POLITICAL LAW Part 1 144195

Part 1
POLITICAL LAW
(STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT)
I. IN GENERAL
A. Political Law Defined
POLITICAL LAW has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with
the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define
the relations of the state with the inhabitants1 of its territory People vs. Perfecto, 43
Phil. 887, 897 [1922]
DEFINITION / EFFECTIVITY
Case: Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte. The complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been
organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 - The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or
industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge
their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in
active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of
judge or prosecuting attorney. xxxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory.
Rule: It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code
of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922…. Specifically, Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates
the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence,
political in essence. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code
of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las
Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6,
1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following
a conquest or otherwise ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the
prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty.
(Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
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This includes not only citizens as there are rights protected by the Constitution for Inhabitants
Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

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While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do
not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as
are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force
if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by
Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In
the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L.
Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are
dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired
their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who
remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although
that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until
altered by the newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated”
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision
of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then
to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal
and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance,
now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Macariola vs. Asuncion- 114 SCRA 77, - A.M. No.
133-J May 31, 1982
Hence, As To Laws Which Are Not Political In Nature;
Rule: As to whether the Indeterminate Sentence Act was in force during the occupation, the answer
is in the affirmative. A proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces of January
2, 1942, directed that "so far as the military administration permits, all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the
time being as in the past." This was nothing more than a confirmation of the well-known rule of the
Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty. (Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) The
Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a political law. It does not affect political relations. In fact, it is a
part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related to the punishment of crime
and the maintenance of public peace and order, which Article 43 of Section III of the Hague
Regulations of 1907 compels the belligerent occupant to take all steps in his power to reestablish
and insure as far as possible. G.R. No. L-1352 April 30, 1947 ALFONSO MONTEBON vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
Case: On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter
nuptias in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his then prospective and eventual bride
By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in
question, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees. Herminigildo and Raymunda
died on December 15, 1962.
Years later, the donation was questioned by the Petitioner as allegedly it did not observe the form
required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public
instrument. The issue to be threshed out is whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is
required.
Rule: It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias
was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact that in
1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-known
rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature,
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are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This Court specifically held that during the Japanese
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occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the

Part 1
Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter
whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in
either case. G.R. No. 122134 October 3, 2003 ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO
B. Scope of Political Law:
a. The law of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. This deals with the organization and
management of the different branches of the government
b. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Deals with the guaranties of the constitution to individual

rights and the limitations on governmental action
c. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Deals with the exercise of executive power in the making
of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights
d. The law on PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. Deals with the governmental agencies for
local government or for other special purpose
C. Constitutional Law defined
Constitutional law is a term used to designate the law embodied in the constitution
and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application made by
courts of the constitution in specific cases. (Sinco, Phil. Political Law)
It “is a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of cases in
which the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some act of
government, has been challenged.” (Bernas)
Constitutional law consist not only of the constitution, but also of the cases decided
by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, i.e., every case where the ratio
decidendi is based on a constitutional provision. (Defensor-Santiago)
Constitutional law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between
authority represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)
D. Constitution Defined
A constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. It, therefore, embodies
legal rules as well as political principles. And so when we speak of constitutional law
in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the legal rules of the constitution.2
It is defined by Judge Story to be a fundamental law or basis of government. It is

established by the people, in their original sovereign capacity, to promote their own
happiness, and permanently to secure their rights, property, independence, and
common welfare. (McKoan vs. Devries, 3 Barb., 196, 198 [quoting 1 Story, Const.,
secs. 338, 339]; Church vs. Kelsey, 7 Sup. Ct., 897, 898; 121 U. S., 282; 30 L. ed.,
960.)
A constitution is delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first
principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed.
It contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land. It
is paramount to the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority
that made it. (Vanhornes's Lessee vs. Dorrance, 2 U. S. [2 Dall.] 304, 308; 28 Fed.
Cas., 1012;1 L. ed., 391.)
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Mendoza Notes

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A constitution is an act of extraordinary legislation by which the people establish the
structure and mechanism of their government, and in which they prescribe
fundamental rules to regulate the motions of the several parts. (Eakin vs. Raub [Pa.]
12 Serg. & R., 330, 347.)
A constitution is the written charter enacted and adopted by the people of a state
through a combination of representatives, or in any way the people may choose to
act, by which a government for them is obtained and established, and by which the
people give organic and corporate form to that ideal thing, a state, for all time to
come, or during the life of the state. (Lynn vs. Polk, 76 Tenn. [8 Lea], 121, 165.)
It is a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in writing.
(Hamilton)
It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the

government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the People
(Tañada and Fernando)
According to Schwartz, “it is seen as an organic instrument, under which

governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.” Such stress upon both
grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in American theory. “The office and
purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity.”
(Fernando)
Comprehensive Definition: That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which
the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. (Cooley) –This covers written
and unwritten constitutions. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)
American sense: A constitution is a written instrument by which the fundamental

powers of government are established, limited, and defined and by which these
powers are distributed among several departments, for their more safe and useful
exercise, for the benefit of the body politic. (Justice Miller)
With particular reference to the Philippine Constitution: That written instrument

enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the
government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are
distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefit of the body politic. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6)
E. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,3 the Court held that, "It
is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution."
In Sabio v. Gordon4, the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of
the land. It is the ‘basic and paramount law (to which all other laws must conform.’"
In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections5, the Court held that, "The

Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional
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G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, 3 November 2008, 570 SCRA 410
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G.R. No. 174340, 17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 704.
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453 Phil. 586 (2003).

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In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, the Court held
that:
Rule: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes
the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is
founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all
public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void
and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. G.R. No. 122156
February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM - quoting 8 Wall. 603 (1869).
“…When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern” Art 7, New Civil Code’’
Rule: As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the
Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive. CIR v. San
Roque Power Corp., G.R. No. 187485, 8 October 2013
F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law
Rule: American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC, (227 SCRA 100 (1993).)"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution
can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged.
In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003 FRANCISCO, JR. vs THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Rule Foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we
cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs,
and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law
and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and
such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation
related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is
the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct
and different from others. G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009 SERRANO vs. .GALLANT MARITIME
G. Types of Constitution
1. In relation to the amendment process:
RIGID CONSTITUTION - is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually
difficult process. This may not be amended except through a special process
distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws.
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The constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater

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degree of stability;

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FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION - is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

(Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5).
It may be changed in the same manner and through the same body that enacts
ordinary legislation. Example: British Constitution.
2. As to its adaption:
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION - is one whose precepts are embodied in one document

or set of documents. The provisions have been reduced to writing and embodied
in one or more instruments at a particular time6.
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION - consists of rules which have not been integrated

into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statues
of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists,
customs and traditions, and certain common law principles. (Cruz, Constitutional
Law pp 4-5) Such has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is
the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development.7
3. As to its enactment
ENACTED or CONVENTIONAL CONSTITUTION - is enacted, formally struck off at

a definitive time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a
constituent body or ruler;
CUMULATIVE OR EVOLVED - is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated

at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by systematic method.
(Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5)
4. Others:
NORMATIVE - adjusts to norms, those that function more truly as prescriptive

documents, such as the Constitution of the United States, are called normative
constitutions.
NOMINAL – not yet fully operational. Constitutions such as that of the former
Soviet Union are called nominal constitutions. The Soviet Constitution claimed to
guarantee Freedom of Speech, press, and assembly, but in practice the Soviet
government continually repressed those who sought to express those freedoms.
SEMANTIC – A Fundamental law for the perpetuation of power. (“pseudo-

constitution”), enforced to formalize and legalize the monopoly of power in
authoritarianism or even totalitarianism.
What is the Philippine Constitution? The Constitution of the Philippines is written,

conventional and rigid.
H. Qualities of a Good Constitution
 BROAD. Because it provides for the organization of the entire government and
covers all persons and things within the territory of the State and also because
it must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency. (Cruz,
Constitutional Law pp 5-6)
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They have been also called conventional or enacted because they are given definite form by a steadily constituted
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body, the constitutional convention, at a particular time. Example: U.S. and Philippine Constitution
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They are also known as cumulative or evolved because they are not formulated at any definite time but are rather the
outcome of a political evolutionary process. Example: English Constitution

Part 1
Case: A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to
endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign,
a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern
not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution
must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be
progressive and not static. G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Case: Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should
be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that
a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the
refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and
respected jurist explains:
“The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the
base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must
take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino
minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally
achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from
the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must
grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing
from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified
rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.” Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No.
118295 May 2, 1997
 BRIEF. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with

legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. (Cruz,
Constitutional Law pp 4-5)
 DEFINITE. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in

confusion and divisiveness among the people. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4-
5)
I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution
Constitution of GOVERNMENT. The series of provisions outlining the organization of

the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its
administration and defining the electorate. (ex. Art VI, VII, VIII and IX)
Constitution of LIBERTY. The series of proscriptions setting forth the fundamental

civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. (Ex. Article III)
Constitution of SOVEREIGNTY. The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure

in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought
about. (Ex. Art XVII)
J. Philosophical View of the Constitution
Case: The Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby
the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest
the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants
of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

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A- Precedents

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Treaty of Paris: (signed December 10, 1898; became effective on April 11, 1899)
The Philippines was ceded by Spain to the U.S. Spain relinquished its sovereignty
over the Philippines Islands, and with this,
 All laws of political nature were automatically abrogated.

 It provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands
were to be determined by the US Congress.
 The US Constitution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US Congress
expressly enacted its provisions.
McKinley’s Instructions: (issued by Pres. McKinley on April 7, 1900 as “Letter

of Instruction to the Second Philippines Commission” under Taft)
It set up a “divided civil and military government” with the existing Military governor
as the Executive and a Philippine Commission, created on September 1, 1900, as
the Legislative. Both represented the US President as Commander-in-Chief.
 It extended to the Philippines all the rights in the Bill of Rights of the US
Federal Constitution except
o the right to bear arms8 and

o the rights to a trial by jury9.
 This was the first Organic Act (a law which establishes the structure and
limitations of the government) of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a
constitution, were the ratification by the people and the right of amendment
which was reserved solely to the US President)
 The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a Supreme
Court, Courts of First Instance, and Justice of Peace Courts
Spooner Amendment:
July 4, 1901: The Spooner Amendment, was actually a rider to the “Army and Navy
Appropriation Act.”
 It changed the then “divided military and civil government” into a fully civil
government under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippines Commission
would now begin: “Be it enacted by the authority of the US government,” and
no longer by authority of the US President.
Philippine Bill of 1902: (Philippines’ organic act from 1902 to 1906)
 The Governor-General retained all executive power, including the power to

suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendation of the Philippine
Commission.
 The Philippine Commission was the upper house. It established an elective
lower house called the Philippines Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos.
 It defined for the first time who are the citizens of the Philippines. They were
all the inhabitants of the Philippine islands who were subjects of Spain as of
April 11, 1989, who continued to reside therein, and all the children
subsequent thereto.
Jones Law (or the Philippine Autonomy Act): (passed on August 29, 1916 by the
US Congress)
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The Philippines was then in rebellion
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Due to the distrust of the US to Filipinos

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 It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was

the prototype of our present set-up.
o The executive power was in the hands of an American Governor-

General, who was independent of the Legislature, and who was given
the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and impose martial law
without the recommendation of the Legislature. The Legislature was
composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, all
composed of Filipinos. The judiciary continued to be made up of the
Supreme Court, the CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts.
o Under this set-up, while the Filipinos has all the legislative power, the
Americans had all the executive power and thus, also the control of the
government
Tydings-McDuffie Law: (not an organic act)
It is an enabling statute that provided the mechanism whereby the constitution of

an independent Philippines could be adopted.
This provided for:
1. The calling of Constitutional Convention to draft our Constitution.

2. The adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a
Bill of Rights and a separation of Church and state.
3. Submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the Constitution
was in conformity with the condition set by the Tydings-McDuffie Law.
4. Its ratification by the people in a plebiscite.
Complete independence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity.
1935 Constitution: (took effect on November 15, 1935)
 This served as the charter of the Commonwealth and upon withdrawal of US

sovereignty, of the Republic.
 It provides for a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in the
President who had a 6-year term, the legislative in a unicameral National
Assembly and the judiciary in a Supreme Court, CFI’s, and Justice of Peace
Courts.
Amendments:
1. 1940. Provided a bicameral Congress, a term of 4 years for the President with
re-election, and establishment of Commission on Elections
2. 1947. Included Parity Rights Agreement which stated that Congress acting as
constituent body, needed ¾ vote to propose an amendment to the Constitution
3. 1967. Provided the amendment of the Constitution by a Convention
1973 Constitution:
This was ratified by the citizens’ assembly (January 10-15, 1973 which was called
by Pres. Marcos during the Martial Law. After the ratification, Proclamation No. 1102
on 17 January 1973, certified and proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 had been ratified by the Filipino people and
thereby come into effect.
Relevant Law: PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

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ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED

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BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

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WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is
subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered
cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are
residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the
Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or
ward secretary;
WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their
views on important national issues;
WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated
January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you
approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as
against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection;
while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the
new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814)
answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of
the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay
has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino
people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen
hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority
of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines,
and has thereby come into effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

"President of the Philippines
"By the President:

"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
"Executive Secretary"
Amendments:
1. 1976. Gave the President legislative powers even if the Interim Batasang
Pambansa was already operating.
2. 1980. Raised the retirement of justices from 65 to 70.10
3. 1980. Changed the form of government from Parliamentary to Presidential.
4. 1984. Provided for a Vice President.
B- The 1986 Revolution and proclamation of the provisional Constitution
The alleged electoral fraud in the “snap presidential election” in February 7, 1986,
sparked demonstrations with the demands for the ouster of Marcos. Then Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Armed Forces Vice-Chief of Staff command of
Fidel V. Ramos, who barricaded themselves at Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo,
10
Page
10
To extend the terms of presidential allies

Part 1
withdrew their support from the Marcos government and called for the resignation
of the late president. With the support of the church and mass media, thousands of
Filipinos to march the street of EDSA.
1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution.
a. Proclamation No. 1 – February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government) Announced

the assumption of power of Aquino and Laurel
This supposed to have established the Provisional Government but Proclamation No.
3 seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary government since in its preamble,
it announced that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces,”
referring to the EDSA revolution.
The popular view was that the Aquino government was not an offshoot of the 1973
Constitution for under that Constitution a procedure was given for the election of
the President – proclamation by the Batasan – and the candidate proclaimed was
Marcos. Was the Aquino Government legitimate? This was said to be not a
justiceable matter. This view was affirmed in Lawyers League v Aquino where the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is questioned on the ground that it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution
Case: The SC ruled that petitioners had no personality to sue and their petition states no cause of
action. "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control
of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto11 government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government."
The Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group revolted
and succeeded in wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state revolted and overthrew the
government, so that right from the beginning, the installation was already lawful and the government
was at all times de jure12. - Lawyers League v Aquino (GR Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990, May 22,
1986
Case: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto8 government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R.
11
Kinds of de facto government: 1. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or by the
voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter. 2. That established
as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. 3. That
which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of
war and which is denominated as a government of paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines established
by the Japanese belligerent.
Characteristics: a. Its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government. b. During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters
by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as
wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
12
In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A revolution, from
11
the point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can change its government in whatever
way the sovereign sees fit. But this right of revolution, inherent in sovereignty, cannot be recognized in a Constitution,
Page
for this would be self-destructive. The nature of a Constitution is to set-up a government and provide for an orderly way
to change this government. A revolution contradicts this nature.

Part 1
No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.];
G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et
al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis13,
there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel
are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines for
the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, G.R. No. 76180 October
24, 1986 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
b. Proclamation No. 3 – March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution), announced the

promulgation of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, pending the drafting and
ratification of a new Constitution. It abrogated the legislative provisions of the 1973
Constitution, modified the provision regarding the executive department, and totally
reorganized the government.
It adopted certain provisions in the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles

on the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing laws.
It provided for the calling of a Constitution Commission composed of 30 to 50
members appointed by the President within 60 days.
C- Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution
1. Adoption of the Constitution.
 Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members

 October 15, 1986 - Approval of the draft Constitution by the Constitutional
Commission
 February 2, 1987 - Plebiscite held for the present constitution
2. Article V of the Provisional Constitution
Provisional Const., Art. V
Section 1: Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed
by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than
thirty (30) nor more than (50) natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known
for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after
consultation with various sectors of society.
Section 2: The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent
with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to draft a document
truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people.
Section 3: The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have
adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution
Section 4: The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and recorded.
Section 5: The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall
fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a period of 20 days following
its submission to the President.
3. Section 27. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
“This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
12
Page
13
With necessary changes in points of detail (Black’s Law Dictionary)

Part 1
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six,
and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six at the
Plenary Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the Commissioners whose signatures
are hereunder affixed.”
4. Proclamation No. 58 – February 11, 1987 - proclaiming the ratification of the

Constitution
Rule: The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof
By virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose,"
the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held
on that same date.
So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation
of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by
the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite. DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
(As compared to the effectivity and the Publication of laws: Taňada vs. Tuvera 136
SCRA 27 - 1985)
Context: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
(New Civil Code)
Rule: Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. (Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985)
Rule: After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
13
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
Page
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them

Part 1
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires14 act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must a also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
It is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article
2 of the Civil Code. Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Law: E.O. 200 June 18, 1987 Amending Article 2 of the Civil Code
“Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless
14
it is otherwise provided.”
Page
14
Beyond the powers or if within the powers are not binding due to lack of consent of stakeholders

Part 1
III. Judicial Elaboration of the Constitution
A. Construction
- IN CASE OF DOUBT, THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SELF-

EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING
Case: The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC (Manila Hotel). In a close bidding only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution
of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad and subsequently sent a
manager's check Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which respondent GSIS
refused to accept. Hence, the case.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS,
a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part
of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction
involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to
which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
Rule: Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII15 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays
down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection
of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty
for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
15
Page
15
“In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.” (NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY)

Part 1
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable. (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM)
Also the case of GAMBOA VS TEVES* reiterates the ruling of Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS
Case: Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly
reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and
ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no
need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale
why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
thus:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . .Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.
In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, later
Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno
stated that ”Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than
as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they
are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign
people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional
inaction should not suffocate them.” G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, WILSON P. GAMBOA vs.
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES
Also, the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, that the provisions of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts.
Case: Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO
"intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court,
the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the
1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
16
Rule: Declaration of Principles, Not Self-Executing

Page

Part 1
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution16 is called the "basic political creed of the nation"
by Dean Vicente Sinco.17 These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts.18 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in
the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in
the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,19 the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII20 are not "self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Case: Petitioner questions his being declared a nuisance candidate
Rule: Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution
neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration
of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No.
6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio
refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
PAMATONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Rule: As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011 MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. et al
16
Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the 1987's.
17
Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
18
Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision which lays down a general
17
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing."
19
246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases,
Page
August 25, 1995.

20
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Part 1
OTHERS;
There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction:
First, VERBA LEGIS, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed;
Second, where there is ambiguity, RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, meaning that the
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers; and
Third, UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, meaning that the Constitution is to be

interpreted as a whole.21
1. The Constitution has to be Interpreted as a Whole (UT MAGIS

VALEAT QUAM PEREAT)
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be

allowed to defeat another.22
Rule: Economic Nationalism should be read with other constitutional mandates to attain Balanced
Development of Economy.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System,
et al., this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself
states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to
exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is
self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions23
in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is
unfair. Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Rule: x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of
our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all
other provisions of that great document . Chiongbian v. De Leon 82 Phil 771 (1949).
21
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
22
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
23
Secs. 1 and 13 Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. The
State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian
reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive
18
in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
Page
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . . xxx xxx xxx Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

Part 1
Rule: It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
2. Plain Meaning Rule. Whenever Possible the Words Used in the

Constitution Must Be Given their Ordinary Meaning Except When
Technical Terms are Employed. (VERBA LEGIS)
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.24
Rule: “In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed." G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA
vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rule: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document,
it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration 31 SCRA 413 (1970)
Case: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
Allegedly, counting, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No.
4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent lacks the one (1) year
residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
Rule: Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon
City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of
Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned
his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention25. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question
of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in
mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or
domicile at a time.
19
24
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS.
Page
25
Verba Legis - Plain meaning rule. Whenever possible the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except when technical terms are employed.

Part 1
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of
domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change
of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but
it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original
domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without
the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract
of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be
used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened
by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive
of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay.
Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and
is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or
believes to be, his residence. G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999 JUAN DOMINO vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
3. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance

with the intent of its framers (RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA)
Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law must be given a
reasonable interpretation at all times26. The Court may, in some instances, consider
the spirit and reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, or injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.27
Applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of the constitution may render
its provisions meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent
or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be made to the rule that the
spirit of the law controls its letter.28
Following the verba legis doctrine, (a) law must be applied exactly as worded (if) it
is clear, plain and unequivocal.29
Interpretation according to spirit. The words of the Constitution should be

interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
Rule: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within
its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent
of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that
would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011 RODOLFO G.
NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA 30
26
Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002.
27
People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962, citing Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294
28
20
Navarro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010

29
G.R. No. 183880 January 20, 2014 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TOLEDO POWER, INC.
Page
30
Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, December
21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636, 644-645

Part 1
Rule: Truly, law must be understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even for the sake of
logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and specific environmental facts.
Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in
the ultimate development of the social edifice." Frivaldo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 120295, p. 56, June
28, 1996
Rule: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be
examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the
framing of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought
to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be
prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the
constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect. Atty. Romulo A.
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA
783, 797-799. cited in G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
- OTHER CASES
Case: Petitioners allege that the Health Sector Reform Agenda should be declared void, since it
runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They
claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement
violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly
resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is
unfounded.
Rule: As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some
provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.
 In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution as non-self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x.
These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
 In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections
11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court
referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely
lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non-
self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court
21
categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.

Page

Part 1
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal
protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.
There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the
HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached,
petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and
consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the
State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful
working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the
Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care
and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non-self-executory in the cases of Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are
mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but
rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.
The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon
v. National Labor Relations Commission:
x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise
of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be
impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being
overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of
these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a
loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.. G.R. No.
167324 July 17, 2007 TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS
B. Theory of Judicial Review
1. The Theory and the Basis
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any

norm of the Constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.31 As such, the law provides therefore
that “…When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern”32
Judicial review guarantees that all laws, or governmental actions must conform to
the Constitution. Otherwise, they may be struck down due to the contradiction.
The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this Court
every opportunity to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.33
Mostly, Judicial Review is sparingly used by the courts because of deference or

respect for the other branches of government. It finds its basis from the
Constitution;
22
31
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
Page
32
Art 7, New Civil Code
33
G.R. No. 138268 May 26, 1999 JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN MENDOZA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Part 1
“All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under
the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.” (Article VIII Section 4 (2)
2. Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional.
Rule: The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the
assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr applies when there is found, among others, "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,"
"a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast
against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only
to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their
constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."1
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon. 710 SCRA 1. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA et. al, G.R. No. 208493 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON et.al. G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and
SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Case: For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. This followed after Sen.
Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that
some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
The DBM issued a public statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part
of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
DBM cited that this had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased
appropriations and 2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and
projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of
the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the
petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the
Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various
agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of
the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within
the Executive Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the
23
interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.

Page

Part 1
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were
filed. All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the
issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders.
Issue: Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),
Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under
the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for
certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists
under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader
in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the law to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly
or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases,
the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances. G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Case: In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner was proclaimed as member elect of National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. He took his oath of office on November 15,
1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a Resolution No. 8 confirming the
election of its members against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On the other hand, the
electoral commission adopted a resolution on December 9, 1935 fixing said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made.
Prior to December 9, or on December 8, 1935, respondent Ynsua, a defeated candidate, filed a

“motion of protest”, being the only protest filed after the passage of resolution No. 8, asking for the
nullification of petitioner’s election. The ‘motion to dismiss the protest' filed by petitioner was denied.
Hence, this present petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
Issues: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
24
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Part 1
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Rule: Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts
of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is
required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction
and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to
a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality
25
to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
Page
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect

Part 1
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the governments of the government.. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO
and DIONISIO C. MAYOR
Rule: The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation
of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to
the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases
and controversies.
The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has
transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or
legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy
decision-making.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court added;
x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the
question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
In Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation, the Court elucidated the co-equal status of
the three branches of government:
Considering the co-equal status of the three branches of government, courts may not tread into
matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and legislative
branches, unless it is clearly shown that the government official or office concerned abused his or
its discretion. x x x
Furthermore,
"x x x courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or
officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally
better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as
government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions."
Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the courts
will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise
and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters within the
jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave
abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
The only instance when the Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has acted
with grave abuse of discretion or violated a law. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 17, 2009
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
While each branch of government is governed by the Separation of Powers, the

supremacy of the Constitution may allow the Courts to look into transgressions of
the Fundamental Law in the carrying out of their official mandates.
Rule: There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution
should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court…. have no
choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the
Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Social Justice Society, the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
26
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." In Sabio, the Court held that, "the
Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is ‘the basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons,
Page
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its

Part 1
intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’" In Bengzon v. Drilon, the Court held that, "the three
branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution." In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that, "The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no
choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed."
Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary
power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court held that,
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution." In
Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Court held that,
police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the
constitution.’" In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, "police
power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the Constitution."
When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio, the Court held that, "A statute may
be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates
the Constitution or its basic principles." The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is
void.
In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, the Court held that,
"This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution." In Bengzon, the Court held
that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it
decrees." In Mutuc, the Court held that:
“The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of
any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate
of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to
that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government
in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience
to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of
statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal,
be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it
ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called
upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review
to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.” G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011 TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT
In the absence of any transgression of the Constitution by the other branches of

government, Courts must respect the boundaries established by the Fundamental
Law
Rule: The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only
through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a
limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those
of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate
clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference
to the doctrine of separation of powers. G.R. No. 191567 March 20, 2013 MARIE CALLO-
CLARIDAD vs. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN
27
Rule: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Page
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in

Part 1
this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the
executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. x x x Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III G.R.
No. 177780 January 25, 2012
3. Judicial Review and Presumption of Constitutionality
When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court

must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that
every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments
are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.34
Note the following:
1. It is disputably presumed that official duty has been regularly performed
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; xxx Rule 131 (Rules of Court)
2. Interpretation of laws: The New Civil Code provides;
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
3. Passage of laws: A Bill before becoming a law passes the necessary readings as
well as the assessment of the President. Hence, the presumption of
Constitutionality.
4. As to government actions: Sovereignty belongs to the people, and the

Constitution is the written instrument through which the people entrust to
government a measure of its own sovereignty and no more., What is entrusted to
government is limited power. Hence every act of government must conform to the
terms of the empowerment (Bernas)
Case: Petitioner Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner contends that the law relied upon in convicting him and the sentence imposed is cruel and
therefore violates SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION,
considering that there was already payment of the shortaged amount.
Rule: First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit
any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
28
Page
34
G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL

Part 1
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with,
rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact
a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional
powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will
be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is
repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a
law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail. G.R. No. 164763 February
12, 2008 ZENON R. PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN
Rule: To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law]
based on xx x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed
it but also of the executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of
the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. G.R. No. 204429 February
18, 2014 SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS
Should there be no transgression, the Court shall not declare a law to be

“constitutional” as it enjoys that presumption, It shall only declare the same to be
“not unconstitutional”
Further reference: Annotation: Judicial Review, 583 SCRA 142
C. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. - Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
1. Judicial Power
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept
of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling
actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.35
29
Page
35
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

Part 1
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. 36 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can
be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."37
Rule: Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants
Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
Rule: Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such right. G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966 FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO
ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
2. Grave Abuse of Discretion
Rule: “We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse
of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law. The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term
"arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective
hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.” G. R. No. 174350 August 13, 2008 BALANGAUAN vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS
Rule:" Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Singian, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013
3. Actual Case and Controversy
In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial
review can only be exercised in an actual case and controversy.
According to Fr. Bernas;
 The Court cannot pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory

opinions
 Courts cannot resolve feigned or hypothetical constitutional problems
 Courts cannot resolve friendly suits collusively arranged between parties
without real adverse interests
 Moot cases, as they have no more “flesh and blood”
The following must be avoided:
(i) political questions,

(ii) advisory opinions,
(iii) moot and academic issues, and
(iv) no standing.
Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
36
30
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581,
178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 175.
Page
37
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 450.

Part 1
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.. G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936 JOSE A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR
Rule: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to
an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
An ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY requires the following;
(1) a PARTY with a PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST,

(2) an APPROPRIATE CASE,
(3) a CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION raised at the EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME, and
(4) a constitutional question that is the VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, i.e. an
unavoidable question.
To elaborate;
(1) A PARTY WITH A PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST
General Concept:
A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited
if the case is resolved in his favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decided
against him. Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type
of legislative act being questioned, or his status and the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement. The test of standing is whether the party has alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure such concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.38
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire
to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of
our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people
is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of
suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately
31
render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice.

Page
38
Baker v Carr 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962]

Part 1
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.39 A person has standing
to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.40
Case: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005) which intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Rule: The Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in
favor of RA 9335.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial adjudication41. A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question
must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the
governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 42
Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome
of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.43
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by
the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any
specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them.
They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves.
ABAKADA vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
GENERAL THE ELEMENTS OF STANDING:
Rule: Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when
1. He can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
2. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
3. The injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy brought about by the party. G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998 TELECOMMUNICATIONS BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: Petitioners, holders of permits, contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school
is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit,
as in the case of the questioned law (Act 2706) before such person could exercise said right, amounts
to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government.
39
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE O. VERA
40
32
Mendoza
41
Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1995 edition, p. 23.
Page
42
Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp. 848-849.
43
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000). (Vitug, J., separate opinion)

Part 1
Rule: None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to
operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. Courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a
hypothetical threat being insufficient. G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
Case: All thirty-five (35) art lovers, petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale
scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and
19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed
in the custody of the Central Bank, the same being part of Filipino heritage.
Rule: The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a
party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
related party.
They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of
the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock
corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First
Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership
of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although
the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were
placed on exhibit. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the
valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993,
JOYA vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

Standing of Taxpayers, Voters Legislators, and Citizens, GENERALLY
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo44, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before
the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thus: If in
cases involving constitutional issues;
1.) For TAXPAYERS, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For VOTERS, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
3.) For CONCERNED CITIZENS, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
4.) For LEGISLATORS, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
Case: In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention, in questioning the composition of the JBC,
as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the
citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes. According to petitioner,
"since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid,
petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings
33
are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution."
Page
44
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.

Part 1
Rule: Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict of
rights and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (522
Phil. 705 in 2006), the Court summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from jurisprudence.
There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional
issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity
of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there
must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any
other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have
been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.
Clearly, petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake
in the outcome of this controversy.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because
he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a "personal stake" on
the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post
of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional.
The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized
in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s
ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must
be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust.
Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the
same time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee
to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the
opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant
in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not
empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations are
substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not
elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the
JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
Case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner
Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of
the President and for being in breach of existing laws.
Based on the findings of the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting
34
themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well
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as other] irregular and abusive practices," the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the

Part 1
President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs]
and [GFIs]."
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled "Directing
the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and
[GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish
a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was
also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCs
and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation.
Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI
employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances,
bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7,

which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Rule: Petitioner lacks locus standi. – To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present
petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he "stands to be prejudiced by
[EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or
increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those
officers who are to fix and determine his compensation." The petitioner also claims that he has
standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and
orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal
stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and
based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and
other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has
no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner
of legal standing to assail EO 7.
If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the
courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion
into constitutional adjudication.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present
petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders
of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded
by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, "as too general an interest which
is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry." Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true,
is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT
B. GALICTO vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
- As Legislators:
Rule: In Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), we held that members of Congress
may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government only upon
showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators.
G.R. No. 138298 June 19, 2001 RAOUL B. DEL MAR vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION, ET. AL (OPINION of MELO, J.
Rule To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member
of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
35
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
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validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislator G.R.

Part 1
No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010
- As Taxpayers:
A taxpayer has a standing to sue if
1. He has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised

by taxation
2. He will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
Rule: Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIA vs. ALBA
Case: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality
and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided
for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with
a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, also sought
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter,
releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of
PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA)
from enforcing the questioned provision.
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder – P 8,327,000,000.00
xxxx
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such
amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary:
PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may
be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food
Authority.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct
allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does
not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects
to be funded out of PDAF.
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to
the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core
of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the
expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected
by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public
funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present
controversy.
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the
implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution.
36
For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members
of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of
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illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other

Part 1
branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed
committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete,
real or substantial controversy before the Court.
Issues: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this
case;
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required
in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed
and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed
to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. G.R. No.
164987 April 24, 2012 LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 89-299, which lifted its
system of pre-audit of government financial transactions.
The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in
management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to
contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving government operations by
curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while
continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of these transactions.
As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-audit
duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further
claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government
transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the
P550-million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
Rule: Standing - This Petition has been filed as a taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have
been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the
issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous
irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left
unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its
Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be
adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. G.R. No. 180989 February 7, 2012 Gualberto
J. Dela Llana vs. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, The Executive Secretary and the
National Treasurer
1. On August 28, 2013, petitioner Alcantara, President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition
for Prohibition, seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents as the incumbent Senate President and
Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be
called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.
2. On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et.al. filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
37
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such
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as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null

Part 1
and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a
TRO against respondents who are the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management, and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease
any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing
respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators
who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the
funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto";
and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x
x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x
x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."Also, they
pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-
sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR."109
3. On September 5, 2013, petitioner Nepomuceno filed a Petition dated, seeking that the PDAF be
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Aquino and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release
to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation
with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of
Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
Development Authority.
The three cases were consolidated.
Issues: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue;
Rule: Locus Standi. - Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the
existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized.
It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of
public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest." Indeed, of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental
law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 GRECO
ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA et. al, G.R. No. 208493 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON
S. ALCANTARA, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON et.al. G.R. No. 209251 PEDRITO M.
NEPOMUCENO, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY
FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
- As Citizens
1. When the issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public
2. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Section 18, Article VII, 1987
Constitution
3. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
38
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used

as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
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stations as may be provided by law. (Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution)

Part 1
Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in
interest are the people themselves. G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the
Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) which
won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic
Act No. 913645 (EPIRA).
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP
located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of
Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water.
As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners
Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it
disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed under the Constitution, as the
same was granted sans any transparency.
Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers, or as
Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from being directly
injured by the proceedings of PSALM.
Issues: Legal standing of petitioners;
Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and
taxpayers.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.
Moreover, we have held that if the petition is anchored on the people’s right to information on matters
of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest
is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result. It is sufficient
that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful execution of the laws. G.R.
No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)
- More cases, and instances on standing;
a. “Transcendental Importance” and “Paramount Public Interest”
Case: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation
of the "Contract of Lease" of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO executed by the latter and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation

composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the
cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie
Webb and Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as
members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of
Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.
39
45
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 - Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and
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privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP)
contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner

Part 1
Rule: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many
of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic,
and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier
which the respondents tried to take advantage of. G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994 KILOSBAYAN vs.
GUINGONA
Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and
taxpayers.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing
is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This Court, however, has adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.
Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner
is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is one of
paramount importance to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro Manila
might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power plant in
the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal stake in the resolution of legal
issues in a petition to stop its implementation. G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR
DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
(IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION (PSALM)
Rule: The Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can
be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement.
It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on
more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. James M. Imbong
v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
Case: Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted
by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said
law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning
it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces this
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and two petitions- in-intervention, persons and
entities in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; on behalf of the generations unborn as members of the Bar, and as one as an accredited
political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
40
RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

Page
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

Part 1
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the
powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions. It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that some petitioners lack standing to question the
RH Law
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends
that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet
to be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive.
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Rule: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons
not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
Transcendental Importance. Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement.
It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on
more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion
and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
41
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum
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of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance

Part 1
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her
child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences. James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
b. “Intergenerational Responsibility”
Rule: This case, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature
means the created world in its entirety. G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
Case: Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between
the islands of Negros and Cebu
Among others, Petitioners collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition,
are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters
in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Ramos and Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians
and as friends who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine
species.
Incidentally, recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines
or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.( A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective April 29,
2010 RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES..)
Rule: Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental · Cases became effective, this Court
had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In
Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does
not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties
in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos
and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE
TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180771 & 181527, 21 APRIL 2015
Concurrent opinion: The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors
42
and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court
recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of
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Part 1
succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future
generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is
dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit,
putting into. question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in
arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court.
Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn
may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the
impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real
party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an
actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At
best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right
and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives
have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded
arguments" on behalf of those they represent. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE
PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180771 &
181527, 21 APRIL 2015
(2) AN APPROPRIATE CASE
Political Question. An issue is a political question when it does not deal with the
interpretation of a law and its application to a case, but with the very wisdom of the
law itself. When a judge attempts to resolve a political question, he is not exercising
a judicial function, but is rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political
branch of the government.
Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for
determining whether a question is political or not.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found;
- a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political

department;
- or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
- or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind

clearly for non-judicial discretion;
- or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
- or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already

made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Issues: Whether or not (the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not
subject to judicial review
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Rule: Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine. The "limitation on the power of judicial review
to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr
applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the
political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do
them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to
impose a solution at this stage."1
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 GRECO
N. OCHOA et. al,
Advisory Opinion. A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case
and controversy that demands constitutional construction for its resolution. It is not
wise for the court to engage in an advisory opinion because:
a) This only leads to dialectics or contentions, to abstract legal arguments and

sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter)
b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the
meaning of the law.
Advisory Opinion vs. Declaratory Relief
Declaratory Relief. Section 1, Rule 63 (Rules of Court) Declaratory Relief
By whom? Any person who;

1. Has interests in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
2. Has rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may
When? Before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate RTC
Reason: To determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a

declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Now, an action for declaratory relief is only proper when the following requisites
are present:
1. There must be a justiciable controversy;

2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
3. The person seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy;
Rule: the appellant not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale executed by
the appellees spouses but took part only as notary public before whom they acknowledged
the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. G.R. No. L-
44
16474 January 31, 1962 TOMAS B. TADEO vs. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
PANGASINAN
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4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
Read: G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010, SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT

NETWORK, INC. vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(3) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME
Ripeness. A constitutional question may come to the court either too early or
prematurely, so that it is still abstract (advisory opinion), or too late, so that the
court's decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). The court must
resolve constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time.
Rule: “The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and
if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. APEX MINING CO., INC., vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP, G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 November 20,
2009
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.
In THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, (589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).) where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the
issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate
the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that
the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.
Rule: In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be
to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in.. G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009 ATTY. OLIVER O.
LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C.
NOGRALES
Case: Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted
by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said
law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning
it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
45
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
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adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is
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Part 1
Rule In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it
is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW. James M.
Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
Mootness. A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated
arguments but for some reason the legal problem has become stale. When a case
is moot and academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. Any decision reached
by the court would not be conclusive on the parties. Although moot, the Court may
still resolve the issue if the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review;
if there exists a mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does
not act; if by voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is
free to return to his old ways.
Case: The Sugar Regulatory Administration issued Sugar Orders which provided a lien on all raw
sugar quedan-permits, as well as on any other form of sugar in order to fund the Philippine Sugar
Research Institute, Inc.
Questioning the validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders, Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction. It alleged that the Assailed Sugar Orders are unconstitutional in that: (a) they were issued
beyond the powers and authority granted to the SRA by EO 18, s. 1986; and (b) the amount levied
by virtue of the Assailed Sugar Orders constitutes public funds and thus, cannot be legally channeled
to a private corporation such as PHILSURIN.
In response, the SRA and PHILSURIN filed their respective motions to dismiss on the ground of
forum-shopping. The SRA alleged that there is a pending case for declaratory relief in the Quezon
City-RTC and that the main issue raised in both the Naga and QC Cases is the validity of the Assailed
Sugar Orders. The Naga City-RTC denied SRA and PHILSURIN’s motions to dismiss.
In a Decision dated April 19, 2013, the CA nullified and set aside the Orders of the Naga City-RTC
and ordered the dismissal of the case a quo on the ground of forum-shopping. Hence this Petition.
In the interim, during the pendency of the instant petition, the SRA has issued Sugar Order No. 5, s.
2013-2014, which revoked the Assailed Sugar Orders. As a result thereof, all mill companies were
directed to cease from collecting the lien from all sugar production, effective immediately.
Rule: A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on
the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief
which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is
because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because,
in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.
In this case, the supervening issuance of Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014 which revoked the
effectivity of the Assailed Sugar Orders has mooted the main issue in the case a quo - that is the
validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders. Thus, in view of this circumstance, resolving the procedural
issue on forum-shopping as herein raised would not afford the parties any substantial relief or have
any practical legal effect on the case.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to abstain from passing upon the merits
of this case where legal relief is no longer needed nor called for. G.R. No. 208660 March 5, 2014
46
PEÑAFRANCIA SUGAR MILL, INC. vs. SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION

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Rule: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy
— one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. G.R. No. 185053 February 15, 2012
EUSTAQUIO CANDARI vs. ROLAND DONASCO
Some Cases
Issues: Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy
Rule: Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy. The Court finds that there exists an actual and
justiciable controversy. For there to be an exercise of the Judicial Power, there must be a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning
that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. Withal, courts will decline
to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their
utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional
use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered
moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there
is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-
item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article
which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the
President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot
precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be
done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and
academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and
local autonomy.
47
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
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– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been
and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character
as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at
a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the
coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s
own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"
demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative
or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which
is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a
definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA
Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in
connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Leonen
pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. Accordingly, there is a
compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated
disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public
funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the third exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The
relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget
for 2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the
course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just
resurface wearing a different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had
already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but
evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging." The situation
similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which
certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition
and hence, must not evade judicial review. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 GRECO
N. OCHOA et. al,
Case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner
Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of
the President and for being in breach of existing laws.
Rule: We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for
having been mooted by subsequent events. The petition has been mooted by supervening events. -
Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already
been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section
10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and
GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs
and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system,
in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.
All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its patent formal
and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court to resolve the other issues
raised in the certiorari petition. G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT B. GALICTO, vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Case: The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban
on the President from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the
general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private
respondent’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification.
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
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Rule: Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on
a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy
to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that
will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered
to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has
been overtaken by subsequent events G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010, ATTY. EVILLO C.
PORMENTO, vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the
Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) which
won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic
Act No. 9136 (EPIRA).
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP
located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan On after a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of
Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water.
As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners
Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it
disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed under the Constitution, as the
same was granted sans and transparency.
Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers, or as
Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from being directly
injured by the proceedings of PSALM.
Issues: Mootness of the petition;
Rule: PSALM’s contention that the present petition had already been mooted by the issuance of the
Notice of Award to K-Water is misplaced. Though petitioners had sought the immediate issuance of
injunction against the bidding commenced by PSALM -- specifically enjoining it from proceeding to
the next step of issuing a notice of award to any of the bidders -- they further prayed that PSALM be
permanently enjoined from disposing of the AHEPP through privatization. The petition was thus filed
not only as a means of enforcing the State’s obligation to protect the citizens’ "right to water" that is
recognized under international law and legally enforceable under our Constitution, but also to bar a
foreign corporation from exploiting our water resources in violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution. If the impending sale of the AHEPP to K-Water indeed violates the Constitution, it is
the duty of the Court to annul the contract award as well as its implementation. As this Court held in
Chavez v. Philippine Estates Authority, "supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution." G.R. No.
192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)
Case: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa challenges the
constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit
and accordingly prays that a judgment issue "declaring the unconstitutionality" of the appointment.
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Part 1
Villar, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years
which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to
February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to
President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment
of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon
Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has
rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Rule: A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events, so that a
resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such
instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will
anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general rule, it is not within Our charge
and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, We
acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
FIRST, there is a grave violation of the Constitution,
SECOND, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved,
THIRD, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, and
FOURTH, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of
Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David,
namely: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional
character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional
nature as to necessarily call for the promulgation of principles that will henceforth "guide the bench,
the bar and the public" should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future situations would
be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are resolved straightaway
and settled definitely. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case,
it nevertheless cries out to be addressed. To borrow from Javier v. Pacificador, "Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint in the future." G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012 DENNIS A. B. FUNA
vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR
Case: In the 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia
Paras.
Petitioner Renald F. Vilando, as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional
district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET.
These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the
same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the
office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio
Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a
determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of
the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that
50
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already
attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not
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Part 1
HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House
of Representatives. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was
denied by the HRET. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando
Rule: The petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic. It should be noted that
Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30,
2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of
the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court
deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship
is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 RENALD F. VILANDO vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON.
SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES
(4) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THAT IS THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, I.E.
AN UNAVOIDABLE QUESTION.
In constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to refrain from resolving any
constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case."
The constitutional challenge must be squarely addressed and threshed out in its
entirety because the constitutionality of the law itself is the very lis mota of the
case. In People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56 (1937).), this court first presented the idea of
lis mota:
It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented
in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and
Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782,
783.)30
Case: Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, and Certiorari and/or
Prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction filed by General. The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Urro,
de Guzman and Escueta as NAPOLCOM, and to prohibit then Executive Secretary and Department
of Interior and DILG Secretary from enforcing the respondents’ oath of office. Particularly, the
petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to
continue in office.
Rule: Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial review
is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our
co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers.
Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden
of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is
determined by the Court.
In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents’ appointments is not the lis mota of the
case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner
has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition – a quo warranto against
respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a discussion
of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary.
The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the essential character of
the petitioner’s action since he does not even allege that he has a personal and substantial interest
in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are concerned. G.R. No. 191560
March 29, 2011 HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission
vs. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO
Rule: As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be
51
settled on other grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable
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Part 1
separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative
and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally
enacted and approved.
The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be
determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in
P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The
governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners' agent.
In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of
the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. G.R. No. 128448
February 1, 2001 SPOUSES. MIRASOL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
4. Judicial Discretion and the Power to Review
Case: Petitioner, an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines assails the
validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable
withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets.
Whether or not this Court should take cognizance of the present case;
Rule: Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites
are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the
question before the court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the
act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the
earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.46
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there is
no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication because
[petitioner] did not allege that CREBA, as a corporate entity, or any of its members, has been
assessed by the BIR for the payment of [MCIT] or [CWT] on sales of real property. Neither did
petitioner allege that its members have shut down their businesses as a result of the payment of the
MCIT or CWT. Petitioner has raised concerns in mere abstract and hypothetical form without any
actual, specific and concrete instances cited that the assailed law and revenue regulations have
actually and adversely affected it. Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion, any
discussion on the constitutionality of the MCIT or CWT on sales of real property is essentially an
academic exercise.
Perceived or alleged hardship to taxpayers alone is not an adequate justification for adjudicating
abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion
that does not really settle legal issues.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. On the other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioner’s members have shut down
their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being
implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated
(DESAMA) v. Gozun:
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to settle
such question once and for all.
Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue:

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46
Jumamil v. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 475, 486-487. Citations omitted.

Part 1
Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the Philippines.
Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege any material
interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed provisions].
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that it has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.
In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic
corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and their
overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance of this petition. G.R.
No. 160756 March 9, 2010 CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS,
INC. vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO
D. Functions of Judicial Review
1. Checking - invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be contrary to

the Constitution.
Rule: The acts complained of in this case pertain to the HRET’s exercise of its discretion, an exercise
which was well within the bounds of its authority.
The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial
action.
In the exercise of its checking function, the Court should merely test whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had
a different view. G.R. No. 185401 July 21, 2009 HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR. vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES
2. Legitimating (legitimizing) - upholding the validity of the law which results from
a mere dismissal of a case challenging the validity of that law.
When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that
the law is "not unconstitutional". This is no mere semantics. The Court cannot
declare the law constitutional for it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, so
that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional.
On the other hand, anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of
proof to show its invalidity. Declaring that the law is not unconstitutional is
tantamount to saying that the challenger has not met the burden required.47
3. Symbolic - to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and
concepts on matters of great public importance
Rule: The petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only
by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was
gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious
manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which
flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above
the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the
Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present
government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
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The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a
convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more
important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and
in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are
not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been
settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice
demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also
for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR
Rule: “A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review, none of which are
present in the instant case. Hence, since what is sought to be done by COMELEC has been
accomplished, there is nothing else that the Court can order the COMELEC to perform.” G.R. No.
177927 February 15, 2008 FLORANTE S. QUIZON vs HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: On April 21, 1998, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc issued Resolution No.
98-1419 to wit;
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that
ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of
the elections . . . and to make an exit survey for the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately." The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized
or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998
election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy
before us.
Issue: Whether or not the case is moot.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998
election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past
election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its
very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty
to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees."48 Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here,
we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of
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48
134 SCRA 438, 463, February 18, 1985; per Gutierrez Jr., J.

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exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.49 G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
E. All Courts Can Exercise Judicial Review
According to Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts
have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they decide the case
only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC.
Rule: “Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases
involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” G.R. No. L-18128
December 26, 1961 J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
In Ynot v IAC, 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no
authority to rule on the validity of EO 626-A, banning the transporting of carabaos
from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has jurisdiction
to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in
constitutional cases, then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in
the first instance.
Rule: “This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules
of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving
the constitutionality of certain measures.” G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 YNOT vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
However, such decisions of the lower courts only bind the parties. Only decisions of
the Supreme Court becomes part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Case: For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
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49
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, ... Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on
April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

Part 1
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. This followed after Sen.
Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that
some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under
the Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the validity of any law unless there is an
actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the constitutional
question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the
constitutionality of a law or any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for
that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the
principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving
the DAP and NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no
court can validly render
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners
can question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the
ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by petition
for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
Rule: The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of
that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the
repositories of judicial power. However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest
being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the Rules, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly
or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases,
the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances.
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become
more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded
judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executive’s
spending power. G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Other Cases;
Case This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on
Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage
Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director rendered a decision dated November 16, 1984
in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final and executory, the Regional Director
issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were
levied upon and its operating expenses kept with the bank were garnished. The levy and garnishment
56
were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim of the private covering the period from June 16 to
October 15, 1984.
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Part 1
After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order No. 5
and likewise, failed to comply with the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November 1,
1984, prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another complaint, which is now the
case at bar.
Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor of
the complainants (private respondents herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent therein) is
estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the hearing is in
itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a previous case where
the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on orders of the Regional Office. On
the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the Regional Director declared
that only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the
Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.
Rule Anent the issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the constitutionality of
Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission,
lacks merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declare a
law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and can be
the source of rights and duties especially so in the case at bar when petitioner complied with Wage
Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the total amount of P163,047.50, representing the latter's
minimum wage increases up to October 16, 1984, instead of questioning immediately at that stage
before paying the amount due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality. The Regional
Director is plainly without the authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional and his duty is
merely to enforce the law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be
unconstitutional. On our part, We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as constitutional, there
being no provision of the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987
Constitution) violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for the benefit of labor.
G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990 BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs. THE
HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKER'S UNION-FFW
Case: Due to the imposition of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, Respondent wrote a letter to
petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public
market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant
and open for qualified and interested applicants. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was the “Municipal
Revised Revenue Code." The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the
imposition of goodwill fees for stalls. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease
contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall
holders at the municipal public market.
This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal public
market, to file before the RTC a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent.
The RTC ruled for the respondents
Upon the appeal of the losing party, The Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ resort to a petition
for prohibition was improper, since respondent’s acts in question herein did not involve the exercise
of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC was
premature, as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto.
Rule: The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a
purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the
administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which
involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power
that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may
establish.
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present
57
evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether
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Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its

Part 1
enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the
competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases
involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question. (Emphases ours.)
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to
resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in the
first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. G.R. No. 182065
October 27, 2009 EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA vs HON. MARIANO M.
MALONES
F. Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Civil Code, Art. 7. - When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Rule: Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution." The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American
Supreme Court stated: "The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of
constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official."
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and
provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter, much less, this Court, has power under the
Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions
is to that extent unwarranted and null.
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative attitude
of the emerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which the more
orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive order, or
ordinance was in "actual existence" appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical
then than to consider it as "an operative fact." G.R. No. L-21114 November 28, 1967 FEDERICO
FERNANDEZ, vs. P. CUERVA and CO.
The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law either
void or voidable.
First View (Orthodox view) GENERAL RULE - It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy
58
any presumption of validity. As such, it produces no effect whatsoever, creates no

Page

Part 1
right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever penalty was paid during the period of
its operation must be remitted.
Rule: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed.
It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only
the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality which means that no
one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in
other words, a total nullity. G.R. No. 102232 March 9, 1994 Violeta Aldovino, et al. vs. Rafael
Alunan III, et al.
Second View (Unorthodox view) - But a law declared unconstitutional is only

voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this case, it becomes
inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the
invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the
law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification. From the time the law
was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid, people would have entered into
various transactions and relations, expecting and in fact compelled to presume that
the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the law never produced any effect would
penalize those who in faith believed the laws passed by their representatives to be
in accordance with their solemn duty under the Constitution.
Case: Plaintiff obtained the loan from defendant Bank, secured by real estate mortgage duly
registered covering her land. Subsequently, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the
balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with her suit against both defendants on
the main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen
years having elapsed from the date of maturity. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the
decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even
on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March
10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from
the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan.
Rule: The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared
unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the Debt Moratorium
Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed,
it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt
Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made
him lose his right to collect.
It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties
may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that
in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive
act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that
prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before
it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication. Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971),
Case: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA)50, is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
59
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50
Respondent Gordon appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA is questioned
here

Part 1
injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of
public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office
Rule: Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
“No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered
a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of
policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons,
where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment,
void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by
or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll,
38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122
Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)." G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 ROBERTO A. FLORES,
DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. ALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ
and MANUEL P. REYES vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and
RICHARD J. GORDON
“THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE”
Rule: Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action
null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in
favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual
existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,––with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." x x x
That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts––in this case, the approval by
PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution.
The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated
that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid
and must be complied with. G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011 HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED
vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL
However, in another case;
Rule: In Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management (G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011), the Operative
Fact Doctrine was discussed in that:
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
60
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Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

Part 1
The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held:
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter
of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done
by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R.
No. 179532, May 30, 2011)
…. the Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be
iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an
unconstitutional provision of law. (See e.g. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011)
The Court had the following disquisition on the concept of the Operative Fact Doctrine in the case of
Chavez v. National Housing Authority (G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235.):
The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated
that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid
and must be complied with, thus:
As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative
or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more
fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative
or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely
to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of
what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila
Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking
for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (Emphasis supplied.)
The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v. People of the Philippines, thus:
In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
61
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
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Part 1
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree…. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects –with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Moreover, the Court ruled in Chavez that:
Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case against respondents on August 5, 2004,
the JVAs were already terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI. The
respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were unconstitutional or even
questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the executive department lent validity to the
implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have produced vested rights in favor
of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land, and
the agencies and investors who made investments in the project or who bought SMPPCs.
These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after the passage of around
ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the "operative fact"
principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can no longer be
invalidated.
From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares.
Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to
private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on not
only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually
be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not
only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to
the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect
that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for
public purpose. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 January 24, 2012 PHILIPPINE COCONUT, PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Case. The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact doctrine. As a general
rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects.
However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative
fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of
the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded through
the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the
invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such
DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot sustain the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, ET AL. V.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287, FEBRUARY 3, 2015
IV. THE PHILIPPINESS AS A STATE
A. State Defined
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state,
it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law. 51
62
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51
G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971 THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA

Part 1
A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying

a fixed territory and possessed of an independent government organized for political
ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (Garner,
Introduction to Political Law, 41)
The elements of a state are: territory, people, sovereignty, government.
a. TERRITORY is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people
of the State.
b. PEOPLE refers simply to the inhabitants of the State.
c. SOVEREIGNTY is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by

which that State is governed.
d. GOVERNMENT is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State
is formulated, expressed and realized.
“State” vs “Nation”
Is there a difference between the terms “State” and “Nation”? The term “State” is
a legal concept. On the other hand, “Nation” is an ethnic or racial concept. However,
the distinction, according to Fr. Bernas, is of little significance for the study of
Constitutional Law. The word nation has been found and used in the 1987, 1973
and 1935 Constitutions.52
The Philippines, a Republican State:
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
Opinion A democratic form of government requires that political rights be enjoyed by the citizens
regardless of social or economic distinctions. Such is our government. Clearly and solemnly, our
citizenry have thus been given the supreme guaranty of a democratic way of life, with all its freedom
and limitations, all its rights and duties. G.R. No. L-24761 September 7, 1965 LEON G. MAQUERA,
vs. JUAN BORRA (BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring.)
Rule: All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the
fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter
how seemingly benign will be tolerated. Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra v. COMELEC and Atty.
Marvil V. Majarucon, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Rule: The first and the foremost state principle announced in our Constitution is that "the Philippines
is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." Our people express their mighty sovereignty mainly thru the election ballot
where they decide, free from any fetter, who will represent them in government. In a representative
government, the choice by the people of who will be their voice is nothing less than sacred, hence,
its desecration is unpardonable. G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372 August 28, 2006 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ
B. Territory (Archipelagic Doctrine)
NATIONAL TERRITORY
“The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea,
63
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52
“Patrimony of our nation; national assembly; The 1935 Constitution make the :”State of the Nation” a duty of the
President. The word ”national” appears in many instances in the 1987 Constitution.

Part 1
the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines”. (Article 1)
Philippine territory consists of:
(1) The Philippine archipelago; and

(2) All territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
SOVEREIGNTY, JURISDICTION and TERRITORY
Rule: Sovereignty is the possession of sovereign power53, while jurisdiction is the conferment by law
of power and authority to apply the law54.
From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed Locations are territories of the Philippines that the U.S. forces
are allowed to access and use55. By withholding ownership of these areas and retaining unrestricted
access to them, the government asserts sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists so long
as the Filipino people exist56. G.R. No. 212426 January 12, 2015, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,
WIGBERTO E. TANADA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PA QUITO N. OCHOA
 Territorial, Personal, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the manifestation of sovereignty.57 The jurisdiction of the state is

understood as both its authority and the sphere of the exercise of that authority58.
a. Territorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State to have all persons and things
within its territorial limits to be completely subject to its control and protection59.
Chief Justice Taney, in an 1857 decision, affirmed the fundamental principle of everyone within
the territorial domain of a state being subject to its commands: "For undoubtedly every person
who is found within the limits of a government, whether the temporary purposes or as a resident,
is bound by its laws." It is no exaggeration then for Justice Brewer to stress that the United
States government "is one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting
directly upon each [individual found therein];"
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and
an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such
restriction." After which came this paragraph: "All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
They can flow from no other legitimate source."60
b. Personal jurisdiction is the authority of the state over its nationals, their persons,
property, and acts, whether within or outside its territory61.
When jurisdiction is exercised on the basis of the status of the persons affected, independent of
their presence or absence in the territory of the state, it is known as personal jurisdiction. (Sinco
26.)
53
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1523 (9th ed. 2009)
54
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009).
55
EDCA, Article 1(1 )(b ).
56
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 ( 194 7).
57
Mendoza
58
Sinco 26.)
59
Example – Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn
64
in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (New Civil Code)
60
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969 WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Page
61
Example - Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (New Civil Code)

Part 1
The personal jurisdiction of the state is exercised over all its citizens within or without its territory.
It affects their person, property, and even some of their acts performed abroad. The authority of
the state to which they owe permanent allegiance follows them at all times wherever they might
reside and as long as their membership of the state subsists. (Sinco 28.)
c. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State over persons, things or

acts, outside its territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory62.
TERRITORY, SOVEREIGNTY
JURISDICTION AND TREATIES
Criminal Law:
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law
and to treaty stipulations. (New Civil Code)
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but
also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations
and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined
in Title One of Book Two of this Code. (Revised Penal Code)
Civil Law
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
62
Example - Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application,
the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its
interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued
by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
65
mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
Page
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book
Two of this Code. (Revised Penal Code)

Part 1
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their
object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. (11a)
While the rule of lex loci celebrationis generally governs forms and solemnities of
contracts under Article 17 of the Civil Code (Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, 1986 First ed., p. 11), the principle of lex rei sitae generally applies
with respect to formalities for the acquisition, encumbrance, and alienation of real
and personal property (1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines annotated, 1989 12th
ed)
Treaties and Jurisdiction
Rule: Sec. 25 of ARTICLE XVIII (TRANSITORY PROVISIONS) of the Constitution expressly

provides that after the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except;
a. under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
b. when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose,
c. and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United
States military bases in the country.
It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine
Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United States agreed to
cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few
islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which
the United States retained for itself.
This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the
Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory,
as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.
Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the
United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification
by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty
and had it concurred in by our Senate.
Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were
finally ceded to the Philippines.
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, Sec. 25 of ARTICLE XVIII was adopted in the 1987
Constitution. The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the
Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the
situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our
territory were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State. G.R. No. 175888 February 11, 2009,
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON vs. ALBERTO ROMULO
66
1. The Philippine Archipelago

Page

Part 1
a. Treaty limits
1. Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898 - Article 363 defines the metes and bounds
of the archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees and seconds. Technical
descriptions are made of the scope of the archipelago as this may be found on the
surface of the earth
2. Treaty of Washington of 7 November 190064 between the United States and Spain
- Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu.
3. Treaty of 2 January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain.65 - Ceding
the Turtle and Mangsee Islands.
b. Method of determining the baselines
1. In June 17, 1961, Congress passed REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AN ACT TO DEFINE
THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES, demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.
(This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign
right of States parties over their "territorial sea", the breadth of which, however,
was left undetermined.)
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046 provided the method in defining the baseline to wit;
determine appropriate points of the outermost Islands of the archipelago, then
connect them by means of a straight line until all islands are surrounded or enclosed
by the imaginary straight lines.
“WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined
consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago;”
Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered
inland or internal waters of the Philippines.
2. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446 was passed in 8 September 1968 correcting

typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North
Borneo.
In RA 5446 the definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over
which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.66
63
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying
within the following line: “A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, ….
thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of
beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after
the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.”
64
Spain relinquishes to the United States all title and claim of title, which she may have had at the time of the conclusion
of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines
described in Article III of that Treaty and particularly to the islands of Cagayan, Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies,
and agrees that all such islands shall be comprehended in the cession of the Archipelago as fully as if they had been
expressly included within those lines. The United States, in consideration of this relinquishment, will pay to Spain the
sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) within six months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present
67
treaty.”
65
Convention Between the United States of America and Great Britain Delimiting the Boundary Between the Philippine
Page
Archipelago and the State of North Borneo [1930]

66
Section 2

Part 1
3. In March 2009, Congress enacted RA 9522. The change was prompted by the
need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) ), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February
1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline
for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.67 Complying with
these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal,
as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
RA 9522 - March 10, 2009, AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
“Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic
of the Philippines consistent with Article 12168 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and
jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by
provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.”
Case: This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regime of nearby territories.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators," as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two
principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach
of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying
the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging
marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it
excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of
UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal.
Rule a. RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
67
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011 PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et. Al. vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA
68
Article 121. Regime of islands 1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
68
water at high tide. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this
Page
Convention applicable to other land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.

Part 1
delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to
mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to
the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources
in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
b. RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty Over
these Areas
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely
followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped
to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with
UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522,
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding
RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines
are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA
9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location
of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial
sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
69
Page

Part 1
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the
nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them
from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to
emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call the Spratlys and
the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside
our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states:
"The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga
islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin
although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is
defined by the orange line which [we] call archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang
maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that
is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa
natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi
na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits. The need to
shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps,
became imperative as discussed by respondents:
c. Statutory Claim Over Sabah69 under RA 5446 Retained

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69
How did the Sultan of Sulu acquire sovereignty and ownership over North Borneo (Sabah)? In the early 17th century,
the Sultan of Brunei ceded North Borneo to the Sultan of Sulu for having helped him quell a rebellion. Since then, the

Part 1
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim
over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal,
keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around
the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011 PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et. Al.
vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA
Uses of the baseline:
a. Determine what is internal water (all waters inside the baseline
b. Determine the 200 mile EEZ.
c. Archipelagic Doctrine - The basic concept of an archipelago is that body of

water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded with water, is viewed as
a unity of islands and waters together forming one unit.
Sultan became the effective and legal sovereign over Sabah and the Sulu archipelago. The historical ties between Sabah
and Sulu are so close that in fact, a former Chief Ministry of Sabah served as one our guerrilla leaders in Sulu during the
resistance movement in the last war.
How close is Sabah to the Philippines and to the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur? The nearest distance from the
Philippine boundary to Sabah is 18 miles which is nearer than the distance from Manila to Malolos. On the other hand,
Sabah is a thousand miles away from Kula Lumpur and is not connected by any land mass to the Malayan peninsula.
Why is the territory now in the possession of Malaysia? In 1878, as evidenced by a lease contract, the Sultan of Sulu
leased the territory to Australian Gustavus Baron de Overbeck who, together with his British partner, Alfred Dent, paid
the rentals to the Sultan. When they ran out of money they organized the British North Borneo Company which
continued to pay the rentals until 1946. The agreed annual rentals was initially 5,000 Mexican dollars and/or British
pounds but increased to 5,300 in 1903. Then on July 14, 1946, just after the Philippines had gained its independence
from the US, Britain annexed Sabah as part of its dominion. Still, Britain continued to pay the rentals to the Sultanate.
In 1963, the British government turned over Sabah to Malaya to become part of the new Federation of Malaysia. Since
1963 the Malaysian government through its embassy in Manila has been the one paying rentals to the Sultanate.
Why does Malaysia say that what it has been paying is not rentals but cession money? The lease contract of 1878
between the Sultan of Sulu and Overbeck was in the Malay language but written in Arabic. The contract was called in
Arabic as “Padjak” which means lease and described in contemporary Spanish documents as “Arrendamiento” which
also means lease. This document has been translated by a Dutch scholar, an American scholar and by Spanish scholars.
All these authoritative translations translated “Padjak” as lease. The British, on the other hand, had its own version.
They simply referred to it as cession.
Was there any subsequent acknowledgment of the Sultan’s continuing sovereignty in Sabah by the British North Borneo
Company? Yes. In 1903, the British North Borneo Company asked the Sultan to execute a confirmatory deed to confirm
the lease agreement in consideration of the increase in rentals beginning that year.
When the British government annexed Sabah in 1946 did it not acquire sovereignty over it as against the Sultan of Sulu
and consequently, the Philippines? No, because it acquired Sabah from the British North Borneo Company which did
not exercise sovereignty over the territory. Britain could not have acquired a better right than the company which was
only a lessee. Therefore, it had no power to give (to Malaysia) what it did not own. Thus, Malaysia did not acquire
sovereignty over Sabah either.
Does the Philippine government have a right of dominion over the territory and therefore, a duty to lay a claim? Yes. A
series of acts and transactions created the cumulative effect of transferring dominion and sovereignty to the Philippine
government. In 1962, a formal instrument of transfer of sovereignty was executed by the Sultanate in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines. However, a proviso in the 1962 document states that “Should the Republic of the Philippines
fail to recover North Borneo (Sabah), after exhausting all peaceful means, this transfer document shall, ipso facto,
become null and void and the Sultan of Sulu shall be free to assert his sovereignty over North Borneo by other means
available to all sovereign claimants.”
So, has the Philippines laid claim on Sabah? Yes. On September 4, 1950, when the Federation of Malaysia was not yet
existent, the Philippines advised the British government that a dispute over North Borneo existed. This position was
71
reiterated by the Department of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy on 22 June 1962. Then on 12 September 1962,
the Philippines sought the holding of talks with the United Kingdom regarding the dispute. This led to the holding of a
Page
Ministerial Conference in London in 1963. - Legal basis for the Sabah claim By Rita Linda V. Jimeno | Posted on Apr. 08,
2013 at 12:01am - Manila Standard Today 2013/04/08

Part 1
The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial
interests of an archipelago. According to the doctrine, even these bodies of
water within the baseline, regardless of breadth, form part of the archipelago
and are thus considered as internal waters.
The Philippine Government adopted the archipelagic doctrine as a national

policy to safeguard its territorial integrity and of its sovereign right to explore
and exploit, convert and manage its marine resources. Thus, the archipelagic
doctrine has a two-fold purpose:
(1) Economic reasons;

(2) National security.
The archipelagic doctrine is the principle that it is an integrated unit;

everything within it comprises the archipelago.70
The Constitutional provisions embodying this doctrine are:
1. "…archipelago, with all the island and waters embraced therein".
2. "…the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the

archipelago, regardless of the breadth and dimensions, form part of internal
water"
3. "…terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains" - (although superfluous to mention

because land, water and air space already form part of an archipelago
4. "…territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, other submarine areas"
"Territorial sea" means water outside the baseline extending up to 12 nautical

miles.
"Internal water" refers to water within the baseline.
"Insular shelf" means the land which is submerged under water which may
extend beyond 12 miles as long as it is not more than 300 ft. deep. It is also
known as intercontinental shelf.
2. Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or

jurisdiction
a.) Law: PD No. 1596 – June 11, 1978 (Kalayaan Islands)
The Philippines claims the Kalayaan group of islands as part of Philippine territory
or the basis of historic rights and legal title. (PD 1596, June 11, 1978)
The claim was made "by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective
occupation and control established in accordance with international law. xxx"
b.) Article: Kalayaan Islands by: Amb. Pacifico Castro, Lawyer’s Review page 4,
December 31, 1999
3. The territorial sea, the sea bed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other
submarine areas
4. Exclusive Economic Zone

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70
Mendoza

Part 1
a. PD 159971 (11 June 1978). There is established an exclusive economic zone

extending "to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the
baselines from which the territorial sea is measured." (Sec. 1 thereof.)
Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over it territorial
sea and continental shelf, it shall have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone
the following72;
a. Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation,

conservation and management of the natural resources, whether living or
non-living, both renewable and non-renewable, of the sea-bed, including the
subsoil and the superjacent waters, and
b. with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration
of the resources of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds;
c. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and

utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures,
the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention and
control of pollution, and scientific research;
d. Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice.
Other states are prohibited from using the zone to73:
a. Explore or exploit any resources;
b. Carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations:
c. Conduct any research;
d. Construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal,

installation or other structure or device; or
e. Perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to, or in

derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein provided.
Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to74;
a. Navigation and overflight,
b. The laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and
c. Other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and

communications.
In case of overlapping of EEZs, the common boundaries are to be determined

by75
i. Agreement and
71
ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
72
Section 2
73
73
Section 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or
of any license granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines,
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74
Section 4.
75
Section 1

Part 1
ii. International rules on delimitations.
b. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.)
The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
baselines, from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is recognized
in the UNCLOS, of which the Philippines is a signatory. Its concept is that although
it is not part of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country.
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid
customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources,
and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public
international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the
oceans." (Merlin M. Magallona, A Primer on the Law of the Sea, 1997, p. 1.)The
UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10,
1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came
into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State

sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare
liberum).76 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest
customary principles of international law.77 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State
sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are:
1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic
zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over
foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State
exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law.
Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its
bed and subsoil. 78
Case: Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known
as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha
Reefs.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect nearby provinces
which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed
in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Issue: Whether or not respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
Rule: During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while
76
74
Bertrand Theodor L. Santos, "Untangling a Tangled Net of Confusion: Reconciling the Philippine Fishery Poaching Law
and the UNCLOS' World Bulletin, Vol. 18: 83-116 (July-December 2002), p. 96.
Page
77
Anne Bardin, "Coastal State's Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels" Rev. 27, 28 (2002)
78
Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

Part 1
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of
the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the
territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional
uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former
Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30 - Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State. If any
warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to
it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31. Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes. The flag State shall bear international responsibility
for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32. Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes. With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes.
A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship
is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite
this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult
to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate
the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend
a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS
directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment
as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197. Cooperation on a global or regional basis. States shall cooperate on a global basis
and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international
organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of
the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31. G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014 MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO,
Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa et.al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander
of the US. 7th Fleet et.al.
75
Page
Summary:

Part 1
Body of Water Measurement Remarks
Internal Waters Within the baselines

Territorial Sea Water outside the baseline, extending Article 48 of UNCLOS III
up to 12 n.m. from the baseline
Contiguous Zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines (or Not part of our territory but we
up to 12 n.m. from the edge of the have the jurisdiction to enforce
territorial sea) customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws therein
EEZ 200 n.m. from the baseline We have here the right to exploit
the living and non-living
resources
C. People
1. Three meanings of the word "People"
The word "people" is used in at least three senses in the Constitution:
a. "People" as Inhabitants
Art. XIII, Section 1. “The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.”
Art. II, Section 15. “The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.”
Section 16. “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Art. III, Section 2. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, xxx”
Rule:. The right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution. Under
our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably
applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA
27 (1963),
b. “People” as Citizens
Preamble: “We, the sovereign Filipino people imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.”
Art. II, Sec. 1. “The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
Art. II, Sec. 4. “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
"citizens" may be required to render personal military or civil service.”
76
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Part 1
Art. III, Sec. 7. “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertinent to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizens subject to limitations provided by law.”
c. “People” as Electors
Art. VII, Sec. 4. “The President and Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people
xxx.”
Art. XVI, Sec. 2. “The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national
anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history,
and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people
in a national referendum.”
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred
in by the Senate and, when Congress requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting party.”
2. Citizenship
A. Who are citizens (Art IV)
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and79
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
These citizens are classifiable into (i) natural-born citizens (covering nos. 1, 2, and
3) and (ii) naturalized citizens (covering no. 4).
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis (right of
blood). Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli (right
of the soil) which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political

community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full
civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes
the duty of allegiance to the political community.80 The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievance.81
Historical Background82
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, the natives were called
79
Under the 1935 Constitution- ARTICLE IV Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:… 4.Those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution - ARTICLE III Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:.. 3 Those who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
80
77
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, 2009 Edition, p. 629.
81
id pp. 629-630
Page
82
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER

Part 1
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws
on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands
except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,

promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to
the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;
however, three royal decrees were indisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, the Royal Decree of 23
August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine
Islands, and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions
of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by
special laws.
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy.
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state
of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States. The Treaty came into effect on April 11, 1899 when the documents
of ratification were exchanged. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States
would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws
as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the
date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and
to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
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Part 1
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
The term "Citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902 (enacted by the United States Congress on July 1, 1902), also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight."
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant
of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who
was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those
born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment
to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens
of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens"
had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft,
the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of
it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others
as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
79
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
Page

Part 1
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be
a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was
a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any
such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose
their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status
of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted
the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her
citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
80
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Part 1
Case: On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President83 of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the then forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition before the Commission on Elections

("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed,
Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could
be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that –
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age
of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born
sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering
that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office.
Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same
period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at
least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives
Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.84
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted
his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior
to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain
Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an
illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less
than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of
his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American
mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried
parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ
so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the
ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo (20 SCRA 562, Paa vs. Chan 21 SCRA 753)
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did
so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien
father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and
83
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
81
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election”
84
Note Philippine Bill of 1902 – “ that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Page
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands”

Part 1
had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution,
the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be
more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There
utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
In Sum - In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC,
it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents
him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
1. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
2. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father
of respondent FPJ.
3. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the foregoing action. G.R. No. 161434 March 3,
2004 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER
Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata85
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, this Court declared that: “Every time the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.”
Exception;
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA
248 [1973]), viz:
“We declare it to be a sound rule that
1. where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court

or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy,
2. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor

General or his authorized representative, and
3. this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by the Supreme Court,
82
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85
A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit

Part 1
the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's
citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance
will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive
or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the
procedure herein stated.”
Some cases:
Rule: Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is
put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections, we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves
it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be
precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has
never been threshed out by any tribunal.
Citizenship proceedings, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not
obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship
of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus
soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree.
The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s citizenship.
However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v.
Secretary of Labor.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have
also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the
rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed
an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of
Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this
jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted
only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself
to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 598 SCRA
266 September 4, 2009 GO SR. vs. RAMOS
Rule: We agree with petitioners that the issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not
attained finality. In Go v. Ramos, the Court ruled that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own
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and can be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied
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in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:

Part 1
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the BI. Judicial review is
permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship,
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. G.R. No.
169958 March 5, 2010 GONZALEZ vs. PENNISI*
B. Election of Philippine Citizenship
The following are citizens of the Philippines xxx
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution)
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 625 - AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION
TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER
IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), section 1, Article
IV, of the (1935) Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein
authorized before any officer of the Government of the United States authorized to administer oaths,
and he shall forward such statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila.
(Approved, June 7, 1941.)
Note: The right of election permitted under the 1987 Constitution is available only
to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, had that charter
not been changed, would have been able to elect Philippine citizenship upon
attaining majority age. That right is retained for them under Article IV, Section 1
(3). Obviously, election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother
under the present constitution as she would be considered a Filipino citizen at birth.
Case:: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila
A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines. On July 17, 1998, Ching after having completed a Bachelor of
Laws course, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a resolution of this Court, he
was allowed to take the Bar, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his
Philippine citizenship. Ching passed the bar but because of his questionable citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath.
Issue: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Sec. 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship. (Ching has inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect
by election upon reaching the age of majority.)
CA No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election.
However, the 1935 Constitution and CA No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made...Jurisprudence dictates that this must be done
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In Cuenco v. Sec. of Justice86 It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that 3 years is
the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino. (In Cuenco, petitioner was allowed to elect 7 years after
attaining the age of majority.)
The span of fourteen years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing “upon reaching the age of majority. Moreover, Ching has offered no reason
why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as
a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, VICENTE D. CHING
Case: The case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933. Therein, among others, she claims that her nationality was entered
in her records as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother
never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims
that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
Rule: Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly
an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As
such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became
a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004 REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CHULE Y. LIM
Case: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Rule: We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship
has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such
election.
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G.R. No. L-18069 May 26, 1962

Part 1
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where,
as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame
should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and
continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the
herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration
of the election of Philippine citizenship.
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is
the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although
a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. G.R. No.
183133 July 26, 2010 MA vs. FERNANDEZ, JR.
Case: Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo,
a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document
was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that
she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election
of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
annotate the same on her birth certificate.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and
such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine
passport.
Rule: As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of

Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the
law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the
election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution,
which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution
reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
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judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
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Part 1
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only
legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;
he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered
a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship,
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
(1) a statement of election under oath;

(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
(3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No.
625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records indisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent
had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary
evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As
aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625.
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no
satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the
nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert
that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition
of citizenship by election. G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012 The Republic of the Philippines
vs. Nora Fe Sagun
C. Natural Born Citizens
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 1, “3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;” (Art IV)
What offices under the Constitution require the official to be “Natural Born”?
1. President
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
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election. (Art VII)

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Part 1
2. Vice –President –
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of
office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. (Art VII)
3. Members of Congress –
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day
of the election. (Art VI)
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election. (Art VII)
4. Justices of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts –
Section 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must
be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower
court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (VIII)
Case: Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong (as as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable,
and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate, petitioners
add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and
his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Rule: It is clear, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the
DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil

register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a
substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, this Court held that:
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should
be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and
wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence
is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct
clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial
corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore,
be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 177721
July 3, 2007 KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG
5. Ombudsman and his deputies –

88
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
Page
and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and

Part 1
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years
or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (Art XI)
6. Constitutional Commission Members –
Section 1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of
a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment. (Art IX-B)
Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Art IX –C)
Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two

Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession. (Art IX-D)
7. Central Monetary Authority Members –
Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the
members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity,
integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also
be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority
shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervision
over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law
over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions. (Art
XII)
8. Commission on Human Rights Members –
Section 17. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The
term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be
provided by law. (Art XIII)
Case: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares Grace Poe was a main contender in the 2016
Presidential elections. This case intended to clarify her citizenship qualification, among others. Mary
Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968.
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition
and ordered that petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” to
“Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed
her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the
89
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with
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Part 1
her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the
wedding ceremony.
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon
learning of her father’s deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually
expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father’s funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.
In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move
and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately
followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to
arrange the sale of their family home there.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 Under the
same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on
10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner’s
petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her
children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification
Certificates (ICs) in petitioner’s name and in the names of her three (3) children.
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.
She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport.
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner
executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in
satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, 21 October
2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
“Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a “Certificate of Loss of Nationality
of the United States” effective 21 October 2010.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.56 In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen.
Rule: There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner’s
parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because
such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case
where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether
such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 12887:
90
87
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters – Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
Page
existence or no¬existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

Part 1
The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the
fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an
oval face. There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of
the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. The Court, quotes the Solicitor General;
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may
be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not
just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t make
any sense. Given the statistical certainty – 99.9% – that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright.
There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either.
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration.
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino
citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines,
and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed
that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to
them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of
international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of
the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to
render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to “give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x” and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the “right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern
the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the
“Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all
expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
91
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Part 1
Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In the first
place, “having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this
instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. The common thread of
the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot
be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18)
years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed
to have the “nationality of the country of birth.
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines
is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2
of the 1961 “United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness” merely “gives effect” to
Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed
or ratified the “International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance.” Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said
convention was nonetheless binding as a “generally accepted principle of international law.” Razon
v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international
law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into
force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner
points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional
state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Petitioner’s evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. These circumstances, including
the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international
law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption,
expressly refer to “Filipino children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who
could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting
through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption
that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show,
that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
92
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country
Page

Part 1
which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General’s warning
in his opening statement is relevant:
…the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings
renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political
status or to accord them second-class citizenship. GR 221697 March 8 2016 NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO and GR
21698-700 NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO
S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
D. Naturalized Citizens
Among those listed in the 1987 Constitution as citizens are those who are Filipinos
by naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the privilege of a citizen.
Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or

administrative.
Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and
receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance
of the proper naturalization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil
registry.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in
the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding
by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the
facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization.
In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a
sovereign nation.
A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is found under Section 15 of

CA 473, is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
1. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139 June 08, 2001 - "The Administrative Naturalization Law
of 2000"
Under RA 9139, Aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship
by administrative proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and
interest.
Qualifications. -
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of
his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles
of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
93
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public
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school or private educational institution duly recognized by the Department of Education,

Part 1
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the
school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided,
That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in
similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from
which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or
has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to
applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession
because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the
Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
The following are NOT QUALIFIED to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this
Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or

group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence,

personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period
of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the
right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
2. COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 - "Revised Naturalization Law."
Any person having the following QUALIFICATIONS may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:
a. AGE: age of majority in the country - He must be of majority age on the day
of the hearing of the petition88;
b. RESIDENCE: 10 years, 5 years in certain cases - He must have resided in the

Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years. The ten years of
continuous residence required shall be understood as reduced to five years for
any petitioner having any of the following qualifications:
94
Page
88
CA 473, Sec.2; RA 6809, amending Art. 234 of the Family Code making 18 the majority age. Effective December 18,
1989

Part 1
o Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or
under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political
subdivisions thereof;
o Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the

Philippines;
o Being married to a Filipino woman89;
o Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized

private school not established for the exclusive instruction of children of
persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of
education or industry for a period of not less than two years;
o Having been born in the Philippines. (refer also to REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139
June 08, 2001, "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000" as earlier
stated)
c. CHARACTER: good moral character and the usual disqualifications as provided

for by law: polygamy, bigamy, and violence for overthrow of government
He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living.
d. PROPERTY: He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
Rule: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support
in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the
object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family
to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization."
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should
consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the
assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should
be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him
to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s qualifications
89
If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative proceeding for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration, upon proof of marriage and according to the holding in Moy Yam
Lim, proof of non-disqualification. These are the only requirements because ipso facto, she became a Filipino herself by
marriage. Accordingly, thus;
“Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file
a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or
supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
95
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see
attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order
Page
or decision granting or denying the petition”. G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971 MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

Part 1
must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. G.R. No. 175430 June 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KERRY LAO ONG
e. EDUCATION: education requirement is not with respect to the petitioner alone,

but also to his minor children. With respect to the petitioner, it only refers to the
language requirement, that he must have known and spoken any of the
Philippine languages. With respect to the children, they must have to study in
Philippine schools, not solely for the foreigners and for the grade schools – must
teach Phil. government and Constitution.
 He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish90 and any one of the
principal Philippine languages; and
 He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools of the Philippines, where the Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.
Who are DISQUALIFIED? - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
 Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association

or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
 Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal

assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
 Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
 Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
 Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
 Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire
to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
 Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
 Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
Case: Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under C.A.No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law
with the RTC. During the hearings, petitioner testified to prove his compliance with all the
requirements for naturalization and presented, as witnesses, Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward C.
Tordesillas, Silvino J. Ong, Teresita M. Go ,and Juan C. Go.
90
The language requirement now is the applicant must be able to speak and write Filipino or English and any Philippine
dialect.
Art XIV, Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed
96
and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.

Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to
Page
initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in
the educational system.

Part 1
Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he had
no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that
petitioner’s medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family, stated that
being their neighbor in Sto. Cristo Street, he had known petitioner since childhood through his
association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita claimed that she had personally known
petitioner since birth because he was the son of her brother-in-law. She described him as a peace-
loving person who participated in activities sponsored by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan,
a businessman by profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner personally and that he had
executed an Affidavit of Support in his favor.
After trial was conducted, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization ruling
that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law. Among these were petitioner’s lack
of a derogatory record, his support for an organized government, his being in perfect health, his
mingling with Filipinos since birth and his ability to speak their language, and his being a law abiding
citizen. The RTC likewise found that petitioner presented convincing evidence that he was not
disqualified for naturalization as provided for under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473.
On appeal to the CA, the OSG raised the following arguments:
- Petitioner failed to prove that his witnesses were credible;
- Petitioner’s character witnesses failed to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for the grant of Philippine citizenship; and
- Failure to state all former places of residence was fatal to petitioner’s application for naturalization.
In its assailed decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed, without
prejudice, the petition for naturalization. According to the CA, while there was sufficient evidence
from which petitioner’s ability to write English or any of the principal Philippine languages, may be
inferred, he failed to adduce evidence to prove that his witnesses were credible. He was not able to
prove that the persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to be
honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at face
value, as a good warranty of his worthiness.
Rule: In judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance with
C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish
his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the
law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations91. In Ong v. Republic
of the Philippines,92 the Court listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely:
1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are "credible persons";
3. That they personally know the petitioner;
4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required
by law;
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;
6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;
7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines; and
8. That he "is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law.
In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a witness, for purposes of
naturalization, must be a "credible" person as he becomes an insurer of the character of the
candidate. The "law requires that a vouching witness should have actually known an applicant for
whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary competence
to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer
of the character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in
deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be competent and reliable. And
he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had the
opportunity to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has allegedly known
97
Page
91
Section 7. Petition for citizenship
92
103 Phil. 964 (1958). 111 Phil. 211(1961).

Part 1
him."93 The law, in effect, requires that the character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances
of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be competent to testify
of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of the requisite qualifications and none of
the statutory disqualifications.
The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not
establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did
not present evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. While there is no showing
that petitioner’s witnesses were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was likewise no indication that
they were persons whose qualifications were at par with the requirements of the law on
naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to prove the witnesses’ good standing in
the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their
statements about the petitioner do not possess the measure of "credibility" demanded of in
naturalization cases. This lack of "credibility" on the part of the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or
renders futile petitioner’s claim of worthiness.
Further, petitioner’s witnesses only averred general statements without specifying acts or events that
would exhibit petitioner’s traits worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship.
It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses only
proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. While almost all of the witnesses testified that they
knew petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with petitioner’s family in times of celebration,
this did not satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a genuine desire to learn and embrace
the Filipino ideals and traditions. Besides, both the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on petitioner’s
alleged social interaction with Filipinos. The background checks done on petitioner yielded negative
results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In fact, petitioner himself
disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to
embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the OSG was correct in arguing that petitioner's failure to state his former
residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently stated, the inclusion of
present and former places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement, without which
the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured by evidence on the
omitted matter at the trial G.R. No. 202809 July 2, 2014 DENNIS L. GO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Procedure:
a. Declaration of intention filed with the OSG one year before actual application.
DECLARATION OF INTENTION: One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to
Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the (Office of the
Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen
of the Philippines94
b. Filing of petition95 for naturalization with the RTC of the province in which the
applicant is a resident for at least one year96.
93
Lim Ching Tian v. Republic
94
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and
have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years
or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon
complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the
applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with
98
respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.
Page
95
Section 7
96
Section 8

Part 1
c. Hearing, except within 30 days before an election. The State is represented by
the Solicitor General or by the fiscal in his behalf. Two witnesses to testify on the
character of the applicant are presented.
d. Decision. Appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court may be made to the
Court of Appeals (Under BP 129).
e. Decision becomes final but not executory, thirty (30) days after notice of the
decision is received by the parties. The notice of the decision must be received by
the OSG; copy furnished to the fiscal is not sufficient to start the running of the 30-
day period.
A favorable decision becomes executory only after 2 years from the finality of the
decision. It shall become executory only after the period of 2 years during which the
petitioner shall continue to be under probation, as it were, so the government can
be doubly sure he is entitled to be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines.
(Republic Act 530, Section 1)
Sec. 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship
shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application
required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after
two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance
of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the
intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.97
f. Summary hearing after two years, which is really a continuation of the previous
proceedings, to prove that:
i) He did not leave the country during the 2-year period of probation;
ii) He devoted himself to lawful calling;
iii) He was not convicted of any offense of violation of government rules.
iv) He did not commit an act prejudicial to national interest or inimical to a

government announced policy.
g. Oath before the Regional Trial Court.
h. Issuance of a Certificate of Naturalization issued by the Court. (Only a certification

is given because the decision two years before has granted him his citizenship.)
i. Cancellation of ACR before the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife
Rule: "It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife
of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among
the members of the family."
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and business
activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied
99
to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership,
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97
Republic Act No. 530 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 - AN ACT MAKING ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR NATURALIZATION

Part 1
acquire such interests. G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS
If the wife is (i) legally married to the naturalized husband, and (ii) she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications in Sec. 4, she is entitled to be declared a
citizen as well. What is required is only an administrative proceeding before the
Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration on
the ground that her husband has been recently naturalized.
According to Moya Lim Yao vs. The Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292)
ruling, she need not prove the qualifications, but only that she is not disqualified.
The proceedings may even be with the Department of Natural Resources in relation
to a grant of concession requiring citizenship, where the wife proves that her
husband has become a Filipino.
"Derivative Naturalization” -In its latest pronouncement on this question, the

Supreme Court held that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
should be interpreted to mean only that the alien woman must not be laboring under
any of the disqualifications prescribed by law. Moreover, she can establish her claim
to Philippine citizenship in administrative proceedings before the immigration
authorities only and will not have to file a judicial action for this purpose. She is no
longer required to prove that she possesses the qualifications for naturalization.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option,
called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
"Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed
ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which
has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which
then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.98
Effect of Naturalization on the Children
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the
naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen and a
foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he
begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parents, shall
be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the Philippine Consulate
of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
100
Hence, to simplify the effect of naturalization on the children;

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98
G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS

Part 1
I. If the child is of age, no effect.
II. If the child is a minor:
A. If born in the Philippines - automatically becomes a citizen upon the

naturalization of the father.
B. If born abroad
1. If before the naturalization of the father.
a. If residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization - automatically

becomes a citizen.
b. If not residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization --- considered

citizen only during his minority, unless he takes permanent residence in the
Philippines before reaching majority age. In other words, he continues to be
a Filipino after reaching 18 years old only if he decides to reside here
permanently before reaching that age.
2. If after the naturalization of the father - Considered citizen on the condition

that upon reaching the age of majority, he takes an oath of allegiance in the
Philippine consulate of the place where he may be. If he fails to register his
intent to continue as Filipino within one (1) year upon reaching 21 years, he
ceases to be a Filipino citizen.
DENATURALIZATION
Com. Act No. 473, Sec. 18
Section 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificate issued.-- Upon motion made in

the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the
proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization
certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Registry:
(a) If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or

illegally;
(b) If the person naturalized shall, within the five years next following the issuance
of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign
country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, that the fact of the
person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the
country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be
considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up permanent residence
in the same;
(c) If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
(d) If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate
from a public or private high schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum through the fault
of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to
another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree cancelling the naturalization
certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Office of the President
101
and the Solicitor-General;
Not when they dropped out because of scholastic performance

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Part 1
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a
dummy in violation of the Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship, as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege.
Procedure: Filed by the Solicitor General before the same Regional Trial Court that
granted his naturalization, regardless of where he may be residing at that time.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the government’s favor and against the
applicant. (Republic v. Hong, 520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006); Ong Chia v. Republic, 385
Phil. 487, 498 (2000).) The applicant carries the burden of proving his full
compliance with the requirements of law.(Republic v. Hong,520 Phil. 276, 285
(2006); Tiu v. Republic, 158 Phil. 1137, 1138 (1974); Que Tiac v. Republic, 150
Phil. 68, 86 (1972).)
Rule: The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest
public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law. G.R. No. 175430 June 18, 2012 REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, vs. KERRY LAO ONG
Rule: In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a
citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the State;
the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to
Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino
citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply
with all the statutory conditions and requirements. G.R. No. 197450 March 20, 2013 REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE
KENG
3. Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship
Under the 1987 Constitution
Article IV, Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law.
Article IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
Under the law
Republic Act No. 9225 "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."-
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that
I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
102
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of
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a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Part 1
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or

adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizen of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, that they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed

forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
Case: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225. Petitioner avers that it is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."
Rule: From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting
Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it
does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear
out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or
not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship
was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3
of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status
of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. G.R. No. 160869
May 11, 2007 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, vs. THE
HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice
103
Case: Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced
Page
his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.

Part 1
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions…
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides
that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. While respondent was able to regain his Filipino
Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not
enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a
candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions
of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. G.R. No. 182701 July
23, 2008 EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P.
VILLANUEVA
Case: Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of
the US on 13 December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. He filed a
request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the
Philippine Consulate General of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June
2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September
2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner
as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
Subsequently, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC
Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In his Answer dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his
104
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the
oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign
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citizenship.

Part 1
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified
from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
Rule: This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified. Contrary to the assertions made
by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles
PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied
with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines,
but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might
arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or
retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The law categorically requires
persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a
public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate
of candidacy
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. G.R. No. 179848
November 27, 2008 NESTOR A. JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in
the May 14, 2007 elections. Private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification
alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United
States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25,
2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. Upon approval of his application,
he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued
that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights.
As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Mercado v. Manzano, that
the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of
allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Rule: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1)
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity
of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-
acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those
who wish to seek elective public office, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
105
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Part 1
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and
Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more
requirements.
Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, the Court ruled that a candidate’s oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. G.R. No. 180048 June 19,
2009 ROSELLER DE GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA
CRUZ
Case: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents in 1944.
In 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 The application was approved and the
petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2005. In 2006, the petitioner
filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued in, 2006 an order
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Vice-Mayor in Caba, La Union and obtained the highest numbers of votes and
was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Soon thereafter, private respondents all registered voters
of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
Rule: Under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2005. At that
point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. The year before she initially sought
elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2)
that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer
oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through
an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. Failure to renounce foreign
citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders
a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office. G.R. No. 198742 August
10, 2012 TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUA
a. Loss of Citizenship
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 63 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED99
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

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99
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost

Part 1
Read: G.R. No. 167824 July 2, 2010 GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU vs. ALVIN
AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship or expatriation;
Expatriation is a constitutional right (Go Gullian v Government). No one can be

compelled to remain a Filipino if he does not want to.
Case: Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years and renewed for the same
period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization
as a Philippine citizen in 1978, he applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981. While
still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed.
Rule: The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioner vs Go
Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity, after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport
and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent
with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Yu v Defensor-Santiago (169 SCRA 364)
Case: Emelito Osmena ran for Governor of Cebu in the Jan. 18, 1988 elections. Aznar as Cebu
Chairman of LDP-Laban filed with COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmena on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a US citizen, as evidenced by Osmena's
application for his alien certificate of registration, permit to re-enter the Philippines, immigration
certificate of clearance etc. Osmena on the other hand maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmena, that he is a holder of a valid Phil
passport, that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth & has not gone out of
the country for more than 6 months and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965. The Comelec decided for Osmena.
Rule: Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not
supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate
of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is
an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath
of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether
or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us
here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
107
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
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Part 1
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both
as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and
the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24
years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering
the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a
brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person
is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y,
presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he
is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied". Aznar v Osmena,
COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (May 1990)
Rule: An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino
citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a
declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and physical details
that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change
to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and
fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.
Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like
other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not
a public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein. On its
face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore,
there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so where the declarant has
in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status as such.
Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original
citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this
Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of
registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is
lacking in this case. G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 RENALD F. VILANDO vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND
HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a

foreign country upon reaching the age of majority; Provided, however, that a Filipino
may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Philippines
is at war with any country.
Case: Appellant Pedro Manayao together with others were charged with the high crime of treason
with multiple murder in the People's Court.. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay fine and indemnity of to the
heirs of each of the victims In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that
appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject
to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost
108
his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason.
Rule: It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the
Page
very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the

Part 1
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby
placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the
shield that would protect him from punishment. The defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal,
military or civil service.. G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., PEDRO MANAYAO
(4) By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign

country.
Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance
incident thereto, with the consent of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of
his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory
with the consent of the Philippines; Provided that the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service or acceptance of said commission, and
taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided finally, That
any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed
forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph (a) or (b) shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed
forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said
foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his
civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine

armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted;
(7) (Under the Art. IV, Sec. 4. 1987 Constitution) Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens, who by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced their Philippine citizenship.
Note:
Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance
at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire
the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
b. Reacquisition
Modes of re-acquiring Philippine Citizenship
(1) Naturalization (CA 63, now CA 473)
(2) Repatriation
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO
109
WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS

AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS
Page

Part 1
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
provided, that the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration
and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act
are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
(3) Legislative Act - Which is both a mode of acquiring and reacquiring citizenship.
Some Cases:
Case: Three petitions involving the same issues and parties were consolidated. Said cases
questioned the readmission of Juan Frivaldo as a Filipino citizen under CA 63 or the Revised
Naturalization Law as amended by CA 473. Frivaldo became a US citizen allegedly due to the
pressure from the Marcos regime. He came back here, ran for Governor of Sorsogon and won.
Rule: DISQUALIFIED. Frivaldo must vacate his office and surrender the same to the Vice- Governor.
A former citizen who opts to reacquire Philippine citizenship through naturalization under CA 63 is
duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by said law, and it is not for him to decide and select
the requirements which he believes are inconvenient. The law does not distinguish between an
applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never a citizen.
Failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the law rendered null and void
the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken.
The Trial Court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. Under
the law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once
a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Moreover, the publication and the posting must be in its full text for the Court to acquire jurisdiction.
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations under Secs. 2 and 6 of the law:
(1) that petitioner is of good moral character; (2) he resided continuously in the Phil. for at least ten
years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) he will
reside continuously in the Phil. from date of filing of petition until his admission to Philippine
citizenship; (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition.
110
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from promulgation, counted
from the date of receipt by the OSG of his copy of the decision. Sec. 1 of RA 530 provides that no
decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after 2 years from
Page
its promulgation in order to be able to observe if the applicant has: (1) not left the country; (2)

Part 1
dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling; (3) not been convicted of any offense or for violation
of government promulgated rules; (4) not committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country
or contrary to government announced policies.
The proceedings in the Trial Court were marred by irregularities. The hearing was set ahead of the
scheduled date upon request of Frivaldo so he could catch up with the last day for filing his certificate
of candidacy, without publication; the petition was heard within 6 months from last publication;
Frivaldo was allowed to take his oath of allegiance even before the finality of judgment and without
waiting for the 2 year waiting period. G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO
Rule: In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration,
and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be
express. Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born
in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since
private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that
respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. G.R. No. 137000
August 9, 2000 CIRILO R. VALLES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO
LOPEZ
Case: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4),
a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630100. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Issue: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Rule: The petition is without merit. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualification provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
100
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. Section 1. Any
person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of
111
the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering
Page
the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Part 1
court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2)
has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic, we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in
court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where
he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On
the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 2630, to wit;
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
The term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as
follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Two requisites must
112
concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth
and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
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Part 1
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,
of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those
"naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because
they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-
born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001 ANTONIO BENGSON III, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ
Case: Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his
citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street,
Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina City,
Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630. The court ruled in its favor and as such
the petitioner was ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to R.A. 8171
On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the
OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of
jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently
with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency
of R.A 8171.
Finding merit in the Motion of the OSG, the court subsequently, set aside its orders and the herein
petition was ordered DISMISSED
Rule: The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have
been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover.
The court's order was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be a source of
right on the part of petitioner
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation
(a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political or economic
necessity
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate
of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
113
Parenthetically, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required
to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic
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Part 1
he had last resided in the Philippines. G.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999 GERARDO ANGAT
vs .REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Case: Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship
by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not. To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to
the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171,
his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation
where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship
and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship:
the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation
is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil
life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own,
the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still
a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner
acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic
repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June
13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the
filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or
economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political
reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could
prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and
extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation. In sum, petitioner is not qualified
to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine
citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No.
9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow
the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with
the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for
repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, G.R.
No. 125793 August 29, 2006 JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN
4. Dual Citizenship
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. (Art XVI, 1987 Constitution)
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
114
xxx
Page

Part 1
(d) Those with dual citizenship; (Republic Act No. 7160 October 10, 1991 – Local
Government Code)
Case: The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for
any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4,
1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the
United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national
both of the Philippines and of the United States.
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended,
and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rule: What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On
its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3
of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status
of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. G.R. No. 160869
May 11, 2007 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, vs. THE
HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice
D. Sovereignty
 “Sovereignty” is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by

which it is governed.
There are two kinds of sovereignty;
1. Legal sovereignty - the authority or the power to issue final commands.

115
2. Political sovereignty - is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum
Page
total of the influences that operate upon it.

Part 1
Sovereignty may also be;
1. Internal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to control its domestic
affairs.
2. External sovereignty, which is the power of the State to direct its relations
with other States, is also known as independence. xxx" (Cruz.)
"The supreme power of the State to govern persons and things within its territory”
and “AUTO LIMITATION”.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction,
both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it
were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied,

submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment
of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. 101
That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct

language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the
exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction."102
A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence.

 Dominium and Imperium
"Imperium refers to the State's authority to govern. It covers such activities as

passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and
defending it against foreign invasion. When the State act in this capacity jure
imperii, it generally enjoys sovereign immunity.
This governmental function includes services that only the government does, such
as restaurant inspection, animal control, health and safety permits and licenses,
sanitation, , and related functions.
Dominium refers to the capacity of the State to own property. It covers such rights
as title to land, exploitation and use of it, and disposition or sale of the same. The
Regalian doctrine whereby all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
anyone claiming title has the burden to show ownership, comes within this concept.
In this capacity jure gestium, the State descends to the status of ordinary persons
and thus becomes liable as such." (Mendoza notes.)
A proprietary function is one that a private entity can perform, and is not uniquely
for the benefit of the general public.
Rule: As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known
distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it
116
101
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969 WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Page
respondent
102
Jellinek as quoted in Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty, p. 35 (1937).

Part 1
is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium
and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the
state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands
and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean
Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts,
but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, a case of
Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown...." That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was
adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather
than the head thereof. G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972 PEDRO LEE HONG HOK vs.
ANIANO DAVID
1. Sovereign Immunity
a. Basis
Constitutional Support - ARTICLE XVI, Section 3.
“The State may not be sued without its consent103”
Theoretical support104– (Positivist and Sociological): The rule that a state may not be
sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution.
It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a
state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on
the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.105
It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered,
and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits
at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and
dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the
government.106
Case: On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of
respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40,
subject of Special Proceedings. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor,
issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to
the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued dated
June 26, 1969, .... On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26,
1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several
Banks, especially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank
received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the
Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July
3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..." . The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then
alleged: " Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or]
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias
writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ
of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." In the answer
filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth
103
The constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
G.R. No. 186192 August 25, 2010 THE HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN AND ROMANA vs. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE
117
104
G.R. No. 155504 June 26, 2009 PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., vs. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
Page
105
Positivist theory
106
Sociological Theory

Part 1
were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of
P2,372,331.40.
Rule: It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily
understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a
recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its
affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency
and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the
well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of
time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that
constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined."
"The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense
from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if
the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversionof public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law."Republic
v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83 (1973.)
Availability to foreign States
Rule: In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized
principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and
its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the
sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation
of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal) G.R. No.
108813 December 15, 1994 JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (Second Division) and FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO, Union President, JPFCEA
Rule: As things stand in the international sphere, the immunity of the state (and by extension, its
agents, in the performance of their governmental functions Jure imperii) must stand against even
serious violations of international law, including breaches of international environmental law (which
is an aspect of human rights law as well). The ICJ concluded that
x x x [U]nder customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity
by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the
international law of armed conflict. In reaching that conclusion, the Court must emphasize that it is
addressing only the immunity of the State itself from the jurisdiction of the courts of other States; the
question of whether, and if so to what extent, immunity might apply in criminal proceedings against
an official present case.
This does not mean that the act of the state is to be considered lawful. However, this also does not
mean that state immunity is waived in the context of an international breach of even a jus cogens107
norm, as explained in this manner:
107
Jus cogens (from Latin: compelling law; English: peremptory norm) refers to certain fundamental, overriding
principles of international law, from which no derogation is ever permitted. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law (5th ed., Oxford, 1998).
That body of peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted; those norms recognized by the
international community as a whole as being fundamental to the maintenance of an international legal order.
118
Elementary rules that concern the safeguarding of peace and notably those that prohibit recourse to force or the threat
of force. Norms of a humanitarian nature are included, such as prohibitions against Genocide, Slavery, and racial
Page
discrimination. Jus cogens may, therefore, operate to invalidate a treaty or agreement between states to the extent of
the inconsistency with any such principles or norms.

Part 1
The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or
not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear
upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was
lawful or unlawful. That is why the application of the contemporary law of State immunity to
proceedings concerning events which occurred in 1943-1945 does not infringe the principle that law
should not be applied retrospectively to determine matters of legality and responsibility (as the Court
has explained in paragraph 58 above). For the same reason, recognizing the immunity of a foreign
State in accordance with customary international law does not amount to recognizing as lawful a
situation created by the breach of a jus cogens rule, or rendering aid and assistance in maintaining
that situation, and so cannot contravene the principle in Article 41 of the International Law
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. CONCLUSION OF JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS
AND IMMUNITY.
What the Court is left to work with is a process by which jurisdiction and immunity can be determined
by answering several questions, summated thusly:
1. Is the act of the foreign national or entity an act Jure imperii, such that it can be considered an act
of state entitled to immunity, or an actjure gestionis, in which case it is to be considered a private
act?
2. In respect of the above question, has the executive branch, in the exercise of its political power,
determined whether absolute diplomatic immunity is applicable?
3. If it is an actjure imperii and thus entitled to sovereign immunity, does an exception apply to
withdraw the immunity privilege of such acts? G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014 MOST REV.
PEDRO D. ARIGO vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT
b. When is a suit against the State? Regardless of who is named as the

defendant, when it produces adverse consequences to the public treasury in terms
of disbursement of public funds and loss of government property. It cannot prosper
unless the State has given its consent.
Case: PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated contract with PROVI. On December
29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their "Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card
Issuance" (the Contract Agreement) for the provision of goods and services in the printing and
encoding of PVC cards. According to PROVI, it delivered the items subject to the agreement to
TESDA.
PROVI alleged that out of TESDA’s liability of P39,475,000.00, TESDA paid PROVI only
P3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00, as evidenced by PROVI’s
Statement of Account. Despite the two demand letters dated March 8 and April 27, 2001 that PROVI
sent TESDA, the outstanding balance remained unpaid.
PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA. The RTC
granted PROVI’s prayer and issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of TESDA
not exempt from execution in the amount of P35,000,000.00. TESDA responded on July 24, 2001
by filing a Motion to Discharge/Quash the Writ of Attachment, arguing mainly that public funds cannot
be the subject of garnishment. The RTC denied TESDA’s motion. Faced with these rulings, TESDA
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to question the RTC orders. The CA set aside the RTC’s
orders
Rule: TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental functions. Its funds
are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do not believe that the role and status of
TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly
attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the
performance of governmental functions – i.e., the handling of formal and non-formal education and
training, and skills development. As an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific
charter, it is equipped with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to
119
it.
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TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.

Part 1
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as well
a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the
jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered,
and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance
of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for
the proper administration of the government.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely:
1. a suit against the Republic by name;

2. a suit against an unincorporated government agency;
3. a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s
performance of governmental functions;
4. and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will
fall on the government.
In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its
own charter.
As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is
a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing,
and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the
existence of state immunity applies – i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of
governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use
and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions. In Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, we said:
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With
the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the
loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic
principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.
PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively waived its immunity when it
entered into a contract with PROVI for a commercial purpose. The PVC cards purchased by TESDA
from PROVI are meant to properly identify the trainees who passed TESDA’s National Skills
Certification Program – the program that immediately serves TESDA’s mandated function of
developing and establishing a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in
the country. How the mandated certification is to be done, however, lies within the discretion of
TESDA as an incident of its mandated function, and is a properly delegated authority that this Court
cannot inquire into, unless its exercise is attended by grave abuse of discretion.
That TESDA sells the PVC cards to its trainees for a fee does not characterize the transaction as
industrial or business; the sale, expressly authorized by the TESDA Act, cannot be considered
separately from TESDA’s general governmental functions, as they are undertaken in the discharge
of these functions. Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function
proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function
is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity. G.R. No. 155504 June 26, 2009
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC. vs. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
Case: Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land was being used as
part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office. They agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale
120
to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite
repeated verbal and written demands.
Page
Respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC

Part 1
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included
the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had
been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
Issue: The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without the State’s
consent.
Rule: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly,
a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government
agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The
immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental
to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a
necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
ATO is an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function,
but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that
was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim
to the State’s immunity from suit. We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the
plaintiffs’ property.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been
rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation
Authority Act of 2008 abolished the ATO and established in its place the Civil Aviation Authority of
the Philippines (CAAP).
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, including the
power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind and description, to construct,
acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real properties, and to
settle, under such terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim by or against it.
With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that
the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced
against the CAAP. G.R. No. 159402 February 23, 2011 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, vs.
SPOUSES DAVID* ELISEA RAMOS
Rule: This Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario (G.R. No.
101949, 1 December 1994), to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the
act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz (221 Phil. 179 -1985)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
121
A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a
proprietary activity.
Page

Part 1
The parties executed the Contract Agreement for the purpose of constructing the Luzon Railways.
The Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002 shows that CNMEG sought the
construction of the Luzon Railways as a proprietary venture. Also, that CNMEG, and not the Chinese
government, initiated the Northrail Project was confirmed. Thus, the desire of CNMEG to secure the
Northrail Project was in the ordinary or regular course of its business as a global construction
company. The implementation of the Northrail Project was intended to generate profit for CNMEG.
The use of the term "state corporation" to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a
government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did
not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign functions.
G.R. No. 185572 February 7, 2012 CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP.
(GROUP), vs. HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA
Case: With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the National
Parks Development Committee, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice
dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner
terminated their verbal lease agreement with General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and
demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park.
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into
signing the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that
he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was
knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional
Trial Court against petitioner,
GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the
complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent.
Rule: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for
acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against
the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state
itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages
awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal
capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in
his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied
a public position.
We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his
personal capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner
as chairman of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity. G.R.
No. 102667 February 23, 2000 AMADO J. LANSANG, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS*
Case: A vehicle, was apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and

Philippine Army elements. It was loaded with forest products Calub duly filed a criminal complaint
against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No.
3625, for violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio
Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded
122
vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan.
The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order
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Part 1
Issue: Is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Rule: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold
the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without
willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question
are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry
Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as
officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith
on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the
State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent. G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000 FELIPE
CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T.
BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA
Rule: The suit is to the mind of this court a suit against the state. At times, it would be teasingly
obvious, even from the moment of the filing of the complaint, that the suit is one against the State. A
cursory examination of the caption of the complaint can sometimes betray such proscribed intent, as
when the suit is directly initiated against the Republic of the Philippines, any foreign government, or
an unincorporated government agency as the named respondents. In such cases, obviously there is
need for immediate caution, although if it is somehow established that those respondents had given
their consent to be sued, the suit may nonetheless prosper.
The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the unknown awardee, Lichauco was
identified in the complaint as "acting Secretary of the [DOTC]." The hornbo0ok rule is that a suit for
acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private
citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded
as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. However, government
immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an
interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises
from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within
the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law
or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff,
under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a
suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice. G.R. No. 142362 May 3, 2006 PHILIPPINE AGILA
SATELLITE INC. and MICHAELC. U. DE GUZMAN vs. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO
Undersecretary for Communications, Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC)
Case: On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued
Administrative Order No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the
accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products
On May 9, 2000 and May 29, 2000, respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin
G Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of
and release of the result of respondent’s request were due on September 2000, the last month of
123
the quarter following the date of its filing.

Page

Part 1
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of
the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement
of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine .
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request for inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies
participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS
Laboratories’ bid of P95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent’s
Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS.
Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages
Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright
dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. By Order of December 8, 2003,
the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Order. Hence, the instant petition for review which
raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial of petitioners’
motion to dismiss.
Rule: The petition fails. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official
concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the
performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government.
In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official
concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party.
In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their
official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who
should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary
injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of
state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of
the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have
now adopted as part of the law of the land.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive
act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.
The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. Shauf v.
Court of Appeals elucidates:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al., ‘ Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within
the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law
or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff,
under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a
124
suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent.’ The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
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Part 1
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that
are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the
public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although
the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official positions to make sure that
plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad
faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is permissible, in
consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him
by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally. G.R.
No. 169304 March 13, 2007 THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M.
DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ vs. PHIL.
PHARMAWEALTH, INC.
c. Consent to be Sued
How consent is given.
1. Express consent:
Generally: The consent to be sued, in order to be effective, must come from the
State, acting through a duly enacted statute. Waiver of state immunity can only be
made by an act of legislative body.
Rule: A contract entered into by the Rice and Corn Administration stipulating that in the event of
breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be the basis of a money claim against the RCA, a
government entity under the Office of the President, since the RCA had no authority to bind the
government to be sued. Only a statute could.
Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted
statute. “The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted
statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no
binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. G.R. No. L-
36084 August 31, 1977 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P.
PURISIMA
Rule: The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state
may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued.
The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state
from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is
conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when
it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level
of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied
upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all
contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, where the questioned transaction dealt with improvements
on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
125
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary
to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
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Part 1
to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States,
the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this
be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for not dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree
("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao,
Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, we ruled:
(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under
Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving
the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof
that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the
Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for
filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed."
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained
execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give
the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor
this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus —
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution
or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,
as appropriated by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993 DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.
1) Money claims arising from contracts, express or implied.
 ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
Section 1. Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine
Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented his
claim to the Insular Auditor and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its
presentation.
Sec. 3. Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter,
upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.
126
Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and appellate,
as if the litigants were private parties.
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Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original
jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action
between private parties.
Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the authority
granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense,
either himself or through delegates.
Sec. 7. Execution. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government
of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court
in which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General, within five days after the
same becomes final.
Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-General, at the commencement of each regular session of the
Legislature, shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body
determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced
to pay, including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved: March 16, 1923.
 COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 - AN ACT FIXING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF APPEAL THEREFROM
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their
presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested,
the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him. With respect to the accounts of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one
hundred days after their submission, Sundays and holidays excepted.
In case of accounts or claims already submitted to but still pending decision by the Auditor General on or before the
approval of this Act, the periods provided in this section shall commence from the date of such approval.
Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account for claim
may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing:
XXX
(b) To the President of the Philippines, or
(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity.
If there are more than one appellant, all appeals shall be taken to the same authority resorted to by the first appellant.
From a decision adversely affecting the interests of the Government, the appeal may be taken by the proper head
of the department or in case of local governments by the head of the office or branch of the Government immediately
concerned.
The appeal shall specifically set forth the particular action of the Auditor General to which exception is taken with
the reasons and authorities relied on for reversing such decision.
Section3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 18. 1938.
 Sec. 2 of CA 327 has been amended by Sec. 50 of PD 1445 and by Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle B, Title I, Book
V, Administrative Code of the Philippines, as follows:
 Sec. 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission.-- The party aggrieved by any decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court
in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the
127
interests of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (PD 1445.)
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 Sec. 35. Appeal from Decision of the Commission.-- Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
thereof in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order or ruling adversely affects
the interest of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (Subtitle B,
Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of the Philippines.)
Case: Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the
government, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the
Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be
shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public
policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a
ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel
the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper
or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State . In other words, the respondent
should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 ...
which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed".
Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases involving the
settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall
act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their
presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a
party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to
a proper decision is received by him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party
aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may,
within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the
United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or
(b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant
is a private person or entity."
With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed decision
defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability.
It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be
exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal
would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had
there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower
court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious
then that it does not have the imprint of validity Sayson v. Singson, 54 SCRA 282 (1973)
Before the 1987 Constitution With the effectivitiy the 1987

Constitution
Act 3038 and CA 327 allowed suit All money claims are to be filed
only for money claims arising from with COA, which has 60 days
contract, and providing a special within which to act.
procedure.
The claim must be filed with the  If COA fails to so act, the
Auditor General (now, COA). claimant must wait anyway.
 If the Auditor does not act  Once a decision has been
within 60 days, then the made, he has, within 30
claimant could file his claim days to appeal by certiorari
with the RTC. to the SC
 But if the Auditor renders a
decision, then the appeal
could be made to the SC,
unless the claimant was a
public official in which case
appeal was to the
President.
128
(2) Quasi-delicts committed by special agents
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
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or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Part 1
XXX
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what Is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict …
Case: The Plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was struck by the General Hospital ambulance, which
turned suddenly and, without having sounded any whistle or horn. By reason of the resulting collision,
the plaintiff was severely injured. Plaintiff was allowed to sue the Government of the Philippine
Islands by virtue of Act No. 2457
Rule: By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
That the state is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 (now Art. 2180) The chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. The responsibility of the state is limited
by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense
in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to
his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18,
1904; 98 Jur. Civ. ,389, 390.) The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent Merritt vs. Government. of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil 311
(3) Incorporation of government-owned or controlled corporation.
When the government creates a corporation, it invariably provides this corporation

a separate entity and with the capacity to sue and be sued. If the government entity
is given the capacity to be sued, the suit encompasses any kind of action, including
one from tort.
Rule: The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either
by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action
"only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation

which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then
its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. G.R. No. 154411 June 19, 2003 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, ,vs. HEIRS OF
ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
2. Implied consent:
129
(1) When the government enters into business contracts

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Important to note - When the government is in the performance of governmental
function (jure imperii), even if it enters into a contract with private persons, it cannot
be sued without its consent.
Thus in United States v Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985). a contract for the repair of
wharves and piers at the naval base in Subic was held to be in line with the
governmental function of the US Government and so the immunity existed.
But when the government enters into commercial contracts and descends to the
status of ordinary persons (jure gestioni), it can be sued like any other person. In
Malong v PNR, 138 SCRA 63 (1985), it was held that when the state organized
the Philippine National Railway, it divested itself of its sovereign capacity, and so
became liable for damages that arose from the death of one who fell from an
overloaded train.
Case: In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the said base. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private
respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering
Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual
petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop
concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue
operating the concessions pending litigation.
The petitioners' filed with the trial court their motion to dismiss which was denied by the latter.
Rule: The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters
into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which
the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties." In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of
its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the government
files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. We have held that not all contracts entered
into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between
its sovereign and proprietary acts.
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of
America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have
acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction in question
dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly
governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its
sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
130
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
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immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is
now the rule in the United States, the United kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
In this case, by entering into an employment contract [a proprietary function] with the respondents,
the US impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The state could therefore be sued since
such contracts are commercial in nature.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as
follows: In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated
December 11, 1986, is LIFTED. G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990 UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA vs. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO
Case: Allegedly that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought the disputed lot from Claro Oñate,
respondent’s grandfather, and since then it had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in
the concept of an owner until 1988 when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS;
thus asserting that it could also claim ownership also through adverse possession.
Respondent instituted a Complaint for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery
of Possession of the Lot
The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can sued be without its consent. A supplementary
issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines.
Rule: We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy
to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property.
When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would
necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to
a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and
forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.
The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise resolved in the
negative. While it is true that petitioner is an unincorporated government agency, and as such
technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against the former,
nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted.
Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve
the long litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue, we
will arrive at the same ruling.
The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant considering that it
impliedly gave its approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a
situation involving a contract between a government department and a third party, the Republic of
the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed
that the authority granted to such department to enter into such contract carries with it the full
responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name. G.R. No. 161758 June 8, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOL’S Division
Superintendent vs. CELSO OÑATE,.
Also Read: PTA vs. PGDEI 668 SCRA 406

131
(2) When it would be inequitable for the state to invoke its immunity, or when it
takes private property for public use or purpose.
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Case:: The Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual contracts with herein petitioners
for the construction of the housing units. After complying with the terms of said contracts, and by
reason of the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary that additional funds
would be available and forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional
constructions" for the completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and
written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for the "additional constructions." Thus, the money
claims of petitioners.
Respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims prompting herein
petitioners to file a Petition for Mandamus.
Hence, this petition where the core issue for resolution focuses on the right of petitioners-contractors
to compensation for a public works housing project
Rule: The Court found the instant petition laden with merit and upheld, in the interest of substantial
justice, petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated for the "additional constructions" on the
public works housing project, applying the principle of quantum meruit.
Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invoking
the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative
of Dishonesty.
Respondent's argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State Immunity finds no

application in the case before us.
Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty
and conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this
principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for
it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
Thus, in Amigable vs. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which shields the
State from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio vs. CFI of Cebu that "the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on
the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the State's immunity
from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this Court nonetheless
finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy,
considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular
instance, the State's immunity from suit.
To be sure, this Court — as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare — cannot
sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration
thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred
in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated — on the basis of
quantum meruit — for construction done on the public works housing project. .G.R. No. 131544
March 16, 2001 EPG CONSTRUCTION CO. vs. HON. GREGORIO R. VIGILAR
Case: The Petitioner BOC Commissioner was ordered to pay respondent the commercial value of
the goods based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation. The same was due
to the loss of some confiscated items in BOCs custody, pending the determination of the shipper’s
compliance with the law.
Petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge against the government requires a
corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order.
Rule: Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on
the government, and that, under the political doctrine of "state immunity," it cannot be held liable for
governmental acts (jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The
circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.
132
As previously discussed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence
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in the safekeeping of respondent’s goods. We are not likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude

Part 1
in failing to provide a cogent explanation on the goods’ disappearance, considering that they were
in its custody and that they were in fact the subject of litigation. The situation does not allow us to
reject respondent’s claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the
doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue
advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it.
In Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, we enunciated that this Court, as the
staunch guardian of the people’s rights and welfare, cannot sanction an injustice so patent in its face,
and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over time, courts have recognized
with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in
law. Justice and equity now demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be
shredded. G.R. Nos. 166309-10 March 9, 2007 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, vs. UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS.
(3) If the government files a complaint, defendant may file a counterclaim against
it
In Froilan vs Oriental Pan Shipping, GR L-6060 (Sept. 30, 1950), the Court held
that when the State itself files a complaint, the defendant is entitled to file a
counterclaim against it. This is based on equitable grounds. The Court ruled that the
state impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for
the purpose of asserting a claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit,
recovery of a vessel.
Case: Froilan purchased from Shipping Commission a vessel for P200,000 paying P50,000 as down
payment. A Chattel Mortgage was executed to secure the payment of the balance. For various
reasons including non-payment of installments, the Commission took possession of the vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to
Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed from the action of the Commission and he was restored to all the
rights under the original contract. However, Pan Oriental retained the possession of the vessel.
Froilan filed a complaint to recover possession of the vessel.
A writ of replevin was issued. The Government intervened alleging that Froilan failed to pay the
balance to the Commission; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of said vessel under
the terms of the original contract or in order for it to effect the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. Pan Oriental answered the complaint in intervention praying that if Government
succeeded in obtaining the possession of the vessel, to comply with its obligation of delivering it to
Pan Oriental pursuant to their contract of bareboat charter with an option to purchase. Complaint in
intervention was dismissed upon Froilan's payment of his account to the Government.
Government filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim which Pan Oriental had filed against it in view
of the court's order dismissing the complaint in intervention. Counterclaim of Pan Oriental. against
the Republic of the Philippines was dismissed. Hence, this appeal. Government raised, among
others, as ground for the dismissal of Pan Oriental 's counterclaim, the State's immunity from suit.
Rule: By filing its complaint in intervention, the Government in effect waived its right of non-suability.
Stated otherwise, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State surrendered
its privileged position and came down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against
the State. Froilan vs Oriental Pan Shipping, 12 SCRA 276, GR L-6060 (Sept. 30, 1950)
Summary Note:
Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly
enacted statute
Not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts.
As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
133
3. Scope of consent
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Part 1
(1) Under Act No.3083
Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby
consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.
When a money judgment is given against the government, the ordinary rule for
execution would not apply, for the consent of the government to be sued is only up
to the point of judgment. If it does not pay, it cannot be compelled to pay by
attachment or otherwise
Rule: Although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered
requiring its payment of the award determined as just compensation for the condemned property as
a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon execution.
The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate any additional amount,
over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the
judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of Public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by

law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law. G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970 THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs.
HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO
(2) Under a charter
When consent to be sued is provided by the charter, the consent does not stop with
the rendition, but goes up to the satisfaction of the judgment.
If an incorporated agency has a charter of its own, it has a separate and distinct
personality. If the agency is incorporated, the basis for its suabilty is found in its
charter.
Case: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had
become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala
had previously been issued.
Rule: The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the
sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity It does
not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. By engaging in a particular business thru
the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations."
According to US Chief Justice Marshall: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of
that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating
to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it
associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which
is to be transacted.
134
One of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are
immune from garnishment. Since then such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity.
It is an entirely different matter if, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
Page

Part 1
existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That
is what happened in this case. PNB v CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978)
(3) Execution
Rule: It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily
consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all
it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a
liability. In Republic v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution
directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory
judgment, has explained, thus—
. . . The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1959 December 9, 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JUDGE VICENTE A.
HIDALGO
4. Suability vs. Liability
Rule: The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and
its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit
but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business
contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a
general or special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers —one
of them is the power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v.
Allarde, where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially,
the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not
issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of
property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication
that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction.
Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited
only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment. G.R. No. 168289 March
22, 2010 THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN vs. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR.
Case: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere
fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity,
it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United States
of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660) G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
FERNANDO, LA UNION, vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME
135
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Part 1
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation.108 The transformation method requires that an international law
be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.109
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section
21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties
or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to
be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.110 (G.R. No. 173034
October 9, 2007 PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE et.al.)
136
108
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government (Notes and Cases) Part I ( 2005).
Page
109
Id.
110
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., An Introduction to Public International Law, 2002 Ed., p. 57.

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Part 1

A. Political Law Defined

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Hence, As To Laws Which Are Not Political In Nature;

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

B. Scope of Political Law:

b. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Deals with the guaranties of the constitution to individual

C. Constitutional Law defined

It is defined by Judge Story to be a fundamental law or basis of government. It is

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the

According to Schwartz, “it is seen as an organic instrument, under which

American sense: A constitution is a written instrument by which the fundamental

With particular reference to the Philippine Constitution: That written instrument

E. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections5, the Court held that, "The

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law

1. In relation to the amendment process:

The constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION - is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

WRITTEN CONSTITUTION - is one whose precepts are embodied in one document

UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION - consists of rules which have not been integrated

ENACTED or CONVENTIONAL CONSTITUTION - is enacted, formally struck off at

CUMULATIVE OR EVOLVED - is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated

NORMATIVE - adjusts to norms, those that function more truly as prescriptive

SEMANTIC – A Fundamental law for the perpetuation of power. (“pseudo-

What is the Philippine Constitution? The Constitution of the Philippines is written,

H. Qualities of a Good Constitution

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 BRIEF. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with

 DEFINITE. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in

I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution

Constitution of GOVERNMENT. The series of provisions outlining the organization of

Constitution of LIBERTY. The series of proscriptions setting forth the fundamental

Constitution of SOVEREIGNTY. The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure

J. Philosophical View of the Constitution

II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 All laws of political nature were automatically abrogated.

McKinley’s Instructions: (issued by Pres. McKinley on April 7, 1900 as “Letter

o the right to bear arms8 and

Philippine Bill of 1902: (Philippines’ organic act from 1902 to 1906)

 The Governor-General retained all executive power, including the power to

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was

o The executive power was in the hands of an American Governor-

Tydings-McDuffie Law: (not an organic act)

It is an enabling statute that provided the mechanism whereby the constitution of

This provided for:

1. The calling of Constitutional Convention to draft our Constitution.

1935 Constitution: (took effect on November 15, 1935)

 This served as the charter of the Commonwealth and upon withdrawal of US

Relevant Law: PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED

BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

"By the President:

B- The 1986 Revolution and proclamation of the provisional Constitution

Political Law 1 2016 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution.