In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law 21 which exclusively deals with

local government units (LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in consonance with
the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy. RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993), on
the other hand, was a general law 22 which outlined the share in the national fund of all
branches of the national government. RA 7645 therefore, being a general law, could not
have, by mere implication, repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160 should be taken as the
exception to RA 7645 in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.
23

A special law is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class, or to a

particular portion or section of the state only. U.S. vs. Serapio, 23 Phil 584 [1912].

A general law is one which affects all people of the state or all of a particular class of
persons in the state or embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class. U.S. vs. Serapio, 23 Phil 584 [1912];
Valera vs. Tuason, 80 Phil 823 [1948]; Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 [1971].

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A LATER LAW REPEALS AN EARLIER

ONE; RA 6679 REPEALED BY RA 7160. — RA 7160, the Local Government Code,
was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict
between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores
priores contraries abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one
because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the
older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not
have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they did
not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones — and not
the other way around. Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay
officials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of
barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994." This provision is clearly
inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term shall
be for five years." Note that both laws refer to the same officials who were elected "on
the second Monday of May 1994." RA 7160 is a special law insofar as it governs the
term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, RA 7160 states that "all
general and special laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and
incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later
law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing clause. When a
subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the
latter is deemed repealed. [G.R. No. 127116. April 8, 1997.]
ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7,
Kalookan City and as President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA PILIPINAS,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY,
Department of Interior and Local Government, and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY,
Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128039. April 8, 1997.]
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER, Represented by
BONIFACIO M. RILLON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; IN CASE OF

CONFLICT BETWEEN A GENERAL AND A SPECIFIC LAW, THE LATTER
PREVAILS. — In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that — The
fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of
the land and the other as the law of the particular case.
3. ID.; ID.; FACT OF EARLY ENACTMENT OF EITHER LAW, IMMATERIAL.
— The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not
change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to,
or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special
statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly
or by necessary implication. [G.R. No. 84811. August 29, 1989.]
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

1. TAXATION; FRANCHISE TAX; P.D. NO. 231, BEING A GENERAL LAW,

DOES NOT AMEND OR REPEAL SEC. 3 OF RA 6020; EXCEPTION. — There is no
provision in P.D. No. 231 expressly or impliedly amending or repealing Section 3 of R.A.
No. 6020. The perceived repugnancy between the two statutes should be very clear
before the Court may hold that the prior one has been repealed by the later, since there is
no express provision to that effect (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224). The
rule is that a special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a
later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the terms of
the general act are broad enough to include the cases in the special law (id.) unless there
is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.
2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION. — Republic Acts Nos. 3247, 3570 and 6020 are
special laws applicable only to CEPALCO, while P.D. No. 231 is a general tax law. The
presumption is that the special statutes are exceptions to the general law (P.D. No. 231)
because they pertain to a special charter granted to meet a particular set of conditions and
circumstances. [G.R. No. 45355. January 12, 1990.]
THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, represented by its PROVINCIAL
TREASURER, petitioner, vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT
COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO), respondent.

It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a special law,
the special law prevails. GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT. 8
Where a later special law on a particular subject is repugnant to, or inconsistent with, a
prior general law on the same subject, a partial repeal of the latter will be implied to the
extent of the repugnancy or an exception grafted upon the general law.
A special law must be intended to constitute an exception to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances forcing a contrar

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER A

GENERAL LAW REGARDLESS OF THEIR DATES OF PASSAGE AND THE
SPECIAL IS CONSIDERED AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL. — There is no
doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the
Government of the City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185
and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws.
As the Solicitor General points out, and we agree with him, it is a canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law — regardless of their dates of
passage — and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.
3. ID.; CONFLICT BETWEEN STATUTES MUST BE AVOIDED. — So also,
every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable
construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.
4. ID.; REPEALS OF LAWS BY IMPLICATION, NOT FAVORED; WHEN
THERE IS A MERE REPUGNANCY BETWEEN TWO STATUTES, THE ONE
LATER IN TIME REPEALS THE OTHER. — Repeals of laws by implication moreover
are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to
warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.
5. ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5185 (DECENTRALIZATION LAW) AND BATAS
BLG. 337 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE), NOT MEANT TO DEPRIVE CITY
COUNCIL OF MANILA OF ITS APPOINTING POWER GRANTED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 409 (CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA). — We also agree with the
Civil Service Commission that the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving mayors
the power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city funds" and those of Batas Blg.
337, empowering local executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and
employees of the city," were meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive
powers but rather, to underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over local
officials and employees from the President to the local governments and to highlight the
autonomy of local governments. They were not meant, however, to deprive the City
Council of Manila for instance, its appointing power granted by existing statute, and after
all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the
Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local
autonomy. [G.R. No. 87119. April 16, 1991.]
HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. LACUNA, in his
capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, and THE
CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW;

PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The Court
feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. [G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as
Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76,
San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; WHERE A

LATER SPECIAL LAW IS REPUGNANT TO A PRIOR GENERAL LAW, A
PARTIAL REPEAL OF THE LATTER WILL BE IMPLIED. — The Court, however,
agrees with the Court of Appeals' ratiocination in arriving at the conclusion that Sec. 8,
Art. V of the PPA Charter should prevail over Sec. 37(b) of the Civil Service Law,
considering that where a later special law on a particular subject is repugnant to, or
inconsistent with, a prior general law on the same subject, a partial repeal of the latter
will be implied to the extent of the inconsistency, or an exception grafted upon the
general law. Since, in a sense, the two laws are in pari materia, both should be construed
as to harmonize with each other. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
6. ID.; ID.; REASON. — For the assumption is that whenever the legislature enacts
a law, it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the
absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new statute is deemed enacted in
accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes. [G.R. No. 97356.
September 30, 1992.]
HON. ARTURO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his
capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, and EUFRACIO
SEGUNDO C. PAGUNURAN, in his capacity as Chairman of the Department of
Transportation and Communications — Administrative Action Board, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG and

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS; PURPOSE

MUST BE IN HARMONY WITH AND SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND THE TERMS
AND PROVISIONS OF THE BASIC LAW; CIVIL SERVICE MEMORANDUM
CIRCULAR NO 27 S. 1990 AN ADDITION TO OR EXTENSION OF THE LAW. —
There is no need to belabor the issue in the present proceeding. It has already been
squarely passed upon and resolved in G.R. No. 97419 (Gaudencio T. Cena vs. Civil
Service Commission and the Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, etc.), judgment in which was
promulgated on July 3, 1992. In Cena, Memorandum Circular No. 27 of the Civil Service
Commission was declared invalid because it is not in harmony with and has in fact gone
beyond the terms of the law. Cena contains the following relevant pronouncements:
"While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service
Commission the authority 'to take appropriate action on all appointments and other
personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement
age,' the said provision cannot be extended to embrace matters not covered by the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax
Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to therein is
limited only to carrying into effect what the special law, Revised Government Insurance
Act of 1977, or any other retirement law being invoked, provides. It cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law. The Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by
the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs. Maceren,
G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing
Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August
29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusto Toledo
vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely
applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-
year old persons from employment, reinstatement, or reemployment in the government
service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel
Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity because it is entirely a
creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was
meant to implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision
of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo
L. Paras, stated thus: 'The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to
implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or
execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of
Congress." (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419
[1960]; see also Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224
[1989] in turn citing Teoxon). The considerations just expounded also conduce to the
conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of
said section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part
of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any
provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or
extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.' The governing
retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the `Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.' The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years but has less than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 27 s. 1990 cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or
connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule
was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.
The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D.
1146." Conformably with Cena, therefore, Gobante's petition should be granted, and she
should be allowed to continue in the service as public school teacher until she completes
fifteen (15) years of service and thereby qualifies for retirement with full benefits unless,
of course, she becomes incapacitated or is sooner dismissed for cause in accordance with
law. [G.R. No. 98093. October 8, 1992.]
PRIMA K. GOBANTES, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Hon. Patricia
Sto. Tomas, Hon. Samilo

A general law and a special law on the same subject should be accordingly read together
and harmonized if possible with a view to giving effect to both. Where there are two acts,
one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone,
would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special must
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of the general statute
and must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the rule. 57
The same principle applies regardless of whether the special law is passed before or after
the general act. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute
will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by
necessary implication. 58

After re-examining the provisions on jurisdiction of Rep. Act No. 1125 and P.D. No. 242,
this Court finds itself in disagreement with the pronouncement made in Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., 58 and refers to the earlier case of
Lichauco & Company, Inc. v. Apostol, et al., 59 for the guidelines in determining the
relation between the two statutes in question, to wit:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption
that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the law making
power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always
be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of
statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the
Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which
the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. (Underscoring
ours.)
When there appears to be an inconsistency or conflict between two statutes and one of the
statutes is a general law, while the other is a special law, then repeal by implication is not
the primary rule applicable. The following rule should principally govern instead:
Specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the
same subject unless it clearly appears that the provisions of the two laws are so repugnant
that the legislators must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier
legislation. The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of
the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land. (Ex Parte United States,
226 U. S., 420; 57 L. ed., 281; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S., 556; 27 L. ed., 1030;
Partee vs. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 204 Fed. Rep., 970.)
Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and
certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone,
would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the
special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act or
provision, especially when such general and special acts or provisions are
contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict.
(Crane v. Reeder and Reeder, 22 Mich., 322, 334; University of Utah vs. Richards, 77
Am. St. Rep., 928.) 60
It has, thus, become an established rule of statutory construction that between a general
law and a special law, the special law prevails — Generalia specialibus non derogant. 61
Sustained herein is the contention of private respondent Savellano that P.D. No. 242 is a
general law that deals with administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims
and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Its coverage is broad and
sweeping, encompassing all disputes, claims and controversies. It has been incorporated
as Chapter 14, Book IV of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative
Code of the Philippines. 62 On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 1125 is a special law 63
dealing with a specific subject matter — the creation of the CTA, which shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the tax disputes and controversies enumerated
therein.
Following the rule on statutory construction involving a general and a special law
previously discussed, then P.D. No. 242 should not affect Rep. Act No. 1125. Rep. Act
No. 1125, specifically Section 7 thereof on the jurisdiction of the CTA, constitutes an
exception to P.D. No. 242. Disputes, claims and controversies, falling under Section 7 of
Rep. Act No. 1125, even though solely among government offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, remain in the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Such a construction resolves the alleged
inconsistency or conflict between the two statutes, and the fact that P.D. No. 242 is the
more recent law is no longer significant. ESaITA [G.R. No. 109976. April 26, 2005.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and TIRSO
SAVELLANO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 112800. April 26, 2005.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, TIRSO B. SAVELLANO and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, points out that Republic Act No.
6758 is a special law while Republic Act No. 7160 is a general law. It argues that a
general law does not operate to modify or repeal a special law unless it has been so
expressly provided. Furthermore, it maintains that any apparent inconsistency should be
reconciled by regarding the prohibition stated in Republic Act No. 6758 as an exception
or limitation to the authority of local legislative bodies under Republic Act No. 7160.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. [G.R. Nos. 145383-84. August 6,
2003.]
ATTY. RUDY M. VILLAREÑA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.

Basic in statutory construction is the rule that the enactment of a later legislation which is
a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law unless expressly so
stated. Well-settled in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that a "special statute, provided for
a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its
terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in
the special law." 15 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251
SCRA 42, 56 (1995).

First, Section 23 of PD 957 — the law upon which the Implementing Rule cited was
based — requires only due notice to the owner or developer for stopping further
payments by reason of the latter's failure to develop the subdivision according to the
approved plans and within the time limit. Section 23 provides as follows:
"SECTION 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a
buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy
shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to
the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or
developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved
plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his
option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but
excluding [delinquency] interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate." (Italics
supplied)
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the
provisions of the enabling law. 34 An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify,
expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void. 35 Thus, the Court in People v. Maceren
36 explained as follows:
"Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the
law itself cannot be extended. . . . .
"The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. . . . ."
Plainly, therefore, Section 23 of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules cannot rise higher
than Section 23 of PD 957, which is the source of its authority. For that matter, PD 957
would have expressly required the written approval of the HLURB before any stoppage
of amortization payments if it so intended, in the same manner that the decree specifically
mandates written consent or approval by the NHA (now the HLURB) in Section 18. 37
Section 18 has been held by the Court to be a prohibitory law; hence, "acts committed
contrary to it are void," 38 pursuant to the intent of PD 957 "to provide a protective
mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957
termed 'unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.'" 39 The Court stressed that
“such construal ensures the attainment of the purpose of the law: to protect lot buyers, so
that they do not end up still homeless despite having fully paid for their home lots with
their hard-earned cash." 40
Apropos, to require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in
keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from
scheming subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to
treat the right to stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the
owner or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLRUB against the erring
developer. Such course of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent
determination of its propriety and consequences, should the suspension of payment
subsequently be found improper. EAHcCT
Significantly also, the Court has upheld the reliance of a buyer on Section 23 of PD 957
when he ordered his bank to stop payment of the checks he had issued, so that he could
suspend amortization payments until such time as the owner or developer would have
fulfilled its obligations. 41 In Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing
Authority, 42 the exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments was
considered a valid defense against the purported violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
22 by the petitioner in that case. Such right negated the third element — the "subsequent
dishonor of the check without valid cause." With more reason, then, should the buyer's
right to suspend installment payments be considered a valid defense against the suit for
reconveyance and damages. CAHaST Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, G.R. No.
154684, September 8, 2005.