UY v.
ADRIANO Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed in
Compare this case with Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE: ​Certainly, the right to speedy trial
cannot be invoked where to sustain the same
would result in a clear denial of due process to
the prosecution. It should not operate in
depriving the State of its inherent prerogative
to prosecute criminal cases or generally in
seeing to it that all those who approach the bar
of justice are afforded fair opportunity to
present their side. For it is not only the State;
more so, the offended party who is entitled to
due process in criminal cases In essence, the
right to a speedy trial does not preclude the
people's equally important right to public
justice.
A party's silence may amount to laches. The
right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the
accused. If he does not claim it, he should not
complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of
1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2),
Article III of the Constitution. The spirit of the
law is that the accused must go on record in
the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting
delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in
law, to have waived the privilege.
TICKLER: TOYO
FACTS: Based on confidential information that
petitioner Henry Uy had been engaged in
manufacturing, delivering, and selling "fake"
Marca Piña soy sauce, Orlando S. Bundoc,
Intelligence Officer II of the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), applied for a
search warrant for unfair competition which was
granted on February 14, 1994. When the search
warrant was implemented on even date, Atty.
Francisco R. Estavillo, agent of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac, seized
fifty-five (55) bottles of label Marca Piña soy
sauce.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tarlac City on
March 23, 1994, charging petitioner Henry Uy
with violation of Article 189 (Unfair Competition)
of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to
speedy has been properly observed
HELD: No. The delay of about 21 months,
covering 15 re-settings, can be attributed to the
prosecution. However, except in five instances,
when the trial was reset because the private
prosecutor had to attend to some professional and
personal matters, the delays were brought about
because of the recent engagement of legal service,
absence of the public prosecutor, and
unavailability of documents and witnesses.
Not only the petitioners but the State as well were
prejudiced by the inordinate delay in the trial of
the case. It took the prosecution more than four
years to rest its case after presenting only three
witnesses. Had the prosecution, petitioner and the
trial court been assiduous in avoiding any
inordinate delay in the trial, the prosecution could
have rested its case much earlier. The court even
failed to order the absent
counsel/prosecutor/witnesses to explain/justify
their absences or cite them for contempt. The
speedy trial mandated by the Constitution and the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is as much
the responsibility of the prosecution, the trial
court and petitioners to the extent that the trial is
inordinately delayed, and to that extent the
interest of justice is prejudiced.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 21,
2003 Decision and July 17, 2003 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 64, Tarlac City, is directed to
proceed with the trial on the merits of the criminal
case with all reasonable and judicious dispatch
consistent with the right of petitioners to a speedy
trial. No costs.
1

DETAILS
TIMELINE
November 8, 1994 - private respondent
Piñakamasarap Corporation moved to amend the
criminal charge by including Henry's spouse,
petitioner Rosario Uy. he court granted the motion
in its Order dated November 15, 1994 and
admitted the amended criminal complaint which
reads:
January 30, 1995 - ​the court issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioners.10 They were released
after posting a cash bond on February 1, 1995.11
On July 10, 1995, petitioners were arraigned,
assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the
charge.12 Petitioners, through counsel, waived the
pre-trial conference on October 25, 1995. The
initial trial was set on November 27, 1995.
February 26, 1996 - that the first witness of the
prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of the NBI, testified. In
the meantime, in October 1996, this Court issued
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 104-96 providing,
inter alia, that the RTC shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over violations of Articles 188 and
189 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 166,
Despite the administrative order of the Court,
the MTC continued with the trial. Gloria P.
Tomboc, Analyst of the Bureau of Food and
Drugs Administration (BFAD), testified on
August 25, 1997. In the meantime, Articles 188
and 189 of the Revised Penal Code were
amended by R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as
the Intellectual Property Code. Two years
thereafter, Alfredo Lomboy, supervisor of
Piñakamasarap Corporation, testified on
August 30, 1999.
On December 12, 1999​, the prosecution filed its
formal offer of evidence.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
In the meantime, on October 22, 1999, Atty.
Joselito L. Lim had moved to withdraw his
appearance as counsel for petitioners;15 the court
had granted the motion on October 25, 1999; and
the new counsel of petitioners, Balbastro and
Associates, had entered its appearance on
November 24, 1999.
In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000​, the court
held that there was prima facie evidence which, if
unrebutted or not contradicted, would be
sufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioners.
However, the court ruled that the RTC was vested
by law with the exclusive and original jurisdiction
to try and decide charges for violation of R.A. No.
166 as amended by R.A. No. 8293. Accordingly, the
court denied the demurrer to evidence and
ordered the records of the case forwarded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate
action.
On June 19, 2000​, the RTC ordered the City
Prosecutor to conduct the requisite preliminary
investigation and to file the necessary Information
if he found probable cause against petitioners.
The City Prosecutor found probable cause based
on the findings of the MTC in its May 16, 2000
Resolution that there was a prima facie case
against petitioners. He filed an Information in the
RTC on ​July 18, 2000 ​for violation of Article 189
of the Revised Penal Code
Petitioners’ contention:
➢ Their rights to due process and speedy
trial had been violated. Other than the
notice of hearing sent by the court, they
never received a subpoena which
required them to submit their evidence
during a preliminary investigation.
➢ Petitioners further averred that certain
delays in the trial are permissible,
especially when such delays are due to
uncontrollable circumstances or by
accident. In this case, the inordinate delay
was obviously brought by the
2
 lackadaisical attitude taken by the
prosecutor in prosecuting the case.
➢ Petitioners pointed out that there was
already a delay of six (6) long years from
the time the initial complaint was filed,
and that they had already been
prejudiced. Their life, liberty and
property, not to mention their reputation,
have been at risk as there has been no
determination of the issue of whether or
not to indict them.
➢ Thus, the case should be dismissed in
order to free them from further
capricious and oppressive dilatory tactics
of the prosecution. Indeed, their right to a
speedy trial is part of due process, both of
which are guaranteed by no less than the
fundamental law itself. They insisted that
they should not be made to unjustly await
the prosecution of the charges against
them.
Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, on the sole
ground that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion
to quash based on violation of their right to a
speedy trial. They claimed that there was no active
effort on their part to delay the case as they
merely attended the scheduled hearings and
participated in the preliminary investigation. On
the contrary, it is the prosecution that has the
unmitigated obligation to immediately file the
Information with the proper court. The public
prosecutor is supposedly knowledgeable of the
existing laws and jurisprudence since his office
has the delicate task of prosecuting cases in behalf
of the State.
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, he is the
officer responsible for the direction and control of
criminal prosecutions. In the case at bar, the
public prosecutor failed in his bounden duty by
neglecting to file the case in the court of
competent jurisdiction. The prosecution could not
advance a single reason to justify the procedural
error and instead pointed its accusing finger to
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
petitioners who are just ordinary citizens. Their
failure to call the attention of the prosecution is
neither acquiescence nor consent on their part.
While their former lawyer was obviously
lackluster in their defense, the act of the counsel
should not deprive them of their constitutional
right to a speedy trial. For petitioners, the
prosecution's blunder in procedure and ignorance
of existing laws and jurisprudence far outweigh
whatever minimal participation, if any, they had in
the protracted proceedings.
On March 21, 2003, the CA dismissed the
petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Orders dated September 8, 2000 and
October 9, 2000 of the public respondent are
hereby DISMISSED.
In dismissing the petition, the appellate court
ratiocinated that:
CASTILLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN - ​The right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
Binay v. Sangiganbayan ​In the instant case, aside
from the fact that it took almost six years for the
prosecution to complete the presentation of its
evidence, petitioners failed to show that the delay,
if ever there is any, was caused solely by the
prosecution. Neither did the petitioners show that
the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court
was attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays attributable to the prosecution
or that unjustified postponements of the trial were
asked for and secured by the prosecution to the
prejudice of the petitioners. The fact alone that the
prosecution had consumed six (6) years to
3
complete its presentation of evidence, without any
allegation or proof that the prosecution has
caused unreasonable delays or that the
proceeding was attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, to Our minds is not
sufficient for the application upon the petitioners
of their Constitutional right to speedy trial. "A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the Constitutional guarantee of the
right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case." In the case at
bar, petitioners failed to present, for Our perusal,
the circumstances attending the trial of their case
before the Municipal Trial Court.
The only controversy of the instant case lies in the
fact that the Municipal Trial Court which heard the
case has no jurisdiction over the said case. While it
may be conceded that the prosecution erred in not
filing the information against the petitioners to a
proper court, still, petitioners are not blameless in
this regard.
➢ Petitioners, through their counsel, had
actively participated in the proceedings
before the Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioners had to wait for almost six (6)
years to elapse before they brought to the
attention of the Municipal Trial Court that
it had no jurisdiction to hear the case
against the petitioners. Petitioners have,
by reason of their participation in the
proceedings before the Municipal Trial
Court and also by reason of their silence
and inaction, allowed the Municipal Trial
Court to proceed with a case for six (6)
years despite absence of jurisdiction of
such court to hear the case. We cannot
allow the petitioners to reap from their
acts or omissions. "A litigation is not a
game of technicalities in which one, more
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle
art of movement and position, entraps
and destroys the other​." (Fortune
Corporation v. Court of Appeals)
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
DOMINGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN - "The right of an
accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by
the Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized
to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of
fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to an
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of
public justice.
COURT’S DISCUSSION:
➢ petitioners have been prejudiced. Their
lives, liberty and property, not to mention
their reputation have all been put at risk
for so long.
➢ The public prosecutor failed to explain
the reason for the delay. Truth to tell,
even at this last stage, the public
prosecutor chooses to remain silent why
it had unjustifiably taken him too long to
file this case before a competent court.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals
deliberately ignored this glaring flaw
committed by the public prosecutor and
instead focused on petitioners' alleged
negligence in not raising the issue of
jurisdiction earlier. It further ruled that
due to this fact, petitioners are thus not
entirely blameless for the delay of the
trial.
JURISDICTION
➢ It is elementary that jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings. This is because no
amount of waiver can confer jurisdiction
on a court over an offense for which such
jurisdiction has not been conferred by law
in the first place.
➢ even assuming that petitioners
failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction earlier, still, they
could not be estopped from
invoking their right to speedy
trial. The delay to be considered
"partly attributable" to the
accused (which could work
against him in invoking the right
4
 to speedy trial) presupposes an
active effort of the defendant to
delay the case. There is no
violation of the right to speedy
trial where the delay is imputable
to the accused Here, it was the
prosecution that had the
unmitigated obligation to file the
Information with the correct
court, within a reasonable time. It
did not. Such blunder was fatal to
its cause.
NOTE: ​petitioners need not even call the attention
of the prosecution that it had failed to file the case
with the proper court, contrary to the opinion of
the Court of Appeals.
➢ Although petitioners agree with the Court
of Appeals that mere mathematical
reckoning of time would not be sufficient
for the application of the right to speedy
trial, still, the public prosecutor's blunder
should already be considered "vexatious,
capricious and oppressive" warranting
the dismissal of the case.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure -
provides that the accused is entitled to a speedy,
impartial and public trial.
Section 2, Rule 119 of the said Rules provides
that trial, once commenced, shall be
continuous until terminated:
Sec. 2​. Continuous trial until terminated;
postponements. – Trial, once commenced,
shall continue from day to day as far as
practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time
for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with
the prosecutor and defense counsel, set
the case for continuous trial on a weekly
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire
trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial,
except as otherwise authorized by the
Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this
section and the preceding section shall
not apply where special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court provide for a
shorter period of trial.
However, any period of delay resulting
from a continuance granted by the court
motu proprio, or on motion of either the
accused or his counsel, or the
prosecution, if the court granted the
continuance on the basis of its findings set
forth in the order that the ends of justice
is served by taking such action outweigh
the best interest of the public and the
accused on a speedy trial, shall be
deducted.
The trial court may grant continuance,
taking into account the following factors:
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a
continuance in the proceeding would
likely make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible or result in a
miscarriage of justice; and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a
whole is so novel, unusual and complex,
due to the number of accused or the
nature of the prosecution, or that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate
preparation within the periods of time
established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section
3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because
of congestion of the court's calendar or
lack of diligent preparation or failure to
5
 obtain available witnesses on the part of
the prosecutor.
Under the Constitution and Section 1(7) of
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
➢ the accused shall be entitled to have a
speedy and impartial trial.
➢ "Speedy trial" - a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept.
➢ In determining whether the right of the
accused to a speedy trial was violated, the
delay should be considered, in view of the
entirety of the proceedings.
➢ Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved would not suffice45 as
the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which,
after all, do not exist in a vacuum.
A.O. No. 113-95 of the Court provides that:
The trial of cases for violation of Intellectual
Property Rights covered by this Administrative
Order shall be immediately commenced and shall
continue from day to day to be terminated as far
as practicable within sixty (60) days from initial
trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within
thirty (30) days from date of submission for
decision.
Martin v. Ver - began adopting the "balancing
test" to determine whether a defendant's right to a
speedy trial has been violated. As this test
necessarily compels the courts to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, the conduct
of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1)
length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3)
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right;
and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the
delay.
➢ None of these elements, however, is
either a necessary or sufficient condition;
they are related and must be considered
together with other relevant
circumstances. These factors have no
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
talismanic qualities as courts must still
engage in a difficult and sensitive
balancing process.
A. Length of the Delay
The length of delay is to some extent a "triggering
mechanism." Until there is some delay, which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity to
inquire into the other three factors. Nevertheless,
due to the imprecision of the right to a speedy
trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an
inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar
circumstances of the case.
B. Reason for the Delay
Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the accused have the burden
to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash
the Information on the ground of denial of their
right to a speedy trial. They must demonstrate
that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive; or is caused by
unjustified postponements that were asked for
and secured; or that without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the case being tried. On the other hand,
the prosecution is required to present evidence
establishing that the delay was reasonably
attributed to the ordinary processes of justice, and
that petitioners suffered no serious prejudice
beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and
ordinary delay.
In the present case: The delay of about 21
months, covering 15 re-settings, can be attributed
to the prosecution. However, except in five
instances, when the trial was reset because the
private prosecutor had to attend to some
professional and personal matters, the delays
were brought about because of the recent
engagement of legal service, absence of the public
prosecutor, and unavailability of documents and
witnesses.
6
 ➢ Not only the petitioners but the State as
well were prejudiced by the inordinate
delay in the trial of the case. It took the
prosecution more than four years to rest
its case after presenting only three
witnesses. Had the prosecution, petitioner
and the trial court been assiduous in
avoiding any inordinate delay in the trial,
the prosecution could have rested its case
much earlier. The court even failed to
order the absent
counsel/prosecutor/witnesses to
explain/justify their absences or cite
them for contempt. The speedy trial
mandated by the Constitution and the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is as
much the responsibility of the
prosecution, the trial court and
petitioners to the extent that the trial is
inordinately delayed, and to that extent
the interest of justice is prejudiced.
The case before the RTC should not be
dismissed simply because the public
prosecution did not move for the dismissal of
the case in the MTC based on A.O. No. 104-96
declaring that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases under Articles 188 and
189 of the Revised Penal Code; or for failure of
the MTC to motu proprio dismiss the case on
that ground. The City Prosecutor then believed
in good faith, albeit erroneously, that under
R.A. No. 7691 which amended B.P. Blg. 129, the
MTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged.
➢ The mistake of the City Prosecutor and
the failure of the MTC to dismiss the case
motu proprio should not prejudice the
interest of the State to prosecute criminal
offenses and, more importantly, defeat
the right of the offended party to redress
for its grievance. Significantly, petitioners
do not attribute to the prosecution or to
the MTC any malice aforethought or
conscious disregard of their right to a
speedy trial; nor have substantially
proven the same by clear and convincing
evidence. Hence, absent showing of bad
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
faith or gross negligence, delay caused by
the lapse of the prosecution is not in itself
violative of the right to a speedy trial.
➢ Different weights should be assigned to
various reasons by which the prosecution
justifies the delay. A deliberate attempt to
delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighed heavily
against the prosecution. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or
overcrowded courts should be weighed
less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances
must rest with the government rather
than with defendant.
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan - the Court had
carefully balanced the societal interest in the case,
which involved the so-called "tax credit
certificates scam," and the need to give substance
to the defendants' constitutional rights. In said
suit, we upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan
(Special Fourth Division) that the dismissal of the
cases was too drastic, precipitate and
unwarranted. While the Court recognized that
defendants were prejudiced by the delay in the
reinvestigation of the cases and the submission of
a complete report by the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor to the Sandiganbayan, we underscored
that the State should not be prejudiced and
deprived of its right to prosecute cases simply
because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor. "An overzealous
or precipitate dismissal of a case may enable a
defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without
having been tried, thereby infringing the societal
interest in trying people accused of crimes by
granting them immunization because of legal
error."
As significant as the right of an accused to a
speedy trial is the right of the State to
prosecute people who violate its penal laws.
The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by
7
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
To erroneously put a premium on the right to
speedy trial in the instant case and deny the
prosecution's prayer to adduce additional
evidence would logically result in the
dismissal of the case for the State. There is no
difference between an order outrightly
dismissing the case and an order allowing the
eventual dismissal thereof. Both would set a
dangerous precedent which enables the
accused, who may be guilty, to go free without
having been validly tried, thereby infringing
the interest of the society.
➢ Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot
be invoked where to sustain the same
would result in a clear denial of due
process to the prosecution. It should not
operate in depriving the State of its
inherent prerogative to prosecute
criminal cases or generally in seeing to it
that all those who approach the bar of
justice are afforded a fair opportunity to
present their side. For it is not only the
State; more so, the offended party who is
entitled to due process in criminal cases
In essence, the right to a speedy trial does
not preclude the people's equally
important right to public justice.
State v. McTague: ​The constitutional and
statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the
protection of the defendant, but that does not
mean that the state is the only one that may
initiate action. There is really no reason for the
courts to free an accused simply because a
dilatory prosecutor has 'gone to sleep at the
switch' while the defendant and his counsel rest in
silence. These solicitous provisions are not to be
used as offensive weapons, but are for the benefit
of defendants who claim their protection. They are
a shield, and they 'must not be left hanging on the
wall of the armory.' It is for the protection of
personal rights, not to embarrass the
administration of the criminal law nor to defeat
public justice.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
IN THE PRESENT CASE: ​Be that as it may, the
conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must
not pass without admonition. This Court must
emphasize that the State, through the court and
the public prosecutor, has the absolute duty to
insure that the criminal justice system is
consistent with due process and the constitutional
rights of the accused. Society has a particular
interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the
society's representatives are the ones who should
protect that interest. The trial court and the
prosecution are not without responsibility for the
expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for
trial promptness is not solely upon the defense.
The right to a speedy trial is constitutionally
guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only
for the vigilant and the knowledgeable.
C. Petitioners' Assertion of the Right
The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in
determining whether the defendant is being
deprived thereof. Failure to claim the right will
make it difficult to prove that there was a
denial of a speedy trial.
Except in only one instance in this case: the
records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners,
through counsel, have bothered to raise their
objection to the several re-setting of the trial
dates. This is not unexpected since, as already
shown, the reasons for the delay are not in
themselves totally inexcusable or unreasonable.
Moreover, petitioners actively participated in the
trial when the prosecution presented its evidence,
as they scrutinized the documentary evidence and
cross-examined the witnesses. Until the filing of
the motion to quash in the RTC, they never
contested the prosecutorial proceedings nor
timely challenged the pendency of the case in the
MTC.
While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage of the proceedings, such
defense must be seasonably raised at the
earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise,
active participation in the trial would stop a
8
party from later challenging such want of
jurisdiction.
In the same vein, one's failure to timely
question the delay in the trial of a case would
be an implied acceptance of such delay and a
waiver of the right to question the same.
Except when otherwise expressly so provided,
the speedy trial right, like any other right
conferred by the Constitution or statute, may
be waived when not positively asserted​.
➢ A party's silence may amount to laches.
The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of
the accused. If he does not claim it, he
should not complain. R.A. No. 8493
(Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of
enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution. The spirit of the law is that
the accused must go on record in the
attitude of demanding a trial or resisting
delay. If he does not do this, he must be
held, in law, to have waived the privilege.
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners'
untiring argument that, being "ordinary
citizens," they should not be made to suffer
from the "lackluster" performance of their
former counsel who failed to recognize the
MTC's want of jurisdiction. Too often we have
held that a client is bound by the acts, mistakes
or negligence of his counse​l.
➢ This is, as it should be, since a counsel has
the implied authority to do all acts which
are necessary or, at least, incidental to the
prosecution and management of the suit
on behalf of his client. Any act performed
within the scope of his general and
implied authority is, in the eyes of the law,
regarded as the act of the client If the rule
were otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation so long as a new counsel could
be employed who would allege and show
that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned It would enable every party to
render inutile an adverse order or
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
decision through the simple expedient of
alleging gross negligence on the part of
the counsel. Every shortcoming of a
counsel could be the subject of challenge
by his client through another counsel
who, if he is also found wanting, would
likewise be disowned by the same client
through another counsel, and so on ad
infinitum.Proceedings would then be
indefinite, tentative and at times, subject
to reopening by the simple subterfuge of
replacing counsel.
➢ While the rule admits of certain
exceptions, we find none present in this
case. Other than his obvious failure to
assert lack of jurisdiction, Atty. Lim
undeniably represented the cause of his
clients in the MTC proceedings.
Interestingly, their new counsel, wittingly
or unwittingly, raised the issue of
jurisdiction only four months after it
entered its appearance, thus, adding to
the delay.
Prejudice to the Petitioners
In the Barker case, the different interests of a
defendant which may be affected by the
violation of the right to a speedy trial were
identified. It was held that prejudice should be
assessed in the light of the interests of a
defendant which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect, namely:
(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration;
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern of
the accused; and
(3) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant to
adequately prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system. If witnesses die or
disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.
There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are
9
unable to recall accurately events of the distant
past. Loss of memory, however, is not always
reflected in the record because what has been
forgotten can rarely be shown.
Even if an accused is not incarcerated
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints
on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.
➢ After all, arrest is a public act that
may seriously interfere with the
defendant's liberty, whether he is
free on bail or not, and that may
disrupt his employment, drain
his financial resources, curtail his
associations, subject him to
public obloquy, and create
anxiety in him, his family and
friends.
Again, a perusal of the records failed to reveal
that the delay in bringing petitioners to trial in
a court of competent jurisdiction caused them
any prejudice tantamount to deprivation of
their right to a speedy trial. Petitioners in this
case were not subjected to pretrial
incarceration, oppressive or otherwise, thus
eliminating the first Barker consideration
bearing on prejudice.
NOTE: ​As to the minimization of anxiety and
concern of the accused, there is no showing that
petitioners suffered undue pressures in this
respect. Mere reference to a general asseveration
that their "life, liberty and property, not to
mention reputation" have been prejudiced is not
enough.
➢ There must be conclusive factual basis, as
this Court cannot rely on pure speculation
or guesswork. Surely, a pending criminal
case may cause trepidation but, as
stressed in Barker, the standard here is
minimization, not necessarily elimination
of the natural consequences of an
indictment. While this is not to be
brushed off lightly, it is not by itself
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
sufficient to support a claim of denial of
the right to a speedy trial.
There is no factual basis for the claim of
petitioners that we are not supplied with any
specific allegation in the record, nor witnesses or
evidence may become unavailable because of the
delays in this case. To repeat, ​the claim of
impairment of defense because of delay must
be specific and not by mere conjecture. Vague
assertions of faded memory will not suffice.
Failure to claim that particular evidence had
been lost or had disappeared defeats speedy
trial claim.
➢ As neither the specific types of prejudice
mentioned in Barker nor any others have
been brought to the Court's attention, we
are constrained to dismiss petitioners'
claim. The passage of time alone, without
a significant deprivation of liberty or
impairment of the ability to properly
defend oneself, is not absolute evidence of
prejudice. The right to a speedy trial is
not primarily intended to prevent
prejudice to the defense caused by the
passage of time; that interest is protected
primarily by the due process clause and
the statutes of limitation.
In several cases where it is manifest that due
process of law or other rights guaranteed by
the Constitution or statutes has been denied,
this Court has not faltered to accord the
so-called "radical relief" to keep accused from
enduring the rigors and expense of a
full-blown trial​.
➢ In this case, however, there appears no
persuasive, much less compelling, ground
to allow the same relief for absence of
clear and convincing showing that the
delay was unreasonable or arbitrary and
was seasonably objected to by petitioners.
MARCOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
10
An accused has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable
doubt standard is demanded by the due process
clause of the Constitution which protects the
accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and
unless it discharges that burden the accused need
not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would
be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such
degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.
DOCTRINE: ​Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution assures "all persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." This right expands the
right of an accused "to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial . . ." in criminal case
guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of the
Constitution. It has a broadening effect
because Section 16 covers the periods before,
during and after trial whereas Section 14(2)
covers only the trial period. Heretofore, we
have held that an accused should be acquitted
when his right to speedy trial has been
violated.
Rationale for both Section 14(2) and section
16 of Article III of the Constitution = "justice
delayed is justice denied." Violation of either
section should therefore result in the acquittal
of the accused.
TICKLER: LRT LRT
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
FACTS: That on or about June 8, 1984, and for
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati,
Metro-Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public
officers, being then Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority
(LRTA), a government corporate entity created
under Executive Order No. 603 of the former
President Ferdinand Marcos, while in the
performance of their official functions, taking
advantage of their positions and committing the
crime in relation to their offices, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of
the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease
Agreement covering LRTA property located in
Pasay City, with the Philippines General Hospital
Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise,
under terms and conditions manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the
complaint against petitioner due to the delay
amounts to an acquittal
HELD: yes.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for
Reconsideration under consideration is
hereby GRANTED and petitioner Imelda R.
Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged. Costs de oficio.
DETAILS
People v. Remorosa - ​when inculpatory facts
are susceptible to two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or
hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.
SANDIGANBAYAN - convicted Imelda Marcos and
Joe P. Dans for violation of R.A 3019.
11

➢ Docketed as Criminal Case No. 17450
before the Sandiganbayan, the
Information indicting
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of this court
came out with its decision affirming the judgment,
as against petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in G.R. No.
126995, but reversing the same judgment, as
against Joe P. cans, Jr., in G.R. No. 127073.
ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS (IF ALL THEM ARE
PRESENTED)
The following elements of the offense charged
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
1] that the accused acted as a public officer; 2] that
subject Contract or transaction entered into by the
latter is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government.
➢ In light of the foregoing antecedent facts
and circumstances, the irresistible
conclusion is that petitioner did not sign
the subject Lease Agreement as a public
officer, within the contemplation of RA
3019 and, therefore, the first element of
the offense charged is wanting.
➢ It bears stressing, in this connection, that
Jose P. Cans, Jr., the public officer who
signed the said Lease Agreement for
LRTA, was acquitted.
➢ The said contract however, was not
deemed to be grossly disadvantageous to
the government
➢ At most, it creates only a doubt in the
mind of the objective readers as to which
(between the lease and sub-lease rental
rates) is the fair and reasonable one,
considering the different circumstances
as well as parties involved. It could
happen that in both contracts, neither the
LRTA nor the Government suffered any
injury. There is, therefore, insufficient
evidence to prove petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
➢ Verily, it is too obvious to require an
extended disquisition that the only basis
of the respondent court for condemning
the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") as
"manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government" was a comparison of
the rental rate in the Lease Agreement,
with the very much higher rental price
under the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit
"D"). Certainly, such a comparison is
purely speculative and violative of due
process. The mere fact that the Sub-lease
Agreement provides a monthly rental of
P734,000.00 does not necessarily mean
that the rental price of P102,760.00 per
month under the Lease Agreement
(Exhibit "B") is very low, unreasonable
and manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
There are many factors to consider in the
determination of what is a reasonable
rate of rental.
➢ That the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit
"D") was for a very much higher rental
rate of P734,000.00 a month is of no
moment. This circumstance did not
necessarily render the monthly rental
rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the lessor.
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove
that the rental rate of P102,760.00 per
month was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. Not
even a single lease contract covering a
property within the vicinity of the said
leased premises was offered in evidence
The disparity between the rental price of
the Lease Agreement and that of the
Sublease Agreement is no evidence at all
to buttress the theory of the prosecution,
"that the Lease Agreement in question is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government".
➢ "Gross" is a comparative term. Before it
can be considered "gross", there must be
a standard by which the same is weighed
and measured.
12
Furthermore, that the lessee, PGHFI, succeeded in
obtaining a high rental rate of P734,000.00 a
month, did not result in any disadvantage to the
government because obviously, the rental income
realized by PGHFI from the Sub-lease Agreement
(Exhibit "D"), augmented the financial support for
and improved the management and operation of
the Philippine General Hospital, which is, after all,
a government hospital of the people and for the
people.
➢ petitioner signed the said Lease
Agreement as Chairman of the PGH
Foundation, Inc., a private charitable
foundation, and not as a public officer.
➢ Neither can petitioner be considered as in
conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has
been found without any criminal liability
for signing the same Lease Agreement.
Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with
Dans, the act of the latter cannot be
viewed as an act of the former. Petitioner
is only answerable for her own individual
act. Consequently, petitioner not having
signed Exhibit "B" as a Public officer,
there is neither legal nor factual basis for
her conviction under Section 3(g) of Rep
Act 3019.
It bears repeating that apart from the Lease
Agreement and Sub-lease Agreement marked
What makes petitioner's stance the more
meritorious and impregnable is the patent
violation of her right to due process, substantive
and procedural, by the respondent court. Records
disclose that:
(a) the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not
agree on whether to convict or acquit the
petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending
against her. Justice Atienza was in favor of
exonerating petitioner in Criminal Case Nos.
17449, 17451 and 17452. Justices Garchitorena
and Balajadia wanted to convict her in Criminal
Case Nos. 17450, 17451, 17452 and 17453. As
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
there was no unanimity of votes in Criminal Case
Nos. 17451 and 17452;
(b) on September 15, 1993, in accordance with
Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1606, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena issued Adm. Order No. 288-93
constituting a Special Division of five (5) justices,
and naming thereto, Justices Augusto M. Amores
and Cipriano A. del Rosario;
(c) on September 21, 1993, Justice Amores sent a
written request to Presiding Justice Garchitorena
asking that he be given fifteen (15) days to submit
his Manifestation;
(d) on the same day, September 21, 1993,
however, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
Justices Balajadia and del Rosario, after attending
a hearing of the Committee of Justice of the House
of Representatives, lunched together in a Quezon
City restaurant where they discussed petitioner's
cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and
Amores and in the presence of a non-member of
the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, and Justices, Balajadia and del
Rosario agreed with the position of Justice Atienza
to acquit petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 17449,
17451 and 17452 and to convict her in the other
cases; and
(e) when the Justices returned to the official
workplace of Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena issued Adm. Order No. 293-93
dissolving the Special Division.
Such procedural flaws committed by
respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the
validity of its "decision" convicting petitioner
for the following reasons, viz:
➢ First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically
provides that "sessions of the
Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or
division, shall be held in its principal
office in the Metropolitan Manila where it
shall try and determine all cases filed with
it . . .." This rule reiterates Sec. 2 of P.D.
13
 No. 1606, as amended, creating the
Sandiganbayan.
➢ Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do
not allow unscheduled discussion of
cases. We take judicial notice of the
procedure that cases in all courts are
carefully calendared and advance notices
are given to judges and justices to enable
them to study and prepare for
deliberation. The calendaring cases
cannot be the subject of anybody's whims
and caprices.
➢ Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not
also allow informal discussion of cases.
The deliberations in the case at bar did
not appear on record. The informal
discussion of the three justices came to
light only when petitioner moved to
inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena
after her conviction by the resuscitated
First Division. Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, in a paper entitled
"Response," revealed for the first time the
informal discussion of petitioner's cases
at an unnamed restaurant in Quezon City.
There is no way to know how the
discussion was conducted as it was not
minuted.
➢ Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan
do not allow the presence of a
non-member in the deliberation of cases.
In the case at bar a certain justice was
present when Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, Justice Balajadia, and
Justice del Rosario discussed petitioner's
cases while taking their lunch in a Quezon
City restaurant.
➢ Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do
not allow the exclusion of a member of a
Division, whether regular or special, in
the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza
and Amores were members of the Special
Division but were not present when
petitioner's cases were discussed over
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. They
were not notified of the informal,
unscheduled meeting. In fact, Justice
Amores had a pending request for 15
days to study petitioner's cases. In effect,
Atienza and Amores were
disenfranchised. They were denied their
right to vote for the conviction or
acquittal of petitioner.
Under PD No. 1606, as amended, and pursuant
to the rules of Sandiganbayan,
➢ ​petitioner cannot be convicted except
upon the vote of three justices, regardless
of whether her cases are before a regular
division of three (3) justices or a Special
Division of five (5) justices.
➢ But more important than the vote of
three (3) justices is the process by which
they arrive at their vote. It is
indispensable that their vote be preceded
by discussion and deliberation by all the
members of the division
➢ . Before the deliberation by all, any
opinion of a justice is but tentative and
could be changed. It is only after all the
justices have been heard should the
justices reach a judgment. No one opinion
can be denigrated in importance for
experience shows that an opinion that
starts as a minority opinion could become
the majority opinion after the collision of
views of the justices. The right of the
petitioner, therefore, is the right to be
heard by all the five justices of the Special
Division. She is entitled to be afforded the
opinion of all its members.
In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
had already created the Special Division of five (5)
justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the
three (3) justices in the First Division
.At that stage, petitioner had a ​vested right to be
heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new
justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del
Rosario who may have a different view of the
cases against her.
14

At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
and Justice Balajadia may change their mind
and agree with the original opinion of Justice
Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive the
petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of
justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true
that Justice del Rosario had already expressed
his opinion during an informal, unscheduled
meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as
aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion
contemplated by law. But what is more,
petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice
Amores for before it could be given, Presiding
Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special
Division.
We reject the rationalization that the opinion of
Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as
it cannot overturn the votes of the three justices
convicting the petitioner. This is a mere
guesswork. The more reasonable supposition is
that said opinion could have changed the
opinions of the other justices if it is based on an
unbiased appreciation of facts and an
undistorted interpretation of pertinent laws.
For we cannot unreasonably suppose that
Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices
Balajadia and Atienza are bigots who will never
change their opinions about the guilt of the
petitioner despite a better opinion.
Yet, that is not all the value of the aborted
opinion of Justice Amores. If it were an opinion
for the acquittal of the petitioner, that opinion
will have an added value when petitioner
appeals her conviction to this Court. Again,
depending on its scholarship, that minority
opinion could sway the opinion of this Court
towards the acquittal of petitioner.
The decision of the First Division of the
respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the
petitioner is void for violating her right to
substantive and procedural due process of law.
➢ This case should be remanded.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
➢ General rule: a void decision will not
result in the acquittal of an accused. The
case ought to be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings for a void
judgment does not expose an accused to
double jeopardy. But the present case
deserves a different treatment
considering the great length of time it has
been pending with our courts. Records
reveal that the petitioner was first
indicted in Criminal Case No. 17450 in
January 1992. More than six (6) years
passed but petitioner's prosecution is far
from over.
➢ To remand the case to the Sandiganbayan
will not sit well with her constitutional
right to its speedy disposition. Section 16,
Article III of the Constitution assure​s "all
persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." ​This right
expands the right of an accused "to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial . . ." in
criminal case guaranteed by Section 14(2)
of Article III of the Constitution. It has a
broadening effect because Section 16
covers the periods before, during and
after trial whereas Section 14(2) covers
only the trial period.1 Heretofore, we
have held that an accused should be
acquitted when his right to speedy trial
has been violated.
PEOPLE v. CASTANEDA - ​A strict regard for the
constitutional rights of the accused would
demand, therefore, that the case be remanded to
the court below for a new trial before an impartial
judge.
There are vital considerations, however, which in
the opinion of this court render this step
unnecessary. In the first place, the Constitution
guarantees to every accused person the right to a
speedy trial. This criminal proceeding has been
dragging on for almost five (5) years now. The
accused have twice appealed to this court for
redress from the wrong that they have suffered at
the hands of the trial court. At least one of them,
15
namely, Pedro Fernandez (alias Piro), had been
confined in prison from July 20, 1932 to
November 27, 1934 for inability to post the
required bond of P3,000 which was finally
reduced to P300.
CONDE v. RIVERA and UNSON ​- The Government
should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it
is the moral and legal obligation of this court to
see that the criminal proceedings against the
accused to come to an end and that they be
immediately discharged from the custody of the
law. (Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil., 650).
ACEBEDO v. SARMIENTO
More specifically, this Court has consistently
adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the
denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal.
➢ Necessarily, any further attempt at
continuing the prosecution or starting a
new one would fall within the prohibition
against an accused being twice put in
jeopardy.
People vs. Abaño​- the facts disclosed that there
were three postponements. Thereafter, at the time
the resumption of the trial was scheduled, the
complaining witness as in this case was absent,
this Court held that respondent Judge was
justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the
defense and that the annulment or setting aside of
the order of dismissal would place the accused
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.
People v. Robles - likewise presented a picture of
witnesses for the prosecution not being available,
with the lower court after having transferred the
hearings on several occasions denying the last
plea for postponement and dismissing the case.
NOTE: Such order of dismissal, according to this
Court "is not provisional in character but one
which is tantamount to acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
➢ For it was entered upon the
defendants" insistence on their
constitutional right to speedy trial and
by reason of the prosecution's failure
to appear on the date of trial." " There
is no escaping the conclusion then that
petitioner here has clearly made out a
case of an acquittal arising from the
order of dismissal given in open court.
Rationale for both Section 14(2) and section
16 of Article III of the Constitution = ​"justice
delayed is justice denied."
➢ Violation of either section should
therefore result in the acquittal of the
accused.
I consider this opinion incomplete without
quoting herein the following portion of the
concurring and dissenting opinion of former
Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco dated
January 29, 1998:
Thus, purely from the legal standpoint, with the
evident weakness of the prosecution's case and
the procedural aberrations that marred the
trial, it is simply unsound and impossible to
treat differently each petitioner who found
themselves in one and the same situation.
Indeed, our regained democracy, creditably, is
successfully bailing us out from the ruins of the
authoritarian regime, and it expects that
government efforts in going after the
plunderers of that dark past remain
unrelenting and decisive. But let us not, in our
anxiety to carry out this duty, for a moment
forget that our criminal justice system is not a
popularity contest where freedom and
punishment are determined merely by the fame
or infamy of the litigants. "The scales of justice",
it has been aptly said "must hang equal and, in
fact, should even be tipped in favor of the
accused because of the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Needless to stress,
this right is available to every accused,
whatever his present circumstance and no
16
matter how dark and repellent his past."
Culpability for crimes Must always take its
bearing from evidence and universal precepts
of due process — lest we sacrifice in mocking
shame once again the very liberties we are
defending.
GARCIA v. DOMINGO
DOCTRINE: There is no showing that the public
was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the
size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce
the number of those who could be our present.
Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of
uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than
others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his
masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy
the requirement of a trial being public if the
accused could "have his friends, relatives and
counsel present, no matter with what offense he
may be charged."
The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing
the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in
his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on
such attendance. His being a stranger to the
litigants is of no moment.
TICKLER: AIRCON
FACTS: respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not
objected to any supposed irregularity of the
proceedings thus far; Then Carbonnel thru their
counsel, filed with the Court of FirstInstance a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional
defects. The respondent judge acting on such
petition forthwith issued a restraining order
causing the deferment of the promulgation of
judgment. There was
an order from him declaring that ‘the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused
had been
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
violated, adversely affecting their right to a free
and impartial trial noting that the trial of these
cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively
in chambers and not in the courtroom open to the
public. What did occasion difficulty in this suit was
that for the convenience of the parties, and of the
city court Judge, it was in the latter’s air
conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did
that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative
of this right?
Copied this verbatim, to simplify = so dahil ba
nag hold sila ng trial sa naka aircondition na room,
violative na siya to the right to public trial.
HELD: Hindi siya violative, public trial pa rin
naman. Hindi naman dineny ng access ang mga
tao.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring
bereft of any legal force or effect the order of
respondent Judge Felix Domingo November 29,
1968 for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by
petitioner is likewise granted, commanding
respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to
desist from any further action in Criminal Case No.
74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
other than that of dismissing the same. The
preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court
in its resolution of February 3, 1969 against the
actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent.
With costs against respondent policemen Edgardo
Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
DETAILS
JUSTICE LAUREL: ​Trial should also be public in
order to offset any danger of conducting it in an
illegal and unjust manner.
➢ It would have been surprising if its
proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights
had provoked any discussion, much less a
debate. It was merely a reiteration what
appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act
of 1916, popularly known as the Jones
Law.
17
The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a
stranger to the litigants is of no moment​.
➢ No relationship to the parties need be
shown. The thought that lies behind this
safeguard is the belief that thereby the
accused is afforded further protection,
that his trial is likely to be conducted with
regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that
Delegate Laurel in his terse summation
the importance of this right singled out its
being a deterrence to arbitrariness.
➢ It is thus understandable why such a right
is deemed embraced in procedural due
process. Where a trial takes place, as is
quite usual, in the courtroom and a
calendar of what cases are to be heard is
posted, no problem arises. It is the usual
course of events that individuals desirous
of being present are free to do so. There is
the well recognized exception though that
warrants the exclusion of the public
where the evidence may be characterized
as "offensive to decency or public
morals."
There is no showing that the public was
thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the
size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be our
present. Such a fact though is not indicative of
any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are
not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller
than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his
masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to
satisfy the requirement of a trial being public
if the accused could "have his friends, relatives
and counsel present, no matter with what
offense he may be charged."
Then, too, reference may also be made to the
undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
been held in chambers of the city court Judge,
without objection on the part of respondent
policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice
Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to
be accorded, more appropriately the lack of
weight, to any such objection raised. Thus: "In one
case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid
prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public
trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error.
The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively
appears on the record that the accused offered no
objection to the trial of his case in the place where
it was held, his right is deemed waived." The
decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, was
handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of
respondent is far from being invulnerable.
That is all that need be said as to the obvious
merit of this petition. One other objection to the
conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge
may be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge
would seek to lend support to an order at war
with obvious meaning of a constitutional
provision by harping on the alleged abdication by
an assistant fiscal of his control over the
prosecution. Again here there was a failure to
abide by settled law. If any party could complain
at all, it is the People of the Philippines for whom
the fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in
law be termed an offended party for such an
alleged failure to comply with official duty.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent
policemen could be heard to raise such a
grievance, respondent Judge ought to have been
aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was
incurred by the city court Judge. As was so
emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: "The case below was
commenced and prosecuted without the
intervention, mediation or participation of the
fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding,
the jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but
the court should have cited the public prosecutor
to intervene.
18
There is much to be said of course for the concern
displayed by respondent Judge to assure the
reality as against the mere possibility of a trial
being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a
right could be reduced to a barren form of words.
To the extent then that the conclusion reached by
him was motivated by an apprehension that there
was an evasion of a constitutional command, he
certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of
the robe. Further reflection ought to have
convinced him though that such a fear was
unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in
dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily
calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as
well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on
procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all
make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the
attendance of the general public is much more in
evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it
is remembered further that the occupants of such
courts are not chosen primarily for their legal
acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar
more considerably attuned to the pulse of public
life, it is not to be rationally expected that an
accused would be denied whatever solace and
comfort may come from the knowledge that a
judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his
demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of
being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it
change matters, just because, as did happen here,
it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city
court judge rather than in the usual place that the
trial took place.
The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a
stranger to the litigants is of no moment.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE
TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA. (JUNE 2001)
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
DOCTRINE: An accused has a right to a public
trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure
that he is fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
and observe the trial process.
TICKLER:
FACTS: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga
BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized
television and radio networks throughout the
country, sent a letter requesting this Court to
allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial
of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public
of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history." The request
was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter
of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later,
by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo
Romulo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed coverage
amounts to a violation of the right to speedy,
impartial, and public trial
HELD: Yes.
Public trial ≠ publicized trial
DETAILS
US JURISPRUDENCE
➢ Television cameras are prohibited in
criminal trials.
➢ Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure - forbids the taking of
photographs during the progress of
judicial proceedings or radio
19
 broadcasting of such proceedings from
the courtroom.
➢ A trial of any kind or in any court is a
matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a
means of entertainment. To treat it so
deprives the court of the dignity which
pertains to it and departs from the
orderly and serious quest for truth for
which our judicial proceedings are
formulated.
➢ Courts do not discriminate against radio
and television media by forbidding the
broadcasting or televising of a trial while
permitting the newspaper reporter access
to the courtroom, since a television or
news reporter has the same privilege, as
the news reporter is not permitted to
bring his typewriter or printing press into
the courtroom.
Estes vs. Texas - ​the United States Supreme
Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due
process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4,
the Court through Mr. Justice Clark identified four
(4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise
from the impact of the cameras on the jury,
witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The
decision in part pertinently stated:
➢ Experience likewise has established the
prejudicial effect of telecasting on
witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened,
play to the camera, or become nervous.
They are subject to extraordinary out-of
court influences which might affect their
testimony. Also, telecasting not only
increases the trial judge's responsibility
to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant,
it may as well affect his own performance.
Judges are human beings also and are
subject to the same psychological
reactions as laymen. For the defendant,
telecasting is a form of mental
harassment and subjects him to excessive
public exposure and distracts him from
the effective presentation of his defense.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
➢ The television camera is a powerful
weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and
his case in the eyes of the public.
➢ Representatives of the press have no
special standing to apply for a writ of
mandate to compel a court to permit
them to attend a trial, since within the
courtroom, a reporter's constitutional
rights are no greater than those of any
other member of the public. Massive
intrusion of representatives of the news
media into the trial itself can so alter or
destroy the constitutionally necessary
judicial atmosphere and decorum that the
requirements of impartiality imposed by
due process of law are denied the
defendant and a defendant in a criminal
proceeding should not be forced to run a
gauntlet of reporters and photographers
each time he enters or leaves the
courtroom.
➢ Considering the prejudice it poses to the
defendant's right to due process as well
as to the fair and orderly administration
of justice, and considering further that the
freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and
satisfied by less distracting, degrading
and prejudicial means, live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings
shall not be allowed. Video footages of
court hearings for news purposes shall be
restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the
parties and their counsel taken prior to
the commencement of official
proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during
the trial proper.
IN ORDER TO PROTECT DUE PROCESS, TO
PREVENT DISTRACTION OF THE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCEEDINGS AND IN
THE LAST ANALYSIS, TO AVOID MISCARRIAGE
20
OF JUSTICE - ​the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live
radio and television coverage of court
proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for
news purposes shall be limited and restricted as
above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in
awakening public consciousness, and it has
become an important instrument in the quest for
truth.
● The Court, just recently, has taken
judicial notice of the enormous effect of
media in stirring public sentience during
the impeachment trial, a partly judicial
and partly political exercise, indeed the
most-watched program in the boob-tubes
during those times, that would soon
culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the
instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press and the right to public information, on
the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial.
When these rights race against one another,
jurisprudence tells us that the right of the
accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the
precious liberty but also the very life of an
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely
certain that an accused receives a verdict
solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate
judgment, a verdict that would come only after
the presentation of credible evidence testified
to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any
kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that
might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper influence,
and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
mind, unbridled by running emotions or
passions.
➢ Due process guarantees the accused a
presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved in a trial that is not
lifted above its individual settings nor
made an object of public's attention and
where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or
influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where
fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men
and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy
climate, with every reason to presume
firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but
it must also be conceded that "television can
work profound changes in the behavior of the
people it focuses on."
➢ The conscious or unconscious effect that
such a coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision
of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can
likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for
a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. It
might be farcical to build around them an
impregnable armor against the influence
of the most powerful media of public
opinion.
To say that actual prejudice should first be
present would leave to near nirvana the subtle
threats to justice that a disturbance of the
mind so indispensable to the calm and
deliberate dispensation of justice can create.
The effect of television may escape the
ordinary means of proof, but it is not
far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal
conception of a trial such as we know it now.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a
right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
21
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
and observe the trial process.
➢ In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as
to render the openness negligible and not
too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions,
who shall then be totally free to report
what they have observed during the
proceedings.
The courts recognize the constitutionally
embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. It also approves of media's
exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action;
nevertheless, within the courthouse, the
overriding consideration is still the paramount
right of the accused to due process which must
never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.
JUSTICE CLARK: "​while a maximum freedom
must be allowed the press in carrying out the
important function of informing the public in a
democratic society, its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of
absolute fairness in the judicial process."
ESTES v. TEXAS
"1. The potential impact of television is perhaps of
the greatest significance. From the moment the
trial judge announces that a case will be televised
it becomes a cause celebre. The whole community
becomes interested in all the morbid details
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately
assumes an important status in the public press
and the accused is highly publicized along with the
offense with which he is charged. Every juror
carries with him into the jury box these solemn
facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice
that is present in every criminal case.
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials
will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness
of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast
audience is Simply incalculable. Some may be
demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given
to overstatement; memories may falter, as with
anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of
statement may be severely undermined. Indeed,
the mere fact that the trial is to be televised might
render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby
impede the trial as well as the discovery of the
truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional
responsibilities the presence of television places
on the trial judge. His job is to make certain that
the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult
task requires his undivided attention.
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of
courtroom television on the defendant. Its
presence is a form of mental if not
physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up
or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of his
gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his
trial might well transgress his personal
sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to
concentrate on the proceedings before him
-sometimes the difference between life and death
-dispassionately, freely and without the
distraction of wide public surveillance. A
defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to
his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or
nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor
resulting from radio and television coverage will
inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice
Harlan opined that live television and radio
coverage could have mischievous potentialities for
22
intruding upon the detached atmosphere that
should always surround the judicial process.
IBP RESOLUTION
Live television and radio coverage can negate the
rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings
intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the
criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the
accused but the very credibility of the Philippine
criminal justice system, and live television and radio
coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting
throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of
judging the guilt of the accused, such that the
verdict of the court will be acceptable only if
popular; and live television and radio coverage of
the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will
only pander to the desire for publicity of a few
grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were
to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the
prosecution of cases before trial courts brought
about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial
on account of undue publicity and assailing a court
a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live
media coverage of the court proceedings because of
supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia
as having modified the case law on the matter. Just
to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its
standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991,
the Court had yet to establish the case law on the
matter, and when it did in its 23rd October
resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live
television and radio coverage of court proceedings,
that "the records of the Constitutional Commission
(were) bereft of discussion regarding the subject of
cameras in the courtroom" and that "Philippine
courts (had) not (therefore) had the opportunity to
rule on the question squarely.
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and
cited in the minority opinion really in point?
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court
and other federal courts do not allow live
television and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases
presently involved are of great dimensions so
involving as they do a former President of the
Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have
twice become the nation's focal points in the
two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and
EDSA III where the magnitude of the events
has left a still divided nation. Must these
events be invited anew and risk the relative
stability that has thus far been achieved? The
transcendental events in our midst do not
allow us to turn a blind eye to yet another
possible extraordinary case of mass action
being allowed to now creep into even the
business of the courts in the dispensation of
justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a
change in the standing rule of the court
contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991
may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not
express the popular will of the people in any
sense which, instead, are tasked to only
adjudicate justiciable controversies on the
basis of what alone is submitted before them.
A trial is not a free trade of ideas, Nor is a
competing market of thoughts the known test
of truth in a courtroom.
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent
technological and scientific advances but to
chance forthwith the life or liberty of any
person in a hasty bid to use and apply them,
even before ample safety nets are provided
and the concerns heretofore expressed are
aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
SEPTEMBER 2001 - MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Section 21, Rule 119 - Sec. 21. Exclusion of the
public. – The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the
public from the courtroom if the evidence to be
produced during the trial is offensive to decency or
23
public morals. He may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from the trial except
court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
➢ On the other hand, former President
Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection
to the live TV and radio coverage of his
trial on the ground that its allowance will
violate the ​sub judice rule and that, based
on his experience with the impeachment
trial, live media coverage will only pave
the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive
demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one
way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends
that the right of the people to information
may be served through other means less
distracting, degrading, and prejudicial
than live TV and radio
coverage.1âwphi1.nêt
➢ The Court has considered the arguments
of the parties on this important issue and,
after due deliberation, finds no reason to
alter or in any way modify its decision
prohibiting live or real time broadcast by
radio or television of the trial of the
former president. By a vote of nine (9) to
six (6) of its members,the Court denies
the motion for reconsideration of the
Secretary of Justice.
➢ In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the
trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8)
Justices, has resolved to order the
audio-visual recording of the trial.
➢ Considering the significance of the trial
before the Sandiganbayan of former
President Estrada and the importance of
preserving the records thereof, the Court
believes that there should be an
audio-visual recording of the proceedings.
The recordings will not be for live or real
time broadcast but for documentary
purposes. Only later will they be available
for public showing, after the
Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its
decision in every case to which the
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
recording pertains. The master film shall
be deposited in the National Museum and
the Records Management and Archives
Office for historical preservation and
exhibition pursuant to law.
➢ For the purpose of recording the
proceedings, cameras will be
inconspicuously installed in the
courtroom and the movement of TV
crews will be regulated, consistent with
the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in
its entirety, except such portions thereof
as the Sandiganbayan may decide should
not be held public pursuant to Rule 119,
§21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. No comment shall be included
in the documentary except annotations
which may be necessary to explain
certain scenes which are depicted. The
audio-visual recordings shall be made
under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case
may be.
REASONS
➢ There are several reasons for such
televised recording.1awphil.net First, the
hearings are of historic significance. They
are an affirmation of our commitment to
the rule that "the King is under no man,
but he is under God and the law." (Quod
Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub
Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases
involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to
know how their government is conducted.
This right can be enhanced by audio
visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education
and civic training of the people.
➢ there is the need to keep audio-visual
records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in
preserving the essence of the proceedings
in a way that the cold print cannot quite
24
 do because it cannot capture the sights
and sounds of events. They will be
primarily for the use of appellate courts in
the event a review of the proceedings,
rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan
is sought or becomes necessary. The
accuracy of the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the trial
can be checked by reference to the tapes.
➢ On the other hand, by delaying the release
of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that
those taking part in the proceedings will
be playing to the cameras and will thus be
distracted from the proper performance
of their roles -- whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges --
will be allayed.
➢ The possibility that parallel trials before
the bar of justice and the bar of public
opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent,
the just determination of the cases can be
minimized. The possibility that judgment
will be rendered by the popular tribunal
before the court of justice can render its
own will be avoided.
➢ At the same time, concerns about the
regularity and fairness of the trial --
which, it may be assumed, is the concern
of those opposed to, as much as of those
in favor of, televised trials - will be
addressed since the tapes will not be
released for public showing until after the
decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of
the tapes, much of the problem posed by
real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong - A
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long
been regarded as permissible where that person is
a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character.
NOTE: No one can prevent the making of a movie
based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
record is made of the proceedings, any movie that
may later be produced can be checked for its
accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
PAUL FREUND - ​No one could witness the trial
without a feeling of profound respect for the
painstaking way in which the truth was searched
for, for the ways whereby law copes with
uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense
of gravity with which judge and jury carried out
their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television
from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons.
And yet the use of television at a trial for
documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of
live news, and with the safeguards of
completeness and consent, is an educational
experiment that I would be prepared to welcome.
Properly safeguarded and with suitable
commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
agency of enlightenment that could have few
equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely
provided by our educational system, is now a
desperate need.
RULING: a​n audio-visual recording of the trial of
former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for
the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine
should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall
be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom
and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall
be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
25
have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan
or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the
audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the
original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
THIS CASE IS PRO HAC VICE
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: ​National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the
victims, individual journalists from various media
entities, and members of the academe filed a
petition before this Court praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these
criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g.,
still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside
the courtroom to assist the working journalists,
and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of
devices. The Court docketed the petition as A.M.
No. 10-11-5-SC.
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on
live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings. They principally urge the Court to
revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio
Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C.
Aquino’s Libel Case and the 2001 ruling in Re:
Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
Former President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings,
they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed
restrictions on constitutional rights are to be
narrowly construed and outright prohibition
cannot stand when regulation is a viable
alternative.
DETAILS
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao
Massacre Cases
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases has attracted intense media
coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime,
prominence of the accused, and the number of
media personnel killed. They inform that
reporters are being frisked and searched for
cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon
entry, and that under strict orders of the trial
court against live broadcast coverage, the number
of media practitioners allowed inside the
courtroom has been limited to one reporter for
each media institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose
Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter to Judge
Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss
concerns over media coverage of the proceedings
of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge
Solis-Reyes replied, however, that "matters
concerning media coverage should be brought to
the Court’s attention through appropriate
motion." Hence, the present petitions which assert
the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to
information, right to a fair and public trial, right to
assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances, right of free access to
courts, and freedom of association, subject to
regulations to be issued by the Court.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice
petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the trial
court proceedings, subject to the guidelines which
shall be enumerated shortly.
26

Putt’s Law states that "technology is dominated by
two types of people: those who understand what
they do not manage, and those who manage what
they do not understand." Indeed, members of this
Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the
experts’ gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee
and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the
use of technology inside the courtroom.
The indication of "serious risks" posed by live
media coverage to the accused’s right to due
process, left unexplained and unexplored in the
era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a
blow to the exercise of press freedom and the
right to public information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was
shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable
cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific
study in the Philippine setting confirms, and
which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards
and safety nets under existing rules and exacting
regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a
win-win situation that shall not compromise
rights in the criminal administration of justice,
sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and
interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity
of judicial proceedings. Compliance with
regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a
workable solution to the concerns raised in these
administrative matters, while, at the same time,
maintaining the same underlying principles
upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─
"[a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of
serious importance to all concerned and should
not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and
t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity
which pertains to it and departs from the orderly
and serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated." The observation that
"[m]assive intrusion of representatives of the
news media into the trial itself can so alter and
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere
and decorum" stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the
defendant's right to due process as well as to the
fair and orderly administration of justice, and
considering further that the freedom of the press
and the right of the people to information may be
served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading
and prejudicial means, live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings shall not be
allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of
the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and
their counsel taken prior to the commencement of
official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial
proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right
to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last
analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited
and restricted as above indicated.
The Court had another unique opportunity in
Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in a
criminal case. It held that "[t]he propriety of
granting or denying the instant petition involve[s]
the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other
hand, along with the constitutional power of a
court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair
and impartial trial." The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent
technological and scientific advances but to
chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person
in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before
ample safety nets are provided and the concerns
27
heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a
price too high to pay.
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the
Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13,
2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered
the audio-visual recording of the trial for
documentary purposes, under the following
conditions:
x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety,
excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held
public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall
be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan
or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the
audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the
original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v.
Texas20 which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited,
was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system,
where the considerations for the possible
infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose
members are not necessarily schooled in the law,
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
are different from that of a judge who is versed
with the rules of evidence.
To petitioners, Estes also does not represent
the most contemporary position of the United
States in the wake of latest jurisprudence and
statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all
50 states, except the District of Columbia,
allow television coverage with varying degrees
of openness.
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media
coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United
Kingdom’s Supreme Court are filmed, and
sometimes broadcast. The International Criminal
Court broadcasts its proceedings via video
streaming in the internet.
On the media coverage’s influence on judges,
counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that
Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical
evidence to support the sustained conclusion.
They point out errors of generalization where the
conclusion has been mostly supported by studies
on American attitudes, as there has been no
authoritative study on the particular matter
dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media
coverage on the impartiality of trial court
judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines
the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of
circumstances" test
The totality of the circumstances test refers to a
method of analysis where decisions are based on all
available information rather than bright-line rules.
Under the totality of the circumstances test, courts
focus "on all the circumstances of a particular case,
rather than any one factor"
On the media coverage’s influence on judges,
counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out
that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack
empirical evidence to support the sustained
conclusion. They point out errors of
generalization where the conclusion has been
28
mostly supported by studies on American
attitudes, as there has been no authoritative
study on the particular matter dealing with
Filipinos.
People v. Teehankee​ and ​Estrada v. Desierto
➢ the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to a
fair trial, and that there must be
allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Mere fear of possible undue
influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of
the right to a fair trial.
➢ Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample
legal remedies. He may challenge the
validity of an adverse judgment arising
from a proceeding that transgressed a
constitutional right. As pointed out by
petitioners, an aggrieved party may early
on move for a change of venue, for
continuance until the prejudice from
publicity is abated, for disqualification of
the judge, and for closure of portions of
the trial when necessary. The trial court
may likewise exercise its power of
contempt and issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the
Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the
earlier cases is the impossibility of
accommodating even the parties to the cases –
the private complainants/families of the
victims and other witnesses – inside the
courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically
discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a
right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
and observe the trial process. In the constitutional
sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities
for a reasonable number of the public to observe
the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report
what they have observed during the proceedings.
Even before considering what is a "reasonable
number of the public" who may observe the
proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal
cases is that the proceedings already necessarily
entail the presence of hundreds of families. It
cannot be gainsaid that the families of the victims
and of the 197 accused have as much interest,
beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the
proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or
trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture
that the prosecution and the defense have listed
more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial
proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether
private complainants or accused, is unfortunate
enough. What more if the right itself commands
that a reasonable number of the general public be
allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place
inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide
the only solution to break the inherent limitations
of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting
by radio and television of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following
guidelines toward addressing the concerns
mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao
massacre cases may be made both for
29
documentary purposes and for transmittal to live
radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a
letter of application, manifesting that they intend
to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings and that they have the necessary
technological equipment and technical plan to
carry out the same, with an undertaking that they
will faithfully comply with the guidelines and
regulations and cover the entire remaining
proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed.
No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the
proceedings without an application duly approved
by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be
installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to
provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of
the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be
allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or
downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The
camera and the necessary equipment shall be
operated and controlled only by a duly designated
official or employee of the Supreme Court. The
camera equipment should not produce or beam
any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or
signs showing the equipment is operating should
not be visible. A limited number of microphones
and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless
technology, must be unobtrusively located in
places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the
Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist
the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera
and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording
from inside the courtroom to the media entities
shall be conducted in such a way that the least
physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping
with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings
and the exclusivity of the access to the media
entities.
Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law
The hardware for establishing an interconnection
or link with the camera equipment monitoring the
proceedings shall be for the account of the media
entities, which should employ technology that can
(i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside
the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary
ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude
undue commotion in case of technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space
for the set-up of the media entities’ facilities, the
media entities shall access the audio-visual
recording either via wireless technology
accessible even from outside the court premises
or from one common web broadcasting platform
from which streaming can be accessed or derived
to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities
to the real-time audio-visual recording should be
protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a
particular day must be continuous and in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof where
Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court27 applies,
and where the trial court excludes, upon motion,
prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in
instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved
identification issues or there are issues which
involve the security of the witnesses and the
integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of
corroborative testimonies is material, minority of
the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the
parties, order only the pixelization of the image of
the witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of
the proceedings, no commercial break or any
other gap shall be allowed until the day’s
proceedings are adjourned, except during the
period of recess called by the trial court and
during portions of the proceedings wherein the
public is ordered excluded.
30
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the
audio output from the on-going proceedings, the
proceedings shall be broadcast without any
voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain
them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any
commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and
be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording
shall be allowed until after the finality of
judgment, except brief footages and still images
derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes
based on the recording, only for news purposes,
which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule
and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited
in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation
and exhibition in accordance with law.
practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be
observed in addition to these guidelines.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances
technology has to offer in distilling the abstract
discussion of key constitutional precepts into the
workable context. Technology per se has always
been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof
that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can
work to the advantage and furtherance of the
various rights herein involved, within the
contours of defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing
disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS
PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by
television and radio of the trial court
proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre
cases, subject to the guidelines herein
outlined.

(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings

shall be made under the supervision and control
of the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, including the
suspension or revocation of the grant of
application by the media entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special committee

which shall forthwith study, design and
recommend appropriate arrangements,
implementing regulations, and administrative
matters referred to it by the Court concerning the
live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in
accordance with the above-outlined guidelines.
The Special Committee shall also report and
recommend on the feasibility, availability and
affordability of the latest technology that would
meet the herein requirements. It may conduct
consultations with resource persons and experts
in the field of information and communication
technology.

(l) All other present directives in the conduct of

the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition
on recording devices such as still cameras, tape
recorders; and allowable number of media

Gilda Flores 1J SBU Law 31