CONSTI II: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (Case Digests)

PEOPLE VS CAYAT
FACTS: In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin
or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay
P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this is an attempt to treat them with
discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with
their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from
Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements.

1.The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It
is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. This distinction is unquestionably reasonable,
for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
2.That it is germane/relevant to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. It has been the sad
experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
3.The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.
4.Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal
thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason
of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable
race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy
towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those
privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by

appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of
their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the
basis of true equality.
The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities."
VILLEGAS VS HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
FACTS: This case involves City Ordinance of Manila No. 637 prohibiting aliens from being
employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the
Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well
as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner,
hence this case
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider
valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not prohibit classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is
being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who
may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens
and citizens.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
FACTS: Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from
his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted. Section 4 of it specifically states:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of
the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1
hereof.Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of

the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to

run for the same elective local office from which he has retire.

This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to
run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in case of Dumlao, there is a violation of Equal Protection of the Law.
HELD: No. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against
him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the
COMELEC. This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection
is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial,
city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself
tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither
result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny
equal protection neither does it permit of such denial.Persons similarly situated are
similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not prohibit all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the appearance of younger blood

in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be
considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by
theoretical inconsistencies".

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken.The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.
The SC also pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never
been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further,
this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There
are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial
by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3 rd requisite was met.
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL VS ORMOC CITY
FACTS: Petitioner assails the validity of City Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, passed by the
Municipal Board of Ormoc City, imposing:
"On any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per
centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries."
Petitioner states the following grounds for declaring it Unconstitutional: it is violative of the Equal
Protection Clause and the Rule of Uniformity of Taxation.
ISSUE: WON City Ordinance is violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
HELD: Yes. The questioned ordinance wasnt able to meet the requisites of Reasonable
Classifictaions. It only imposes taxes upon only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
As to Uniformity f Taxes, Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code was subsequently
repealed by Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 which gave chartered cities, municipalities and
municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.

BINAY VS DOMINGO
FACTS: Resolution No. 6O re-enacted the Resolution No. 243 of the Municipality of Makati, which
reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE
TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURY.

Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati
whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The
beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred
pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.
The said Resolution was approved by the Metro Manila Commission and certified a disbursement
of 400K. It was then referred to COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA
disallowed in audit the disbursement of the funds.
Respondent COA is of the position that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the
expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the
whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a
few individuals as in the present case."
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 6 is violative of Equal Protection Clause for its purpose is only for
paupers.
HELD: No. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the
poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious
to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenantfarmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a
paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken
as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner is a member of the PNP who is criminally charged for the crime of Murder and
Attempted Murder. He was suspended based on Section 47 of RA. 6975 which states:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Relying on Sec 42 of PD. 807 and the ruling of the Court in Deloso and Layno Cases, petitioner
filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension. The Respondent Judge denied the said motion.
Hence this petition.
Sec 42 of PD. 807 -Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative
Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or employee
under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority
within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent
who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically
reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the
case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner was denied Equal Protection of the law.
HELD: No. There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and
attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which
specifically applies to members of the PNP.
Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that
he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension
shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section
requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in
the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive
suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the
trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law. When the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a
member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law
exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against
him is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed
to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under

Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.
As to petitioners contention in the ruling to Layno and Deloso Case, the Court held that he
misplaced such contention. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019
(1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike, R.A. 6975, is
silent on the duration of the preventive suspension.
Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
TABLARIN VS GUTIERREZ
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board
of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial
court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act
of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians;
and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified
in Section 5 of the statute include the following
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants
the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has
not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree

in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from
the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing
in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in
addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.
This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument
toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its
calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.
The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently
called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate
of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein
as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a
word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order
is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue
that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,
and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement
of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought
by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the
NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly

effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
- Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that
that portion of the MECS Order which provides that the cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board
of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.
(Emphasis supplied)
-It infringes the requirements of EQUAL PROTECTION. They assert, in other words, that
students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected
to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are
discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The
force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different
school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus,
the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the
number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the
number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score
attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current
year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of
changes in circumstances from year to year, may result in an unreasonable rigidity. The
above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the
Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances
as they change.