LAST MINUTE TIPS: POLI U.P.

LAW BOC

POLITICAL LAW
Q1: What is the binding nature of soft law?
A1: Soft law is not binding, as it does not fall into any of the categories of international law set
forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is,
however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state
behavior. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, [October
9, 2007])

Q2: What is an associative state?

A2: An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other,
the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a
middle ground between integration and independence.

In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. (Province of North
Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.
R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 & 183962, [October 14, 2008])

Q3: What is extradition? The principles of dual criminality and specialty?

A3: The practice of extradition enables one state to hand over to another state suspected or
convicted criminals who have fled to the territory of the former. It is based upon bilateral treaty
law and does not exist as an obligation upon states in customary law. It is usual to derive from
existing treaties on the subject certain general principles, for example that of double criminality,
i.e. that the crime involved should be a crime in both states concerned, and that of specialty, i.e. a
person surrendered may be tried and punished only for the offence for which extradition had
been sought and granted [Shaw, International Law].

Q4: When does Congress' power of contempt expire? What is the effect of such expiration
on persons detained for contempt in the Senate?
A4: The power of contempt is co-terminus with the legislative inquiry being undertaken in the
Senate. The Senate's power of contempt expires upon the approval or disapproval of the report of
the Committee conducting the investigation or when the session of Congress is terminated.

The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries
in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which
the said power is invoked.

Q5: What is the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement?

A5: Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of
the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress.Hence, one of the distinguishing features of executive
agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence.
(Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444, [January 12, 2016])

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Q6: What are the rights in the contiguous zone?

A6: The coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial
sea. (Section 33, UNCLOS).

Q7: What is the doctrine of immunity from suit of foreign states?

A7: If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
xxx the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction [Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, [September 16, 2014], 743 PHIL 8-
130]

Q8: What is the Principle of Postliminy?

A8: It is part of international law that acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are valid. (Co Kim Cham vs Tan Keh)

In other words, when a foreign power occupies a state and exercises the powers of
government, the political laws of the said state are deemed automatically suspended but the
former government automatically comes to life and will be in force and in effect again upon
the re- establishment of the former government. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)

Q9: What are the objective and subjective requirements under the reasonable
expectation of privacy test?
A9:
Subjective: that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;
Objective: that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

Q10: What is the Carrol Doctrine?

A10: It refers to a principle that permits a police officer to search an entire motor vehicle
and any containers inside it if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
contraband or the fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of criminal activity.

Q11: Are aliens entitled to due process in deportation proceedings? What are the
processes that must be afforded to them?
A11: Yes, they are entitled to due process. Although a deportation proceeding is not in the
nature of a criminal action, it is considered a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person. Hence, the right of due process
applies. The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure will be applicable in such proceedings.

The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be
stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to
know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a
proper judgment
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted
to determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation

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Issuance of search warrants and warrants of arrest, arrests without warrant, service of
warrants
must comply with the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Q12: The prosecutor has already found probable cause and has filed the
corresponding information. The informations was accompanied by certifications that
theprosecutor found prima facie cases against the accused. Is the judge already obliged
to issue the warrant of arrest?
A12: NO. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court which provides that the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information
the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause. (Placer v. Villanueva)

Q13: What is the rule on John Doe Warrants?

A13: A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name
of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," without other and
further descriptions of the person to be apprehended is void. Such a warrant in order to be
valid must contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or
persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his
personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any
other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.

Q14: What is Deliberative Process Privilege? What must be established to qualify for
protection under this privilege?
A14: The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are component parts of the
process for formulating governmental decisions and policies.

To qualify for protection under this privilege, the agency must show that the document is
both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.

A document is "predecisional" if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it

relates. A material is "deliberative," if it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative
process.

Q15: What constitutes taking?

A15: First, The expropriator must enter a private property; Second, the entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period; Third, the entry into the property
should be under warrant or color of legal authority; Fourth, the property must be devoted to
a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and Fifth, the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property (Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi)

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Q16: How is just compensation computed?

A16: In order to determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the
market value of the property by considering the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape,
location, and the tax declarations thereon. [Republic v. Sps. Salvador, G.R. No. 205428
(2017)]

The Supreme Court may substitute its own estimate of value as gathered from the record
submitted to it, in cases where the only error of the commissioners (or concerned government
instrumentality doing the taking) is that they have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them; or that they have disregarded a clear preponderance of the evidence; or that
they have used an improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of award; provided
always, that the evidence be clear and convincing.

Q17: Q: When does custodial investigation start? What are the rights of the person
under custodial investigation?
A17: Custodial investigation starts when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. It involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.This includes
situations in which an accused is merely invited for questioning
Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation
(a) Shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Shall be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or
in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and
of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by
his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly
accredited by the Office of the President.

Q18: What are the test to determine a valid delegation of legislative power?
A18: The delegation must satisfy the completeness and sufficient standard tests.
1. Completeness Test - a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or to be implemented by the delegate. The law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it

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2. Sufficient Standards Test - there is a sufficient standard when there are adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. The standard must specify the limits of the
delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which the law is to be implemented (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
 These tests are intended to prevent a total transfer of legislative authority and prevent
the
delegation from running riot (Vivas v. The Monetary Board)

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Q19: When do the Electoral Tribunals attain jurisdiction over a case?

A19: The jurisdiction of the ET begins only after the candidate is considered a member of
the House of Representatives. The requisites to be recognized as such are:
1. The candidate has been proclaimed as a member of the House.
2. The candidate has taken their oath, before the Speaker, in an open session
3. The candidate must have assumed office as a member of the House, whose session
begins on June 30
 The HRET has jurisdiction over the qualifications of Party-list nominees that sit in
the HOR. While it is true that the power to determine the qualifications of party-lists
rests with the COMELEC (pursuant to the Party-List System Act), the HRET has
jurisdiction over the nominees of the party- list once they sit as representatives in the
HOR.

Q20: While Congress is not in session, Cabangbang, a member of the House of

Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, wrote an open
letter to the President regarding a plan by some AFP officials of staging a coup d’ etat.
The same letter was also published in newspapers. Persons reffered to in the letter as
“planners” of said plot filed a libel suit. Cabangbang asserts that such communication
is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a absolutely privileged
communication under the speech and debate clause. Is Cabangbang correct?
A20: No, it is not privileged communication but it is also not libelous.

"The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place." (Article VI,
Section 15.)
Meaning of "speech or debate therein"

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their

official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the
same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members
of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. [Jimenez v. Cabangbang, GR
No. L-15905, Aug 3, 1966]
In this case, Congress was not in session went the communication was made. Also, it is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.

Even if not privileged, the letter is also not libelous.

Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein
alluded to as "planners", defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that
plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge".
Allegations of hatred, contempt and attempt to dishonour are not consistent with the

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contents of the letter as it explicitly states that they may be are unwitting tools of the
planners and that they may have no knowledge of the plan. [Id]

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Q21: When does a legislative inquiry end?

A21: The legislative inquiry ends upon the approval or rejection of the committee report
and/or upon the expiration of one Congress. (Balag v Senate)

Q22: Why is the pork barrel system unconstitutional?

A22: 1. The Pork Barrel System violates the separation of powers because it is a form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget. By giving individual
legislators the (a) power to determine projects after the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
is passed, and, (b) through congressional committees, authority in the areas of fund release
and realignment, the system encroaches on the Executive’s power to implement the law.
Furthermore, identification of a project by a legislator being a mandatory requirement before his
PDAF can be tapped as a source of funds, his act becomes indispensable in the entire budget
execution process.

Also, it violates the system of checks and balances. It deprives the president of his item-veto
power. As lump-sum appropriations, the actual projects under each congressman’s PDAF
are determined (by the congressman) only after the GAA is passed. It has a detrimental
effect on Congressional Oversight because legislators effectively intervene in project
implementation. (Belgica v Ochoa)

Q23: Is the DAP constitutional?

A23: NO. The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made “within their respective offices”. Under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to
an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. The DAP transfers are also not “savings” contrary to
what was being declared by the Executive. (Araullo v Aquino)

Q24: What are the tax exemptions on non-stock, nonprofit educational institutions?
A24: When a non-stock, nonprofit educational institution proves that it uses its revenues
actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from income tax,
value-
added tax (VAT), and local business tax. On the other hand, when it also shows that it uses
its
assets in the form of real property for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from real
property tax.

Q25: Who succeeds the presidency in case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of President AND Vice-President?

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A25: Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or Vice-President shall be elected
and qualified.

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Q26: Is the prohibition against midnight appointment applicable to the judiciary?

A26: NO. The prohibition against midnight appointment is under Article VII of the
Constitution, thus, applies only to positions in the executive department. In re: Valenzuela,
which extended the prohibition for midnight appointments to the judiciary, was effectively
overturned. (De Castro v JBC)

Q27: Does the appointment of a Bureau of Customs Chief require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments?
A27: No. The following are the groups of officers whom the president shall appoint under
Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the 1987 Constitution:

1. the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone

Of the four groups only the first require the consent of the Commission on Appointments
applying constitutional construction and a review of the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution. Since appointment in a bureau is not under those enumerated in the first group
then the consent of the Commission on Appointments is not required.

Q28: May the president appoint an Acting Secretary in the Department of Interior and
Local Government, while Congress is in session, without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments?
A28: Yes. Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended
any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

Q29: Who has jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective
local officials?
A29: Jurisdiction is lodged with the following:
1. The President
All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials
mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President. The
President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred
to as the Disciplining Authority.(A.O. 23)
2. The Civil Service Commission
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine

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in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,

removal or dismissal from office. (E.O. 292, Book V, Title I, Sub. Title A, Chapter
7)
3. The Ombudsman
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
(R.A.6770)

Q30: How may the Commander-in-chief powers be exercised?

A30: Commander-in-chief powers such as calling out of the armed forces is a power directly
vested by the Constitution in the President. The President does not need congressional
authority to exercise the same (Ampatuan v. Puno). The President may call out the Armed
Forces in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In cases of
actual or impending (Lagman v. Pimentel III) invasion or rebellion, the President may
declare Martial Law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Q31: What is the extent of the Judiciary's power of review when the President declares
Martial Law/Suspends the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?
A31: To determine the factual sufficiency of such declaration, the Supreme Court will have
to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department, which will have to open
its findings to the scrutiny of the Court. The determination of which among the
Constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual
circumstances is a prerogative of the President, and the Court may not substitute the
President's judgment with its own. (Lagman v. Medialdea)

When impugning the factual sufficiency of a declaration of martial law, the following
requisites must be followed:
1. Congress shall be made a party to the case
2. The President, who enjoys immunity from suit, cannot be made a party to the suit
3. The Petitioners cannot invoke the Court's expanded certiorari power under Art. VIII,
Sec. 1, as the Court's jurisdiction under Art. VII, Sec. 18 is special and specific
(Lagman v. Pimentel III)

Q32: Can the Supreme Court compel Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate
on the validity of a proclamation of Martial Law?
A32: NO. The Constitutional provision does not actually require Congress to have a joint
session, but only requires it to vote jointly on the revocation or upholding of the President's
proclamation of Martial Law/Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
Court has no authority to compel Congress to convene in joint session absent a clear
ministerial duty under the Constitution.

Q33: Does a grant of absolute pardon automatically entitle a convicted public official
to resume public office which had been forfeited by reason of such conviction?
A33: Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly

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restores his eligibility for appointment to that office [Monsanto v Factoran Jr. GR No. L-
78239 (1989)]

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Q34: What powers does the President exercise with regard to foreign loans?
A34: Constantino v. Cuisia: The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the
foreign borrowing power “subject to such limitations as may be provided under law.”
Presidential prerogative may be exercised by the President’s alter ego, who in this case is
the Secretary of Finance. Full exercise must be allowed. The only restriction that the
Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the
loans must be subject to limitations provided by law.

Q35: Can a Peace Treaty entered into by the Philippines with another State be
invalidated by the Supreme Court?
A35: No. The issue is a political question that is not subject to judicial inquiry. The
Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for
the Philippines; hence, the Court can not intere with nor question the wisdom behind acts
that are within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive.

Q36: What is the distinction between a suspension pending investigation and

suspension pending appeal?
A36: Preventive suspension pending investigation, is not a penalty but only a means of
enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other
hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision
finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of
the suspension. (Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, [April 21, 1999], 365 PHIL
744-776)

Q37: What is the extent of the power of the COMELEC to settle intra-party disputes?
A37: The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers
and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment
of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The
Court also declared in Palmares v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s power to
register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act
on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a
proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
[Atienza v. Comelec. G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010]
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions. [Id]

Q38: Because the country is in financial distress, the President issued an

Administrative Order. Section 1 of such AO “directs” LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent while Section 4 withholds 10% of the LGUs’ IRA pending
the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee.
Are the two provisions constitutional?
A38: Section 1 is constitutional while Section 4 is unconstitutional.

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Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President’s power over local
governments to one of general supervision, excluding the power of control. It reads as
follows:
“Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments, x x x”
Section 1 is constitutional. The SC construed a similar provision as merely directory. It is
intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-
reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing
economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 2 of the AO is well within the powers of the
President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an
exercise of the power of control. [Pimentel Jr. v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000.]

Section 4 is unconstitutional. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic

release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue in accordance with Art. X
Sec. 6 of the Constitution. The Local Government Code Sec. 286(a) provides that the release
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the
year and “ shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose.” [Id]

The withholding of 10% of the LGUs’ IRA pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee, pursuant to Section 4 of the AO, although
temporary, is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back or withheld,
often temporarily.” Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. The
“temporary” nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any
retention is prohibited. [Id]

Q39: What is the procedure of impeachment?

A39:
1. Anyone can file a complaint but this must be in a form of resolution endorsed by any
member of the House.
2. Must be verified, subscribed and sworn with oath
3. Once there is a resolution, it must be included in the Order of Business or agenda of
the House
4. Once discussed in the House, it will be referred to a Committee, which is usually the
Committee of Justice
5. The Committee will conduct hearing to determine the veracity of the charges and
information
6. Committee will vote and submit a committee report to the House
7. House needs 1/3 vote before it can be submitted to the Senate.
8. Senate serves as the impeachment court, needs 2/3 vote of all Senate to convict What
happens if committee votes unanimously, then 1/3 of House votes otherwise?
 If there is a conflict between the Committee vote and the House Vote, the 1/3 House
Vote will prevail. Rationale: At the initiation stage in the House, guilt is not
determined, only if there is prima facie evidence. It is the Senate that determines guilt
and convicts the accused.

Q40: Differentiate Ancestral Land and Ancestral Domain.

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A40: (Separate Opinion of J. Puno in Cruz v. SENR):

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted
by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private
individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds,
burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They
also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied
and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional
group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or
paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.

Q41: What is the constitutional requirement of ownership for public utilities?

A41: For purposes of determining compliance to the constitutional requirement of
ownership for public utilities, the required percentage of Filipino equity should be applied to
both (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to
vote in the election of director.

Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 goes beyond requiring a 60-40 ratio in favor of Filipino
nationals in the voting stocks; it moreover requires the 60-40 percentage ownership in the
total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or not.

Further, for stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine
nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial
ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential.

Q42: What are the due process requirements in student disciplinary proceedings?
A42: Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
mínimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions were complied with:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
2. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance
of counsel, if desired;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

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Q43: What may be proposed through a People's Initiative, an amendment or a

revision?
A43: ONLY AN AMENDMENT.An amendment is a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principles involved. It generally affects few and specific
provisions of the Constitution. It serves two purposes: (1) to improve specific parts or add
new provisions and (2) to suppress specific portions that have become obsolete. A revision
alters basic principles in the Constitution. It fundamentally alters a substantial entirety of the
Constitution.

The case of Lambino v. COMELEC provides two tests to determine whether a change is a
revision or an amendment:
1. Quantitative Test: so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.
2. Qualitative Test: whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in
the nature of our basic governmental plan. A change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.

Q44: Which aspects of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) were declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court?
A44: The DAP enabled the executive to realign funds from slow moving projects in the
executive department to priority projects. It also utilized funds which came from
unprogrammed funds of the General Appropriations Acts. However, certain aspects of the
Program were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, such as:
1. The use of unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated/unprogrammed
funds under the DAP were not savings, and the use of such appropriations are
unconstitutional.
o Savings refers to an excess in the funding of a project once completed and
should be declared at the end of fiscal year and not halfway thru the year.
2. Cross-border transfers are not allowed. Budget should only be aligned within a
respective branch of government
3. Funding programs that are not covered in the GAA.
4. Use of unprogrammed funds without certification of Treasurer.

However, the Court applied the Operative Fact Doctrine, holding that projects and acts
performed under the DAP should be upheld and recognized.

Q45: What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?

A45: The archipelagic doctrine states that a body of water studded with islands, or the
islands surrounded with water, is viewed as a unity of islands and waters together forming
one integrated unit. This doctrine, as enunciated in the UNCLOS and affirmed in Article I of
the 1987 Constitution, pertains to the sovereign state and does not place within the territory
of LGUs the waters between and surrounding its islands.(Republic v. Provincial
Government of Palawan, G.R. Nos. 170867 & 185941, [December 4, 2018])

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Q46: What is the 9-dash line ruling?

A46: What has become known as the ‘nine-dash line’ first appeared on an official Chinese
map in 1948. In that year, the Ministry of the Interior of the then Republican Government of
China published a “Map Showing the Location of the Various Islands in the South Sea.”
China argues that it has historical rights to the waters encompassed by the nine-dash line.
On the other hand, the Philippines argues both (a) that any rights that China may have had in
the maritime areas of the South China Sea beyond those provided for in the United Nations
Convention on the Laws of the Sea (the Convention) were extinguished by China’s
accession to the Convention and (b) that China never had historic rights in the waters of the
South China Sea.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the Convention supersedes earlier rights and
agreements to the extent of any incompatibility. The Convention is comprehensive in setting
out the nature of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and the rights of other
States within those zones. China’s claim to historic rights is not compatible with these
provisions. The Tribunal concluded that China’s claim to historic rights to the living and
non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’ is incompatible with the Convention to the
extent that it exceeds the limits of China’s maritime zones as provided for by the
Convention. Upon China’s accession to the Convention and its entry into force, any historic
rights that China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash
line’ were superseded, as a matter of law and as between the Philippines and China, by the
limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention.

Q47: Is a statute adjusting the country's archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regimes of nearby territories constitutional?
A47: Yes. Baseline laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III state parties to mark-
out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime
zones and continental shelf. Thus, these laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of
the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights (Magallona v. Ermita, G. R. No. 187167, [August 16, 2011], 671 PHIL
243-294)

Q48: What is a search incidental to a lawful arrest?

A48: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. [Sec. 6,
Rule 126, Rules of Court]

As an incident of an arrest, the premises where the arrest was made can also be searched
without a search warrant. [Nolasco v. Pano. G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985]
An arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was
similarly illegal. [People v. Aruta. G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]

Q49: Is the Aguinaldo Condonation Legal Doctrine Good Law?

A49: NO. The Aguinaldo doctrine states that reelection of a public officer serves as
condonation of a previous misdeed. Under this doctrine, each term is separate from other

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terms, and that reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him for those past acts.

However, this doctrine was overruled in the case of Carpio-Morales v. CA, where the Court
held that there was no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction.
However, abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Q51: What is the difference between the void for vagueness doctrine and the
overbreadth doctrine?
A51: A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In contrast, the
overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot
areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court,
that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines
itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.(Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, [August 8, 2017])

Q52: When is an election candidate, who has lost his Filipino citizenship, required to
have reacquired his former status as a natural-born citizen and be repatriated? What
is the effect of repatriation to one's citizenship?
A52: Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
 a citizen of the Philippines;
 a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
 a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
 able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
 In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist
of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
23 years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,

and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien,
i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof. The aim or purpose of the citizenshp requirement would not be
thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the

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time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. (Frivaldo v.
COMELEC (1996))

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino. (Bengzon III v. HRET(2001))

Q53: Does an impeachment proceeding bar a quo warranto proceeding based on the
rule against forum shopping?
A53: No, a pending impeachment proceeding does not bar the filing of a complaint for quo
warranto. In Republic vs. Sereno, the Court held that Quo Warranto and impeachment are
distinct in terms of jurisdiction, grounds, applicable rules, and limitation. The existence of
the other will not prevent the commencement of the other remedy. Hence, the rule against
forum shopping will not apply because of the difference in cause of action.

Q54: Can the Court rule on whether or not Senate Impeachment Rules were followed?
A54: No. The question of whether or not Senate Impeachment Rules were followed is a
political question. (Corona vs. Senate)

Q55: What is the difference between the presidential communications privilege and the
deliberative process privilege?
A55: The presidential communications privilege covers communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential. It only applies to decision-making of the
President. On the other hand, the Deliberative process privilege covers Advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated. It applies to decision-making of executive officials.
(Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R.
No. 180643, [March 25, 2008])

Q56: How is expropriation justified?

A56: To justify expropriation, it must be for a public purpose and public purpose benefit.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the
necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, SC held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover,
the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of
the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, SC ruled that "necessity within the rule
that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to
the public with the least inconvenience and expense to
the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit."

Q57: Does the holding of Catholic Mass on government property violate the non-
establishment of religion clause?

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A57: No. The holding of Catholic mass is not a case of establishment, but merely
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental
measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these
measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise
of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or
prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. (Re: Tony Q. Valenciano,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC (Resolution), [March 7, 2017])

Q58: What are the requisites for Congress to extend Martial Law?
A58:
1. Congress may only extend Martial Law upon the President's initiative
2. Grounded on achievement of public safety and to fight against rebellion
3. The extension is subject to review by the Supreme Court

Q59: What is the doctrine of operative fact?

A59: The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior
to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the
void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule
that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect (Araullo v. Aquino III).

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Q60: Who are Citizens of the Philppines?

A60: The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Consti Art IV Sec. 1)

Q61: What is Prior Restraint

A61: Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. While any system of prior
restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior
restraints on speech are invalid [Newsounds Broadcasting Network v. Dy, G.R. No. 170270
(2009)].

Q62: Give an instance wherein the Court held that the agreement between two states
are treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
A62: A loan agreement, coupled with an exchange of notes between two governments,
constitutes an executive agreement. The exchange of notes indicates that the two
governments have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to
the Philippines and that these loans were aimed at promoting our country’s economic
stabilization and development efforts [Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919 (2007), where the
Court applied the definition of “treaty” in the VCLT].

In contrast, the contract between North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail) and China
National Machinery & Equipment Corporation (CNMEG, the Chinese contractor) was not
held to be an executive agreement because (1) by the terms of the contract agreement, both
Northrail and CNMEG entered into the contract agreement as entities with personalities
distinct and separate from the Philippine and Chinese governments, respectively; and (2) the
contract agreement itself expressly stated that is to be governed by Philippine law, while as
defined in the VCLT, a treaty or an executive agreement is governed by international law
[China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572 (2012)].

Q63: Can an LGU validly impose a garbage fee?

A63: No. LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and
charges for services rendered. “Charges” refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against
persons or property, while “Fee” means a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the
regulation or inspection of a business or activity. The fee imposed for garbage collections
under an ordinance is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity.

Garbage fee is not a tax. If the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation
is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact
that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. “if the
generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally
revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. The designation given by the
municipal authorities does not decide whether the imposition is properly a license tax or a

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license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may be
apparent from the provisions of the ordinance.

Even if it is not considered a tax, it is still invalid. It must still be reasonably commensurate
to the cost of providing the garbage service. To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must
not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will be
construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the regulation exceeds the cost of
the regulation.

The authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and
transport of nonrecyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary
landfill.
Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection and
segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households,
commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay Materials
Recovery Facility (MRFs).

Furthermore, even if the ordinance is considered to refer only to non recyclable and special
wastes, it will still be invalid if the Court finds that the rates charged by the ordinance are
unjust and inequitable. (Ferrer v Bautista)

Q64: What is the citizenship status of foundlings?

A64: Foundlings are natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. No such intent or language permits discrimination against foundlings. On
the contrary, all three Constitutions (1935, 1973, 1987) guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice [Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 (2016)].

Furthermore, Art. 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for
the right of every child “to acquire a nationality.” The Philippines is obligated under various
conventions, such as the ICCPR, to grant nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended, and Republic Act No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at
least 18 years old.

Q65: Differentiate the suspension found in RA 3019 and Article VI of the Constitution
A65: The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is different from the suspension
prescribed in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). The former is
punitive in nature while the latter is preventive. [Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 118364, (1995)].

Q66: What are the sources of International Law according to Section 38 of the ICJ
Statute?
A66:
1. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
2. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

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3. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

4. subject to the provisions of Article 59, [.e. that only the parties bound by the decision
in any particular case,] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law.

Q67: Cite some exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

A67:
1. Grave abuse of discretion
2. Pure questions of law
3. No other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
4. Administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a
judicial remedy
5. Administrative agency is in estoppel

Q68: Differentiate quasi- judicial from quasi- legislative rule-making power in terms of
requirements of notice and hearing.
A68:
Quasi-legislative - Where an agency fixes rates which are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the country; prior notice and hearing are NOT a requirement of
due process.
Quasi-judicial - Where the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, predicated
upon a finding of fact; prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity

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