1.

Rights in the Contiguous Zone and EEZ

…baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the
rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-
living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77)…

Magallona vs Ermita G.R. No. 187167

2a. Precautionary Principle

Precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats of serious and
irreversible damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be
taken to avoid or diminish that threat.

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

The “Precautionary approach” is contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which states:

“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”

(Suarez 2018, Political Law Reviewer)

2b. Immunity from suit of foreign states

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by
Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the
right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of
Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Arigo vs Swift. G.R. No. 206510 Sept 16, 2014

3. Doctrine of Jus Postlimini

When a territory which has been occupied by the enemy comes again into the power of the State during
the progress of a war through conquest or otherwise, the legal state of the things existing prior to the
hostile occupation is re-established.

(Argueo, International Law)

4. Right to Privacy
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and
the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is
entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test.

Subjective Test:
The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation
of privacy over a certain matter.

Objective Test:

The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared
to accept as objectively reasonable.

Disini vs Sec of Justice G.R. No. 203335 Feb 11, 2014

In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States, the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a "search and seizure". Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Pollo vs Constantino G.R. No. 181881 Oct 18, 2011

5. Carroll Doctrine
As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search incidental to
an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied).

…This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which boarders on
the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

People vs Balingan G.R. No. 105834 Feb 13, 1995

6. Due process in Deportation

The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. 1 It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. 2

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be
denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure
are applicable to deportation proceedings.

Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:

- No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be
stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what
ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.

Lao Gi vs CA G.R. No. 81798 Dec 29, 1989

7a. Requisites of a Valid Warrant

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions.

These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants. The
proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process
known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which
excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrants will
always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify
under it.

7b. Reliance on Prosecutor’s Certification

There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, but does such certification bind the
judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in the negative. The issuance of a warrant is
not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing
magistrate.

This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination
conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
 committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it,
he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing, a
warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. vs.
Ocampo 8 and Amarga vs. Abbas. 9 And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of
the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been
attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for
the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had
submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the
cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.

Placer vs Villanueva G.R. No. L-60349-62 Dec 29, 1983

8. Signing articles of the crime

The alleged motive of the policemen for fabricating the charge against him and planting marked
money on his person is not credible. The Court is unable to imagine that a lowly tricycle driver would
have the temerity to defy a pair of armed policemen by refusing to give them a ride in his tricycle to
pursue a law violator.

The appellant was not denied due process during the custodial investigation. Although he was
not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist, his
right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not
constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana a cigarettes (People
vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47; People vs. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457). His
conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial
court believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged
in selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence
to their categorical declarations than to the appellant's denials (People vs. Tan, 145 SCRA 614). That is as
it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular
manner (People vs. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521; People vs. Ale, 145 SCRA 50). Their task of apprehending
persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities
to make it doubly so.

People vs Linsangan G.R. No. 88589 Apr 16, 1991

8b. Booking Sheets

With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said in People v. Morico that
"when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not admit
the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is
merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an
arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police
themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction."

People vs Ang Chun G.R No. 109232 Dec 29, 1995

10. Suspicionless Drug Tests

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary
level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory
purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of
"an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through
an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies,
programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found
positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals.
They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. -
A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through
his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that
the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the
applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation
in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent
under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from
the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

xxxx

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition
for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
 We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.
The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case
of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

SJS vs. DDB G.R. No. 157870 Nov 3, 2008

11a. Specificity of Offense

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate(Right against
unreasonable search and seizures), namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed
by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws…

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14
by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."

Stonehill vs Diokno G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

11b. General Pattern of Business Exceptions

…the failure of the witness to mention particular individuals does not necessarily prove that he had no
personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the Organization, for the witness might be
acquainted with specific transactions, even if the names of the individuals concerned were unknown to
him. I.e. general pattern of the organization bank in this case.

it may be necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said isolated transactions, so that the
search and seizure be limited to the records pertinent thereto (where a business entity engaging in)
isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type of business in which it is generally engaged.

Central Bank vs Morfe G.R. No. L-20119 June 30, 1967

Emphasis supplied and rephrased

12. John Doe Warrants

it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void,
"except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify
the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the
warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his
possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John
Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso
without difficulty.

John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or
farfetched judicial interference.

People vs Veloso G.R. No. L-23051 Oct 20,1925

13. Deliberative Process Privilege

Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged information, which is within the
exceptions of the constitutional right to information. In In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses, we held that:
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication.

Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC provides:

Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. - Court sessions are executive in character, with only the
Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside
parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by the Court.

Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in
Arroyo v. De Lima (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on confidentiality will enable the
Members of the Court to "freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding
unpopular positions" or fear of humiliation for one's comments. The privilege against disclosure
of these kinds of information/communication is known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it
does the deliberative process of reaching a decision. "Written advice from a variety of individuals is an
important element of the government's decision-making process and that the interchange of advice
could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those recommendations;" the privilege is
intended "to prevent the 'chilling' of deliberative communications."

The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in passing recognized the claim of this
privilege by the two other branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
(speaking through J. Carpio) when the Court declared that -
[t]he information x x x like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or
executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect
the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial
power. (Emphasis supplied)

As we have held in Akbayan v. Aquino, the deliberative process privilege is closely related to the
presidential communications privilege and protects the public disclosure of information that can
compromise the quality of agency decisions:

Closely related to the "presidential communications" privilege is the deliberative process privilege
recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,
deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the
privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the
"obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a
potential item of discovery and front page news," the objective of the privilege being to enhance the
quality of agency decisions. (Emphasis supplied)
 As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency asserting the deliberative
process privilege to prove that the information in question satisfies both requirements - predecisional
and deliberative. "The agency bears the burden of establishing the character of the decision, the
deliberative process involved, and the role played by the documents in the course of that process." It
may be overcome upon a showing that the discoverant's interests in disclosure of the materials
outweigh the government's interests in their confidentiality. "The determination of need must be made
flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis," and the "factors relevant to this balancing include: the
relevance of the evidence, whether there is reason to believe the documents may shed light on
government misconduct, whether the information sought is available from other sources and can be
obtained without compromising the government's deliberative processes, and the importance of the
material to the discoverant's case."

DFA vs BCA G.R. No. 210858 June 29, 2016

14. Non-establishment Clause

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It
simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion,
or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot
punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity
or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice
religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or
group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict
other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and,
thus, establish a state religion.

Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:

"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Such
government neutrality may be summarized in four general propositions: (1) Government must not
prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because such preference would violate
voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes
because this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; (3) Government action must
not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4)
Government action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion because this too can violate
voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension."

A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC Mar 7, 2017

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V ALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE
BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY

15. Hold Departure Orders

It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The courts may issue
a HDO against an accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. It does
not require legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial
power.

The point is that the DOJ may not justify its imposition of restriction on the right to travel of the
subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 by resorting to an analogy. Contrary to its claim, it does not have
inherent power to issue HDO, unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in anyway. It is limited
to the powers expressly granted to it by law and may not extend the same on its own accord or by any
skewed interpretation of its authority.

Genuino vs De Lima G.R. No. 197930 Apr 17, 2018

16. What constitutes taking

Taking includes either physical seizure or appropriation of the property, or to the limitation to
the use of the property. (Stearns vs. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223)

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power
may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of
title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is
essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should
be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property
constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to
permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that
unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of
private property, and the owner may recover therefor.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with
respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said
facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only
requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is
also mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an
excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right
to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use
or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required
parking facilities. OSG vs Ayala Land G.R. No. 177056 Sept 18, 2009
17. Computing Just Compensation
Compensation given to the owner is just if he receives for his property a sum equivalent to its
market value. (City of Manila vs. Corales, 32 phil 85, 92, 98 1915)

Fair market value is the price at which a willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy,
neither being under normal pressure. (Manila Railroad Co. vs Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326)

In the practical application of this doctrine, the courts have been obliged to reject various kinds
of evidence which the partisan zeal of the one side has attempted to introduce in order to swell the
measure of damages, and to approve evidence which the other side has attempted to discredit in order
to reduce the amount to be realized.

First, testimony as to mere offers for the property desired or for contiguous property is not
admissible.

Second, the admission of testimony relative to real estate transaction in the vicinity of the land
desired. The rule which admits such evidence meets with universal approval, but with certain
reservations:

Evidence of other sales is competent if the character of such parcels as sites for business
purposes, dwellings, or for whatever other use which enhances the pecuniary value of the condemned
land is sufficiently similar to the latter that it may be reasonably assumed that the price of the
condemned land would be approximately near the price brought by the parcels sold.

And where these differences are so great that the sales in question can form no reliable
standard for comparison, such evidence should not be admitted.

The next question of evidence, and the most important to this case, is the admissibility of
evidence showing prices paid for neighboring land under eminent domain proceedings. Is this class of
evidence admissible? The authorities almost with one accord reply emphatically, No.

It is to be observed that this rule excluding evidence of prices obtained for neighboring land
under eminent domain proceedings is in the nature of an exception to the rule that sales of such land
may be offered in evidence, and that, speaking briefly, the underlying reason is that they are not prices
obtained "by one who desires but is not obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who is under no
necessity for having it."

City of Manila vs Estrada G.R. No. 7749 Sept 9, 1913

18a. Custodial Investigation; When it begins

This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect." R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual
has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning.
Decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of
October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer
Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III,
§ 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him.

People vs Domantay G.R. No. 130612 May 11, 1999

18b. Custodial Investigation; Rights

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the
confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.

Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438),4 approved on May 15, 1992, re-enforced the constitutional
mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which
reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation"
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating
officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading
by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.

People vs Tan G.R. No. 117321 Feb 11, 1998

19. Meaning of being a witness against himself
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial or upon trial, for the
purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a
crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)

U.S. vs Tan Teng G.R. No. 7081 Sept 7, 1912

Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a
witness against himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge
the morphine from his mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the
same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other
articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a
substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction
of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing
taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort
unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats
[1885], 75 Ga., 415.)

U.S. vs Ong Siu Hong G.R. No. L-12778 Aug 3, 1917

…whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under
examination.

…in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the
fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except
that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels
in one's possession.

We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one
who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
 And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act
of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.

Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and
those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

Beltran vs Samson G.R. No. 32025 Sept 23, 1929

20a. Valid Delegation of legislative power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power,
however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA G.R. No. 76633 Oct 18, 1988

20b. Completeness and Sufficient Standard Test

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
People vs Vera G.R. No. L-45685 Nov 16, 1937
21. Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over
the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not
averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not
a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court
ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
(Emphasis supplied.)

22. Guidelines for Party-lists

…the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also
for non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-
list system prescribed in the Constitution.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals." The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized
and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and
underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective
sectors.
 Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to
refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.

Atong Paglaum vs COMELEC G.R. No. 203766 Apr 2, 2013

23. Privilege from arrest of legislators

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

24. Inquiries in aid of legislation

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative
inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process
may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range
of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject. 52
Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by
the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the
exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize
the detained witness.

Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules
state:

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.

The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members. Concurring and dissenting reports
may likewise be made by the members who do not sign the majority report within seventy-two (72)
hours from the approval of the report. The number of members who sign reports concurring in the
conclusions of the Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining whether the Report has
been approved by a majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both a
concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the majority unless he expressly
indicates his vote for the majority position.

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the Secretary
of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred to the
Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied)

The said Report shall be the subject matter of the next order of business, and it shall be acted
upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its
approval or disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate
whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of business. At that
point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. As
the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Balag vs Senate G.R. No. 234608 Jul 3, 2018

25. Organization of the House of Representatives and Senate

Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority
vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide
to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control. In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, which involved
a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court
observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the
House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the
Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.' [As such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court."

Baguilat vs Alvarez G.R. No. 227757 Jul 25, 2017

The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to elect another Senator
as president of the Senate, and their freedom to make such change is subject only to the dictates of
their own conscience and to any verdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at the
polls, and to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of leadership, the
Senate and the Senators are bound to follow the orderly processes set and outlined by the Constitution
and by the rules adopted by the Senate as authorized by the fundamental law. Any step beyond said
legal bounds may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts of justice, the latter
cannot simply wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of jurisdiction, adopting
the indifferent attitude of a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of the wind may cause a
live wire to ignite a neighboring house.

When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being deprived of the powers
and prerogative of the position of President of the Senate, to which he has been duly elected because
twelve Senators, without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted to depose him and
to elect another Senator in his place, he raises a constitutional question of momentous importance
which we should not fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us. Such complaint
constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority by the twelve Senators, in utter violation
of the fundamental law. The situation would demand ready and another agency of government can
offer that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint has been filed.

The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective

collective action. Because a society or collective body is composed of separate and independent
individual units, it cannot exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can only act
in organized form. Every time it has to act, it has to an organic whole, and quorum here is the organizing
element without which the personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The importance of
such organizing element has been recognize by the members of our Constitutional Convention, and that
is the reason why they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring the existence of quorum for
the former National Assembly to transact official business and that requirement was also imposed by
the National Assembly when, amending the Constitution, it voted itself out of existence, to be replaced
by a bicameral Congress. The requirement, both in the original text of the Constitution and in the
amendment, had been ratified by the sovereign will of the people.

When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a quorum we did it for

mighty reasons, such as that democracy is based on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of
less than the majority of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to
allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where the Constitution provides
for only one. If the twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact official
business, what will preclude the twelve remaining Senators from constituting themselves into a quorum
to transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend the session,
even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad and sides with petitioner's
group. Then there will be, in effect, two Senate and, according to respondent's theory the Supreme
Court will have no jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and no one decide it except public opinion or, in its
failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:

Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may take shelter when
afraid to displease the powerful.

Avelino vs Cuenco G.R. No. L-2821 Mar 4, 1949

26. Journals and Records

…statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate
the intent of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Casco vs Gimenez G.R. No. L-17931 Feb 28, 1963

27. PDAF

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

…these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. 

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through
formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies,
else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation
involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.

This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system

fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.

Belgica vs Hon. Exec Sec G.R. No. 208566 Nov 19,2013

27b. DAP

In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the
authority to transfer funds.

A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were
textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their respective
offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices"
was to authorize only transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the
transfer was to an item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions carried a different
phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if
the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be used to
claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a
constitutional commission.

Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed,
there still remained two other requisites to be met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred
were savings from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for the
purpose of augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.
Cross-border
augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution

The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to ₱143,700,000.00 and ₱250,000,000.00 were
transferred under the DAP respectively to the COA and the House of Representatives. Those
transfers of funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being from the Executive
to the COA and the House of Representatives.

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of
Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.

Araullo vs Aquino G.R. No. 209287 Jul 1, 2014