, sir.

Q. When he was doing this, what were you doing?

A. I was just crying, sir.32

As to the second incident of rape, AAA declared:

Q. In the month of July, how many times were you raped?

A. Three times, sir.

Q. More or less, what time of the day would have this occurred, the

second time that you were raped?

A. 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

Q. The first incident in July, you said that it was committed at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon in
1999?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The second time was also at 7:00 o'clock in the month of July?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The second time that this happened to you in the month of July 1999 at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, what were you doing then, if you can remember?

A. I was seated inside our house, sir.

Q. What were you doing then, at that time?

A. None. I was just sitting, sir.

Q. And what did the accused do to you?

A. He called me, sir.

Q. What is the full name of the accused?

A. Ludigario Belen, sir.

Q. What is his relation to you again?

A. He is my stepfather (tatay-tatayan), sir.

Q. He is not your biological father?

A. No, sir.

Q. So the second time that this happened to you in the year 1999, what did he do while you were
inside your house at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening?

A. Inutusan po nya ako na maghubad ako dahil gagalawin nya ako, sir.

Q. Did you do what you were told to do?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You said that he asked you to remove your clothes, what were you wearing then at that time?

A. Shorts and panty.

Q. After removing it, what if, any, happened next after that?
A. Pinatuwad po nya ako and then he inserted his penis, sir.

Q. Where were you at that time?

A. I was inside the room, sir.

Q. You were on the floor, on what part of the room were you stooping down?

A. Inside the room of my mother, sir.

Q. On the floor or what kind of furniture?

A. On the floor, sir.

Q. After he had done that, what did he do to you?

A. He went on top of me, sir.

Q. When you say "moving" what kind of motion was he doing?

A. He was moving up and down, sir.

Q. At that time, what clothes was he wearing?

A. He removed, sir.

Q. Madam witness, you said that he went on top of you, after going on top of you, what did he do?

A. No more, he dressed up, sir.

Q. You said that he was moving back and forth, how did he do that?

A. While he was on top of me and he did that sir.

Q. You said that before that, you were asked to stoop down?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then you said that he went on top of you, what did he do to turn you over?

Q. Madam witness, you said that you were first asked to stoop down?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On the floor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then you testified before the Honorable court that he went on top of you?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. So how did it happen that you were facing him when he went on top of you when you said that he
first asked you to stoop down, that would mean that if you are stooping down, your back was facing
him, not your head facing him?

...

A. After asking me to stoop down, he told me to lie down, that is why I was facing him, sir.

Q. After he had gone on top of you, what did he do, if he had done anything?

A. He mashed my breast, sir.

Q. After doing that, what else did he do?

A. He continued what he was doing, sir.

Q. What was he doing?

A. He was moving on top of me, sir.

Q. While he was doing that, what were you doing?

A. I was crying, sir.

Q. Why were you crying when you said he was just on top of you.

A. Because he inserted his penis in my vagina and after that he moved sir.

Q. How long did he continue moving on top of you?

A. More than half an hour, sir.

Q. After that you said that he just left you there inside the room?

A. Yes sir and he told me to dress up.33

It was clearly established that the first rape incident was accomplished with the use of a knife which
proved that appellant employed threat in AAA's life. As to the second rape, while there was no force
and intimidation used by appellant on AAA, the fact that appellant is the live-in partner of her mother
and with whom she had been living with since she was 2 years old, established his moral
ascendancy as well as physical superiority over AAA. Appellant's moral ascendancy and influence
over AAA substitutes for threat and intimidation34 which made AAA submit herself to appellant's
bestial desire. It is doctrinally settled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim
renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.35
We agree with the RTC's conclusion that AAA testified in a candid and straightforward manner. The
evaluation of the trial court judge from the viewpoint of having observed the witness on the stand,
coupled by the fact that the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court, is binding on the court unless it
can be shown that facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted which, if
considered, would affect the disposition of the case in a different manner, 36 which is not present in
this case.

Appellant argues that most of the details of the alleged rape incidents were elicited from AAA
through leading questions; that a reading of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) showed that
she was consistently led to her answers by the trial prosecutor's questions, hence, it cannot be said
that her testimony was straightforward and a categorical disclosure of the events that transpired.

We find such argument without merit. We quote with approval the CA's disquisition on the matter, to
wit:

A perusal of the AAA's testimony reveals that the prosecution did not proffer leading questions.
Assuming arguendo that the questions are leading, the defense failed to object as soon as the
alleged leading questions were asked. It is too late in the day for appellant to object to the
formulation of the offer and the manner of questioning adopted by the public prosecutor. Appellant
should have interposed his objections in the course of the oral examination of AAA, as soon as the
grounds therefor became reasonably apparent. As it were, he raised not a whimper of protest as the
pub!ic prosecutor recited his offer or propounded questions to AAA. Worse, appellant subjected AAA
to cross-examination on the very matters covered by the questions being objected to; therefore, he
is barred from challenging the propriety thereof or the admissibility of the answers given.37

Appellant contends that while AAA alleged that she was raped many times when she was 8 years
old, however, it was shown by the medico-legal report that she had only one laceration in her hymen
which was at 6 o'clock position and deeply healed; and that there is a possibility that this laceration
could have been done by any other male person aside from appellant since the actual genital
examination was only done in 2005 when the victim was no longer living with the appellant under the
same roof.

We are not impressed.

In People v. Ferrer,38 we held:

It is settled that laceration is not an element of the crime of rape. The absence of lacerations does
not negate rape. The presence of lacerations in the victim's vagina is not necessary to prove rape;
neither is a broken hymen an essential element of the crime.x x x

xxxx

We accordingly reject accused-appellants arguments which hinge on alleged inconsistencies

between the statements made by the private complainant vis-a-vis the medical examination and
report. The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly held that a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and no law requires a
medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical examination of the victim or
the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape as the
testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The
medical examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is merely corroborative in
character.39
Accordingly, what is crucial is that AAA's testimony meets the test of credibility, which serves as the
basis for appellant's conviction.40 Notably, PSI Cabrera, in his cross examination, had clarified that it
is possible that a person being raped or a hymen, or a vagina being penetrated by a penis would
create a laceration at the same spot just like a lightning hitting on the same spot.41 Therefore, AAA's
straightforward testimony that appellant had raped her twice is not at all negated by a finding of only
one laceration in her hymen.

We have been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims especially in sensitive
cases of rape,42 as no young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her
private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and
scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.43

Appellant denies the charges and imputes ill motive on the part of AAA and her mother. It is well
settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion
that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and
categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the complainant
and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence.44

Appellant's allegation that AAA and her mother filed the cases against him in order to get his
properties does not inspire belief. For appellant's allegations of ill motive to be credible, he should
substantiate the same by clear and convincing evidence which he failed to do, as he even admitted
that the properties are not yet titled in his name but with the govemment. 45 We have ruled that no
mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to
a prosecution for rape if she was not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person
responsible for her child's defilement. 46 We find that AAA and her mother are not impelled by any
improper motive in filing rape charges against appellant but to obtain justice for what AAA had
suffered in the hands of appellant.

We agree with the RTC as affirmed by the CA that appellant is guilty of two counts of simple rape
only and not of qualified rape as charged. Rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.47 Well-settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the
Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. 48 The informations alleged that
AAA is eight years old and appellant is the common law husband of AAA's mother. The relationship
of AAA with appellant was admitted by the latter but AAA's age was not sufficiently proved during
trial. The victim's minority must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.49

We held in People v. Pruna50 that:

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is so-ught to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In this case, the prosecution presented a copy of AAA's birth certificate but the same was not
authenticated, hence, could not be given any probative value.1âwphi1 While attached to the records
is AAA's baptismal certificate51 which showed that she was born on July 27, 1991, which the defense
admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original, however, the same was not offered in evidence.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered and that the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. Furthermore, while BBB testified that her daughter was 8 years old at the time of the rape
incidents, she admitted that she did not know when AAA was born, hence, her testimony as to AAA's
age could not be considered as sufficient compliance with paragraph no. 3 of the guidelines in the
Pruna case.

While in People v. Balo,52 we had appreciated pieces of evidence and circumstances which were
actually established by the prosecution in determining the age of the victim, to wit:

In the case at bar, several documents were presented in court indicating the very young age of the
victim; first, while assisted by her grandmother, AAA stated in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that she
was five (5) years of age; second, the Request for Genital Exam indicated that AAA was five (5)
years old; third, the Sexual Crime (Protocol) Form stated that the age of AAA was five (5) years old;
fourth, the Initial Medico-Legal Report showed that AAA was five (5) years of age; fifih, Medico-Legal
Report No. R07-757 reflected that AAA was five (5) years old; sixth, the personal circumstances of
the victim when she testified on June 24, 2008 stated that AAA was five (5) years old and she
likewise answered that she was five (5) years old when asked about her age; and seventh, the
accused failed to controvert that AAA was four (4) years old at the time the crime was committed
when the court inquired about it while he was testifying.

In this particular case, these pieces of evidence, together with the physical appearance of the victim
when she testified, would have been sufficient basis for !he lower court to ascertain the tender age of
the victim when the crime was committed. Furthermore, the Medico-Legal Report prepared by Police
S/Insp. Dr. Ebdane, a government physician who took an oath as a civil service official, means that
she is competent to examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the
government. As such, the Medico-Legal Report carries the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her functions and duties. As regards the other documents, under Section 44,45 Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. To be sure, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, law enforcement agencies of the government similarly enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their official functions. Verily, if baptismal certificates or school records are
allowed to be presented in court to establish the age of the victim in the absence of a birth certificate,
with more reason should Medico-Legal Reports and comparable documents be allowed to ascertain
such circumstance in similar cases.

Consequently, notwithstanding the fact that AAA's original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or school records, were never presented by the prosecution, the Court agrees with the
lower court and the appellate court that AAA's minority was duly established by the evidence on
record.

We, however, find those pieces of evidence wanting in this case. AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay was
executed when she was already 14 years old and thus, the initial medico-legal report also showed
that she was 14 years old when she was examined. Hence, AAA's allegation that she was 8 years
old when she was raped was not proved by these documents.

Article 266-B of RA 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, states that whenever rape
is committed through force, threat or intimidation, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. However,
whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, such as a knife in this case, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the first incident of rape, it was committed with the
use of a knife which is a deadly weapon, thus the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code states that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no
aggravating nor any mitigating circumstance had been proved, We find that the RTC correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. As to the second rape incident, since the moral
ascendancy of appellant over AAA took the form of threat and intimidation on her, the RTC likewise
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant.

We, however, modify the damages awarded by the RTC in the two rape cases pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Ireneo Jugueta. 53 The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should
all be increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this decision until
fully paid. 54

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 11, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05610 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should all be increased to P75,000.00 for each
count of rape. The monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

G.R. No. 207098               July 8, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NONIETO GERSAMIO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this present appeal is the Decision1 dated 25 April 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR. HC-CR No. 00906 affirming the Decision2 dated 14 January 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29 of Toledo City, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. TCS-4609, finding Nonieto
Gersamio (herein appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against
AAA,3 but, deleting the portion ordering the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support the
child of AAA.

Two (2) separate informations were filed against the appellant charging him with rape committed in
1999 and on 28 August 2002 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. TCS-4608 and TCS-4609,
respectively. The appellant was later acquitted in Criminal Case No. TCS-4608 per the
abovementioned RTC Decision dated 14 January 2008 for prosecution’s failure to specify with
certainty the exact month in 1999 when the offense was committed. 4 Thus, only Criminal Case No.
TCS-4609 is the subject of this instant appeal.

The Information docketed as Criminal Case No. TCS-4609 subject of this appeal reads:

That on the 28th day of August 2002, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, at
Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [herein appellant], with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, violence and intimidation and having carnal knowledge
with the complainant [AAA], 15 years old, a minor, at the time of the incident against her
will.5 (Emphasis supplied.)

On arraignment, the appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. 6 After the pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA, the victim herself; BBB, the grandmother of AAA;
and Dr. Shiela Faciol (Dr. Faciol), Medical Health Officer of Pinamungajan, Cebu, who conducted
the medical examination on AAA.

The prosecution’s evidence was engaged in the establishment of the following facts:

AAA’s first sexual ordeal at the hands of the appellant happened sometime in 1999, when she was
only 13 years old, having been born on 11 April 1986.7 It was repeated for several times thereafter.
The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002. On the said date, at around 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, while AAA was about to enter their house, the appellant, who was then hiding behind a
coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her towards the back of their house - a banana
plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as the appellant pointed a knife at her neck. The
appellant also put a handkerchief over her mouth and told her not to say a word. At the banana
plantation, the appellant commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted, prompting the former to kick
the latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the ground, the appellant removed her tshirt,
short pants and underwear. The appellant also threatened to kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply
cried. The appellant then lay on top of AAA and began kissing her on her cheeks and later on her
lips. After a short while, the appellant, who was no longer wearing any shirt, pulled down his shorts
and brief with his right hand while his left hand was still holding the knife. Thereafter, the appellant
held his penis, inserted it inside AAA’s vagina and made push and pull movements. AAA felt pain
and cried. After satiating his lust, the appellant immediately stood up, kicked AAA on her thigh and
instructed her to wear her panty and short pants. The appellant likewise wore his brief and short
pants. Before leaving, the appellant warned AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what
happened between them.8
Out of fear for her life, AAA suffered in silence. She never told anyone about the dreadful acts done
to her by the appellant. However, on 2 September 2002, AAA’s grandmother, BBB, discovered her
pregnancy because of the changes in her physical appearance. When asked about the father of her
child, it was then that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing experiences at the hands of the
appellant, which began in 1999 when she was only 13 years old, the last of which was on 28 August
2002. Such sexual advances by the appellant resulted in her pregnancy.9 At once, BBB went to the
house of the appellant and confronted him regarding what he did to AAA. Nonetheless, in order to
save AAA and their whole family from shame as the appellant is AAA’s uncle, being the first cousin
of AAA’s mother, BBB would just like to keep the matter among themselves and merely asked the
appellant to acknowledge and support the child of AAA. The appellant, however, denied the
accusation and he even got mad at BBB. Leaving with no other choice, AAA, accompanied by BBB,
sought the assistance of their barangay Captain and they told the former the whole incident. The
Barangay Captain then advised them to have a medical examination, which they did.10

Dr. Faciol, who conducted the physical examination on AAA, found that (1) AAA was already five
and a half months pregnant; (2) no contusion or laceration on AAA’s sex organ; 11 and (3) AAA’s
hymen is not intact anymore. Dr. Faciol likewise stated that AAA told her that she was last rape by
her perpetrator about a year ago, i.e., 28 August 2002, and she was so scared at that time because
the perpetrator had a knife. Dr. Faciol also clarified that after 8 to 10 days from the time the victim
was raped, there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of rape on the victim’s vagina.
Thus, she could no longer determine if the penetration was forceful. Even so, Dr. Faciol declared
that her aforesaid findings did not exclude the possibility of rape.12 AAA and BBB subsequently
proceeded to the police station, submitted the result of the medical examination and narrated the
whole incident of rape committed by the appellant against AAA.13

For its part, the defense presented the appellant and his mother, Dominga Gersamio, whose
testimonies consist of sheer denials and alibi. Their version of the case is as follows:

The appellant vehemently denied that he raped AAA. He maintained that from 1999 until 2002 he
was in Cebu City working as a driver of a public utility jeepney (PUJ) and that he only went home to
Pinamungajan, Cebu, every Saturday afternoon. While working as a jeepney driver, he stayed at the
shop of his brother in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. From 1999 up to 2000, he had a girlfriend, who isa
teacher previously assigned in Consolatrix Academy. He admitted having known AAA, being the
granddaughter of her mother’s older sister. He claimed that on 22 September 2002, her mother
informed him that he was being accused of raping AAA. He got angry as it was not true and he
never had any sexual relationship with AAA. On the same day, to their surprise, AAA and BBB went
to their house asking him to support AAA’s child. But, he refused. He stated that prior to the filing of
this case, his family and that of AAA were still in good terms even though they had a previous
misunderstanding regarding a video cd allegedly stolen by AAA. He is also willing to submit himself
to DNA testing to determine the paternity of AAA’s child but he has no money to spend for it.14

Dominga Gersamio corroborated the appellant’s testimony that AAA and BBB went to their house
asking the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support the child AAA was carrying in her
womb. But, the appellant refused and got angry, as he is not the father of AAA’s child. AAA and BBB
then went home and, thereafter, charged the appellant with rape.15

After both parties presented their evidence, the trial court rendered its Decision dated 14 January
2008 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thereby, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court similarly ordered the appellant to (1)
pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; (2) acknowledge or recognize AAA’s offspring resulting
from the rape; and (3) support AAA’s child in the event his means improves after serving his
sentence.16
The appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s 14 January 2008 Decision was denied
for lack of merit in the Order17 dated 5 May 2008.

On appeal,18 the Court of Appeals, in its now assailed Decision dated 25 April 2012, affirmed the
guilty verdict and the sentence imposed by the trial court. It deleted, however, the portion ordering
the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child, as the issue of whether the child
is of the appellant is yet to be resolved in a full-blown trial.19

Hence, the instant recourse20 alleging that the Court of Appeals fatally erred in affirming the
appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. TCS-4609 despite the inherent weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence to support the verdict.21

The appellant argues that AAA is not a credible witness and her testimony is also not credible being
replete with several material inconsistencies, contradictions and improbabilities. Firstly, AAA claims
that the 28 August 2002 rape incident was the proximate cause of her pregnancy but it was belied by
the result of her own medical examination conducted in September 2002 confirming that she was
already five and a half months pregnant at that time. To explain this inconsistency, AAA asserts that
the appellant started raping her when she was still 13 years old until she became pregnant but
nothing on record substantiates this claim of repeated prior rape incidents. Secondly, AAA’s
behavior negates her claim of rape. Assuming the appellant with the use of force or threat had
repeatedly raped her, there seemed to be no signs that she suffered trauma as a consequence
thereof, or at least a change in behavior. Moreover, even if the rape was perpetrated by means of
threat, such threat was not imminent as the appellant was not always around her. Yet, AAA never
reported to her grandmother or uncle or teacher that the appellant had repeatedly raped her until her
grandmother noticed the physical changes in her body. Thirdly, while AAA cries repeated rape, this
was not the reason why she charged the appellant with that crime but the latter’s refusal to
acknowledge paternity and to support the child she was carrying in her womb. Ill motive can
therefore be attributed to AAA in filing the case against the appellant, which ill motive was
corroborated by the very own testimony of BBB.22 The appellant further contends that Dr. Faciol is
not an expert witness in the field of rape cases and physical examination of child abuse. Thus, her
opinion on the matter has no probative value at all. Even the medico-legal report she made is
incompetent to prove the 28 August 2002 rape incident. Based on the record, AAA’s physical
examination was conducted eight days after the 28 August 2002 rape incident, however, the medico-
legal report of Dr. Faciol did not indicate any trauma on AAA’s genitalia nor any healed lacerations
on the labia majora, labia minora, vaginal canal and/or fourchette. In other words, both Dr. Faciol’s
testimony and her medical findings could not prove the charge of rape against him.23

With all the foregoing, the appellant claims that since his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, he must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged.

This Court believes otherwise.

Noticeably, the appellant’s arguments primarily hinge on the issue of AAA’s credibility. Settled is the
rule that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is concerned, this Court adheres to these
jurisprudentially established guidelines: (1) it gives the highest respect to the trial court’s evaluation
of the testimony of the witnesses because of its unique position in directly observing the demeanor
of a witness on the stand, and from its vantage point, is also in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses; (2) in the absence of any substantial reason that would justify the reversal
of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower
court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of
the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded; and (3) the rule is even more
stringently applied if the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court.24
A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the findings of both
lower courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility and that, indeed, the appellant raped her and his guilt
was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

It is evident in the transcript of stenographic notes that AAA’s testimony, in contrast to the claim of
the appellant, was clear, credible, convincing and worthy of belief. Her narration of how she was
sexually abused by the appellant on that fateful afternoon of 28 August 2002 was given in a
categorical and straightforward manner. She unwaveringly described to the trial court how the
appellant raped her. She recounted in detail that while she was about to enter their house, the
appellant, who was hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her to the back of
their house - a banana plantation. With a knife pointed at her neck, she could not do anything but
cry. The appellant also put a handkerchief over her mouth and told her not to say a word. At the
banana plantation, the appellant commanded her to lie down. Though she resisted, the appellant
overpowered her. While lying on the ground, the appellant removed her tshirt, short pants and
underwear. The appellant also threatened to kill her. Defenseless, she simply cried. The appellant
then lay on top of her and began kissing her on her cheeks and then on her lips. After a short while,
the appellant, who was no longer wearing any shirt, pulled down his shorts and brief with his right
hand while his left hand was still holding the knife. Thereafter, the appellant held his penis, inserted it
inside her vagina and made push and pull movements. She felt pain and cried. After satiating his
lust, the appellant immediately stood up, kicked her on her thigh and instructed her to wear her panty
and short pants. The appellant likewise wore his brief and short pants. Before leaving, the appellant
warned her that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them.25

AAA’s trustworthy account proved all the elements of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act
was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. 26 The appellant in this case had
sexual intercourse with AAA, which he accomplished through force, that is, with the use of a knife he
threatened to kill AAA to make her succumb to his bestiality. Indubitably, the appellant committed the
crime of rape against AAA.

Regarding the alleged inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions in AAA’s testimony pointed
out by the appellant, this Court finds them all inconsequential as they refer to trivial matters that have
nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is, carnal knowledge through
force or intimidation. Further, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness
referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not
impair her credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or rehearsed.27

Here, even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002 showed
that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not necessarily follow that
the appellant could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape against her. Contrary to appellant’s
view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue since pregnancy is not an essential element of the
crime of rape. So, whether the child whom the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by
some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was
testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. As long as the elements of rape are present and proven
by the prosecution, the accused could be adjudged guilty thereof notwithstanding the attendance of
other matters that are completely irrelevant to the crime.28

The appellant’s assertion that AAA’s behavior belies her claim that she was raped, as there seemed
to be no signs that she suffered trauma as a consequence thereof, or at least a change in behavior,
is futile. Victims of a heinous crime, such as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in
accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to
an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in
an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under
emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among
victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with different circumstances.29

As to AAA’s delay in reporting the rape incident until BBB noticed the changes in her physical
appearance, the same can be attributed to her tender age and to the threat made upon her person
by the appellant. Even if the appellant was not always around, the fact that he is her uncle and he
lives nearby is more than enough to cause fear on AAA since he could make good of his threat at
anytime. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, AAA’s failure to report the rape incident is not an
indication of fabricated charges. If she did not become pregnant she would not have revealed the
humiliating, painful experience she suffered in the hands of someone whom she may have regarded
as a father.30 Moreover, this Court in People v. Pareja 31 citing People v. Ogarte32 explained why a
rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or
to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated.
Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and
pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims.33 (Emphasis supplied)

With respect to the appellant’s allegation that AAA and BBB acted with ill motive in filing the rape
case against him as he refused to acknowledge paternity and to support the child AAA was carrying
in her womb, this Court considers it preposterous. As can be gleaned from the testimonies of AAA
and BBB, they tried to settle the matter with the appellant not only because they belong to the same
family, but, more so, to avoid exposing in public the disgraceful thing done to AAA by the appellant.
But, the latter denied the commission of the crime and even got mad at them.

Leaving with no other choice, AAA, together with BBB, sought the assistance of their Barangay
Captain and later filed the case against the appellant.1âwphi1 To the mind of this Court, the action
taken by AAA and BBB after the appellant’s denial of the commission of the crime was not prompted
by any ill motive but by the desire to seek the truth and get justice for the wrong done to AAA. As
succinctly explained by the Court of Appeals, thus:

x x x the filing of the rape charge was done by [AAA] not by mere desire to exact revenge or ill
motive but was driven by the heinousness of the crime and the feeling of degradation and for the
lone purpose of ferreting the truth.

"Undergoing all of the humiliating and invasive procedures for the case – the initial police
interrogation, the medical examination, the formal charge, the public trial and the cross-examination
– proves to be the litmus test for truth, especially when endured by a minor who gives her consistent
and unwavering testimony on the details of her ordeal."34

Moreover, as this Court has pronounced in Rondina v. People, 35 ill motives become inconsequential
if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the
liability of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically identified the appellant as her ravisher. Her
account of the incident was given credence by both lower courts to which this Court conforms. Thus,
the appellant’s flimsy allegation of ill motive is immaterial. Besides, no woman would concoct a story
of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and
scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the
culprit apprehended and punished. 36 This Court equally finds erroneous the appellant’s contentions
that Dr. Faciol is not an expert witness, thus, her testimony cannot be given any probative value and
that both Dr. Faciol’s testimony and her medical findings could not prove the charge of rape against
him. In prosecutions for rape, the testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable for a conviction
for rape. Such is not an element of rape. By declaring that the appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina, the victim said all that was necessary to prove rape. Also, it is well settled that medical
findings of injuries in the victim's genitalia are not essential to convict the appellant of rape. Hymenal
lacerations are not an element of rape. What is essential is that there was penetration, however
slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance was proven beyond doubt in this case by the
testimony of AAA.37 Moreover, Dr. Faciol clarified that after 8 to 10 days from the time the victim was
raped there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of rape on the victim’s vagina. 38 This
would precisely explain the lack of any injury on AAA’s genitalia.

Now, in comparison to AAA’s positive and categorical testimony and her positive identification of the
appellant as her rapist, the appellant could only muster denial and alibi as his defenses. As this
Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the
crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony, which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere
denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed
and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 39 In the case at bench,
the appellant miserably failed to prove that he was not at the scene of the crime on 28 August 2002.
As comprehensively discussed by the Court of Appeals:

For one, no sufficient independent evidence was presented to support [the] appellant’s claim that he
was in Cebu City on [28 August 2002], driving a public utility jeepney (PUJ) and that he went home
only on Saturday afternoons, and that after he stopped driving sometime in 2002, he lived in his
brother’s shop located in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City.

As proof of his being a professional driver, he presented his professional driver’s license.

For another, it has been established from the testimony of [AAA] that her house is not far from the
house of the appellant and that she had to pass by [the] appellant’s house before reaching her
house. Based on the foregoing, this court can safely conclude that, due to the proximity of the two
houses to each other, it was not physically impossible for [the] appellant to be at the scene of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.

Still for another, [AAA] could not have made a mistake in identifying the appellant as her rapist, as
the latter not only lived in her neighborhood and is known to her for many years prior to the rape
incidents being her mother’s first cousin.

In the face, therefore, of the positive identification by [AAA], [the] appellant’s self-serving denial and
alibi cannot prevail.40

In light of the foregoing, this Court affirms appellant’s conviction for simple rape.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. The lower courts, therefore, correctly imposed the said penalty.
This Court likewise sustains the award of ₱50,000.00 moral damages by the lower courts. Moral
damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape on the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. 41 In addition
thereto, this Court finds it proper to also award ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00
exemplary damages to AAA. Civil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been
committed.42 Exemplary damages are also called for, by way of public example, and to protect the
young from sexual abuse.43 Furthermore, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.44

Finally, this Court similarly affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering the
appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidence thereof. In
this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically examined in
September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on 28 August 2002 was not the cause of that
pregnancy. Though there were allegations of repeated rape from 1999 up to 28 August 2002, only
two Informations for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in 1999 and on 28 August 2002. And, the
appellant was acquitted for the rape committed in 1999 for prosecution’s failure to specify with
certainty the exact month in 1999 the offense was committed. With these, the appellant cannot be
ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.

Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the guilt of the
appellant for the crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat, not only is the impregnation
of the rape victim not an element of rape;45 it must also be stressed that AAA stated that the
appellant repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28 August 2002. 46 Although the appellant cannot be
held liable for such alleged rapes, as this case does not cover other incidents of rape prior to 28
August 2002, AAA's testimony on this point provides a possible explanation for her childbirth on 5
January 2003 as her child turned one on 5 January 2004.47 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 25 April 2012 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the appellant is further ordered to pay
AAA civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of 1!50,000.00 and 1!30,000.00,
respectively, plus interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of this judgment.