FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly
salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.Hence, Serrano refused to stay on
as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment
clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or
calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the
dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. BSP

FACTS:
The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the creation of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.Other
Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended their charters.
After almost 8 years following the amendment of the GFIs’ charters, BSP’s employees, through petitioner,
filed a petition for prohibition against the BSP and the Executive Secretary to restrain the respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the New Central Bank Act (i.e., the exemption from the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary grade of 19 and the non-exemption of those having a salary
grade under 19). They alleged its constitutionality for being an invalid “class legislation”.

ISSUES:
Is the proviso unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause?

HELD:
Yes,
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above)
from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers
and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the resulting discrimination or
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, in
the subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters of other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of the case
changed.
The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-
and-file employees of the exemption from SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
 PEOPLE VS CAYAT

FACTS:
Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes,
was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1
gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who
is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink
any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the
constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws,
violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is discriminatory and denial of equal protection of the laws

HELD:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon
“accident of birth or parentage,” as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture.
“The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly,
to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities.” The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-
Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

FACTS:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.”

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that It denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no
conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause
“does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

VILLEGAS vs. HUI CHIUNG TSAI PAO HO

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the
diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and
another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as
to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of
the ordinance is 3 to 6 months’ imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.

ISSUE:
Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

HELD:
The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens
who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider
difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or
executive.
The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to
aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers.

VERA vs. CUEVAS

FACTS:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products
throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold
under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand
"Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent,
Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal
purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other
private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not
bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure
to comply will result to penalties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

HELD:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms
"skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the
scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part."
In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem
generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy
for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective provincial
city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law
and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges that the
provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

HELD:
In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work
is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as
that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

PJA V. PRADO

FACTS: The petitioners in this case are members of the lower courts. They assailed the constitutionality of Section
35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. It withdrew
the franking privilege from the SC, the CA, the RTC, the Metropolitan TC, the Municipal TC, and the Land Registration
Commission and Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.The petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: its title embraces more than one subject and does not express
its purposes; it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354, as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
Circular No.92-28, violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: Yes..
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar
to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.7The only acceptable
reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation for a
smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. There is no question that if there is any
major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department.

CENIZA V. COMELEC

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Bilang 51, the COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in
chartered cities, highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities from voting in provincial
elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized
one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in
behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the
constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution.
They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

RULING:
The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial
officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which
violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.
The petitioner’s allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit; it has no factual or legal basis. It is prospective
in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June
1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular
annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City
are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial
officials.

NUNEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused
before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.
It is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex
post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to equal
protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there
is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other
estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts,
i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be
concerned.

RULING:no. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction
over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention
of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such
court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force,
that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution..

VILLEGAS V. SUBIDO

FACTS: Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the
City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under
Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that
appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that
putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and placing them under manual labor
exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded
Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of
the President hence the same is no longer in effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service
Commissioner.

RULING: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on his
own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he
appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers
would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule
justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights.