[G.R. No. 88694. January 11, 1993.

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN

MENDIONA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S.
BALTAO, respondents.

Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.

Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS; CONSTRUED. — Article 19,
known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercises, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is
different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts
it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with Articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been
very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable that the Anglo-American law on torts. It is
now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of
these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or
not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Article 20 and 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. — The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is
a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intentof prejudicing or injuring another. Article
20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own
sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or
duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with
acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of these
three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.
3. ID.; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; CANNOT BE AWARDED IN THE ABSENCE OF WRONGFUL
ACT OR OMISSION OR OF FRAUD OR BAD FAITH. — The criminal complaint filed against private
respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere
attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of money due
them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to
pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the
adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals,
141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
4. ID.; ID.; AWARD THEREOF ON BASIS ON MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; ELEMENTS. — To
constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false
and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution. (Manila Gas
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles
19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious
prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the
New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case
can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and
the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an
acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is
later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious
prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three
(3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to
exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted
with probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has
been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to
public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their
indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]). The presence of probable
cause signified, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were
not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-
founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent. "To
constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges where false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to
damages."
6. ID.; ID.; UNWARRANTED, WHERE THE ACTION WAS FILED IN GOOD FAITH AND DAMAGE
RESULTS FROM A PERSON'S EXERCISING HIS LEGAL RIGHTS. — The root of the controversy in this
case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners
would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible
for the dishonor check. However, the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to
determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio
Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed
Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent
mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered
if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified
by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal
of the complaint. Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate,
such right is so precious that moral damages may be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And
an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales,
183 SCRA 72 [1990]). Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in
good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte
Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
7. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; PECUNIARY LOSS MUST SUBSTANTIALLY
BE PROVED. — Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records
show that the same was based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present
proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
breakdown he suffered, not did he present proof of the actual loss to his business cause by the unjust litigation
against him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the
amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of
Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]). Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary
loss — in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the
proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
For these reason, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in
favor of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.

8. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS FEES; AWARD THEREOF MUST BE DISALLOWED WHERE THE
AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS ELIMINATED. — The award of attorney's fees must be disallowed
where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186
SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private
respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.

DECISION

BIDIN, J p:

This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S.
Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which modified the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered
petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in
the amount of P50,000.00.
The facts are not disputed.
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short)
delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,
the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking
Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks
(Rollo, p. 148).
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner
Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and
exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one
"Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was
advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao"
After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is his.
He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business with
Albenson. Cdpr
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio
S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner
Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
establishment, E. L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,
the very same business address of Guaranteed.
On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given
Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was
deemed to have waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in
the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or
Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was
not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and
exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed
against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of
Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary investigation that
Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for
failing to exercise care and prudence in the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who
was not properly notified of the complaint against him and of the requirement to submit his counter
evidence. cdrep
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced in
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse
Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of 'E.L. Woodworks,' not of
Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had
ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975 . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III,
a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street, that the
defendants may have been dealing with. . . . " (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants
ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:
1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;
2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);
3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
5. costs.
"Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile Insurance
Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment at the instance of plaintiff are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit." (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral damages
awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees from P100,000.00 to
P50,000.00, said decision being hereby affirmed in all its other aspects. With costs against
appellants." (Rollo, pp. 50-51) cdll
Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and Benjamin Mendiona filed
the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:
"1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution
but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the fact that the
basis of a civil action for malicious prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 of Article
2176 of the Civil Code . . .
"2. Concluding that 'hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an unjust criminal
case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by misdirection' and 'was therefore,
actionable by itself,' and which 'became inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when . . .
(private respondent) was deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called
preliminary investigation . . .'
"3. Concluding that petitioner's 'actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and calculated', no
evidence having been adduced to support such a sweeping statement.
"4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly and
severally liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.
"5. Awarding respondents-
5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of
sufficient evidence to show that such was actually suffered.
5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this connection
merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as a businessman, there
being no showing that the act complained of adversely affected private respondent's
reputation or that it resulted to material loss.
5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were duly
advised by counsel of their legal recourse.
5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify such
an award" (Rollo, pp. 4-6).
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of
Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves them from
any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages
on Article 19, 20 and 21 * of the Civil Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is
different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts
it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been
very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is
now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of
these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). cdrep

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting
in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each
case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general
sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p.
71). Thus, anyone who, whetherwillfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has
the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis
for an award of damages.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20
does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the
respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the bases for
the award of damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:
"With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not much difficulty
in ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given the
admitted fact that when there was an attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants
were explicitly warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants had
been dealing with (supra, p.5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a
case — a criminal case no less — against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions
(Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra)."
Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right to complain.
But that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limits is the area of excess, of abuse of
rights." (Rollo, pp. 44-45). cdphil
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be validly made
the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no
cogent reason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22against private respondent was their failure to
collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by
private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the following
results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of
Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry
of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in
the name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed
that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao"
In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent demanding that he make
good the amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private
respondent ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the check in
question. Private respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to check the veracity of
their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear
himself from the baseless accusation made against his person, he should have made mention of the fact that there
are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and
Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out
later, was the issuer of the check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the
same building — Baltao Building — located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild steel plates were
ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and delivered to
Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio Baltao who issued the
bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make good the amount of
the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for violation for BP Blg. 22.
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private
respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was
propituous by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme. cdphil
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the
bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by
which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him
will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the
issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith,
moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to
Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao.
Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in
the same building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in
payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and
probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal:
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]).
Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that
it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for
damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29,
32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements
must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court
of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for
damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a
complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are
shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one
cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. "Probable
cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without
probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if
prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried"
(Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]). LLjur
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is
evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private
respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against
private respondent.
 "To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case
to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and
motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages" (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private
respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in
determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to
amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more
assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is
not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that petitioners did
exert considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to
private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the
debtor-corporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in
the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error
could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway
and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the
reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the complaint. LLpr
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is
so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse
decision does not ipso factojustify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA
72 [1990]).
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage
results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records show that the
same was based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the
cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he
suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In
determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount.
Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan,
171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and
unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it
was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private
respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner,
neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145
SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than the general rule.
Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is
eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the
fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on
that ground. Cdpr
In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the
case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by
petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577
[1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for
malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award
damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable sums as damages
without bases therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948
dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, [January 11, 1993], 291 PHIL 17-34)
[G.R. No. L-8883. July 14, 1959.]

ALFREDO M. VELAYO, ETC., plaintiff, vs . SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES

ISLANDS, LTD., defendant-appellee. ALFONSO Z. SYCIP, ET. AL., intervenors-appellants.

Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar & Associates for appellants.

Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEAL; WHEN PRO-FORMA. — Where a party did not
introduce any evidence in support of his claim during the trial of the case, his appeal from the decision rendered
therein would be merely pro-forma.
2. ID.; PETITION FOR RELIEF; WHEN PARTY NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF. — A party
has no right to file a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court where the order complained of was
entered upon motion filed by said party. It cannot be asserted that the order was issued against him through
fraud, accident, mistake, or negligence. The fraud mentioned in Rule 38 is the fraud committed by the adverse
party and the same cannot be attributed to the Court.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:

On December 17, 1948, Alfredo M. Velayo as assignees of the insolvent Commercial Airlines, Inc.,
instituted an action against Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd., in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for injunction and damages (Civil Case No. 6966). On October 26, 1951, a complaint in intervention was
filed by Alfonso Sycip, Paul Sycip, and Yek Trading Corporation, and on November 14, 1951, by Mabasa &
Company.
After trial wherein plaintiff presented evidence in his behalf, but none in behalf of intervenors, the
Court rendered decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as those filed by the intervenors. On March 31,
1954, counsel for plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal in behalf only of plaintiff
even if they also represent the intervenors, which in due time were approved, the Court instructing its clerk to
forward the record on appeal to the Supreme Court together with all the evidence presented in the case. This
instruction was actually complied with.
On August 31, 1954, the Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court notified counsel of plaintiff that the
record as well as the evidence have already been received and that they should file their brief within 45 days
from receipt of the notice. On November 2, 1954, counsel filed their brief for appellants. On November 6,
1954, or 7 months after the judgment had become final as against the intervenors, and 4 days after counsel for
appellants had submitted the latter the judgment had become final as against the intervenors, and 4 days after
counsel for appellants had submitted the latter's brief, counsel for intervenors filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for correction of the record on appeal in order to enable them to insert therein the names of the
intervenors as appellants, the petition being based, among others, on the ground that the omission of the names
of the intervenors in said record on appeal was due to the mistake of the typist who prepared it while the
attorney in charge was on vacation. The petition was vigorously opposed by counsel for defendant, contending
that the same would serve no purpose, whatsoever considering that the intervenors had not presented any
evidence in support of their claim, aside from the fact that the alleged absence of the attorney of the intervenors
cannot constitute a justification for the alleged omission of the intervenors as appellants. On November 12,
1954, the Court denied the petition. Counsel for intervenors moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the
same was denied.
On November 19, 1954, counsel for intervenors filed with the lower court a petition for relief under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, wherein he reiterated the same grounds they alleged in the petition for correction
filed by them in the Supreme Court, which petition was denied on November 27, 1954, for having been filed
outside the reglementary period fixed in said Rule 38. Counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
again denied, the Court stating that "no judgment or order has been rendered, nor any other proceeding taken
by his Court on the right of the intervenors to appeal."
On December 20, 1954, counsel filed once more a motion to amend the record on appeal based on
grounds identical with those alleged in the petition for correction filed before the Supreme court. On December
27, 1954, the lower court denied the motion. On January 6, 1955, counsel filed a petition for relief from this last
order entered on December 27, 1954, to which counsel for defendant filed an opposition. On February 5, 1955,
hearing was has on both the petition for relief and the opposition, and on February 9, 1955, the petition was
denied on the ground that the case is already before the Supreme Court on appeal. It is from this order that
counsel for intervenors has taken the appeal now before us.
The instant appeal has no merit.
The begin with, the only remedy which appellants now seek in this appeal is the inclusion of the
intervenors as appellants in the appeal from the decision rendered in the main case, but this remedy has already
been denied twice by this Court, first, in its resolution of November 12, 1954 denying their petition for
correction of the record on appeal, and, second, in denying their motion for reconsideration of said resolution.
It should be noted that the grounds relied upon in this appeal are the same grounds alleged in said petition for
correction.
In the second place, the intervenors have no right or reason to appeal from the decision in the main
case, it appearing that they did not introduce any evidence during the trial in support of their complaint, which
shows that their appeal would be merely pro-forma. And, in any event, they made the attempt to amend the
record on appeal seven (7) months after the decision had become final against them.
In the third place, the intervenors have no right or reason to file a petition for relief under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court from the order of the lower court issued on December 27, 1954, for the reason that the same
was entered upon a motion filed by them. Indeed they cannot reasonably assert that the order was entered
against them though fraud, accident, mistake, or negligence. The fraud mentioned in Rule 38 is the fraud
committed by the adverse party and certainly the same cannot be attributed to the Court.
Finally, it appears that the main case has already been decided by this Court on the merits on October
31, 1956, reversing the decision of the lower court and awarding damages to plaintiff, which apparently is the
very purpose which the intervenors seek to accomplish in joining the appeal as co-appellants. This appeal,
therefore, has already become moot.
 Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.

||| (Velayo v. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd., G.R. No. L-8883, [July 14, 1959], 105 PHIL 1114-1118)
[G.R. No. 126486. February 9, 1998.]

BARONS MARKETING CORP., petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and PHELPS

DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents.

Vero B. Librojo for petitioner.

Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On August 31, 1973, private respondent Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc. appointed petitioner Barons Marketing
Corporation as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. During the period covering December 1986 to
August 1987, petitioner purchased on credit from respondent various electrical wires and cables in the total amount
of P4,102,438.30. On September 7, 1987, petitioner paid respondent the amount of P300,000.00 out of its total
purchases above-stated. On several occasions, respondent wrote petitioner demanding payment of its outstanding
obligations due respondent. In response, petitioner wrote respondent requesting the latter if it could pay its
outstanding account in monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per month. Respondent, however,
rejected petitioner's offer and reiterated its demand for full payment of petitioner's account. Respondent then filed a
complaint before the Pasig Regional Trial Court against petitioner for the recovery of P3,802,478.20 representing
the value of the wires and cables the former had delivered to the latter, including interest. After hearing, the trial
court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay respondent: 1) P3,108,000.00 constituting the unpaid balance,
plus interest; 2) 25% of the preceding obligation for and as attorney's fees; 3) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court modified the decision of the
trial court ordering petitioner to pay respondent P3,802,478.20, the amount which appeared in the body of the
complaint and proven during the trial rather than P3,108,000.00, the latter amount appearing in petitioner's prayer
supposedly as a result of a typographical error, as well as 5% of the amount awarded for and as attorney's fees.
Petitioner now invokes Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, claiming that private respondent abused its rights when
it rejected petitioner's offer of settlement and subsequently filed the action for collection. CHaDIT
The Supreme Court found petitioner's theory untenable. The Court held that to constitute an abuse of rights
under Article 19 the defendant must act with bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. In the case at bar,
petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioner's allegation that private
respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent
itself may deal directly with Meralco is not supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition is considered by
the Court merely speculative. The Court having ruled that private respondent's acts did not transgress the
provisions of Article 21, petitioner cannot be entitled to moral damages or for that matter, exemplary damages. The
Court, however, found the amount of attorney's fees and collection fees of 25% of the principal to be manifestly
exorbitant, and, accordingly, reduced it to 10%.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; GOOD FAITH IS ALWAYS PRESUMED AND THE
BURDEN OF PROVING BAD FAITH RESTS UPON THE PARTY ALLEGING THE SAME; IN CASE AT
BAR, PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT. — We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed
and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has
failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioner's allegation that private respondent was
motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal
directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition is merely speculative.
Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioner's offer and
instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent, the corporation had
its own "cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations." This is not such "a lame and poor
rationalization" as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent were to be required to accept petitioner's
offer, there would be no reason for the latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be
inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see
that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem
private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to violate the
provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; DAMAGES; PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES OR
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; REASONS. — Having ruled that private respondent's acts did not transgress the
provisions of Article 21, petitioner cannot be entitled to moral damages or, for that matter, exemplary damages.
While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, petitioner must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. As we have observed above, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
3. ID.; CONTRACTS; IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ABUSE OF RIGHT, PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PERFORM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER SUCH CONTRACT IN PARTS;
THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY OF CONTRACTS MUST BE RESPECTED. — It may not be amiss to
state that petitioner's contract with private respondent has the force of law between them. Petitioner is thus bound
to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein. In the absence of any abuse of right, private respondent cannot
be allowed to perform its obligation under such contract in parts. Otherwise, private respondent's right under
Article 1248 will be negated, the sanctity of its contract with petitioner defiled. The principle of autonomy of
contracts must be respected.
4. ID.; ID.; DAMAGES; COLLECTION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES REDUCED BY THE COURT
FOR BEING EXORBITANT. — Under Article 1229 of the Civil Code courts are empowered to reduce such
penalty if the same is "iniquitous or unconscionable." It is true that we have upheld the reasonableness of penalties
in the form of attorney's fees consisting of twenty-five percent (25%) of the principal debt plus interest. In the case
at bar, however, the interest alone runs to some four and a half million pesos (P4.5M), even exceeding the principal
debt amounting to almost four million pesos (P4.0M). Twenty five percent (25%) of the principal and interest
amounts to roughly two million pesos (P2M). In real terms, therefore, the attorney's fees and collection fees are
manifestly exorbitant. Accordingly, we reduce the same to ten percent (10%) of the principal.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO REVIEW MATTERS EVEN THEY ARE NOT
ASSIGNED AS ERRORS. — Private respondent argues that petitioner failed to question the award of attorney's
fees on appeal before respondent court and raised the issue only in its motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
petitioner should be deemed to have waived its right to question such award. Private respondent's attempts to
dissuade us from reducing the penalty are futile. The Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case. cIECaS

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:
 The instant petition raises two issues: (1) whether or not private respondent is guilty of abuse of right; and
(2) whether or not private respondent is entitled to interest and attorney's fees. prcd
The facts are undisputed:
On August 31, 1973, plaintiff [Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. private respondent herein]
appointed defendant [petitioner Barons Marketing, Corporation] as one of its dealers of electrical
wires and cables effective September 1, 1973 (Exh. A). As such dealer, defendant was given by
plaintiff 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiff's electrical products. This credit term was to be
reckoned from the date of delivery by plaintiff of its products to defendant (Exh. 1).
During the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, defendant purchased, on
credit, from plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of P4,102,438.30 (Exh.
B to K). These wires and cables were in turn sold, pursuant to previous arrangements, by
defendant to MERALCO, the former being the accredited supplier of the electrical requirements
of the latter. Under the sales invoices issued by plaintiff to defendant for the subject purchases, it
is stipulated that interest at 12% on the amount due for attorney's fees and collection (Exh.
BB). 1 On September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 out of its total
purchases as above-stated (Exh. S), thereby leaving an unpaid account on the aforesaid deliveries
of P3,802,478.20. On several occasions, plaintiff wrote defendant demanding payment of its
outstanding obligations due plaintiff (Exhs. L, M, N, and P). In response, defendant wrote plaintiff
on October 5, 1987 requesting the latter if it could pay its outstanding account in monthly
installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until
full payment (Exh. O and O-4). Plaintiff, however, rejected defendant's offer and accordingly
reiterated its demand for the full payment of defendant's account (Exh. P). 2
On 29 October 1987, private respondent Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc. filed a complaint before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court against petitioner Barons Marketing Corporation for the recovery of P3,802,478.20
representing the value of the wires and cables the former had delivered to the latter, including interest. Phelps
Dodge likewise prayed that it be awarded attorney's fees at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded, exemplary
damages amounting to at least P100,000.00, the expenses of litigation and the costs of suit.
Petitioner, in its answer, admitted purchasing the wires and cables from private respondent but disputed the
amount claimed by the latter. Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim against private respondent, alleging that
it suffered injury to its reputation due to Phelps Dodge's acts. Such acts were purportedly calculated to humiliate
petitioner and constituted an abuse of rights.
After hearing, the trial court on 17 June 1991 rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds Phelps Dodge
Phils., Inc. to have preponderantly proven its case and hereby orders Barons Marketing, Inc. to
pay Phelps Dodge the following:
1. P3,108,000.00 constituting the unpaid balance of defendant's purchases from plaintiff
and interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the respective expiration of the 60 day
credit term, vis-a-vis the various sales invoices and/or delivery receipts;
2. 25% of the preceding obligation for and as attorney's fees;
3. P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Costs of suit. 3
Both parties appealed to respondent court. Private respondent claimed that the trial court should have
awarded it the sum of P3,802,478.20, the amount which appeared in the body of the complaint and proven during
the trial rather than P3,108,000.00. The latter amount appears in petitioner's prayer supposedly as a result of a
typographical error.
 On the other hand, petitioner reiterated its claims for damages as a result of "creditor's abuse." It also
alleged that private respondent failed to prove its cause of action against it. cdll
On 25 June 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds Phelps Dodge
Phils., Inc. to have preponderantly proven its case and hereby orders Barons Marketing, Inc. to
pay Phelps Dodge the following:
1. P3,802,478.20 constituting the unpaid balance of defendant's purchases from plaintiff
and interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the respective expiration of the 60 day
credit term, vis-a-vis the various sales invoices and/or delivery receipts; and
2. 5% of the preceding obligation for and as attorney's fees.
No costs. 4
Petitioner Barons Marketing is now before this Court alleging that respondent court erred when it held (1)
private respondent Phelps Dodge not guilty of "creditor's abuse," and (2) petitioner liable to private respondent for
interest and attorney's fees.
I
Petitioner does not deny private respondent's rights to institute an action for collection and to claim full
payment. Indeed, petitioner's right to file an action for collection is beyond cavil. 5 Likewise, private respondent's
right to reject petitioner's offer to pay in installments is guaranteed by Article 1248 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled
partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to
make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may
demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation
of the latter.
Under this provision, the prestation, i.e., the object of the obligation, must be performed in one act, not in parts.
Tolentino concedes that the right has its limitations:
Partial Prestations. — Since the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial performance,
unless otherwise stipulated, the creditor who refuses to accept partial prestations does not incur in
delay or mora accipiendi, except when there is abuse of right or if good faith requires acceptance. 6
Indeed, the law, as set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code, prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by
setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. 7Thus:
ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Petitioner now invokes Article 19 and Article 21 8 of the Civil Code, claiming that private respondent
abused its rights when it rejected petitioner's offer of settlement and subsequently filed the action for collection
considering:
. . . that the relationship between the parties started in 1973 spanning more than 13 years
before the complaint was filed, that the petitioner had been a good and reliable dealer enjoying a
good credit standing during the period before it became delinquent in 1987, that the relationship
between the parties had been a fruitful one especially for the private respondent, that the
petitioner exerted its outmost efforts to settle its obligations and avoid a suit, that the petitioner
did not evade in the payment of its obligation to the private respondent, and that the petitioner
was just asking a small concession that it be allowed to liquidate its obligation to eight (8) monthly
 installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per month on the balance which proposal was
supported by post-dated checks. 9
Expounding on its theory, petitioner states:
In the ordinary course of events, a suit for collection of a sum of money filed in court is
done for the primary purpose of collecting a debt or obligation. If there is an offer by the debtor
to pay its debt or obligation supported by post-dated checks and with provision for interests, the
normal response of a creditor would be to accept the offer of compromise and not file the suit for
collection. It is of common knowledge that proceedings in our courts would normally take years
before an action is finally settled. It is always wiser and more prudent to accept an offer of
payment in installment rather than file an action in court to compel the debtor to settle his
obligation in full in a single payment.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Why then did private respondent elect to file a suit for collection rather than accept
petitioner's offer of settlement, supported by post-dated checks, by paying monthly installments of
P500,000.00 plus 1% per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment? The answer
is obvious. The action of private respondent in filling a suit for collection was an abuse of right
and exercised for the sole purpose of prejudicing and injuring the petitioner. 10
Petitioner prays that the Court order private respondent to pay petitioner moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. It likewise asks that it be allowed to liquidate its obligation to private
respondent, without interests, in eight equal monthly installments.
Petitioner's theory is untenable. prLL
Both parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19 the defendant must act with bad
faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. They cite the following comments of Tolentino as their authority:
Test of Abuse of Right. — Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not
unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be
concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without
utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept of social
solidarity which considers law as rational and just. Hence, every abnormal exercise of a right,
contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the
sound exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the
exercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right. 11
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it
rejected petitioner's offer and filed the action for collection.
We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the
burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. 12 In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to
prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioner's allegation that private respondent was motivated by a
desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal directly with
Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition is merely speculative.
Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioner's
offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent, the
corporation had its own "cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations." This is not such "a
lame and poor rationalization" as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent were to be required to
accept petitioner's offer, there would be no reason for the latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors.
Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private
respondent. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abusethereof. Under these
circumstances, we do not deem private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy as to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, petitioner's prayer for moral and exemplary damages must thus be rejected. Petitioner's claim
for moral damages is anchored on Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
Having ruled that private respondent's acts did not transgress the provisions of Article 21, petitioner cannot be
entitled to moral damages or, for that matter, exemplary damages. While the amount of exemplary damages
need not be proved, petitioner must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. 13 As we
have observed above, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
It may not be amiss to state that petitioner's contract with private respondent has the force of law between
them. 14 Petitioner is thus bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein. 15 In the absence of any
abuse of right, private respondent cannot be allowed to perform its obligation under such contract in parts.
Otherwise, private respondent's right under Article 1248 will be negated, the sanctity of its contract with petitioner
defiled. The principle of autonomy of contracts 16 must be respected.
II
Under said contract, petitioner is liable to private respondent for the unpaid balance of its purchases from
private respondent plus 12% interest. Private respondent's sales invoices expressly provide that:
. . . Interest at 12% per annum will be charged on all overdue account plus 25% on said amount for
attorney's fees and collection. . . . 17
It may also be noted that the above stipulation, insofar as it provides for the payment of "25% on said
amount for attorney's fees and collection (sic)," constitutes what is known as a penal clause. 18 Petitioner is thus
obliged to pay such penalty in addition to the 12% annual interest, there being an express stipulation to that
effect. dctai
Petitioner nevertheless urges this Court to reduce the attorney's fees for being "grossly excessive,"
"considering the nature of the case which is a mere action for collection of a sum of money." It may be pointed out
however that the above penalty is supposed to answer not only for attorney's fees but for collection fees as well.
Moreover:
. . . the attorneys' fees here provided is not, strictly speaking, the attorneys' fees recoverable
as between attorney and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the
attorneys' fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly
called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law,
morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. The attorneys' fees so provided are
awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is the litigant, not counsel, who is the judgment
creditor entitled to enforce the judgment by execution. 19
Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such penalty if the same is "iniquitous or
unconscionable." Article 1229 of the Civil Code states thus:
ART. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty
may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. (Emphasis supplied.)
 The sentiments of the law are echoed in Article 2227 of the same Code:
ART. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
It is true that we have upheld the reasonableness of penalties in the form of attorney's fees consisting of
twenty-five percent (25%) of the principal debt plus interest. 20 In the case at bar, however, the interest alone runs
to some four and a half million pesos (P4.5M), even exceeding the principal debt amounting to almost four million
pesos (P4.0M). Twenty five percent (25%) of the principal and interest amounts to roughly two million pesos
(P2M). In real terms, therefore, the attorney's fees and collection fees are manifestly exorbitant. Accordingly, we
reduce the same to ten percent (10%) of the principal.
Private respondent, however, argues that petitioner failed to question the award of attorney's fees on appeal
before respondent court and raised the issue only in its motion for reconsideration. Consequently, petitioner should
be deemed to have waived its right to question such award. LexLib
Private respondent's attempts to dissuade us from reducing the penalty are futile. The Court is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. 21
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the attorney's and
collection fees are reduced to ten percent (10%) of the principal but is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Romero, Francisco and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
||| (Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126486, [February 9, 1998], 349 PHIL 769-781)
[G.R. No. 138964. August 9, 2001.]

VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto

Ortega, petitioners,vs .GONZALO PELLOSIS, INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO
RADAM, respondents.

Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr. for petitioners.

Fred Henry V. Marallag for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land owned by Victor Reyes. In 1986, Victor informed respondents
that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have a right of first refusal to buy the
land. However, in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by them was
sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name. After the sale,
Cynthia Ortega filed a petition for condemnation, docketed Condemnation Case No. 89-05-007, with the Office of
the Building Official, City of Manila, of the structures on the land. Respondents, on the other hand, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the "Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," docketed as Civil Case No. 89-
49176, made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated upon their right of first refusal which was claimed to
have been impinged upon the sale of the land to petitioner Ortega without their knowledge. After due hearing in
the condemnation case, the Office of the Building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses
of respondents. However, due to the timely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police District, the
intended demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel who pleaded that the
demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11
December 1989, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the Building Official. On 12
December 1989, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of respondents' houses.
Resultantly, respondents filed Civil Case No. 89-49176 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54,
praying that petitioners be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, for the untimely
demolition of the houses. After trial, the court dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead ordered them to
pay petitioners moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed the decision of the trial court and
ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Hence, the present
petition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding damages to respondents. While
petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof; it does not, however, mean that the exercise of said rights is not without
limitations. The Court stressed that the abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every
person to act with justice, to give everyone his due, and to observe honesty and good faith. It simply means that
when a right is exercised in a manner which discards the said norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable. At the time petitioners implemented the order of
demolition, barely five days after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory.
The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of
the Building Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to
the expiration of the period to appeal),the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The Court further ruled
that the fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and Highways was
of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an order of demolition was
not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a
different matter and could only beheld utterly indefensible.

SYLLABUS

CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; ARTICLE 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE REQUIRES EVERY
PERSON TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, TO GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE, AND TO OBSERVE HONESTY
AND GOOD FAITH; WHEN A RIGHT IS EXERCISED IN A MANNER WHICH DISCARDS THESE
NORMS RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO ANOTHER, A LEGAL WRONG IS COMMITTED FOR WHICH
THE ACTOR CAN BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE; CASE AT BAR. — A right is a power, privilege, or immunity
guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a
legally enforceable claim of one person against another. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the
right to enjoy and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these rights is
not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to
act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor
can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the
order of demolition as the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in
disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code. At the time petitioners implemented the order of
demolition, barely five days after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory.
The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of
the Building Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to
the expiration of the period to appeal),the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that the order of
demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The action of
petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but
implementing the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could
only be held utterly indefensible.

DECISION
VITUG, J p:

"Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 1 This provision in our law is not just a declaration of
principle for it can in itself constitute, when unduly ignored or violated, a valid source of a cause of action or
defense.
The case seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals in not countenancing an attempt to abridge and render
inutile a legal right to contest an adverse ruling of an agency of government.
Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes, located at San Pascual Street,
Malate, Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the land which, over the years, underwent continuous
improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son Victor Reyes. Sometime in 1986, Victor
informed respondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have a right of
first refusal to buy the land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land
occupied by them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in
her name.
On 25 May 1989, Cynthia Ortega, filed a petition for condemnation, docketed Condemnation Case No. 89-
05-007, with the Office of the Building Official, City of Manila, of the structures on the land.
On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the "Declaration of
Nullity of the Sale," docketed as Civil Case No. 89-49176, made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated
upon their right of first refusal which was claimed to have been impinged upon the sale of the land to petitioner
Ortega without their knowledge. CADacT
After due hearing in the condemnation case, the Office of the Building Official issued a resolution, dated 27
November 1989, ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents. Copies of the resolution were served upon
respondents and their counsel on 07 December 1989. The following day, or on 08 December 1989, Cynthia Ortega,
together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition of
respondents' houses. Due to the timely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police District, the intended
demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel who pleaded that the
demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11
December 1989, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the Building Official. On 12
December 1989, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of respondents' houses.
Resultantly, respondents filed Civil Case No. 89-49176 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
54, praying that petitioners be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fee, for the
untimely demolition of the houses. After trial, the court dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead
ordered them to pay petitioners moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on the basis of its findings and
conclusions, reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay respondents the following sums:
"1) Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00),or Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) for each appellant, by way of moral damages;"
"2) Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00),or Twenty Five thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) for each appellant, by way of exemplary damages;"
"3) Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as and for attorney's fees; and
"4) The costs of suit." 2
The appellate court ruled:
"Thus, by the clear provisions of paragraph 23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of PD 1096 (otherwise known as the Building Code), above, appellants, being the parties adversely
affected by the November 27, 1989 Resolution of the Office of the Building Official, had fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy of the same within which to perfect an administrative appeal.
 Thus, since appellants received a copy of the Resolution on December 7, 1989, they had until
December 22, 1989 within which to perfect an administrative appeal and until such time, the said
Resolution was not yet final and executory." DSATCI
"xxx xxx xxx
"It cannot be denied, therefore, that when appellees commenced to demolish appellants'
houses as early as December 8, 1989 and eventually on December 12, 1989, neither the Resolution
of the Building Official nor the Demolition Order itself were final and executory." 3
Petitioners filed the instant petition contending that the appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the
premature demolition of respondents' houses entitled them to the award of damages. Petitioners pointed out that
the order of the Office of the Building Official was eventually upheld on appeal by the Department of Public
Works and Highways in its decision of 14 March 1990. Furthermore, petitioners added, the structures subject
matter of the demolition order were declared to be dangerous structures by the Office of the Building Official and,
as such, could be abated to avoid danger to the public.
The Court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, 4 constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.
Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy 5 and to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof, 6 but the exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights
rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due;
and to observe honesty and good faith. 7 When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this
instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the
question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by
Article 19 of the Civil Code. CSDTac
At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents received a
copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of
a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but by the precipitate action of
petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal),the latter were
effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of
Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to
secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of
respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly indefensible.
The Court, however, finds the award of P75,000.00 exemplary damages and another of P75,000.00 moral
damages for each respondent to be rather excessive given the circumstances; the awards must be reduced to the
reasonable amounts of P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P20,000.00 moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by reducing the awards of
P75,000.00 exemplary damages and of P75,000.00 moral damages to each respondent reduced to P20,000.00
exemplary damages and P20,000.00 moral damages for each respondent. In all other respects, the decision of the
appellate court is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.,is on leave.
||| (Rellosa v. Pellosis, G.R. No. 138964, [August 9, 2001], 414 PHIL 786-793)
[G.R. No. 161188. June 13, 2008.]
 Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA
DUYAN, petitioners, vs . ARTEMIO CABANSAG, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision 1 dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution 2 dated October 28, 2003, dismissing petitioners' appeal
and affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated August 10, 1994 rendered in
Civil Case No. Q-91-10541. IaEACT
The facts of the case are as follows:
Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October 1991.
According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa
Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the
Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. del
Prado), in behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves
the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed against him.
Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent suffered damages and
was constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. del Prado. 3
Atty. del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely acting in
behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part
of an 800-square meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided
into two parts. The 400-square meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with
the agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that
respondent is only renting the property which he occupies. 4
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994, in favor of
respondent. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds in favor of
the plaintiff and hereby orders the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:
1. P150,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
3. P20,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and
4. to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
Nala and Atty. del Prado appealed to the CA. The herein assailed CA Decision dated December 19,
2002 affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, thus: EAICTS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is
heretofore AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendants-appellants are ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. It is
further ordered to pay him exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and P10,000.00,
attorney's fees.
 SO ORDERED. 6
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA took note of the Decision dated September 5, 1994 rendered by
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, dismissing Civil Case No. 91-8821, an action for reconveyance of real
property and cancellation of TCT No. 281115 with damages, filed by Nala against spouses Gomez. 7
Hence, herein petition by the heirs of Nala (petitioners) 8 with the following assignment of errors:
a) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the right of Purisima Nala to assert her
rights and interest over the property.
b) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in the case for reconveyance which upheld the rights and interest of Purisima
Nala and her children over a certain parcel of land, a portion of which is subject of the
present case.
c) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees without any
basis. 9
Atty. del Prado filed a motion for extension of time to file his separate petition but it was denied by the
Court per its Resolution dated January 19, 2004 issued in G.R. No. 160829.
Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her interests over
the property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses Gomez to respondent when the
demand letters were sent. What she was aware of was the fact that spouses Gomez were managing the rentals
on the property by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Eulogio Duyan. When spouses Gomez
failed to remit the rentals and claimed ownership of the property, it was then that Nala decided to procure the
services of legal counsel to protect their rights over the property.
Petitioners also contend that it was error for the CA to take note of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No.
91-8821 without further noting that the CA had already reversed and set aside said RTC Decision and ordered
reconveyance of the property to Nala and her children in a Decision dated March 8, 2000 rendered in CA-G.R.
CV No. 49163. Petitioners also argue that respondent did not substantiate his claim for damages. TIAEac
Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision
of law under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in respondent's
complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should
be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only
for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
injure another. 10
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. 11
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is
presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. 12Bad faith, on the other hand, does
not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and
 conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes
of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. 13
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. del
Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was
ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and
that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after
respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact that
respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the
demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice
could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the
property. aCSTDc
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. del Prado's acts were done with the sole
intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm
which results from the injury. 14 Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. 15
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. del Prado to send the demand letters.
She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by
respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. 16 Thus, whatever damages are suffered
by respondent should be borne solely by him.
Nala's acts in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact that the
property has already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision dated March 8, 2000 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 49163, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and ordered the reconveyance of the
property to petitioners, and TCT No. 281115 was declared canceled. Said CA Decision was affirmed by this
Court in its Decision dated March 18, 2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which became final and executory on July 27,
2005.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution
dated October 28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48580 are NULLIFIED. Civil
Case No. Q-91-10541 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. aSDHCT
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Reyes and Brion, * JJ., concur.
||| (Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 161188, [June 13, 2008], 577 PHIL 310-318)
[G.R. No. 164273. March 28, 2007.]

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, petitioner, vs . CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
 Before this Court is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62554 dated January 30, 2004 which set aside the November 25, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 10, Cebu City and reinstated the Decision of RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City dated May 29, 1998 in
Civil Case No. CEB-16474; and the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. CDScaT
The facts are as follows:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman 2 in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card
(Mastercard) bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and
his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar
made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to
P635,000.00. 3
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth
P237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said destination. 4 DEICTS
Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia, the same was not honored. 5 And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency
(Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card
was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. 6 He further claims that his
humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use
blacklisted cards. 7 Aznar and his group returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994. 8
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence
blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and
prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. 9 He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of
his card. 10 To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated
as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan
Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) 11 which shows that his card in question
was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit. 12 AEDISC
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar's card. It also contended that under the terms and
conditions governing the issuance and use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor
of its cards by any merchant affiliate, and that its liability for any action or incident which may be brought against it
in relation to the issuance and use of its credit cards is limited to P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven whichever
is lesser. 13
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar's card, Citibank's Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores,
presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of
Aznar's trip. 14
On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its decision
dismissing Aznar's complaint for lack of merit. 15 The trial court held that as between the computer print-
out 16 presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins 17 presented by Citibank, the latter had more
weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank. 18 The trial court also held that
even if it was shown that Aznar's credit card was dishonored by a merchant establishment, Citibank was not shown
to have acted with malice or bad faith when the same was dishonored. 19 CHaDIT
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case saying that Judge Marcos could
not be impartial as he himself is a holder of a Citibank credit card. 20 The case was re-raffled 21 and on November
25, 1998, the RTC, this time through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of Branch 10 of Cebu City, issued an Order granting
Aznar's motion for reconsideration, as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The DECISION
dated May 29, 1998 is hereby reconsidered, and consequently, the defendant is hereby condemned
liable to pay the following sums of money:
a) P10,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P1,000,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
d) P200,000.00 as litigation expenses. 22 IcHTED
Judge De la Peña ruled that: it is improbable that a man of Aznar's stature would fabricate Exh. "G" or the
computer print-out which shows that Aznar's Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over
the limit; Exh. "G" was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of business in the modern credit card
industry and Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking
judicial notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out
bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznar's Mastercard; no
rebutting evidence was presented by Citibank to prove that Aznar's Mastercard was not dishonored, as all it proved
was that said credit card was not included in the blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted the additional deposit of
P485,000.00 from Aznar, there was an implied novation and Citibank was obligated to increase Aznar's credit limit
and ensure that Aznar will not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard; Citibank's
failure to comply with its obligation constitutes gross negligence as it caused Aznar inconvenience, mental anguish
and social humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of the credit card limiting the liability of the bank to P1,000.00 or
the actual damage proven, whichever is lower, is a contract of adhesion which must be interpreted against
Citibank. 23
Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case against Judge De la Peña for
grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence, claiming among others that said judge rendered his
decision without having read the transcripts. The administrative case was held in abeyance pending the outcome of
the appeal filed by Citibank with the CA. 24 ASaTHc
On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank's appeal thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed order of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16474, is hereby SET
ASIDE and the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 20, Cebu City in this case is REINSTATED. aASDTE
SO ORDERED. 25
The CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the blacklisting of his card and only presumed the
same when it was dishonored in certain establishments; such dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was
blacklisted by Citibank; Exh. "G" is an electronic document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence26 or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 27 by anyone
who saw the document executed or written; Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh. "G", thus it
must be excluded; the unrefuted testimony of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency and
certain establishments abroad is not sufficient to justify the award of damages in his favor, absent any showing that
Citibank had anything to do with the said dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control over the actions of its
merchant affiliates, thus it should not be held liable for the dishonor of Aznar's credit card by said
establishments. 28
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26,
2004. 29 IEDHAT
Parenthetically, the administrative case against Judge De la Peña was activated and on April 29, 2005, the
Court's Third Division 30 found respondent judge guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and ordered
his suspension for six months. The Court held that Judge De la Peña erred in basing his Order on a manifestation
submitted by Aznar to support his Motion for Reconsideration, when no copy of such manifestation was served on
the adverse party and it was filed beyond office hours. The Court also noted that Judge De la Peña made an
egregiously large award of damages in favor of Aznar which opened himself to suspicion. 31
Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition for review alleging that: the CA erroneously made its own
factual finding that his Mastercard was not blacklisted when the matter of blacklisting was already a non-issue in the
November 25, 1998 Order of the RTC; the RTC found that Aznar's Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that
it was declared over the credit limit; this factual finding is supported by Exh. "G" and by his (Aznar's) testimony;
the issue of dishonor on the ground of 'DECL OVERLIMIT', although not alleged in the complaint, was tried with
the implied consent of the parties and should be treated as if raised in the pleadings pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10
of the Rules of Civil Procedure; 32 Exh. "G" cannot be excluded as it qualifies as an electronic evidence following
the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best
Evidence Rule; Exh. "G" has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the signature of Nubi, thus the same is
reliable for the purpose for which it was generated; the RTC judge correctly credited the testimony of Aznar on the
issuance of the computer print-out as Aznar saw that it was signed by Nubi; said testimony constitutes the "other
evidence showing the integrity and reliability of the print-out to the satisfaction of the judge" which is required
under the Rules on Electronic Evidence; the trial court was also correct in finding that Citibank was grossly
negligent in failing to credit the additional deposit and make the necessary entries in its systems to prevent Aznar
from encountering any embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard. 33 TcEaDS

Citibank, in its Comment, contends that: Aznar never had personal knowledge that his credit card was
blacklisted as he only presumed such fact; the issue of dishonor on the ground that the card was declared over the
limit was also never tried with the implied consent of both parties; Aznar's self-serving testimony is not sufficient to
prove the integrity and reliability of Exh. "G"; Aznar did not declare that it was Nubi who printed the document
and that said document was printed in his presence as he merely said that the print-out was provided him; there is
also no annotation on Exh. "G" to establish that it was Nubi who printed the same; assuming further that Exh. "G"
is admissible and Aznar's credit card was dishonored, Citibank still cannot be held liable for damages as it only
shows that Aznar's credit card was dishonored for having been declared over the limit; Aznar's cause of action
against Citibank hinged on the alleged blacklisting of his card which purportedly caused its dishonor; dishonor
alone, however, is not sufficient to award Aznar damages as he must prove that the dishonor was caused by a
grossly negligent act of Citibank; the award of damages in favor of Aznar was based on Article 1170 34 of the Civil
Code, i.e., there was fraud, negligence or delay in the performance of its obligation; there was no proof, however
that Citibank committed fraud or delay or that it contravened its obligations towards Aznar; the terms and
conditions of the credit card cannot be considered as a contract of adhesion since Aznar was entirely free to reject
the card if he did not want the conditions stipulated therein; a person whose stature is such that he is expected to be
more prudent with respect to his transactions cannot later on be heard to complain for being ignorant or having
been forced into merely consenting to the contract. 35
In his Reply, Aznar contended that to a layman, the term "blacklisting" is synonymous with the words "hot
list" or "declared overlimit"; and whether his card was blacklisted or declared over the limit, the same was
dishonored due to the fault or gross negligence of Citibank. 36 TIDHCc
Aznar also filed a Memorandum raising as issues the following:
I. Whether or not the augmentation deposit in the amount of P485,000.00 of the Petitioner
constitutes relative extinctive novation;
II. Whether or not the purchases made by Petitioner were beyond his credit limit;
III. Whether or not the issues of dishonor by reason of overlimit was tried with the consent of the
parties;
IV. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" is an electronic document."
V. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" constitutes electronic evidence;
 VI. Whether or not the agreement between the parties is a contract of adhesion;
VII. Whether or not the Respondent is negligent in not crediting the deposits of the
Respondent. 37 EacHCD
Aznar further averred in his Memorandum that Citibank assured him that with the use of his Mastercard, he
would never be turned down by any merchant store, and that under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Exh. "G" is admissible in evidence. 38
Citibank also filed a Memorandum reiterating its earlier arguments. 39
Stripped to its essentials, the only question that needs to be answered is: whether Aznar has established his
claim against Citibank.
The answer is no.
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a
preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has the burden of proving it. 40
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which
caused its dishonor in several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in
Indonesia where he was humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a blacklisted
card. CScaDH
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of
evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the "hot list." 41
Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted by
Citibank and only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card. ASTcEa
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the "hot" list was confirmed to be
authentic".
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A. Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the Merchant's store, I do not
know, they called up somebody for verification then later they told me that "your card is
being denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not know whom they called
up; where they verified. So, when it is denied that's presumed to be
blacklisted. IESDCH
Q. So the word that was used was denied?
A. Denied.
Q. And after you were told that your card was denied you presumed that it was
blacklisted?
A. Definitely.
Q. So your statement that your card was allegedly blacklisted is only your presumption
drawn from the fact, from your allegations, that it was denied at the merchandise
store?
A. Yes, sir. 42 (Emphasis supplied)
The dishonor of Aznar's Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was
blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar's own admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala
Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored. 43
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his
Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT"
opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012. TEIHDa
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as
its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b)
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. HCISED
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written,
neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to
him said computer print-out. Indeed, all he was able to allege in his testimony are the following:
Q I show to you a Computer Print Out captioned as On Line Authorization Activity Report
where it is shown that the Preferred Master Card Number 5423392007867012 was denied
as per notation on the margin of this Computer Print Out, is this the document evidencing
the dishonor of your Preferred Master Card? cTADCH
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes sir, after that Ingtan incident, I went straight to the Service Agency there and on the left
hand side you will be able to see the name of the person in-charged [sic] there certifying
that really my card is being blacklisted and there is the signature there of the agency.
ATTY. NAVARRO:
The witness, your honor, is pointing to the signature over the handwritten name of Victrina
Elnado Nubi which I pray, your honor, that the Computer Print Out be marked as our
Exhibit "G" and the remarks at the left hand bottom portion of Victorina Elnado Nubi
with her signature thereon be encircled and be marked as our Exhibit "G-1".
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Aznar, where did you secure this Computer Print Out marked as Exhibit
"G"? HSIADc
A This is provided by that Agency, your honor. They were the ones who provided me with
this. So what the lady did, she gave me the Statement and I requested her to sign to
show proof that my Preferred Master Card has been rejected. 44 (Emphasis
supplied). CIHAED
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which
is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. — The person seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule. cCDAHE
Section 2. Manner of authentication. — Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the
same; ScAIaT
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized
by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were
applied to the document; or
 (c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence showing
integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not convinced. Aznar's testimony
that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said
person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-out's integrity and reliability. As
correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was
issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the
agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because
while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-
out. 45 HSIaAT

Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and how
the said information could be relied upon as true. In fact, Aznar to repeat, testified as follows:
ATTY. NERI
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the "hot" list was confirmed to be
authentic"
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the Merchant's store, I do not
know, they called up somebody for verification then later they told me that "your card is
being denied ". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not know whom they
called up; where they verified. So, when it is denied that's presumed to be
blacklisted. 46 (Emphasis supplied) jurcda
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to entries in the course of
business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads: ITaCEc
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 47 DAEaTS
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on the computer print-out
the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal
side were handwritten the words "Sorry for the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It is not
clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated in the print-out and was the one who printed the
same. The handwritten annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who printed the
same and only handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the provision above
mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did petitioner establish in what professional capacity did Mario or
Nubi make the entries, or whether the entries were made in the performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only shows that the use of the credit card of petitioner was
denied because it was already over the limit. There is no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that there
was gross negligence on the part of Citibank in declaring that the credit card has been used over the limit. TaDAIS
The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh. "G" is the amount of "6,289,195.10" opposite petitioner's
account number, which data, petitioner did not clarify. 48 As plaintiff in this case, it was incumbent on him to prove
that he did not actually incur the said amount which is above his credit limit. As it is, the Court cannot see how
Exh. "G" could help petitioner's claim for damages.
The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted his card through fraud or gross negligence is likewise
effectively negated by the evidence of Citibank which was correctly upheld by the RTC and the CA, to wit:
. . . Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit Card Department of defendant Bank,
presented documents known as Warning Cancellation Bulletin for July 10, 17, 24, and 31, 1994
(Exhibits '3', '3-1' to '3-38', '4', '4-1' to '4-38' '5', '5-1' to '5-39' and '6', '6-1' to '6-39'), for August 7,
1994 (Exhibit[s] '7', '7-1' to '7-37'), for August 8, 1994 (Exhibit[s] '8', '8-1' to '8-20') which show
that plaintiff's Citibank preferred mastercard was not placed in a hot list or was not
blacklisted. HEITAD
The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) (Exhibits '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8' and their
submarkings) which covered the period of four (4) days in July 1994 (from July 10, 17, 24 and 31,
1994), and two (2) days in August 1994, (August 7 and 8, 1994), when plaintiff traveled in the
aforementioned Asian countries showed that said Citibank preferred mastercard had never been
placed in a 'hot list' or the same was blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit cards which
had been cancelled by the defendant bank were all contained, reported and listed in said Warning
Cancellation Bulletin which were issued and released on a regular basis. aTEHIC
These three hundred (300) Warning Cancellation Bulletins pieces of documentary proofs,
all in all, adduced by defendant pointed to the fact that said plaintiff's credit car (sic) was not
among those found in said bulletins as having been cancelled for the period for which the said
bulletins had been issued.
Between said computer print out (Exhibit 'G') and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins
(Exhibits '3' to '8' and their submarkings) the latter documents adduced by defendant are entitled
to greater weight than that said computer print out presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of
whether the plaintiff's preferred master card was actually placed in the 'hot list' or blacklisted for
the following reasons:
The first reason is that the due execution and authentication of these Warning Cancellation
Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly established and identified by defendant's own witness, Dennis
Flores, one of the bank's officers, who is the head of its credit card department, and, therefore,
competent to testify on the said bulletins as having been issued by the defendant bank showing
that plaintiff's preferred master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the Bank's 'hot list'.
But on the other hand, plaintiff's computer print out (Exhibit 'G') was never authenticated or its
due execution had never been duly established. Thus, between a set of duly authenticated
commercial documents, the Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits '3' to '8' and their
submarkings), presented by defendants (sic) and an unauthenticated private document, plaintiff's
computer print out (Exhibit 'G'), the former deserves greater evidentiary weight supporting the
findings of this Court that plaintiff's preferred master card (Exhibit '1') had never been blacklisted
at all or placed in a so-called 'hot list' by defendant. 49 EcASIC
Petitioner next argues that with the additional deposit he made in his account which was accepted by
Citibank, there was an implied novation and Citibank was under the obligation to increase his credit limit and make
the necessary entries in its computerized systems in order that petitioner may not encounter any embarrassing
situation with the use of his credit card. Again, the Court finds that petitioner's argument on this point has no leg to
stand on.
Citibank never denied that it received petitioner's additional deposit. 50 It even claimed that petitioner was
able to purchase plane tickets from Cebu to Kuala Lumpur in the amount of P237,170.00, which amount was
beyond his P150,000.00 limit, because it was able to credit petitioner's additional deposit to his account. Flores of
Citibank testified:
COURT:
Q When was this ticket purchased, after the account was augmented or before?
A After the account was augmented, Your Honor, because there is no way we can approve a
P250,000.00 purchase with a P150,000.00 credit limit. 51
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. NERI:
For the record, your honor, the deposit of P450,000.00 was made as per exhibit of the
plaintiff on June 28. The purchase of the tickets amount to P237,000.00 was
approved and debited on the account of Mr. Aznar on July 20, your honor. The
deposit was made about a month before the purchase of the tickets as per
documentary exhibits, your honor. ITScAE
COURT:
So, Atty. Navarro, what do you say to that explanation?
ATTY. NAVARRO [counsel of petitioner]:
That is correct, your honor, that is borne out by the records, your honor. (Emphasis
supplied)
COURT: (to witness)
Q So, I think Atty. Navarro is only after whether a credit line could be extended?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Even if there is no augmenting?
A No, sir, it is not possible. So, the only way the P237,000.00 transaction could be approved
was by way of advance payment which actually happened in this case because
there is no way that the P237,000.00 can be approved with the P150,000.00 credit
limit. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
The allegations of blacklisting not having been proved, is Citibank liable for damages for the dishonor of
Aznar's Mastercard?
Again, the answer is no. HAEDIS
Citibank, in its attempt to evade liability, invokes paragraphs 7 and 15 of the terms and conditions governing
the issuance of its Mastercard which read:
7. MERCHANT AFFILIATES. [Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored by
any merchant affiliate for any reason. Furthermore, [the cardholder] will not hold [Citibank]
responsible for any defective product or service purchased through the Card. HSDIaC
xxx xxx xxx
15. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. In any action arising from this agreement or any
incident thereto which [the cardholder] or any other party may file against [Citibank], [Citibank's]
 liability shall not exceed One Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] or the actual damages proven,
whichever is lesser. 53
On this point, the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and conditions of Citibank's Mastercard
constitute a contract of adhesion. It is settled that contracts between cardholders and the credit card companies are
contracts of adhesion, so-called, because their terms are prepared by only one party while the other merely affixes
his signature signifying his adhesion thereto. 54 IcESDA

In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states that "[Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is
not honored by any merchant affiliate for any reason . . . ". While it is true that Citibank may have no control of all the
actions of its merchant affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect, however, to give it blanket
freedom from liability if its card is dishonored by any merchant affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the
statement vague and as the said terms and conditions constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its
provisions must be construed against the party who prepared the contract, 55 in this case Citibank.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions which limits its liability to P1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven, whichever is lesser.
Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being unconscionable as it precludes payment of a
larger amount even though damage may be clearly proven. This Court is not precluded from ruling out blind
adherence to the terms of a contract if the attendant facts and circumstances show that they should be ignored for
being obviously too one-sided. 56 TaISEH
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court still
cannot award damages in favor of petitioner.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law; thus there must first be
a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury. 57
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the
actuations of the other party. It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof
that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the
claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 58 and
2220 59 of the Civil Code. 60 HSTCcD
In culpa contractualor breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive. 61 DEICHc
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he suffered when his credit
card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency's personnel insinuated that he could be a
swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by
preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said suffering.
As the Court pronounced in BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 62
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered
damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt,
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury to those instances in which the
 loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. 63 SDHacT
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.

||| (Aznar v. Citibank, N.A. (Philippines), G.R. No. 164273, [March 28, 2007], 548 PHIL 218-242)
[G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.]

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT;

RULE AND EXCEPTIONS. — It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial
court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the
opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. (People vs. Garcia,
89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs.
Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs., Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985];
People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414 [1991]; People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991]). Equally settled is the rule that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the
lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., this Court took
the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions: "(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590
Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,
103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,);
and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970])." Petitioner has not endeavored
to point out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; TORTS; ART. 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE; CONSTRUED. — Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is
an Anglo-American or common law concept.Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts. with certain exceptions, are to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite
spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21
fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. (TOLENTINO, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1,
1985 ed., 72).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; RULE; RATIONALE. — The existing rule is that a
breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629
[1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960]) Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: "The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.
866 [1933]). The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has
led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states . . ." This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books (Philippine National Bank
vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES, JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF FRAUD AND DECEIT
BEHIND IT; CASE AT BAR. — In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion,
and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction —
the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction. Prior decisions of this Court
clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction.
5. ID.; PARI DELICTO RULE; DEFINED; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — The pari delicto rule
does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." (Black's Laws Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004). At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto. "Equity
often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
imposition or undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud." (37 AM Jur 2d. 401). In Mangayao vs. Lasud, (11 SCRA 158
[1964]) We declared: "Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1 of
the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmedin toto the 16 October 1989 Decision or
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. cdphil

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987; the latter courted and proposed to marry
her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him;
a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in
the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees
and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money
and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
"1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian, citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City
since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum-Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper.
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan
City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the Manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986." cdll
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the
costs.
3. All other claims are denied." 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent
were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by
reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking
for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to
come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
"According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Banaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and
their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiff's parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good
 and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise
allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would
tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of
this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort
the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise
to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod send by the barangay captain went to talk to
defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the
parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his
desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to
the forthcoming wedding." 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G
R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs. Cdpr
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:
"First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 23 years old
at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin
prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had a boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass 'not used and accustomed to the trend of modern urban life', and
certainly would (sic) not have allowed 'herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her.' In fact, we agree with the lower court
that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought
because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the
pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a
nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted
that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on
April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious
study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Banaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some
kind of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to
her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from
her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
 Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that
when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he
came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like
what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in
pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in
order to satisfy his lust on her." 11
and then concluded:
"In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people
and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-
appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court
ordered him to do in its decision in this case." 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury
or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a
Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
possess good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship,
the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates
that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with. prLL
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in
this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the
latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or value which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus,
in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401
[1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970])."
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is
set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable
has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise
suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily
to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states .." 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
"'But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule: LLpr
'ARTICLE 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.'
'An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
 grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes." 21
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional
and malicious acts. with certain exceptions, are to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts
or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception
on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission
in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because: LibLex
" . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot,
but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant 'surrendered herself' to
 petitioner because, 'overwhelmed by her love' for him, she 'wanted to bind' him'by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.'"
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27
Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
'To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by
the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do
have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer' (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out sexual desire or
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such
cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by; which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662).
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude
that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged,
no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint." 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
" . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733,
Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence
 recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of
moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . . ."
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding preparations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)." LLpr
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
"It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is
correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance
of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a
man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal
law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason."
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because
of her own doing," 33 for:

" . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . (Annex C ) or a waitress
(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered
by the petitioner." 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending,
if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled
by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because
of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as
she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto. cdphil
"Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has
been brought about by the imposition or undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the
original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud." 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
"Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where
one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209)."
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones
the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner. cdll
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J ., Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J ., is on terminal leave.
||| (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97336, [February 19, 1993])
[G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004.]

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner, vs . LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
69537, 1 promulgated on 17 January 2002. 2 The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision denying
respondent's claim for damages against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay moral damages to the former in the
amount of P100,000.00.
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the
Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were
already there including the bride, the bride's parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the official
photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride
who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites
and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be
held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the
suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang
ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's bag. It turned
out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which
she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings,
one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of about one million pesos. The hotel
security was called in to help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were
searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the
evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted
them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner
kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.” Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel premises
was also searched but the search yielded nothing.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation
as a result of petitioner's imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20 February
1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
268. In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees.
Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single
out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely
a police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000, dismissing Valmonte's complaint for damages. It
ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if
damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was
presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit.
The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social humiliation, or
that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner's wrongful act.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did
not slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented. HDTSIE
The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled
out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the testimony of Serena Manding,
corroborating Valmonte's claim that petitioner confronted her and uttered words to the effect that she was the only
one who went out of the room and that she was the one who took the jewelry. The appellate court held that
Valmonte's claim for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation
by the police but rather petitioner's act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It categorized
petitioner's utterance defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court
concluded that petitioner's verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in
the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioner's suspicion. Such unfounded accusation
entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated,
deeply insulted, and embarrassed. However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual
damages.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court's conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not
conform to the evidence presented. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained
of, it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.
In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual conclusions reached by the appellate
court. The cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must raise only questions of
law, 3 and judicial review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence unless there
is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 4 This Court, while not a trier of facts, may review the
evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court
of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken. 5
Contrary to the trial court's finding, we find sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that petitioner's
imputations against respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.
Petitioner's testimony was shorn of substance and consists mainly of denials. She claimed not to have
uttered the words imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned the latter's name to the
authorities as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 6
Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioner's testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in
great detail her distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how rudely she was treated by petitioner
right after she returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the words “Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang kumuha.” Thereafter, her body was searched
including her bag and her car. Worse, during the reception, she was once more asked by the hotel security to go to
the ladies room and she was again bodily searched. 7
Sereña Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondent's testimony. She testified that petitioner
confronted respondent in the presence of all the people inside the suite accusing her of being the only one who
went out of the comfort room before the loss of the jewelry. Manding added that respondent was embarrassed
because everybody else in the room thought she was a thief. 8 If only to debunk petitioner's assertion that she did
not utter the accusatory remarks in question publicly and with malice, Manding's testimony on the point deserves to
be reproduced, thus:
Q After that what did she do?
A Then Leo came out from the other room she said, she is (sic) the one I only saw from the
comfort room.
Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs. Carpio on that matter?
A She said “siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R.”
Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant referring to?
A Leo Valmonte. AEaSTC
Q Did she say anything else, the defendant?
A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she saw in the C.R. After that she get (sic) the
paper bag then the jewelry were already gone.
Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte regarding that fact?
A Yes.
Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs. Valmonte?
A “Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko.”
Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte were there other people
inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
 Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs. Valmonte?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs. Carpio said that to Mrs. Valmonte?
A “Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang magnanakaw siya. Kasi marami na kaming
nandodoon, dumating na yung couturier pati yung video man and we sir.

Q Who was the person you [were] alleging “na nakakahiya” whose (sic) being accused or being
somebody who stole those item of jewelry?
A “Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan siya. Sa dami namin doon siya yung
napagbintangan.”
Q And who is Leo, what is her full name?
A Leo Valmonte.
Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people inside the room?
A Yes, the mother of the bride.
Q And who else did she talk to?
A The father of the bride also.
Q And what did the defendant tell the mother regarding this matter?
A “Nawawala yung alahas ko.” Sabi naman nung mother baka naman hindi mo dala tignan mo
munang mabuti.
Q Who was that other person that she talked to?
A Father of the bride. 9
Significantly, petitioner's counsel elected not to pursue her cross-examination of the witness on this point
following her terse and firm declaration that she remembered petitioner's exact defamatory words in answer to the
counsel's question. 10
Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise contradicted petitioner's allegation that she did
not suspect or mention the name of respondent as her suspect in the loss of the jewelry. 11
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action. 12
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he
sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which
are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to
serve as guides for human conduct. 13 First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as
“abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.” To find the existence of an
abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. 14 When a right is exercised in a manner which
discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
accountable. 15 One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to
another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts
with negligence or abuse. 16
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
which read, thus:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same. aCTADI
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals or good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a
transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
In the case at bar, petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that
by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. 17 This
being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but
outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss
of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the
malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is
an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her
missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently,
she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals
which affirm those of the trial court, 18 we sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that
respondent's claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and
must therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of
certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork. 19
Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury 20 in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. 21 Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, courts
are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their
discretion. 22 Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant, 23 or to enrich a
complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. In any case, award of moral damages
must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. 24
Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we rule that the appellate court did not err in
awarding moral damages. Considering respondent's social standing, and the fact that her profession is based
primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly
tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings with her clients, the award of
P100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and reasonable assessment of respondent's damages. DTaSIc
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno and Callejo, Sr., JJ ., concur.
 Austria-Martinez, J ., is on official leave.
Chico-Nazario, J ., is on leave.

||| (Carpio v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866, [September 9, 2004], 481 PHIL 352-365)
[G.R. No. L-19671. November 29, 1965.]

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-

appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendants-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE; FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FILIPINO CITIZENS DECREED

AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE; REMARRIAGE OF DIVORCED
CONSORT. — A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the new
Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce
entitled to validity in this country.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INNOCENT CONSORT ENTITLED TO LEGAL SEPARATION. — The
remarriage of the divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitles the
latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law.
3. ID.; ID,; ID.; INVALID DIVORCE ENTITLES INNOCENT CONSORT TO RECOVER
DAMAGES. — The desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages.
4. ID.; ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS AGAINST PARENTS OF ONE
CONSORT; ABSENCE OF PROOF OF MALICE. — An action for alienation of affection against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

DECISION

REYES, J. B. L., J p:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees,
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena 1 , all surnamed "Escaño" respectively. 2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late-afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished
stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one
Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of previous love affair and was duly registered
with the local civil registrar.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital
future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A
few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicenta went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the
intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that
she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke
(t.s.n., vol. 111, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos
College students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that
day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor
returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's
welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish". She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor
(Exh. 1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, that she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she
intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character". On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court
by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her
marriage (Exh. "D-2").
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo
Moran; while her parents denied that they had in anyway influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed
for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of
P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages
and in dismissing the complaint;
2. In not holding the defendant parents Don Mamerto Escaño and the heirs of Doña Mena
Escaño liable for damages;
3. In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents
on their counterclaim; and
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta
Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the
record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented
to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of the Church and State
but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that —
"SEC. 1. Ecclesiastical Requisites.—Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacityof the contracting parties and their consent." (Italics supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not
essential to give the marriage civil effects 3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which
provided the following:
"SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements:—No marriage shall be declared
invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if,
when it was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person
who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal."
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60
Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu.
Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for
divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even
granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by
fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly,
Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
 It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine Law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character". At the time the divorce decree
was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subject to Philippine
law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act. No. 386), already in force at the time,
expressly provided:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of person are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad."
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact it does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in
contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book K, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially
in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country."
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law can not be nullified by acts of private parties
(Civil Code, Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort can
not confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Arca vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that
her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute
in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil
Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit, nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under
our law, on the basis of adultery (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a remarriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered
under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a
matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became
effective: and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely
reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil
Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
 "As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize
their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the Mory
children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore de rejected. The right
to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code can not be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous
relations." (Italics supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo
Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the
proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In
not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in
the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
"The hardships of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known
to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such
laws are too strict or too liberal." (p.72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the
late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affection of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her
husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters
written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2- Escaño" and "2-Vicenta", Rec. on App. pp. 270-274). In these
letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused
by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride" "effrontery and audacity" (sic). Plaintiff was admitted to the
Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicenta had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even
after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of
Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their
religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage
ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to
proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in
their decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. pp. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently and being of
age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so
doing, certainly can not be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives,
which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
"Sec. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or kin. — The law distinguishes between the
right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of right
in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability
of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent is
liable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
 wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where
he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations, in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and
liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it
has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may
in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so
long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause
him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied
in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son."
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While his suit may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are
not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicenta Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in
damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or
undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact
is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit have
wounded said defendant's feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured
their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present
society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said
defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore,
reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither
is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in this country.
(2) That the remarriage of the divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified, as follows:
 (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorney's fee.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
||| (Tenchavez v. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, [November 29, 1965], 122 PHIL 752-776)
[G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964.]

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-

appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; WHEN ACTIONABLE WRONG. —

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring
promisor must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED IN AN
ACTIONABLE BREACH OF PROMISE SUIT. — When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the said Code.
Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant
clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
3. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS IN PETITION FOR BELIEF MUST
STATE FACTS CONSTITUTING DEFENSE. — An affidavit of merits supporting a petition for relief from
judgment must state facts constituting a valid defense. Where such an affidavit merely states conclusions or
opinions, it is not valid.
4. ID.; TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER; CLERK OF COURT MAY BE VALIDLY DESIGNATED.
— The procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule
34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO DESIGNATION OF COMMISSIONER NOT
NECESSARY WHERE HE IS IN DEFAULT. — The defendant's consent to the designation of the clerk of
court as commissioner to receive evidence is not necessary where he was declared in default and thus had no
standing in court.
6. AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT; MUST CONTAIN FACTS AND NOT CONCLUSIONS OF FACT.
— Affidavits of merit to be valid must contain facts and not mere conclusions of facts.
7. ID.; ID.; WHEN CONCLUSION OF FACT, NOT A FACT, DEEMED CONTAINED IN
AFFIDAVIT. — An affidavit of merit stating no facts, but merely an inference that defendant's failure was due
to fortuitous events and/or circumstances beyond his control, is held to contain a conclusion of fact, not a fact.
 DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J p:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning
and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
"Will have to postpone wedding. My mother oppose it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.
"Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create
a scandal.
Paquing"
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
"NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING"
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.09 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00
as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it out. But the court, on August 2, 1955,
ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear
"the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before the court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant's petition for relief. The counsel
stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility
of an amicable settlement. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September
8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time, however, defendant's counsel informed the
court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court.
In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to
set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
 A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must
be duly supported by an affidavit of merit stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of
Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and
valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control". An affidavit of merits like this, stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs.
P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence
adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court
pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure,
the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court
(Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil., 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for
breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960)
as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not
an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code
the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued. (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-
be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses
for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding —
My mother opposes it . . ." He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon". But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his aforestated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is
raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of
moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219(10) of the new Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could
not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the new Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner". The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . . .
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.

||| (Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, [December 26, 1964], 120 PHIL 1440-1447)
[G.R. No. L-17396. May 30, 1962.]

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs . ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. DAMAGES; ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS. — Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an

ingenious scheme or trickery and seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by
the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because
he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiff even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until
she disappeared from the parental home, Held; The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00, exclusive of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts
alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe,
an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral
damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately
and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely
of law.
 The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe.
At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a
married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of
Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the
same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father.
Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who
regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other
and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their
infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about
their love affair reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden
from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B
España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her
brothers and sisters checked up her things and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found
a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper
approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant. In English it reads:
"Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will
have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love"
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present
there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the new Civil Code which provides:
"Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a
married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that an
illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation
of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable
for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.
Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the
defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and
sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply
fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and
in full consciousness of the disastrous consequences that such an affair would naturally bring on both of them.
This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a
married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection
cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency
of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine
love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about
their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and
 even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental
home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering
the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Costs
against appellee.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ. concur.

||| (Pe v. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, [May 30, 1962], 115 PHIL 186-191)
[G.R. No. L-18630. December 17, 1966.]

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI

SANTOS, respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.

Antonio V. Bonoan for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; REQUISITES FOR RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE
21, CIVIL CODE. — The essential feature under Article 21 of the Civil Code is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
2. ID.; ID.; NO RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 21, IF SEDUCTION IS ABSENT;
CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar the facts show that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, plaintiff-appellee,
a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is here voluntariness and mutual passion, for had
the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relation upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code and, no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond
to the child of the plaintiff against defendant-appellant, if any.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee
herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed
and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time, reciprocated the tender feelings";
that in consideration of defendant's promises of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for
carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to
her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in
IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support
herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a
month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the
lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support,
but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
"ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to
proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs.Piansay, 109 Phil. 640;
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of
Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in
1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the
Code), the Commission stated:
"But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
'ART. 23. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damage.'
"An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of 'X'. A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
 incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action."
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part or the seducer to which the woman has yielded
(U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
"To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and
the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56).
She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer" (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
"On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the
female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the
act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:
"I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while
defendant is also of legal age, single, and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be
served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in
December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed
and professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated
the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young
people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and
sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff
consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with
him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in
December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant though his
protestations, of love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was
confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and
pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises
and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff, since about
 July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement
and his promises."

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child
of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of
First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

||| (Tanjanco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, [December 17, 1966], 125 PHIL 158-163)
[G.R. No. 69866. April 15, 1988.]

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO, NOEL ETABAG,

DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN,
ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO,
ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA,
MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO
TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN, petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN.
FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL.
GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, LT. COL. PANFILO M.
LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO
TANGO, 1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT. BIENVENIDO
BALABA, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES LIABLE. — Article 32 of the Civil
Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do
not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS. — The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
 petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT DOES NOT VALIDATE ILLEGAL ARREST OR DETENTION. — The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
4. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR NOT APPLICABLE TO
SUPERIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES. — The doctrine
of respondent superior is inapplicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally
limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. — Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person
"directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus,
it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax
his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties
of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception
that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of
human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
7. REMEDIAL LAW' MOTION TO DISMISS; FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, A
GROUND; DETERMINED BY THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. — A motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the
complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no
others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint.
8. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; AUTHORITY TO APPEAR FOR A PARTY, ASSUMED. —
The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or
challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WITH RESPECT TO
PARTIES WHOSE LAWYERS DID NOT SIGN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of
November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiffs. They needed no specific authority
to do that. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the
motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the
plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is
obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of
the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the
motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
1. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; PERSONS COVERED. — All persons, be they public officers or employees,
or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat,
violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand
liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR; NOT APPLICABLE TO OFFICERS
OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES. — The case at bar rejects the automatic
application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer
jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who
committed such transgressions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERIOR OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN
ABDICATION OF PROPER SUPERVISION OF SUBORDINATES. — The judgment gives the caveat that
a superior officer must not abdicate is duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being
held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly
and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by
Brandeis in this wise: "In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the
whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt
for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of criminal law the end justifies the means . . . . would bring terrible retribution."

DECISION

YAP, J p:

This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the
question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the
military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties
of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila." Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain
members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they
were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence
and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence
on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all
violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount
of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito
Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in
the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2)
assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in
the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin
Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez,
Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo
Benosa, Belen Diaz Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On
November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel. cdrep
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge
Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. It sustained, lock, stock and
barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of
their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of
action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated
plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of
Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo, committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that
the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had
vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful
study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On
the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration
was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983,
the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys
of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto
Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella, Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further
proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge
Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs' assertion that the undersigned has no
authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to file an amplificatory
motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid
Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2, 1984,
the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the
motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
"It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez, represented
by counsel, Atty. Augusto Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos, represented by counsel, Atty.
Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a
motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is
now final against said plaintiffs."
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,
1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a
motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period.
Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers. llcd
 In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider
its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983
had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants'
motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of
dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is
denied for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Kintanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
8. 1Lt Pedro Tango
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or
complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied; but in so far as it affects and refers to
defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba,
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3, 1983 is
granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and modified."
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set
aside the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9,
1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
 (5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed
or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts. LLjur
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply
cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek to violate
those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the
temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of
force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule
of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law
compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant
power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is
respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith,
a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain
residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls." 2
 Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public
officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official
duties or functions. In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
"Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to
safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call
them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing
for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining
dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent General
Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch preemptive strikes against communist terrorist
underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent
implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights
against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to
property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force should be
held liable for damages.
But, by launching a preemptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members of the
armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to
recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties run
contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability (Aarlon v.
Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2731; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534), and upon the necessity of
protecting the performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or
constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79
Phil. 819). cdphil
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is now
a settled jurisprudence (Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding
v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 738, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US
478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco,
supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for the
suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from suit." 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases
invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties within the
ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
"No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what
he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under
the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the
method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise
of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the
purpose of controlling or interfering with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief
executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for
the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exercise of this authority."
 It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely
responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on
January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist
terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of
the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable
in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out
their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether
of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions
and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel.
In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The
linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot
circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose -
a judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action
is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same
claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for
release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e.
override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering
the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. LibLex
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly
recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
"However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from
or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the
same must be brought within one (1) year."
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does
not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents'
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25,
1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revokingProclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-
A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become
moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion
of respondeat superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to the case. We agree. The
doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and
servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the
military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The
law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires
added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate
his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.
Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col.
Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro,
1st Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the complaint on the assumption that
under the law, they cannot be held responsible for the wrongful acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone "have
been specifically mentioned and identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the
plaintiffs, which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action."
But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to limit the plaintiffs' action for damages to "acts of alleged physical violence" which
constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a state witness. LLphil
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash
and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal
nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular,
improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of "safehouses" where
they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a
detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held
liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is
well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency
of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the
complaint against all defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The
complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient
to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to
plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-
Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a
motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by "plaintiffs,
through counsel." True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgundo;
Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel
for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S.
Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the
plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his
comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all
the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado,
Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Ella, Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on
behalf of all the plaintiffs. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear
for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take
it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was
filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the
benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to
declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose
lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be
sanctioned. cdphil
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated
November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be
remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., concurs with a separate opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
||| (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 735-756)
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO

MARTIN, respondents.

Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Galileo P. Brion for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND

CORRESPONDENCE; A PERSON BY CONTRACTING MARRIAGE, DOES NOT SHED HIS/HER
INTEGRITY OR HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION IS EVER AVAILABLE TO HIM OR TO HER. — Indeed the documents and papers in question
are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one
of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering
Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys
and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin,
and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the
trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return
them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v.Alfonso Felix,
Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in
evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial
court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty.
Felix, Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains
that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the
said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness
and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence
against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent
submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under
oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against
him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's
admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of
the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuineness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in
that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement
of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was
eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and,
therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. 6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
||| (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, [February 20, 1996], 324 PHIL 63-69)
[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000.]

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON.

JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
City,respondents.

Agoot Buensuceso & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking to review and set aside the Order issued by respondent judge
which denied his prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Alden Cervantes from
proceeding with the trial of the concubinage case against him. Petitioner contended that the pendency of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which he filed against his wife based on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him by his wife.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes
of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final
judgment declaring his remarriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage
other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. SaITHC

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS; PENDENCY OF CASE FOR

DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO
CONCUBINAGE CASE. — The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; IN
CONCUBINAGE CASE, ACCUSED CAN ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE OTHER
THAN FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID. — "The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is
that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity
is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a
final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONCUBINAGE; SUBSEQUENT PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED'S
MARRIAGE IS VOID FROM BEGINNING IS NOT A DEFENSE. — With regard to petitioner's argument
that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs. Luna where this Court held that: ". . .
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be
material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
4. ID.; ID.; HE WHO COHABITS WITH A WOMAN NOT HIS WIFE BEFORE DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ASSUMES THE RISK OF BEING PROSECUTED THEREFOR. — It must also
be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in
affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
 DECISION

BUENA, J p:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set
aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and
Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial
of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question. prLL
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. 1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, 2 petitioner filed a petition for
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192. 3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4 Charmaine subsequently
filed a criminal complaint for concubinage 5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his
paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information 6 against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order 7 dated August 31,
1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated
December 9, 1998. dctai
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and
December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 8 In
an Order 9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court
subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil
case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare
the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit
petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal
case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void
by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his
marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he
was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. prLL
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
". . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile
spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than
proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is
void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 13 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this Court held that:
". . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage. prcd
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567, [June 20, 2000], 389 PHIL 447-454)
[G.R. No. L-22579. February 23, 1968.]

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.

Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ACTIONS; PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; WHEN ANNULMENT OF

MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE. — The mere fact
that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that
"prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In
order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID; LOWER COURT'S HEARING OF THE CRIMINAL CASE PENDING DECISION ON THE
QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TWO MARRIAGES INVOLVED IN THE PENDING CIVIL
SUIT, NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the
time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on Feb. 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her
should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the
criminal case. Parties to the marriages should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court, therefore, has not abused, much less gravely abused, its discretion in
failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is whether
or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against
petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first
marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent Judge Relova
answered in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense of bigamy. It
was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage
has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
likewise presided by respondent Judge, by plaintiff Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as
null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner
and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-
party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with
the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati,
Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision
on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on
November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence, this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days, with
a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy
case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment
consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such
amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as above
detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first
spouse Elvira Macatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are
actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial
questions' are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for
bigamy." 1The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to
Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according
to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs
the penalty provided for in this Article . . ." 2
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In
Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before
hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We
have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be
determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity
of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the validity of the second
marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion
of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted
"must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such
a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza, 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice
Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal . . . The
prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try
the same must be lodged in another court . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for
annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is
obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which
he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of
the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy . . ."
The situation in this case is markedly differently. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27,
1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15,
1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action,
filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and
void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge
relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint
against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been
inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The
above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less
gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.
||| (Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, [February 23, 1968], 130 PHIL 745-750)
[G.R. No. L-10016. February 28, 1957.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . PROCESO S.

ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. MARRIAGE LAW NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES; JUDICIAL DECREE TO ESTABLISH

INVALIDITY, NOT NECESSARY. — A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of
his first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity as dis tinguished from mere annuable marriage. (People vs. Mendoza, L-5877, September 28, 1954.)
 DECISION

LABRADOR, J p:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The
facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
"On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1"
and "1-A). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of
Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the
Santa Teresita church in Iloilo City.
"The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomera, a clerk
in the said office (Exhibit "A", and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol).
After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the
accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria
Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu
City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the coast was
clear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a
teacher-nurse.
"It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu,
for it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical
maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to
Ilioilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the
accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Magsalang on October 3, 1953, in
Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F").
"The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Magsalang in Sibonga,
Cebu, on October 3, 1953. Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage
with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second
marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the
testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the
identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40,
41, hearing of April 27, 1954)."
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No.
3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant
could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Magsalang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria
Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the
instance of the latter. Authorities given for his ruling are 5 iada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence,
Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs, Bickford, 74 N.H. 466, A. 579.
Appellant in this court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767).
In this case the majority of this Court declared:
"The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law of Act 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and
void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity, as
distinguished from mere annuable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second
marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had
been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court."
 We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in the case
above-quoted. But these weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction
of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the
above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule
enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within
the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in
the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with
the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into.
Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not
prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second
bigamous marriage. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Aragon, G.R. No. L-10016, [February 28, 1957], 100 PHIL 1033-1036)
[G.R. No. 124498. October 5, 2001.]

EDDIE B. SABANDAL, petitioner, vs . HON. FELIPE S. TONGCO, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42, and PHILIPPINES TODAY, INC., respondents.

Montesino Montesino & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Eddie B. Sabandal entered into a memorandum of agreement on dealership with respondent
Philippines Today, Inc. In order to make partial payments for items delivered, petitioner issued to respondent
several checks amounting to ninety thousand (P90,000.00) pesos. When respondent presented petitioner's
checks to the drawee banks for payment, the bank dishonored the checks for insufficiency of funds and/or
account closed. On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Philippines Today, Inc., the assistant
city prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, eleven informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner. Three years later while the cases are still pending, petitioner filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Negros Occidental at Himamaylan, a complaint against Philippines Today, Inc. for
specific performance, recovery of overpayment and damages. Petitioner also filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 42, a motion to suspend trial in the criminal cases against him based on a prejudicial question.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion to suspend trial based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court ruled that the issue in the
criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is whether petitioner knowingly issued worthless
checks while the issue in the civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment and damages is
whether petitioner Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc. Even granting that after the trial
in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held
liable for the bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense. The Court also ruled that the peculiar
circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the
criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him.
Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.
 SYLLABUS

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SUSPENSION OF CRIMINAL ACTION BY

REASON OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL ACTION FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, OVERPAYMENT AND DAMAGES DID NOT POSE A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN
THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA 22; CASE AT BAR. — In this case, the
issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is whether the accused knowingly issued
worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages is whether
complainant Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is
shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks he
issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the
checks is itself an offense. The lower court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of a civil action for
specific performance, overpayment, and damages did not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the
filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three
years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases. Petitioner's claim of overpayment to respondent may be
raised as a defense during the trial of the cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22charged against him. The
civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action. Hence, petitioner
may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action.

DECISION

PARDO, J p:

The Case
The case is a petition to suspend the criminal proceedings in the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch
42, 1 where petitioner Eddie B. Sabandal is charged with eleven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. 2
The Facts
On February 18, 1989, Eddie B. Sabandal entered into a memorandum of agreement on dealership with
respondent Philippines Today, Inc. for the distribution of the newspaper Philippines Today, (now Philippine Star)
in Bacolod City and in designated towns in Negros Occidental. 3
Under the agreement, petitioner shall pay for an equivalent amount of one month of deliveries in advance
within the first seven days of the succeeding month. Petitioner's allowable percentage of return shall be 10% and be
entitled to a rebate of P0.15 per copy sold.
After execution of the agreement, respondent Philippines Today, Inc. made regular deliveries of the agreed
copies of the newspaper to petitioner.
In order to make partial payments for the deliveries, on December 18, 1990 to April 15, 1991, petitioner
issued to respondent several checks amounting to ninety thousand (P90,000.00) pesos.
When respondent presented petitioner's checks to the drawee banks for payment, the bank dishonored the
checks for insufficiency of funds and/or account closed. Consequently, respondent made oral and written demands
for petitioner to make good the checks. However, petitioner failed to pay despite demands.
In December 1992, on the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Philippines Today, Inc.,
assistant city prosecutor of Manila Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila eleven
informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner. 4
 Three years later, or on October 11, 1995, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Negros Occidental
at Himamaylan, a complaint against Philippines Today, Inc. for specific performance, recovery of overpayment and
damages. 5
On October 11, 1995, petitioner also filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42, a motion to
suspend trial in the criminal cases against him based on a prejudicial question. 6
On November 27, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to suspend trial based on a prejudicial
question. 7
On December 20, 1995, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the denial. 8
On January 9, 1996, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. 9
Hence, this petition. 10
The Issue
The issue raised is whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the criminal
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner until after the resolution of the civil action for
specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and damages.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
"A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused." 12
"For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal." 13
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised
in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is
satisfied. 14 It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 15 If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does
not involve a prejudicial question. 16 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. 17
In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is whether the accused
knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and
damages is whether complainant Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc. If, after trial in the
civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the
bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
to support the checks is itself an offense. 18
The lower court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of a civil action for specific performance,
overpayment, and damages did not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy
to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the
criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings
in the criminal cases.
Petitioner's claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a defense during the trial of the cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against him. The civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the filing of the criminal action. 19 Hence, petitioner may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil
liability in the criminal action. 20
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. The Court directs the
Regional Trial Court, Manila to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases against petitioner with all judicious
dispatch in accordance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. 21
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on official leave.
||| (Sabandal v. Tongco, G.R. No. 124498, [October 5, 2001], 419 PHIL 13-19)

DIGEST
Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao Building mild steel
plates which the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.
Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal complaint against private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite
demand. However, there was a mistake of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting business in the
same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.
It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged unjust filing of
a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of
the Civil Code against petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20
and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

RULING:
No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. What prompted petitioners to file
the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount
of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.
Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check. Private respondent, however, did nothing to
clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter
pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general
sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify
his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against
private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they
cannot be held liable for damages.

Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company

100 Phil 168 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Obligations arising from human relations
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54 plane
as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had
sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting
of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would
determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against
CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.
Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working
committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was
pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its
credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of
CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell
USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was
granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell
USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other
creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint
of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the
Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the
 insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction
against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in
the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The
C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law
which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should
be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for
damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

Barons Marketing Corp vs Court of Appeals and Phelp Dodge Phils Inc [G. R. No. 126486. February 9,
1998] 286 SCRA 96 Case Digest

Concept:
Article 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that
effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the
prestation in which the obligation consists. Neither may the
debtor be required to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in
part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor
may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the
liquidation of the latter.
Facts:
 August 31, 1973. Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables
effective Sept. 1, 1973. Defendant was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelps Dodge’s electrical products
 Barons Marketing purchased, on credit, from Phelps Dodge’s electrical wires and cable in the total amount of
P4,102,483.30. This was then sold to MERALCO, Baron Mktg being the accredited supplier of the electrical
requirements of MERALCO.
 Under the sales invoices issued by Phelps Dodge to Barons Mktg for the subject purchases, it is stipulated that
interest at 12% on the amount of atty’s fees and collection. Baron’s Mktg paid P300,000 out of its total purchases
leaving an unpaid account of P3,802,478.20. Phelps Dodge wrote Barons Mktg demanding payment of its
outstanding obligations due Phelps Dodge. Baron Mktg responded by requesting if it could pay its outstanding
account in monthly installments of P500,000 plus 1%interest per month until full payment, this request was rejected
and Phelps Dodge demanded full payment
 Phelps Dodge then filed a complaint before the Pasig Trial Court for the recovery of P3,802,478.20 and it also
prayed to be awarded with attorney’s fee at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded, exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000, the expenses of litigation and the costs of suit.
 The court ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge with the exemplary damages of P10,000 and recovery of P3,108,000
 Both parties appealed. Phelps Dodge claimed that court should have awarded the sum of P3,802,478.20. It also
said that the amount awarded was a result of a typographical error.
 Barons Mktg claimed that Phelps Dodge’s claim for damages is a result of “creditor’s abuse” and it also claimed
that Phelps Dodge failed to prove its cause of action against it.
 CoA ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge with the correct amount but only with the 5% for the Atty’s fee. No costs.
 Barons Mktg then alleged that the Coa erred its decision

Issue: W/ON private respondent is guilty of abuse of right

Held: No. a creditor cannot be considered in delay if he refuses to accept partial performance because, unless
otherwise provided by law or stipulated by the parties, a creditor cannot be compelled to accept
partial performance; however, if good faith necessitates acceptance or if the creditor abuses his right in not
accepting, the creditor will incur in delay if he does not accept such partial performance.

RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS

GR # 138964 Aug 9, 2001

FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a panel of land owned by Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St., Malate, Manila. After
the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her son, inherited the land. Victor informed the respondents that they would
have a right of first refusal to buy the land. In 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land was sold to
petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name.
On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for condemnation of the structures on the land. The office of
building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents on November 27, 1989.
Copies were received by respondents on December 7, 1989 and on December 12, the day respondents filed an
appeal contesting the order, petitioners proceeded with the demolition of the house.
Respondents filed case before Manila RTC which was dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the decision and ordered
petitioners to pay respondents for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA ruling in favor of respondents tenable.

RULING:
The court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.
A right to power, privilege or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law or recognized as a
result of long usage constitute of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.
The decision of CA was MODIFIED by reducing the awards for exemplary and moral damages to P20,000 to each
respondent. The decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

Digest 5:EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines)

G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2007

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.

Facts: The herein petitioner, Emmanuel B. Aznar, is a prominent businessman and entrepreneur in Cebu. He
decided to treat his wife together with their grandchildren for an Asian Tour using his Citibank credit card. He
deposited P485,000 to his account to increase his ordinary credit limit from P150,000 to P635,000. He bought
tickets to Kuala Lumpur amounting to P235,000. When they were in Kuala Lumpur, they decided to purchases
things to which the credit card was dishonoured for over the limit. Eventually the agency further dishonoured the
card and even mentioned that the petitioner be a swindler. In that note, they decided to go back Philippines and
instantly filed a complaint for damages. The lower court initially dismissed the complaint on the ground that their
was no proper authentication as to the print out of the computer generated document presented as evidence before
the court. The petitioner filed a motion for the re-raffle of the case, raising the contention that the judge was also a
holder of Citibank credit card. The judge later acceded with the contention of petitioner and ordered for the
company to pay enormous amount of damages to the plaintiff. When the case was elevated before the CA the latter
denied such.

Issue: Whether or not the print out of the computer generated document was properly authenticated to be
admissible before the court?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be excluded as it qualifies as electronic evidence following
the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best
Evidence Rule;

Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or
by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Indeed there was no proper authentication of the electronic evidence presented by the petitioner before the court
which is the print out of the computer generated document where on it printed that the card was over the
limit. During the trial the petitioner mentioned that desk officer phoned someone and eventually the hard copy was
given to him signed by one named Nubi, however such was not witnessed by the petitioner or he does not have
personal knowledge of such authentication.
The high court denied the petition.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

219 SCRA 115 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Breach of promise to Marry – Article 21 of the Civil Code
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met
Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The
two got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end
of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get
married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for
animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time,
their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of
marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and
later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have
violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and
traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to
marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by
Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She
was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not
promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of
Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of
our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions.
Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is
meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws.
It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was
carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction),
Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then
actual damages may be recovered.
ARPIO v. VALMONTE
GR No. 151866
September 9, 2004

FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church weddinng on October 10, 1996. At about 4:30 pm on that day, Valmonte went to the
Manila Hotel and when she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there including Soledad Carpio, the
aunt of the bride.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite to go to the reception hall to give the meal allowance to
the band and to pay the suppliers. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her and it was at
this juncture that Soledad Carpio allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng
kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha” It
turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry
which she placed ins i de the comfort room in a paper bag were lost and these include diamond rings, earrings,
bracelet and diamong necklace with a total value of about 1M pesos. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched,
interrogated and trailed by the police officers, but the pe titioner kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas
ng kwarto.” Valmonte’s car was also searched but the search yielded nothing.

Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which
she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation but the
petitioner did not respond. Valmonte filed a suit for damages.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that when sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was
merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque
injuria. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad fai
th in pointing to her as the culprit.
The CA ruled out differently and opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by the
petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. However, the court find no sufficient evidence to justify
the award of actual damages.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is entitled to the award of actual and moral damages
HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to moral damages but not to actual damages.

In the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the fundamental precepts is the principle known as “abuse of
rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be
present: 1) there is legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or
injuring another. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is
when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

The Court said that petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by
her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being
the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitve but outrightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the
jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is
contrary to morals and good customs. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to
Article 20 for which she should be held accountable.

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-
weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental
in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano
married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him,
has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a
complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages
because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their
daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man
(Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no
evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory
negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a
positive act.

Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject
to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit
absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the
declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give
rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at
the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to
Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article
(Article 2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in
civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code
of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason
why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if
in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".
Beatriz Wassmer vs Francisco Velez
12 SCRA 648 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 21 of the Civil Code – Moral Damages – Exemplary Damages –
Breach of Promise to Marry
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on September 4,
1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding
dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent
a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to
said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has
changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was
made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He
further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no
law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages
against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that
a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of
promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable
withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is
supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.
Pe et. al. vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.
Bautista Angelo J.:
Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla.

Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a
married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary.
They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant
from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her
brother’s house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador
The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and
plaintiffs appealed.
Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”

Held: “The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion
than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in
love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the
fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”
APOLONIO TANJANCO V. CA and ARACELI SANTOS18 SCRA 994
–
December 17, 1996FACTS:
About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio expressed his undyinglove
affection to Araceli also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of Apolonio
promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Apolonio’s pleas for carnal knowledge. U
ntilDecember 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded inhaving carnal access to
plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child. Araceli informedAplolonio and pleaded with him to make
good his promises of marriage but instead of honoring hispromises and righting his wrong, Apolonio stopped and
refrained from seeing Araceli since about July1959 has not visited her and to all intents and purposes has broken their
engagement and his promises.
ISSUE:
WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21.
HELD:
No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts stand out that for one whole year, from1958 to 1959,
Araceli, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio, withrepeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction.Hence, the courts conclude that no case is made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other
cause ofaction being alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the complaint. The decision of CAis reversed and that
of CFI is affirmed.
ART. 21.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that iscontrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage

ABERCA v. VER

FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively
judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them
with the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not
cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are
immune from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983,
Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later
inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was
filed, and was only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said
complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution?
3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution.
These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or
else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do
not authorize them to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done
in their official duties”. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of
these constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for
the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What
the writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of
obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of
their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as well as
people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers are the ones
who gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who
were the ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they
admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.
2.

San Andres
Cecilia Zulueta, Petitioner,vs.Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin, Respondents.
Facts
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. OnMarch 26, 1982, petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took
certainpossessions and documents belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence forthe suit Cecilia filed
against her husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC ofManila which rendered a decision declaring him as
“the capital/exclusive owner of the
pro
perties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress.
”The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was
made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were
enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional TrialCourt. Hence this
petition.Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the samedocuments were
admissible as evidence.
Issue
Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissibleas evidence.
Held
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence[to be] inviolable”
is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the co
nstitutionalprovision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,as prescribed by law.”
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.
 MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR. being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In her Answer to
the said petition, petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home
and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmainesubsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion
to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminalcase. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage.

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The pendency of the case for declaration
of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of
the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
CASE DIGEST ON LANDICHO V. RELOVA
CASE DIGEST ON LANDICHO V. RELOVA [22 S 731 (1968)] - Where the first wife filed a criminal action for
bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground
of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the
civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to
the second marriage is not in issue.
"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case.
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of
duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time
the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremo¬nies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the peti¬tioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third
party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declara¬tion of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
PRESUMPTION OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH

Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it
is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

Tolentino: Application of Article.-- This article applies only when the question of survivorship involves persons
"who are called to succeed each other." Hence, it cannot apply to other cases w/c do not involve succession.
When the persons involved would succeed each other, however, then this article applies, whether the death be
actual or merely presumed from absence or other circumstances.

Are Rules of Court Repealed?-- There is every indication that the Code Commission intended to repeal the
presumptions on survivorship under the Rules of Court, because the presumptions laid down therein are sometimes
absurd and mere guesswork. [I Tolentino 176]

Compare with Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), (kk)

PRESUMPTION OF PRIORITY OF DEATH (Survivorship Agreement)

Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj). That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of
the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex
be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof,
they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (Rules of Court.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON
G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957
Facts:
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu finding Proceso Aragon guilty of bigamy.The accused, under the name
of
Proceso Rosima
, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea inCebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the
accused under the name of
ProcesoAragon
, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo City.After the said marriage, the accused and Maria
Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused wasthen a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo
where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebuwhere he maintained his first wife.Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City.
After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City whereshe worked as a teacher-nurse.The accused
and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that Maria Faicolsuffered injuries to her
eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. The accusedsent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly
for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During herabsence, the accused contracted a third
marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu.
Issue:
Whether the accused committed bigamy when he married for the third time.
Held:
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, Maria Faicol, whosemarriage with
the appellant Proceso Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife andbefore the third marriage
was entered into. Hence, the last marriage (the marriage of Proceso Rosimawith Maria Gorrea) was a valid one and
appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper.