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LEGAL MAXIMS PHILIPPINES

1) interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium


Public interest requires that by the very nature of things there must be an end to
a legal controversy.
G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILFREDO G. CAINGLET, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
On December 13, 1962 Wilfredo G. Cainglet was prosecuted before the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for falsification of public and/or official documents
in order to deceive the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in renderring
its decision in the cadastral cases petitioned against Cainglet. Respondent moved
to quash the mentioned information on the ground that they contain avernments. Such
judicial pronouncement which has become final, as can be inferred from the
information, allegedly runs counter to the charge that accused falsely claimed said
real estate to be his own private properties. The lower court granted the motion
and dismissed the aforequoted informations. Hence the provincial fiscal appealed to
this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the final judgment in Cainglet's ownership of the lots debated in
the cadastral cases against him bars his subsequent prosecution for falsely stating
in his answers in said Cadastral Case that he possessed and owned Lots Nos. 8479
and 8492.

HELD:
It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding
� a proceeding in rem � is binding and conclusive upon the whole world, reason is
that public policy and public order demand not only that litigations must terminate
at some definite point but also that titles over lands under the Torrens system
should be given stability for on it greatly depends the stability of the country's
economy. INTEREST REIPUBLICAE UT SIT FINIS LITIUM. However, this conclusiveness of
judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute. It admits of exceptions.
Public policy also dictates that those unjustly deprived of their rights over real
property by reason of the operation of our registration laws be afforded remedies.
Thus, the aggrieved party may file a suit for reconveyance of property2 or a
personal action for recovery of damages against the party who registered his
property through fraud,3 or in case of insolvency of the party who procured the
registration through fraud, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines for
recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund.4 Through these remedial proceedings,
the law, while holding registered titles indefeasible, allows redress calculated to
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of others. Necessarily, without
setting aside the decree of title, the issues raised in the previous registration
case are relitigated, for purposes of reconveyance of said title or recovery of
damages. In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute for perjury
the party who obtains registration through fraud, such as by stating false
assertions in the sworn answer required of applicants in cadastral proceedings. For
Section 116 of the Land Registration Act states:

SEC. 116. Whoever knowingly swears falsely to any statement required to be made
under oath by this Act shall be guilty of perjury and liable to the penalties
provided by laws for perjury.

As such, a judgment on the guilt of the appellee would not undermine the
indefeasibility of the titles over Lots involved in the cadastral cases. Neither
would the criminal proceeding for falsification or perjury be a collateral attack
on the titles in question. The prosecution for falsification or perjury is a
proceeding in personam which inquires into the criminal liability of the accused.
Not being an attack on the validity of the titles in question, any judgment
rendered therein would leave said titles undisturbed.

2) interpotare et concordare legibus est optimus interpotandi modus


Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form
uniform system of law.
G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

FACTS:
Herein respondent Luisito Bustinera was hired by ESC Transport as a taxi driver. It
was agreed that he would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which
he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in the
amount of P780.00 per day. Appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the
taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to. Owner of ESC
reported the taxi stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC
Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to recover.
The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bustinera is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for qualified
theft.
HELD:
Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310
has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When
statutes are in pari materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to
the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular
subject matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they
should be construed together (INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS
INTERPRETANDI MODUS). The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent
to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the
theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is
either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property
stolen is fish taken from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. On the other hand, Section 2 of
Republic Act No.6539, as amended defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things." The elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle
which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things;
and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is essentially the
robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery and car napping being the same. From the foregoing, since appellant is
being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping
law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply.

3) interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat


A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.
G.R. No. 117818 April 18, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMAN DERILO, ISIDRO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias "Sido", LUCAS DO�OS, ALEJANDRO
COFUENTES, and JOHN DOE, accused
ISIDORO BALDIMINO y QUILLO, alias, "Sido", accused-appellants.

FACTS:
Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Do�os, Alejandro Cofuentes and one
John Doe were charged with the so-called crime of murder committed by a band before
the First Branch of the former Court of First Instance of Borongan, Eastern Samar.
1 The information filed therefor alleges that the aforementioned accused with
treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill, with the use of firearm
and bolos, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there shot
(sic) and stabbed (sic) one Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting injuries which caused
her death. Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was
apprehended and brought within the trial court's jurisdiction, he initially filed
guilty but consequently pleaded not guilty. The court proceeded to the trial of the
case. Appelant Baldmino invokes the constitutional provision (Section 19) on the
imposition of death penalty and the mitigating circumstances applicable to his case
in order to lessen the penalty of death penalty accorded to the crime he committed
to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty for the crime committed by Baldimino shall be reduced
from death penalty to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The
intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in
the constitutional provisions themselves. INTERPRETATION FIENDA EST UT RES MAGIS
VALEAT QUAM PEREAT. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather
than destroying it. Even though no proclamation or grant of commutation was
officially issued by the President will not prevent the implementation and
operation of Section 19 to appellant. To argue otherwise would be subordinating
the command of the Constitution to the will of the President. The framers of the
Constitution never intended that the non-imposition or non-execution of the death
sentence under those constitutional provisions would be dependent on the act or
omission of the Chief Executive. From the foregoing, it is apparent that no
presidential action is necessary in order that any accused sentenced to the death
penalty under the same circumstances as herein appellant may avail of the benefit
of Section 19. The accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a reduction of his sentence.
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer�s document, its language should be
understood in the sense that it may have in common use. Its words should be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. While �to
commute� necessitates presidential initiative, �to reduce� does not. Accused-
appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

4) interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et


absurdum
Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted.
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:
Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a
student regent of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in
the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and
renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused
requested the amount of P15,000,000.00. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a
public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in
representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.)
that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student
regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27. The Ombudsman contends
that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the
general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Moreover, relying on
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.

HELD:
Yes. First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred
by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer. Delegation of sovereign
functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of
P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board
of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a
public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Third, it is well established that compensation
is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to
the public office. Lastly, it can be noted that in hoisting this argument,
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without
regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The rule is well-
established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS
IN AMBIGUIS SEMPRER FIENDA EST, UT EVITETUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM. Where there
is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to
be adopted.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and
jurisprudence.

5) legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet


The authoritative interpretation of the court of a statute acquires the force of
law by becoming a part thereof.
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of
the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite
license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,
although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from
the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. The accused contended
before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter
of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court�s decision in People vs. Macarandang (1959) and People vs. Lucero (1958) and
not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court�s rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

HELD:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that
�Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system � .� The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim �LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM OBTINET�
� the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and
Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said
firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it
was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.

6) leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant


A later law repeals a prior law on the same subject which is repugnant thereto.
G.R. No. L-29304 September 30, 1970
Carabao, Inc.
Vs.
Agricultural Productivity Commission, Francisco P. Saguitguit And/Or Faustino
Sychangco

FACTS:
Petitioners, herein Carabao Inc., filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint
to recover a sum of 238,500.00Php of the unpaid price of 300 units of fire
extinguishers sold and delivered by it to defendant Agricultural Productivity
Commission. Petitioners contend that the failure of the Auditor General to decide
on the claim within two (2) months, under Act No. 3083, the lower court resumed
jurisdiction over the claim for payment of petitioners.
Defendants moved for the dismissal of the case based on the ground of the lower
court�s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The lower court sustained the
dismissal, declaring itself having no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioners, in this present case, appealed again reiterating that the lower court
has jurisdiction over the case based on Act No. 3083.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to decide over
the claim of petitioner to recover the aforementioned amount of unpaid fire
extinguishers.

HELD:
No. Provisions of Act No. 3083, as contended by petitioners, are incompatible with
the Commonwealth Act and must be deemed superseded and abrogated, under the
principle of LEGES POSTERIORES PRIORES CONTRARIAS ABROGANT - a later statute which
is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on
the same subject matter.
The Auditor General�s failure to act within the sixty-day period provided by
Commonwealth Act 327 no longer entitles the claimant to file a direct suit in
court, as he was formerly authorized by Act 3083, the claimant's only remedy is to
institute mandamus proceedings to compel the rendition of a decision by the Auditor
General in the event of such inaction.

7) lex de futuro judex de praterito


The law provides for the future the judge for the past.
G.R. NO. 181556 December 14, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN
BANK, INC.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
v.
STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC., Respondents.

The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in
the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging
that, inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due
course. Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually
substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the
meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 was enacted which provides that 'before any
distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the preferences
established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets
reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper court,
reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of
receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect payment therefor from available
assets.'

A perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive
application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent
to the contrary: �Section 28. Effectivity Clause. � This Act shall take effect
fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.�
Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the
formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim LEX DE
FUTURO, JUDEX DE PRAETERITO � the law provides for the future, the judge for the
past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: �Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.� The reason for the rule is
the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of
its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior
transactions.

8) lex prospicit non respicit


The law looks forward, not backward.
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section
Division, Central Police District Command received a dispatch order which directed
him and three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner
in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team conducted necessary
surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan.
Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police Central Station in
Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.
SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in
his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live
ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the
subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that
it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as
amended.
On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner
moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4,
2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition. SC affirmed CA's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that
the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD
1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.

HELD:
Yes, RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with
the trial court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity). LEX
PROSPICIT, NON RESPICIT. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.
However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal,
shall be given retroactive effect. (Exception and exception to the exception on
effectivity of laws).

9) Maledicta est expositio quae corrumpit textum


It is dangerous construction which is against the text.
327 SCRA 158 (2000)
National Federation of Labor
vs.
NLRC

FACTS:
Private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and owner,
Patalon Coconut Estate, was forced to sell their estate, when congress passed,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL), Operation was ceased and employees were laid off without separation
pay.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of the
compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of agrarian
reform, is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees

HELD:
NO. The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral
and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment
as may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that "The employer
may also terminate the employment of any employee due to. The use of the word "may"
in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only.
10 The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

10) Noscitur a sociis


Word constructed with reference to accompanying or associated words
G.R. No. L-47848, August 23, 1978
Tablante-Tungol Enterprises
vs.
Hon. Carmelo C. Noriel, Eliseo E. Penaflor and Association of Democratic Labor
Organization

FACTS:
Petitioner Tablante-Tungol Enterprises filed a certoriari proceeding against
respondents, Director Carmelo C. Noriel, Bureau of Labor Relations, and the Chief
of its Med-Arbiter Section, Regional Office No. 3, Eliseo Penaflor, for the third
time so as not to bargain collectively with private respondent, Association of
Democratic Labor Organization. The first two petitions were dismissed for lack of
merit on May 12, 1976 and November 18, 1977, respectively. The petitioner claimed
in the third certoriari proceeding that respondents should have cancelled the
registration and permit because the private respondent labor union engaged in an
illegal strike. It based its contention on relevant section under Presidential
Decree No. 823 and also, under the Labor Code. The latter, as asserted by the
petitioner, provides for the cancellation of registration on the basis of �any
activity prohibited by law.�

ISSUE:
Whether the case shall be dismissed for being moot and academic or not.

HELD:
The court dismissed the case for being moot and academic. The particular section
that the petitioner used as grounds for cancellation of registration is as follows,
�Article 239. Ground for cancellation of union
11) Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis
A new statute should affect the future, not the past.
G.R. No. 110478. October 15, 2007
Fermin Manapat
vs.
Court of Appeals and National Housing Authority

G. R. Nos. 116491-503. October 15, 2007


Maximo Loberanes, Eladio Quimque, Cesario Vega, Juanito Santos,
Alejandrino Oracion and Gonzalo Mercado
vs.
Court of Appeals and National Housing Authority

FACTS:
Petitioners Fermin Manapat, Domingo Lim and Maximo Loberanes filed against the
National Housing Authority for expropriating their lots. The land was originally
owned by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila and the Philippine Realty
Corporation. These owners generously lent the lands to petitioners on the condition
that they would vacate once their planned school is established.
However, the plan did not materialize. Occupants then petitioned the government to
acquire the property and turn it into a socialized housing through the Zonal
Improvement Program. The government failed to match the price, so RCAM sold the
lands individually in 1963. In 1977, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1072 granting the amount needed for the expropriation. Most lands were
expropriated except for the lots below 300 square meters.
The ruling was based on RA No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992)
which was instituted for the purposes of urban development and housing which
exempts parcels of land owned by small property owners from expropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court apply RA No. 7279 in the said case?

HELD:
No. The case was instituted in 1977. RA No. 7279 was only declared in 1992, or
almost two decades after the initial arraignments. Nova constitution futuris formam
imponere debet, non praeteritis. A new statute should not affect the future, not
the past. The law looks forward, not backward. The language of the legislature did
not provide any retroactive application for RA No. 7279. Expropriation from small
property owners shall be allowed.

12) Nullus commodum potest de injuria propriasua


No man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrongdoing.
G.R. No. L-3529, September 29, 1953
Apolinar Talento and Marciana Limuco Talento
vs.
Eigero Makiki, Benita Escartin and The Court Of Appeals

FACTS:
Apolinar Talento and Marciana Limuco seeked to annul a deed of sale excuted by them
to Benita Escartin and Eigero Makiki of a honestead in Abucay, Bataan. Their basis
is that (1) they were forced and intimidated to execute the deed of sale to private
respondents by the same private respondents, which they followed out of fear of
possible consquences of refusal of such bidding, and (2) that the sale should be
declared null and void for the reason that it was entered into between petitioners
who were Filipinos and respondents who were Japanese, and as such it was a contract
executed between enemies in time of war, which is against the present constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is annulled based on the grounds given by
petitioners

HELD:
First ground: No, respondents denied that such intimidation and force ever happened
and petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove such instance of
intimidation in the execution deed of sale.
Second ground: No. The court did not honor this ground by petitioner because it
only came out during the present trial and not in the previous trial in lower
courts. The court stated that �No other question of fact or of law as ever been
raised in the court of origin in an effort to dispute the validity of the
transaction. As a matter of fact, that was the only question (first ground)
considered by the lower court.�
�Even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution xxx to set aside the sale
in question, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover
the lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty knowledge
that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. xxx The law will
not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them.' The rule is expressed in the maxims: "NULLUS COMMODUM POTEST DE INJURIA
PROPRIA SUA".

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