PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ELYBOY SO Y ORBES

G.R. NO. 10664

FACTS OF THE CASE:

- On June 1991, accused Elyboy So, while walking his friend, Teresita Domingo, passed by the
house of his first cousins, Esteban, Emy and Edgar all surnamed So. When they passed his
cousins’ house, he was invited by his cousin Edgar to have a drink with them.

- After walking his companion home, Elyboy went to his cousin’s place and joined them in their
drinking session.

- In this drinking session, accused met Mario, the future husband of his cousin Emy.After a
while, Emy felt sleepy so she went inside the house to sleep. While Emy was sleeping inside
the house, she was awakened by the noises coming from the outside. It turned out that the
accused had an argument with someone and he was shouting loudly, disturbing the neighbors
in the proess. After the accused was pacified, Mario told him to go home as he was disturbing
their neighbors.

- Come morning while Emy and Mario were waiting for a taxi, Elyboy suddenly appeared from
behind and attacked Mario with an eleven inch fan knife. He repeatedly stabbed Mario despite
the pleas of Emy to stop. Even when Mario tried to run but unfortunately slipped, Elyboy still
continued to attack him. Accused fled from the scene and ran in a dark alley. After a while the
policemen came to arrest him and asked him to surrender, accused then surrendered.

- Accused argued that he was defending himself from the deceased and that he was insane at
the time of the incident,

- The RTC held that he is guilty of murder and imposing on him reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
appeal to Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

- Whether or not he is guilty of murder

- Whether or not the lower court erred in disregarding his insanity and self-defense claim
- Whether or not the lower court erred in when it held that the testimony of the accused-appellan
Elyboy is undeserving of credit, improbable and implausible.

HELD:

- The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the Petition of Accused.
Credibility of witness

The question whether the lower court erred when it held the testimony of the accused-apellant
undeserving of credit raises the issue of the credibility of the witness. Appellant would like the
S.C. to believe that the testimony of Emy So is biased and this was aggravated by her grudge
towards the accused. “The Court has time and again ruled that mere relationship of the
witness to the victim does not automatically impair his credibility and render the testimony less
worthy of faith and credit”

Self- defense-
According the Supreme Court, the essential element to prove self-defense is if there is an
unlawful aggression done by the deceased. Accused claim that Mario attacked him with a
knife, this did not convince the Supreme Court “Even if we allow appellant's contention that
Mario Tuquero was the initial unlawful aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-
defense. After appellant successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression
had ceased. After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense has no
more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor”

Also, the presence of the large number of wounds that the deceased sustained, the nature and
extent of the stabbed wounds indicated the determination of the accused to kill the deceased.

Insanity

Claim is unmeritorious “In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance,
there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the
accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability”. The fact that he recalls what transpired before, during and after the
incident and even knows the nature and content of his testimony does not betray an abnormal
mind.
SANTIAGO PAERA , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G. R. No. 181626. May 30, 2011

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Santiago Paera (petitioner) a Punong Barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental,

allocates limited distribution of communal water from a communal tank to his constituents. The
tank was located at the property of Vicente Darong, the complainant, father of Indalecio
Darong, a complainant. Despite the petitioners’ scheme, Indalencio continued drawing water
from the tank. On April 7, 1999, Santiago Paera reminded Indalencio of the water scheme and
cut Indalencio’s access.
The following day the petitioner inspected the tank due to his constituents’ complaints of about
the water interruption supply and discovered a tap on the main line and he disconnected it. To
stop water from leaking, petitioner borrowed a bolo and made a wooden plug, this was when
Indalecio arrived. What happened next was contested by both parties..
According to the prosecution, Paera without any warning charged and shouted at Indalecio
“patyon tikaw!” (I will kill you). Indalecio ran for safety and passing along the way Diosetea his
wife who followed him going to the tank. Diosetea asked the petitioner what’s the matter and
instead of replying, petitioner shouted ”wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka patyon tikaw!”, (“I don’t
spare anyone, even if you’re a woman, I will kill you!”). diosotea also ran and sought refuge to
a nearby house of her relative. Unable to pursue Diosotea, petitioner turned his back to
Indalecio. As he chase Indalecio, he came across Vicente, father of Indalecio and recognizes
him and thrusts his bolo towards him shouting, “bisag gulang ka, buk-on ko imo ulo!” (“even if
you’re old I will crack open your skull”).
According to petitioner, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo. Angrily inquiring why
the petitioner cut his supply of water connection. Forcing the petitioner to take a defensive
stance and using a borrowed bolo that makes Indalencio ran away.
Except for the father of Indalecio, Vicente who was seriously ill, the Darong’s testified during
trial. The petitioner was the defense lone witness.

ISSUE:

Was Santiago Paera guilty of grave threats?

DECISION:

Yes, Santiago Paera is guilty of grave threats. The MCTC found the prosecution evidence
sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs’
persistent water tapping contrary to Paeras directive must have angered Paera, triggering his
criminal behaviour. The MCTC rejected petitioner’s defence of denial as self-serving and
uncorroborated.
The Regional Trial Court affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter’s findings on petitioner’s
motive. The RTC similarly found unconvincing petitioners denial in light of the ‘”clear, direct
and consistent” testimonies of the Darong`s and other prosecution witnesses.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of
continued and complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten another
with the infliction upon the person of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime.
This felony is consummated  as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person
threatened.
Santiago Paera’s threat to kill Indalencio and Diosetia and crack open Vicente’s skull are
wrongs amounting to homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized in Revised Penal
Code. The threats were consummated as soon as the Darongs heared Paera said his
threatening remarks.
The proof of grave threats against Vicente came from the prosecution’s evidence on the
testimonies of Indalencio and Diosetia and two witnesses who corroborated with them
indisputably shows the threat of Paera on killing Vicente. Vicente’s absence on the stand does
not affect the veracity and strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
There is no justifying circumstances attended on Paera’s commission of grave threats. His
claim of defence of a stranger under rule number 3 of Article 11 of the RPC which negates the
criminal liability of “anyone who acts in defence of his persons or rights of a stranger, provided
that the first and second requisites in the next preceding circumstance are present and the
person defending be not induced by resentment, revenge or any other evil motives” which
requires 1. Unlawful aggression 2. Reasonable necessity of means to avoid or repeal it and 3.
Lack of provocation on the part of the person being attacked. None of this requisites was
obtained.This claim of Paera has no merit on having acted to protect and defend the water
rights of his constituents in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay.
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under Article 11
paragraph 5 lies upon a proof the offense was committed was the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office. When Paera barred the Darong’s
access to communal water, arguably, he acted in the performance of his duty to ensure the
delivery of basic services. But he excessively exceeded the bounds of his office when he
chased the Darong’s with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons for violation on
his orders.

The Supreme Court denied the petition of Santiago Paera and affirms the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete, Branch 39 dated November 28, 2008.
G.R. No. 199892; December 10, 2012
People v. Punzalan, Jr.

Facts:

- Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1
Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of
the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC)
at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales.
- On August 10, 2002, at 5 or 6 p.m., they all went to the All-in-One Canteen to drink and at 10
p.m. transferred to Aquarius, a videoke bar where SN1Bacosa and appellant Punzalan got into
a fight.
- The Navy group walked back to the NETC Camp to avoid aggravating the conflict. The
appellant, however, drunk drove a maroon Nissan with plate number DRW 706 and followed
the group to the camp. The navy sentries flagged down Punzalan and heard him threaten to
kill the Navy members he fought in the bar.
- Punzalan charged forward despite being flagged down, hit the group of navy personnel from
behind, and sped away resulting to the death of Andal and Duclayna, and injuries to the rest of
the group.
- Punzalan was charged with complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with
Attempted Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle
- Punzalan countered the verdict and claimed that he only accelerated the vehicle because he
was attacked by the Navy group. He insisted that he bumped the group without intent to kill
and that he may not be held criminally liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or
injury, a justifying circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. He
asserted that the attack against him by the two navy personnel constituted actual and
imminent danger to his life and limb.

CRIMINAL LAW

Issue: WON Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury (WON a justifying circumstance
may be invoked).

Held/Ratio: NO. Punzalan’s assertions regarding the existence of the evil which he sought to be
avoided are baseless and such evil did not actually exist as the allegations neither conformed to the
evidence at hand nor were they consistent with the testimony of his own witness. Under paragraph 4,
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as a justifying
circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with: (1) the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists;(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and(3) there be no other
practical and less harmful means of preventing it. There is no corroboration among the testimonies.
Punzalan also failed to satisfy the third requisite as the infliction of damage or injury to another so that
a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and
with the least possible prejudice to another. Furthermore, WON Punzalan acted in avoidance of
greater evil or injury is a question of fact.

Issue: WON the crime is qualified as murder

Held/Ratio: YES. Treachery is clearly present in the crime. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
any defense which the offended party might make. The elements of treachery are: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted. Punzalan’s act of
running over the victims with his van from behind while the victims were walking inside the NETC
camp was a clear act of treachery. The victims were surprised and were not able to prepare and repel
the treacherous assault of Punzalan.

SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan and Office of the Special Prosecutor (G.R. No/ 148431,
July 28, 2005)
Facts:
Police officers CABANLIG, PADILLA, ABESAMIS, MERCADO and ESTEBAN were all charged for
the MURDER of Jimmy Valino before the Sandiganbayan. Jimmy Valino was a detained prisoner who
was escorted to retrieve the effects of the crime to the place where he hid the same. Aboard the
police vehicle, Jimmy Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 rifle and about to jump out of the jeep.
CABANLIG shouted “hoy!”and without issuing any warning of any sort, CABANLIG fired at Valino,
hitting his head, left side of the chest and left lower back.
CABANLIG admitted shooting Valino during the trial. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting as an
act of self-defense and performance of duty. Nevertheless, Sandiganbayan CONVICTED CABANLIG
but acquitted his 4 companions.
Upon appeal, the SUPREME COURT eventually ACQUITTED CABANLIG
RULING 1: Because the killing was justified and that the same was done in the fulfillment of duty
A policeman in the performance of duty is JUSTIFIED in using such force as is reasonably (and
absolutely)necessary to (1) secure and detain the offender, (2) overcome his resistance, (3) prevent
his escape, (4) recapture him if he escapes, and (4) protect himself from bodily harm. (People v.
Oanis, 74 Phil 257 [1943]; People v. Lagata (83 Phil 150 [1949]).
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful
aggression from the victim is NOT a requisite.
In People v. Delima,(46 Phil 738 [1992]) where the killing of a fugitive who lunged at a policeman with
a bamboo-makeshift lance, the SC ruled that the same was done in the fulfillment of duty. The
fugitive’s unlawful aggression, in that case, had already ceased when the policeman killed him,
however, the policeman's act of shooting at him is justified because he was running away from him
when he was shot. Ordinarily, it may appear that the policeman, acting in the fulfillment of duty, is the
aggressor, but his aggression is NOT UNLAWFUL, it being necessary to fulfill his duty. But IF the
policeman was a PRIVATE PERSON, not in the performance of duty, and the same situation was
given, there would be NO self-defense because there would be NO unlawful aggression on the part of
the deceased.
RULING 2: Because Cabanlig did not exceed the fulfillment of duty when he IMMEDIATELY SHOT
Valino without issuing a warning.
The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost to the detriment of
the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several
options are still available to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances where the threat to the
life of a law enforcer is already imminent AND there is NO OTHER option but to use force to subdue
the offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning is EXCUSABLE.
RULING 3: Was there an OVERKILL?
There was none.

In the case of Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148431 dated 28 July 2005, the Supreme Court
pronounced: “Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty,
unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite. In People v. Delima, a policeman was looking
for a fugitive who had several days earlier escaped from prison. When the policeman found the
fugitive, the fugitive was armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. The
policeman demanded the surrender of the fugitive. The fugitive lunged at the policeman with his
bamboo lance. The policeman dodged the lance and fired his revolver at the fugitive. The policeman
missed. The fugitive ran away still holding the bamboo lance. The policeman pursued the fugitive and
again fired his revolver, hitting and killing the fugitive. The Court acquitted the policeman on the
ground that the killing was done in the fulfillment of duty.

“The fugitive’s unlawful aggression in People v. Delima had already ceased when the policeman killed
him. The fugitive was running away from the policeman when he was shot. If the policeman were a
private person, not in the performance of duty, there would be no self-defense because there would
be no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. It may even appear that the public officer
acting in the fulfillment of duty is the aggressor, but his aggression is not unlawful, it being necessary
to fulfill his duty.”

Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 120744-46

Main Point:
Mistake of fact rests on the inquiry into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all
to the belief or state of mind of any other person. It also requires that (a) that the mistake be honest
and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit
the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element
of the offense.
Facts:
The accused-petitioners were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the
Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, barangay captains of Quebiawan and De, Carmen members of
the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del
Carmen and Telebastagan. They allegedly received information concerning a reported presence of
armed NPA members in Quebiawan. It was so unfortunate that the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the
victims would make an inevitable turn to which the accused all await. Believing that the victims were
the armed NPA members, the accused opened fire to the passengers of the said Tamaraw. Such
shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga caused the
death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder. Upon conviction, Yapyuco
disputed that he cannot be exonerated since he responded to the scene in fulfillment of his duty as a
member of the police force and he invoked mistake of fact as caused by his co-accused in the belief
that the victims are members of the NPA.
Issue 1:
Whether the principle of Mistake of Fact is applicable in the instant case.
Issue 2:
Whether the petitioner can be award with the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of a right or office.
Answer 1:
No, the principle of Mistake of fact is not applicable. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is
a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the
subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime
where it negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged
requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it
does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this
defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c)
that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which
the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. In the present case, he relied merely
on the statement of his co-accused therefore it cannot be invoked
Answer 2:
No, he cannot be awarded of the justifying circumstance. The said justifying circumstance rests on
proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or
office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the present case, their duty
is supposed to be the validation of the information that they received and not to immediately fire at the
victims. Bloodless arrest can even be achieved when they have validated the information. Failing to
meet the requisites, the petitioner cannot be award of the justifying circumstance.

Conclusion:
Yapyuco who merely relied on the statement of his co-accused cannot invoked mistake of fact since it
needs to be a personal belief and not the belief of others.

PEOPLE VS. GENOSA
“Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression,
there can be no self-defense – complete of incomplete – on the part of the victim.”

FACTS:
Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
Ben, a habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke her, slap her, pin her down on the
bed or beat her. These incidents happened several times and Marivic would often run home to her
parents. She had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile.
On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then eight months pregnant, and the victim quarreled.
The latter beat her, however, she was able to run to another room. Allegedly there was no
provocation on her part when she got home that night, and it was her husband who began the
provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting to make sure she would deliver
her baby safely, appellant admitted having killed the victim, who was then sleeping at the time, with
the use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts opined that Marivic fits the
profile of a battered woman syndrome and at the time she killed her husband, her mental condition
was that she was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the imprint of all the abuses that she had
experienced in the past.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as constituting self-
defense;

2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

RULING:
No, the Court ruled in the negative on both issues.

1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner; (b)
the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life; and (c) at the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused, based on
the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly established. Here, there was
a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In
fact, she had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the reality or even imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. Ben was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her
life or safety.

2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously
and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from
any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. Here, there is no showing that appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself
from any retaliatory act that he might make. It appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to
her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her
favor.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010

Facts:

After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused
for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The
CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan
filed the present for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time
before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Dabalos vs. Regional Trial Court,

G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013

Ponente: Justice Perlas-Bernabe

Petition: Petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders of the RTC which denied
petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information.
Topics: Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus

Doctrines and Provisions:

Republic Act No. 9262: Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act

Doctrine: When the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts- The limitations of the law
should only be set by itself.

Facts:

 July 13, 2009, The complainant sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the
latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading
rumors about her which he admitted. She then slapped the petitioner, who did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her
hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading
the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
 November 19, 2009, RTC issued warrant of arrest for the petitioner.
 Petitioner posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty
 August 12, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with
Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on
July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA
9262 was inapplicable.
 RTC ruled against the petitioner; It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a
prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence
against women and their children.

Issues and Holdings:

1. Whether or not petitioner is liable under RA 9262, given that the said violence occurred not
because of the relationship between the petitioner and the complainant.

The petitioner is liable under RA 9262. it is not indispensable that the act of violence be
a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred.
Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all
acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.

Ruling:

The petition is DISMISSED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 193707. December 10, 2014.
*

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her
minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,
petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, respondent.
G.R. No. 193707. December 10, 2014.
*

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her
minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,
petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, respondent.

FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with
a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came
home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to
their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave
support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines
particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The
trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.
RULING:
1.
YES.
While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the
RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In
the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto
2.
YES.
The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
Philippines and committed the offense here.