ABDULSAMAD P. BOGABONG, COMPLAINANT, v. HON. RASAD G.
waived as he failed to assume office within one year and two
BALINDONG
● As the elected First Kagawad of Barangay Bubonga Marawi,
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur in the July 2002 Barangay Elections,
complainant assumed office as Barangay Chairman in
hold-over capacity by operation of law due to the death of
Dianisia P. Bacarat, incumbent Chairman in hold​over capacity
due to failure of elections on December 15, 2007. On April 9
and 10, 2008, Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), Province of Lanao del Sur, Provincial Director Haroun
Alrashid A. Lucman, Jr. (Director Lucman) issued
Certifications2 to attest to complainant's assumption as
Barangay Chairman.
● On April 10, 2008, however, Marawi City Mayor Fahad U. Salic
appointed a certain civilian, Omera Hadji Isa-Ali (Omera) as
Barangay Chairman. In a Certification dated May 7, 2008,
Director Lucman recognized Omera as the legitimate Barangay
Chairman.
● Complainant filed a letter-complaint before the DILG,
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), to question
Omera's appointment. In a DILG-ARMM Resolution dated May
5, 2009, complainant was again acknowledged as the
legitimate Barangay Chairman in hold-over capacity. By virtue
thereof, complainant again took over chairmanship in
hold-over capacity of Barangay Bubonga Marawi. As Chairman,
complainant was able to withdraw the May 2009 Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the barangay.
● This prompted Omera to file the quo warranto case against
complainant.
DETAILS
● respondent-judge granted Omera's Petition for Quo Warranto
and held that complainant's right to the position was deemed
months after Bacarat's death.
● Meanwhile, Omera filed an Urgent Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal, citing impairment of the delivery of basic
public services and the continuation of barangay projects as
good reasons therefor. In his Order dated August 28, 2009,
respondent-judge granted the motion on the ground cited by
Omera and that complainant's appeal "seemed dilatory" and
that "the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment
ineffective." On even date, respondent-judge issued the
corresponding writ of execution, directing the LBP to release
the IRA to Omera.
● Complainant then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
respondent-judge's Order which granted the issuance of the
writ of execution pending appeal.
CA - In its Decision12 dated September 13, 2012, the CA reversed and
set aside respondent-judge's August 24, 2009 Decision and declared
complainant the rightful Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bubonga
Marawi for the 2007-2010 term of office. The CA explained that both
under the Local Government Code and the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act No. 25, permanent vacancies in elective positions for reasons such
as death or permanent incapacity are filled through automatic
succession. Specifically for permanent vacancy in the office of the
Barangay Chairman, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay
member becomes the Barangay Chairman. The CA further held that
respondent-judge gravely erred in ruling that complainant had waived
his right to public office, explaining that complainant's obedience to the
authority which recognized Omera as the legitimate holder of the
contested position cannot be deemed a waiver of his right and interest
thereto. Further, the CA nullified respondent-judge's August 28, 2009
Order which granted the motion for execution pending appeal. The CA
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 1
found no evidence to prove Omera's alleged "good reasons" as ground
to grant the said motion.13
The CA also found respondent-judge to have committed grave abuse of
discretion and gross violation of the rules, amounting to gross
ignorance of the law when he ordered the issuance of the TRO and WPI
without requiring the posting of bond.
RESPONDENT JUDGE’S CONTENTIONS:
● He denied the charges against him.
○ He averred that in resolving the subject quo warranto
case, as in all the other quo warranto cases that he
resolved, he acted reasonably, prudently, and
appropriately. He even added that he gave both parties
their day in court, acting impartially when he could
have decided in favor of herein complainant who was
then represented by counsel who is
respondent-judge's fraternity brother. Finally,
respondent-judge concluded that any error that he
incurred was a mere error of judgment, which does
not warrant administrative sanctions.
Respondent-judge also faulted complainant for not
filing a supersedeas bond under Section 3, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court to prevent the enforcement of the
writ of execution pending appeal
○ Rule 39, Section 3- ​Stay of discretionary execution.
■ Discretionary execution issued under the
preceding section may be stayed upon
approval by the proper court of a sufficient
supersede as bond filed by the party against
whom it is directed, conditioned upon the
performance of the judgment or order
allowed to be executed in case it shall be
finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond
thus given may be proceeded against on
motion with notice to the surety.
OCA’S FINDINGS
The OCA was one with the CA's findings that respondent-judge plainly
defied established rules and jurisprudence when he ordered the
execution pending appeal of his August 24, 2009 Decision without
evidence on record to support the ground alleged by the applicant
therefor. The OCA explained that the execution of judgment pending
appeal is a mere exception to the general rule that only a final and
executory judgment may be executed. As such, while the presiding
judge is given the discretion to decide on the propriety of the execution
pending appeal, the grant thereof must be strictly construed and firmly
grounded on the existence of "good reasons" pursuant Section 2(a),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the OCA noted that as found by the CA, the issuance of the
writ of execution pending appeal was plainly grounded on Omera's
allegation that "impairment of public services will occur" if
respondent-judge's August 24, 2009 Decision, recognizing Omera as the
rightful Barangay Chairman and directing the release to her of the
Barangay's IRA, will not be implemented. However, no evidence was
found on record to support such claim.
The OCA also found respondent-judge to have decided on the basis of
pure speculation when he ordered the execution pending appeal by
reasoning that complainant's appeal was merely a dilatory tactic and
that the execution of the appealed Decision is necessary to avoid the
possibility of rendering it ineffective. The OCA noted that it is basic that
it is not within the province of the trial court to decide whether an
appeal is or appears to be dilatory.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 2

Lastly, the OCA ruled that respondent-judge gravely disregarded settled
rules when he granted the TRO and WPI without requiring Omera, the
applicant thereof, to file bonds as required by Section 4(b),17 Rule 58
of the Rules of Court. The OCA explained that while said provision gives
the judge the discretion to decide whether or not to exempt the
TRO/WPI applicant from the posting of the bond, it does not intend to
give the judge the license to arbitrarily exercise such discretion. As
found by the CA, such disregard of established rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
Such gross ignorance of the law, according to the OCA, was further
demonstrated by the fact that this is the third time that
respondent-judge was similarly charged for the improper issuance of a
TRO/WPI.
Court’s Rulings
● ​While it may be true that his infraction arose from his
erroneous rulings and orders, we cannot subscribe to his
contention that they were mere error of judgments and as
such, do not warrant administrative sanctions.
- a judge's failure to interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable. Only
judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice will be administratively sanctioned.
- ​However, it is also settled that when a law or rule is
basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the
law. Anything less is ignorance of the law warranting
administrative sanction.
NOTE: Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law
or of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within
the parameters of tolerable misjudgement. When the law or the rule is
so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted
position of a judge owes the public and the court proficiency in the law,
and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When a
judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to keep
abreast of the developments and amendments thereto, as well as of
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be
the mainspring of injustice.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. However, the
assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation of clearly
established law or procedure, which every judge must be familiar with.
Every magistrate presiding over a court of law must have the basic
rules at the palm of his hands and maintain professional competence at
all times.
● Respondent-judge patently erred in recognizing Omera as the
legitimate Barangay Chairman merely by virtue of the mayor's
appointment. As held by the CA, basic is the rule under existing
and established laws that permanent vacancies in elective
positions are filled through automatic succession, not by
appointment.
● Respondent-judge also patently erred in issuing a TRO and
WPI without requiring the applicant to post a bond. Section 4,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly states:
○ SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary
Injunction or temporary restraining order. — A
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when:
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 3

○ (a) The application in the action or proceeding is
verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded; and
○ (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files
with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay to such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond,
a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
● Exemption from posting of the bond is merely an exemption.
Hence, the reason for such exemption must be stated in the
order.
○ Universal Motors Corporation v. Judge Rojas -
while Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
gives the presiding judge the discretion to require
a bond before granting a temporary restraining
order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge
the license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily
to favor one party and prejudice the other.
○ Why is the bond important? It shall answer to the
damages which the enjoined party may sustain by
reason of the injunction or TRO. Thus, unless it is
shown that the enjoined party will not suffer any
damage, the presiding judge must require the
applicant to post a bond, otherwise the courts could
become instruments of oppression and harassment.
○ Respondent-judge did not explain nor did he mention
anything with regard to the posting of the bond when
the injunctive reliefs were issued.
○ Lastly, respondent-judge also gravely erred when he
granted Omera's motion for execution pending appeal
when there was no evidence presented to justify the
same. Execution pending appeal, also called
discretionary execution under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, is allowed upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order after due hearing. Here, as
found by the CA, aside from Omera's bare allegations,
there was no evidence presented to support the claim
that execution pending appeal was necessary and
justified.
■ Section 2. Discretionary execution. —
■ (a) Execution of a judgment or final order
pending appeal. — On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession
of either the original record or the record on
appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or
final order even before the expiration of the
period to appeal.
■ After the trial court has lost jurisdiction the
motion for execution pending appeal may be
filed in the appellate court. Discretionary
execution may only issue upon good reasons
to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 4

DILATORY
​respondent-judge granted the motion merely on the ground
that he "believes that the appeal seemed dilatory" and "the
lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment ineffective."
Again, basic is the rule that the authority to determine whether
an appeal is dilatory or not lies with the appellate court. The
trial court's assumption prematurely judged the merits of the
main case on appeal. "Except in cases where the appeal is
patently or unquestionably intended to delay, it must not be
made the basis of execution pending appeal if only to protect
and preserve a duly exercised right to appeal.
Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is considered as a serious
charge which is punishable by: (1) dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
● CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, Judge Rasad G. Balindong
in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Branch 8, is
found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and thereby,
in lieu of dismissal from service which may no longer be
imposed due to his retirement, all his benefits, except
accrued leave credits, are hereby FORFEITED. He is further
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
PALALAN FARMERS PURPOSE MULTI-PURPOSE CORP c. ATTY.
ELEMER DELA ROSA
● Atty. Elmer Dela Rosa was accused of anomalies in the
handling of money of his client, a cooperative and its
farmer-beneficiaries.
● In the year 1977 the Palalan CARP Farmers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative hired the responsdent in a civil case involving the
annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a 111.4-hectare
land situated in Barangay Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro City, in the
cooperative’s name.
● In 2002, the cooperative executed a special power of attorney
(SPA) authorizing dela Rosa to do certain acts but this was
revoked in 2007
● Dela Rosa still brokered and commenced the sale of the
property, despite the revocation, Dela Rosa did not dispute
that he processed the sale and paid the farmer-beneficiaries
their respective shares in the purchase price.
● The IBP-Board of Governors concluded that dela Rosa
preferred to protect his own personal pecuniary interest over
the interest of his client and its members, and recommended
the extreme penalty of disbarment which the SC adopted.
● Respondent violated Several provisions of the CPR in relation
to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
○ Section 27, Rule 138 ​- ​Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 5
 his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers constitute
malpractice.
○ Misconduct - has been defined as an intentional
wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of
law or standard of behavior.
○ Misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule are present; otherwise, it is only
simple (​Imperial v. GSIS)
Conflict of interests
● The rule against conflict of interest is expressed in Canon 15,
Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR. It means the existence of a
substantial risk that a lawyer's loyalty to or representation of a
client would be materially and adversely affected by the
lawyer's own interest or the lawyer's duties to another client, a
former client, or a third person, during the various stages of
the professional relationship
● The rule stipulates that a lawyer cannot act or continue to act
for a client when there is a conflict of interest, except as
provided in Rule 15.03 itself - - securing the written consent of
all the parties concerned after full disclosure to them of the
facts
● Rule against conflict of interest - founded on the bedrock of a
lawyer-client relationship (since it is a fiduciary relationship)
○ The duty of confidentiality, the duty of candor, and the
duty of commitment to the client's cause are all
derivatives of the ultimate duty of loyalty.
ILLUSTRATION
conflicts may also arise because of the lawyer's own financial interests,
which could impair client representation and loyalty. This is reasonably
obvious where a lawyer is asked to advise the client in respect of a
matter in which the lawyer or a family member has a material direct or
indirect financial interest. The conflict of interest is exacerbated when
the lawyer, without full and honest disclosure to the client of the
consequences of appointing him or her as an agent with the power to
sell a piece of property, willfully and knowingly accepts such an
appointment. When the lawyer engages in conduct consistent with his
or her appointment as an agent, this new relationship may obscure the
line on whether certain information was acquired in the course of the
lawyer-client relationship or by reason of agency, and may jeopardize
the client's right to have all information concerning the client's affairs
held in q strict confidence.
In the present case: the IBP-BOG correctly found that at its most basic
element, Respondent’s conflict of interest hinges on the fact that while
may want a quick sale to be able to earn at once. Complainant would
want a sale what would bring the most profit.
Respondent just took it upon himself to side with the opposition group
which wanted to establish and assert themselves as the new leaders of
the Cooperative. Hence, his determination of which between the two
(2) opposing groups may properly give instructions about the sale was
patently tainted by his own private interest to earn from the sale of the
land. He knew he could only ensure his private interest if he was able to
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 6
simultaneously continue not only as the Cooperative's lawyer but as the
Cooperative's agent authorized to sell the land and to actually
consummate it. He may have also forgotten he was the lawyer of the
Cooperative which has a personality distinct from its members. As it
was, instead of staying neutral for the sake of maintaining order within
the organization of the Cooperative, Respondent chose to side with
Lino D. Sajol just so he could complete the sale of its only asset.
HORINILLA v. SALUNAR - TEST OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or
not on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief,
if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client."
- this rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded upon
principles of public policy and good taste.
Paces Industrial Corp v. Salandanan - 5 rationales on the
prohibition against conflict of interest.
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on the following
five (5) rationales:
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent
them with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a
lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such confidence is an
objective important in itself.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance
the effectiveness of legal representation. To the extent that a conflict of
interest undermines the independence of the lawyer's professional
judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in
the client's behalf, the client's expectation of effective representation
could be compromised.
Third, ​a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard
confidential information pertaining to it. Preventing the use of
confidential information against the interests of the client to benefit the
lawyer's personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an
assumed public purpose, is facilitated through conflicts rules that
reduce the opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, ​conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients,
such as by inducing a client to make a gift or grant in the lawyer's favor.
Finally, ​some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal
system in obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence
of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the
litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise
adversary argumentation.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 7
IN THIS CASE: ​The client did not know who the buyer was. Respondent
acted to protect the buyer's interest, and in all likelihood, his as well.
The client did not know and still does not know how much was actually
paid for the land. Money flowed from an account set-up by
Respondent himself and although under the Cooperative's name,
Respondent alone had access to it. The cash proceeds of the sale have
not been accounted for to this date.
● A lawyer is prohibited from acting or continuing to act for a
client where there is a conflict of interest, except when there is
a written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the
facts
● Here, there was no consent to speak of at all. Instead of halting
his legal representation of the Cooperative to avoid conflict of
interest, he stubbornly continued to engage therein i.e. his
seeming obsession to sell the land in question. He even
managed to secure alleged General Assembly Resolutions to
validate his objective of selling the land. The rule against
conflict of interest requires a lawyer to decline a retainer from
a prospective client or withdraw from a client's ongoing
matter. This, Respondent did not do, obviously for monetary
considerations arising from the sale of the land.
● A lawyer should examine whether a conflict of interest
exists not only from the outset but throughout the
duration of a retainer because new circumstances or
information may establish or reveal a conflict of interes​t.
● Respondent did not have the circumspection as his
professional judgment has been obscured by the singular
objective of selling the land to his undisclosed buyer. Indeed,
Respondent had acted with corrupt intent to flagrantly
disregard established ethical rules, and his conduct amounts to
grave ​misconduct.
On disbarment
● It has been ruled that disbarment should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.
Undoubtedly, a violation of the high moral standards of the
legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty, including suspension and disbarment. These penalties
are imposed with great caution, because they are the most
severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are
beyond repair (​Francia v. Abdon)
- This is the second time that respondent engaged in a
situation where there was conflict of interest. He was
punished with suspension back then. Thus, the
respondent is ​DISBARRED.
PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT ONE (SPV-AMC), INC., REPRESENTED BY
CARLOS GAUDENCIO M. MAÑALAC, v. ATTY. AURELIO JESUS V.
LOMEDA
● UCPB assigned to complainant all its rights over Lantaka's
credit line, which was purportedly secured by Big "N"'s
mortgage.
● In an unexpected turn of events, however, Big "N" filed a civil
case for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement,
Secretary's Certificate, Real Estate Mortgage, and Cancellation
of Encumbrance on TCT No. 124230; Declaration of Nullity of
Sale; Delivery of the Owner's Copy of TCT No. 124230; and
Damages against Lantaka, a certain Ric Raymund F. Palanca
(Palanca) of Lantaka, UCPB, and herein complainant and
respondent, among others.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 8
● Succinctly, in the said civil case, Big "N" alleged that it was not
privy to any agreement as regards accommodating Lantaka for
UCPB to extend a credit line to the latter. Big "N" also alleged
that the Secretary's Certificate which was the basis of the
accommodation mortgage was null and void as the person who
executed the same, herein respondent, "is not, was not, and has
never been" the corporate secretary of Big "N". According to
Big "N," the company never knew who respondent was. Hence,
he could not have bound Big "N" to any contract. Neither was
there any truth as to the content of the said Secretary's
Certificate as Big "N" emphatically denied having passed any
resolution as stated therein.
● respondent's admission of his actions in the Compromise
Agreement prompted herein complainant to file this
administrative case. Complainant argues that respondent's
admission that the statements in the Secretary's Certificate
that he executed were not true, which were material to the
damage and prejudice caused to complainant, makes him liable
criminally and administratively. It is constitutive of a criminal
act, i.e., falsification and/or estafa. It also constitutes as
malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer
● tThe CPR is emphatic in its provisions with regard to the high
moral standards required in the legal profession. The following
provisions of the CPR are relevant:
○ CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
○ Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
● The lawyer’s oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the
laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in
or out of court.
- The respondent transgressed the said oath by allowing
himself to be used in a fraudulent act and by falsifying
statements.
- Despite using the victim card, he still executed a
falsified document with full knowledge and made
himself be used in his legal capacity.
-
It must be stressed that the CPR exacted from him not only a firm
respect for the law and legal processes, but also the utmost degree of
good faith in all his professional and even personal dealings.
Disrespect to the IBP - . Despite several notices, respondent never
bothered to comply with the IBP's order for him to participate in
the proceedings of this administrative case.
● By his repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the
authority of the Court. The Court cannot turn a blind eye
on this matter because it reflected respondent's
undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a
body that the Court has invested with the authority to
investigate this administrative case against him. It cannot
be overemphasized that more than anyone who has
dealings with the court and its duly constituted authorities
like the IBP, a lawyer has the bounden duty to comply with
his/her lawful orders.
● The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act
with the highest standards of truthfulness and nobility in the
course of their practice of law. If the lawyer falls short of this
standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline the lawyer by
imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 9
 ● The respondent in this case was also sanctioned in the Morono
v. Judge Lomeda case for gross negligence and for having
giving false testimony.
● The circumstances in the instant administrative case
against respondent as a lawyer, coupled with those in the
administrative matter against him as a Judge and as a
witness in court certainly reveal his character and
manifest his propensity to commit falsehood without
moral appreciation for, and regard to the consequences of
his lies and frauds.
- there is no necessity for members of the bar to be
repeatedly reminded that as instruments in the
administration of justice, as vanguards of our legal system,
and as members of this noble profession whose task is to
always seek the truth, we are expected to maintain a high
standard of honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
- For a lawyer to override the laws by committing falsity, is
unfaithful to his office and sets a detrimental example to
the society.24 Thus, any resort to falsehood or deception
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to
remain a member of the law profession..
● Thus, Lomeda was disbarred.
JUDGE NIMFA P. SITACA v. ATTY DIEGO M. PALOMARES
● Judge Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca sought the disbarment of Atty.
Diego M. Palomares, Jr., for having filed a falsified bail bond.
● When RTC Branch 35 Clerk of Court Atty. Roy P. Murallon later
requested Atty. Baldado to forward to the Ozamis City RTC the
original records and supporting documents on the bail bond,
Atty. Baldado, by then already a practicing lawyer, disavowed
the existence of the bail bond. Atty. Baldado wrote to say that
per the official records of Cagayan de Oro RTC, Branch 18, the
bail bond did not exist, that no approval was made by Judge
Chavez, and that no order for the release of Dunhill was issued.
Atty. Baldado concluded that the bail bond was a forged
document.
Explanation of Palomares
● he was the corporate legal counsel of Bentley House
International Corporation, and when the bail application
was approved for P200,000.00, he requested the amount
from Jonathon Stevenz and Cristina Q. Romarate, Chief
Operations Officer and Treasurer, respectively, of Bentley
House International Corporation. Instead of giving the
money, Stevenz and Romarate proposed to utilize the
services of William Guialani. He acceded. Guialani then
delivered the release order, which Atty. Palomares
immediately presented to the Branch 35 clerk of court of
RTC Ozamis City. The clerk of court read the release order
and then issued the corresponding order for the release of
Dunhill Palomares. Atty. Palomares denied any
wrongdoing in connection with the submission of the
falsified bail bond and offered, in any event, to replace the
bail bond with a cash bond.
Investigation
● While there was no conclusive proof that Atty. Palomares had
been the author of the fictitious bail and release order, it could
not be denied, however, that it was he who presented the
papers to the court. Atty. Palomares failed to satisfactorily
explain, she stated, why he had to take a circuitous route and
secure the services of Guialani despite his claim that he could
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 10
 have easily availed himself of the facilities of other insurance
companies.
● Administrative complaints for disbarment are referred to
the IBP for formal investigation by the Court after an
evaluation by it of the pleadings submitted An ex-parte
investigation may only be conducted when the respondent
fails to appear despite reasonable notice. In this case, it
would appear that no investigation, not even just an
ex-parte investigation, was conducted by the Commission
on Bar Discipline.
Prevailing Procedure for investigation (RULE 139-B) - pertinent
provisions
"SEC. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. – The National
Grievance Investigators shall investigate all complaints against
members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP Board of
Governors.
"x x x xxx xxx
"SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. – If the complaint appears to be
meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served
upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen
(15) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit
action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that
the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the
Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution
of dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court
which may review the case motu proprio or upon timely appeal of the
complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the
complaint.
"No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.
"x x x xxx xxx
"SEC. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the
respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed,
proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to
issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given
full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf
and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable
notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.
"The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3)
months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good
cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
"Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order
issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of
court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator
before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged
contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP
Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before
the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP
Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if
warranted, the imposition of penalty."
DUE TO PROCEDURAL LAPSES, THE CASE IS REMANDED.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 11
ATTY. CARMELITA CANETE v. ATTY. ARTEMIO PUTI
● In her complaint, Canete claimed that her husband was a
victim in a criminal case for kidnapping for ransom with
double murder filed against Atty. Puti's client. Canete averred
that Atty. Puti had, in numerous occasions, appeared in court
while he was intoxicated and made discourteous and
inappropriate remarks against the public and private
prosecutors as well as the judge.
● Canete claimed that Atty. Puti provoked her private counsel,
Atty. Arturo Tan (Atty. Tan), by calling him "bakla" in open
court during the hearing, among other insults.
COURT’S RULINGS:
➢ ​ n Intoxication - it was not sufficiently proven. Thus,
O and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
Atty. Puti cannot be held liable on this ground.
➢ Regarding the provocation and insults - the TSN of the
hearings plainly showed that Puti employed impertinent and
discourteous language towards the opposing counsels.
➢ COURT: Atty. Puti called Atty. Tan "bakla" in a condescending
manner. To be sure, the term "bakla" (gay) itself is not
derogatory. It is used to describe a male person who is
attracted to the same sex. Thus, the term in itself is not a
source of offense as it is merely descriptive. However, when
"bakla" is used in a pejorative and deprecating manner, then it
becomes derogatory. Such offensive language finds no place in
the courtroom or in any other place for that matter. Atty. Puti
ought to be aware that using the term "bakla" in a derogatory
way is no longer acceptable — as it should have been in the
first place.
● Sy v. Fineza - the respondent judge's act of ruling
that a witness should not be given any credence
because he is a bakla was most unbecoming of a judge.
➢ As against the public prosecutors - Atty. Puti made the
following statement: "Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki
siguro bayad sa inyo." Such remark was clearly unprofessional,
especially since Atty. Puti used to be a public prosecutor By
nonchalantly accusing the prosecutors of having been bribed
or otherwise acting for a valuable consideration, Atty. Puti
overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness, and candor
which he owes to the opposing counsels.
○ Because of these statements, Puti was held to have
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the CPR
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness,
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.
➢ As against the judge - ​Specifically, Atty. Puti stated in open
court that the judge was abusing his discretion and implied
that the judge was partial and biased. Moreover, Atty. Puti
threatened the judge that he would withdraw from the case
and walk out if his request was not granted.
○ While a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the
right to criticize the acts of courts and judges, the
same must be made respectfully and through
legitimate channels. In this case, Atty. Puti violated
the following provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 12
CANON 11 -A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
➢ As defense, Atty. Puti claimed that he was merely doing his
duty to call out the judge for being biased. He maintained that
he was only discharging his duties to his client by representing
him with zeal. Such contention deserves scant consideration.
○ While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's
cause is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming
from such zeal or enthusiasm is disfavored.
On the penalty to be imposed, the Court disagrees with the IBP's
recommendation that Atty. Puti be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months. While Atty. Puti is found to have violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspension from the
practice of law is not a commensurate penalty. The Court has
consistently held that disbarment and suspension of an attorney
are the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be
imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for
duly proven serious administrative charge
➢ the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for Atty. Puti's
infraction. The Court also takes into consideration that this is
the first administrative case against Atty. Puti in his more than
three decades in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Artemio Puti GUILTY of violating Canons
8 and 11 and Rules 8.01, 11.03, and 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court REPRIMANDS him with STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
ROGER CAS V. ATTY. RICHARD LIBRADA
The complainant, in his capacity as the President of Werr Corporation
International (WCI), engaged the services of respondent Atty. Librada
to prosecute the complaint for collection filed by WCI against AMA
Computer College (AMA) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon
City.[1] WCI sought therein to collect P3,286,030.31 representing the
retention billings that had remained unpaid by AMA under the
construction agreement that they had entered.
The RTC scheduled the pre-trial conference, and issued notices to the
parties. However, because Atty. Librada did not appear at the pre-trial,
the RTC dismissed the complaint.
Atty. Librada filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same did not
prosper because of his failure to attach an affidavit of service, and
because of his scheduling the hearing of the motion on a Saturday
instead of on a Friday.
Undeterred, Atty. Librada filed an omnibus motion, but the RTC denied
the motion for being a prohibited pleading and for having been filed out
of time.
Consequently, Atty. Librada assailed the denial of his motions in the
Court of Appeals (CA) on certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition
on November 15, 2010 by affirming the procedural lapses committed in
the RTC,[5] specifically: (1) failure of Atty. Librada to appear on the
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 13
scheduled pre-trial conference; (2) failure to incorporate the
affidavit of service in the motion for reconsideration; (3) setting
the hearing of the omnibus motion on a Saturday; and (4) belated
filing of the omnibus motion. The dismissal of the petition became
final, and the entry of judgment was received by WCI on February
9, 2011.
Aggrieved by the outcome of its case, WCI brought its complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Librada in the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (CBD-IBP).
COURT’S DISCUSSION
➢ Once the lawyer-client relationship commences, the lawyer
becomes bound to serve his client with full competence, and
committed to attend to its cause with utmost diligence, care
and devotion. To accord with the highly fiduciary nature of the
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer must always be mindful
of the client's cause and must be diligent in handling the
client's legal affairs.
Canons 17 and 18; Rules 18.03 and 18.04
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
PROCEEDINGS
Under his Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Librada expressly vowed to
conscientiously safeguard the cause of WCI once he accepted his
engagement. From that moment on, WCI fully expected him to
diligently advance and protect its interest in each phase of the
proceedings before the trial court and he had to meet the expectation.
But the records reveal how Atty. Librada had been inexcusably remiss
in discharging his duty of diligence towards WCI.
➢ Dismissal = due to Librada’s absence during the pre-trial
conference despite due notice.
○ Justification of RTC in dismissing the complaint:
Section 5, Rule 18.
SECTION 5- Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the
plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding
section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be
with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure
on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to
present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof.
Had Atty. Librada been truly mindful of his obligation to exercise
the utmost diligence expected of him as a lawyer, the problem of
transportation was not so insurmountable as to have prevented
him from still going to the pre-trial by his own means of
conveyance. Every lawyer knows that the duty to appear at the
pre-trial is binding on both the client and the lawyer, and the
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 14
latter's duty towards the Court in this regard is personal and
direct, and may not be shifted unto the shoulders of the client.
- BASIS: Section 4, Rule 18 ​of the Rules of Court, provides that:
"It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear
at the pre-trial.”
- failing on his part was a badge of his lack of professionalism,
and clearly exposed his lack of resolve to live up to his duties
and responsibilities as a worthy member of the legal
profession.
- Talento v. Paneda: The Court held that absence in
the pre-trial conference exhibits the lawyer's failure to
live up to his duties and responsibilities.
DEFECTIVE MOTIONS
➢ the filing of the defective motion for
reconsideration and the belated filing of the
omnibus motion underscored Atty. Librada's
negligence. That the trial court would not act upon
any written motion unless the movant set if for
hearing.
○ BASIS: ​ ​ RULE 15, SECTIONS 4 AND 6
Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the
court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice.
Section 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion set for
hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service
thereof.
Atty. Librada was expected to know the rudiments of law and legal
procedure. His knowledge and proper observance of the procedural rules
were part and parcel of the legal duty to handle the client's legal matters
with care and mindfulness. He thus had no excuse to offer to save him
from his plight.
CONCEALMENT OF ADVERSE DECISIONS
➢ Such concealment prevented WCI to take the necessary actions
or to lessen its injury. The respondent's actuations
compounded his unprofessionalism. He thereby violated the
need for the relationship between a counsel and his client to be
founded on confidence and candor, under which the former
must adequately and constantly inform the latter of the
developments of the case and should not leave it in the dark as
to the mode and manner in which its interests are being
prosecuted or defended.
ADDITIONAL: Librada did not attend the mandatory conference and
requested its postponement instead. He also filed his position paper
four months after the scheduled mandatory conference.
➢ disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. The
proceedings are investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers, and are unlike the trial of an action or a suit
in a court of law. Based on the character of disciplinary
proceedings, the Court is not bound to receive additional
evidence when it appears that the respondent was already
accorded sufficient time to adduce evidence in his favor.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 15
IBP-BOG’s POWERS - their exercise of disciplinary powers
vis-a-vis the respondent was anchored on the existence of
sufficient evidence of the respondent's wrongdoing
● Librada was suspended from 2 years and was found guilty
of having violated said canons and rules.
SPS NERIE S. ASUNCION v. ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG
​ n November 6, 2012, Atty. Bassig, on behalf of one Fidel B. Cabangon
O I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of
(Cabangon), filed a complaint for annulment of original titles and all
derivative titles emanating from Original Certificate of Title Nos. 17, 18,
19, 20, 1230 and 2640 and for damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Antipolo City.
Sps. Asuncion, intervenor in the case for annulment of original title,
filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Bassig for violation of his
lawyer's oath under Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court through
the commission of deceit and gross misconduct. They alleged that
Cabangon died two years prior to the filing of the complaint, as proven
by a copy of Cabangon's Death Certificate issued by the National
Statistics Office.
DETAILS
➢ Atty Bassig in the conference but he failed to file his verified
answer or position paper.
○ Nonetheless, pursuant to Section 5 of the Rules of
Procedure of the IBP-CBD, the hearing proceeded
ex-parte, and the case was thereafter submitted
for decision.
➢ Atty. Bassig was found guilty of having violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the CPR, the lawyer’s oath, or Section 3, Rule 138.
​ ec. 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United
S
States of America. - Citizens of the United States of America who, before
July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active
practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing
as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme
Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following
oath of office:cralawred
law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.
BASSIG’S DEFENSE
(i) his legal services were engaged by a person claiming to be an
agent of Cabangon; (ii) upon examination of the documents
presented by the agent, he was satisfied that Cabangon had a valid
claim over the properties, hence, he prepared the complaint; (iii)
he prepared the format for verification and certification for
non-forum shopping which he gave to the agent for Cabangon's
signature, and that the same document was returned to him
already signed and notarized; and (iv) the agent concealed
Cabangon's death from him, and that had he known it earlier, he
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 16
would have immediately asked for the substitution of Cabangon's
heirs in the complaint.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
➢ As members of the profession duty-bound to uphold the law,
lawyers are called to conduct themselves with utmost honesty
and integrity, and in a manner beyond reproach. The nature of
the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral
character, and this qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain one's good
standing in the profession.
➢ Atty. Bassig filed a complaint that was false in a critically
material aspect—the status of the plaintiff. The mere act of
filing such a complaint, alongside the proven deceased status of
its purported plaintiff, shows either Atty. Bassig's ill intent on
the one hand, or appalling incompetence on the other, neither
of which are excusable under the circumstances.
➢ The alleged agent was unnamed even in his raising of defenses;
bassig also did not address this mistake in court
➢ Non-filing of an answer despite repeated orders of the
commissioner = ​ his attitude of Atty. Bassig is inexcusable
considering that he has been previously sanctioned for his
refusal to obey the orders of the IBP, in violation of Canon
II,
➢ Given this, bassig was guilty of having violated the said
canons, and is therefore suspended from the practice of
law for two years; he is also sternly warned.
DR. VIRGILIO RODIL V. ATTY. ANDREW C. CORRO, SAMUEL
ANCHETA, JR. AND IMELDA POSADAS
Dr. Rodil contracted the assistance of respondents Imelda Posadas
(Posadas), Records Officer II of the Reporters Division in the Court of
Appeals, and Samuel Ancheta, Jr. (Ancheta), Records Officer III, Third
Division of the Supreme Court, who purportedly both facilitated the
alleged transactions with Atty. Corro. Relevantly, Ancheta gave Dr.
Rodil information about Atty. Corro after finding out that the case was
raffled to then Associate Justice Villarama. Eventually, in exchange for a
favorable decision acquitting Alejandro, Atty. Corro allegedly asked for
a total of Ten Million Pesos (PhP 10,000,000.00). Atty. Corro
supposedly received the said amount at Max's Restaurant along Maria
Orosa Street, Manila in four payments or installments: 1) PhP
800,000.00 on April 22, 2013 given by Dr. Rodil to Posadas who turned
over the cash to Ancheta for delivery to Atty. Corro; 2) PhP 700,000.00
on August 12, 2013, again given by Dr. Rodil through Posadas who
passed it on to Ancheta for delivery to Atty. Corro; 3) PhP 5 Million on
December 13, 2013, when Dr. Rodil personally met Atty. Corro and his
friend Rico Alberto; and 4) PhP 3.5 Million on February 21, 2014, which
Dr. Rodil also gave to Atty. Corro with Rico Alberto as witness.
Afterwards, Atty. Corro supposedly gave Ancheta the advanced copy of
the decision in G.R. No. 205227 and instructed them to open the
envelope outside Max's Restaurant, since other court employees might
be around the establishment. Dr. Rodil later on discovered that the
advanced copy was actually a fake after he requested an official copy of
the decision in the Reporters Office of the Supreme Court. Dismayed,
Dr. Rodil tried to contact Atty. Corro but he completely ignored the
former. Because of this, Dr. Rodil sent his representative to the Office of
then Associate Justice Villarama to find Atty. Corro. He subsequently
learned that Atty. Corro had already resigned from the Supreme Court.
This prompted Dr. Rodil to file a complaint against Atty. Corro.
Hearings were then conducted in order to clarify what had transpired.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 17
during the initial hearing of the case on November 7, 2017, Dr. Rodil,
represented by his counsel, Atty. Ric Juan, Jr., appeared. Both Ancheta
and Posadas were present as well. However, although represented by
his counsel, Atty. Jovian Jubert Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao), Atty. Corro
failed to appear despite notice. Dr. Rodil testified that Atty. Aguinaldo,
counsel of Alejandro in G.R. No. 205227, appropriated for himself the
11,294-square meter property titled to Dr. Rodil 's daughter. Dr. Rodil
explained that he was compelled to surrender the title to Atty.
Aguinaldo because the latter's group harassed and threatened him
since the family of Alejandro were awaiting the return of the Php 10
Million bribe. Hence, Dr. Rodil stated that he initiated the complaint
against Atty. Corro in order to retrieve the title of the lot which he was
forced to surrender to Atty. Aguinaldo for supposed safekeeping. In
addition, Dr. Rodil asserted that he exchanged several text messages
with Atty. Corro.
DEFENSE:
Meanwhile, through a Comment, Atty. Aguinaldo averred that his group
paid PhP 10 Million to Dr. Rodil who solely transacted with Atty. Corro,
Ancheta and Posadas. Atty. Aguinaldo alleged that Dr. Rodil deceived
them when he assured them that an acquittal will be granted to
Alejandro.
During the March 6, 2018 hearing, Posadas testified that Dr. Rodil
asked her if she knew anyone who could help his lawyer-friend, Atty.
Aguinaldo, who was handling a criminal case pending before the
Supreme Court. Posadas then contacted Ancheta to ask about the status
of the case and later found out who the ponente was. Ancheta then
transacted with Atty. Corro who supposedly asked for an initial billing
of PhP 800,000.00 to review the case. Posadas informed Dr. Rodil of the
said condition. Thus, on April 22, 2013, Dr. Rodil met Posadas outside
the gate of the Court of Appeals to deliver the PhP 800,000.00. Posadas
then turned the money over to Ancheta, who in turn gave it to Atty.
Corro at Max's Restaurant. The same arrangement was followed on
August 12, 2013, which involved the amount of PhP 700,000.00.
Thereafter, on December 13, 2013, after Dr. Rodil gave Posadas a bag
containing the amount of PhP 5 Million, she handed it over to Ancheta
to give to Atty. Corro. Since Posadas wanted to see Atty. Corro in
person, she followed Ancheta to Max's Restaurant. She subsequently
saw Ancheta tum over the money to Atty. Corro from a distance of
approximately 10 meters. Posadas left the restaurant and waited at the
gate of the Court of Appeals. Afterwards, Ancheta gave to Posadas an
envelope containing the draft decision, which she turned over to Dr.
Rodil. However, Dr. Rodil demanded that the draft be made in proper
form since the document was unsigned and did not have the Supreme
Court letterhead.
After several months, Dr. Rodil called Posadas to tell her that Atty.
Aguinaldo got furious since the draft decision that they "bought"
from Atty. Corro was exposed to be a fake decision. Posadas then
contacted Ancheta who assured her that Atty. Corro will handle
the situation. Since then, Atty. Corro could no longer be contacted
or located.
➢ The court personnel admitted that they did hand over cash to
Atty. Corro. They also admitted that they made an advanced
copy of the said decision.
OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT
➢ the OBC limited itself to Atty. Corro 's case since the cases of
the other two court personnel, Ancheta and Posadas, should be
referred to the Office of Administrative Services of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, respectively.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
➢ ​Disbarment proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a class
of their own, and are distinct from that of civil or criminal
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 18
 actions. To be sure, a finding of liability in a civil case or a
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding a
member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding.
Section 27, Rule 138
provides that disbarment or suspension may be imposed upon a
lawyer based on certain grounds, as follows:
➢ Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to d
Respondent’s act of demanding and accepting the bribe = gross
misconduct and grossly immoral conduct.
- he also violated the laws against bribery, graft, and corruption
in the government service.
VIOLATIONS OF CORRO, IN SUM
➢ Corro received the full amount of Ten Million Pesos (PhP
10,000,00.00) from Dr. Rodil (which was supposedly funded by
the family of Alejandro) in exchange for a favorable decision of
acquittal for Alejandro in G.R. No. 205227. This undeniable fact
warrants Atty. Corro's disbarment since he is guilty of gross
misconduct as well as grossly immoral conduct for committing
such reprehensible acts. His additional infractions in ignoring
and disrespecting lawful issuances or orders from the Court
only added to the long list of reasons why he should no longer
be given the privilege to practice law or to be a member of the
Bar. Indeed, in order to maintain membership in the law
profession, ​"[a] lawyer at no time must be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions
precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership in, a great and
noble profession. ​Unfortunately, Atty. Corro displayed
characteristics and committed contemptible acts contrary to
what is expected of a lawyer.
➢ In like manner, Atty. Corro definitely violated the Lawyer's
Oath.
➢ As an officer of the court, Atty. Corro violated the lawyer's oath
because he disobeyed the legal orders of the Court and did not
conduct himself as a lawyer to the best of his knowledge and
discretion given that he initiated and participated in illegal
transactions which ran afoul to his duty to maintain good
fidelity to the courts and even to litigants. By acting in
conspiracy with Dr. Rodil, Ancheta, and Posadas to commit
corrupt acts, Atty. Corro additionally broke the laws against
bribery, graft and corruption.
➢ Also, the Court found that Atty. Corro essentially violated the
following provisions of the CPR
CANON 1 ​-​ A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -​ A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 19

Rule 1.02 ​- A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 ​- A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 ​- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
CANON 10 ​- A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - ​A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
NOTE: ​Atty. Corro tried to deflect the accusations by placing the blame
on Dr. Rodil, Posadas, and Ancheta as the orchestrators of the corrupt
transactions. However, it should be emphasized that the subject of this
disbarment case solely involves Atty. Corro as a member of the Bar, and
not the other parties to the case since they would have to answer for
their individual liabilities in different fora as applicable to their
personal circumstances and violations.
MEMBER OF THE BAR = SUBJECT TO FULL INVESTIGATION BY THE
COURT.
- ​if there are other wrongdoings which he will be found guilty
of, these will definitely contribute to the ruling on his case
whether the allegations were specific or not. Without a doubt,
"'[a]ny person may bring to this court's attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if
the facts proven so warrant.
Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Attorney to be heard
before removal or suspension​. - No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him,
to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or
counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the
accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
In line with this, a] member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.
Atty. Corro was not deprived of due process, he failed to attend the
hearings despite notice.
Bolivar v. Simbol - “respondent knew that the disbarment proceedings
were pending. His right to practice his profession was at stake. He could
ill-afford to just stand by and wait. It was his duty to inquire as to his fate.
He was hidebound by his obligation to inform this Court of his
whereabouts, to the end that notices could reach him. In all these, he
failed. On the face of the environmental facts, respondent gave this Court
ample reason to believe that he purposely stayed away."
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 20
 ➢ Atty. Corro, surely, had connections who could inform
him of the status of his administrative case. In fact, he had
his own counsel who represented him in the proceedings.
Thus, the Court finds that he has had the full opportunity
to defend himself, and that because of his own negligence
or calculated maneuvers, he has waived his right to be
heard.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Andrew C. Corro is hereby DISBARRED for
gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, violations of the
Lawyer's Oath, violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the
Court. His name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The individual cases of Samuel Ancheta, Jr. and Imelda Posadas
are hereby referred to the Office of Administrative Services of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, respectively, for the
corresponding investigation and report within sixty (60) days
from notice of the charges.
PRESIDING JUDGE AIDA ESTRELLA MACAPAGAL VS. ATTY.
WALTER T. YOUNG
In a letter-complaint dated November 10, 2011 addressed to Deputy
Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa (Atty.
Layusa), Presiding Judge Aida Estrella Macapagal (Judge Macapagal),
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch (Br.) 195, Parañaque City alleged
that on even date, she received a letter from respondent Atty. Walter T.
Young (Atty. Young), threatening her that an administrative and a
criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment"
would be filed against her if the writ of possession/writ of demolition
would be implemented. This was in connection with a pending
complaint for expropriation (Civil Case No. CV-04-0245) filed by the
City of Parañaque against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and
Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation.
It appears that even before the said case was unloaded to Judge
Macapagal in 2008, the writ of possession had already been issued in
2006 by the previous presiding judge. On February 3, 2011, Judge
Macapagal granted the plaintiffs motion for demolition and issued the
corresponding writ, which the sheriff served on the occupants of the
subject properties on October 28, 2011. In her letter, Judge Macapagal
alleged that Atty. Young committed an act unbecoming of a lawyer in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) in sending
the subject threatening letter.
COURT’S DISCUSSIONS
➢ The sending of the letter was malicious
➢ there is no question that Atty. Young did threaten to file
administrative and criminal complaints against Judge
Macapagal if the writ of demolition was implemented
STATEMENTS
While Atty. Young alleged in his Comment that he had no intention to
threaten Judge Macapagal in sending the subject letter, he also stated
that she may be "stubbornly pursuing" the demolition operations
"because of her desire to please and gratify" the Mayor of Parañaque
City. He also stated in his Comment that he sent the subject letter in
order to "courteously warn" and prevent Judge Macapagal from
"committing a judicial act which would be a transgression" of his
clients' right to due process, and which would make her "truly
vulnerable to criminal as well as administrative" complaints.
➢ These statements, in the mind of the Court,
indubitably demonstrate how Atty. Young had failed to
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 21
 observe the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
courts
➢ Pantanosas Jr. v. Pamatong - the Court reiterated
that while lawyers have the right, both as officers of
the court and as citizens, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges, such criticisms, no matter
how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Further, while the Court agrees with the Board that Atty. Young
violated Canon 11 of the CPR, it deems it appropriate to lower the
penalty to reprimand, considering that this is his first offense and in
view of his advanced age. In determining the penalty to be imposed, the
Court considers the facts and factors which may serve as mitigating
circumstances, such as the respondent's acknowledgment of his or her
infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, respondent's
advanced age, humanitarian and equitable considerations, among other
WHEREFORE, the Court adopts and approves with
modification the Resolution No. XXI-2014-832 dated October 11,
2014 of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 12-3504. Atty.
Walter T. Young is hereby adjudged GUILTY of violating Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby
REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
ATTY. LEANIE GALVEZ-JISON v. MAY N. LASPINAS and VERCELLE H.
NALLOS
On August 3, 2012, complainant filed a letter-complaint for Serious
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against Laspiñas and Nallos.
Complainant filed a Petition for Change of Gender and Correction of
Certificate of Live Birth on November 17, 2011 in behalf of her client,
Geno Adelantar Reyes (Reyes). Later on, the petition was docketed as
Spec. Proc. Case No. 2034 and raffled to Branch 40, RTC, Silay City,
Negros Occidental. Hence, she paid all the legal fees before the Office of
the Clerk of Court (OCC), RTC, Silay City and apprised her client to wait
for the issuance of the order for publication coming from the trial court.
However, to the surprise of the complainant, the trial court issued an
Order dated March 6, 2012 directing the complainant's client, Reyes, to
pay for the publication fee or risk the dismissal of the petition. This
came as a surprise since complainant already paid the publication fee
when she filed the petition. She averred that because of the Order of the
court, her client thought that she pocketed the money given to her for
the payment of the fees were it not for the acknowledgment receipt she
had which was issued by the OCC.
After complainant conducted an investigation, she learned that
Nallos claimed the publication fee from the OCC on December 1,
2011 by claiming that she was authorized to do so by former
Branch Clerk of Court Karen Joy T. Gaston (former Branch Clerk
Gaston [now a Judge at Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Bacolod City]. Nallos received the total amount of P3,520.00 and
turned over the said amount to former Branch Clerk Gaston only
in March 2012 when they discovered the trial court's Order dated
March 6, 2012.
Complainant averred that former Branch Clerk Gaston did not
authorize Nallos to claim the publication fee from the OCC and that it
was another court employee, Laspiñas, who gave such instruction. It is
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 22
the complainant's position that both Laspiñas and Nallos should be
administratively charged for their actions which prejudiced her client.
COURT’S DISCUSSIONS
➢ Nallos said that she did not withdraw the publication fee from
the OCC and that it was voluntarily given to her.
➢ However, even if it was given to her voluntarily, as custodian of
the funds, she should have immediately accounted for it with
the Branch Clerk of Court.
○ Since she was a custodian, she cannot appropriate the
money as she has admitted.
○ Her reason for keeping the money was because she
anticipated that the publication fee would be given
back to her by the Branch Clerk.
Even if that were the case, she still should have made
it known to the persons higher in rank than her that
she has the money and ask for instructions as to where
the money should be safekept. Instead, respondent
Nallos reasoned that she forgot to inform former
Branch Clerk Gaston about her receipt of the
publication fee. Moreover, it also took approximately
four months before the publication fee taken by Nallos
was returned. The long period of time before the said
amount was remitted shows that there was really no
intention on the part of Nallos to return the amount. In
other words, such act can be considered as a mere
afterthought.
AS TO LAS PINAS = DISMISSED
➢ Lack of merit - there is no clear evidence presented agaisnt her.
➢ ​The only basis to implicate her was the testimony of
former Branch Clerk Gaston that Nallos admitted to her
that it was respondent Laspiñas who ordered her to get
the publication fees from the OCC and that some of the
money went to Laspiñas. However, later on, during the
investigation of the case, Nallos repudiated this claim by
former Branch Clerk Gaston.
➢ As a legal researcher, Las Pinas does not have the power to
command another staff of the said branch; she does not have
the power to handle administrative matters, such as the
handling of funds, since these are matters within the
responsibility of the branch of the clerk of court.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ISIP - all court
employees must practice a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility at all times. Service in the judiciary is not only a duty, but
also a mission. It cannot be overemphasized that everyone in the
judiciary, from the presiding judge to the clerk, must always be beyond
reproach, free of any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. Public service
requires utmost integrity and discipline. No less than the Constitution
mandates the principle that "a public office is a public trust and all public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency." It
requires public officers to live up to the strictest standards of honesty,
probity and moral righteousness. Accordingly, their conduct, at all times,
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also
be above suspicion.
MISCONDUCT
➢ A transgression or a wrongdoing under some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer.
➢ The misconduct must be grave, serious,important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling, in order to warrant dismissal
from the service.
➢ The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgement and must also have a direct relation to and
be connected with the performance of the public officer’s
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 23
 intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office.
➢ In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former.
DISHONESTY
➢ The concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of
integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray,
or intent to violate the truth.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. 06-0538
➢ Classifies dishonesty in three gradations: serious, less
serious or simple.
➢ In this case, petitioner was charged with serious
dishonesty, which necessarily entails the presence of any
of the following circumstances: ​(a) ​the dishonest act caused
serious damage and grave prejudice to the Government; (​b)
the respondent gravely abused his authority in order to
commit the dishonest act; (c) ​where the respondent is an
accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves
property, accountable forms or money for which he is directly
accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit
material gain, graft and corruption; ​(d) ​the dishonest act
exhibits moral depravity on the part of respondent; (e) the
respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official
documents in the commission of the dishonest act related to
his/her employment; ​(f) t​he dishonest act was committed
several times or in various occasions; ​(g) the dishonest act
involves a Civil Service examination irregularity or fake Civil
Service eligibility such as, but not limited to impersonation,
cheating and use of crib sheets; and (h) ​other analogous
circumstances.
Note: Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or
negligence, but a question of intention. In determining the intention of a
person charged with dishonesty, scrutiny must be taken not only of the
facts and circumstances giving rise to the act committed by the
respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose
of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment.
➢ Both grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, of which
respondents were charged, are classified as grave offenses
for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first
time offenders ( Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, Rule 10, Sec. 50(A)(1) and (3)).
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds no reason to depart
from the findings and recommendation of the OCA that the evidence on
record sufficiently demonstrate respondent Nallos' culpability for the
charges and fully satisfy the standard of substantial evidence, which is
defined as such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds
equally reasonable might conceivably opine differently.
WHEREFORE, respondent Mae Vercille H. Nallos, Clerk III, Branch
40, Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Negros Occidental is found
GUILTY of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and is DISMISSED
from the service immediately, with FORFEITURE of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to her
reemployment in any branch or agency of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, without
prejudice to the criminal liability of Nallos arising from the said
infraction.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 24

The instant complaint against May N. Laspiñas, Legal Researcher,
Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Negros Occidental is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PEDRO LUKANG v. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS
The respondent in this case was charged with the following violations:
➢ He tampered with the records of the court by making it appear
that he received the copy of the order of non-suit dated
DECEMBER 3, 1992 AND FEBRUARY 14, 1993, which was a
Sunday and Valentine’s day, respectively.
➢ As to forum shopping - supported by the decision rendered by
Judge Agnes Reyes -Carpio.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: he confessed that he had committed an
honest mistake in writing February 14 instead of February 15; that
when he was engaged as counsel, the first thing he did was to
encourage the resolution of the issues among the members of the
Lukang family; that he did not obstruct the settlement among the
Lukang family members; that although there was a resolution
dismissing him as a judge for having "committed errors bordering on
ignorance of the law," the resolution was ultimately reversed and set
aside, and he was thereafter even promoted to the RTC in Makati City
by President Ferdinand Marcos; and that anent the charge of
forum-shopping, he filed the intestacy cases in venues that he
considered appropriate.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
➢ A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such,
although he is required to serve his clients with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence, his acts must always be
within the bounds of law. Graver responsibility is imposed
upon him than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts
and show respect to their processes. Hence, any act on his part
that obstructs, impedes and degrades the administration of
justice constitutes professional misconduct necessitating the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him.
FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO HIS DUTIES
➢ Respondent exhibited dishonesty and deceit in alleging that
the petition for reconstitution that his clients ad been the true
and absolute owners of the property involved therein, and that
such property had been free from all liens and encumbrances
despite his knowledge that the ownership of the same was
controversial and still the subject of several cases pending in
the MTC and RTC.
➢ Secondly, the respondent's act of instituting intestate
proceedings involving the estate of the late Arsenio Lukang
simultaneously in two courts of co-equal jurisdiction in the
hope of obtaining a favorable ruling constituted a deliberate
disregard of court processes that smacked of outright forum
shopping and tended to unduly clog the courts' dockets.
Further, he instituted the petition for letters of administration
for the same estate despite the existence of a valid and binding
extrajudicial settlement executed on August 5, 1976 by the
heirs of the decedent. Thereby, the respondent manifestly
neglected his solemn vow under his Lawyer's Oath to act with
all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions
as appeared to him to be consistent with truth and honor.
➢ Lastly, the respondent ignored his solemn duty under the
Lawyer's Oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to its doing
in court by noting in the records in Civil Case No. 89-87 of the
RTC in Lucena City that he had received the order of non-suit
only on February 14, 1993, which was contradicted by the
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 25
 certification of the postmaster of the Parañaque Post Office to
the effect that he had received it on December 14, 1992.
Canons the respondent violated
Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be mislead by any artifice.
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Anent the respondent's conviction for the crime of other forms of
swindling as defined and punished under Article 316, paragraph 2,
of the Revised Penal Code, the Court, through the resolution dated
August 16, 2010, set aside its decision promulgated on September
29, 2009 in G.R. No. 149588 entitled Francisco R. Llamas and
Carmelita C. Llamas v. Court of Appeals, thereby acquitting him of
the crime charged for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The consequence of the reversal of the
conviction and his resulting acquittal, according to Interadent
Zahntechnik, Phil., Inc. v. Francisco-Simbillo, prevented the
disbarment complaint based on the respondent attorney's moral
turpitude from
Prospering.
We note, however, that this charge was not the first time that the
respondent faced an administrative case and been held liable
therefor. Earlier, in Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, he was suspended from
the practice of law for one year for failure to pay his IBP dues and
for making misrepresentations in the pleadings he filed in court.
Given his multiple infractions committed against the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for six months is proper and
condign +s stern warning.
SHORT DISCUSSION ON FORUM SHOPPING (FROM BATAS NATIN)
➢ ​Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse
judgment in one forum, a party seeks another and possibly
favorable judgment in another forum other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. There is also forum shopping
when a party institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition (Mun of
Taguig v. CA)
➢ Wee v. Galvez- An important factor in determining the
existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to
claim substantially the same reliefs. The rationale against
forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple
petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,
which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks
havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
➢ There is forum shopping when there exist: (a) ​identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and ​(c) ​the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 26
RAQUEL L. BANAWA v. HON MARCOS C. DIASEN
In their Verified Affidavit, complainants alleged that: (a) they received
summons by substituted service on January 13, 2013 directing them to
file a verified response to the attached statement of claims filed by
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard Insurance) in Small Claims No.
12-3822; (b) although they filed their response on January 24, 2013,
they were not notified of the hearings apparently set on November 29,
2012, December 11, 2012, February 19, 2013, and March 19, 2013;3 (c)
they were surprised when they received a copy of the Decision dated
March 19, 2013 rendered by Judge Diasen finding them jointly and
solidarity liable to pay Standard Insurance the amount of P30,445.93
with interest at 6% per annum until fully paid and (d) upon
verification, they discovered that Standard Insurance was able to send a
representative during those scheduled hearings despite the lack of
notice of hearing in the records of the case.
Complainants claimed that Dulfo and Albano were both guilty of gross
negligence and gross ignorance of the law as these two failed to
properly serve the notice of hearing together with the summons. They
further faulted Dulfo for allowing the case to be submitted for decision
without the requisite hearing. As regards Judge Diasen, complainants
averred that he failed to fulfill his judicial duty to ensure that all the
parties to a case were afforded the fundamental opportunity to be
heard.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court defines the nature
and scope of the work and specific function of Clerks of Court as
follows:
The Clerk of Court has general administrative supervision over all
the personnel of the Court. As regards the Court's funds and
revenues, records, properties and premises, said officer is the
custodian. Thus, the Clerk of Court is generally also the treasurer,
accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof. The law also
requires the Clerk of Court, in most instances, to act as ex-officio Sheriff
and ex-officio Notary Public. In all official matters, and in relation with
other governmental agencies, the Clerk of Court is also usually the
liaison officer.
As to specific functions, the Clerk of Court attends Court sessions
(either personally or through deputies), takes charge of the
administrative aspects of the Court's business and chronicles its
will and directions. The Clerk of Court keeps the records and seal,
issues processes, enters judgments and orders, and gives, upon
request, certified copies from the records.
➢ Given this, Dulfo was responsible for the preparation of court
processes, including notices of hearing, and for seeing to it that
all returns of notices were attached to the corresponding case
records.
➢ Albano, as sheriff - was responsible for the service of notices
and other court processes assigned by the judge and/ or the
clerk of court (The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court, Section 17.7.)
The complainants in this case were not served with notices of hearing
for the scheduled hearing. The notices were also missing from the
records. Although Dulfo presented a Notice of Hearing dated October
17, 2012,18 it was not shown that the same was actually served upon
complainants, either by personal or substituted service, as the original
copy of said notice bore no signature of a receiver as proof of receipt.
n light of these, the Court finds Dulfo and Albano guilty of simple
neglect of duty, which is defined as "the failure of an employee to
give one's attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 27
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."
(Dr. Dignum v. Diamla)
LIABILITY OF JUDGE DIASEN
Judge Diasen's act of immediately rendering judgment due to the
non-appearance of complainants during the hearing in Small
Claims Case No. 12-3822 did not constitute gross negligence or
gross ignorance of the law as the same was authorized under
Section 18 in relation with Section 12, of the Rule of Procedure in
Small Claims Cases, as amended.
SEC. 18. Non-appearance of Parties. ​— F​ailure of the
plaintif​f to appear shall be cause for the dismissal of the claim
without prejudice. The defendant who appears shall be entitled
to judgment on a​ permissive counterclaim.
Failure of the defendant to appear ​shall have the same effect
as failure to file a Response under Section 12 of this Rule. This
shall not apply where one of two or more defendants who are
sued under a common cause of action and have pleaded a
common defense appears at the hearing.
Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with
prejudice of both the claim and counterclaim.
SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Response​. — Should the
defendant fail to file his Response within the required period,
and likewise fail to appear at the date set for hearing, the court
shall render judgment on the same day, as may be warranted
by the facts.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
Should the defendant fail to file his Response within the
required period but appears at the date set for hearing, the
court shall ascertain what defense he has to offer and proceed
to hear, mediate or adjudicate the case on the same day as if a
Response has been filed.
NONETHELESS, the Court finds that Judge Diasen failed to
comply with his administrative responsibilities under
Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
state:
RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity.
NOTE: a judge presiding over a branch of a court is, in legal
contemplation, the head thereof having effective control and
authority to discipline all employees within the branch.
➢ Consequently, Judge Diasen shares accountability for
the administrative lapses of Dulfo and Albano in this
case. As the OCA observed, had Judge Diasen
meticulously examined the records in Small Claims No.
12-3822, he could have been prompted by the lack of
Notice of Hearing therein to look further into the
matter.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 28
(1) finds Clerk of Court III Victoria E. Dulfo and Sheriff III Ricardo R.
Albano, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty and imposes upon them the penalty of
SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE for a period of two (2) months without pay,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely; and,
(2) finds Hon. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., then Presiding Judge, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty
and orders him to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
RADIAL GOLDEN MARINE SERVICES CORPORATION,
COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. MICHAEL M. CABUGOY
Complainants alleged that during the annual general meeting of Radial
Golden Marine Services Corporation, Atty. Cabugoy, together with a
certain Sheila Masacote and Virgilo Anonuevo, entered into the office
premises of Radial Golden Marine Services, and claimed that they are
stockholders of Radial. Complainants alleged that Atty. Cabugoy and his
group insisted on attending the stockholders' meeting and participate
in the election despite not being stockholders of Radial. They further
alleged that Atty. Cabugoy ordered that the meeting be stopped, and
even declared the proceedings to be illegal, causing disruption of the
stockholders' meeting, and thus, prevented the stockholders from
deliberating on the dividends and the election of the board of directors
of Radial
Due to non-compliance and failure to file his comments - he Court
resolved to deem as waived the filing of comment of Atty. Cabugoy on
the complaint for disbarment against him, and referred the instant case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On October 23, 2017, the mandatory conference was conducted, but
neither of the parties appeared, nor did they submit their respective
mandatory conference briefs. Records indicate that the Notice of
Mandatory Conference was not delivered to complainants and was
returned to the IBP with the annotation "moved out."
Despite the non-appearance of the parties and non-submission of the
pertinent pleadings, the IBP-CBD, being duty-bound to comply with the
Court's directive, submitted its report and recommendation based on
available records and documents.
COURT’S DISCUSSIONS
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has
➢ such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
➢ The complainants in this case failed to provide clear and
convincing evidentiary support to their allegations of
misconduct due to their failure to attend hearings and to
submit their position papers/judicial affidavits.
➢ Even the attaching supporting documents failed to convince as
they are mere photocopies, not certified true copies, which
cannot be given credence.
HOWEVER, Atty. Cabugoy's disregard of the Court's Resolutions
directing him to file his Comment and to show cause for his failure
to do so, as well as the IBP's directives to file his position paper
and to attend the mandatory conference, despite due notice,
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 29
without justification or valid reason, indicates a lack of respect for
the Court and the IBP's rules and procedures.
➢ As an officer of the Court, Atty. Cabugoy is expected to
know that said Resolutions of the Court, and the IBP, as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases
against lawyers, is not a mere request but an order which
should be complied with promptly and completely. As an
officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of
respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's
obedience to court orders and processes.
Cabugoy’s acts = ​willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
court
➢ under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, is in itself
alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His
cavalier attitude in ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Atty. Cabugoy's conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. His obstinate refusal to comply with the
Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’”
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Ngayan v. Atty. Tugade - We ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to
answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of
office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court."
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the
United States of America. — Citizens of the United States of America
who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine
Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and
regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts
before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after
taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize
the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 30
Figueras, et al v. Atty. Jimenez - the "determination of whether an
attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period
involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court has
imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyer's failure to file
a brief or other pleading."
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Michael M. Cabugoy is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION v. PRESIDING JUDGE
TINGRAAN U GUILING.
​On May 28, 2015, June 22, 2015, July 10, 2015, and August 6, 2015,
Branch 109 forwarded to the Court copies of Orders and Decisions in
relation to the list of cases that were needed to be acted upon by RTC,
Branch 109, Pasay City. Thereafter, the team found that there were 17
criminal cases with no action taken, 78 criminal cases with no further
action/setting, 22 criminal cases with motions/pending incidents, and
24 criminal cases submitted for decision. Meanwhile, there were 22
civil cases with no action taken, 134 civil cases with no further
action/setting, 92 civil cases with motions/pending incidents, and 132
civil cases submitted for decision.
The following are the audit team's general adverse findings: 1) many of
the records were not paginated nor chronologically arranged; 2) there
were Pleadings/Documents2 received by the court without date and
time stamped thereon; 3) there were no returns of summons on the
writ of replevin in Civil Case No. 14-16623; 4) not all criminal case
folders had Certificates of Arraignment; 5) the court was delayed in the
submission of its Semestral Docket Inventory and Monthly Report of
Cases with the Statistical Reports Division of the Court Management
Office (as of April 2015, the court has yet to submit the 2011 Second
Semester of the Semestral Docket Inventory to Second Semester of
2014, and its Monthly Report of Cases for June 2014 to February 2015,
both the old and new forms); 6) the court's general docket books were
not updated; and 7) the Pre-trial Orders were only signed by the
Presiding Judge.
The team also observed the continued presence of a certain ma person
conversing with the staff during the audit. That man was present in the
court the entire day from 14 to 29 April 2015 (Monday to Thursday).
The man introduced himself as "Mang Boy" or Mr. Adolf Mantala. The
team first thought that he was a friend of the staff but information was
gathered on the last day of the audit that Mr. Mantala is the personal
secretary of Sheriff de Jesus who takes the call of petitioners in replevin
cases whenever Sheriff de Jesus is not around. His presence was
tolerated by Judge Guiling and OIC Paulo.
During the exit conference, the team brought to the attention of the
court that information was received earlier about some records being
kept by Sheriff de Jesus in the trunk of his car. On one hand, Sheriff de
Jesus replied that he had already returned all the replevin cases to the
court. On the other hand, OIC Cleotilde Paulo did not offer any
explanation as to why said records were in the possession of Sheriff de
Jesus.
Court’s Discussion
➢ Judge Guiling was granted an extension of thirty (30) days
from February 9, 2016 to fully comply with the directives
issued to him by the Deputy Court Administrator. On March 11,
2016, Judge Guiling forwarded copies of orders, alias warrants
of arrest and decisions issued by him in compliance with the
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 31
 Memorandum11 dated January 12, 2016, directing him to take
appropriate action on the remaining criminal and civil cases.
➢ However, despite these submissions from Judge Guiling,
the OCA still found two (2) criminal and eight (8) civil
cases with no action taken from the time of their filing;
thirty-eight (38) criminal and sixty (60) civil cases without
further setting; and six (6) criminal and fifty-four (54) civil
cases with unresolved motions or incidents, and five (5)
criminal and eleven (11) civil cases undecided and
submitted for decision. Judge Guiling did not provide any
justification for his delay in the rendition of judgment in
numerous cases. He failed to submit any explanation as to
why he should not be administratively charged for
proceeding to hear cases involving annulment of marriage
despite invalid service of summons, prior to the receipt of
the Notice of Report on Collusion (in cases grounded on
Article 36 of the Family Code), and the non-compliance of
the parties with the Manifestation and Motion of the OSG
to be furnished with copies of the petitions and their
annexes
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 15 (1) - 1987 Constitution
SECTION 15. (1) ​All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by
the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three months for all other lower courts.
➢ Mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the
reglementary period of 90 days.
➢ The New Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 5 of Canon 6
also directs judges to perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness. Rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be one are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases.
Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.
➢ NOTE: The speedy disposition of cases in our courts is a
primary aim of the Judiciary, so that the ends of justice
may not be compromised and the Judiciary will be true to
its commitment to provide litigants their constitutional
right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of their cases.
➢ Anent the presence of a certain Mr. Adolf Mantala in
Branch 109, this Court finds that Judge Guiling, Ms. Paulo
(being the officer-in-charge of the court) and Sheriff de
Jesus (as he allowed Mr. Mantala to be his alter ego in
facilitating replevin cases and receiving phone calls from
petitioners) guilty of violation of Section 1, Canon II of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for Court Personnel.
SECTION 1​. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized
person any confidential information acquired by them while employed
in the Judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or
unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of
public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet
made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to
pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and
similar papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal
memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a
justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall
remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made
public.
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 32

➢ Mr. Mantala is an outsider and should not have been
granted access to the cases or proceedings in court. Mr.
Mantala was allowed to answer calls from parties
regarding replevin cases and to drive the seized vehicles
in replevin cases. This runs counter to the mandate that
court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized
person any confidential information acquired by them
while employed in the judiciary.
CLASSIFICATION OF CHARGES
Classified as less serious charges under Section 9, 14 Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court are undue delay in rendering decisions or
orders, and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, penalized with either suspension without pay for a
period of not less than one (1) month, but not more than three (3)
months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not more than
P20,000.00.16 With respect to Judge Guiling's offense of undue
delay in rendering decisions or orders, the Court imposes upon
him a penalty of fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). For his violation of Supreme Court rules, directives
and circulars, and violation of the rules on annulment of marriage,
Judge Guiling is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
Meanwhile, under Section 10 of the same Rule 140, undue delay in
the submission of monthly reports is considered a light offense.
Section 11(C) of Rule 140 provides that if the respondent is guilty
of a light offense, any of the following may be imposed: (i) a Fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or (ii)
Censure, (iii) Reprimand, (iv) Admonition with warning.17 Thus, a
fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is
imposed against Judge Guiling for undue delay in the submission
of monthly reports.
In fine, this Court finds that the OCA's recommended fine of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) imposed against Judge Guiling is
proper for all his infractions. However, the recommendation by
the OCA to relieve Judge Guiling of his judicial and administrative
functions has already been rendered moot by his compulsory
retirement last February 25, 2018. In view of the retirement of
Judge Guiling, the aforementioned penalty of fine shall be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
CLEOTILDE P. PAULO
➢ The OCA found OIC Cleotilde P. Paulo guilty of violation of
Supreme Court rules, directive and circulars, undue delay in
the submission of monthly reports, failure to maintain the
confidentiality of court records and proceedings and violation
of rules on annulment of marriage. However, in the judicial
audit report, no adverse findings for violation of rules on
annulment of marriage against Ms. Paulo was found by the
audit team. Such violation was only imputed against Judge
Guiling. Thus, this Court deems that the finding and
recommendation for violation of rules on annulment of
judgment against Ms. Paulo be not considered.
➢ Ms. Paulo is charged with safekeeping of all records, papers,
files, exhibits and public property committed to her charge,
including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture
belonging to her office. The Rules of Court provides that no
record shall be taken from the clerk's office without an order
from the court except as otherwise provided by the rules.
Clearly, Ms. Paulo was remiss in the discharge of her function
in allowing Sheriff de Jesus to bring some records out of the
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 33
 court premises which were found inside the trunk of his car,
and Mr. Adolf Mantala to have access to court records and
proceedings.
➢ Anent the charge of undue delay in the submission of monthly
reports, this Court finds Ms. Paulo's explanation unmeritorious.
The dates pointed out by Ms. Paulo when the civil in-charge
and criminal in-charge were promoted and took a leave of
absence, respectively, were way before June 2014 to February
2015. As admitted by Ms. Paulo in her letter, a new civil cases
clerk-in-charge was appointed in 2013. Through an office
Memorandum dated October 23, 2013, she gave Mr. Alonto
Paramihan, Jr., former criminal cases clerk-in-charge who was
promoted to court interpreter, additional duty to temporarily
act as criminal clerk-in-charge. In September 2014, a new
criminal clerk-in-charge was appointed to Branch 109. All of
these facts show that Ms. Paulo could have submitted the
court's monthly reports on time had she exerted more effort to
comply with Supreme Court directive as there was no shortage
of personnel, an excuse she would like the Court to consider.
SHERIFF REYENER DE JESUS
➢ heriff de Jesus denied that he took custody of case records
involving replevin, brought them out of the court room, and
placed them inside the trunk of his car. He likewise denied any
knowledge of Mr. Mantala taking calls for him but admitted
that sometimes he requested Mr. Mantala to drive for him
when he implemented his writs of replevin outside Metro
Manila.
➢ Manotoc case.
➢ The explanation submitted by Sheriff de Jesus why he availed
of substituted service of summons and made a general
statement in his returns in cases of annulment of marriage
cannot absolve him from liability. He should have been aware
of existing rules and jurisprudence governing the functions of
his office. Worthy to note that the Manotoc case is not a new
case but was promulgated way back in 2006.
➢ With respect to the charge of failure to maintain the
confidentiality of court records and proceedings, his denial
cannot prevail over the observations and findings of the audit
team. Furthermore, Ms. Paulo, in her Letter dated January 22,
2016, admitted there were occasions when Sheriff de Jesus
would bring records outside the court premises to
accommodate parties requesting to photocopy the records.
This is contrary to the statement of Sheriff de Jesus that only
the respective clerks-in-charge of criminal and civil cases were
able to bring records outside the court to photocopy the
records. Thus, the Court is inclined to believe the observation
and findings of the audit team that Sheriff de Jesus kept some
records in the trunk of his car.
PROCESS SERVER GAUDENCIA SIOSON
Lastly, the OCA recommended that Process Server Mr.
Gaudencio Sioson be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for
violation of the rules on annulment of marriage.
In his Letter filed on January 25, 2016, Process Server
Gaudencio Sioson explained that it was his honest belief that
service made to the relative of the respondent was sufficient
compliance with the rules. However, after his attention was
called, he started to observe the procedures laid down in the
The explanation submitted by Sheriff de Jesus cannot absolve
him from liability. He should have been aware of existing rules
GILDA FLORES SBU LAW 1J 34
and jurisprudence governing the functions of his office. It is
worthy to note that the Manotoc case is not a new case but was
promulgated way back in 2006. Thus, this Court sustains the
recommendation of the OCA to impose the penalty of fine of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) against Process Server
Gaudencio Sioson.
(4) GAUDENCIO P. SIOSON, process server of RTC, Branch 109
of Pasay City GUILTY of violation of the rules on annulment of
marriage for which he is FINED Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).

WHEREFORE: UDGE TINGARAAN GUILING, former Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109 of Pasay City,
GUILTY of gross dereliction of duty, gross inefficiency and
gross incompetence for undue delay in rendering judgment in
23 criminal cases and 40 civil case; undue delay in the
resolution of motions or incidents in 17 criminal cases and 63
civil cases, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, undue delay in the submission of monthly reports;
failure to maintain the confidentiality of court records and
proceedings, and violation of the rules of annulment of
marriage, for which he is FINED Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits;

(2) CLEOTILDE P. PAULO, officer-in-charge RTC, Branch 109 of

Pasay City, GUILTY of violation of Supreme Court rules,
directive and circulars, undue delay in the submission of
monthly reports, and failure to maintain the confidentiality of
court records and proceedings, for which she is SUSPENDED
for six (6) months without salaries and allowances;

(3) REYNER DE JESUS, Sheriff of RTC, Branch 109 of Pasay City

GUILTY for failure to maintain the confidentiality of court
records and proceedings, and violation of the rules on
annulment of marriage for which he is FINED Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); and

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