Due Process

1. Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940
Doctrine: Cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings
(1994 Bar)
1. Right to a hearing which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must be supported by evidence;
4. Such evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least
contained in the record, and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy in arriving at a decision;
7. The board or body should render decision in such a manner that parties can know the
various issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered. (Ang Tibay v. CIR,
G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940)
Is there a need for a new trial on the Decision arrived at by the CIR finding that
the 89 laborers represented by Ang Tibay was excluded due to their union
affiliation; and that this Decision was rendered without due process considering
that there was no evidence relied upon in such Decision?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that it re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had
before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and it found no substantial evidence that
the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.

There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.)
This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City
of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.
G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render
final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is
no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe

here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not
satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a
conclusion of law.

Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth hereinabove. So ordered.
2. Ichong vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic
Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: it denies to
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law;
Issue:
Does the Act deny to alien resident the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without process of law?
Ruling:
The equal protection clause limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. Does the law deny the equal
protection of the laws?
No, there is no denial of equal protection of the laws. There is a valid legislative
classification between the alien and nationals as retail traders.
a. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted
country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of
gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but
he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country
where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from
taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.

b. The alien retailer in this country never really makes a genuine contribution to
national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help
the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this
country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to
continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and
all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the
classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to
declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can
not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by
the Constitution.
b. Is the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause?
No. Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and
classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the
laws clause.
The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of
the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.
c. What is the reasonable basis used by the Legislature in making the
classification in this case?
In this case, the classification is based on citizenship.
Ichong Case:
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so.
As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic
consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily
contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so
far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national
owes to the land.
These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many
occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency.
The due process clause limitation
1. Lawful purpose: For public purpose.
2. Reasonableness: The law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
subject sought to be attained. . . . .

If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court
functus officio. . . .
Ichong’s argument:
Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable.
No, it is not unreasonable. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring
about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control
and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.)
.
3. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
Doctrine:
Facts:
Restituto Ynot challenges the constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A.
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

Issue: Is the law unconstitutional for depriving owners of carabaos their right to
be heard before their carabaos are confiscated and thus violative of the due
process clause?
Ruling:
Ynot case:
Yes.
1. While conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject
as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it
complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method.

2. Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of
the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The Court does not see how the
prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another.

3. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and

the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

4. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which
 was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court.

5. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of

the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished.

6. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the

officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

4. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818,

December 18, 1989
Issue: Does the rate fixing power of the NTC properly exercised and does not
violate procedural nor substantive due process?
Ruling:
NTC, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature.
This postulate is bereft of merit.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, NTC has no authority to make such
order without first giving PhilComsat a hearing, whether the order be temporary
or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present
case.

While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other
sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC
should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or
information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even
if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a
specified date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it
has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case.
An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary
period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates
are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during
the prescribed period.
In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by
the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced
rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its
property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on
substantive due process.

5. Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993
Issue:
Should the expelled students be readmitted on the ground that the school denied
them due process in the investigation regarding their participation in the hazing
that resulted in the death of one of the students?
Ruling:
No, the Court held that they should not be readmitted and thus the order of the
judge for their readmission is reversed.
It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to
expel them was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due
process.
We are constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been
violated.
The minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
"(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case."

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which
became the basis of petitioners’ February 14, 1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process.
An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students’ participation in
a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.

As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases of a similar nature, due

process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice.
Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the
precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the
students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School Catalogue
shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the
subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem
this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.
6. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994
Issue: Was PhilPhos denied due process of law in the issuance of an order by the
Mediatior Arbiter that included in its membership the professional/technical and
confidential employee?
Ruling:
No, Philiphos was not denied due process of law.
PHILPHOS claims that it was denied due process when respondent Mediator-
Arbiter granted the amended petition of respondent PMPI without according
PHILPHOS a new opportunity to be heard.

We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does here.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Where, as in the instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision
on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient
compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present its side.
Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront
and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it didnot; instead, it opted to
submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

7. Aniag vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994

Issue:
Was there a violation of Congressman Aniag’s constitutional right to due process
when he was automatically made as a respondent, along with Arellano, without
affording him the right to preliminary investigation?
Ruling:

Aniag’s right to due process

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he
was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading
to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of
explanation regarding the incident.This does not satisfy the requirement of due
process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense.
Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural
rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a
statute or a rule of court. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts
show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a
preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City
Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation is violative of due process which requires that the procedure
established by law should be obeyed.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over
to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some
other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right . . . .
[T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps,
to hardened criminals is a valuable right.

To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him

of the full measure of his right to due process.

Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of

Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation.
8. Alonte vs. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998
Issue: Was there a violation of due process on the part of Judge Maximo
Savellano when he based his Decision finding Alonte and company guilty of rape
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the affidavit of desistance by the
complainant?
Ruling:
Yes, there was a violation of due process.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable.
In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present
his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.

"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution
or defense.

WAS THERE A WAIVER ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED OF THEIR RIGHT TO

DUE PROCESS? NONE.
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that -
"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November
1997 with their respective counsel of choice.
None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim
Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's
clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits - one
detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the
opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived.
The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a
personal one and may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) –
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be
positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."16 Mere silence of the
holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what
otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not
been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor
been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the
opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
Judge for the purpose;19 and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in
the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial.
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for
not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the
first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and
invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. This case,
in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings.

9. Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573

Issue: Was the dismissal by Riviera of the Agabons in compliance with due
process of law?
Ruling:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and
(2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the
employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment
written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should
be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to
work for another company.
Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead
argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been
useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private
respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice
requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable
for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be
upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee.
This became known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule.
. Due process is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the
executive and judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.

Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two
aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment
termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the
violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations
Commission.
10. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti- Terrorism Council,
632 SCRA 146
Doctrine:
A law is vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its common meaning and differ as to its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution because:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and
2. It leaves law enforcers an unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions. (People
v. de la Piedra, G.R. No. 128777, January 24, 2001)
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine can only be invoked against that species of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560,
November 19, 2001)

Facial Challenge As applied challenge

An examination of the entire law, Considers only extant facts affecting real
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only litigants
on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.
Is facial challenge to a penal statute allowed?
A: NO.
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

Facial challenges are not allowed in penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech. (KMU v. Ermita, G.R. No. 17855, October 5, 2010)
Facts:
Southern Hemisphere et al. assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that
terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace"
and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited
acts.
Issue:
Whether RA 9372 may be challenged in its face on the ground that the terms of
the law are vague leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the prohibited acts
Ruling:
No.
SUMMARY OF THE RULING
ON PENAL STATUTES: NOT ALLOWED
• The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

• The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the

aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged.
 • On the other hand, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct.
In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

****
• [T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged.

Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial

challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution
would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge
in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised.

A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and

speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties
who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a
facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s
ability to deal with crime.
ON WHAT SPECIFIC CASES MAY OVERBREADTH BE ALLOWED
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least
two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, and that

1. claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving

statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.

2. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth

challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression.
WHY IS RA 9372 UNASSAILABLE ON ITS FACE?
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA
9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them