7.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO LIAD and JUN VALDERAMA

335 SCRA 11, March 22, 2001, 1st Div., Kapunan, J.

FACTS:

On February 28, 1996, at around 7:00 pm, Liad and Valderama, wilfully and unlawfully assault
Lydia Dy-Cuenca. The accused pursuant to their conspiracy, flagged down the victim’s vehicle.
However, when the latter refused to open her car, they fired two successive shots at the
windshield, hitting the victim, which was the cause of her death. After that, the accused boarded
the same vehicle but abandoned it later upon robbing money and valuable items belonging to the
victim. As soon as the police were informed about the incident, they went to the compound
where the perpetrators were said to be sited. There, they had an encounter with the latter.

Besides robbery with homicide, accused-appellants were also charged with illegal possession of
firearm. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty and offered denial as their defense.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not conspiracy exists in the commission of the crime
2. Whether or not the accused-appellants should be convicted of robbery with homicide
3. Whether or not they are guilty of illegal possession of firearms

HELD:

The Court finds that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
conspiracy. In this case, there were several circumstances immediately before, during and after
the robbery which show that the perpetrators were one in their purpose to rob the victim.

Moreover, SC held that the accused-appellants are guilty of robbery with homicide. Whenever
homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the
homicide.

Regarding illegal possession of firearm, accused-appellants were acquitted for insufficiency of

evidence. The prosecution failed to prove that the paltik, a homemade gun, should have
corresponding license or permit to possess.
33. People v. Valdez

159 SCRA 153/25 March 1988

Accused: Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio

Decision by J. Feliciano, Digest by Roe Anuncio

Short Version: Valdez and Orodio were charged with and convicted by the trial court of murder,
thereby being sentenced to death. On automatic review, the SC discussed the argument of the
OSG that the guilt of Orodio was not proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution
because conspiracy was not sufficiently proven, it only having been alleged that he was seen
running away with Valdez after the gunshot. SC confirms the guilt of Orodio, taking into account
all the circumstances enumerated below.

Facts: Eleno Maquiling was having dinner with his family at their house when he was shot to
death. Witnesses thereafter saw Valdez and Orodio running away from the bushes outside the
house, Valdez carrying a shotgun. Valdez and Orodio were charged with and convicted by the
trial court of murder for the shooting of Eleno, thereby being sentenced to death. The case was
brought to the SC for automatic review. The Court discussed the argument put forward by the
OSG that accused-appellant Simplicio Orodio should be acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence
to sustain this conviction either as a principal or an accomplice. According to the OSG, the
prosecution did not adduce any evidence establishing the aforesaid alleged conspiracy between
Valdez and Orodio to commit the crime charged.

Issue: Was there conspiracy? YES.

Ruling: RTC decision affirmed.

Ratio: Circumstances evidencing conspiracy: 1) Orodio was present with Valdez at the time
Eleno Maquiling was killed; 2) he was in the company of a man running with a shotgun, at
approximately 8:00 o'clock in the evening, immediately after the fatal shooting, just outside the
Maquilings house where he had no business being if he were not acting in concert with Danilo
Valdez; 3) he was a close friend (barkada) of the accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the
deceased victim had Identified as probably responsible should any untoward event befall the
victim; 4) Orodio completely failed to explain what he was doing with Danilo Valdez the night
of the killing; 5) both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio pleaded the same alibi. Their
common alibi remained uncorroborated. The prosecution had adequately proven the conspiracy.

Both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-conspirators since any act of a co-
conspirator becomes the act of the other regardless of the precise degree of participation in the
act.
People vs. Pagalasan, et. Al

G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991. June 18, 2003

Tickler: Kidnap or 3 Handwritten Letters

Facts: Spouses George and Desiree Lim and their three young children, one of whom was 10-
year-old Christopher Neal Lim, resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision, General Santos City.The
spouses hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez. When all of their family was at home, Michael
Pagalasan together with 3 other men wearing bonnets over their faces and armed with handguns
and grenades ransacked their house getting cash and valuables. With them was Ferdinand Cortez,
whose hands were tied behind his back. The masked men kidnapped George and Christopher
using George’s Nissan Car, with Pagalasan as the driver. Before leaving, they gave Desiree a
handwritten note (First Handwritten Letter) warning them not to cooperate with the military, not
to take any action concerning the kidnapping wihtout their consent and made it clear to the
couple that only those communications, whether by letter or by telephone, bearing the name MR.
MUBARAK II or 2 came from them. While in transit, Christopher was transferred to another
place. In the meantime, the police was informed of the kidnapping incident. George was then
rescued during the police check point.

In the custodial investigation, Michael made an extra judicial confession that upon orders of a
certain Ronnie Cabalo, he, Ferdinand Cortez, Boy and Aladin, kidnapped Christopher. In the
light of Michael’s confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo, Ronie Puntuan and Fernando
Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp Fermin Lira Barracks, General Santos City. In the
meantime, on September 6, 1994, George received the second handwritten letter, ordering the
release of Michael and Ronie Puntuan because they were innocent, and demanding P3,000,000
for Christophers release. On Sept. 9, 1994, George received the third handwritten letter,
informing him and his wife that the kidnappers did not want the military to be involved nor
innocent people to be prejudiced. The spouses were also warned that their son would not be
released alive unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in three days. For tunately, Christopher was
rescued by the policemen wihtout any ransom being paid.

MTC: Found probable cause against Michael, together wth the other accused, with kidnapping
for ransom and violation of PD 1866 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of General Santos
City.

RTC: The Trial court rendered judgment acquitting Ferdinand Cortez and convicting Michael of
kidnapping for ransom

Defense: Michael averred that was forced at gunpoint by Boy and Aladin to barge into the Lim
residence and drive the latters car. Ferdinand Cortez denied kidnapping George and Christopher.

Issue: Was there a conspiracy to kidnap Christopher? Is Pagalasan liable for Kidnap for ransom?
Held: (1) Yes. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. The act must be the ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful acts
specifically agreed on, so that the connection between them may be reasonably apparent, and not
a fresh and independent project of the mind of one of the confederates, outside of or foreign to
the common design, and growing out of the individual malice of the perpetrator.

In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the appellant and his three cohorts
were armed with handguns; two of them had hand grenades, and all of them had masks over their
faces. They gained entry into the Lim residence after overpowering the security guard Ferdinand
and the housemaid Julita, and tying their hands behind their backs. One of the masked men
remained in the sala, while the three others barged into the bedroom of George and Desiree, and
kidnapped George and his ten-year-old son Christopher. The appellant and his cohorts forced
father and son to board Georges car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his
cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the direction of Maasim.

The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his cohorts before, during
and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof that the appellant and his three companions
conspired with each other to attain a common objective: to kidnap George and Christopher and
detain them illegally. The appellant was a principal by direct participation in the kidnapping of
the two victims.

(2) No. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant
conspired with three others to kidnap the victims. However, it failed to prove that they intended
to extort ransom from the victims themselves or from some other person, with a view to
obtaining the latters release. The kidnapping by itself does not give rise to the presumption that
the appellant and his co-conspirators purpose is to extort ransom from the victims or any other
person.

As gleaned from the three letters, there was no demand for ransom in exchange for George and
Christophers liberty. While there is a demand for ransom of P3,000,000 in the second letter, and
a demand for the release of Ronie Puntuan within three days in the third letter, the said demands
are in consideration of Christophers release from custody, and not that of George. The second
letter received by George was signed by an unidentified person. Since there is no evidence that
the signatory and sender of the second letter is a co-conspirator of the appellant, the latter is not
bound by the said letter. Even if it is assumed for the nonce that the second letter came from a
co-conspirator, the same is not binding on the appellant, absent evidence aliunde that he knew of
and concurred with the said ransom demand. Furthermore, the third letter was sent to George on
September 9, 1994. At that point, the appellant had already been arrested by the policemen, and
was already in jail. There is no evidence that while in jail, the appellant had knowledge of and
concurred with the said ransom demand. The said demand for ransom was a new and
independent project of the appellants co-conspirators, growing out of their own malice, without
anya priori knowledge on the part of the appellant or his post facto concurrence therewith.

However, the Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. The appellant is guilty of
slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant and his co-
conspirators were animated by two sets of separate criminal intents and criminal resolutions in
kidnapping and illegally detaining the two victims. The criminal intent in kidnapping
Christopher was separate from and independent of the criminal intent and resolution in
kidnapping and detaining George for less than three days. In the mind and conscience of the
appellant, he had committed two separate felonies; hence, should be meted two separate
penalties for the said crimes: one for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
and another for slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the same code. he felony of slight
illegal detention is necessarily included in the crime of kidnapping for ransom; thus, the
appellant may be convicted of the former crime under an Information for kidnapping for ransom

PP vs Garcia GR 138470

Facts:

 Garcia and Bernabe approached Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator, to borrow his brand
new Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip in Bicol. However,the van was not available so
Cortez contacted Ferdinand Ignacio, who has just purchased a brand new Toyota
Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for 2 days and on the other
hand, Bernabe and Garcia rented it from Cortez inclusive of the latter’s driver, Wilfredo
Elis.
 Four days passed without a word from the accused so Cortez began to worry and
Wilfredo’s wife is already asking where is her husband. Cortez reported the incident to
the brgy. Captain.
 The accused were arrested by the police in Nueva Ecija.
 Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detention. They admitted to him that they
stabbed Elis and dumped him along the highway. They claimed that they were compelled
to eliminate Elis when he refused to join their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. The police
received information that a male cadaver was found. The cadaver was identified as that of
Wilfredo Elis by his wife, Nancy.
 In their defense, Garcia and Bernabe alleged that they agreed to rent the subject vehicle
for a period of five days; that Garcia and Elis had a fight because the latter allegedly did
not want to go with them to Nueva Ecija; that Elis, while driving the Tamaraw FX,
bumped a passenger jeepney along Baliuag Highway; that they left Elis along the Baliuag
Highway so he can inform Cortez that they were already in Bulacan and were en route to
Nueva Ecija to have the dented portion of the vehicle fixed.
 Both accused appeal from RTC’s decision finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and
Regalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping
with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Garcia withrawed his appeal.

Issue:
W/O all the elements of carnapping as defined in RA 6539 (Anti-carnapping Act) was present
and duly proven.

Held:

Republic Act No. 6539, defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."
The elements are:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
 It cannot be denied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of the Tamaraw FX was
initially lawful. But, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the
vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an unlawful one. It
does not matter whether the unlawful taking occurred within the period of the lease. What
is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his co-accused in killing the victim. To
reiterate, the prosecution was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused stabbed
the victim to death because he refused to join them in their plan to appropriate the
vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence,
rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.
 Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted the crime
of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The
settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or
violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property
be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not
belong to the offender.
 Appellant Bernabe claims that he and his co-accused went to Nueva Ecija to have the
dent on the vehicle repaired. Garcia, on the other hand, testified that there was no such
damage. A person in possession of a stolen article is presumed guilty of having illegally
and unlawfully taken the same unless he can satisfactorily explain his possession of the
thing.
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things;and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof.
 Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant
Bernabe and his co-accused, Garcia.