Equal protection of the Laws

All persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to

rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
It does not forbid discrimination as to persons and things that are different.
What it forbids are distinctions based on impermissible criteria unrelated
to a proper legislative purpose, or class or discriminatory legislation, which
discriminates against some and favors others when both are similarly situated.
1. People vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937
.

Issue:
Is Act No. 4221 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause?
Ruling:
Yes, Act. No. 4221 is unconstitutional.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of
Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)
1) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited.

2) But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously,

is permitted.

The classification, however, to be reasonable

a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
b) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
c) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the
course of his oral argument,
one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so.
In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province
but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the
purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one
province while another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or
several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have
probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation,
and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to
the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that
the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of
laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality
clause but "a rope of sand".
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and
void because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.

2. Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February
17, 1968
Facts:
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer
on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Incorporated,

Issue:
Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
Ruling:
Yes, the equal protection clause was infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III)
In Felwa vs. Salas, we ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where (SuGePreBe)
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance

does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by
the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. ‘
At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to
Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

3. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
"AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO
BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN
THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT
FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated
therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00
except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries,
or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any
foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or
in kind.
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for
wanting the ordinance declared null and void:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are
thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null
and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because
the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures
and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of
the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue
measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit.
There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have
been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to
raise money under the guise of regulation.
***The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but
because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide
the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it
does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City
Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying
him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood.
4. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution.
Section 4 of the law provides that x x x Any retired elective provincial city or
municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which
he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired
(Emphasis supplied)
Issue: Is BP 52 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause by arbitrary
class legislation?
Ruling:
No. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of
equal protection is neither well taken.

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to

rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class.
For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would
be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons.
On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

!!!!!But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running
for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision.
The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the
retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again.
It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid
all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same
class
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the
objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice
Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).

5. Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June
30, 1988
Facts:
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
Issue: Whether the D.O is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause as it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills
Ruling:
No, the questioned D.O is not unconstitutional.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes.
It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.
It admits of classifications, provided that
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is
content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.
1. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the
purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of
Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible
mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment
will be for their own good and welfare.

2. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is

intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is
clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal
measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to
say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater
degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.

3. The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all

female domestic overseas workers.
 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain
women workers, and not the contrary.)

6. Himagan vs. People, G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994

Facts:
Issue: Whether a policeman who has been imposed with preventive suspension
“until the case is terminated” is violative of the equal protection clause.
Ruling:

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serous offense is reinstated

to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him
are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the
mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the
suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is

intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection
clause does not demand absolute equality.
It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such
as the one which exists in the instant case.
If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the
purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same class; and applies to
current as well as future conditions, 1the classification may not be impugned as
violating the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.
A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable,
capricious nor unfounded.
7. Almonte vs. Vazquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

Doctrine:
Issue:
Is there a violation of the equal protection of the laws on the ground that the
Office of Ombudsman may base its initial investigation on any anonymous letter
while in all other proceedings, the complaints must be verified?

Ruling:
No, there is no violation of the equal protection of the laws.

Nor is there violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . .
can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with
their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.

In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is

provided in the Constitution itself.
In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in
any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the
well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against
official wrongdoings.
As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different
from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against
them.
On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk
who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
8. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254
Issue:
Whether R.A. 8042, Section 10 which provides that In case of termination of
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less violates the equal protection clause
for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting
a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of
illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local
workers when their dismissal is declared illegal;

Ruling:
Yes, the section of the said law violates the equal protection clause.
!!!!Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent’s employment
contract is eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his
basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.
PRIOR 8042
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or
the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of
their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected
to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire
unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
ENACTMENT OF 8042
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated
rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on
their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose
contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to
the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their
salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but
all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the
latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination
among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are
illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled
to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are
illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be
covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their
salaries for three months only.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his
salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23
days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.

9. Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

Facts:
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the constitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth.
Specifically, (1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and
those holding elective positions;

Issue: Whether the questioned law and resolutions are unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause
Ruling:
No, Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional.
1. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.

On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

2. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited
from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election
except to vote.

Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding

political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election

Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials
differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of
the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by
them.

WHAT IS REALLY THE PURPOSE

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials
from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression
of the sovereign power of the people. Considering that elected officials are put in
office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they
were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost
respect for the mandate of the sovereign will.
In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
10. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7,
2010
Facts:
At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Aquino III, on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
x x x WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
Issue:
Whether the E.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Ruling:
Yes, E.O No. I is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular
act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions
created in the past. “The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and
intentional discrimination.

11. Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352

Doctrine:
Facts:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A.
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as
being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Issue: Is R.A 9262 violative of the equal protection clause?

Ruling:
No, R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender
bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out
in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally
to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long
as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence
and abuse.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the
husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC
12. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 732 SCRA 22
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months’ worth of salary,
Ruling:
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary
for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together
with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
!!!!!We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment
contracts had a term of less than one year were granted the amount equivalent to
the unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at
least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the
unexpired portions of their contracts.
CASE AT BAR
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of
the three-month equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified
accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on
July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25,
1998. “To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and
would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on
an unconstitutional provision of law.”