JURISPRUDENCE

Although the offense committed by Landicho does not relate to her official function as a
Public Nurse, she took advantage of her position to obtain the trust and confidence of her
co-employees in the Rural Health Unit of Valencia. An offense may be considered
committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is
the constituent element of the crime (or offense for that matter) xxxxxx PEOPLE VSS.
MAGALLANES 249 SCRA 212

Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
inconvenient or contrary to reason is not allowed in law. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF
APPEALS 258 SCRA 712

The Supreme Court has always held that equity which has been aptly described as
“justice outside legality” is applied only in the absence of and never against, statutory law
or judicial rules of procedure. CONTE VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 264 SCRA 19

Where the parties are equally guilty of violating the law, they are in pari delicto, in which
case, it follows as a consequence that petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC. VS, COURT OF APPEALS,
260 SCRA 673

[G.R. No. L-42620. April 30, 1985.]

MAXIMINO RUELANvs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, MINISTER OF
PUBLIC WORKS, TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, and THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE RULES; PUBLIC OFFICERS;

APPLICABILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 6; CASE AT BAR. — The
Commissioner of Civil Service committed a mistake in applying Section 1 (w) of
P.D. No. 6 to the petitioner's case as the same had not yet been promulgated in
1968 when the petitioner committed the offense. However, this error is not fatal
because the petitioner's culpable act was punishable under Section 19 (o) of the
Revised Civil Service Rules which took effect on January 3, 1963, in relation to
Section 33 of R.A. No. 2260 which reads: "Section 19. The following are also
declared to be grounds for disciplinary action in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Service Rules: . . . "(o) Contracting loans of money or other property
from persons with whom the bureau or office of the employee has business
relations."

PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST; VIOLATORS OF ANY CIVIL SERVICE

RULE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY DISCIPLINED. — The commission of graft
and corrupt practices from violations of any Civil Service rule is not necessary.
Public interest demands that public officers found violating any Civil Service
rule should immediately be disciplined. This is so because: "Public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to
the people." (Art. XIII, Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution.) To be sure, the act of the
petitioner took place before 1973 but the provision of the Constitution expresses
a doctrine which is not circumscribed by time.

DECISION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; SUPPORTED BY

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. — The petitioner contests the sufficiency of the
evidence presented against him to warrant his dismissal from public office. He
contends that there is no clear evidence against him that he borrowed money
from the complainant so as to warrant his dismissal from office. We have
examined the record, particularly with respect to the hearing conducted by Atty.
Roland P. Lucero on October 23, 1972 (Annex H-1, amended petition) and We are
satisfied that the decisions of the respondent officials are supported by
substantial evidence.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioner insists that private respondent should be dismissed in accordance with

rules contained in its employees' handbook titled Working Together, Appendix
A 5 of which reads as follows:
"Appendix A
Serious Offenses
Calling For
Termination — Any form of dishonesty, like but not limited to the following:
— fraud
— making false or artificial entries in the books or records of the Bank
— failing to turn over money entrusted by a client for the Bank within a
specified time
— theft of bank property
— using company funds/assets for any unofficial purpose.
— Any violation of the Bank's Code of Conduct which has penal
consequences under relevant local laws.
— Deliberately inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury upon a co-
employee on Bank premises, or in case it is committed elsewhere, for reasons
which are work-related.
— Sabotage or causing damage to work or equipment of the Bank, or any
underhanded interference in Bank operations.
— Any other serious offense analogous to the above."
While the foregoing text makes "any form of dishonesty . . ." a "serious offense
calling for termination," such general statement must however be understood in
the context of the enumeration of offenses, all of which are directly related to the
function of the petitioner as a banking institution. It is unarguable that private
respondent's false information concerning his whereabouts on February 3, 1993
is not a fraud, nor a false entry in the books of the bank; neither is it a failure to
turn over clients' funds, or theft or use of company assets, or anything
"analogous" as to constitute a serious offense meriting the extreme penalty of
dismissal.

Like petitioner bank, this Court will not countenance nor tolerate ANY form of
dishonesty. But at the same time, we cannot permit the imposition of the
maximum penalty authorized by our labor laws for JUST ANY act of dishonesty,
in the same manner that death, which is now reinstated as the supreme sanction
under the penal laws of our country, is not to be imposed for just any killing. The
penalty imposed must be commensurate to the depravity of the malfeasance,
violation or crime being punished. A grave injustice is committed in the name of
justice when the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong
committed.

In the context of the instant case, dismissal is the most severe penalty an
employer can impose on an employee. It goes without saying that care must be
taken, and due regard given to an employee's circumstances, in the application of
such punishment. Moreover, private respondent's acts of dishonesty — his first
offense in his seven years of employment, as noted by the respondent NLRC —
did not show deceit nor constitute fraud and did not result in actual prejudice to
petitioner. Certainly, such peremptory dismissal is far too harsh, too severe,
excessive and unreasonable under the circumstances.

To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance
to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood. This is merely in keeping with
the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean over backwards in favor of the
working class, and mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor.

[G.R. Nos. L-58973-76. July 20, 1982.]

INOCENTES AMORA, JR., and CLAUDIO MURILLO vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered
no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders actually
delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the
additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the
informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no
indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done
in good faith; there was no criminal intent. "The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of be innocent." (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504, 507 [1911].)
There can be no conviction for falsification of a public document in the absence
of proof that the defendants "maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful
intent of injury the complaining witness." (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341, 344 [1902].)
Thus the learned Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino has said, "there is no falsification
of a public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith.
Thus, it has been held that 'a conviction for falsification of a public document by
a private person will not be sustained when the facts found are consistent with
good faith on the part of the accused.' In other words, although the accused
altered a public document or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion
therein, he would not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith
and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error."(II Revised Penal Code, pp.
986-987 [1976].)

GERMAN P. ZAGADA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 99302. November 27, 1992.]

EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES, GENERALLY

UPHELD ON APPEAL; REQUISITE. — In order for this Court to sustain the findings
of an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, such body must abide by
the elementary rules of due process.

FINDINGS OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ON THE BASIS OF A MERE AFFIDAVIT, A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. —
We find a mere affidavit of the clerk in charge of the preparation of the plantilla of
personnel for calendar year 1981 insufficient to constitute substantial evidence to sustain
the finding of grave misconduct. The respondent Commission erred in finding the
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct on the basis of the evidence presented, the same not
being substantial evidence. This constitutes a denial of administrative due process,
amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

We find the petition meritorious.

In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact are not
generally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not the respondent
tribunal had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. 6 However, in order for this Court to sustain the findings of an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, such body must abide by the elementary rules of
due process. 7
When there is denial of due process, there is grave abuse of discretion and the writ of
certiorari is in order.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 8 this
Court has laid down the seven Cardinal rights which constitute the administrative due
process, the fourth of which reads:
"(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion . . ., but
the evidence must be "substantial." . . . . "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." . . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules
so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidated the administrative order. . . . But this assurance of
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. . . ."
We find a mere affidavit of the clerk in charge of the preparation of the plantilla of
personnel for calendar year 1981 insufficient to constitute substantial evidence to sustain
the finding of grave misconduct. We arrived at this conclusion after pondering upon the
following: LLphil
1. The affidavit of Guinoo which was the sole basis of the respondent Commission
in its ruling that the petitioner committed grave misconduct, is self-serving, Guinoo, the
clerk, admitted responsibility for altering the plantilla by inserting the name of Valdez
with the corresponding item of EGT-5. Should he not point to someone else as the
culprit, the fault would necessarily fall heavily on him.
2. The plantilla in question had allegedly been signed and certified as correct by
Osea, the Officer-in-Charge as of the time the said plantilla was prepared, and the same
submitted to the Division Office prior to the assumption of office of the petitioner. 9 With
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. We believe that Osea
affixed her signature certifying as to its correctness with the knowledge that she was
signing the final and official form for submission to the Division Office. If we would
further presume that the clerk, Guinoo, was regular in the performance of his duties,
under no circumstances will he allow any charges thereon after it had been certified
correct. It is hard to believe his allegations that he altered it upon a simple request and
assurance from the petitioner.
3. It is surprising why the complainant and the affiant had not presented the very
plantilla in question as evidence. Had there really been an alteration, it would have been
so easy to determine this therefrom.
4. It appears that the petitioner's participation in the execution and preparation of the
plantilla in question is not reflected thereon. Guinoo alleged that the plantilla was
certified by Osea as Officer-in-Charge, and not by the petitioner. Had there really been
the alleged falsification or alteration, the most logical procedure would be for Guinoo to
have insisted that it be counter-signed by the present District Supervisor, who is the
petitioner herein. We have the impression that the petitioner's signature or initials never
appeared in said document. Thus, We have no basis for the falsification.
The respondent Commission erred in finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct on
the basis of the evidence presented, the same not being substantial evidence. This
constitutes a denial of administrative due process, amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest (In Re: Impeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212 [1922]). None of these
elements exists in petitioner's case. LUNINGNING LANDRITO vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 108740. December 1, 1993.]

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD and SOCORRO V. GREGORIO

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; APPEAL IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; NATURE,

RULE, REASON FOR RULE. — The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by and in accordance with the provisions of the law. This doctrine is equally
made applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings so that one must first ascertain the law
applicable to determine whether or not the party can appeal from the order or decision.
The reason for this is that even administrative proceedings must end sometime, just as
public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; EXTENT; CASE
AT BAR. — Section 37 of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree,
provides that the Civil Service Commission shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for
more than thirty (30) days, or a fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days' salary,
demotion in rank or salary, or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The inescapable
conclusion is that in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is not one of those
covered by or is less than those enumerated under Section 37, the decision of the
disciplining authority shall be final and inappealable. Respondent CSC has no jurisdiction
to review the same on appeal. In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the decision of
the MSPB merely imposed a reprimand on herein private respondent with a stern warning
that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Under such
circumstances, even private respondent cannot appeal therefrom to respondent
Commission . . . As we have earlier stated, the exercise of the right to appeal, being
merely a statutory right, is subject to the requirements of the governing law. No right to
appeal having been granted to herein petitioner under the circumstances obtaining in this
case, it can not successfully invoke or avail of such remedy.
MEANING OF "PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED" UNDER SEC. 39, P.D. NO. 807.
— Furthermore, it is likewise provided by Presidential Decree No. 807, specifically in
Section 39 thereof, that appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely
affected by the decision within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. The term "party
adversely affected" has been interpreted by this Court as referring to the person or the
respondent employee against whom the administrative disciplinary case is filed.

DECISION OF MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD FINDING UNIVERSITY

OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEE GUILTY OF LESSER OFFENSE THAN THAT
CHARGED; NOT TANTAMOUNT TO AMENDMENT OF CHARGE; CASE AT
BAR. — Finally, we find no cogency in the argument of petitioner that the MSPB
amended the charge against private respondent, as well as the corresponding penalty.
This is merely a case where the MSPB found that, on the basis of the facts and the
evidence adduced herein, private respondent should only be held guilty of a violation of
reasonable office regulations. What this obviously means is that the facts and the
evidence obtaining in the case do not suffice to warrant a finding of guilt for conduct
prejudicial to the interests of the university. Withal, it is legally permissible, as in fact it
is recognized both in law and jurisprudence, that a party may be found guilty of a lesser
offense than that charged. It is not how petitioner wishes to categorize the offense but
what that offense is as made out by the evidentiary facts and the law. Besides, it has
generally been the accepted rule that where the findings of the administrative body are
amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but
also finality. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the MSPB, in petitioner's deplorably
unrestrained language, "simple-mindedly likened her offense to the violation of an
ordinary office regulation." On the contrary, said respondent board has pithily resolved
the controversy under a ratiocination which we quote with approval.

NOT SUBJECT TO CERTIORARI; CASE AT BAR. — In addition, the sufficiency or

insufficiency of evidence in support of the findings of the MSPB is a factual issue which
is not within the purview of an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, absent a showing of such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner would do well to recall that the extraordinary writ it
prays for does not issue to correct an error of judgment or even a simple abuse of
discretion, neither of which is present in nor taints the challenged disposition.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of Resolution No. 93-006 issued by respondent
Civil Service Commission (CSC) on January 5, 1993 1 affirming the decision of the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner.

The records show that on May 27, 1989, the President of the University of the Philippines
(UP) filed an administrative case against private respondent Socorro V. Gregorio for
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the university, charging her in this wise:
"That sometime before June 1988 you, as employee of the University connected with the
U.P. Diliman Police bought the self-built house of Mr. Ignacio P. Hementera from his
wife, Rosalinda Hementera, while the husband is (sic) abroad. Such sale is null and void
and is not recognized under Memo No. 83 of the Office of the President and your
occupancy of the land on which said house stands is without the knowledge, consent and
authority of the University authorities. Such conduct is prejudicial to the interest of the
University punishable under P.D. No. 807, Civil Service Decree." 2
Pursuant thereto, an investigation was conducted by the Administrative Disciplinary
Tribunal (ADT), constituted for that purpose and chaired by petitioner's present counsel,
wherein the parties presented their respective testimonial and documentary evidence. A
formal investigation report was subsequently submitted by the ADT finding that there is
more than substantial evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the offense charged.
3
Consequently, UP President Jose V. Abueva issued an Order, 4 dated March 7, 1991,
finding private respondent guilty as charged and imposing upon her the penalty of six (6)
months suspension chargeable against her leave credits. She was also ordered to vacate
the housing unit within fourteen (14) days from notice of said order, to deliver possession
thereof to the university, and to accept the offer of Ignacio P. Hementera to refund to her
the amount of P25,000.00 which she paid for said unit.
Private respondent appealed to the MSPB which thereafter rendered a decision on
October 21, 1991 in MSPB Case No. 91-1253, setting aside the appealed decision,
finding her guilty only of a violation of reasonable office regulations, and modifying the
penalty to a reprimand with a warning that she "be more circumspect in her actuations,
otherwise, these should be dealt with more severely in the future." 5
Petitioner elevated the decision of the MSPB before respondent commission which
subsequently issued the questioned resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that
UP is not a party adversely affected by the decision of the MSPB and, therefore, it has no
right to appeal therefrom, aside from the fact that the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction
over administrative disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is suspension of less
than thirty (30) days.
Petitioner now claims that respondent commission erred in affirming the MSPB decision
which supposedly amended the charge against and the penalty imposed upon private
respondent, asseverating that the MSPB had no jurisdiction to amend the charge from one
of conduct prejudicial to the interests of the service to one of violation of reasonable
office regulations. It likewise claims that there exists substantial evidence to sustain
petitioner's holding that private respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interests
of the university. Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, have frontally met
said issues with arguments of such puissance as to warrant dispensing with further
comment from private respondent.
On a judicious assay of the submissions of the parties, we find no merit in the petition.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege which may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by and in accordance
with the provisions of the law. 6 This doctrine is equally made applicable to quasi-
judicial proceedings so that one must first ascertain the law applicable to determine
whether or not the party can appeal from the order or decision. 7 The reason for this is
that even administrative proceedings must end sometime, just as public policy demands
that finality be written on judicial controversies. 8
Section 37 of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, provides that the
Civil Service Commission shall have appellate jurisdiction over all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
(30) days, or a fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days' salary, demotion in rank or
salary, or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. 9 The inescapable conclusion is
that in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is not one of those covered by
or is less than those enumerated under Section 37, the decision of the disciplining
authority shall be final and inappealable. Respondent CSC has no jurisdiction to review
the same on appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the decision of the MSPB merely imposed a
reprimand on herein private respondent with a stern warning that a similar infraction in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. Under such circumstances, even private
respondent cannot appeal therefrom to respondent Commission.
Furthermore, it is likewise provided by Presidential Decree No. 807, specifically in
Section 39 thereof, that appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely
affected by the decision within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. 10 The term
"party adversely affected" has been interpreted by this Court as referring to the person or
the respondent employee against whom the administrative disciplinary case is filed.
It has thus been held in the case of Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., 11 and
reiterated in Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., 12 that:
"Based on the above provisions of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an
administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the
person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for
more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank
or salary, or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining
authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where
the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary . . .
"Here the MSPB, after hearing and the submission of memoranda, exonerated private
respondent of all charges except for habitual tardiness. The penalty was only a reprimand
so that even private respondent Amor, the party adversely affected by the decision,
cannot even interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission."
As we have earlier stated, the exercise of the right to appeal, being merely a statutory
right, is subject to the requirements of the governing law. No right to appeal having been
granted to herein petitioner under the circumstances obtaining in this case, it can not
successfully invoke or avail of such remedy.
Finally, we find no cogency in the argument of petitioner that the MSPB amended the
charge against private respondent, as well as the corresponding penalty. This is merely a
case where the MSPB found that, on the basis of the facts and the evidence adduced
herein, private respondent should only be held guilty of a violation of reasonable office
regulations. What this obviously means is that the facts and the evidence obtaining in the
case do not suffice to warrant a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the interests of
the university. Withal, it is legally permissible, as in fact it is recognized both in law and
jurisprudence, that a party may be found guilty of a lesser offense than that charged. It is
not how petitioner wishes to categorize the offense but what that offense is as made out
by the evidentiary facts and the law. Besides, it has generally been the accepted rule that
where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial
evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality. 13
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the MSPB, in petitioner's deplorably unrestrained
language, "simple-mindedly likened her offense to the violation of an ordinary office
regulation." On the contrary, said respondent board has pithily resolved the controversy
under a ratiocination which we quote with approval:
"The appealed decision found Gregorio guilty of Grave Misconduct. We are, however, of
the belief that under the circumstances obtaining, the evidence of guilt of grave
misconduct is wanting. In order for grave misconduct to exist, there must be substantial
evidence showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules (Impeachment
of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212). On the contrary, the record is bereft of any proof which
establishes that Gregorio is guilty of grave misconduct. It is a fact that there exists a U.P.
Memorandum No. 83, dated September 2, 1981, which prohibits the Sale, Donation, or
Assignment of Private-Owned Houses in the U.P. Campus. Any violation thereof cannot
be equated with misconduct. Misconduct in office implies a wrongful intention, and not
more indiscretion, and acts done in good faith, i.e., an act of buying a real property right,
which constitutes only an error of judgment, cannot be characterized as a misconduct in
office; hence, appellant Gregorio could not be guilty thereof, but only of violation of
office regulations." 14
In addition, the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence in support of the findings of the
MSPB is a factual issue which is not within the purview of an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, absent a showing of such grave abuse of
discretion as would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner would do well to
recall that the extraordinary writ it prays for does not issue to correct an error of judgment
or even a simple abuse of discretion, neither of which is present in nor taints the
challenged disposition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the impugned resolution is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Annex C, Petition; Rollo, 29.
2. Annex D, id.; ibid., 33.
3. Annex G, id.; ibid., 39.
4. Annex A, id.; ibid., 24.
5. Annex B, id.; ibid., 26.
6. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 205 SCRA 537 (1992).
7. Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., 192 SCRA 84 (1990).
8. Tiatco vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., 216 SCRA 749 (1992).
9. The same provision appears as Section 47, Chapter 7, Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), which took effect on November 23, 1989 by
virtue of Proclamation No. 495 of even date.
10. See also Section 49, Book V, Executive Order No. 292.
11. 192 SCRA 84 (1990).
12. 204 SCRA 965 (1991).
13. Tiatco vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., supra.
14. Rollo, 28.