PECHO v.
PEOPLE other crime which is necessarily included in
DOCTRINE: ​What determines the real nature
and cause of accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law.
TICKLER: Inasal
FACTS: ​The Court held that although the
petitioner could not be convicted of the crime
charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended — because the said
section penalizes only consummated offenses
and the offense charged in this case was not
consummated — he could, nevertheless, be
convicted of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, which is necessarily
included in the crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that after having been acquitted of
the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a
special law, he could not be convicted anymore
of attempted estafa through falsification of
official and commercial documents, an offense
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, a
general law; otherwise, the constitutional
provision on double jeopardy would be violated.
In other words, his acquittal of the crime
charged precludes conviction for the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
official and commercial documents, because
both offenses arose from the same overt act as
alleged in the information in Criminal Case No.
14844.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s right to
be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him was violated when the
Court said that he may be convicted of some
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
the crime charged, rather than the one which
was presented in the information.
HELD: No. Variance Doctrine
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision of
14 November 1994 is SET ASIDE, and another
is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged
decision of 28 June 1993 and resolution of 12
August 1993 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 14844 and ACQUITTING petitioner
ODON PECHO of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents, without, however,
prejudice to any appropriate administrative
action which his office may take against him as
may be warranted by the circumstances in this
case.
DETAILS
SOLGEN: ​T​he rule on double jeopardy
cannot be successfully invoked in this case
considering that no new information for
estafa through falsification of public
document was filed against the petitioner;
only one information was filed against him
and his co-accused
For double jeopardy to exist, there must be
such new information and the accused must
be able to show that :
(1) he has been previously brought to trial, (2),
in a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) upon a
valid complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance, (4) for the same offense or an
attempt to or frustration thereof as that charged
in the new information, and that (5) the case has
been dismissed or terminated without his
consent or after he had pleaded to the
information but before judgment was rendered.
The law and a host of the Court’s ruling
declare that circumstantial evidence is
1
sufficient for conviction if the following
conditions concur:
(1) There is more that one circumstances;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt (Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of
Court).
➢ In this case, it should be stressed that the
inference that petitioner falsified
documents appears to be based on
another inference, i.e., that he was in
possession of the same because he
accompanied his co-accused Catre in the
transactions. However, other than
accompanying Catre, there is no
evidence on record that petitioner had
custody of the falsified documents.
➢ As to the conspiracy angle, there is
likewise no showing that petitioner
interceded for Catre. In fact, it was Catre
who talked to Calica.
➢ The elements of conspiracy, like the
physical acts constituting the crime
itself, must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. (People v. Manuel,
234 SCRA 532). To hold an accused
guilty as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, it must be shown that he
performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the conspiracy. (People v.
Roxa), In this regard, it is respectfully
submitted that there is no overt act
conclusively attributable to petitioner
which would pin him down as a
co-conspirator.
➢ SOLGEN = RECOMMENDED
ACQUITTAL In their respective
memoranda, the petitioner and the
Office of the Solicitor General are one
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
in asserting that the petitioner could
not be convicted based entirely on
circumstantial evidence because of the
failure of the prosecution to satisfy
the requisites set forth in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court​, There
is no evidence that the petitioner had a
hand in the processing of the import
entry declaration for the release of the
shipment from the Bureau of Customs
or was instrumental in the approval of
the import entry declaration.
➢ As to the second issue, the Office of the
Solicitor General rejects the theory of
the petitioner and submits that the
information in this case contains the
essential ingredients of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial
documents; therefore, assuming there is
sufficient evidence, the petitioner could
be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents
without violating Section 14(2), Article
III of the Constitution on the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
On the assumption that the prosecution’s
evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for
conviction for the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents, there is absolutely no
merit in the petitioner’s claim that he could not
be convicted of the said crime without offending
his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
OBJECTIVES OF THE SAID RIGHT
First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for
2
protection against a further ‘prosecution for the
same cause; and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if
one should be had ​(United States v.
Cruikshank).
➢ In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated; not
conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent:
these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff or defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint
must contain a specific allegation of
every fact and circumstance necessary
to constitute the crime charged.
Rules of Court
➢ What determines the real nature and
cause of accusation against an accused
is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the
caption or preamble of the information
or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law.
➢ An incorrect caption is not a fatal
mistake.
➢ It follows then that an accused may be
convicted of a crime which, although
not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter. Section 4, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance
between allegation and proof. — When
there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
offense proved included in that which is
charged, or of the offense charged
included in that which is proved.
SEC 5. W ​ hen an offense includes or is
included in another. – An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter.
We held that the information in this case "can
also be considered as charging two offenses: the
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and
the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial
documents," and since the petitioner failed to
object before trial to such duplicity, he could be
validly convicted of both or either of the
offenses charged and proved.
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we based
the conviction of the petitioner on conspiracy.
The evidence for the prosecution, as admitted
by the respondent, only showed that it was
Catre who possessed the falsified documents,
contracted the services of Calica, and
delivered the documents to the latter for
processing. In the absence of satisfactory
explanation, Catre, being the one in
possession of the forged documents, is
presumed to be the forger.
➢ Catre, however, could not provide the
explanation because only the petitioner
was tried. The information states that his
address is "unknown," and the record
does not show that a warrant for his
arrest was issued.
➢ The only warrant of arrest that was
issued was that for the petitioner.
Assuming that such evidence and the
3
 others adduced by the prosecution are to
be admitted to prove the commission of
the crime, a prima facie case enough to
prove the guilt of Catre with moral
certainty was duly established against
Catre as a principal.
➢ Accordingly, if conspiracy were
proven, the petitioner would be equally
guilty of the offense proved. For, in a
conspiracy, every act of one of the
conspirators in furtherance of a common
design or purpose of such a conspiracy
is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them.
➢ ART. 8, RPC - ​There is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.
○ Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary. Conspiracy may
be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a
joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and
community of interest. It is,
however, settled that the same
degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is
likewise required to support a
finding of conspiracy. In other
words, conspiracy must be
shown to exist as clearly and as
convincingly as the commission
of the offense itself in order to
uphold the fundamental
principle that no one shall be
found guilty of a crime except
upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
➢ It is also essential for one to be a party
to a conspiracy as to be liable for the
acts of the others that there be
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design.
○ Except when he is the
mastermind in a conspiracy, it is
necessary that a conspirator
should have performed some
overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution in the execution of
the crime planned to be
committed. 19 The overt act
may consist of active
participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself,
or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators
by being present at the
commission of the crime or by
exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators.
➢ Since conspiracy must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
then the next inquiry would be
whether the prosecution was able to
adduce such proof against the
petitioner. It is in this respect that we
agree with the People and the
petitioner that the prosecution had
only circumstantial evidence against
the petitioner.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
➢ a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proven
must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty.
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In the instant case, all that the prosecution was
able to prove insofar as the petitioner is
concerned is that he and co-accused Catre are
from Surigao del Norte; that he accompanied
Catre in contracting the services of customs
broker Constantino Calica; and that he also was
with Catre when the latter went with Dennis
Calica, son of Constantino Calica, to the Manila
International Container Port. In all these
instances, however, it was Catre who transacted
the business and did all the talking. As a matter
of fact, the petitioner was not even introduced to
Calica. As recapitulated by the Office of the
Solicitor General in its Memorandum.
[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded
for Catre. Prosecution witness Calica testified
that it was Catre and not petitioner, who
introduced themselves as agents of Eversun
Commercial Trading. He also testified that it
was Catre who did all the talking and directly
transacted with him (Calica) regarding the terms
and conditions of the particular engagement and
it was also Catre, and not petitioner, who
actually delivered the documents to him (tsn,
August 26, 1991). There is no evidence that
petitioner had a hand in the processing of the
import entry declaration for the release of the
shipment from the Bureau of Customs. There is
also no evidence that petitioner was instrumental
in the approval of the import entry declaration.
In short, there is no showing that petitioner
performed an overt act in furtherance of alleged
conspiracy.
The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed
to prove that the petitioner (1) personally
represented himself as an agent of Eversun
Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of
any of the public and commercial documents in
question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of
all or some of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy
between the petitioner and Catre to commit the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents. Neither is
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
there evidence of petitioner’s active participation
in the commission of the crime. The concordant
combination and cumulative effect of the acts of
the petitioner as proven by the prosecution’s
evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There
is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty can be overthrown only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioner
must then be acquitted even though his
innocence may be doubted.
PEOPLE v. QUITLONG
DOCTRINE: Article III, Section 14, of the
1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that
no person shall be held answerable for a
criminal offense without due process of law and
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall first be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The right to be
informed of any such indictment is likewise
explicit in procedural rules.
An information, in order to ensure that the
constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of his
accusation is not violated, must state the name of
the accused; the designation given to the offense
by the statute; a statement of the acts or
omissions so complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time and date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense has
been committed
TICKLER: ​ fishball
FACTS:
At around six o'clock in the evening of 20
October 1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come
from work as a dispatcher of passenger jeepneys
plying the Baguio City-Loakan route, repaired to
a nearby game parlor where he saw 19-year-old
University of Baguio medical technology
student Jonathan Calpito playing billiards with
5
Jonathan Gosil. Adjaro was Calpito's neighbor
and barkada (gangmate) in Loakan. At past eight
o'clock, Calpito decided that it was time to go
home. Since at that hour there were no longer
passenger jeepneys bound for Loakan, the three
friends decided to walk down to Harrison Road
behind the Melvin Jones grandstand to grab a
taxicab. The area was well-lighted. Wanting to
partake of some "fishballs, Calpito and Gosil
approached a fishball vendor about three to four
meters away. The two returned with three sticks
of fishballs worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito
counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he saw
that he had only been handed back thirty five
pesos. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the
fishball vendor would not admit that he had
short-changed Calpito.
Herbert Soriano, a civil engineer driving a
passenger-type jeep on his way to Loakan from
the Dominican Hill, was seen passing by.
Adjaro, his neighbor, hailed him. Soriano
positioned his jeep around four or five meters
from where Gosil and Calpito were still having
an argument with the fishball vendor. Soriano
called out to the two to board the jeep but they
ignored him. Moments later, Soriano saw eight
men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito from the
direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep.
Some of the men later backed out but four of
them pursued Calpito who, meanwhile, had
started to retreat from the group. The four men,
however, succeeded in cornering Calpito.
Soriano saw Calpito fall to the ground and
thought that the latter had just been weakened by
the men's punches but, when Calpito was carried
on board his jeep, Soriano realized that Calpito
had been stabbed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-inclusion of
conspiracy in the amended and original
informations constitute a violation of the
accused’s right to information and cause of
accusation
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
HELD: Yes An information, in order to
ensure that the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of his accusation is not violated, must
state the name of the accused; the designation
given to the offense by the statute; a
statement of the acts or omissions so
complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate
time and date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense has
been committed.
NOTE: the petitioners were said to be fortunate
in this case, because conspiracy may still be
proven from the acts and circumstances
surrounding the accused.
DETAILS
➢ Adjaro saw no less than eight men
approach and aggressively confront
Calpito and Gosil. Seeing that his
friends were outnumbered, Adjaro
shouted at Calpito and Gosil to run
posthaste. Adjaro promptly boarded
Soriano's jeep. From where he sat,
Adjaro could see appellant Emilio
Senoto embracing Calpito from behind
and appellants Salvador Quitlong and
Ronnie Quitlong holding Calpito's right
hand and left hand, respectively. Calpito
struggled unsuccessfully to free himself.
Suddenly, appellant Ronnie Quitlong
stabbed Calpito at the left side of the
body just below the nipple. Once the
three men had released their hold on
Calpito, the latter fell to the ground.
Despite the condition that Calpito was
already in, his assailants still went on
hitting him with their feet.
➢ Police officers Jerry Patacsil, Arthur
Viado and Nito Revivis were on foot
patrol that evening. Attracted by the
commotion along Harrison Road, the
police officers hurriedly proceeded to
the brightly-lighted place and saw
6
 Calpito lying on the ground. Three of
the malefactors started to flee upon
seeing the approaching police officers
but the rest kept on with their attack on
Calpito. Patacsil drew out his service
firearm and told the attackers to freeze.
Seeing that the victim had bloodstains
on his left chest, Patacsil advised the
victim's companions to rush him to the
hospital. Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro took
Calpito to the Baguio General Hospital
on board Soriano's Jeep. ​Calpito died
the same night.
➢ The defense gave no alibi and admitted
the presence of accused-appellants at the
vicinity of the crime scene; however, it
interposed denial by appellants of any
participation in the commission of the
crime.
APPELLANTS
1. Appellant Emilio Senoto, Jr., a taxicab
driver, testified that out of curiosity,
after parking his cab to buy some
cigarettes and getting attracted by the
commotion, went near the scene and
saw the victim lying on the ground
beside a cart. He was about to leave the
place when several policemen arrived
and arrested him.
2. Appellant Salvador Quitlong, a food
vendor at the Burnham Park and father
of five children, denied having had any
participation in the stabbing incident nor
having been acquainted with Jesus
Mendoza. He admitted, however, that on
the night in question when he was
selling "fishballs" at the park, around
eighty meters away from where
Mendoza was selling his wares, the
latter's daughter, who was a classmate of
his own daughter, asked for help yelling
that her father was in trouble. He rushed
over to Mendoza's place (puesto) but
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
barely in time to witness the stabbing of
Calpito by Mendoza.
3. Appellant Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador
Quitlong's 26-year-old younger brother,
was also a sidewalk vendor at the
waiting shed along Harrison Road. He
learned of the trouble Mendoza got
himself into when the latter's daughter
summoned for help. When he and his
brother responded, Mendoza had by
then already stabbed Calpito.
➢ Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia Cultura,
both sidewalk vendors, corroborated the
story of the Quitlong brothers.
According to Nonita, it was Mendoza
who stabbed Calpito. She witnessed the
incident from a distance of ten meters
away. Nonita explained that she did not
immediately reveal what she saw to the
authorities because of shock. Lydia
Cultura, on her part, said that she saw
Jesus Mendoza in the "rumble" with five
or six men who had come from the
Genesis Folkden. She saw Mendoza
embrace and stab the man in white
t-shirt. Nonita and Alma Balubar
followed appellants to the police station
but did not tell the police what she knew
because she was busy attending to the
crying pregnant wife of appellant
Ronnie Quitlong.
ON CONSPIRACY
➢ The question is whether or not the
herein three accused participated in, and
may be held guilty as co-principals by
reason of conspiracy for, the fatal
stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there
being no dispute that the latter died due
to the solitary stab inflicted on him.
➢ There was a lapse committed by the
prosecution in drafting the indictment
since the original and amended
informations failed to allege conspiracy.
➢ This could have been timely cured if
obeisance had been observed of the
7
 admonition, often given, that the
prosecution should not take the
arraignment stage for granted but,
instead, treat the notice thereof as a
reminder to review the case and
determine if the complaint or
information is in due form and the
allegations therein contained are
sufficient vis-à-vis the law involved and
the evidence on hand.
➢ It is fortunate that in the case at bench
conspiracy may readily be inferred from
the way the allegation of abuse of
superior strength has been phrased, to
wit: ". . . the above-named accused,
being then armed with a knife, with
intent to kill . . . and taking advantage of
their numerical superiority and
combined strength did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack assault and stab JONATHAN
CALPITO y CASTRO . . . ."
BALMADRDID v. SANDIGANBAYAN - the
trial court has opined that "conspiracy may be
deemed adequately alleged if the averments in
the Information logically convey that several
persons (have been) animated with the single
purpose of committing the offense charged and
that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of
that purpose."
➢ no direct proof is essential and that it
suffices that the existence of a common
design to commit the offense charged is
shown by the acts of the malefactors and
attendant circumstances.
➢ In the case on hand, it bears repeating
that Ronnie Quitlong and Salvador
Quitlong were admittedly responding to
Jesus Mendoza's call for help through
the latter's daughter. They must have,
therefore, been disposed, out of empathy
with a fellow sidewalk vendor, to lend
Mendoza all the assistance the latter
needed under the circumstances. They
were joined, according to prosecution
witnesses Lito Adjaro and Herbert
Soriano, by no less than six others,
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
including Emilio Senoto, Jr. They came
upon Mendoza engaged in a heated
altercation with the victim Calpito.
When they reached Calpito, they pushed
him and started beating him up and his
companion Jonathan Gosil. Four to five
men manhandled Calpito who kept on
retreating and even went around
Soriano's parked jeep until he was
cornered. Senoto then held Calpito's
body from behind; Ronnie, his left hand;
and Salvador, his right hand, and they
mauled him. Calpito struggled to free
himself but that proved futile and,
instead, Ronnie stabbed him once. It
was only then that he was released and
when he fell down on his back, his
attackers still kicked him. Only the
arrival of some policemen made some of
the assailants stop and run away.
However, Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto,
kept on kicking the victim and they were
restrained and arrested.
➢ ​Given this, they may be held liable as
co - principals
NOTE: evidence of conspiracy is not enough
for an accused to bear and to respond to all its
grave legal consequences; it is equally essential
that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing
substantive and procedural requirements.
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution,
in particular, mandates that no person shall be
held answerable for a criminal offense without
due process of law and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall first be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. The right to be informed of any such
indictment is likewise explicit in procedural
rules.
WHAT AN INFORMATION SHOULD
CONTAIN
8
 ➢ An information, in order to ensure
that the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of his accusation is not
violated, must state the name of the
accused; the designation given to the
offense by the statute; a statement of
the acts or omissions so complained of
as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the
approximate time and date of the
commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense has been
committed.
➢ In embodying the essential elements of
the crime charged, the information must
set forth the facts and circumstances that
have a bearing on the culpability and
liability of the accused so that the
accused can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two
or more accused persons is that of
conspiracy.
➢ Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary
recital of fact which, if not excepted
from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent
proof, an allegation, however, of
conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the
act of another or others, is indispensable
in order to hold such person, regardless
of the nature and extent of his own
participation, equally guilty with the
other or others in the commission of the
crime.
➢ Where conspiracy exists and can rightly
be appreciated, the individual acts done
to perpetrate the felony becomes of
secondary importance, the act of one
being imputable to all the others.
➢ Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but
also for the acts of his co-accused as
well.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course,
aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that
each of the parties therein have performed,
the evidence proving the common design or
the facts connecting all the accused with one
another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither
is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the
same degree of particularity required in
describing a substantive offense.
➢ It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of the facts
relied upon to be constitutive of
the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the
case will admit, in a manner that
can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is
intended, and with such
precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction
to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.
➢ Generally, an indictment may be
held sufficient "if it follows the
words of the statute and
reasonably informs the accused
of the character of the offense
he is charged with conspiring to
commit, or, following the
language of the statute, contains
a sufficient statement of an
overt act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, or alleges both
the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the
language of the respective
statutes defining them."
The information charging herein appellants
for the death of Jonathan Calpito, as
amended, has but simply stated:
9
That on or about the 20th day of October
1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then
armed with a knife, with intent to kill and
with treachery and taking advantage of their
numerical superiority and combined strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab
JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO
suddenly and unexpectedly, without any
warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a
stab wound at the left thorax at the level of
the 7th rib, left medclavicular line,
penetrating the pereduum and left ventricle
causing left remothones of 700 cc and
hemoperecuduum of 250 cc, which directly
caused his death.
SC: ​The opinion of the trial court to the effect
that conspiracy may be inferred from the
allegation of abuse of superior strength and with
the aid of armed men is difficult to accept.
Conspiracy arises when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.
➢ Verily, the information must state that
the accused have confederated to
commit the crime or that there has been
a community of design, a unity of
purpose or an agreement to commit the
felony among the accused. Such an
allegation, in the absence of the usual
usage of the words "conspired" or
"confederated" or the phrase "acting in
conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive
acts constituting conspiracy.
➢ the agreement to commit the crime, the
unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be
conveyed such as either by the use of
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
the term "conspire" or its derivatives and
synonyms or by allegations of basic
facts constituting the conspiracy.
➢ ​Conspiracy must be alleged, not just
inferred, in the information on which
basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be
confused with or likened to the
adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the
evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof
but may be inferred from shown acts
and conduct of the accused.
CREDIBILITY
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and
proved as heretofore explained, an accused can
only be made liable for the acts committed by
him alone and this criminal responsibility is
individual and not collective.
And so it is that it must be so held in this case.
The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the
defense on who stabbed the victim is an issue
that ultimately and unavoidably goes into the
question of whom to believe among the
witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a
determination that is concededly best left to the
trial court with its unique position of having
been enabled to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the deportment of
witnesses on the stand.
The Court is not, at this time and in this
instance, disposed to deviate from the foregoing
rule. In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the
eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has
steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his
story on the commission of the crime. A witness
who testifies in a categorical, straightforward
and spontaneous manner, as well as remains
consistent on cross and rebuttal examination, is
10
not likely to be an incredible witness. Secondly,
the defense has failed to establish any ill motive
on the part of Adjaro that would have prompted
him to testify wrongly against appellants. Where
there is no evidence to indicate that the
prosecution witness has been actuated by any
improper motive, it would be hard to reject the
supposition that a person will not prevaricate
and cause damnation to one who has brought
him no harm. 30 Finally, Herbert Soriano and
the police, who have testified seeing the already
wounded Calpito lying on the ground and still
being attacked, both corroborate Adjaro's
positive identification of appellants as the
persons who did maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open
court to be the persons who ganged up on
Calpito, Adjaro testified on their respective
participations in the commission of the crime;
thus:
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by
his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the
latter's death.
➢ Appellants Salvador Quitlong and
Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the
hands of Calpito at the precise time that
Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of
executing his criminal intent.
Simultaneity, however, would not itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will or
the unity of action and purpose that
could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more
individuals; indeed, from all
indications, the incident would appear to
have occurred at the spur of moment.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and
Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be
held to be mere accomplices
conformably with Article 18 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed was qualified by abuse of
superiority.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
While superiority in number would not per
se mean superiority in strength, enough proof
was adduced, however, to show that the
attackers had cooperated in such a way as to
secure advantage of their superiority in
strength certainly out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person
attacked.
Treachery may not be here considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance although it
might have ensured the commission of the
crime. In order that treachery may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance, there must
be proof that the accused has consciously
adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself, i.e., appellant Ronnie Quitlong in this
case. No such proof has been adequately
shown.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion
temporal maximum to death. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances to
appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant
Ronnie Quitlong, as principal, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indeterminate
penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as minimum to forty (40) years of
reclusion perpetua, as maximum, has been
imposed by the trial court on the premise that
reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty. In the
Court's Resolution of 09 January 1995,
clarifying its decision 38 in People vs. Lucas, 39
the Court has said that —
. . . although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has
fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years, there was no clear legislative intent to
alter its original classification as an indivisible
penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible
penalty. 40
The two accomplices, appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be subject
to the imposition of the penalty next lower in
11
degree than reclusion temporal maximum to
death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period. Absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the penalty that may
be imposed is reclusion temporal minimum.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
them, each may be held to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of anywhere from prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, as the minimum
penalty, to anywhere within the range of
reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum
penalty.
The trial court correctly imposed the payment of
a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor of the
heirs of the victim. The consequential (actual)
damages in the amount of P35,700.00 not having
been substantiated, except for the amount
P12,000.00 paid to the memorial chapel, is
disallowed. The award of moral damages
recoverable under Article 2219 (1), in relation to
Article 2206, of the Civil Code is reduced from
P100,000.00 to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is
found guilty of the crime of murder for the
killing of Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to
reimburse them the actual damages of
P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of
P50,000.00. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and
Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as
accomplices in the commission of the crime, and
each shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of
nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor minimum period, as minimum penalty, to
thirteen (13) years and nine (9) months and ten
(10) days of reclusion temporal minimum
period, as maximum penalty. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are
also hereby held solidarily liable with appellant
Ronnie Quitlong in the payment of the damages
hereinabove mentioned. Costs against
appellants.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
PEOPLE v. GALLARDE - SEE SECTION 17
DISCUSSION
PEOPLE v. DADULLA
A rapacious father who vented his lust on his
own daughter without any qualms is allowed
to suffer the lesser penalty because of the
failure of the criminal information to aver his
relationship with the victim. Even so, the
Court condemns his most despicable crime.
DOCTRINE: it is notable that the RTC
outrightly concluded that the crime committed
on January 22, 1998 constituted attempted rape,
after quoting the testimony of AAA and BBB. It
offered no analysis or discussion of why the
accused was criminally liable for attempted rape.
The omission contravened Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution, as reiterated in Section
1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which
enjoined that decisions should state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are
based.
TICKLER:
FACTS: ​In the evening of January 15, 1998,
AAA, then sleeping in the bedroom that she and
her five younger siblings shared with their
father, was roused from sleep by someone
undressing her. It was her father. AAA resisted,
but the accused, wielding a bladed weapon,
threatened to kill her if she shouted. The accused
then forcibly kissed her on the lips, mashed her
breasts, touched her private parts, and had carnal
knowledge of her. After her ordeal, she put on
her garments and just cried. She recalled that her
father had first sexually abused her on February
14, 1992.
12
On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused
from sleep by her father touching her body.
Noticing that her shorts were already unzipped
and unbuttoned, she zipped and buttoned them
up and covered herself with a blanket. But her
father pulled the blanket away and tried to unzip
her shorts. However, she was able to go under
the wooden bed to evade him. She resisted his
attempts to pull her out from under the bed by
firmly holding on to the bed. She told him that
she would not get out from under the bed
because what he was doing to her was bad.
Upon hearing her, he stopped and withdrew,
telling her to leave the house. He then went to
sleep. In the meanwhile, BBB, AAA’s younger
sister, was awakened by what she thought was
an argument between her father and AAA. She
heard him tell AAA: Tumigil ka na nang
kaiiyak, wala ka nang pakinabang. AAA just
cried under the bed and did not say anything.
BBB soon fell asleep,12 but AAA could not
sleep and remained under the bed until morning
when the accused left to ply his jeepney route.
Upon waking up, BBB saw her father as he was
about to leave the house. She heard him telling
AAA to leave the house.14 As soon as he had
left, BBB approached the crying AAA and asked
what had happened to her. AAA related her
ordeal and pleaded with BBB to help her.15
Together, they went to their uncle, CCC, to
report the incident. CCC queried AAA whether
she wanted her father to be thrown in jail, and
she replied in the affirmative. Thus, CCC
requested his wife to accompany AAA to the
barangay to file a complaint. Later, AAA and
CCC’s wife went to Camp Crame for the
physical and genital examinations, which
established that AAA had a deep healed
hymenal laceration at 5:00 o’clock position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of the
trial court in explaining why the accused was
convicted of the crime of attempted rape
constitute a violation of the accused’s eright
to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
HELD: YES. see doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on
January 20, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01021 is affirmed in all respects, subject to the
modification that the civil liabilities include
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for the rape
(Criminal Case No. 98-2034-MK), and
₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages for the acts of
lasciviousness (Criminal Case No.
98-2035-MK).
DETAILS
➢ The accused contended that the trial
court erred in imposing the death
penalty in criminal case no. 98-2304
despite that the accused was not
properly informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him
which is in violation of his
constitutional right.
➢ The CA held that the correct penalty in
Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK was
reclusion perpetua because the accused
was liable only for simple rape by virtue
of the information not alleging any
qualifying circumstances; and that in
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the
accused was guilty only of acts of
lasciviousness, not attempted rape,
because his act of opening the zipper
and buttons of AAA’s shorts, touching
her, and pulling her from under the bed
constituted only acts of lasciviousness.
➢ The SC agreed with the CA.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
➢ Failure to allege the qualifying
circumstance of relationship in the
information in Criminal Case No.
98-2304-MK precluded a finding of
13
 qualified rape against the accused.
Section 8,19 Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court has expressly required that
qualifying and aggravating
circumstances be specifically alleged in
the information. Due to such
requirement being pro reo, the Court has
authorized its retroactive application in
favor of even those charged with
felonies committed prior to December 1,
2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of
the 2000 revision of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure that embodied the
requirement).
➢ The term "aggravating circumstance" is
strictly construed when the appreciation
of the modifying circumstance can lead
to the imposition of the maximum
penalty of death.
○ Consequently, the qualifying
circumstance of relationship,
even if established during trial,
could not affect the criminal
penalty of the accused by virtue
of its non-allegation in the
information. The accused could
not be convicted of the graver
offense of qualified rape,
although proven, because
relationship was neither alleged
nor necessarily included in the
information. Accordingly, the
accused was properly convicted
by the CA for simple rape and
justly punished with reclusion
perpetua.
➢ it is notable that the RTC outrightly
concluded that the crime committed
on January 22, 1998 constituted
attempted rape, after quoting the
testimony of AAA and BBB. It offered
no analysis or discussion of why the
accused was criminally liable for
attempted rape. The omission
contravened Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution, as reiterated in
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, which enjoined that decisions
should state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are
based.
SECTION 1, RULE 120
Judgment; definition and form​. – Judgment is
the adjudication by the court that the accused is
guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and
the imposition on him of the proper penalty and
civil liability, if any. It must be written in the
official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and
shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of
the facts and the law upon which it is based.
➢ Nonetheless, the omission did
not invalidate or render
ineffectual the conviction, for
the CA in due course reformed
the RTC’s error. In its
disquisition on why the accused
should be held liable for acts of
lasciviousness, instead of
attempted rape, the CA
explained the true nature of the
crime of the accused thus:
➢ ​CA: ​We likewise agree with
accused-appellant that the court
a quo erred in convicting him of
attempted rape in Criminal Case
No. 98-2305-MK. In connection
with the incident that transpired
on January 22, 1998, Liza
testified as follows:
CRIMINAL LAW DISCUSSIONS
➢ The act of accused-appellant in opening
the zipper and buttons of the shorts of
Liza, touching her and pulling her when
she hid under the bed showed that he
employed force on Liza and was
motivated by lewd designs.
14
 ➢ The word "lewd" is defined as obscene,
lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It
signifies that form of immorality which
has relation to moral impurity; or that
which is carried in a wanton manner.
➢ Thus, the crime committed by
accused-appellant is merely acts of
lasciviousness, which is included in
rape. The elements of the crime of acts
of lasciviousness are: (1) that the
offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is
done: (a) by using force and
intimidation, or (b) when the offended
party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended
party is under 12 years of age; and (3)
that the offended party is another person
of either sex.26
People v. Collado - the difference between
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness lies in
the intent of the perpetrator as deduced from his
external acts. The intent referred to is the intent
to lie with a woman
➢ Attempted rape is committed when the
"touching" of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate;
otherwise, there can only be acts of
lasciviousness
➢ Thus, the accused’s act of opening the
zipper and buttons of AAA’s shorts,
touching her, and trying to pull her from
under the bed manifested lewd designs,
not intent to lie with her. The evidence
to prove that a definite intent to lie with
AAA motivated the accused was plainly
wanting, therefore, rendering him guilty
only of acts of lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK.
CIVIL LIABILITY MUST BE MODIFIED
Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,32 the
attendance of any aggravating circumstance
(generic, qualifying, or attendant) entitles the
offended party to recover exemplary damages.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
Here, the relationship was the aggravating
circumstance attendant in both cases. We need
to award ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in
rape and of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages in
acts of lasciviousness.
Although, as earlier mentioned, an
aggravating circumstance not specifically
alleged in the information (albeit established
at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the
criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two
aggravating circumstances of any kind or
nature entitles the offended party to
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the
Civil Code because the requirement of
specificity in the information affected only the
criminal liability of the accused, not his civil
liability​.
People v. Catubig - ​The term "aggravating
circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law
not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social
order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim.
➢ The increase of the penalty or a shift to
a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission.
➢ Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would
make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but
to be withheld when it is qualifying.
15
 ➢ the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil
liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning
of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
That People v. Catubig was subsequent to the
dates of the commission of the crimes charged
did not matter. Like any other judicial
interpretation of an existing law, the ruling in
People v. Catubig settled the circumstances
when Article 2230 of the Civil Code applied,
thereby reflecting the meaning and state of
that legal provision. The retroactivity of the
ruling vis-à-vis the accused could not be
challenged or be barred by virtue of its being
civil, not penal, in effect.
PEOPLE v. SOLAR
DOCTRINE: ​The Court holds that it is
insufficient for prosecutors to indicate in an
Information that the act supposedly committed
by the accused was done "with treachery" or
"with abuse of superior strength" or "with
evident premeditation" without specifically
describing the acts done by the accused that
made any or all of such circumstances present.
Borrowing the words of the Court in
Dasmariñas, "to merely state in the information
that treachery was attendant is not enough
because the usage of such term is not a factual
averment but a conclusion of law."
An information alleging that treachery exists, to
be sufficient, must therefore have factual
averments on how the person charged had
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
deliberately employed means, methods or forms
in the execution of the act that tended directly
and specially to insure its execution without risk
to the accused arising from the defense that the
victim might make.The Information must so
state such means, methods or forms in a manner
that would enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense was
intended to be charged.
TICKLER:​ baseball bat
FACTS: ​Ma. Theresa testified that on March 9,
2008, at around 2:00 a.m., she decided to follow
her husband who left the house to get his
cellphone from Rolando. Along the way, she
saw Rolando and Mark Kenneth hit Joseph with
a baseball bat on his nape. When Joseph fell
down, the two simultaneously ganged up on
him. She then shouted for help and the assailants
ran away. Immediately, Joseph was rushed to the
hospital but was pronounced "dead on arrival."
According to Dr. Nulud, the death resulted from
traumatic injuries on the brain caused by a blunt
force applied on the head of the victim.
This case provided new guidelines for the
bench and the bar.
DETAILS
RTC: ​WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
Court finds accused Rolando Solar [y]
Dumbrique GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of MURDER defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim,
Joseph Capinig, the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for his death, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
16

CA- ​downgraded the offense from Murder to
Homicide, holding that the Information did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended the killing.
The CA also modified the award of damages to
be paid to the heirs of Joseph. The CA ordered
Rolando to pay the heirs of Joseph the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
In questioning his conviction, Rolando reiterates
the arguments he raised in the CA, namely that:
(1) the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Ma.
Theresa, was insufficient to convict him because
of her failure to positively identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime; (2) the testimony of
Ma. Theresa was marred with material and
substantial inconsistencies; and (3) Ma. Theresa
was a biased witness and her testimony was
tainted with improper motive.
➢ It is well-settled that in the absence of
facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of
the case, appellate courts will not
overturn the factual findings of the trial
court.
➢ Thus, when the case pivots on the issue
of the credibility of the witnesses, the
findings of the trial courts necessarily
carry great weight and respect as they
are afforded the unique opportunity to
ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of
witnesses during trial. Here, after
examining the records of this case, the
Court finds no cogent reason to vacate
the RTC's appreciation of the evidence,
which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
➢ Ma. Theresa was also able to positively
identify Rolando as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
➢ The Court stresses that slight
contradictions, in fact, even serve to
strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses, as these may be considered as
badges of truth rather than indicia of bad
faith; they tend to prove that their
testimonies have not been rehearsed; nor
are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for no person
has perfect faculties of senses or recall.
➢ The credibility of the prosecution
witnesses is not affected by their
relationship with the deceased. The fact
that witness Chito is the son of the
victim while Annaluz's mother-in-law is
the second cousin of the wife of the
victim is of no consequence since mere
relationship with the victim does not
necessarily tarnish the testimony of a
witness. When there is no showing of
improper motive on the part of the
witness in testifying against the accused,
her relationship with the victim does not
render her testimony less worthy of full
faith and credence.
➢ In fact, relationship itself could even
strengthen credibility in a particular
case, for it is highly unnatural for an
aggrieved relative to falsely accuse
someone other than the actual culprit.
The earnest desire to seek justice for a
dead kin is not served should the witness
abandon his conscience and prudence to
blame one who is innocent of the crime.
The testimony of Ma. Theresa deserves full faith
and credit = hence, it is enough to convict
accused based on guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ON CONSPIRACY
➢ Rolando also questions his conviction
on the ground that the RTC and the CA
17
 erred in finding him to have acted in
conspiracy with Mark Kenneth. He
avers that the evidence on record reveals
that it was Mark Kenneth who delivered
the fatal blow, and thus he should be
acquitted of the crime charged.
➢ Conspiracy is the unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of a crime.
There is conspiracy if at the time of the
commission of the offense, the acts of
two or more accused show that they
were animated by the same criminal
purpose and were united in their
execution, or where the acts of the
malefactors indicate a concurrence of
sentiments, a joint purpose and a
concerted action.
While it is true that the elements of
conspiracy must be proved by the same kind
of proof — proof beyond reasonable doubt —
necessary to establish the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, this is not to say
that direct proof of such conspiracy is always
required. The existence of conspiracy need
not, at all times, be established by direct
evidence. Nor is it necessary to prove prior
agreement between the accused to commit the
crime charged.
Indeed, conspiracy is very rarely proved by
direct evidence of an explicit agreement to
commit the crime. Thus, the rule is
well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime,
where such conduct reasonably shows
community of criminal purpose or design.
In this case: implied conspiracy between the
accused can be deduced from the mode and
manner in which they perpetrated the killing.
First, Rolando and Mark Kenneth were together
at the crime scene. Second, Rolando mauled the
victim after Mark Kenneth hit him with a
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
baseball bat. Third, as soon as they achieved
their common purpose, both accused fled
together. All these acts point to the conclusion
that the accused conspired to commit the crime.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation
in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of the law the act of
one is the act of all. In this case, it is therefore
inconsequential whether Rolando delivered a
fatal blow or not.
SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION
CA - FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE
Here, the averments of the information to the
effect that the two accused ​"with intent to kill
and with treachery and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there knowingly,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one JOSEPH
CAPINIG y MATO, by then and there hitting
and beating his head with a baseball bat,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injury
which directly caused his death"
➢ d​ id not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how
treachery attended the killing. It should
not be difficult to see that merely
averring the killing of a person by
hitting his head with a baseball bat,
without more, did not show how the
execution of the crime was directly and
specially ensured without risk to the
accused from the defense that the victim
might make.
➢ Indeed, the use of the baseball bat as an
instrument to kill was not per se
treachery, for there are other instruments
that could serve the same lethal purpose.
Nor did the use of the term treachery
constitute a sufficient averment, for that
18
 term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of
fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as
an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the information
While neither of the parties questioned the above
finding of the CA in this appeal, the Court
nevertheless addresses the same considering
that:
in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire
case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.
In reaching its conclusion, the CA adhered to the
ruling in the case of People v. Valdez where the
Court held:
Treachery is the employment of means,
methods, or forms in the execution of any of
the crimes against persons which tend to
directly and specially insure its execution,
without risk to the offending party arising
from the defense which the offended party
might make. It encompasses a wide variety of
actions and attendant circumstances, the
appreciation of which is particular to a crime
committed. Corollarily, the defense against
the appreciation of a circumstance as
aggravating or qualifying is also varied and
dependent on each particular instance. Such
variety generates the actual need for the State
to specifically aver the factual circumstances
or particular acts that constitute the criminal
conduct or that qualify or aggravate the
liability for the crime in the interest of
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
affording the accused sufficient notice to
defend himself.
NOTE: It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information.
The averments of the informations to the effect
that the two accused "with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength did assault, attack
and employ personal violence upon" the victims
"​by then and there shooting [them] with a gun,
hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies
"​which [were] the direct and immediate cause of
[their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth the
facts and circumstances describing how
treachery attended each of the killings. It should
not be difficult to see that merely averring the
killing of a person by shooting him with a gun,
without more, did not show how the execution
of the crime was directly and specially ensured
without risk to the accused from the defense that
the victim might make.
➢ Indeed, the use of the gun as an
instrument to kill was not per se
treachery, for there are other instruments
that could serve the same lethal purpose.
Nor did the use of the term treachery
constitute a sufficient averment, for that
term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a
fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as
an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the
charge, the State must specify in the information
the details of the crime and any circumstance
that aggravates his liability for the crime. The
19
requirement of sufficient factual averments is
meant to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the charge against him in order to
enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates
from the presumption of innocence in his favor,
pursuant to which he is always presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the details of the
crime he is being charged with. To have the
facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime of which he stands charged
and for which he must be tried thoroughly
accords with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice
U.S. V. LIM SAN
From a legal point of view, and in a very
real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged. It
in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits x That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he,
above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real
question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the
acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence
to him, either as a matter of procedure or
of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts
constitute. The designation of the crime
by name in the caption of the
information from the facts alleged in the
body of that pleading is a conclusion of
law made by the fiscal. In the
designation of the crime the accused
never has a real interest until the trial
has ended. For his full and complete
defense he need not know the name of
the crime at all. It is of no consequence
whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights. The real and
important question to him is, "Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
named murder." If he performed the acts
alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime
is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the
province of the court alone to say what
the crime is or what it is named.
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of
a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit
the introduction or consideration against the
accused of evidence that tends to establish that
detail.
NOTE: ​The allegations in the information are
controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when
there is a variance between the offense charged
in the information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged
included in the offense proved. In that regard, an
offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
On the other hand, there is a separate line of
cases in which an allegation in the Information
that the killing was attended "with treachery" is
already sufficient to inform the accused that he
was being charged with Murder instead of
simply Homicide.
People v. Batin ​- for instance, the accusatory
portion of the Information filed against the
accused therein stated that:
The accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, and with evident
20
premeditation, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one
EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and
there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him
on the right side of his stomach, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of
his untimely death.
The accused in Batin specifically claimed in his
appeal that the foregoing charge did not allege
the specific treacherous acts of the accused and
that the phrase "with treachery" was a mere
conclusion of law. The accused thus argued that
the Information failed to satisfy the test of
sufficiency of Information as provided in
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. In ruling against the accused's
contention, the Court in Batin stated:
We hold that the allegation of treachery in the
Information is sufficient. Jurisprudence is
replete with cases wherein we found the
allegation of treachery sufficient without any
further explanation as to the circumstances
surrounding it. Here are some of the cases:
People v. Lab-eo - Wilson Lab-eo was indicted
for murder under the following Information:
The accused in this case argued that the
Information above, while captioned as
"Murder," only charged him with
homicide as written. This Court found
nothing wrong with the Information, and
ruled that the Information sufficiently
charged the accused with murder, not
even considering the absence of an
explanation of the treachery stated
therein, thus:
The fact that the qualifying
circumstances were recited in the second
paragraph and not in the first paragraph
of the Information, as commonly done,
is a matter of form or style for which the
prosecution should not be faulted. That
the Provincial Prosecutor decided to
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
write the Information differently did not
impair its sufficiency. Nothing in the
law prohibits the prosecutor from
adopting such a form or style. As long
as the requirements of the law are
observed, the Information will pass
judicial scrutiny.
The test of sufficiency of Information
is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the
charge against him, and the court to
render judgment properly. The rule is
that qualifying circumstances must be
properly pleaded in the Information
in order not to violate the accused's
constitutional right to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The
purpose is to allow the accused to
fully prepare for his defense,
precluding surprises during the trial.
Significantly, the appellant never
claimed that he was deprived of his
right to be fully apprised of the nature
of the charges against him because of
the style or form adopted in the
Information.
This Court went on to affirm the
conviction of the accused therein with
murder qualified by treachery.
Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the
information because these are matters of
defense. Informations need only state the
ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be
proved during the tria​l.
Note: ​In short, there are currently two different
views on how the qualifying circumstance of
treachery should be alleged. On the one hand is
the view that it is sufficient that the Information
alleges that the act be committed "with
treachery." The second view requires that the
acts constituting treachery — or the acts which
directly and specially insured the execution of
the crime, without risk to the offending party
21
arising from the defense which the offended
party might make — should be specifically
alleged and described in the Information.
The CA, in the assailed Decision in this case,
took the second view and held that the
Information did not specifically allege the
acts constituting treachery. As a result, it
downgraded the offense from Murder to
Homicide.
RIGHT TO QUESTION DEFECTS IN AN
INFORMATION
The Court notes that the right to question the
defects in an Information is not absolute. In
fact, defects in an Information with regard to
its form may be waived by the accused.
People v. Palarca - the accused was
charged with rape, but the Information
filed against him failed to specify that he
had carnal knowledge of the victim
through force or intimidation. When it
reached the Court, it held that the
accused therein may still be validly
convicted of the crime despite the
insufficiency of the Information,
ratiocinating thus:
In any event, accused-appellant failed to
interpose any objection to the
presentation by the prosecution of
evidence which tended to prove that he
committed the rape by force and
intimidation. While generally an
accused cannot be convicted of an
offense that is not clearly charged in the
complaint or information, this rule is not
without exception. The right to assail the
sufficiency of the information or the
admission of evidence may be waived
by the accused-appellant.
People v. Lopez - ​we held that an
information which lacks certain
essential allegations may still sustain a
conviction when the accused fails to
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
object to its sufficiency during the trial,
and the deficiency was cured by
competent evidence presented therein.
Thus —
Failure to object was thus a waiver of
the constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation.
It is competent for a person to waive a
right guaranteed by the Constitution,
and to consent to action which would be
invalid if taken against his will. (1
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 31-32
[1983 ed.]). This Court has, on more
than one occasion, recognized waivers
of constitutional rights, e.g., the right
against unreasonable searches and
seizures (People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil.
221 [1936]; Viuda de Gracia v. Locsin,
65 Phil. 689 [1938]); the right to
counsel and to remain silent (People v.
Royo, 114 SCRA 304 [1982]); the right
to be heard (Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil.
525 [1949]; People v. Dichoso, 96
SCRA 957 [1980]); and the right to bail
(People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130
[1991]).47
People v. Razonable - the Court held that if an
Information is defective, such that it fails to
sufficiently inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, then it is the
accused's duty to enforce his right through the
procedural rules created by the Court for its
proper enforcement. The Court explained:
The rationale of the rule, which is to
inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him,
should guide our decision. To claim
this substantive right protected by no
less than the Bill of Rights, the
accused is duty bound to follow our
procedural rules which were laid
down to assure an orderly
administration of justice. Firstly, it
behooved the accused to raise the
22
 issue of a defective information, on
the ground that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form,
in a motion to quash said information
or a motion for bill of particulars. An
accused who fails to take this
seasonable step will be deemed to
have waived the defect in said
information. The only defects in an
information that are not deemed
waived are where no offense is
charged, lack of jurisdiction of the
offense charged, extinction of the
offense or penalty and double
jeopardy. Corollarily, we have ruled
that objections as to matters of form
or substance in the information
cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. In the case at bar, appellant
did not raise either in a motion to
quash or a motion for bill of
particulars the defect in the
Information regarding the
indefiniteness of the allegation on the
date of the commission of the offense.
To recall, in the present case, Rolando did not
question the supposed insufficiency of the
Information filed against him through either a
motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars.
He voluntarily entered his plea during the
arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus,
he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable
defects in the Information, including the
supposed lack of particularity in the description
of the attendant circumstances. In other words,
Rolando is deemed to have understood the acts
imputed against him by the Information. The CA
therefore erred in modifying Rolando's
conviction in the way that it did when he had
effectively waived the right to question his
conviction on that ground.
It is for this reason that the Court modifies
Rolando's conviction from Homicide to
Murder — he failed to question the
sufficiency of the Information by availing any
of the remedies provided under the
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
procedural rules, namely: either by filing a
motion to quash for failure of the Information
to conform substantially to the prescribed
form, or by filing a motion for bill of
particulars. ​Again, he is deemed to have
waived any of the waivable defects in the
Information filed against him.
IMPORTANT!!
Despite the foregoing, the Court hereby
establishes a policy, for the guidance of the
Bench and the Bar, on how the qualifying
circumstance of treachery — and other
qualifying, aggravating, and attendant
circumstances similar to it — should be
properly alleged in an Information.
➢ The Court stresses that the starting point
of every criminal prosecution is that the
accused has the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent. Further to this, the
courts, in arriving at their decisions, are
instructed by no less than the
Constitution to bear in mind that no
person should be deprived of life or
liberty without due process of law. An
essential component of the right to due
process in criminal proceedings is the
right of the accused to be sufficiently
informed, in writing, of the cause of the
accusation against him
There is a general opinion that a greater
degree of certainty is required in criminal
pleading than in civil. This is not the rule. The
same rules of certainty apply both to
complaints in criminal prosecutions and
petitions or demands in civil cases. Under
both systems, every necessary fact must be
alleged with certainty to a common intent.
Allegations of "certainty to a common intent"
mean that the facts must be set out in
ordinary and concise language, in such a
form that persons of common understanding
may know what is meant.
23

This right to be informed of the cause of the
accusation, in turn, is implemented through
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110, of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provide:
SECTION 8. Designation of the Offense. —
The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. ​— The
acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
It is thus fundamental that every element of
which the offense is composed must be alleged
in the Information. No Information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
➢ The test in determining whether the
information validly charges an offense is
whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information will establish
the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined in the law
➢ In this examination, matters aliunde are
not considered. To repeat, the purpose
of the law in requiring this is to enable
the accused to suitably prepare his
defense, as he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
In addition, the Court remains mindful of the
fact that the State possesses vast powers and has
immense resources at its disposal. Indeed, as the
Court held in Secretary of Justice v. Lantione the
individual citizen is but a speck of particle or
molecule vis-a-vis the vast and overwhelming
powers of government and his only guarantee
against oppression and tyranny are his
fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights
which shield him in times of need.
In the particular context of criminal
prosecutions, therefore, it is the State which
bears the burden of sufficiently informing the
accused of the accusations against him so as
to enable him to properly prepare his defense.
➢ The Court holds that it is insufficient for
prosecutors to indicate in an Information
that the act supposedly committed by
the accused was done "with treachery"
or "with abuse of superior strength" or
"with evident premeditation" without
specifically describing the acts done by
the accused that made any or all of such
circumstances present. Borrowing the
words of the Court in Dasmariñas, "to
merely state in the information that
treachery was attendant is not enough
because the usage of such term is not a
factual averment but a conclusion of
law."
➢ An information alleging that treachery
exists, to be sufficient, must therefore
have factual averments on how the
person charged had deliberately
employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the act that tended
directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to the accused
arising from the defense that the victim
might make.The Information must so
state such means, methods or forms in a
manner that would enable a person of
common understanding to know what
offense was intended to be charged.
24
Indeed, prosecutors perform the unique function,
essential in the maintenance of the rule of law
and peace and order, of ensuring that those who
violate the law are brought to justice. The right
of the State to prosecute, however, is not
absolute. The Bill of Rights precisely "defines
the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state
actions" and reserves certain areas for "the
individual as constitutionally protected spheres
where even the awesome powers of Government
may not enter at will." The prosecutors —
through whom this right of the State to prosecute
is exercised — therefore do not have a blanket
grant of authority to disregard the rights of
citizens under the Constitution.
Therefore, prosecutors should bear in mind that
in performing their functions, the
constitutionally enshrined right of the accused to
be informed of the cause of the accusation
against him remains primordial. To this end,
prosecutors are instructed to state with sufficient
particularity not just the acts complained of or
the acts constituting the offense, but also the
aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying
or generic, as well as any other attendant
circumstances, that would impact the penalty to
be imposed on the accused should a verdict of
conviction be reached.
Moreover, prosecutors are enjoined to strictly
implement the mandate of, and ensure
compliance with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to attach
to the Informations they will be filing in courts
their resolutions finding probable cause against
the accused.
SECTION 8 (a) -
Sec. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the
information or complaint. – An information or
complaint filed in court shall be supported by
the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the
parties and their witnesses, together with the
other supporting evidence and the resolution on
the case.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
Finally, trial courts are likewise enjoined to
ensure that the accused is furnished a copy of the
said resolutions finding probable cause against
the accused. The trial court, on its own initiative,
shall thus order the production of the records of
the preliminary investigation in accordance with
Section 8 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Section 8 (b) - Record of preliminary
investigation. – The record of the preliminary
investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a
prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of
the case. However, the court, on its own
initiative or on motion of any party, may order
the production of the record or any of its part
when necessary in the resolution of the case or
any incident therein, or when it is to be
introduced as an evidence in the case by the
requesting party
These requirements are imposed to ensure
that the accused is sufficiently apprised of the
acts and circumstances with which he is being
charged, with the end in view of respecting or
fulfilling his right to be informed of the cause
of the accusation against him.
In sum, the Court, continually cognizant of its
power and mandate to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, hereby lays down the
following guidelines for the guidance of the
Bench and the Bar:
➢ Any Information which alleges that a
qualifying or aggravating
circumstance — in which the law uses
a broad term to embrace various
situations in which it may exist, such
as but are not limited to (1) treachery;
(2) abuse of superior strength; (3)
evident premeditation; (4) cruelty —
is present, must state the ultimate
facts relative to such circumstance.
25
 Otherwise, the Information may be
subject to a motion to quash under
Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it does not
conform substantially to the
prescribed form), Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
or a motion for a bill of particulars
under the parameters set by said
Rules.
RULE 117 - MOTION TO QUASH
Section 1. Time to move to quash. – At
any time before entering his plea, the
accused may move to quash the
complaint or information.
Sec. 2. Form and contents. – The motion
to quash shall be in writing, signed by
the accused or his counsel and shall
distinctly specify its factual and legal
grounds. The court shall consider no
ground other than those stated in the
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged.
Sec. 3. Grounds. – The accused may
move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not
constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is
charged except when a single
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or
information. – If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall
order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court
an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make
the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment.
Sec. 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to
quash. – If the motion to quash is
sustained, the court may order that
another complaint or information be
filed except as provided in section 6 of
this rule. If the order is made, the
accused, if in custody, shall not be
discharged unless admitted to bail. If no
order is made or if having been made,
no new information is filed within the
time specified in the order or within
such further time as the court may allow
for good cause, the accused, if in
custody, shall be discharged unless he is
also in custody of another charge.
26

Sec. 6. Order sustaining the motion to
quash not a bar to another prosecution;
exception. – An order sustaining the
motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless
the motion was based on the grounds
specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this
Rule.
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal;
double jeopardy. – When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
However, the conviction of the accused
shall not be a bar to another prosecution
for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information under
any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same
act or omission constituting the former
charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver
charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered
in the former complaint or information;
or
Gilda Flores 1J SBU LAW
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the consent of
the prosecutor and of the offended party
except as provided in section 1(f) of
Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the
accused satisfies or serves in whole or in
part the judgment, he shall be credited
with the same in the event of conviction
for the graver offense.
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case
shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended
party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of
the order without the case having been
revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two
(2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to
allege any ground therefore. – The
failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
➢ Failure of the accused to avail any of
the said remedies constitutes a waiver
of his right to question the defective
statement of the aggravating or
qualifying circumstance in the
27
 Information, and consequently, the motion for a bill of particulars) pursuant
same may be appreciated against him to this Decision.
if proven during trial.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus reverses
➢ Alternatively, prosecutors may the assailed Decision of the CA.
sufficiently aver the ultimate facts
relative to a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance by referencing the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
pertinent portions of the resolution Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of fact in
finding probable cause against the the attached Decision dated January 13, 2015
accused, which resolution should be of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
attached to the Information in No. 05757, and finds the accused-appellant
accordance with the second guideline Rolando Solar y Dumbrique GUILTY beyond
below. reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of
➢ Prosecutors must ensure compliance the Revised Penal Code. He is thus sentenced
with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
that mandates the attachment to the Joseph Capinig y Mato SEVENTY-FIVE
Information the resolution finding THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as civil
probable cause against the accused. indemnity, SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
Trial courts must ensure that the accused PESOS (P75,000.00) as moral damages,
is furnished a copy of this Decision prior SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
to the arraignment. (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
➢ Cases which have attained finality prior temperate damages. All monetary awards
to the promulgation of this Decision will shall earn interest at the legal rate of six
remain final by virtue of the principle of percent (6%) per annum from the date of
conclusiveness of judgment. finality of this Decision until fully paid.
➢ For cases which are still pending before
the trial court, the prosecution, when
still able, may file a motion to amend
the Information pursuant to the
prevailing Rules in order to properly
allege the aggravating or qualifying
circumstance pursuant to this Decision.
➢ For cases in which a judgment or
decision has already been rendered by
the trial court and is still pending appeal,
the case shall be judged by the appellate
court depending on whether the accused
has already waived his right to question
the defective statement of the
aggravating or qualifying circumstance
in the Information, (i.e., whether he
previously filed either a motion to quash
under Section 3(e), Rule 117, or a

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