ARTICLE 8 – CONSPIRACY

G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMY EVASCO Y NUGAY AND ERNESTO
ECLAVIA, Accused.
JIMMY EVASCO Y NUGAY, Accused-Appellant.

For the killing of Wilfredo Sasot, Jimmy, along with Ernesto Eclavia (Ernesto), was indicted
for murder

witness Lorna Sasot (Lorna) went to the house of their neighbor, one Armando Braga
(Armando), to fetch her husband, Wilfredo Sasot (Wilfredo).
When Lorna arrived at Armando's house, she saw Ernesto boxing Wilfredo. Thereafter, she
saw Jimmy hit Wilfredo's head with a stone. As a result, Wilfredo fell to the ground with his
face up.
While Wilfredo was still on the ground, Jimmy continuously hit him with a stone and
Ernesto was boxing Wilfredo's body.
After mauling Wilfredo, Jimmy and Ernesto walked away together.
Subsequently, Lorna brought Wilfredo to the hospital and was pronounced dead-on-arrival.

Witness Joan Fernandez (Joan) corroborated the testimony of Lorna. She alleged that she
was standing for about four meters from the accused when the incident happened.
Wilfredo was standing when Jimmy and Ernesto mauled him. In particular, she stated,
"[s]inusuntok po saka iyong bato pinupukpuk po sa ulo ni Wilfredo Sasot."

After trial, the RTC convicted Jimmy, concluding that the Prosecution's witnesses were
credible as they did not have any ill-motive to impute a heinous crime against Jimmy unless
the imputation was true; that Jimmy and his co-accused had conspired to kill Wilfredo as
borne out by their concerted actions in assaulting the latter; that the killing of Wilfredo had
been treacherous and attended with abuse of superior strength; and that the attendance of
evident premeditation was ruled out.

CA affirmed the conviction of Jimmy. It concurred with the disquisition of the RTC, except
that it declared that treachery was not attendant. It concluded that Jimmy had committed
murder because he and Ernesto abused their superior strength in killing the victim and in
preventing the latter from fleeing. The fallo reads:

Jimmy argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction for murder considering that the
RTC gravely erred in finding that conspiracy had existed between him and Ernesto because
there was no direct evidence to prove the conspiracy, but only circumstantial evidence

ISSUE: WON the acts of jimmy and Ernesto establish conspiracy between them.
Ruling: YES.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it.9 Conspiracy must be established, not by
conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence, direct or circumstantial.

Jimmy and Ernesto were shown to have acted in conspiracy when they assaulted Wilfredo.
Although their agreement concerning the commission of the felony, and their decision to
commit it were not established by direct evidence, the records contained clear and firm
showing of their having acted in concert to achieve a common design – that of assaulting
Wilfredo. Direct proof of the agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and of the
decision to commit it is not always accessible, but that should not be a hindrance to
rendering a finding of implied conspiracy.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form,
which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the
crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon.

Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when
two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperativ e, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the
mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a
concert of action and a community of interest.

Indeed, when it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy could be
inferred although no actual meeting among them is proved.12

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 227748, June 19, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. EDDIE VERONA, ACCUSED,

EFREN VERONA AND EDWIN VERONA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
Facts: , Romeo Ortega (Ortega) was driving his passenger jeepney known as "Valizing"
along the highway in Barangay Guingauan, Tanauan, Leyte. had Manuel [Tingoy] as
conductor

Dioscoro and Eddie flagged down the jeepney and Ortega stopped to let them aboard.
Suddenly Edgar, who was then standing on the left side of the jeepney, tried to stab Ortega
with a "pisao" (short bolo). However, it was the right hand of Arlene Yepes, the passenger
seated on the left side of Ortega

Ortega knew Edgar as the conductor of "7 Brothers," a competitor transportation company
plying the same route - Burauen Tacloban City.

As the "Valizing" left, Eva Castañ o, who was then riding a motorcycle twelve meters behind
the said jeepney saw Dioscoro, Eddie, Edwin, Edgar and Efren all carrying bolos.

Dioscoro, Eddie and Edwin carried long bolos, about 70 em. in length,
while Edgar and Efren carried short bolos, about 33-34 em. in length

Manuel, the conductor, was then holding on with both hands on the "Valizing" and was
standing on its rear step board.

Suddenly, Efren and Eddie stabbed Manuel at the back, causing the latter to fall on the
ground.

As Manuel lay flat on the ground, Edwin hacked Manuel on the head and many times on the
body.

Edgar also hacked Manuel.

Dioscoro was seen holding a bolo as he stood near Manuel.

ISSUE: Whether or not Eddie (at large), Efren, and Edwin are guilty of the crime of murder
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: YES.

As for the issue of conspiracy, Efren and Edwin alleged in their Brief that "the facts of the
case were wanting of any overt acts that are reflective of any conspiracy amongst the five
accused."25 However, in the same Brief, Efren and Edwin cited the direct testimony of Eva
Castañ o which revealed that "after the victim was first stabbed at the back by accused-
appellant Efren, the other accused Edwin did the hacking thrust, followed by Edgar; while
the other two accused, Dioscoro and Eddie, were merely described xxx as being there
carrying a weapon."26

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced
from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime charged,
from which it may be indicated that there is common purpose to commit the crime.27

In this case, the hacking acts of Efren and Edwin, when taken together with the stabbing act
of Efren, reveal a commonality and unity of criminal design. The defense cannot aver
that Dioscoro and Eddie's mere act of carrying a weapon is not an overt act reflective of
conspiracy because clearly, such act is in line with the crime of murder. Regardless of the
extent and character of Dioscoro and Eddie's respective active participation, once
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals. The act of one is the
act of all.28

G.R. No. 175926               July 6, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA, Accused-Appellants.

Case: two counts of murder (salgo and pilar red) and one count of frustrated murder
(montecalvo dalida)

When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m.,6 they alighted from their vehicles
and surrounded Milan’s house. SPO1 Montecalvo’s group went to the left side of the house,
while SPO2 Red’s group proceeded to the right. The two groups eventually met at the back
of the house near Milan’s room. The door to Milan’s room was open, enabling the police
officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the persons
inside the room would not put up a fight, making them confident that nothing violent
would erupt. However, when the group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan
immediately shut the door.7

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them
inside the room. PO2 Alonzo shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the
suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to return fire and
were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right
behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when Carandang shot and
hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan,
"Sugurin mo na!" Milan lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his
gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out.8

Trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy in the
commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was Carandang
who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused
were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court explained that
Carandang, Milan and Chua’s actuations showed that they acted in concert against
the police officers.

the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the Decision of the trial
court:

ISSUE: WON THERE IS CONSPIRACY AMING THE APPELANTS

Ruling:

The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy in the
commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was Carandang
who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused
were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court explained that
Carandang, Milan and Chua’s actuations showed that they acted in concert against the
police officers. The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision reads:
Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room of Milan. Upon arrival of police officers
Red, Alonzo and the others and having identified themselves as police officers, the door
was closed and after Alonzo and Red pushed it open and as Alonzo shouted, "walang
gagalaw," immediately shots rang out from inside the room, felling Alonzo, then Red, then
Montecalvo. Chua was heard by Estores to shout to Milan: "Sugurin mo na" (tsn, October
16, 2001, page 8). And as Milan lunged at Montecalvo, the latter shot him.

That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from their actuations.
First, when they learned of the presence of the police officers, they closed the door.
Not one of them came out to talk peacefully with the police officers.
Instead, Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance to
touch their firearms at that instant.31
 In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on the acts of Milan
and Chua showing that they acted in concert with Carandang, to wit:
In the present case, when appellants were alerted of the presence of the police
officers, Milan immediately closed the door. Thereafter, when the police officers
were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with bullets.
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was
mortally wounded. Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and
seriously wounded, Chua ordered Milan to attack the police officers. Following the
order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the latter, however, was able to shoot
him.
At first glance, Milan’s act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution in the
furtherance of the crime. On second look, however, that act actually facilitated the
commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the police officers were
trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants to take strategic positions
which gave them a vantage point in staging their assault

To summarize, Milan’s and Chua’s arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence showing
that they conspired with Carandang during the latter’s act of shooting the three victims.
However, as we have held in People v. Sumalpong, 42 conspiracy may also be proven by
other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual
agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the
commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime,
which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of
participation of each.43
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was
established by their acts
(1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing the door when the police officers
introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and
(2) after the shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan’s
following such instruction).

Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a
principal by inducement, or that Milan’s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made
him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing
circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-
conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.
Appellants’ attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua shouted "sugurin mo na" to
Milan, who then ran towards SPO1 Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1 Estores’s positive
testimony44 on this matter prevails over the plain denials of Milan and Chua. SPO1 Estores
has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April 5, 2001. As part of the team that
was attacked on that day, it could even be expected that he is interested in having only the
real perpetrators punished.

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike
evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a
sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection.
Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the subject felony.47

G.R. No. 195196               July 13, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ESTANLY OCTA y BAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:

Facts: issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 48, Manila, convicting accused-
appellant Estanly Octa y Bas, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom

accused-appellant was arrested by the operatives of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER) on S[u]sano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City, in connection with another
kidnap for ransom incident. He was identified by prosecution witness Ana Marie
Corpuz from a police line-up as the person who had received the ransom money from
her

the RTC rendered a Decision,10 the dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Estanly Octa y Bas guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the felony charge [sic] and pursuant to law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer maximum
prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private aggrieved party of the following:

The CA found the positive identification of accused-appellant by prosecution witness Ana

Marie Corpuz to be unwavering and steadfast. It stressed that his positive identification,
when categorical, consistent, straightforward, and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, would prevail over mere alibi and denial.
ISSUE: WON OCTA SHOULD BE LIABLE

Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in

the absence of concrete proof that he actually participated in the execution of the essential elements
of the crime by overt acts indispensable to its accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money
transpired only after the kidnapping had been consummated and was not an essential
element of the crime.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.1awp++i1 Where all the accused acted in
concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they
had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy
is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts
with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit
the felony.
xxxx
Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. x x x.
xxxx
Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused-
appellant was the one who received the ransom money x x x then the commonality of
purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the other accused can no longer be
denied. Such acts have the common design or purpose to commit the felony of kidnapping
for ransom.

Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a

principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267
of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659 x x x.32 (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant received
the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were
still being illegally detained by the kidnappers.33 While his receipt of the ransom money
was not a material element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was
in fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims.34 Ransom is money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person or persons; or
payment that releases from captivity.35 Without ransom money, the freedom of the
detained victims cannot be achieved. The positive identification of accused-appellant
constitutes direct, and not merely circumstantial, evidence.
Accused-appellant's contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial
evidence deserves scant consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that
"[Corpuz] testified that she gave the ransom money to accused-appellant, and as the trial
court declared, his act of receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in the
commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive identification of the accused-
appellant then constitutes direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial evidence."36

G.R. No. 196735               May 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN
L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

Some of the members ran but Venturino was seen lying on ground and being attached
by appellant felicano JR. Vecturino died of head traumatic injuries. Lachica, Natalicio,
Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their respective affidavits before the National
Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal examinations. These injuries required
medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of
infliction.79

Zimpangan and Soliva recognized.

Fats: December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library
of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked
men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An information1 for
murder, was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity.

According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around
when Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.

According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when
Venturina shouted and saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them
wore pieces of cloth around their heads.32 He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men,
whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead
pipes.33 While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle
Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded
his attackers and ran to the Main Library.35 He then decided that he needed to help his
fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House.36 There, he saw Venturina lying
on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while
Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.38 When they saw him, they went toward his
direction.39 They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were
coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.40
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of
attackers coming toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting
Venturina.58 He was also able to see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a
jeepney to the College of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers.60 One of his
fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that he received information that members of
Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM
North.61 Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and
identify their attackers.62

On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their
respective affidavits76 before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-
legal examinations77 with their medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr.
Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above
the left ear, and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion on the left leg
and thigh,"78 all of which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries
required medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date
of infliction.79

The trial court rendered its decision100 with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among
other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.101 The trial court, however, acquitted
Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund
Narag.102
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the
murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate
court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty
of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang,
Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer
chased by the attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from
pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the
intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them."158 It also
pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an
intent to kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight
physical injuries.

ISSUE: WON SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the
accused-appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless
of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons
unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to
the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own,
"when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." he imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that

... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in
view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the
actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x
x x.  (Emphasis supplied)
162

The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein
the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to
do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and
take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill
was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the
accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore,
immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to
determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether
the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight
physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and
suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and
Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill
was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them
were liable for that intent to kill.1âwphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina
and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica,
Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

G.R. No. 230778

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JUAN CREDO y DE VERGARA and DANIEL CREDO y DE VERGARA, Accused-Appellant

Facts: Juan and Daniel (collectively, accused-appellants) were charged with murder and
frustrated murder. The two separate Information 

According to the prosecution witnesses, Spouses Antonio Asistin (Antonio) and Evangeline
Asistin (Evangeline) operated a computer shop. Juan and Daniel were nephews of
Evangeline.

Daniel, an assistant at the computer shop, entertained male customers who wanted to rent
tapes.

Evangeline then told them that if they are not from the area, they could just buy the tapes.
Evangeline went back to the table and continued eating her lunch. 15
When Evangeline stood up to get water from the refrigerator, Daniel and the two
unidentified men suddenly appeared. One of the unidentified men strangled her. She then
sustained eight stab wounds.

Once the two unidentified men left, Evangeline stood up and saw Antonio standing at the
gate with several stab wounds. Upon seeing Antonio, Evangeline told Daniel to chase the
two men who had just left. According to Evangeline, Daniel did not help her and even
watched while she was being stabbed. He did not go out to chase the two men.  

Evangeline and Rufo Baguio (Baguio), a neighbor, allegedly saw Daniel carry Antonio
about two feet from the ground and then drop him, causing his head to hit the
ground. 19 A few minutes later, Antonio was carried to the vehicle of a neighbor while
Evangeline took a tricycle with neighbor Roy Bischotso to the hospital. 20 Antonio was
declared dead on arrival.

prosecution witness Reynante Ganal (Ganal) testified that he was outside Spouses Asistin's
residence when he saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other in a vacant room together
with three other male companions. Although he was merely four arms-length away, he
did not hear the conversation of the group. 27 Juan came up to him and asked how much
he was renting his place.28 A few minutes later, while he was preparing to take a bath,
he saw Juan walking with an unidentified person. 29 Juan asked permission to urinate at
the back of the house.30 Thereafter, someone shouted "nasaksak sila tatay at nanay."
Then, his sister-in-law told him that two persons climbed the fence. 31
a follow-up operation was conducted by the police led by Police Officer 2 (PO2) Victorio B.
Guerrero (PO2 Guererro) after Daniel allegedly implicated his brother Juan to the crime.
The operation resulted to the arrest of Juan at his rented room. In his sworn statement, PO2
Guerrero alleged that Juan was nabbed while stashing in his bag a homemade shot gun
(sumpak). The bag also contained clothing, two live ammunitions for shotgun and a fan
knife measuring approximately seven inches long. He was allegedly in the process of
absconding when he was apprehended. 34

RTC= finding the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and frustrated murder.

CA- AFFIRMED RTC.

Evangeline admitted that neither Daniel nor Juan stabbed her and that she did not see Juan
during the incident.60 Their complicity was merely based on circumstantial evidence,
having been allegedly seen near the residence of Spouses Asistin, talking to strangers,
before the incident took place. The prosecution witnesses admitted to not knowing nor
hearing what Daniel, Juan, and the other men were discussing. They also admitted not
seeing who killed Antonio.61

As We have held in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,62 to wit:

xxxx
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by
conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form,
which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the
crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon.
Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when
two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the
mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of crime indubitably pointing to a joint
purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to
have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the
conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-
conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own
acts. 63 (Citations omitted; emphasis ours)

In this case, We find that the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof of concerted
action before, during, and after the commission of the crime which would demonstrate
accused-appellants' unity of design and objective. There is no direct proof nor reliable
circumstantial evidence establishing that Juan and Daniel conspired with the unidentified
men who stabbed Spouses Asistin.

The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution - testimonies of Baguio and

Ganal claiming that they saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other moments before the
crimes were committed do not prove conspiracy

Baguio and Ganal insisted seeing three (3) unidentified men and Juan enter the house of
Spouses Asistin. However, neither of the witnesses could confirm to the Court that these
men were the same men who stabbed Spouses Asistin nor could they confirm that they
heared their conversation. Furthermore, the claim of Baguio and Ganal that three (3)
unidentified men entered the house of Spouses Asistin contradicts the statement of
Evangeline that only two (2) unidentified men were allowed by Daniel to enter their
house, 64 and that she did not see Juan.65
While it may be true that Daniel acted differently from what was expected of him in the
given situation, We cannot fault him for reacting the way he did. We have held that
"different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or
frightful experience

Interestingly, the claim ofEvangeline73 and Baguio74that Daniel carried Antonio and

suddenly dropped him, causing the latter to sustain a head injury, is belied by the Medico-
legal Report. The report did not indicate that Antonio sustained any head injury at the time
of his death. 75 Moreover, this assertion contradicts Evangeline's other claim that Daniel did
not assist nor come to their aid after the stabbing incident. Considering that she and Baguio
admitted seeing Daniel carrying Antonio, We find no other reasonable explanation for him
to carry Antonio at that moment other than to come to the aid of Antonio.
It is also contrary to ordinary human experience to remain at the crime scene after the
victims were brought to the hospital. One who is guilty would have immediately fled the
scene of the crime to avoid being arrested by the authorities. If Daniel really conspired with
the two unidentified men, he would have done acts that would consummate the crime and
he would have escaped to avoid being identified. A person with a criminal mind would have
ensured Evangeline's death and immediately fled the scene of the crime

G.R. No. 187536               August 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-
Appellants

Facts:

Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front
door, passed by him and went out of the back door.7 A few minutes later, he heard a
commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He peeped
through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing
Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a
hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio
bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio
but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was
told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3.
Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen
floor.

TOLD:

Elsa testified that she was in the master’s bedroom on the second floor of the house when
she heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans. She immediately got off the bed and
went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way

BLOCKED BY RENATO COL AND SPRAYED TEAR GAS ON HER EYES. Col then instructed her
to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the
combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door
by holding her neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw
Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na siya."10 Col
immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3.
Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.11

An Information3 was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of murder.

the trial court rendered judgment20 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, viz:

In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial
court but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 and called the appellate court’s attention on
the omission to rule on Bokingco’s fate when it rendered the challenged decision.
Appellants also noted the absence of other evidence, aside from Bokingco’s admission, to
prove that conspiracy existed in the instant case.

The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of
Bokingco in its dispositive portion

ISSUE: WON COL SHOULD BE CHARGED AS A CO-CONSPIRATOR FOR THE DEATH OF NOLI
PASION

RULING:

in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is
necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.42 Unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the
existence of conspiracy.

As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. 44
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco
in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which
was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on
motion of the prosecution, for murder.47
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that
they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the
consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes
committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the
crimes they separately committed.

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already
killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while
Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the
pawnshop.

G.R. No. 132895             March 10, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, appellants.

Facts: ("Castillo") and Evangeline Padayhag ("Padayhag") guilty of Qualified Kidnapping

and Serious Illegal Detention2 and sentencing them to death.

The Information3 charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda Wenceslao with the crime of
kidnapping.

prosecution’s version of the incident in the appellee’s brief, as follows:

On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of Mr. and
Mrs. Luis De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F. Parañ aque, Metro
Manila.

In the morning of said date, Femie, another housemaid of the Cebreros’ and Baria’s relative,
bathed and dressed up Rocky, the couple’s six year old son and afterwards advised Baria
that someone, who was also a Cebrero househelper, will fetch Rocky (p. 28, supra). At about
8:00 a.m., a tricycle arrived. On board was a woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and
who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag. The three proceeded to a house far from the
"Mcdonald’s" They went to a nearby Mcdonalds. Luis, the father, was informed that Rocky
did not go to school. He then received a phone call from a woman saying “ang atm o bata”.
They kidnappers then asked for 1m but luis did not have that kind of amount, hence, it was
reduced to 400,000. and instructed Luis Cebrero to be in Paco, Obando, Bulacan, alone, at
about 2:00 a.m.; hat at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, is a "Farmacia Dilag" and beside it is a street
which Luis must follow until he reaches the church called "Sabadista" where he should
drop the money.
In court, Sgt. Delena pointed to and identified Castillo and Padayhag as the two women he
saw in front of the chapel in Obando, Bulacan and who, later on, picked up the bag dropped
by Luis Cebrero (p. 12, supra).

After trial, Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as charged.

Appellants maintain their innocence and present their own version of the events in their
brief, as follows:

Both the evidence of the prosecution and the defense establish the commission of the
crime.
Castillo admitted she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky on 1 March 1995:

ISSUE: WON PADAYAHANG WAS A CO-CONSPIRATOR

RULING:

There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with
Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and
definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without any space for baseless
suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through.26 
Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.27

Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors:

(1) singularity of intent; and (
2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur.

Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act must be
motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se
sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a common
design.28

Padayhag’s act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillo’s
plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met
Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhag’s boyfriend was sick. It was
precisely on the pretext that they were to visit Padayhag’s boyfriend that the two met.
When they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived her:

After the two spent the day together, Castillo beseeched Padayhag to fetch Rocky citing as
reason her love for the child and a desire to spend time with the boy. Padayhag is a young
lass from the province who only finished Grade Two. Padayhag was thus easily misled by
the more worldly Castillo. Padayhag’s testimony reveals her naiveté (did not know 12
months in a year)

It is clear that she acted with the full belief that Castillo was doing nothing wrong.
Whatever moved her to do what Castillo asked of her is up for speculation. What matters is
that her motivation in fetching Rocky was not to kidnap the boy. To impose criminal
liability, the law requires that there be intentional participation in the criminal act,32 not the
unwitting cooperation of a deceived individual.
In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the liability of an individual as a
conspirator should focus on all acts before, during and after the commission of the
crime.33 We have done precisely that, and it is precisely why we rule for her innocence.
After her stroll with Castillo and Rocky, she left when Castillo brought the boy to her
sister’s house in Caloocan.34 She never visited nor contacted Castillo afterwards. She
remained at her house and refused to go with Castillo when the latter suddenly tried to
coax her to go to Dipolog. None of the money used as ransom was found in her possession.
Her involvement in the "pay-off" was never established. The testimony of two prosecution
witnesses, Sgt. De Lena and Sgt. Iglesias, claiming that Padayhag was with when the
latter picked up the ransom in Obando, is contradicted by Castillo’s admission in
open court that she brought along a certain "Mila" and not Padayhag.35 In addition, the
testimonies of these two police officers suffer from their failure to explain how they
suddenly lost track of the two women who took the ransom in front of their very eyes.

All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy.

G.R. No. 220598

GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First
Division), Respondents
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN,, J.:
Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed
to prove the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of
the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public
treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the State did not
prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the charge; that to sustain the case for
malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the
accusation against her because the information did not necessarily include the crime of
malversation; and that even if the information did so, the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.

Ruling: Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the
decision imposed additional elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor
jurisprudence had theretofore required, i.e.,  the identification of the main plunderer, and
personal benefit on the part of the accused committing the predicate crime of raid on the
public treasury. The State complains that it was not given the opportunity to establish such
additional elements; that the imposition of new elements fu1iher amounted to judicial
legislation in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; that the Court nitpicked on
the different infirmities of the information despite the issue revolving only around the
sufficiency of the evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond
reasonable doubt.

The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal
benefit in the predicate act of raids on the public treasury have been written in R.A.
No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear
in the decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was
an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of
their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable
that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was
by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the
one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly
states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described
in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-
conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other persons. In other words,
the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner.
Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact
must be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution .

This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,  where the Court

explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main
plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and acquisition was
made, thus:

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in
material damage to the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold
network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be
united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their
different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended
Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each
accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each
misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the
GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from
such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. 5 [bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis]

Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing,
accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least ₱50,000,000.00, the identification in the information of such public official as the main
plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the law
itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals
charged therein - including the petitioners - were 10 public officials; hence, it was only
proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or
himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at
least ₱50,000,000.00.
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself
ambiguous. In order to ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the
public treasury cannot be divided into parts.

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to
look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion,
misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim
of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which
the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in
a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning
may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.

Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation

and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the
maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.7

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury  beyond
reasonable doubt. 8
Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence,
particularly the different irregularities committed in the disbursement of the PCSO
funds, i.e., the commingling of funds, the non-compliance with LOI No. 1282, and the
unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such totality, coupled with the fact of the
petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public funds, showed the
existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused.

The contention lacks basis.

We need not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to
stress that the Prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of plunder - that any or all
of the accused public officials, particularly petitioner Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or
acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court
did not engage in purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary task of
determining the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State against the petitioners.
What the Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what would have been
relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus enable itself to discern and
determine whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or not. In fact, the Court
categorically clarified that in discussing the essential need for the identification of the main
plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but was only enabling
itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that unequivocally showed petitioner
Arroyo as the "mastermind" - which was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her
participation - in the context of the implied conspiracy alleged in the information. But the
search came to naught, for the information contained nothing that averred her commission
of the overt act necessary to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime
of plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient
incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. Hence, the Sandiganbayan capriciously and
oppressively denied their demurrers to evidence.

G.R. No. 145927               August 24, 2007

SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS, 1 Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts:

Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas was convicted of multiple instances of estafa
through falsification of public documents; 5 and the subsequent August 29, 2000 SB Resolution which
denied their separate pleas for reconsideration. Petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH
assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District

On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. of COA Regional Office No.
7, directed auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit a
report on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway engineering districts.
One set consists of regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices
and were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina Escañ o, Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office.
The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly recorded in the logbook of the
Accounting, Budget and Finance Division. The other set consists of fake LAAs which do not
indicate the covering sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat and Engr. Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer. These fake LAAs were not
numbered in proper sequence; they were mostly undated and were sometimes duplicated.
They could not be traced to the files and records of the Accounting, Budget and Finance
Division. The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fake LAAs was debited
to the Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and credited to the Checking
Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790)

Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos created a Special Cabinet
Committee on MPH Region VII "Ghost Projects Anomalies" which in turn organized a
Special Task Force composed of representatives from the Finance Ministry Intelligence
Bureau (FMIB), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and the
Commission on Audit.

A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the
district level.
On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by heads of agencies, the then
Ministry of Budget released funds to the various agencies of the government by means of
an Advice of Allotment (AA) - authority for the agency to incur obligations within a
specified amount in accordance with approved programs and projects and a Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (CDC)- Th is an authority to pay.

Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Budget, the Central Office of the agency prepares
the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
(ACDC) for each region, in accordance with the disbursement allotment. These are
sent to the Regional Office. Upon receipt, the Budget Officer of the region prepares the
corresponding Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the various
districts of the region (The amount that goes to each district is already indicated in the
Advice of Allotment). Only upon receipt of the LAA is the district office authorized to incur
obligations.

How are funds released by the Regional Office to the different districts and ultimately paid
out to contractors?

This procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and Equipment
(RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer, approved by the District Engineer,
and signed by the Chief Accountant of the Highway Engineering District, who certifies as to
the availability of funds. The RSE is then submitted to the Regional Director for approval.
Once it is approved, a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) is prepared by the Chief
Accountant of the district Senior Civil Engineer.

The ROA signifies that a certain amount of district funds has been set aside or earmarked
for the particular expenditures stated in the RSE. On the basis of the ROA, the District Office
puts up advertisements, [conducts] biddings, makes awards and prepares purchase orders
which are served on the winning bidder. The District Office also prepares a summary of
deliveries with the corresponding delivery receipts and tally sheets, conducts inspection
and prepares the General Voucher for the payment of deliveries.

Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared, the corresponding check in the
form of a Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the Disbursing
Officer and finally released to the contractor . At the end of every month, the Report of
Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared, listing all the checks
issued during that period. The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting division of the
region. the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared,
listing all the checks issued during that period. The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting
division of the region.

Upon receipt of the RCIDDO, the Regional Office draws a journal voucher, debiting
the account obligation (liquidated or unliquidated obligation, whichever is
applicable), and crediting the account Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA).
The RCIDDO is recorded in the Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing
Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger at the end of each month.

Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the ROAs are summarized in the Reports
of Obligations Incurred (ROI) in the District Office, once or twice a month, depending
upon the volume of transactions. The ROI is then submitted to the Regional Office.
Upon receipt of the ROI, the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal voucher

Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII, met at
the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off
large sums of money from government coffers. Mangubat had found a way to withdraw
government money through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other documents and to
conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and employees.

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him
carry out his plan. They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took
charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount.

Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General
Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.
 The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were generally not signed by the
Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of accounts. Disbursements made on the
basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-
81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the
unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year. To
conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 and the excess
of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments were
prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account
8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies
Account 8-70-790. These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to
record the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government employees,
tempted by the prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed
spurious documents.

Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977 to June 1978), the
PNB and Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the illegal
operations.

The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and
Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were
accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found
guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On the basis of her
testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions were obtained,
and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused.

Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880,
2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of
deliveries of materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of
general vouchers. Fund releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based
on these general vouchers.

ISSUE:

The honorable sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners as co-conspirators despite

the prosecution’s failure to specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts and
circumstances that would implicate them as co-conspirators and justify their conviction.

RULING:
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets
and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and
other related documents which became part of the supporting documents that led to the
issuance of general vouchers and eventually the disbursement of public funds.29 The tally
sheets are statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of
materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on
supposed project sites on given dates at specific places.
As a result of petitioners’ signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other supporting documents—which
became the basis for payment to suppliers—public funds were released via general
vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not make any
deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs.
The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road construction and maintenance
materials in support of projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by the
testimonies of the various barangay captains and residents of the barangay who were
supposed to be benefited by the construction and repair activities of the Cebu First
Highway Engineering District. The testimonies of these barangay captains and residents
are summarized as follows:30

These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to genuine LAAs. Ergo, there were
no actual deliveries of supplies and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in
Region VII, which were the subjects of the criminal cases where petitioners were charged.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential elements
of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents were present. There is no
question that petitioners, at the time of the commission of the crime, were public officers—
civil engineers—assigned to the MPH. Their signing of tally sheets and related documents
pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and construction constitutes
intervention and/or taking advantage of their official positions, especially considering that
they had the duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the
documents and the statements contained in them.
The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts which the
petitioners had the duty to verify and confirm. These tally sheets were attached as
supporting documents to fake LAAs and subsequently became the bases for the
disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of the government. Indubitably,
there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners’ guilt.
Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the
prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy,
settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. In People v. Pagalasan,
the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary:
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more
persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other,
were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance
of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose.50

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies,

namely:

(1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group
(the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes");
and

(2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other
contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same
way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.51
We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel" conspiracy. The 36
disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government
were controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia
Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II),
who controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the many
spokes of the wheel.

We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice Cipriano A. Del
Rosario, Chairperson of the Third Division, in elaborating the intricate web of conspiracy
among the accused, thus:
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry
out his plan. They typed fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of
negotiating or selling fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido
manipulated the general ledger, journal vouchers and general journal through negative
entries to conceal the illegal disbursements. In the initial report of COA auditors Victoria C.
Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other
anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations:

The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the
group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not
merit any consideration. The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by
petitioners with the other accused, for such requirement, in many cases, would border on
near impossibility. The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts
that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the
objective of the conspiracy. In the case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or
delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for supplies and materials by
petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in siphoning
off government funds. Without such fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering
the supply of materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing
officer for the preparation of checks.

The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the contract to the lowest
bidder. The Purchase Order (PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. Upon
delivery of the supplies and materials, the supplier bills the district office for payment.
Consequently, the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher which must be
accompanied by the following documents:
a. The ROA;
b. The PO;
c. The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations;
d. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and
e. The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier.
After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and the supporting
documents, the disbursing officer shall prepare and draw a check based on said voucher.
The check is countersigned by an officer of the district office and/or the COA Regional
Director based on the amount of the check.
Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher
cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the
payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check
payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated. Thus,
petitioners’ acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable
to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Surely,
there were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the
testimonies of the barangay captains, officials, and residents of the areas where the
materials were allegedly used. More importantly, if there were actual deliveries of
materials made, then there would be no need to fake the LAAs because the suppliers will
have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable profit. As a result, there is
nothing or not much to share with the more than 30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers
would not be too dim-witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they
allegedly supplied. Moreover, the fake delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by
petitioners were linked to the general vouchers upon which check payments were made to
the suppliers who were found guilty of participating in the fraud. With respect to petitioner
Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and
Ismael Sabio, Jr. On the part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and
delivery receipts on supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V. Nuñ ez, Juliana de los Angeles,
Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel Mascardo. Lastly, the checks issued to these suppliers based
on general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general vouchers signed by
petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine LAAs, resulting in the inescapable conclusion
that these LAAs were unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated. These are undisputed tell-
tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate.
In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu highway scam
in a trenchant manner:
Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the
desistance of even one of them would prevent the chain from being completed, then no
conspiracy could result as its consummation would then be impossible or aborted. But
when each and everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their assigned tasks
and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy, by individually performing essential
overt acts, so much so that the common objective is attained, which is to secure the illegal
release of public funds under the guise of fake or simulated public documents, then each
and everyone of said accused are equally liable as co-principals under the well-established
and universally-accepted principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven,
the act of one is the act of all and such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in
every detail in the execution of the offense.54
In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy
among the accused including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be
sustained.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December 4, 1997 Decision of the SB
in the consolidated criminal cases subject of this petition

ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for
including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended
Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of
R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing
multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos
regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and
his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with
the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former
President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing laws
such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special
laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different
personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate
case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and
graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but
eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically
the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was
enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory
Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and
economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru
a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time,
that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and
territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve
simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but
constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus,
the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the
depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to
succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material
damage to the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of
crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a
common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts
have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different
participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge,
therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal
gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused
ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions
from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the
elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For
example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is committed when, in time of war,
two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to
adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. 48 The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the
Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the
offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the
government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the
offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements
must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not
charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the
case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged

The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the
accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of
the degree of their participation in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, 50 for
the act of one is the act of all.

In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the

offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set
forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the
accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such
fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of
conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted
from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an
allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an
accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such
person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty
with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and
can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of
secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313
SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy
or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with
as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.

It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient if it follows the words of the
statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged
with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining
them.

Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant
the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually
pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to
commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose
or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the
absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase
"acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive
acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of
purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such
as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms  or  by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not
just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a
matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that
may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the
evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may
be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
x x x           x x x          x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege
conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: 

(1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude, etc;53 or
 (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of
common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would
enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts.54

The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by
evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or
design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually
pursue it.55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.

In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in
general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder.  It used the words "in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words
are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder.

G.R. No. 189833               February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.

Facts: Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan
(Dequilla) were charged for illegal transport5 of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
commonly known as shabu,

Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure16 to substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information itself
failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement "the above-named accused,
one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who
all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they all help one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy
was only inferred from the words used in the Information.17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this
point, is deemed to have been waived due to Morilla’s failure to assert it as a ground in a
motion to quash before entering his plea.18
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to
contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or
neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.19
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.20 To determine conspiracy, there must be a
common design to commit a felony.21

Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended
is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs.

This argument is misplaced.

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed
in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole.22 In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion
that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the
dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on
convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up
by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he
was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules
scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed
he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police
officers that he was with the mayor.

His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just
obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle
likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting
the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous
Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another."23 It was well established
during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who
was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law.
The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.24
G.R. No. 168852           September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION

Petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known
as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the

Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-
in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing

that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof
aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on
the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered
as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law " expressio unius est
exclusio alterius."13