1

THIRD DIVISION HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the same as Paciencia
G.R. No. 176240              October 17, 2008 business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E- b) Separation Pay     = ₱6,175.00
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its pool of Feb. 2, 1999 to July 15, 2001
ALEJANDRO ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2
PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR PACIENCIA, petitioners, E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with Total   = ₱32,015.00
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able III – Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended    
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE, INC., respondents. Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter Complaint)
DECISION refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: actually or constructively, thus, petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC were without (same as Paciencia)
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the basis.
b) Separation Pay     = ₱7,410.00
Decision1 dated 24 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912,
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners were March 8, 1998 to July 15, 2001
which affirmed the Decision dated 22 January 2003 of the National Labor Relations
regular employees of HI; (b) whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc.
employment; and (c) whether petitioners were entitled to their money claims. Total   = ₱33,250.00
(HI) is a legitimate independent job contractor and that the petitioners were not illegally
dismissed from work; and the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006 of the same court IV – Petronillo Carcedo    
denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners. On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a (same as Paciencia)
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),3 a banking entity duly organized and legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial b) Separation Pay     = ₱41,990.00
existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own Sept. 16, 1984 to July 15, 2001
Services4 with HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code.16 HI is therefore a labor- = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2
providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance to petitioners. According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez: = ₱190.00 x 26 days
services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners Rolando Total   = ₱72,770.00
Sasan, Sr.,5 Leonilo Dayday,6 Modesto Aguirre,7 Alejandro Ardimer,8 Eleuterio [T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not only
as janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an V – Rolando Sasan, Sr.    
Sacil,9 Wilfredo Juegos,10 Petronilo Carcedo,11 and Cesar Peciencia12 were among those a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly related to the main business of the
principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent Equitable- (same as Paciencia)
Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas.13
PCI Bank’s principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare that the b) Separation Pay     = ₱29,640.00
[petitioners] are employees of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked October 1989 to July 15, 2001
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City
with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1) year, they are deemed = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2
separate complaints14 against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for
separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorney’s fees and regular employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from employment without c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
costs. Their complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-2001 and cause and without due process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the severance of = ₱190.00 x 26 days
raffled to Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for their proper their employment in the guise of termination of contract is illegal.17 Total   = ₱60,420.00
disposition. Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the petitioners15 amended their VI – Leonilo Dayday    
complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay. In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
awarded to petitioners the following amounts: (same as Paciencia)
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties b) Separation Pay     = ₱44,460.00
still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez I. – CESAR PACIENCIA    
Feb. 8, 1983 to July 15, 2001
ordered that they submit their respective position papers. a) Backwages
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of = ₱190.00 per day        = ₱25,840.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having = 5 months and 6 days
Total   = ₱75,240.00
continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than = 136 days x ₱190.00
one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and VII – Eleuterio Sacil    
b) Separation Pay       =₱12,350.00
methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was June 10, 1996 to July 15, 2001 a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular = 5 years (same as Paciencia)
employees of E-PCIBank. =₱190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2 b) Separation Pay     = ₱22,230.00
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00 June 2, 1992 to July 15, 2001
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an = ₱190.00 x 26 days = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2
independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
Total   ₱43,130.00
janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners’ wages, = ₱190.00 x 26 days
II – Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended    
monitored petitioners’ daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct Total = ₱53,010.00
Complaint)
control and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to VIII – Mario Juntilla    
a) Backwages     = ₱25,840.00
terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
July 15, 2001 to January 15, 2002
misdeed HI had committed against its employees. (same as Pacencia)
 2

b) Separation Pay     = ₱34,580.00 Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and
8. Mario Juntilla - 65,360.00
October 7, 1987 to July 15, 2001 severally22 pay the complainants of their 13th month pay and attorney’s fees in the
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2 aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Two and 00/100
9. Wilfredo Juegos - 57,950.00
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00 (₱43,472.00), broken down as follows:
= ₱190.00 x 26 days 10. Modesto Aguirre - 54,245.00
Total   = ₱65,360.00
IX – Wilfredo Juegos     11. Alejandro Ardimer - 59,185.00
a) Backwages     = ₱25,840.00
(same as Pacencia) TOTAL - ₱606,575.0018 1. Aguirre, Modesto - P 5,434.00
b) Separation Pay     = ₱27,170.00
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI
July 23, 1990 to July 15, 2001 2. Ardimer, Alejandro - 5,434.00
appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2
were docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002. In support of its allegation that it
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,840.00 3. Carcedo, Petronilo - 5,434.00
was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents
= ₱190.00 x 26 days which it did not present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
Total   = ₱57,950.00 4. Dayday, Leonilo - 5,434.00
X – Modesto Aguirre     1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing
a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00 Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation 5. Juegos, Wilfredo - 5,434.00
(same as Paciencia) of HI showing therein that it increased its authorized capital stock from ₱1,500,000.00
b) Separation Pay     to ₱20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and Exchange Commission; 6. Juntilla, Mario - 5,434.00
= Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001 = ₱23,465.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2 2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets of 7. Paciencia, Cesar - 5,434.00
₱20,939,935.72 as of 31 December 2000;
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
8. Sacil, Eleuterio - 5,434.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days 3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-
Total   = ₱54,245.00 00582 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with Market TOTAL   ₱43,472.0023
XI – Alejandro Ardimer Value of ₱1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue (now Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City,
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution
and
(same as Paciencia) dated 1 July 2003.24
b) Separation Pay   = ₱28,405.00 4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court of
= Jan. 20, 1990 to July 15, 2001 that it has a commercial building constructed on the preceding lot located along Bacalso
Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2 Avenue, Cebu City with market value of ₱2,515,170.00.19
Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79912.
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the
Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence
Total = ₱59,185.00 NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss
presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a
xxxx petitioners:
highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered engaged in "labor-only contracting." As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job contractor,
directing the respondents Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc. to pay jointly and respondent HI illegally dismissed the petitioners. We rule in the negative.
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:
solidarily the complainants as follows:
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely
expired on July 15, 2000. The record shows that after said expiration, respondent HI
1. Cesar Paciencia - P 43,130.00 eight (8) days from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were placed on a temporary
offered the petitioners new work assignments to various establishments which are HI’s
"off-detail," they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and amended their complaints
clients. The petitioners, therefore, were not even placed on "floating status." They
2. Dominador Suico, Jr. - 32,015.00 on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their services were
simply refused, without justifiable reason, to assume their new work assignments which
already terminated. Temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.20
refusal was tantamount to abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners
3. Roland Mosquera - 33,250.00
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrez’s award of backwages and separation pay, are not entitled to backwages or separation pay.26
4. Petronilo Carceda - 72,770.00 but affirmed his award for 13th month pay and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:
(10%) of the 13th month pay, to the petitioners.21 Thus, the NLRC decreed in its 22
5. Roland Sasan, Sr. - 60,420.00 January 2003 Decision, the payment of the following reduced amounts to petitioners: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the NLRC,
6. Leonilo Dayday - 75,240.00 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez
Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-2003 promulgated on June 22, 2003.27
dated 7 January 2002 is MODIFIED, to wit:
7. Eleuterio Sacil - 53,010.00 Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN
EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH DIVISION’S DECISION AND
GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED
BY RESPONDENTS DURING APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME
THE NLRC RAB 7’S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S
PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING OF
NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY
CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
COMPLAINTS WERE PREMATURELY FILED.28
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues
raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue,
however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases29 allowing the NLRC to
admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for
the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases.
Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process.30
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New
Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are
not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial
justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider
evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time
on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the
other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.31
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we again
emphasized that:
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on
appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as
technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are
mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC,
and Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that even if
the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced
on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting
the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence can no
longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more
consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
3
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners’ protestations against the
documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies.
Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3,
Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. – Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of
Court33 were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given
mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered
by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts.
Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds
from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments
contained in position papers and other documents.34
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this
Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentary evidence
presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to
complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is
also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is
not the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that
constitutes violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every
opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against
them. They had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own
substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the
NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely raising
unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties’ evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by petitioners for
our consideration, particularly, whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank
should be deemed petitioners’ principal employer; and whether petitioners were
illegally dismissed from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a
principal agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance
or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined
period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed
within or outside the premises of the principal.35 A person is considered engaged in
legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and
undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own
responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and
direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work
except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the
contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health
standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social
and welfare benefits.36
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the
contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job,
work or service for a principal.37 In labor-only contracting, the following elements are
present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to
actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.38
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only
contracting,39 we elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,40 that it
is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the following: whether or
not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the
work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the
performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to
another; the employer’s power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the
contractor’s workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools,
appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and manner or terms of
payment.41 Simply put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the
case are to be considered.42 Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the
features of the relationship are to be considered.43
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Certificate of Registration44 Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate
states among other things:
"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor Code, as
amended, and its Implementing Rules and having paid the registration fee in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt Number 9042769,
dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended, and
its Implementing Rules specifically Department Order No. 10 series of 1997, I have
hereunto set my hand and affixed the Official on this 23rd day of December 1997."45
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption
that it was issued in the regular performance of official duty.46 In the absence of proof,
petitioner’s bare assertion cannot prevail over this presumption. Moreover, the DOLE
being the agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of independent job
contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to the contrary that it

thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the
issuance of the Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent
business from E-PCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform
janitorial and messengerial services, clearly distinguishable from the banking services
in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible job
contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez still declared that HI was engaged in prohibited
labor-only contracting because it did not possess substantial capital or investment to
actually perform the job, work or service under its own account or responsibility. Both
the NLRC and the Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization
in the case of corporations, tools, equipments, implements, machineries and work
premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the
performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.47 An independent
contractor must have either substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others. The law does not require both
substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.48 It
is enough that it has substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI
has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove
that it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only" contracting.49 There is even no
need for HI to refute the contention of petitioners that some of the activities they
performed such as those of messengerial services are directly related to the principal
business of E- PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the
petitioners as janitors, messengers and drivers are considered directly related to the
principal business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless, they are not
necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANK’s) principal business.50
HI has substantial capital in the amount of ₱20,939,935.72. It has its own building
where it holds office and it has been engaged in business for more than a decade
now.51 As observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well-established business
entity cannot be considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and
engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the
presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control
of the putative employee’s conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-
called "control test."52
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee
relationship to wit, the selection and engagement of the employee is shown by the fact
that it was HI which selected and engaged the services of petitioners as its employees.
This is fortified by the provision in the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank
which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the selection,
engagement, investigation, discipline and discharge of its employees.53
4
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid petitioners
their wages and who provided their daily time records and uniforms and other materials
necessary for the work they performed. Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for
petitioner’s claims for wages and other employee’s benefits. Precisely, the contract of
services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries,
allowances, overtime and holiday pay, and other benefits of its personnel including
withholding taxes.54
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employee’s conduct, and the fourth
requisite regarding the power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the power to
control petitioners with respect to the means and methods by which their work was to
be accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal over the petitioners. All that E-
PCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward act, negligence, misconduct or
malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. The contract of services
between E-PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states:
[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who
may be fielded to [E-PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor
of its employees who may be fielded to the Bank and which regular supervisor shall
exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions defined in Section 1
hereof. x x x.55
All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under
its own responsibility, according to its own manner and method, and free from the
control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is limited only
to the result of the work, independent job contracting exists. The janitorial service
agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is definitely a case of permissible job
contracting.
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private,
as well as in government institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor
to perform special services,56 ranging from janitorial, security and even technical
services, we can only conclude that HI is a legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate
job contractor, the law creates an employer-employee relationship between HI and
petitioners57 which renders HI liable for the latter’s claims.
In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees
of E-PCIBank regardless of how long they were working for the latter.58
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the
termination of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot
insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not
constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank;
and second, they were pulled out from said assignment due to the non-renewal of the
Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed their complaints
with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were only "off-
detail" pending their re-assignment by HI to another client. And when they were
actually given new assignments by HI with other clients,59 petitioners even refused the
same. As the NLRC pronounced, petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal is
apparently premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated 24 April 2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180291               July 27, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F.
GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the
GSIS, Petitioners,
vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ,
RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and
ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service Commission's Resolution No.
062177.
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth
Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco,
and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative
Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to
Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, committed as follows:
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees,
marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation
Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
x x x           x x x          x x x
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS
management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred
by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing
as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution
No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited
Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some
employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.2
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated
May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis
Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU),
Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents
requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they
should not be administratively dealt with.3
Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two
others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that
there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to the

office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union
president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were
interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza
submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-
IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a
copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.4
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each of the
respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit their
written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof.5 None was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding
all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1)
year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the
lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the
penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right to due
process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,
x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a
public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants'
(respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their
Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS
management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a
constitutionally guaranteed right.6 x x x
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.7 The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be
punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the
respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service. Only
about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office, joined the
activity sought to be punished. These employees, now respondents in this case, were
assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the belated claim of
the petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance inside the
petitioner GSIS' premises during office hours, there is nothing in the record that could
support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS was affected or
reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the Investigation Unit.
Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the
Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling of Atty. Molina's
case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before
petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the
gathering was made to demand or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the
GSIS management or from the government. In fact, in the separate formal charges filed
against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to or
appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco,
the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus, petitioners are aware at the
outset that the only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to
5
show support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The
belated assertion that the intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt
the operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario
Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.8
Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review
presenting the following:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I
WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE
TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE
ANSWER, WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE
FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
II
WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE
EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES AN
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE FULL
PROBATIVE VALUE TO UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT FORM
PART OF THE CASE RECORD.
III
WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BASED ON
EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT MAKES A CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON
THE ALLEGATIONS OF A DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED PART OF THE
CASE RECORDS IS VALID.
IV
WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO UNRULY MASS
GATHERING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES
AND WITHIN OFFICE HOURS, IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE SAID
EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE SERVICE PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO. 021316.
V of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly
WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES,
LASTING FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE
OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE
APPEARANCE OF THEIR LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.
VI
WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR
POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR TO HOLD AN UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE
OFFICE PREMISES ONLY CONSTITUTES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE
OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS.9
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of
explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents
never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that there being
no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should have been
deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material averment
in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to
recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule
1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other
cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules,
Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-
04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of
the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered
to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in
proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an
answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in
the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the
burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a
"suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies."10 It means
that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an
insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules
stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and
evidence submitted by the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this
case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed
admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and
incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint.11 Thus, even if
respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the
complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the
forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget
that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the
petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint or in the formal charges.12
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was
resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents' evidence, but on
the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without the
respondents' respective answer to the separate formal charges in accordance with
Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative proceeding
and having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting their responsive
answer and evidence for the defense, petitioners were in the most advantageous

position to prove the merit of their allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner
Winston Garcia issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases
against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were duly
submitted and justly considered independent of the weakness of respondent's evidence
in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof belongs to the one who alleges and not
the one who denies."13
On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of whether
or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316. Stated
differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a
"prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:
Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity or
mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees organizations, with
intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands
of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the
government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
(underscoring supplied)
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or
mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can be deemed an
exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent
reason to deviate therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the
political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action
proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly
colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them
recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM
Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all
collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.
Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government
service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights
and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It
would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof
have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated
only but can never be taken away.
A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he
himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the twenty or so
GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there or just
simply appeared there simultaneously.14 Thus, the petitioners were not even sure if the
spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27, 2005 was a
concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the basis
for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,
6
Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the Investigation
Unit during this time. The rest abandoned their post and duties for the duration of this
incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also observed that the protesters, some of
whom raised their clenched left fists, carefully planned this illegal action as evident in
their behavior of arrogance, defiance and provocation, the presence of various
recording gadgets such as VCRs, voice recorders and digital cameras, the bad mouthing
of the security guards and the PGM, the uniformity in their attire and the collusion
regarding the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to the premises as reported
earlier.15
The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show respondents'
unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work. It also failed to show that
their purpose was to demand a force concession.
In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS,16 the Court
upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering between 300
and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or demonstration
outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so
employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU
office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most
certainly be unfair and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's
right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a
broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First
Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters.17 In said case, the New York
Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit
service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their
uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition
to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule
and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though
recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the
NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."
In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital
District,18 it was held that,
A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union
organization drive constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and the county's
proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress code was
outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and
associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button.19
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals as well
as its October 16, 2007 Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 98952 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime
of rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of violence and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent; and the above-
named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of
the victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill
the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete
hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
Contrary to Law.1
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in
Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age
and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school
dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations
on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and
more than P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his
house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be
taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched
her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant
dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there
until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to
their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete
fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen
and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot.
When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her
moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the
other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned
it.2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was
discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled
toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of
"traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.

2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width,
from right MCL to left AAL.
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed
vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed negative
for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S.
de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to
Traumatic Injuries, Face.3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio
Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal.
Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a
broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found
a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's.4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the
wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and
learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant
also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to
the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants
with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The
clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to
appellant.5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay
Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep
and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially,
appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police
confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found
in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and
Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he
knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne.6 Immediately, the police
took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were
likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the
house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags
which were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were
taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags.7
7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The
following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the suspects by
the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran.8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions
(scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in
size Lt.9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him
and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office
of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the
door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The
mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he
ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor,
the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant
confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them
the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom
he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also
said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid
he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and
asked the mayor to help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and
27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again
interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in
the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos
attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00
P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at
8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to
collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his
father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they
stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the
rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They
coerced him to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. When he refused, they
pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened,
appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he
saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the
old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot. Fearing
for his life, appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced
him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant
to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial
expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby is
found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the
Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous
crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
family of Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne
Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision becomes final and
executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic
Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED
ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION,
THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION
WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three
policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to
whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on
photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the
commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor
and the news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .

Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary rule is premised on the
presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of
custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of
what really transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person
under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC
and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry
about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before
the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4
Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the
house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we
asked Romano Calma who were his other companions in the house, he said that, it was
Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and whose whereabouts were
unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that his
parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and
investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the
culprit. 26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It
is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he
was investigated and interrogated. 27 His confession is therefore inadmissible in
evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar
Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
8
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked as
Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal of
the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were
located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know where
the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the place
where the bags were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really showed
where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police.
They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor
Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a
private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed
the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many people
from the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to talk
to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of
police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of
Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I
will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was telling this
to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what
he was going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he
admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera. 30
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you something
and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of Police and you
stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang
pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the
second one was before the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further
admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going to say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession
before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered
appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor
as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him
did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.
The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by
the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to
the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions
were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in
evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on
Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on
video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in
the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell
the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified
that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place where
the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your interview, in what particular
place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police
station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir.
At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I also
learned from him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for raping
and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was voluntary
or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on his person
because I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was
admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was under the
influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle
beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime
scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the scene
inside the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or any
threatening nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I
was able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was
the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the
scene of the crime where the reenactment and everything that transpired during the
killing of Marianne Guevarra.

Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the
accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag PNP,
you also went to the scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and some
of the relatives of the accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at that
time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag,
Bulacan, what transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was
committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I
tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how he
carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up
to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the
proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so that
we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of
police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other persons.
I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after the suspect
admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to the
suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a
capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do
you really admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the
affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures
of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of Inday
Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect answered the
same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa
ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong
kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa
pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
9
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped his
mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic
magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost everyday
before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and
the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really down
physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that
fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 41
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26,
1994. 42 He also testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the
permission that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the
chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was
suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There were
people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from
the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the wife
but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions that I
asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know
what question did you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a
tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim
was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue
influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when
they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the direction and control of
the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not
force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the
crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed
him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the
news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive
atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section
12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. 46 It governs
the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the
individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken
away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental
power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical
evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial
Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent
physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr.
Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His
findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had
lacerations, thus:
Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3
o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused
by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive, indicating
the possibility of penetration. 52 His testimony is as follows:
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock
position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.

Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the lacerations,
I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver was
merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before you did you
re-autopsy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have been
sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim which
was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds could produce
blood because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I
presumed that when the doctor examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor,
vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is impossible
that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those instruments because the
victim was already dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted blood
at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been
inflicted or could have been sustained while the victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds,
now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges of
the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock.
I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges of the
lacerated wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that small
opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not
negate the commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of
the hymen. 55 What is essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no
matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the
lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have
been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are
supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the
witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near
appellant's house; 57
10
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their
house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a
meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at the
pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged
over a flat rough surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence
and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his
house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive
for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the victim. 61 Marianne 's
exact blood type was not determined but her parents had type "A" and type
"AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be type "O,"
appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were
later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial
evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi
cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the commission of
the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away from Concepcion
Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito
Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide
under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court,
however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.
 PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and
unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not
only her future but of the youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national
hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by
another tragic desecration of human dignity, committed no less upon a child, who at the
salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock on the portals of womanhood,
and met her untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically evil act" of non-consensual
sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an ignominious
crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational
justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the horrible
experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of
appellant, as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record: 1*
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November
20, 1953. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction
adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen.
T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. But he stayed and slept in an apartment also
owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house (TSN, September 6,
1995, pp. 5-10).
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She
used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching maya birds together with other children. While they were playing, appellant
was always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank
(TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995, pp.17; 20-22).
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking
spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left
Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends (TSN,
September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the
compound, saw Ma.Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside
Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house was
about 8 meters away from Rivera's store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's
house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip of
President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On his
way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That same
evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate
of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy
lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice that
appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was
drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he
did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the compound (TSN, September 18,
1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last
saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon,
printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers (TSN,
August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following
day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney

driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the bridge
of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp.
4-9; September 27, l995; pp. 14-17).
That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria
inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents,
Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved
from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face
bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of the left eye, lateral aspect,
2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and
left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior
aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5
cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0
cm elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm, forearms, left, posterior aspect,
lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right antero-lateral
aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and
left antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 X 1.0 cm. lateral
mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural
petechial hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury,
Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock
position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN,
August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126).
Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were
informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According
to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the apartment since whenever
he would go out, he would normally return on the same day or early morning of the
following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-11-27).
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant was
working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded to said
place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that appellant used to work at the
factory but she did not know his present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the
other hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace
Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
11
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house
under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to
belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of
blue slippers which Isip identified as that of appellant. Also found in the yard, three
armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of
dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's belongings.
These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13;
August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the
office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the
victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay
Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On
July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-
judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim.
Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided
to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and
Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp. 13-21).
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an
Information which reads:2
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y
CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN
Y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said
sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA
CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
Contrary to law.3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death
and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by electricution (sic). He is
likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial
and wake of the victim.
Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc  pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code. (RPC), as amended,5 appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In his testimony summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his
version of what transpired as follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking spree.
Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellant's employer. After consuming
three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by Isip to clean the jeepney. He
finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 o'clock noon. Then he had lunch and took a bath.
Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He also
asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5-5).
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to
rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one
case of red horse beer. Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at
Gregorio Rivera's house. They went to Zaldy's house and bought a bottle of gin. They
finished drinking gin around 8 o'clock p.m. After consuming the bottle of gin, they
went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was already 9 o'clock
in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet. After
giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp.
6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina
Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to
Isip's apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to sleep at the second
floor of Isip's unfinished house. Around 10 o'clock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived
carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the room where appellant was
sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed
him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill him. He, however, refused to
follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead
body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank.
Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him again, they
would kill him. At 4 o'clock the following morning, he left the compound and
proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The
police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There,
appellant heard the police officer's plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he
was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he
was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the
review thereof since "there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe . . . than
the termination of a human life." 7 For life, once taken is like virginity, which once
defiled can never be restored. In order therefore, that appellant's guilty mind be
satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant's proffered
excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the commission of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not necessarily
absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence8 and pursuant to

settled jurisprudence, 9 conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that
the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.10 Facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute
evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its
effect upon the court.11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence,
which upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant's guilt
beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST — Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the
unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic tank where the body of
Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is located,
categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry
Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the compound of her sister-in-law
Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle (lugaw). That
she noticed the accused's hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in sigsagging
manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply. That the
accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but went inside the
compound.
SECOND — Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C. Suni, categorically testified that on
June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws house,
he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-law's residence
which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he
also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
THIRD — Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where
victim's body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is
her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a
Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to leave. That after finishing some
work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part
of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the next
morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in Batangas
on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH — Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying
the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Dian St., Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the
passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning
and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.
12
FIFTH — Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a
clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated or
there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of any
evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be
given full faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA
276,. 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH — Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having
been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes
of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission
of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of
Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That
accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person
(People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984;150 SCRA 311). He did not even
informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8,
1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That his
confession abound with details know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from
the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty.
Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was
present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given
by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful
and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the
physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the cause of
death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory
substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the victim and
the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos
tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog siya tapos ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There
were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was
mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a
result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct facts
narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and
freely or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6
SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH — Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was notable to
enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he
proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said while sleeping
Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of the victim and dumped it inside his
room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex with the dead body
but he refused. That the two asked him to assist them in dumping the dead body of the
victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is
unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment and not
in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that night of
June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was already closed. The
Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the
second floor of the unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the room
at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping,
why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to be disposed/dump
later in the septic tank located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can easily disposed
and dumped the body in the septic tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where
accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead
body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except it's conformity to aver
knowledge observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous. (People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT — If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col.
Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who interviewed him. His
failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An innocent person will at once
naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of preservation and
self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence
therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not
innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH — The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his
consciousness of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after the incident
and did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995. 12
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:13
1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution;
and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with
homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious: and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed the penalty
shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children
or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation. 14
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime
against chastity,15 although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has
since been re-classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and
thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a
woman by force and without consent. 16 (Under the new law, rape may be committed
even by a woman and the victim may even be a
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes
immaterial18 not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, 19 but the
absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction
will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of
age or over at the time she was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of
sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other element that the perpetrator's evil
acts with the offended party was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat
needs to be established. Both elements are present in this case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately
proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post
mortem examination on the child's body:
Q: And after that what other parts or the victim did you examine?
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock
position and that the edges were congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of an
organ.
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?
A: Adult male organ, sir.
13
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness? In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim's vagina;
A: I am very sure of that.20 rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to
Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself consummate the sexual intercourse. 22 The mere touching by the male's organ or
admitted that he had sexual congress with the unconscious child. instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the woman's private parts is sufficient
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon? to consummate rape.
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na
ginagawa, tapos dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed
ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na,
employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant's own account, he
nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.
pushed the victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
was at that instance that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires.
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigator's table.
Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it
Subject evidence were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).
could safely be concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?
defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.
18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN. Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession, which he,
19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?. however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his
S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas. contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted,
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari? warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer:
petsa, basta araw ng Linggo.
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
Q — Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.
A — We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta
22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?
and we were told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to
S: Hindi ko po alam.
confess of the crime of, I think, rape with homicide.
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni
Q — And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other
rape at pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ha ito?
person present?
S: Oho.
A — Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
S: Naka-isa po.
Q — And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused
25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng "NAKARAOS", maaari
already there?
bang ipaliwanag mo ito?
A — The accused was already there.
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
Q — Was he alone?
26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte na katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?
A — He was alone, sir.
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.
Q — So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong
Officers, what did they tell you, if any?
ginawa?
A — They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to
S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
confess of the crime charged, sir.
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?
Q — By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
A — Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney's Office.
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso negra na sinasabi mo?
Q — Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused?
S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
A — No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
Q — But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
A — Yes, sir.
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
Q — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period
S: Natatakot po ako.
start?
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
A — If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
Q — And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?
you did as assisting lawyer to the accused?
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.
A — First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
Q — What are those right?
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
A — That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa
own choice and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he
ba siya o patay na?
has the right to refuse to answer any question that would incriminate him.
S: Buhay pa po.
Q — Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
you recall whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.21
writing?
A — Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.

Q — I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing,
will you be able to recognize the same?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document
you mentioned?
A — Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A. proper.
Q — Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused
whether you asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
A — I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.
Q — But you were present?
A — I was then present when he signed.
Q — There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and
after there are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures?
A — These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.
Q — The signature of whom?
A — The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compañero
be encircled and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q — After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining
to him in Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
A — Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.
Q — What was the reply?
A — He said "Opo".
Q — Did you ask him of his educational attainment?
A — It was the Police Officer who asked him.
Q — In your presence?
A — In my presence, sir.
Q — And when he said or when he replied "Opo" so the question started?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present
also when he signed this waiver?
A — Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q — Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
A — I had also explained to him, sir.
Q — In Filipino?
A — In Tagalog, sir.
Q — And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten
name Larry Mahinay, "Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is that?
A — This is also signed in my presence.
Q — Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A — He signed in my presence, sir.
Q — And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry
Mahinay subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this
signature?
A — This is my signature, sir.
Q — And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have
personally examined the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary
executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you recognize the signature?
A — This is also my signature, sir.23 (emphasis supplied).
Appellant's defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim
and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor
Van Fleet of New Jersey, 24
14
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, (emphasis supplied).
but must be credible in itself - such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test or the truth
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant
of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
tried to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of
the time he committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition
judicial cognizance.
of death if the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission
of the crime.31 Again, the record rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled proven to be already more than 20 years of age when he did the heinous act.
is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a
matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.25 In this case, the trial
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by
court's findings, conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on
present amended law, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-
appeal with the highest respect, 26 the same being supported by substantial evidence on
five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).32 In addition to such indemnity, she can also recover
record. There was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded
moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code 33 in such amount as the
relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the
court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis
outcome of this case27 or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the
thereof. 34 Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
court below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal
damages. 35 The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in
witnesses for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such
Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is "recognized that the
motive exists. 28 Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who
victim's injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious
testified against appellant.
crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages". 36 Thus, it was held that a
conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim without
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 37
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 "when by
reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended
This special complex crime is treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape - that
by one or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil
is, when any of the 7 (now 10) "attendant circumstances" enumerated in the law
Code38 after proof that the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and
is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is death. In cases where any of
compensatory damages. 39 Under the circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to
those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except  if
the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
moral damages.
under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper
penalty in accordance with Article 53 of the RPC However, if any of those
circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence
circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the
penalty because Article 63 of the RPC in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting,
to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at
circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial
circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating interrogation 40 in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act
circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death - subject to the usual proof of No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either
such circumstance in either case. by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become
insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the
crime of "rape with homicide", the court has no option but to apply the same 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
"regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and
commission of the crime"29 in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
amended. 30 This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of death which is communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as amended,
which provides:
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that anystatement he
makes may be used as evidence against him;
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under
existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority
vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua. 4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any

person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or
messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed
that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be
warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any
time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that
once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any
time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court — although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray  42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional — nevertheless submit to the ruling of
the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty
should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award
of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS
P50,000.00 moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005
15
CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA, Petitioners, that private complainant Atty. Manuel Hontanosas (Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. four (4) criminal cases for libel against petitioner Torralba, three of which – Crim.
DECISION Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 – were then pending with the RTC, Branch
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: III, Tagbilaran City. As the evidence for the prosecution as well as the defense were
This is a petition for review on certiorari  of the Decision1 promulgated on 22 May substantially the same, petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with consolidated with the three other cases so as to save time, effort, and to facilitate the
modification, the trial court’s2 decision finding petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" early disposition of these cases.
Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
In its order dated 25 May 1998,7 the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner
Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called "Tug-Ani ang
Torralba was granted by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.
Lungsod" which was aired over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September
1994, an information for libel was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information states: During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as
witnesses Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento.
The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses
CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services,
follows: Inc. (TMSI) and was at that time the assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City.
According to him, sometime during the Marcos administration, petitioner Torralba
sought TMSI’s sponsorship of his radio program. This request was approved by private
That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI. During the
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
existence of said sponsorship agreement, the management of TMSI noticed that
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and malicious intent of
petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of Internal Revenue
maligning, impeaching and discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and
Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs
honor of late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI
collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was behind the incessant
Judge of Cebu and a man of good reputation and social standing in the community and
criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI decided to cease sponsoring
for the purpose of exposing him to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in
petitioner Torralba’s radio show. In effect, the TMSI sponsored "Tug-Ani ang
his radio program "TUG-ANI AND LUNGSOD" (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio
Lungsod" for only a month at the cost of ₱500.00.
station DYFX, openly, publicly and repeatedly announce[d] the following: "KINING
MGA HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS UG CASTOR HONTANOSAS, MGA
COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA YUTANG Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim testified
NATAWHAN." X X X. "DUNAY DUGO NGA PAGKATRAYDOR ANG AMAHAN NI that petitioner Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage law and that
MANOLING HONTANOSAS," which in English means: "THESE HONTANOSAS, said corporation was charging higher handling rates than what it was supposed to
AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR HONTANOSAS, ARE collect.
COLLABORATORS DURING THE WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE
TRAITORS TO THE LAND OF THEIR BIRTH." X X X. "THE FATHER OF
On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in petitioner
MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD TREACHEROUS BLOOD," and other words of
Torralba’s radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said incident,
similar import, thereby maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito
however, petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and its management. It was
Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas,3 one of the legitimate children of
petitioner Torralba’s relentless badgering of TMSI which allegedly prompted Lim to
[the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor, discredit,
tape record petitioner Torralba’s radio broadcasts. Three of the tape recordings were
contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social humiliation, embarrassment,
introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit:
wounded feelings and mental anguish, to the damage and prejudice of said Atty.
Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 19948
Manuel L. Hontanosas in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 19949
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 199410
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 355 of the same Code.
During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.
and that he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record
(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES
petitioner Torralba’s radio program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio
City Prosecutor II
whenever the recording took place and had actually heard petitioner Torralba’s radio
APPROVED:
program while it was being taped. This prompted petitioner Torralba to pose a
(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS
continuing objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper
City Prosecutor4
authentication by the person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the
subject tape recordings, Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial
Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to the court provisionally admitted the tape recordings subject to the presentation by the
crime he was charged with.5 prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of said pieces of evidence.
Despite petitioner Torralba’s objection to the formal offer of these pieces of evidence,
the court a quo  eventually admitted the three tape recordings into evidence.11
On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City,
where Crim. Case No. 9107 was raffled off, a motion for consolidation6 alleging therein

It was revealed during Lim’s cross-examination12 that petitioner Torralba previously
instituted a criminal action for libel13 against the former arising from an article
published in the Sunday Post, a newspaper of general circulation in the provinces of
Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found guilty as charged by the trial court14 and
this decision was subsequently affirmed, with modification, by the Court of Appeals in
its decision promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 entitled, "People
of the Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing."15 In our resolution of 04
December 1996, we denied Lim’s petition for review on certiorari.16
For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the
chairman and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape
recording of petitioner Torralba’s radio program aired on 18 January 1994 during
which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him and stated that he was a person who
could not be trusted; that in his radio show on 25 January 1994, petitioner Torralba
mentioned that "he was now [wary] to interview any one because he had a sad
experience with someone who betrayed him and this ‘someone’ was like his father who
was a collaborator"; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording of
petitioner Torralba’s radio program of 11 April 1994 during which petitioner Torralba
averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the land of their birth; that Judge Agapito
Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were collaborators during the Japanese occupation;
and that after he informed his siblings regarding this, they asked him to institute a case
against petitioner Torralba.17
When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralba’s counsel, private complainant
Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralba’s radio
broadcasts and he merely relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he
believed them to be genuine.18
Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC,
Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the tape recordings in
1994 upon the request of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.
The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself. Petitioner
Torralba maintained that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas and other civic organizations in Cebu. In the course of his profession as a
radio broadcaster, he allegedly received complaints regarding the services of TMSI
particularly with respect to the laborers’ low pay and exhorbitant rates being charged
for the arrastre services. As he was in favor of balanced programming, petitioner
Torralba requested TMSI to send a representative to his radio show in order to give the
corporation an opportunity to address the issues leveled against it; thus, the radio
interview of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas on
17 December 1993.
When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas,19 he denied having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor during his
11 April 1994 radio broadcast. Petitioner Torralba admitted, though, that during the 17
December 1993 appearance of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas in his radio
program, he did ask the latter if he was in any way related to the late CFI Judge
Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as mere
backgrounder on his interviewee.
On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision20 acquitting petitioner
Torralba in Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 but holding him guilty of
the crime of libel in Crim. Case No. 9107. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision reads:
16
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from criminal THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 (JAN.
liability herein accused Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded in 14, 1999).
Criminal Cases Nos. 8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of legitimate self-defense, IV
as afore-discussed. Consequently, the corresponding cash bonds of the accused in said
cases as shown by OR No. 5301156, No. 5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
February 23, 2000, issued by the Clerk of Court of Multiple Salas in the amount of
AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING
P4,200.00 each representing cash deposits therefore are hereby cancelled and released.
OF EVIDENT BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT
[TORRALBA] WHO ACTED WITH UBERIMA FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD
However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED FREEDOM
Case No. 9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late Hon. CFI OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW CIVIL CODE).23
Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his radio program resulting to the
dishonor and wounded feelings of his children, grandchildren, relatives, friends, and
This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the lower court’s
close associates. For this, the Court hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for
admission in evidence of the 11 April 1994 tape recording.
an indeterminate period of FOUR MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of
Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the Solicitor General in
Prision Correccional medium period pursuant to Art. 353 in relation to Art. 354 and
its comment.
Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under which the instant case falls. Furthermore, he
is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas for moral
damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given
for, considering their good reputation and high social standing in the community and considerable weight on the tape recording in question as it was not duly authenticated
the gravity of the dishonor and public humiliation caused.21 by Lim’s adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without said authentication, petitioner Torralba
continues, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible evidence. We agree.
Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which, in the
challenged decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form24 where
quo, thus: a proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording.25 In our
jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is
admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the
established, to wit:
modification that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(4) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
prision correccional and to pay moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.22
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following issues: (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
I (6) identification of the speakers; and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS SPECIAL (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of
FIFTEENTH DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF inducement.26
THE LOWER COURT A QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING
PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL AS
In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES 353 AND 355 OF THE
regards its operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the
REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED TESTIMONY OF
identities of the persons speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the
SEGUNDO LIM . . . AS BORNE OUT BY THE STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD
recordings.27 Likewise, a witness’ declaration that the sound recording represents a true
NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS
portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of
IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY PETITIONER-APPELLANT
authentication.28 The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording
[TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107.
bears the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an
II
accurate reproduction of the conversation recorded.29
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AN UNAUTHENTICATED AND
SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A RADIO BROADCAST (EXHIBIT "D") These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to
ALLEGEDLY BY HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] ON THE tampering of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper
BASIS OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR THE CRIME OF foundation for the admission of a recording provided adequate assurance that proper
LIBEL. safeguards were observed for the preservation of the recording and for its protection
III against tampering.30
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT
[TORRALBA] MADE UTTERANCES CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD
In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility
MARKED AS EXHIBIT "D," THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
of the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically
NOT CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE OF HIS ALLEGED
admitted in the witness stand that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape
STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE TO THE LANDMARK DECISION OF
recording31 and that he had to instruct his adopted daughter to record petitioner
Torralba’s radio broadcasts, thus:

ATTY. HONTANOSAS:
q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?
a Yes, sir.
q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?
a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio program of
Choy Torralba.32
Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralba’s radio show
on 11 April 1994, should have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the
proper foundation for the admission of the purported tape recording for said date.
Without the requisite authentication, there was no basis for the trial court to admit the
tape recording – Exhibit "D" – in evidence.
In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are constrained to
examine the records of this case in order to determine the sufficiency of evidence
stacked against petitioner Torralba, bearing in mind that in criminal cases, the guilt of
the accused can only be sustained upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo
Francisco, wrote that "[e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast
is admissible as evidence when the identity of the speaker is established either by the
testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his message or speech, or by the
witness’ recognition of the voice of the speaker."33
The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba
broadcast the alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that
while petitioner Torralba’s radio program on that date was being tape recorded by his
adopted daughter, he was so near the radio that he could even touch the same.34 In
effect, Lim was implying that he was listening to "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" at that time.
In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any
other evidence, fails to meet the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the
voice of the speaker." Being near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the radio
broadcast and recognizing the voice of the speaker is another. Indeed, a person may be
in close proximity to said device without necessarily listening to the contents of a radio
broadcast or to what a radio commentator is saying over the airwaves.
What further undermines the credibility of Lim’s testimony is the fact that he had an ax
to grind against petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused by the latter with the
crime of libel and for which he was found guilty as charged by the court. Surely then,
Lim could not present himself as an "uninterested witness" whose testimony merits
significance from this Court.
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that he did not
listen to petitioner Torralba’s radio show subject of this petition. He simply relied on
the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional
presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond
reasonable doubt -- one which requires moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.35 As we have so
stated in the past –
17
… Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the
prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of
the testimony of the State, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever
defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal
could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person
on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The
proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment.36
Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against petitioner
Torralba, this Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals due
to insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22 May
2002 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24 August 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Instead, a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco
"Choy" Torralba of the crime of libel. The cash bond posted by said petitioner is
ordered released to him subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse
the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled
"Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by
respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of
evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private
respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing
the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the
present petition, which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can
be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in
admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be
questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special
civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be
anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not
by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court
is perceived to have made an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary
matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby
DISMISSED. 1
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous
decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court as the
question of admissibility in evidence of tape recordings has not, thus far, been
addressed and decided squarely by the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law and with applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same can still be [the]
subject of a petition for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy
of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence
offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of

petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained
when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep.
Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a
clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No.
4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section
2 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to
six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the
applicability of American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the
subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168644               February 16, 2010
BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO
BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs. SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 876001 dated April 20, 2005, which
reversed and set aside the September 13, 20042 and November 5, 20043 Orders issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 364 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for
qualified theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by herein
respondent Sally Go for the suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to a Security Bank account, and denied reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by
its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go,
18
alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayan’s wife,
who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to
receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor’s Office a complaint for estafa
and/or qualified theft5 against respondent, alleging that several checks6 representing the
aggregate amount of ₱1,534,135.50 issued by the company’s customers in payment of
their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the company’s coffers, indorsed
by respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account maintained at
Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch.7 Upon
a finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor
recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against respondent.8
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36, in an Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January 1988
[and] October 1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent [to] gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money
in the total amount of ₱1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES
represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in
the aforesaid amount of ₱1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of
confidence, being then employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of the
commission of the said offense and as such she was entrusted with the said amount of
money.
Contrary to law.9
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.10 The trial ensued. On the premise
that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the
corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution moved
for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective
managers or records custodians of Security Bank’s Divisoria Branch, as well as of the
Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad
Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.11 The trial court granted the motion and issued the
corresponding subpoena.12
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed
to Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the
prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank account, to which respondent,
in addition to the Security Bank account identified as Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly
deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent
characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security Bank account
mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to
address the allegations with respect thereto.13
Petitioner, opposing respondent’s move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank
account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks
which respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank.14 To this,
respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential
nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
1405.15 The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash
for lack of merit.16
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita
Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigan’s
testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as
cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the
company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to
her personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the
subject checks were presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same
checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account
with Security Bank.17 But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a
Motion to Suppress,18 seeking the exclusion of Marasigan’s testimony and
accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank
account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of
confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order.19 A
motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order
dated November 5, 2004.20 These two orders are the subject of the instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the
way it did, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision.21 The
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated September
13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of
the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from the records.
SO ORDERED.22
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner is now before the Court
pleading the same issues as those raised before the lower courts.
In this Petition24 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals
had seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect
striking out Marasigan’s testimony dealing with respondent’s deposit account with
Security Bank.25 It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a direct
relation to the subject matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case
under one of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A.
1405.26 Petitioner believed that what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to
be determined by the allegations in the information and, in this respect, it alluded to the
assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which declared to be erroneous the
limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was contained in the information.27
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank
account was neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal
information suggested that the money therein deposited was the subject matter of the
case. She invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal Information which
averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in the total amount of
₱1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term "cash money" stated in the
Information was not synonymous with the checks she was purported to have stolen
from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks which
the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of Marasigan,
should be suppressed by the trial court at least for violating respondent’s right to due
process.28 More in point, respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan,
as well as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the
secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405.29

In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal
Information for qualified theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the
offense charged. It posits that through Marasigan’s testimony, the Court would be able
to establish that the checks involved, copies of which were attached to the complaint-
affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by respondent as cashier,
but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal account with Security Bank.
Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent and,
hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash amount represented by the
checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also the checks themselves.30
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is
whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to
the case, and whether they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of
admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative
estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive
acts of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty
because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. 31 Theft is present
when a person, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, takes the personal property of another without the latter’s
consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as alleged in the instant case, it is
committed with abuse of confidence.32 The prosecution of this offense necessarily
focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a) there was taking of personal
property belonging to another; (b) the taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking
was done without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse
of confidence.33 In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the
presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy and
competency in accordance with Section 334 Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case  the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and
deposited in respondent’s Security Bank account  are relevant, is to be addressed by
considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact from
which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-
existence of the fact in issue.35
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount of
₱1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner
seeks to establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that
respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to
her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence
between the allegation of theft of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the
evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and deposited the same in her
banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no
difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for theft of
cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by
another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended
party has already ensued from such act of execution.36 The allegation of theft of money,
hence, necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the
19
offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has
taken pains in attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject of the
instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by claiming that
respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of
argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the
commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime  probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances.
In estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is
immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an information for that offense; a
check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under
commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary
value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the
offender does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes
material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one.37 In other words, in pursuing a
case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation of the
checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their
contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that
the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his own name.38
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in
this case accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that
respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the
proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also
immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigan’s testimony on the
particulars of respondent’s account with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding
evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable
inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of
specifically addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless,
exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing such accounts.
The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No.
1405,39 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. 40
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at
the same time encourage the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so
that it may be utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in economic
development.41 Owing to this piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits
remains to be a basic state policy in the Philippines.42 Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in general all
deposits of whatever nature with banks and other financial institutions in the country. It
declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as
of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of
the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.1avvphi1
Subsequent statutory enactments43 have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy
yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the
legally recognized zones of privacy.44 There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing
these primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would authorize unbridled
discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as
authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the
present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits.45
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking
Corporation v. Ortega.46 That case principally addressed the issue of whether the
prohibition against an examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in
satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found
guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the
absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is
merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in
any given bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of
B&B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required
Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest
Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of
the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977which
later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to
place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgmentThus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax
case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say,
₱1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual [has
been] attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence
declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine
whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the [BIR],
such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment
or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is a
preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys
deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will
bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made only for the
purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in
favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a
deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount
of the deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x47

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the
instant case posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank
contains the proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself
and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405  that the
money kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis,
petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,48 that the subject
matter of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or personal; the money,
lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the
instant case should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank account.49 On the
surface, however, it seems that petitioner’s theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper
treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because, while
Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to
determine whether the class suit in that case was properly brought to the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A.
No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals,50 in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits
allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited
in the account is itself the subject of the action.51 Given this perspective, we deduce that
the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be determined from the
indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought
by the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information filed
with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with
qualified theft by abusing petitioner’s trust and confidence and stealing cash in the
amount of ₱1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation that in
some material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make
mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks
have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security
Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecution’s inquiry. Without needlessly
expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject matter of
the action in this case is the money amounting to ₱1,534,135.50 alleged to have been
stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks which are sought to
be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with
its evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
respondent’s Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the
existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt
by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy
and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection
posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the
controversy at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondent’s
supposed bank account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented
by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded
by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as
they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of
respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondent’s objection
to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in
reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
20
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to
include an individual’s financial privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation
an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and legislators to laws infringing for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
such rights.52 Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it,
doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. This attitude persists unless congress
the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward,
lifts its finger to reverse the general state policy respecting the absolutely confidential
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The
nature of bank deposits.53
trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and
May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no
G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her
November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she
Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED. needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano,
G.R. No. 176389               December 14, 2010
Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court,
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on
G.R. No. 176864
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and
vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A.
one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
DECISION On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the
ABAD, J.: penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and
Brief Background increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree
that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found
sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old,
Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in
and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an
executing her mother and sister.
intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave
detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered
them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division
especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what of five members voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.
everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen
had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under
who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the
Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in
as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory the case.
after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.1
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the
others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground
autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the
that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial
former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former
of his right to due process.
girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
Issues Presented
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying
they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he
claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court
should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen
specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that
would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in
conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and
Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately,
the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others
as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut
Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime
after its commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on
order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken
from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with
this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her
testimony as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her
credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other
hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached
or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same
DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA of
the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that
simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed
perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites
has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad
faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical
expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have
the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did
not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no
Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently,
the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for
DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the
matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he
allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken
21
against him and the other accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of
Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in
the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA
test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had
in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of
interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice
that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaro’s Story
Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove
her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There,
Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy"
Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian,
and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Parañaque in
January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message
for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After
using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong
Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada
trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura,
Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and
approached Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro
queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991.
When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was just around.
Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had just arrived
home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who
then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove
back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan
Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre
Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the
latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro
to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that
led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her
car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would
know that she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own
car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom
Alfaro believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and
relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with
Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s mood changed
for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45
minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya
[Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others
responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and
drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmela’s house
shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the
others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that
they blow up the transformer near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout
("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea,
telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura
were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for
Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami,
magbabantay lang kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair
mounted the hood of the Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over
it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group went through the open iron grill gate and
passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for
them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed
for the dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her
where she was going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her
way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro
smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear
a woman’s voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her
car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked
her, "Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house,
using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from
outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining
table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito,
maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta
maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a
bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She
also did not find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot
leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on
after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom
from where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual
sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she
lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the
foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears
while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met
Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked
with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting
in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but
she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just
then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass
frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his
jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron
grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached
Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro
noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of the car into the
cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate,
and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered
at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those
who remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened. The first to be
killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed
Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up
and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled
his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed
her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile,
Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to
go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan."
Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We
don’t know each other. We haven’t seen each other…baka maulit yan." Alfaro and
Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house.12
1. The quality of the witness
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years,
bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do
what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as
an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so
she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get
rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping,
Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been
hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She
supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal
elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like
Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the
leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task
force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the
privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and
she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who
had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro
promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen
and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the
role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder
case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
22
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang,
circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. That’s what condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them,
she told me, Your Honor. shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of
ATTY. ONGKIKO: its details with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she
glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro
promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will
could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s
try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see her.
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING: Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on
A. No, sir. the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at
ATTY. ONGKIKO: the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no
Q. Why not? sense. From Alfaro’s narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past
WITNESS SACAGUING: midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection.
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like
to me. She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify. inviting the neighbors to come.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions
WITNESS SACAGUING:
of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…"
explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a
COURT:
kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He
How was that?
said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan."
xxxx Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical
ATTY. ONGKIKO: evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na valuables with him when they left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage
lang yan?" a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already
WITNESS SACAGUING: gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness." was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING: c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away. had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79) that one of them climbed the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This
made sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the
dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look in and see what they
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony. were doing.
2. The suspicious details Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So
she claimed that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to turn the light off.
But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even
anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela
tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.
left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk
standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. straight into the house.
Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were
lots of speculations about them.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative
work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the
them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She
and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above,
NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well. Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact.
Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on
her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one
of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael
Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected
to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran
berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We
just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill
me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle
some score with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had
myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from
inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common
behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart,
who were supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to
testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt
him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada)
agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb,
Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car,
which was parked on the street between Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these
men sat on top of the car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the
street light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were
having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s
companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to
Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as
Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More
inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his
friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a
point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was
nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would,
hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If,
on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just
followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that
only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella
told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back
around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her
own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a
man whom she thought was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on
her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as
a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to
come with his friends and harm Carmela.
23
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time
around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that
Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided
what they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to
Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb
before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead
him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro
wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes,
a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of
the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on
a sly. Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and
others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she did not want to get
involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of
getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what
went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and
reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to
watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the master’s bedroom. He had apparently
stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her young sister whose bloodied bodies were
sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for
she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even
to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified
that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm
Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum
swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six
additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies
of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen
in Carmela’s genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from
7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30
that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw
the dead bodies in the master’s bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud
noise emanating from a television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could
identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons
Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could
not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the
group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious about their
coming and going.
But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate.
He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once.
They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of
cars went back the second time in the direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered
the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who
supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the
subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up"
Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela
arrive with her mom before Alfaro’s first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with
a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He also
did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s
testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led
the three-vehicle convoy,17 White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it
that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that
Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide
corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he
saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his
presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was
manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he
flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan
asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he
resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of
Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly
gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same
and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their Standard Operating
Procedure required.18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a
security guard to challenge a Congressman’s son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did
not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed
procedure, record the visitor’s entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that
Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF
Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents’ house on the
morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two
brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about
1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret door near the
maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30,
1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to
distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time.
She could not remember any of the details that happened in the household on the other
days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her
testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she
noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the
household about it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have
been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and
Sgt. Miguel Muñoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for
the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was
not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the
work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only
four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers
and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who
was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m.
to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt
home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m.
as was her supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde
massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the
evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at
around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF.
Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m.
he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a
foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover
from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a
badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of
two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the
subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after
midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning to dispose
of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In
fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there
hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the
Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime
scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed
to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and
two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because
he was a Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious
enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony
contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going
relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her
house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration
24
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that
Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that
it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is
totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that
would be news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her
friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if
Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen with
her. And this would all the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a relation that
Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’
friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in
some popular hangouts in Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is
like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life
stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but
does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither
antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It
is quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male
passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmela’s lover.
This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her.
Again, none of Carmela’s relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified
about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having ever
seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X
had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special
friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination
of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth,
sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work,
and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight
to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that
Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his
basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them
to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March
8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at
Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina
Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces
Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos
and Jay Ortega.24
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his
Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb
passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport
cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa,
stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through.26 He was listed on the
United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry
into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service,
checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the
U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the
US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification
dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs,
correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria
Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria’s house in Daly City, California. During his
stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In
April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of
Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family
invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the
Philippines.32
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim
Hills, California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball
once or twice a week with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest
control company.35 Webb presented the company’s logbook showing the tasks he
performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he
applied for a driver's license38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39
On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the
Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he
came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and
Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota
car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at
the plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records
of California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using
the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,46 bought a
bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30,
1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca
family had a lakeside picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a
month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack
and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time,
playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards.51 In November
1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who
was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the Rodriguez’s home in
August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed
there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine
immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the
same certifications that confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the

U.S. Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer
of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the
Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he
boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No.
103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In
fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on
October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer
who processed Webb’s reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos,
Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at
the BF's Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi.
Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive
identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as
well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s
denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is
truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such
accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head
that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing,
"I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an
alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is
distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any
chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against
slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of
deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit
the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it.
A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The
lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without
blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She
is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with
her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into
inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above
criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.
She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for
mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals
themselves. She was the prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her
superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde
killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.
25
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S.
the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with
details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone a logical and plausible answer to these questions.
at the front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so
she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave
on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical
the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is
evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the car’s
the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to
hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to
examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his
darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light
dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with
and foot prints on the car hood.
the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the
parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, binding on the parties and on the court.
Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent
with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and
street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the
departure from that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S.
developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story
Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept
that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying
these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration
with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes
official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a
incredulity.
document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is
the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main passport are presumed true.60
road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro
had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of
into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on
which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely
testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman
validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s
woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless
passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these
returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.
certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness
arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the
Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.61
unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence
acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification
from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S.
f. A documented alibi But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and
Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16,
crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and
deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo
Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when
D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic channels and was
the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October
obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such
27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29,
request.
1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the
records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the
Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly
this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the
only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven
paradigm. Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in
his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department,
declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with
and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the
his father’s connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991
Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal
departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But
raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does
this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was
not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than
made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially
as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the
filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How
Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere
could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its record

tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result
inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of
IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy
of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of
departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been
impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on
March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the
Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines,
said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the
rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations
as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the
presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That
presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not
bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the
certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to
the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it
planted in the lower court’s minds.
7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with
respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian,
Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the
U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s
participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others
must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains
doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all
possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For,
it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt
hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the
testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the
witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December
15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada
and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
26
Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five
days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With all due respect to my colleagues, I dissent from the majority decision acquitting
all the accused-appellants.
In the middle part of 1991, the gruesome deaths of 19-year old Carmela Vizconde, her
mother Estrellita and 7-year old sister Jennifer in the hands of unknown assailants
inside their home in a private subdivision shocked our countrymen and alarmed the
authorities of the rise in heinous crimes, particularly those committed by individuals
under the influence of drugs. Investigations conducted by the police and other bodies
including the Senate, and even the arrest of two (2) sets of suspects ("akyat-
bahay"  gang and former contractor/workers of the Vizcondes), failed to unravel the
truth behind the brutal killings – until an alleged eyewitness surfaced four (4) years
later. The ensuing courtroom saga involving sons of prominent families had become
one (1) of the most controversial cases in recent history as the entire nation awaited its
long-delayed closure.
The Case
Subject of review is the Decision1 dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00336 affirming with modifications the Decision dated
January 4, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274
finding the accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada and Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals, and accused-appellant Gerardo
Biong as accessory, of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
The petition for review on certiorari filed earlier by accused Lejano (G.R. No. 176389)
is hereby treated as an appeal, considering that said accused had in fact filed a notice of
appeal with the CA.2 In view of the judgment of the CA imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua,  such appeal by notice of appeal is in accord with A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases)3 which provides under Rule 124 (c):
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the
Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 176389 was consolidated with the present appeal by all accused
(G.R. No. 176864) except Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart who are still at large.4 Only
Webb and Gatchalian filed their respective supplemental briefs in compliance with our
April 10, 2007 Resolution.5
The Facts
The Information filed on August 10, 1995 reads:
That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991, in the
municipality of Parañaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb conspiring and confederating
with accused Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael
Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez and Joey Filart, mutually helping one another, while armed with bladed
instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with lewd design, with abuse of
superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor vehicle, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of Carmela Vizconde against her will
and consent.
That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately thereafter, the
above-named accused with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually helping one another, did then and there, and with evident premeditation, abuse
of superior strength, nighttime, with the use of motor vehicle, assault and stab with
bladed instruments Carmela Vizconde, Estrellita Vizconde and Jennifer Vizconde,
thereby inflicting upon them numerous stab wounds in different parts of their bodies
which caused their instantaneous death.
That accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge after the
commission of the above-mentioned crime, and without having participated therein as
principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission by assisting, with
abuse of authority as a police officer, the above-named principal accused, to conceal or
destroy the effects or instruments thereof by failing to preserve the physical evidence
and allowing their destruction in order to prevent the discovery of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The RTC and CA concurred in their factual findings based mainly on the testimony of
the prosecution’s principal witness, Jessica M. Alfaro who is a confessed former drug
user, the declarations of four (4) other witnesses and documentary exhibits.
Alfaro testified that on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, she drove her
Mitsubishi Lancer and, with her then boyfriend Peter Estrada, went to the Ayala
Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to get her order of one (1) gram of shabu from
Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There she met and was introduced to Ventura’s friends:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez,
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian and Joey Filart (she had previously
seen them in a shabu house located in Parañaque which they frequented as early as
January 1991,7 while she had known Ventura since December 19908). After paying for
her shabu and while she was smoking it, Webb approached her and requested a favor
for her to relay a message to a certain girl who happened to be Carmela, to which she
agreed. After the group finished their shabu  session, they proceeded to Carmela’s place
at No. 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City. She
and Estrada in her car followed the two (2) vehicles: Webb, Lejano, Ventura,
Fernandez and Gatchalian on board a Nissan Patrol car; while Filart and Rodriguez
rode a Mazda pick-up.9
Upon reaching the area, Alfaro parked her car along Vinzons St. and approached the
gate of the house pointed to by Webb. She pressed the buzzer and when a woman came
out, she asked for Carmela. When she was able to talk to Carmela (an acquaintance she
had met only twice in January 199110), Alfaro relayed Webb’s message that he was
around. However, Carmela said she cannot make it as she had just arrived home and
told Alfaro to come back after twenty (20) minutes. She relayed the answer of Carmela
to Webb who then instructed the group to return to Ayala Alabang Commercial
Center.11
At the same parking lot, the group had another shabu  session before proceeding again
to Carmela’s residence in a convoy. Alfaro went to Vinzons St. alone while the Nissan
Patrol and Mazda parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Upon seeing Carmela who
was at their garden, Alfaro was approached by Carmela saying she was going out for a
while. Carmela told Alfaro that they come back before 12:00 midnight and she would

just leave the pedestrian gate, as well as the iron grill gate leading to the kitchen door,
open and unlocked.12 Carmela further instructed Alfaro to blink her car’s headlights
twice before reaching the pedestrian gate to signal her arrival. Alfaro returned to her car
but waited for Carmela’s car to get out of the gate. Carmela drove ahead and Alfaro
likewise left Vinzons St. Upon reaching the main road, Aguirre Avenue, she saw
Carmela drop off the man who was with her in the car (whom she thought to be her
boyfriend13). Alfaro looked for the group and relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb.
Thereafter, they all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.14
At the parking lot, Alfaro relayed to the group what transpired during her last
conversation with Carmela. She also told Webb about Carmela’s male companion; this
changed his mood for the rest of the evening ("bad trip"  already15). Webb then gave out
complimentary cocaine and all of them used shabu and/or cocaine.16 After about 40 to
45 minutes, Webb decided it was time to leave, declaring: "Pipilahan natin
siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said: "Ako ang susunod" and the others
responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot and their convoy of three (3)
vehicles entered Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at the
Vizconde residence between 11:45 to 11:55 p.m.17
Alfaro parked her car in between the Vizconde house and its adjacent house. While
waiting for the rest of the group to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached her
suggesting that they blow up the transformer near the pedestrian gate of the Vizconde
residence in order to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na
ito"). She shrugged off the idea and told Fernandez "Malakas lang ang tama mo."
When Webb, Lejano and Ventura were already standing infront of the Vizconde
residence, Webb repeated to the boys that they will line up for Carmela but he will be
the first, and the others said, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."18
Alfaro entered first the pedestrian gate which was left open, followed by Webb, Lejano
and Ventura. At the garage, Ventura pulled out a chair to get on top of the hood of the
Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra car and loosened the electric bulb ("para daw walang
ilaw"). They proceeded to the iron grill gate which was likewise left open, and passed
through the dirty kitchen. It was Carmela who opened the aluminum screen door of the
kitchen for them to enter. Carmela and Webb for a moment looked at each other in the
eye, and then proceeded towards the dining area. As she lost sight of Carmela and
Webb, Alfaro decided to go out of the house. Lejano asked where she was going and
she told him she will smoke outside. On her way to the screen door, she saw Ventura
pulling a drawer in the kitchen. At the garden area, she smoked a cigarette. After about
twenty (20) minutes, she was surprised upon hearing a female voice uttered "Sino
yan?" and she immediately walked out towards her car. She found the others still
outside around her car and Estrada who was inside the car said: "Okay ba?" After
staying in her car for about ten (10) minutes, she returned to the house passing through
the same iron grill gate and dirty kitchen. While it was dark inside the house, there was
light coming from outside. In the kitchen, she saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag on
top of the dining table. When she asked Ventura what was it he was looking for, he
said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what particular key and
he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse."
When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door of the
house but none of them fitted the lock; she also did not find any car key.19
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro walked back towards the kitchen but upon
reaching the spot leading to the dining area, she heard a very loud static sound (like that
coming from a television which had signed off). Out of curiosity, she went to the door
of the master’s bedroom where the sound was coming from and peeped inside. She
pushed the slightly ajar door with her fingers and the sound grew even louder. After
27
pushing the door wider, she walked into the room. There she saw a man on top of
Carmela who was lying on the floor, two (2) bloodied bodies on top of the bed and
Lejano who was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. She turned her eyes on
Carmela who was gagged, moaning and in tears while Webb was pumping her, his bare
buttocks exposed. Webb gave her a look and she immediately left the room. At the
dining area, she met Ventura who told her: "Prepare an escape. Aalis na
tayo." Shocked by what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house and found the rest of
the group outside, in her car and on the sidewalk.20
Alfaro boarded her car and started the engine but did not know where to proceed. She
saw Webb, Lejano and Ventura leaving the house already. Webb suddenly picked up a
stone and threw it to the main door, breaking its glass frame. When the three (3) were
near the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he left behind his jacket. But Ventura
said they cannot make it anymore as the iron grills were already locked. They all rode
in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. Near an old hotel in
the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro saw the Nissan Patrol slow down and something
thrown out into a cogonal area. They went to a large house with high walls and concrete
fence, steel gate and long driveway located at BF Executive Village. They parked their
cars inside the compound and gathered in the lawn area where the "blaming session"
took place. It was only at this point that Alfaro and the others came to know fully what
happened at the Vizconde house. The mother was the first one (1) killed, then Jennifer
and the last, Carmela.21
Ventura was blaming Webb telling him: "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" According to
Webb, the girl was awakened and upon seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on
him, bit his shoulders and pulled his hair. Webb got mad and grabbed the girl, pushed
her to the wall and stabbed her several times. Lejano excused himself and used the
telephone inside the house, while Webb called up someone on his cellular phone. At
around 2:00 in the morning, Gerardo Biong arrived and talked to Webb who ordered
him to clean up the Vizconde house, and said "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong
answered "Okay lang." Webb addressed the group and gave his final instructions: "We
don’t know each other. We haven’t seen each other...baka maulit yan." She and Estrada
then departed and went to her father’s house.22
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of the victims, testified
on his findings as stated in the autopsy reports he submitted to the court. The bodies
were photographed showing their condition before the start of the post-mortem
examination.23 Considering that they were almost in complete rigor mortis, the victims
must have been dead for twelve (12) hours. Carmela’s hands were on her back hogtied
with an electric cord and her mouth gagged with a pillow case. She had contusions on
her right forearm and thighs, ligature marks on her wrists and nine (9) stab wounds on
her chest (five [5] wounds are "connecting" or reaching to the back of the body).
Further, specimen taken from her genitalia tested positive for the presence of human
spermatozoa, which is indicative of complete penetration plus ejaculation of the male
sex organ into the female sex organ. The contusions on her thighs were probably due to
the application of blunt force such as a fist blow.24
Dr. Cabanayan further testified that Estrellita was also hogtied from behind and her
wrists bore ligature marks from an electric cord with a plug. She sustained twelve (12)
stab wounds, eight (8) of which are "communicating" or perforating (through and
through stab wounds) which are fatal since vital organs are involved.25 As to Jennifer,
her stab wounds, nineteen (19) in all, had the characteristics of one (1) which is
extremely blunt, the other extremely sharp. These wounds are located in different parts
of her body, most of which are on the left anterior chest. But unlike Carmela and
Estrellita, Jennifer had two (2) stab wounds on her back and incise wounds on her left
and right forearms, the latter usually referred to as defense wounds. Seven (7) of the
nine (9) stab wounds on her chest were perforating, hence fatal wounds.26 Judging from
the characteristics of the stab wounds sustained by the victims, Dr. Cabanayan
concluded that they could have been inflicted using sharp-edged, pointed and single-
bladed instruments such as a kitchen knife.27
Normal E. White, Jr., one (1) of four (4) security guards assigned at Pitong Daan
Subdivision which is part of the United BF Homes, testified that he and Edgar Mendez
were the guards on duty on the night of June 29, 1991, starting at 7:00 o’clock in the
evening until 7:00 o’clock in the morning of June 30, 1991. On June 30, 1991, at
around 6:00 a.m., a homeowner called his attention on the incident the previous night at
the Vizconde house. He immediately proceeded to said house where there were already
many people. The housemaids of the Vizcondes led him to the entrance at the kitchen
and pointed to the master’s bedroom. Upon entering the room, he saw the bloodied
bodies of the victims: two (2) were on top of the bed, and one (1) lying down on the
floor. He is familiar with Mrs. Vizconde, Carmela and Jennifer because they were kind
to the guards and usually greeted them. Mrs. Vizconde was gagged and her hands tied,
while Jennifer was also lying on top of the bed. Carmela was lying on her back with
one (1) of her legs raised, her dress pulled up and her genitals exposed. He also noticed
that the TV was still on with loud sound. He went out to call the police but he met their
Security Chief whom he informed about the killings at the Vizconde house. He then
proceeded directly to the entrance/guard post of the subdivision and was told by
Mendez that there were already policemen who had arrived.28
Having been apprised of the arrival of the police, White, Jr. returned to the Vizconde
house to observe what was going on. He saw the policemen already investigating the
crime scene and one (1) of them he later came to know as Gerardo Biong. There was
also a woman who was with Biong when he was conducting the investigation inside the
Vizconde premises at the garage area. The maids were being asked if they were able to
hear the breaking of the main door’s glass frame, and he saw Biong in the act of further
breaking the remaining glass. He recognized other homeowners who were also there,
including Michael Gatchalian who passed by infront of the house. Afterwards, he
returned to their guard post where their Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Justo Cabanacan,
probed him and Mendez on anything they had observed the previous night. He and
Mendez told Cabanacan that they did not notice anything unusual except "Mike"
(Michael Gatchalian) and his friends entering and exiting the subdivision gate ("labas-
masok").29
White, Jr. recounted that Mike’s group entered the subdivision on the night of June 29,
1991. Upon approaching the gate, Mike’s car slowed down on the hump. He was about
to flag down and verify ("sisitahin") but Mike (who was at the right front seat)
immediately opened his window to show his face and pointed to two (2) vehicles
behind him as his companions. Because of their policy allowing outsiders to enter the
subdivision as long as they are accompanied by a homeowner, he and Mendez just let
the three (3) vehicles in (Mike was in the first car). That was actually the second time
he saw Mike and his "barkada" that night because he had earlier seen them at Vinzons
St. near the Gatchalian residence. However, he could no longer remember the precise
time he saw the group on these two (2) instances.30
White, Jr. further testified that on the night of June 30, 1991, policemen took him from
the Pitong Daan Subdivision Homeowners’ Association and brought him to the
Parañaque Municipal Building. Biong was forcing him to admit that he was one (1) of
those who killed the Vizconde women. Biong boxed him insisting he was among the
perpetrators and had no mercy for the victims. He and Mendez were later fetched by the

Chief of Security of Pitong Daan Subdivision Homeowners’ Association, Nestor
Potenciano Jr., and OIC Justo Cabanacan.31 Biong had also taken their logbook where
they list down the names of visitors, plate number of vehicles, name and street of the
homeowner they were staying at, etc. However, when presented with the alleged
logbook, White, Jr. said it was not the same logbook, he could not recognize its cover
and could not categorically confirm the entries supposedly made in his own
handwriting.32
Justo Cabanacan, another security guard assigned at the Pitong Daan Subdivision and
the one (1) supervising his co-guards White, Jr., Mendez and Tungo, testified that when
he reported for duty on June 30, 1991 at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, he was met
by Mendez who told him about the killing of a homeowner and her family. When he
asked Mendez if he and White, Jr. noticed anything unusual during their tour of duty
the previous night, Mendez said everything was alright except for Mike and his friends
who had gone in and out of the subdivision ("labas-masok") until the wee hours in the
morning of June 30, 1991. White, Jr. also reported to him that on the night of June 29,
1991, while doing his roving duty around the subdivision, he noticed vehicles parked
along Vinzons St. near the house of Mr. Almogino where there seemed to be a drinking
party, and that Mike was "labas-masok" through the subdivision gate. He confirmed it
was indeed their policy that if one (1) is a son/daughter of a homeowner, or
accompanied by a homeowner or any relative of homeowner, he/she will no longer be
stopped or queried by the guards. In particular, he knows Mike and had seen him visit
the house of Lilet Sy, another homeowner. He often goes to Lilet Sy’s house because of
the various complaints of homeowners against her like the presence of too many people
at her house until midnight and the vehicles of her visitors running over her neighbors’
plants. This Lilet Sy is also a suspected drug pusher within the subdivision.33
Cabanacan further testified that around the last week of May or first week of June 1991,
he came to know Hubert Webb because he had stopped his car at the subdivision gate
as it had no local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. It was around 7:00 o’clock in the
evening when Webb arrived. He greeted Webb and asked about his destination. Webb
replied he was going to see Lilet Sy. When he asked Webb to leave an identification
card, Webb pointed to his car sticker saying he is also a BF Homes resident. He
explained to Webb that the sticker on his car was for United BF Homes and not the
local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. Webb then said: "Taga-diyan lang ako sa
Phase III...saka anak ako ni Congressman Webb." He insisted on seeing Webb’s ID
card and grudgingly Webb obliged and pulled out his wallet. Webb gave him a
laminated ID card with Webb’s picture and with the name "Hubert Webb" written on it.
After seeing the ID card, he returned the same to Webb and allowed him to enter the
subdivision. However, he did not anymore record this incident in their logbook because
anyway Webb is the son of the Parañaque Congressman, a well-known personality.34
In the morning of June 30, 1991, Cabanacan said he also went to the Vizconde house
upon being told by Mendez and White, Jr. of the killings. By afternoon of the same day,
he came to meet Biong who was conducting the investigation. Based on the information
given by Mendez and White, Jr., he prepared a written report on the incident which he
submitted to Nestor Potenciano, Jr. After the incident, Biong frequented their place to
investigate and asserting he had no female companion while conducting his
investigation at the Vizconde house on June 30, 1991. Aside from taking their logbook,
Biong also took his two (2) guards (Mendez and White, Jr.) to the police headquarters
on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 p.m. The said guards also related to him what Biong
did to them. They said Biong punched them and forced them to admit having
participated in the Vizconde killings.35
28
Mila Solomon Gaviola, a laundrywoman who worked at the Webb residence located at
Aguirre Avenue, BF Homes, Parañaque from January to July 199136 testified that on
June 30, 1991 at around 4:00 in the morning, she went to the room of Hubert to get his
and his brothers’ (Jason and Michael’s) dirty clothes, using the small "secret door" at
the second floor near the servants’ quarters. She noticed that Michael and Jason were
still asleep while Hubert was sitting on the bed wearing only his pants. When she
finished collecting dirty clothes including those of Senator Webb, she brought them
down to the laundry area. She ate breakfast and rested for a while. Afterwards, she
started washing first Senator Webb’s clothes and then those of the sons. She washed
Hubert’s white shirt with round neck and found it had fresh blood stains at the stomach
area and also splattered blood ("tilamsik lang") on the chest. She had difficulty
removing the blood stains and had to use Chlorox. After she finished washing the
clothes, she hanged them to dry on the second floor. Returning to the servants’ quarters,
she peeped into Hubert’s room through the "secret door." She saw Hubert pacing the
floor ("di mapakali"); this was about 9:00 a.m. already. She saw Hubert again around
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon as he left the house passing through the "secret door"; he
was clad in t-shirt and shorts. Hubert was back at the house by 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon. She never saw him again until she left in July 1991.37
Gaviola further testified that on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning,
she saw Senator Webb at the sala reading a newspaper.38
Lolita Carrera Vda. de Birrer, a widow and resident of United Parañaque
Subdivision 5, testified that on June 29, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Biong who was then
her boyfriend, asked her to come to the Parañaque police station to play "mahjong" at
Aling Glo’s canteen located at the back of their office. They started playing at 6:30 in
the evening. Between 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of June 30, 1991, the radio operator
at the police station went down to the canteen telling Biong he has a call. She took
Biong’s place at the game while Biong went to the headquarters. After a while, she
followed Biong to ask if he was joining the next bet. Biong was on the telephone
talking with someone and visibly irked. She heard Biong’s words: "Ano?... Saan?...
Mahirap yan ah! O sige, dadating ako... Ano?... Saan?... Dilaw na taxi?" Biong then
told her he was leaving and shortly thereafter a taxicab arrived with a man seated at the
back seat. Biong bade her good-bye saying he was going to BF Homes. She continued
playing "mahjong" until morning. At around 7:00 a.m., Biong came back and went
straight to the washing area of the canteen. She followed him and saw him cleaning
blood stains on his fingernails. After wiping his face and hands with a handkerchief, he
threw it away and when she asked why, Biong said it smelled stinky. Biong was in bad
mood ("aburido") and complained, "Putang inang mga batang ‘yon, pinahirapan ako
nang husto". Afterwards, Biong took out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer
and put it in his steel cabinet. She invited him for lunch but another policeman, Galvan,
came and told Biong to proceed to BF Homes and investigate the three (3) dead persons
there. Biong answered, "Oo, susunod na ako" and then proceeded to Capt. Bartolome’s
office. With Capt. Bartolome’s permission, she joined them in going to the Vizconde
residence.39
Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, Biong asked that the victims’ relatives and the
homeowners’ association President be summoned. A certain Mr. Lopez and Ms.
Moreno arrived and also a security guard named White, Jr. who pointed to the location
of the victims’ bodies. They entered the master’s bedroom and she saw the mother and
a small girl on top of the bed, and a young woman sprawled on the floor. After
inspecting the bodies, Biong went to the toilet and turned on the faucet; the running
water washed out the blood on the flooring of the toilet. Biong searched the drawers
using his ballpen. She saw him took a round pendant watch and pocketed it. They went
out of the room and on the top of the dining table they saw a shoulder bag and scattered
next to it were various items such as Carmela’s ATM card, her driver’s license and
calling cards. Biong proceeded to the main door and removed its chain lock. When they
came out towards the garage area, Biong saw a stone by the window. He then asked
Capt. Bartolome to go inside the room of the two (2) maids to see for himself if indeed
the noise of the breaking glass could not be heard. When Capt. Bartolome was already
inside the middle room, Biong shattered the remaining glass of the main door with the
butt of his gun. When Biong asked if he could hear it, Capt. Bartolome answered in the
affirmative. Biong next inspected the garage where he saw the footmarks on the car’s
hood; Biong also found fingerprints on the electric bulb. She was just beside Biong at
the time. They followed Biong towards the back of the house but upon seeing another
shoe print on the ground just outside the master’s bedroom, he directed them not to
proceed any further. They left the Vizconde house at around 10:00 a.m. and proceeded
to the Parañaque Municipal Building.40
Birrer further testified that on July 1, 1991 at 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Biong
arrived at her house bringing along with him the two (2) maids of the Vizcondes. He
asked her to cook something for the maids to eat. Biong also instructed her to interview
the maids on what they know about the killings. She did as told but the maids said they
do not know anything as they were asleep. After they had lunch, Biong told her to let
the maids rest. While she and the maids were resting at the sala, Biong requested to use
her bathroom. Before taking a bath, Biong took out the contents of his pockets which he
put on the dining table. She saw Carmela’s ATM card and driver’s license, bracelet,
earrings and the round pendant watch Biong had taken from a jewelry box while they
were inside the Vizconde house. When Biong left her house, he brought all said items
with him.41
On July 2, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Birrer was at the Parañaque Municipal Building
inside Biong’s office. She saw Biong open his steel cabinet and took out a brown
leather jacket which she thought was imported. When she asked him where it came
from, Biong initially just said it was given as a gift but when she further queried, he
answered: "Natatandaan mo ba ‘yong nirespondehan ko noong gabi sa BF Homes?
Doon galing ‘yon." She asked Biong whether those were the youths he had mentioned
earlier and he said yes. As to the jewelries taken by Biong from the Vizconde house,
she was with Biong when the latter pawned them at a pawnshop near Chow-Chow;
Biong got ₱20,000.00 for the pawned items.42
Birrer further testified that two (2) weeks after they went to the Vizconde residence to
investigate, Biong on two (2) occasions brought her along to a certain house. It was
only Biong who went inside the said house as she waited in a taxicab. In both instances,
Biong came out of the house with an envelope containing an undisclosed amount of
money. She remembered this because when she was already staying in Pangasinan on
December 7, 1995, she saw flashed on ABS-CBN’s TV Patrol News 7:00 p.m.
newscast on television, a video footage of the house of Senator Webb. She was certain
it was that house where Biong went and came out carrying cash in an envelope.43
Lauro G. Vizconde, husband of Estrellita and father of Carmela and Jennifer, testified
on the personal circumstances of the victims. At the time of their deaths, Estrellita was
engaged in business (at one [1] time or another she was a garment manufacturer, taxi
operator, canteen owner and local employment recruiter), Carmela was a graduating
B.S. Psychology student at the University of Santo Tomas, while Jennifer was a Grade I
pupil at Bloomfield Academy at BF Resort, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He left the
Philippines in November 1989 to work in the United States of America. He had not
since returned to the country -- until this unfortunate tragedy befell his family -- but
communicated with his wife through telephone once or twice a month.44

Lauro G. Vizconde further testified that his daughter, when she was still alive, was so
close to him that she confides her daily activities, dreams, ambitions and plans in life.
She intended to pursue further masteral and doctoral degrees in business psychology in
the U.S.A. In fact, that was the reason he transferred from one (1) state to another
looking for a school where Carmela could enroll. However, he had to come home in
July 1991 and bury his wife and daughters whose violent deaths he was informed of
only upon arriving in the country and when he saw their bodies with stab wounds at the
funeral parlor just before burial. He spent burial expenses in the amount of
₱289,000.00, plus ₱103,000.00 incidental expenses, ₱300,000.00 paid for memorial
lots and around ₱100,000.00 for the construction of the mausoleum - with a grand total
of ₱793,950.00. He likewise incurred litigation expenses in the amount of ₱97,404.50.45
In one (1) of their telephone conversations when he was still in the U.S.A., Lauro
Vizconde recounted that Carmela mentioned to him that she had turned down a suitor
whom she called "Bagyo," who is a son of politician in Parañaque and comes from an
affluent family. He also expressed his mental anguish, wounded feelings, emotional
suffering due to the untimely demise of his family. It actually cost him his life, his heart
bled all the time and only time can tell when he can fully cope with the situation. He is
presently totally displaced and jobless; he misses his family and he now lives an
abnormal life with no inspiration and no more challenge to work for. When asked how
much compensation he will ask for moral damages, he answered saying he leaves the
matter to the sound discretion of the court as in truth, no amount can truly compensate
him for the loss of his loved ones. He sought justice for the death of his family and
hoped that the culprits, whoever they were, will be punished so that the souls of his
departed loved ones may rest in peace.46
Defense Evidence
The accused chiefly assailed the credibility of prosecution star witness Alfaro, in
particular her execution of two (2) allegedly inconsistent affidavits (one on April 28,
1995 and another on May 22, 1995) and raised alibi and denial as defenses to the
charge of rape with homicide attended by conspiracy. During the trial, no less than 95
witnesses47 were presented, and voluminous documentary exhibits were submitted.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the defense are summarized as follows:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb testified that at the time of the killings between June 29 and
30, 1991, he was still in Anaheim Hills, California, U.S.A., having departed from the
Philippines on March 9, 1991 on board a United Airlines flight bound for San
Francisco. He was accompanied by Gloria Webb, whose husband Richard Webb is the
eldest brother of his father Senator Freddie Webb. It was the first time he traveled to the
US and he returned to the Philippines only on October 25, 1992. On the eve of his
departure, he, Rael, Tina and his then girlfriend Milagros Castillo went out and had
dinner at Bunchchums. Later that night, they went to Faces Disco at Makati Avenue
where his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega followed. They went home at 3:00
o’clock in the morning already. After driving around in the city and bringing Milagros
home, he arrived at his house at around 5:00 a.m. His parents were already preparing to
leave and so they headed to the airport.48 Webb’s friend Rafael Jose, Paulo Santos,
Senator Webb’s security staff Miguel Muñoz, Webbs’ secretary Cristina Magpusao and
house girl Victoria Ventoso corroborated Webb’s testimony that he departed from the
Philippines on March 9, 1991.49
Webb further testified that he stayed at the house of her Auntie Gloria and Uncle Dinky
at San Francisco until late April to May 1991. Upon the invitation of her aunt Susan
Brottman, sister of his mother, he rode a train and went to Anaheim where he stayed
29
until mid-July 1991. Thereafter, he rented a nearby place but did not complete the one
(1) month pre-paid lease period as he proceeded to Longwood, Florida. He stayed at the
residence of his Uncle Jack and Sonia Rodriguez for almost a year (August 1991-
August 1992). He went back to Anaheim and stayed at the house of his godmother and
sister of his mother, Imelda Pagaspas, until October 1992. He met his relatives and
other personalities while in the US; visited Lake Tahoe with the Wheelock family;
toured Disneyland where Luis Wheelock filmed them and attended a concert with
Christopher Esguerra who also took him out to the malls.50
Webb further testified that in the later part of June 1991, his parents joined him in the
US. He applied for and was issued a driver’s license on June 14, 1991. He also worked
at the pest control company of his cousin-in-law Alex del Toro. Aside from his passport
and airline ticket for return flight to the Philippines, Webb presented before the court
the logbook of jobs/tasks kept by del Toro, in which he pointed to the entries therein
which were actually performed by him; and also his purported pay check ($150 "pay to
Cash"), ID and other employment papers. He also identified some handwritten letters
he mailed while he was in the US and sent to his friend Jennifer Cabrera in the
Philippines; photographs and video tape clips taken during his cousin Marie Manlapit’s
wedding to Alex del Toro which wedding he attended in the US together with his
mother; and receipt issued for the mountain bicycle he bought on June 30, 1991 from
the Orange Cycle store in Anaheim.51
Webb denied having met Carmela Vizconde and neither does he know Jessica Alfaro.
He had been jailed since August 9, 1995. When asked about his co-accused, Webb said
the only ones he had met before June 29, 1991 were Fernandez and Rodriguez. He used
to play basketball with Fernandez at BF Homes Phase III, during which he also met
Rodriguez. While he admitted having gone out on a group with Fernandez to the houses
of their basketball buddies, he denied having gone out with Rodriguez at any time.52 He
also denied knowing Biong who is neither a driver nor security aide of his father.53
Gloria Webb testified that on March 9, 1991, she traveled with Webb on a United
Airlines flight to San Francisco. Webb stayed at her residence at 639 Gellert Boulevard,
Daly City, California until May 1991 when he left to be with his mother’s sister and
relatives in Anaheim. Webb and her grandson attended a "concierto" in the evenings
and he also joined and helped her son-in-law with his business. Webb went with them
to church, to the malls and in shopping. In April 1991, Webb went on a trip to Lake
Tahoe with Mr. Wheelock and family.54
Dorothy Wheelock testified that she became a US citizen in 1974 and has been
residing at 877 Las Lomas Drive, Milpitas, California. Webb’s mother is her childhood
friend and schoolmate. When she heard that Webb was in the US looking for a job, she
invited him, and her husband Louis Wheelock picked him up at Daly City in April
1991. To reciprocate the Webbs’ hospitality while they visited the Philippines in 1990,
she and her family took Webb to a trip to Lake Tahoe in Nevada during which they
even took a video tape. Senator Freddie and Mrs. Webb also visited and stayed with
them for four (4) days in July 1991. They took them to a trip to Yosemite Park, also
with video footages taken by her husband.55
Steven Keeler testified that he had been an American citizen since 1982 and resident of
4002 River Street, Newport Beach, California. He met Webb at a dinner in the house of
Webb’s aunt Susan Brottman in Anaheim Hills around May or June 1991. Brottman’s
son, Rey Manlapit, was his good friend. They played basketball with Webb, went to
bars, shopped and watched TV. He also knew that Webb bought a car and worked for
Alex del Toro for Environment First Termite Control. He believed that Webb left for
Florida towards the end of summer (July 1991). He could not recall any specific dates
he was with Webb.56
Honesto Aragon testified that he went to the US in 1967 and became a US citizen in
1989. On June 28, 1991, he met then Congressman Freddie Webb at the house of the
latter’s sister-in-law, Susan, at Anaheim. Congressman Webb introduced to him his son
Hubert Webb. He, Congressman Webb and Hubert went to some stores to go shopping
for a bicycle for Hubert. But they only bought bike accessories. He invited them to
snack before he brought them to his own house where he introduced to them his son
Andrew. The following day, June 29, 1991, they went to Riverside, California to shop
for a car for Hubert; though they found a Toyota MR2, they did not buy it because it
has questionable ownership. Early morning the next day, he picked up Congressman
Webb and they played tennis from 7:00 to 10:00 a.m. He and Congressman Webb were
close friends, as both of them were members of a basketball team in Letran. The first
time he saw Hubert was when he was still a small kid and the other time on June 28,
1991 at the Brottman’s residence in Anaheim.57
Senator Freddie Webb testified that his son Hubert left for the US on March 9, 1991,
the first time he had gone out of the country. Hubert stayed with his sister-in-law
Gloria. They wanted to show Hubert the value of independence, hard work and
perseverance, and for him to learn how to get along and live with other people. Hubert
resigned from his job at Saztec before departing for the US. He and his wife also went
to the US on June 28, 1991. They stayed at the house of his sister-in-law, Susan
Brottman at Anaheim. From San Francisco, they went to Orlando, Florida, then back to
Los Angeles and returned to the Philippines on July 21, 1991. Among the places he
visited while in the US were the Yosemite Park, Nordstrom, Disneyland, Disneyworld.
Upon arriving at Anaheim, he saw his son Hubert and also informed Honesto Aragon
regarding their plan to procure a bicycle for Hubert. Hubert was with them again on
June 29, 1991 at dinner in the residence of his sister-in-law. On July 1, 1991, they went
shopping for some clothes. Together with Aragon, he and Hubert looked for a Toyota
MR2 car and paid for it with a check (the car was priced at $6,000-$7,000).58
Senator Webb further testified that he knows Mila Gaviola who used to be their
"labandera." She left their house but returned to work for them again about a couple of
months after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. As to Alfaro’s statements implicating his son
Hubert in the Vizconde killings, he said the statements were not accurate because it was
physically impossible for Hubert to have participated in the crime as he was abroad at
the time.59
Louis Whitaker testified that he left the Philippines and resided in the US since
September 1964. He met Jack Rodriguez when the latter fetched him and his wife Sonia
at the Los Angeles International Airport on June 28, 1991 upon their arrival from the
Philippines. They proceeded to the house of a mutual friend, Salvador Vaca, at
Moresbay Street in Lake Forest. They went to see Congressman Webb at a house in
Anaheim. That was the first time he met Congressman Webb, Mrs. Webb, the sister-in-
law and a Mr. Aragon. On June 29, 1991, he and Rodriguez invited Congressman
Webb to see Mr. Vaca perform at La Calesa Restaurant in the City of Testin. When
they fetched Congressman Webb at his sister-in-law’s house, he met again Mrs. Webb,
and also Hubert. He saw Hubert for the second time at Orlando, Florida when he went
to the house of Jack Rodriguez there; this was about July or August 1991.60
Sonia H. Rodriguez testified that she was appointed UNESCO Commissioner by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. She has known accused Webb since he was a child. On June
28, 1991, she and her husband boarded a plane for Los Angeles, California. They were
fetched at the LA airport by old-time friend Salvador Vaca and proceeded to the latter’s

house in Orange County, California. They had dinner that evening with spouses Freddie
and Elizabeth Webb at the house of Susan Brottman. The next day, in the afternoon of
June 29, 1991, her husband and Salvador Vaca picked up Senator Webb from the house
of Susan Brottman and then came back to fetch her and Mrs. Vaca to go to La Calesa, a
restaurant owned by Mario Benitez, also a Filipino. However, she and Mrs. Vaca
decided to stay home. On June 30, 1991 at around 8:00 p.m., she and her husband went
to the house of Susan Brottman, together with Salvador and Mrs. Vaca and Louis
Whitaker. She recalled that Hubert was there at the time. She saw Hubert again on July
4, 1991 when they went on a lakeside picnic with the Webb family, Brottmans and
Vacas. After watching the fireworks, they went to Sizzler Restaurant. The next day, she
and her husband stayed overnight at San Francisco where they also met Senator and
Mrs. Webb. On August August 4, 1991, Hubert arrived in her home in Florida with her
son Tony, daughter-in-law Ana, and stayed with them for almost one (1) year. The last
time she saw Hubert was when he left Orlando, Florida on January 27, 1992.61
Webb presented other witnesses to buttress his defense of alibi: Victor Yap (who took
video shots of Congressman Webb during a boat ride in Disneyland);62 Armando
Rodriguez (who testified seeing Hubert in Orlando either August or September
1991);63 performing artist Gary Valenciano (who testified meeting Hubert at a dinner at
the Rodriguez residence in Orlando on November 24, 1991, Jack Rodriguez being the
father of his high school classmate Antonio Rodriguez;64 and Christopher Paul Legaspi
Esguerra (grandson of Gloria Webb who went with Hubert Webb to watch the concert
of the Deelite Band in San Francisco in the later part of April 1991 and saw Hubert
Webb for the last time in May 1991).65
Then a practicing lawyer, Atty. Antonio T. Carpio (now an Associate Justice of this
Court) testified that on June 29, 1991 between 10:00 and 11:00 o’clock in the morning,
he had a telephone conversation with former Congressman Webb who said he was
calling from Anaheim, U.S.A., where he and his wife went to look for a job for their
son Hubert. They also talked about bills to be drafted as his law office had been
engaged by Congressman Webb for bill drafting services as well as preparation of his
speeches and statements. When asked if he had personal knowledge that Congressman
Webb was really in the US at that time, he replied that since Webb had told him he was
leaving for the US, he just presumed it was so when Webb said he was then at
Anaheim. Neither did he have personal knowledge that Hubert Webb was in the US at
the time of his conversation with Congressman Webb.66
Webb submitted the following documentary evidence in connection with his sojourn in
the US:
1) Video Tape recording of Disneyland trip on July 3, 1991;67
2) Official Receipt issued by Orange Cycle Center dated June 30, 1991,68 photographs
of the bicycle purchased by Webb from said store;69
3) Car plate with the name "Lew Webb";70
4) Passport with Philippine Immigration arrival stamp;71
5) Photographs of Webb with Rodriguez family;72
6) California Driver’s License of Webb,73 Original License Card of Webb issued on
June 14, 1991;74
7) Statement of Account issued to Environment First Termite Control showing Check
No. 0180;75 Bank of America Certification on Check Nos. 0122 and 0180;76
8) Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle on sale to Webb of
Toyota MR2 car;77 Traffic citations issued to Webb;78 Import documents of said car into
the Philippines;79
9) Certification issued by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and
correspondence between US and Philippine Government;80 computer-generated print-
out of the US-INS indicating date of Webb’s entry in USA as March 9, 1991 and his
30
date of departure as October 26, 1992;81 US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting the earlier
August 10, 1995 Certification;82
10) Certification issued by Agnes Tabuena;83 Passenger Manifest of PAL Flight No.
103;84 PAL ticket issued to Webb,85 Arrival in Manila Certification issued by the
Philippine Immigration,86 Diplomatic Note of the US Department of State with
enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations,
Office of Records of the US-INS stating that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is
a true and accurate statement;87 and Certificate of Authentication of Philippine Consul
Herrera-Lim.88
Accused Antonio Lejano and Michael Gatchalian likewise raised the defense
of alibi claiming that they spent the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June
30, 1991 watching video tapes at the house of Carlos Syap at Ayala Alabang Village.
Lejano further testified that with the exception of Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and
Michael "Mike" Gatchalian who are his former schoolmates, he does not know any of
his co-accused. They left the house of Syap brothers early morning of June 30, 1991; it
was Cas Syap who brought him and Mike home. On July 5, 1991, he and Cas Syap
went to the police station where Mike, who was picked up as a suspect by the police on
July 4, was detained. When they met Biong there, they told him they are willing to
vouch for Mike’s innocence and even volunteered to give statements. Biong told them
to return the following day. However, when he returned in the morning of July 6, 1991,
Biong wanted his fingerprints taken right away but he told Biong he needed to consult
someone first. He eventually submitted himself for fingerprinting after his name came
out in the media. Lejano pointed out that Alfaro failed to identify him even as she
passed by him three (3) times, and was able to do so only when she was coached by the
prosecution camp.89
On the part of Michael Gatchalian, he presented nine (9) witnesses: Atty.
Porfirio "Perry"  Pimentel, RPN 9 broadcast executive who testified that he personally
took video footages of Mon Tulfo’s interviews with some persons in America
(including Honesto Aragon and the bicycle shop owner) who attested that Hubert Webb
was there at the time of the Vizconde killings, but which segment was edited out in the
program he produced (Action 9);90 Mark Anthony So, a former NBI intelligence agent
who was tasked to confirm photos of Hubert Webb (his classmate at DLSU St. Benilde)
to familiarize Alfaro with his facial features;91 Matthew John Almogino, a childhood
friend and neighbor of Gatchalian, who testified that he was among those who went
inside the Vizconde house in the morning of June 30, 1991 and Biong even asked him
to take pictures; thereupon at around 9:30 a.m., he saw Gatchalian in front of the
Vizconde residence telling him that he just woke up and exchanged pleasantries with
him; and that as far as he knows, Webb, Fernandez, Lejano and Gatchalian are not
"magbabarkada";92 Atty. Leny Mauricio and Ana Marie Pamintuan of The Philippine
Star wherein a news article was published stating that Michael Gatchalian had rejected
government’s offer for him to turn state witness in the Vizconde case;93 Atty. Camilo
Murillo who accompanied Gatchalian on July 19, 1991 when he gave his statement to
the NBI, testified that Atty. Pete Rivera relayed to Gatchalian the request of then NBI
Director Honesto Aragon for him to turn state witness and which offer was refused by
Gatchalian and his father;94 and Atty. Manuel Sunga who accompanied Gatchalian to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) when he submitted his counter-affidavit (where there
were already media people), testified that they were invited to the conference room
where State Prosecutor Zuño in the presence of then Secretary Guingona made the offer
for Gatchalian to turn state witness but it was rejected.95
Atty. Francisco C. Gatchalian confirmed that the NBI and later the DOJ made offers
for his son to turn state witness in this case but they refused for the reason that his son
was innocent of the crime charged. Michael had told him that on the night of June 29,
1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991, Michael was with his friends at Ayala
Alabang Village in Muntinlupa at the residence of the Syaps. Gatchalian narrated that
when he woke up to jog in the morning of June 30, 1991 around 7:00 to 7:30, he passed
by the Vizconde house and saw people milling in front. At about 8:30 a.m., he saw the
crowd getting bigger and so he instructed Michael who had wakened up, to find out and
check what happened to their neighbor. Michael rushed out towards the Vizconde
residence and when he came back about 10:00 o’clock that same morning, he reported
that the house was robbed and people were killed inside the house. Both of them stayed
in their house that day. He denied Alfaro’s claim that she was their distant relative.96
Accused Miguel Rodriguez maintained he was at home when the killings took place.
He presented as witness his first cousin Mark Josef Andres Rualo who testified that at
around 1:00 in the morning of June 30, 1991, he called up Rodriguez asking why he has
not yet proceeded to the birthday party of Rualo at their house. Rodriguez replied that
he could not make it because he was not fetched by his brother Art (who was the one
with a car). So he handed the telephone to Art (who had arrived at the party around
9:30 to 10:00 p.m.) for them to talk. From Rodriguez’s residence at Pilar Village, it will
take about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes by car. It was a big party attended by
some eighty (80) guests and which ended by 3:30 to 4:00 a.m. But it was only the first
time he had invited Rodriguez to his birthday party. He knows Lejano, Rodriguez’s
close friend and classmate, because Rodriguez used to bring him along when Rodriguez
comes to his house.97
The other witnesses presented by Rodriguez, Col. Charles Calima, Jr. and Michael
Rodriguez, testified on the alleged incident of "mistaken identity" wherein Alfaro
supposedly pointed to one (1) "Michael Rodriguez," a drug dependent who was pulled
out by Col. Calima from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center on the basis of the
description given by NBI agents. They testified that when Alfaro confronted this
"Michael Rodriguez," she became very emotional and immediately slapped and kicked
him telling him, "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one
month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." Contrary to the physical
description given by the NBI, the accused Miguel Rodriguez he saw inside the court
room had no tattoo on his arm and definitely not the same "Michael Rodriguez" whom
Alfaro slapped and kicked at the NBI premises. Michael Rodriguez testified that he was
blindfolded and brought to the comfort room by NBI agents and forced to admit that he
was Miguel Rodriguez; he identified Alfaro and Atty. Figueras from a collage of
photographs shown to him in court.98
Accused Gerardo Biong testified that the last time he handled this case was when
General Filart announced the case as solved with the presentation of suspects sometime
in October 1991. However, he was subpoenaed by the NBI for the taking of his
statement because Lauro Vizconde complained that he had stolen jewelries at the
Vizconde house. He had sought the examination of latent fingerprints lifted from the
crime scene but the suspects turned out negative when tested. He denied the accusation
regarding the destruction of evidence as well as missing items during his investigation
at the Vizconde residence. The bloodied bed, mats, pillows and bed sheets were burned
by people at the funeral parlor as ordered by Mr. Gatmaitan. Among the suspects he
had then were Michael Gatchalian, Tony Boy Lejano and Cas Syap. As to the
testimony of Birrer that they played "mahjong" on the night of June 29, 1991, he said it
was not true because the place was closed on Saturdays and Sundays. After a
surveillance on Birrer, he discovered she had in her possession Carmela’s driver’s
license and was driving a car already. He denied Birrer’s account that he went to a

place after receiving a telephone call at 2:30 in the morning of June 30, 1991. As to
Alfaro, he met her for the first time at the NBI on June 23, 1995. His brown jacket was
given to him long ago by a couple whose dispute he was able to settle. He only met
Webb and Estrada at the NBI. Biong denied the accusations of Birrer, saying that she
was angry at him because they separated and he had hit her after he heard about her
infidelity. Neither has he seen Alfaro before the filing of this case. He was
administratively charged before the Philippine National Police (PNP) for Grave
Misconduct due to non-preservation of evidence. He was offered by the NBI to turn
state witness but he declined as he found it difficult to involve his co-accused whom he
does not really know.99
Biong admitted that Birrer went along with him, Galvan and Capt. Bartolome to the
Vizconde residence in the morning of June 30, 1991. Upon arriving at the Vizconde
house, he looked for the victims’ relatives and the homeowners’ association president;
Atty. Lopez and Mrs. Mia came. In going inside the house, they passed through the
kitchen door which was open already. On top of the kitchen table, there was a lady’s
bag with things scattered; he later inspected them but did not think of examining the
bag or taking note of the calling cards and other items for possible relevance to the
investigation. Upon entering the master’s bedroom, he saw the bloodied bodies. Mrs.
Vizconde’s hands were hogtied from behind and her mouth gagged while Jennifer’s
body was also bloodied. Carmela who was lying on a floor carpet was likewise gagged,
her hands hogtied from behind and her legs spread out, her clothes raised up and a
pillow case was placed on top of her private part. He had the bodies photographed and
prepared a spot report.100
Biong also admitted that before the pictures were taken, he removed with his bare
hands the object, which was like a stocking cloth, that was wrapped around Carmela’s
mouth and neck. As to the main door glass, it was the upper part which he broke. There
was a red jewelry box they saw where a pearl necklace inside could be seen; he
remembered he had it photographed but he had not seen those pictures. They left the
Vizconde house and brought the cadavers to the funeral parlor. He did not take steps to
preserve the bloodied carpet, bed sheets and blankets because they have been
previously told by NBI that no evidence can be found on such items. As for the
footprint and shoe print found on the hood of the car and at the back of the house, he
also could not recall if he had those photographed. It was only the following day that he
brought an employee of the Parañaque police to lift fingerprints from the crime scene;
he was the one (1) giving instructions at the time. However, no latent fingerprints had
been taken; despite attempts, no clear fingerprint had been lifted and he did not any
more ask why.101
Biong further admitted that he was so angry with the Vizconde housemaids as he did
not believe they did not hear anything despite the loud sound of the breaking of the
main door glass. He also admitted mauling Normal E. White, Jr. because he thought he
was withholding information during the investigation. Edgar Mendez did not tell him
about the entry of a three (3)-vehicle convoy into the subdivision on the night of June
29, 1991. As for Michael Gatchalian, he knows him because on July 3, 1991 at 4:30
a.m., they caught him at Vinzons St. at the entrance of Pitong Daan Subdivision for
possession of marijuana. However, he does not know any more what happened to that
case he filed against Gatchalian as he was already dismissed from the service.102 He
also admitted having mauled Gatchalian while interrogating him for his participation in
the Vizconde killings.103
Ruling of the Trial Court
31
On January 4, 2000, the trial court rendered its Decision104 finding all the accused guilty
as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds all the principal accused GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND
HEREBY SENTENCES EACH ONE OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA. This Court likewise finds the accused Gerardo Biong
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE
FACT, AND HEREBY SENTENCES HIM TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT
OF ELEVEN (11) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12)
YEARS.  In addition, the Court hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay
the victims’ surviving heir, Mr. Lauro Vizconde, the following sums by way of civil
indemnity:
1. The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;
2. The amount of P762,450.00 representing actual damages sustained by Mr. Lauro
Vizconde;
3. The amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by Mr. Lauro Vizconde;
4. The amount of P97,404.55 as attorney’s fees;
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against the accused Artemio "Dong" Ventura
and Joey Filart for their eventual apprehension so that they can immediately be brought
to trial.
SO ORDERED.105
The trial court found Alfaro as a credible and truthful witness, considering the vast
details she disclosed relative to the incident she had witnessed inside the Vizconde
house. The trial court noted that Alfaro testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and has remained consistent in her narration of the
events despite a lengthy and grueling cross-examination conducted on her by eight (8)
defense lawyers. Neither was her credibility and veracity of her declarations in court
affected by the differences and inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22,
1995 affidavits, which she had satisfactorily explained during the trial considering the
circumstances that she initially desired to protect her former boyfriend Estrada and her
relative Gatchalian, the absence of a lawyer during the first taking of her statements by
the NBI, her distrust of the first investigators who took her statements and prepared her
April 28, 1995 affidavit, and her uncertainty if she could obtain adequate support and
security for her own life were she to disclose everything she knows about the Vizconde
killings.
On the other hand, the trial court ruled that principal accused Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez
and Gatchalian failed to establish their defense of alibi,  the accused having been
positively identified by Alfaro as the group who conspired and assisted one (1) another
in plotting and carrying out on the same night the rape of Carmela, on the occasion of
which Carmela’s mother and sister were also stabbed to death. The trial court held that
Alfaro gave a clear, positive and convincing testimony which was sufficiently
corroborated on its material points by the testimonies of other witnesses and confirmed
by the physical evidence on record.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
By Decision of December 15, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s
decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
274 of Parañaque City in Criminal Case No. 95-404, finding accused-appellants Hubert
"Jeffrey" Webb y Pagaspas, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael Gatchalian y
Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals, and Gerardo Biong as
accessory, of the crime of RAPE with HOMICIDE, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, as indicated:
1). We AFFIRM the sentence of accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
corresponding accessory penalties under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code;
2). We MODIFY the penalty of Gerardo Biong who is an accessory to the crime.
Accused-appellant Biong is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and absolute perpetual disqualification under Article 58 of the Revised
Penal Code; and
3). We MODIFY the civil indemnity. Accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada and Rodriguez are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the
surviving heir of the victims, Mr. Lauro Vizconde. the amounts of P200,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P762,450.00 as actual damages, P2,000,000.00 as moral damages and
P97,404.55 as attorney's fees, with the corresponding subsidiary liability against
accused-appellant Biong pursuant to Article 110, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.106
The CA upheld the trial court in giving full weight and credence to the eyewitness
testimony of Alfaro which was duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who
had not been shown to have ill-motive and malicious intent in revealing what they
know about the Vizconde killings. It disagreed with the appellants’ view that they were
victims of an unjust judgment upon their mere allegations that they were tried by
publicity, and that the trial judge was biased whose discriminatory and hostile attitude
was demonstrated by her rejection of 132 out of 142 exhibits of the defense during the
bail hearings and her refusal to issue subpoenas to prospective defense witnesses such
as former Secretary Teofisto Guingona and Antonio Calvento.
The CA also fully concurred with the trial court’s conclusion that all the principal
accused failed to establish their defense of alibi after carefully evaluating the
voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the defense. On the
issue of conspiracy, the CA found that the prosecution was able to clearly and
convincingly establish its presence in the commission of the crime, notwithstanding
that appellants Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Estrada and Fernandez did not actually rape
Carmela, nor participated in killing her, her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration filed by the appellants, the CA’s Special Division of
Five, voting 3-2, affirmed the December 15, 2005 Decision.107 In the Resolution dated
January 26, 2007, the majority reiterated that it has fully explained in its Decision why
the US-INS Certifications submitted by appellant Webb deserve little weight. It
stressed that it is a case of positive identification versus alibi founded on documentary
evidence. On the basis of the rule that alibi is accepted only upon the clearest proof that
the accused was not and could not have been at the crime scene when it was committed,
the CA in resolving the appeal considered the weight of documentary evidence in light
of testimonial evidence -- an eyewitness account that the accused was the principal
malefactor. As to the issue of apparent inconsistencies between the two (2) affidavits
executed by Alfaro, the CA said this is a settled matter, citing the Joint Decision in CA-

G.R. SP No. 42285 and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 entitled "Rodriguez v.
Tolentino" and "Webb, et al. v. Tolentino, et al.," which had long become final.
Appellants’ Arguments
Appellants Webb and Lejano set forth the following arguments in their Supplemental
Appeal Brief as grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision and their acquittal in this
case:
I
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING APPELLANT WEBB'S ABSENCE FROM
PHILIPPINE TERRITORY BETWEEN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992
ENGENDERS A REASONABLE DOUBT AND PRECLUDES AN ABIDING
CONVICTION, TO A MORAL CERTAINTY, OF HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED. THUS, AS CORRECTLY APPRECIATED BY JUSTICES TAGLE AND
DACUDAO IN THEIR SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINIONS -
A. THE PASSPORT OF APPELLANT WEBB, AS THE OFFICIAL TRAVEL
DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO HIM, IS
STAMPMARKED AND INITIALED WITH THE DEPARTURE DATE OF 9
MARCH 1991 AND ARRIVAL DATE OF 27 OCTOBER 1992, SHOWING THAT
HE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT ABROAD AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME ON 29 JUNE 1991.
B. THE CERTIFICATIONS AND COMPUTER PRINTOUT ISSUED BY THE
UNITED STATES INS NON-IMMIGRANT INFORMATION SYSTEM, WHICH
INDICATE EXACTLY THE SAME DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL DATES OF 9
MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992, CONFIRM THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLANT WEBB TO HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME.
C. THE RULING THAT APPELLANT WEBB WAS "SMUGGLED" INTO AND
OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES WITHIN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992,
WITH THE US INS CERTIFICATIONS BEING THE PROBABLE PRODUCT OF
"MONEY, POWER, INFLUENCE, OR CONNECTIONS" IS BASED ON PURE
SPECULATION AND BIASED CONJECTURE AND NOT ON A CONCLUSION
THAT ANY COURT OF LAW SHOULD MAKE.
D. NO LESS THAN THE HONORABLE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO
TESTIFIED IN OPEN COURT THAT IN THE MORNING OF 29 JUNE 1991, OR
BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, HE HAD AN OVERSEAS
CONVERSATION WITH SEN. FREDDIE N. WEBB ON THE LATTER’S
PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS WIFE AND APPELLANT
WEBB.
II
THE DISSENTING JUSTICES CORRECTLY REJECTED JESSICA ALFARO FOR
NOT BEING A CREDIBLE WITNESS AND FOR GIVING INCONSISTENT AND
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN DISCARDING EACH AND
EVERY PIECE OF THE ACCUSED’S EVIDENCE AND PRACTICALLY
REDUCING THE APPEAL BELOW INTO AN EXERCISE OF FINDING
GROUNDS TO DOUBT, SUSPECT AND ACCORDINGLY REJECT THE PROOF
OFFERED BY THEM IN THEIR DEFENSE INSTEAD OF GIVING DUE WEIGHT
AND CONSIDERATION TO EACH IN ORDER TO THOROUGHLY SATISFY
ITSELF OF THE "MORAL CERTAINTY" REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES.
32
IV
IN LIGHT OF THE BASIC TENETS UNDERLYING OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, WHICH ESCHEW A FINDING OF GUILT UNLESS ESTABLISHED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND ORDAIN THE RESOLUTION OF ALL
DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED, THE COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT
WEBB WHEN THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI HE ESTABLISHED BY
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ENGENDER REASONABLE
DOUBT AS TO HIS GUILT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. THE SCALES OUGHT
TO HAVE BEEN TILTED IN HIS, AND NOT THE PROSECUTION’S, FAVOR.108
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates the arguments he had raised in his appeal brief and
motion for reconsideration filed before the CA, as follows:
I Guilt of Appelants Beyond Reasonable Doubt
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF SUPPOSED EYEWITNESS JESSICA ALFARO
AND CORROBORATING WITNESSES NORMAL WHITE AND JUSTO
CABANACAN.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
HAS PROVED THE CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON SUCH
CONSPIRACY.
III
THE PROCEEDING BELOW WAS ATTENDED BY IRREGULARITIES
SHOWING PARTIALITY ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN VIOLATION
OF HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
xxxx
I glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
BY ALL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, THE TESTIMONY OF
JESSICA ALFARO CANNOT BE JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED.
II
THE CRIMINAL CONNECTION OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN TO THE
GRUESOME VIZCONDE MURDERS HAS NOT EVEN BEEN REMOTELY
SHOWN TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR CONVICTION.
III
IN THE REQUIRED JUDICIAL EVALUATION PROCESS, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE RECORD OF THIS CASE POINT
UNERRINGLY TO THE INNOCENCE OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN.
IV
THE RULES ON EVIDENCE ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND OF THE STANDING
PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW HAVE BEEN GROSSLY VIOLATED.
V
MICHAEL GATCHALIAN RESPECTFULLY INVOKES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS ON THE GROUNDS OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE, AND
FOR ALL THAT IT IS WORTH, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL AND A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE.109
Additionally, Gatchalian assails the denial by the trial court of his motion (and also
appellant Webb’s) for DNA testing despite a certification from the NBI that the
specimen semen remained intact, which Justice Tagle in his dissenting opinion also
found as unjust. He further argues that the right to a speedy trial is violated even if the
delay was not caused by the prosecution but by events that are not within the control of
the prosecution or the courts. Thus, the length of time which took Alfaro to come
forward and testify in this case is most conspicuous. Her delay of four (4) years in
reporting the crime has to be taken against her, particularly with the story behind it. She
volunteered to come forward only after the arrests of previous accused did not lead
anywhere. Moreover, it is clear that she adopted the version previously advanced by an
"akyat-bahay" gang, as noted by Justice Dacudao in his dissenting opinion. Gatchalian
thus contends that the delay occurred even before a preliminary investigation was
conducted and cites cases upholding the right of accused persons to a speedy trial
where there was delay in the preliminary investigation.110
Totality of Evidence Established the
Appellants assail the lower courts in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, particularly Jessica Alfaro despite inconsistencies and
contradictions in her two (2) affidavits, and the alleged "piece by piece discarding" of
their voluminous documentary exhibits and testimonies of no less than ninety-five (95)
witnesses. They contend that the totality of evidence engenders a reasonable doubt
entitling them to acquittal from the grave charge of rape with homicide.
After a thorough and conscientious review of the records, I firmly believe that the CA
correctly upheld the conviction of appellants.
Credibility of Prosecution
Witnesses
The determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with
the trial court, because it has the unique position of observing the witness’ deportment
on the stand while testifying.111 It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts
which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.112 When the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court.113
Reexamining the testimony of Alfaro, who underwent exhaustive and intense cross-
examination by eight (8) defense lawyers, it is to be noted that she revealed such details
and observations which only a person who was actually with the perpetrators could
have known. More importantly, her testimony was corroborated on its material points
by the declarations of other prosecution witnesses, to wit: [1] that their convoy of three
(3) vehicles repeatedly entered the Pitong Daan Subdivision on the night of June 29,
1991 was confirmed by the security guard on duty, Normal White, Jr., who also
testified that he had seen Gatchalian and his group standing at the vicinity of the
Almogino residence located near the end of Vinzons St., which is consistent with
Alfaro’s testimony that on their first trip to the subdivision she parked her car infront of
the Vizconde house while appellants parked their respective cars near the dead end of
Vinzons St.; [2] that Ventura climbed on the hood of the Nissan Sentra car and
loosened the light bulb to turn it off was confirmed by the testimony of Birrer and
appellant Biong that they found a shoe print on the hood of the car parked inside the
garage of the Vizconde house; even defense witnesses Dennis Almogino (neighbor of
the Vizcondes) and SPO2 Reynaldo Carbonnel declared that the garage was totally
without light; [3] that a lady’s bag was on top of the dining table in the kitchen was
likewise confirmed by Birrer and Biong; [4] that a loud static sound coming from the
TV set inside the master’s bedroom which led Alfaro to the said room, matched with

the observations of the Vizconde housemaids, Birrer and Biong that when they went
inside the Vizconde house in the morning of June 30, 1991, the TV set inside the
master’s bedroom was still turned on with a loud sound; [5] the positioning of the dead
bodies of Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer and their physical appearance or condition
(hogtied, gagged and bloodied) was correctly described by Alfaro, consistent with the
declarations of White, Jr., Birrer and Biong who were among those who first saw the
bodies in the morning of June 30, 1991; [6] that Carmela was raped by Webb and how
the three (3) women were killed as Alfaro learned from the conversation of the
appellants at the BF Executive Village house, was consistent with the findings of Dr.
Cabanayan who conducted the autopsy and post-mortem examination of the cadavers in
the morning of June 30, 1991 showing that the victims died of multiple stab wounds,
the specimen taken from Carmela’s vaginal canal tested positive for spermatozoa and
the approximate time of death based on the onset of rigor mortis, which would place it
between midnight and 2:00 o’clock in the morning of June 30, 1991; [7] that Webb, just
before going out of the gate of the Vizconde house, threw a stone which broke the glass
frame of the main door, jibed with the testimony of Birrer who likewise saw a stone
near the broken glass panel at the living room of the Vizconde house, and Biong
himself testified that he even demonstrated to Capt. Bartolome and the housemaids the
loud sound by again hitting the glass of the main door;114 and [8] that after Webb made
a call on his cellular phone, Biong arrived at around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of
June 30, 1991 at the BF Executive Village house where she and appellants retreated,
was consistent with the testimony of Birrer that Biong left the "mahjong" session to
answer a telephone call between 1:00 to 2:00 o’clock in the morning of June 30, 1991
and thereafter Birrer asked where he was going, to which Biong replied "BF" and
shortly thereafter a taxicab with a man at the backseat fetched Biong.
Indeed, Alfaro could not have divulged the foregoing details of the crime if she did not
really join the group of Webb in going to the Vizconde residence and witness what
happened during the time Webb, Lejano and Ventura were inside the house and when
the group retreated to BF Executive Village. Contrary to appellants’ contention,
Alfaro’s detailed testimony appears clear and convincing, thus giving the Court the
impression that she was sincere and credible. She even opened her personal life to
public scrutiny by admitting that she was addicted to shabu for sometime and that was
how she came to meet Webb’s group and got entangled in the plot to gang-rape
Carmela. Her being a former drug user in no way taints her credibility as a witness. The
fact that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug dependent does
not per se affect her credibility.115
Alfaro’s ability to recollect events that occurred four (4) years ago with her mental
condition that night of June 29, 1991 when she admittedly took shabu three (3) times
and even sniffed cocaine, was likewise questioned by the appellants. When the question
was posed to Alfaro on cross-examination, she positively stated that while indeed she
had taken shabu at that time, her perception of persons and events around her was not
diminished. Her faculties unimpaired by the drugs she had taken that night, Alfaro was
able to vividly recall what transpired the whole time she was with appellants. Alfaro
testified that even if she was then a regular shabu user, she had not reached that point of
being paranoid ("praning"). It was the first time Alfaro sniffed cocaine and she
described its initial effect as being "stoned," but lasting only five (5) to seven (7)
minutes. However, she did not fall asleep since shabu  and "coke" are not downers.
Alfaro further explained her indifference and apathy in not dissuading Webb and her
group from carrying out their evil plan against Carmela as due to the numbing effect of
drugs, which also enabled her to dislodge from her mind the harrowing images of the
killings for quite sometime. Eventually, the chance to redeem herself came when she
was invited to a Christian fellowship, and with her child’s future in mind, her desire to
33
transform her life grew stronger. As she cast off her addiction to drugs, its desensitizing
effect began to wear off and her conscience bothered her no end. Under such
circumstances, the delay of four (4) years in admitting her involvement in the Vizconde
killings cannot be taken against Alfaro. In fact, she had to muster enough courage to
finally come out in the open considering that during her last encounter with appellants
at a discotheque in 1995, she was threatened by appellant Rodriguez that if she will not
keep her mouth shut, she will be killed. He even offered her a plane ticket for her to go
abroad. Coming from wealthy and influential families, and capable of barbaric acts she
had already seen, appellants instilled such fear in Alfaro that her reluctance to report to
the authorities was perfectly understandable.
I find that the circumstances of habitual drug use and delay in reporting a crime did not
affect the competence and credibility of prosecution witness Alfaro. It bears stressing
that the fact of delay alone does not work against the witnesses. Delay or vacillation in
making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness
if such delay is satisfactorily explained.116
Besides, appellants failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper motive that
may have impelled Alfaro to falsely testify against them, other than their allegation that
she regularly associated with NBI agents as one (1) of their informants. The absence of
evidence of improper motive on the part of the said witness for the prosecution strongly
tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.117 Neither had appellants established any ill-
motive on the part of the other prosecution witnesses.
Inconsistencies and Discrepancies in Alfaro’s April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
Affidavits
Appellants, from the start of preliminary investigation, have repeatedly harped on the
discrepancies and inconsistencies in Alfaro’s first and second affidavits. However, this
Court has repeatedly ruled that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit
and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weight.118 With greater relevance should this rule apply in situations when a subsequent
affidavit of the prosecution witness is intended to amplify and correct inconsistencies
with the first affidavit, the discrepancies having been adequately explained. We held
in People v. Sanchez119
...we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn statements
and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses.
Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties
are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
which has transpired. Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and
elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn
statements/affidavits.120
Alfaro explained the circumstances surrounding her execution of the first Affidavit
dated April 28, 1995 which was done without the presence of a lawyer and at the house
of agent Mario Garcia where she was brought by Atty. Sacaguing and Moises Tamayo,
another agent of task force Anti-Kidnapping, Hijack and Robbery (AKHAR). The
unusual questioning of these men gave her the impression that she was merely being
used to boost their career promotion and her distrust was even heightened when they
absolutely failed to provide her security. She was aghast upon discovering the
completed affidavit which falsely stated that it was made in the presence of her lawyer
of choice (Atty. Mercader who was not actually present). Agent Tamayo also
incorporated inaccurate or erroneous information indicating that she was a college
graduate even if she tried to correct him. Tamayo simply told her to just let it remain in
the statement as it would not be noticed anyway.121 Moreover, on account of her urgent
concern for her own security and fear of implicating herself in the case, Alfaro admitted
down playing her own participation in her narration (including the circumstance that
she had previously met Carmela before the incident) and those of her ex-boyfriend
Estrada and her relative, Gatchalian.
Prosecution Evidence Sufficient to Convict Appellants
This Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial court’s appreciation of
evidence must bow to the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The law presumes an accused innocent, and this
presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible proof.122 Thus,
we are tasked to consider two crucial points in sustaining a judgment of
conviction: first, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking
into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as
well as the prosecution’s compliance with legal and constitutional standards;
and second, all the elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution
to be present.123
There appears to be no question about the fact that a horrible and most unfortunate
crime has been committed. It is, in this case, indeed a given fact, but next to it is the
pivotal issue of whether or not the prosecution has been able to discharge its equal
burden in substantiating the identities of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. As well said often, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s case
and not on the weakness of the defense.
Positive Identification of Accused-Appellants
Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution.124 Both the RTC and CA found the eyewitness
testimony of Alfaro credible and competent proof that appellants Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Estrada were at the scene of the crime and that
Webb raped Carmela as the bloodied bodies of her mother and sister lay on top of the
bed inside the master’s bedroom, and right beside it stood Lejano while Ventura was
preparing for their escape. At another house in BF Executive Village where the group
retreated after leaving the Vizconde house, Alfaro witnessed the blaming session,
particularly between Ventura and Webb, and thereupon learned from their conversation
that Carmela’s mother and sister were stabbed to death before she herself was killed.
Alfaro likewise positively identified appellant Biong, whom somebody from the group
described as the driver and bodyguard of the Webb family, as the person ordered by
Webb to "clean the Vizconde house."
The testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer, Dr.
Cabanayan, White, Jr., Cabanacan and Gaviola. Appellants’ presence at the scene of the
crime before, during and after its commission was duly established. Their respective
participation, acts and declarations were likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to
be a credible witness. It is axiomatic that a witness who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness.125
A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecution’s case, not on the
weakness of the defense. Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of
innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as

perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense
which shall then test the strength of the prosecution’s case either by showing that no
crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not have committed or did not
commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the
accused.126
Appellants’ Alibi and Denial
We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable
defense, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.127 To establish alibi, the
accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place
where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places."128 Due to its
doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.129
"Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of
the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no
mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to
be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must
be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with
the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being
that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so
airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of
accused’s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water. 130 [emphasis
supplied.]
The claim of appellant Webb that he could not have committed the crime because he
left for the United States on March 9, 1991 and returned to the Philippines only on
October 26, 1992 was correctly rejected by the RTC and CA. These dates are so distant
from the time of the commission of the crime, June 29, 1991 and June 30, 1991, and it
would not have been impossible during the interregnum for Webb to travel back to the
country and again fly to the US several times considering that the travel time on board
an airline from the Philippines to San Francisco, and from San Francisco to the
Philippines takes only about twelve (12) to fourteen (14) hours. Given the financial
resources and political influence of his family, it was not unlikely that Webb could have
traveled back to the Philippines before June 29-30, 1991 and then departed for the US
again, and returning to the Philippines in October 1992. There clearly exists, therefore,
such possibility of Webb’s presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, and his excuse cannot be deemed airtight.
This Court in People v. Larrañaga131 had similarly rejected the defense of alibi of an
accused, involving a shorter travel distance (Quezon City to Cebu) and even shorter
period of time showing the least possibility of an accused’s presence at the time of the
commission of the crime (a matter of hours) than in the case at bar (March 9, 1991 to
June 29, 1991 which is three [3] months). In denying the motion for reconsideration of
accused Larrañaga, we held that accused Larrañaga failed to establish his defense
of alibi, which is futile in the face of positive identification:
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants’ alibi
supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on
the other end is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution
witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above
jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
34
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the
appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and
place. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were
abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James
Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of
physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour
to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline
companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are
several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed,
Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a
possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larrañaga as one of the two
men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela
Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw
Larrañaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The
incident reminded her of Jacqueline’s prior story that he was Marijoy’s admirer. Shiela
confirmed that she knows Larrañaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions.
Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00
o’clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of
Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larrañaga and Josman, having seen
them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of
Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center,
corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio,
a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at
about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a
white van. And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larrañaga as one of
the participes criminis.132 [emphasis supplied]
In the light of relevant precedents, I find no reversible error committed by the RTC in
refusing to give credence to appellant Webb’s argument that he could not have
committed the crime of rape with homicide because he was still in the US on June 29
and 30, 1991. The RTC thus correctly ruled:
Granting for the sake of argument that the claim of departure for the United States of
the accused Webb on March 9, 1991 and his arrival in the Philippines on October 26,
1992 had been duly established by the defense, it cannot prove that he remained in the
United States during the intervening period. During the long span of time between
March, 1991 to October, 1992, it was not physically impossible for the accused
Webb to have returned to the Philippines, perpetrate the criminal act, and travel
back to the United States.
It must be noted that the accused Webb is a scion of a rich, influential, and politically
powerful family with the financial capacity to travel back and forth from the
Philippines to the United States. He could very well afford the price of a plane ticket to
free him from all sorts of trouble. Since there are numerous airlines plying the route
from Manila to the United States, it cannot be said that there was lack of available
means to transport. Moreover, the lapse of more than three (3) months from the time the
accused Webb left the Philippines for the United States on March 9, 1991 to June 29
and 30, 1991 when the crime was committed is more than enough time for the accused
Webb to have made several trips from the United States to the Philippines and back.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it only requires the short period of
approximately eighteen (18) hours to reach the Philippines from the United States,
with the advent of modern travel.
It must likewise be noted that the father of the accused Webb, besides being rich and
influential, was at that time in 1991, the Congressman of Parañaque and later became a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the Webb money and connections
were at the disposal of the accused Webb, and it is worthy of belief that the accused
Webb could have departed and entered the country without any traces whatsoever of his
having done so. In fact, defense witness Andrea Domingo, former Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation testified on the practice of "human smuggling"
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
On this point, the Supreme Court has declared in a case that even the lapse of the short
period of one (1) week was sufficient for an accused to go to one place, to go to another
place to commit a crime, and then return to his point of origin. The principal factor
considered by the Supreme Court in denying the defense of alibi in People vs.
Jamero (24 SCRA 206) was the availability to the accused of the means by which to
commit a crime elsewhere and then return to his refuge. x x x133 [emphasis
supplied]
There is likewise no merit in appellant Webb’s contention that the CA misappreciated
his voluminous documentary evidence and numerous witnesses who testified on his
stay in the US. The CA, after a meticulous and painstaking reevaluation of Webb’s
documentary and testimonial evidence, sustained the RTC’s conclusion that these
pieces of evidence were either inadmissible, incompetent or irrelevant. I quote with
approval the CA’s findings which are well-supported by the evidence on record:
(a) U.S. INS Certifications
xxxx
The Court seriously doubts that evidentiary weight could be ascribed to the August 31,
1995 and October 13, 1995 Certifications of the U.S. INS and computer print-out of the
Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) which allegedly established Webb’s entry to
and exit from the United States. This is due to the fallibility demonstrated by the US
INS with regard to the certifications which the said office issued regarding the basic
information under its direct control and custody.
It is to be remembered that as part of his evidence, Webb presented the explanation of
one Steven P. Bucher, Acting Chief of Records Services Branch of the U.S. INS, who
admitted that the U.S. INS had previously reported on August 10, 1995, erroneously,
that it had no record of the arrival and departure of Webb to and from the United States.
The said office later on admitted that it failed to exhaustively study all information
available to it. We are not convinced with this explanation. It is to be noted that the
U.S. INS is an agency well known for its stringent criteria and rigid procedure in
handling documents relating to one’s travel into and out of its territory. Such being the
case, it would therefore be hard to imagine that the said agency would issue a
certification that it had no record of a person’s entry into and exit from the United
States without first conducting an efficient verification of its records.
We do not also believe that a second search could give rise to a different conclusion,
considering that there is no showing that the records searched were different from those
viewed in the first search. The later certifications issued by the U.S. INS modifying its
first certification and which was issued only a few weeks earlier, come across as a
strained effort by Webb at establishing his presence in the United States in order to
reinforce his flimsy alibi.
It is not amiss to note that a reading of the first Certificate of Non-existence of Record
(Exhibit "212-D") subscribed by Debora A. Farmer of the U.S. INS would show that
the U.S. INS had made a "diligent" search, and found no record of admission into the
United States of Webb. The search allegedly included an inquiry into the automated

and non-automated records systems of the U.S. INS. Be it also noted that the basis of
the U.S. INS second certification (Exhibit "218") was a printout coming also from
automated information systems.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its appeal brief, "how it
became possible for the U.S. INS Archives in Washington, which is supposed to
merely download and copy the information given by the San Francisco INS, to
have an entry on accused-appellant Webb when the said port of entry had no such
record was never sufficiently addressed by the defense."
It is with this view that the Court recognizes little if not nil probative value in the
second certification of the U.S. INS.
xxxx
(b) Passenger Manifest of United Airlines Flight
The purported passenger manifest for the United Airlines flight that allegedly conveyed
accused-appellant Webb for the United States, was not identified by the United
Airlines personnel who actually prepared and completed the same. Instead, the
defense presented Dulcisimo Daluz, the supervisor of customer services of United
Airlines in Manila, who had no hand in the actual preparation or safekeeping of the said
passenger manifest. It must be stressed that to satisfactorily prove the due execution of
a private document, the testimony of the witness with regard to the execution of the
said document must be positive. Such being the case, his testimony thereto is at most
hearsay and therefore not worthy of any credit.
Likewise, we note that the said passenger manifest produced in court is a mere
photocopy and the same did not comply with the strict procedural requirement of
the airline company, that is, all the checking agents who were on duty on March 9,
1991 must sign or initial the passenger manifest. This further lessens the credibility
of the said document.
(c) United Airline Ticket
...the alleged United Airline ticket of accused-appellant Webb offered in evidence is a
mere photocopy of an alleged original, which was never presented below. Other
than the submission that the original could no longer be produced in evidence, there is
no other proof that there ever was an original airline ticket in the name of Webb. This
does not satisfy the requirements set forth under Section 5 of Rule 130. x x x we find
that the photocopy presented in evidence has little if no probative value. Even assuming
there was such an original ticket in existence, the same is hardly of any weight, in the
absence of clear proof that the same was indeed used by accused-appellant Webb to go
to the United States.
(d) Philippine passport
The passport of accused-appellant Webb produced in evidence, and the inscriptions
appearing thereon, also offer little support of Webb’s alibi. Be it noted that what
appears on record is only the photocopy of the pages of Webb’s passport. The
Court therefore can only rely on the appreciation of the trial court as regards the
authenticity of the passport and the marks appearing thereon, as it is the trial court that
had the exclusive opportunity to view at first hand the original of the document, and
determine for itself whether the same is entitled to any weight in evidence.
(e) Video footage of accused-appellant Webb’s parents in Disneyland and Yosemite
Park.
The video footage serendipitously taken by Victor Yap allegedly of Senator Webb and
his family while on vacation at Disneyland in Anaheim, California on July 3, 1991 does
little to support the alibi of accused-appellant Webb for it is quite interesting to note
that nowhere did accused-appellant Webb appear in this footage. None of the
people shown in the film was identified as the accused-appellant Webb. Moreover, the
records disclose that just before the segment of the film that showed Senator Webb,
35
there was a gap or portion of static that appeared which did not appear in any other
portion of the footage. We find that this supports the conclusion that the videotape was
possibly tampered as an additional support to the alibi of accused-appellant that he
was in the United States.
xxxx
(f) Video footage at Lake Tahoe and the del Toro-Manlapit Wedding
...the video footage showing accused-appellant Webb seemingly on holiday at Lake
Tahoe with the Wheelocks, to our mind does not disprove that Webb was in the country
at the time of the Vizconde killing. Firstly, the date being shown intermittently in the
footage was not the same or near the date of the Vizconde killing. As we have
earlier stated, we do not discount the possibility that Webb was in the Philippines
during the time he was supposed to have been in the United States, especially, when
there are eyewitnesses who testified to the effect that Webb was in the Philippines only
a couple of weeks before the killing and who also testified of Webb’s participation in
the crime. In any case, we take judicial notice that modern electronic and photographic
advances could offer a means to splice or modify recorded images to configure to a
desired impression, including the insertion or annotation of numeric figures on a
recorded image.
Likewise, the videotape and photographs taken on Alex del Toro’s wedding also fail to
convince, as this was allegedly taken on October 10, 1992 well after the fateful days
of June 29 and 30, 1991.
(g) Photograph of Webb and Christopher Esguerra before the Dee Lite Concert
The photograph of accused-appellant Webb with Esguerra allegedly taken in late April
1991 before they went to a band concert has little probative value. It must be pointed
out that the image in the picture itself does not depict the date or place it was
taken, or of any Dee Lite concert allegedly attended by Webb. Likewise, we
observed that the photograph appears to have been trimmed down from a bigger size,
possibly to remove the date printed therein. It is also to be noted that Esguerra admitted
that the inscription appearing at the back of the photograph of, "Hubert and I before the
Dee Lite Concert, April 1991" was only written by him in 1995, after it was given to
him by accused-appellant’s mother, Elizabeth, before he took the witness stand. The
Court cannot therefore but cast suspicion as to its authenticity.
(h) Webb’s Driver’s License
We agree with the trial court's observation that the Driver’s License allegedly
obtained by accused-appellant from the California Department of Motor Vehicle
sometime in the first week of June 1991 is unworthy of credit, because of the
inconsistencies in Webb’s testimony as to how he obtained the same. In one
testimony, Webb claimed he did not make an application but just walked in the
licensing office and he did not submit any photograph relative to his application. In a
later testimony, he claimed that he submitted an ID picture for his driver’s license, and
that the picture appearing on his driver’s license was the very same picture he
submitted together with his application for the driver’s license. These are two
inconsistent testimonies on the same subject matter, which render the said driver’s
license and the alleged date when the same was obtained, unworthy of credit.
(i) Logbook of Alex del Toro and Check Payments of Webb’s salary
The employment records of accused-appellant, which include the alleged logbook of
del Toro in his pest control business, and check payments to Webb were also offered to
support the latter’s alleged presence in the United States on the dates near the day of the
Vizconde killings. A review of the logbook shows that the same is unworthy of any
evidentiary weight. The entries where the accused Webb were indicated to have
performed work for del Toro, showed that the name of Webb ("Hubie"/"U.B.")
was merely superimposed on the actual entries and could have been easily
fabricated to create the impression that Webb had some participation in the business of
del Toro, and therefore, are not reliable proofs of Webb’s presence and occupation in
the United States around the time of the Vizconde killing.
The alleged check payments of Webb’s salary are also unreliable. The check dated June
13, 1991 was made payable to "Cash", while the other check which appeared to be
payable to "Hubert Webb" was however dated only July 10, 1991. Neither of the said
checks squarely placed accused-appellant Webb in the United States at the time of
the Vizconde killings. Simply put, neither check is therefore clear proof to support
Webb’s alibi.
(j) Bicycle/Sportscar
The Toyota MR2 sportscar and Cannondale bicycle allegedly purchased by accused-
appellant Webb and his father in the United States appear to have been purchased with
great haste, and under suspicious circumstances.
Consider that immediately after the accused-appellant’s father, former Senator Freddie
Webb, arrived in the United States, the first thing he did was go out with his friend
Honesto Aragon and accused-appellant to look for a bicycle and a car to be used by the
latter in going to and from work. The car was bought sometime in early July 1991 and
the bicycle sometime on June 30, 1991. It is a wonder to this Court that the accused-
appellant and his father would buy a bicycle and a sportscar at practically the same time
to provide the accused-appellant transportation to his work. Would not just a car or a
bicycle do for him? Also, the hurried purchase of the car right after the arrival of
Freddie Webb appears at the very least, suspicious, as a prospective car-buyer would
understandably want to make a canvas first for the best car to buy, and not just to
purchase the first car he sees.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the trial court, though it was made clear that the
purpose of purchasing the said bicycle and car was for accused-appellant’s convenience
in going to and from his work -- we find, that this contradicts the other evidence
presented by accused-appellant because it appears from his evidence that other than his
brief stint in del Toro’s pest control company business and his employment as a
gasoline station attendant which incidentally was not sufficiently proven, all that
accused-appellant did in the United States was to go sightseeing, shopping and meet
with family and friends.
Lastly, the fact that the car and the bicycle were allegedly purchased in close proximity
to the date of the rape and killing of the Vizconde women does little to dissuade the
perception that the car and bicycle were purchased only for the purpose of providing a
plausible defense of alibi for Webb.
(k) Letters to Jennifer Claire Cabrera
Cabrera, a friend and neighbor of accused-appellant in BF Homes, Parañaque, produced
four (4) letters allegedly written and sent to her by Webb while he was in the United
States, in order to support the accused-appellant’s alibi. These were allegedly the only
letters sent by Webb to her.
The letters were allegedly written and posted at around the same time the Vizconde
rape and killing happened, such that, if the letters were to be duly considered, they

would place Webb in the United States at the same time the June 30, 1991 killings
occurred; thus, bolstering Webb’s defense of alibi.
However, the said letters, to our mind, are not convincing proof of alibi, inasmuch said
letters were produced only in 1995 at the time she gave a statement, and the same time
Webb was charged. However, Cabrera admitted that she knew Webb was being
involved or accused in the Vizconde killings as early as 1991 and that she was shocked
upon learning that he was being implicated therein.
The Court finds it incredible that despite being shocked in 1991, about the involvement
of her friend, accused-appellant in the Vizconde rape-slay, Cabrera would wait until
1995 to "produce" the letters that could have cleared her friend’s name. An interregnum
of four years before coming out with valuable proof in support of a friend is to our
mind, a telling factor on the credibility of the alleged letters.
Also, the impression that may be inferred from reading the letters was one of a man
who was pining away for his ladylove. Webb was quite expressive with his feelings
when he wrote that he missed Cabrera, "a lot," yet after only four letters that was
conveniently written sometime in June 1991, he thereafter stopped writing letters to
Cabrera as if the whole matter was already forgotten. It is highly suspicious therefore
that the only letters of accused-appellant Webb to Cabrera were written and sent at the
exact opportune time that the Vizconde killings occurred which conveniently supplied a
basis for his defense of alibi.
Moreover, from the contents of the letters, we can deduce that there was some sort of
romantic relationship with the accused-appellant Webb and Cabrera. In fact, Webb in
his letters referred to Cabrera as his "sweetheart" and "dearest", and confessed to her
that all he thinks about was her, and he was hoping he would dream of her at night. It is
not improbable, therefore, that Cabrera could have prevaricated herself to save her
friend.
In sum, accused-appellant tried vainly to establish his defense of alibi with the
presentation of not only a substantial volume of documentary evidence but also
testimonies of an overwhelming number of witnesses which were comprised mostly of
relatives and family friends who obviously wanted him to be exonerated of the crime
charged. It is for this reason that we regard their testimonies with an eye of suspicion
for it is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative or friend to give weight
to blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal
case is involved.134 [emphasis supplied]
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and
credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of
only one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.135 As to appellant
Webb’s voluminous documentary evidence, both the RTC and CA judiciously
examined each exhibit and concluded that these do not pass the test of admissibility and
materiality insofar as proving the physical impossibility of his presence at the Vizconde
residence on June 29, 1991 until the early morning of June 30, 1991.
Appellant Webb cites the opposite view taken by Justices Tagle and Dacudao in their
dissenting opinions and urges this Court to accord the US INS certification and other
documents relative to his arrival and departure in the US on the dates March 9, 1991
and October 26, 1992, respectively, the presumption of regularity being official
documents issued by US authorities. Justices Tagle and Dacudao concurred in stating
that the conclusion of their three (3) colleagues (majority) that the US INS certifications
did not exclude the possibility of Webb traveling back to the Philippines and again
36
departing for the US between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992 -- is nothing but
speculation and conjecture. Webb further mentions that since a Justice of this Court
"confirmed appellant Webb’s alibi of being in the United States on 29 June 1991[,] [a]t
the very least, such exculpatory testimony coupled with the plethora of appellant
Webb’s other documentary and testimonial evidence on his presence in the United
States on 29 June 1991 raises reasonable doubt as to appellant Webb’s guilt of the
crime charged."136
I find the contentions bereft of merit.
In the first place, let it be emphasized that Justice Carpio’s testimony before the trial
court confirmed merely the fact that his conversation with then Congressman Webb
took place on June 29, 1991 and what the latter relayed to him about his location at the
time such telephone call was made, who was with him in the US (his wife and appellant
Webb) and the purpose of their US trip (to find a job for appellant Webb). Said witness
even admitted that he had no personal knowledge that appellant Webb was in fact in the
United States at the time of his telephone conversation with Congressman Webb.137
As to the travel documents consisting of his US passport, US INS certifications and
other evidence presented by appellant Webb in support of his alibi, while it is true that
such presentation of passport, plane ticket and other travel documents can serve as
proof that he was indeed out of the country at the time of the Vizconde killings,138 it
must still be shown that the evidence is clear and convincing, and the totality of such
evidence constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least possibility of his presence
at the crime scene. However, appellant Webb failed in this regard and the RTC and CA
did not err in giving scant weight to his arsenal of evidence, particularly so on the
strength of the positive identification of appellant Webb as Carmela’s rapist and one of
those who actually took part in the brutal killing of Carmela, her mother and sister
between midnight of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991.
Indeed, alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration,
but also where it does not, on its face, demonstrate the physical impossibility of the
accused’s presence at the place and time of the commission of the crime.139 Against
positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of a credible witness.140 Appellant Webb was placed at the crime
scene by Alfaro who positively identified him as the one (1) who plotted and
committed the rape of Carmela, and later fatally stabbed her, her mother and sister,
aided by or in concert with Lejano and Ventura. Gaviola and Cabanacan gave
corroborating testimonies that appellant Webb was here in the country, as he was just in
his house at BF Homes Subdivision Phase III, at least a few weeks prior to and on June
29 to 30, 1991.
Verily, it is only when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime
charged is inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance. Such is not the
situation in the case at bar where the identification of the perpetrators by a lone
eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty standard.
It is the prosecution’s burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is
guilty, but such uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and
consideration of the evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when --
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of
the [judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it.141
That reasonable doubt is not engendered by the presentation of certifications of entry
into and exit from the US, passport with stamp marks of departure and declarations of
witnesses who are mostly relatives and friends of appellant Webb, can be gleaned from
the fact that passports and plane tickets indicating dates of arrival and departure do not
necessarily prove that the very same person actually took the flight. This Court takes
judicial notice of reported irregularities and tampering of passports in the years prior to
the recent issuance by the DFA of machine-readable passports. In fact, the proliferation
of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration stamps, assumed identity and double
passports, among others, have been cited as grounds to justify the necessity of
amending the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A. No. 8239) as proposed in the
Senate, "x x x to rally for the issuance of passports using tamper proof and the latest
data encryption technology; and provide stiffer penalties against proliferators of fake
passports."142
It is worthy of note I note that the original of Webb's passport was not offered in
evidence and made part of the records, which only gives credence to the prosecution’s
allegation that it bore signs of tampering and irregularities. And as earlier mentioned,
the much vaunted US-INS second certification dated August 31, 1995 based on a mere
computer print-out from the Non-immigrant Information System (Exhibit "213-1-D")
retrieved from the US- INS Archives in Washington, and the accompanying
certifications, have little probative value, the truth of their contents had not been
testified to by the persons who issued the same. Moreover, the issuance of this
certification only a couple of weeks after the August 10, 1995 US-INS Office in San
Francisco was issued, only raised questions as to its accuracy. Said earlier certification
through Debora A. Farmer stated that:
[a]fter diligent search no record is found to exist in the records of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The search included a review of the Service automated and
nonautomated records system; there is no evidence of any lawful admission to the
United States as an immigrant, or as a nonimmigrant, relating to Hubert P. Webb,
born November 7, 1968, in the Philippines. The records searched are current as of
July 1, 1995 for the immigrants and nonimmigrants.143 [emphasis supplied]
The above finding was relayed by Thomas Schiltgen, District Director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Francisco to Ms. Teresita V. Marzan,
Consul General of the Philippines:
SUBJECT: WEBB, HUBERT
RE: Hubert Jeffrey Webb
Dear Requester:
YOUR REQUEST WAS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE ON 07/10/95.
WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR SEARCH FOR RECORDS RESPONSIVE TO
YOUR REQUEST BUT DID NOT LOCATE ANY. IF YOU STILL BELIEVE
THAT WE HAVE RECORDS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF YOUR REQUEST, AND
CAN PROVIDE US WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, WE WILL CONDUCT
ANOTHER SEARCH. IF YOU ELECT TO REQUEST ANOTHER SEARCH, WE
RECOMMEND THAT YOU NOT FOLLOW THE APPEALS PROCEDURE
DESCRIBED BELOW UNTIL WE HAVE COMPLETED THAT SEARCH.
YOU MAY APPEAL THE FINDING IN THIS MATTER BY WRITING TO THE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, SUITE 570, 1310 G. STREET, N.W., FLAG BUILDING,
WASHINGTON D.C., 20530 WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS

LETTER. YOUR LETTER SHOULD REFERENCE THE INS CONTROL NUMBER
ABOVE AND THE LETTER AND THE ENVELOPE SHOULD BE CLEARLY
MARKED FOIA/PA APPEAL.
SINCERELY,
(SGD.) DISTRICT DIRECTOR144 [emphasis supplied]
To show that the August 10, 1995 US-INS Certification was erroneous, appellant Webb
presented the Memorandum addressed to Secretary Domingo L. Siazon signed by
Consul Leo M. Herrera-Lim, the Diplomatic Note dated October 30, 1995 and the letter
of Debora Farmer stating that the San Francisco certification was erroneous.145 The
prosecution, however, presented another document which indicated that an appeal to
the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy yielded a negative
result on any record on file that one (1) Hubert Webb arrived in the United States on
March 9, 1991, and further that Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Information and Privacy had in effect sustained as correct the US-INS San Francisco
report that there is no such data on Hubert Webb in the San Francisco database so that
the Philippine Embassy in Washington, D.C. should instead ask the assistance of other
U.S. government agencies in their search for data on appellant Webb.146
The defense endeavored to explain why the US-INS Archives in Washington could
have made the "mistake" of stating that it had no data or information on the alleged
entry of appellant Webb on March 9, 1991 and his exit on October 26, 1992. However,
it had not satisfactorily addressed the nagging question of how it became possible for
the US-INS Archives in Washington, which is supposed to merely download and copy
the information given by the San Francisco INS, to have an entry on appellant Webb
when the said port of entry had no such record. Considering that many visitors
(nonimmigrants) are admittedly not entered into the NIIS database, and that diligent
search already yielded a negative response on appellant Webb’s entry into the US on
March 9, 1991 as per the August 10, 1995 Certification, as to what US government
agency the alleged computer-generated print-out in the August 31, 1995 certification
actually came from remains unclear.
Appellant Webb’s reliance on the presumption of regularity of official functions,
stressing the fact that the US-INS certifications are official documents, is misplaced.
The presumption leaned on is disputable and can be overcome by evidence to the
contrary.147 In this case, the existence of an earlier negative report on the NIIS record on
file concerning the entry of appellant Webb into and his exit from the US on March 9,
1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, had raised serious doubt on the veracity and
accuracy of the subsequently issued second certification dated August 31, 1995 which
is based merely on a computer print-out of his alleged entry on March 9, 1991 and
departure on October 26, 1992.
As to the testimony of former Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, the same
cannot be given due credence since he is incompetent to testify on the contents of the
August 31, 1995 US-INS Certification, having merely received the said document in
his capacity as the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Consul
Leo M. Herrera-Lim’s testimony likewise did not carry much weight considering that
its significance is confined to the fact that the document from the US-INS was
transmitted and received by the DFA. It is to be noted that the certification issued by
the Philippine Embassy with respect to the US-INS Certifications contained a
disclaimer, specifically stating that the Embassy assumed no responsibility for the
contents of the annexed document.148 The same observations regarding the
"consularized certifications" was reflected in the Decision dated April 16, 1998 in CA-
37
G.R. SP No. 42285 ("Miguel Rodriguez v. Amelita Tolentino") and CA-G.R. SP No.
42673 ("Hubert P. Webb v. Amelita Tolentino").149
Appellant Webb’s travel documents and other supposed paper trail of his stay in the US
are unreliable proof of his absence in the Philippines at the time of the commission of
the crime charged. The non-submission in evidence of his original passport, which
was not formally offered and made part of the records, had deprived the RTC, CA and
this Court the opportunity to examine the same. Such original is a crucial piece of
evidence which unfortunately was placed beyond judicial scrutiny.
IWe quote the following observations made by the prosecution on Webb’s passport
from the appeal brief of the OSG:
In tandem with the presentation of the various U.S. INS certifications to bolster
appellant Webb’s story of a U.S. sojourn before, during and after the commission of the
offense charged, he further anchors his defense on his passport (Exh. AAAAAA and
294) ostensibly to show, among others, that the grant by the United States government
granted him a visa effective from April 6, 1989 to April 6, 1994 and the U.S.
Immigration in San Francisco stampmarked it on March 9, 1991 (Exh. AAAAAA-6) on
page 30 thereof (Exh. AAAAAA-2 and 294-D).
On its face, what the entries in the passport plainly suggest is that appellant Webb
violated U.S. immigration laws by "overstaying" beyond the usual six-(6) month period
allowed for tourists. However, he being the son of a Senator would not unnecessarily
violate U.S. immigration laws. It would be quite easy for him to apply for and secure an
extension of his authorized stay in the U.S., if only he requested. But why did not he or
his parents secure the extension? Why was there no evidence to show that he ever
requested an extension? Did he really overstay in the U.S. or could he simply enter and
leave the U.S. and the Philippines without marking his passport? These raise serious
questions on the integrity of the passport.
Is appellant Webb really untouchable that even U.S. authorities in various states would
let him get "off the hook" without much of a fuss after his alleged brushes with the law
(TSN - Hubert Webb dated September 10, 1997, p. 82)? This is especially incredible
considering that he was allegedly apprehended in the United States near the U.S. border
(Ibid., pp. 82-83) where authorities are always on the look out for illegal aliens.
The questions involving appellant Webb’s passport are not limited to the stamp marks
(or lack of stamp marks) therein. There are unusual things about his passport which he
has been unable to explain satisfactorily.
The passport of her mother, Elizabeth Webb, for example, appears to be well preserved
despite having been used more frequently than that of appellant Webb who supposedly
used it in only one trip abroad. Not only do some of the pages appear smudged or
untidy, but more significantly, the perforations on the passport pages indicating the
serial number of appellant Webb’s passport no longer fit exactly on the pages -- that is,
they are no longer aligned. The perforations are intended not only to indicate the serial
number of the passport but more importantly to countercheck intercalations and
tampering. The "non-alignment" of the perforations is thus significant.
In addition to the over-all shabby appearance of appellant Webb’s passport, what is
evident is the torn plastic portion of the dorsal page thereof near the holder’s signature.
There is also the matter of the marked difference in the signatures of appellant Webb as
appearing on the dorsal side of the passport (Exh. AAAAAA-3 and 294-A-1) as
compared with that appearing on his laminated photograph (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-
C-1). Of course, he tried to offer an explanation on the variance in the two (2)
signatures. All he could reason out, however, was that he wrote his name using his
normal penmanship when in a lazy mood (TSN -- Hubert Webb dated August 14, 1997,
p. 27), implying that the signature appearing on his laminated photograph is his real
signature. A review of his other documentary evidence supposedly bearing his
signature shows that what appears therein is his name written in his "normal
penmanship," and that it is only in the laminated picture (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C)
that such "real signature" appears. Following appellant Webb’s explanation, it means
that he was in a lazy mood all the time!150
Two (2) more documents presented by appellant Webb deserve a close look -- his US
Driver’s License supposedly issued on June 14, 1991, and the Passenger Manifest. The
RTC’s evaluation of said documents revealed their lack of probative value, thus:
On August 14, 1997, [Webb] testified that he did not make any application since the
procedure in California provides for a walk-in system, that he did not submit any
photograph relative to his application for a Californian Driver’s License, inasmuch as a
photograph of him was taken, and that, his driver’s license was issued sometime on the
first week of June, 1991. On the other hand, on September 1, 1997, the accused
suddenly and completely changed his testimony while still on direct examination. He
claims that the picture appearing on the driver’s license was the very same he submitted
together with his application for the driver’s license. Thus, the discrepancy as to the
source of the photograph (Exhibit "334-E") between the testimony given on August 14,
1997 where the accused Webb said that the California Department of Motor Vehicle
took his picture, and the testimony given on September 1, 1997 where he said that he
submitted it to the California DMV as an attachment to his supposed driver’s license
application renders the accused Webb’s testimony as unbelievable and unworthy of
credence.
It is beyond belief that the same picture submitted by the accused Webb became the
picture in the driver’s license allegedly issued on June 14, 1991. Moreover, it is
contrary to human nature and experience, aside from the fact that it is likewise contrary
to the procedure described by the accused Webb in obtaining a driver’s license in the
State of California. Since a driver’s license is one of the principal means of
identification in the United States as well as in the Philippines, to allow the applicants
to produce their own pictures would surely defeat the purpose in requiring them to
appear before the Department of Motor Vehicle, that is, to ensure the integrity and
genuineness of the driver’s license.
The Court takes note that the accused Webb, in his fervent desire to exculpate himself
from criminal liability, earlier offered in evidence the letter dated January 10, 1992 of
Mr. Robert L. Heafner, Legal Attache of the Embassy of the United States to the
then Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Alfredo S. Lim, (Exhibit "61")
which stated in very clear terms that the accused Webb’s California Driver’s License
Number A8818707 was issued on August 9, 1991. Furthermore, the said letter states
the listed address of the accused Webb at the time of the issuance of the driver’s license
was 532 So. Avenida Faro Ave., Anaheim, California 92807. The said listed address of
the accused Webb at the time his driver’s license was issued has demolished the
testimony of the defense witness Sonia Rodriguez that the accused Webb was supposed
to be already living with the Rodriguez family in Longwood, Florida by the first week
of August, 1991.
The accused Webb likewise offered in evidence the official communication coming
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated December 31, 1991 (Exhibit
"MMM" and submarkings; Exhibit "66-C" and submarkings) which likewise gave the
information that the accused Webb was issued California Driver’s License No.

8818707 on August 9, 1991, and that as of August 9, 1991, the address of the accused
Webb was 532 South Avenida Faro, Anaheim, California 92807. The fact that the
alleged Driver’s License No. A8818707 was issued on two (2) different dates (August
9, 1991 and June 14, 1991) casts a serious doubt on its provenance and authenticity.
xxxx
In order to establish that the accused Hubert Webb departed from the Philippines on 09
March 1991 on board UA flight 808 the defense also presented witness Dulcisimo
Daluz, Station Manager of United Airlines for Manila who in turn presented a
document purporting to be the Passenger Manifest for the flight departing on 09
March 1991 (Exhibits "233-A" to "233-N").
This document merits outright rejection considering that the defense witness Daluz
confirmed that the same was prepared by the UA departure area personnel and not by
himself. Thus, this document is merely hearsay and is devoid of any merit whatsoever.
In respect of the plane ticket of the accused Hubert Webb, what was likewise offered as
part of the testimony of Daluz was a mere photo copy, wherein Daluz also admitted not
having any direct participation in its preparation.
The spurious nature of the document was observed by the witness Daluz himself who
admitted that there were irregularities in the Passenger Manifest presented by the
defense. According to Daluz, it is a strict procedural requirement that all the checking
agents who were on duty on March 9, 1991 were supposed to initial the Passenger
Manifest, However, he admitted that Exhibits "223" and "223-N" did not contain
the initials of the checking agents who were supposed to initial the same.
The defense presented Agnes Tabuena, Vice-President for Finance and Administration
of the Philippine Airlines for the purpose of establishing that Hubert Webb arrived in
the Philippines only on 26 October 1992.
Like witnesses Daluz and Nolasco, Tabuena’s statements on the witness stand and the
Certification was based exclusively on the Passenger Manifest of PAL’s PR
103. Unfortunately for the defense, the said testimony is of no probative value and of
doubtful veracity considering that the witness did not prepare the same, nor did the
witness identify the persons who prepared the same other than that they were "airport
staff", nor did she had any idea when the document was transmitted to her office. In
fact, the witness could not even interpret the contents of the said Passenger Manifest,
much more testify as to the due execution and genuineness thereof.
In view of the vital necessity to the other accused of establishing accused Webb’s alibi,
it is important to note that Atty. Francisco Gatchalian, father of the accused Michael
Gatchalian was then a high ranking PAL Official and a colleague of Tabuena. This
makes the source of the document, even ignoring the fact of its inadmissibility,
suspicious.151 [emphasis supplied.]
The alibi of appellants Gatchalian and Lejano, who claimed they were at the Syap
residence at Ayala Alabang Village watching video tapes the whole night of June 29,
1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991, was even less plausible considering the
distance of that place from Pitong Daan Subdivision, which is just a few minutes ride
away. The RTC noted the manifestation of the defense on Andrew Syap’s refusal to
testify on Gatchalian and Lejano’s whereabouts during the night in question, despite
their efforts to convince him to do so. It further noted the testimony of Assistant NBI
Director Pedro Rivera that Carlos Syap upon seeing Gatchalian with their group even
berated Gatchalian for dragging him into his (Gatchalian’s) own problem. Aside from
38
Alfaro, security guard Normal White, Jr. also testified that the presence of Gatchalian
(son of a homeowner), who pointed to the other appellants in the two (2) cars behind
him as his companions, was the reason they allowed his friends to enter the subdivision
on the night of June 29, 1991. White, Jr. also categorically declared he had, earlier that
same night, seen Gatchalian with his friends standing at Vinzons St. Thus, other than
the hearsay declaration of his father who merely testified on what his son told him
about spending the night watching video tapes at the Syap residence on June 29, 1991,
Gatchalian presented no corroborative evidence of his alibi.
As to appellant Lejano, he was positively identified by Alfaro as the first to express
approval of Webb’s plan to gang-rape Carmela by saying, "Ako ang susunod."  Lejano
was also with Alfaro, Webb and Ventura in going inside the Vizconde house, and
whom she later saw inside the master’s bedroom, at the foot of the bed where the
bloodied bodies of Estrellita and Jennifer lay, and just standing there about to wear his
jacket while Webb was pumping the hogtied and gagged Carmela on the floor. His alibi
is likewise feeble, as he could have easily gone to the Vizconde house within a few
minutes from the Syap residence where he and Gatchalian allegedly watched video
tapes.
Appellant Fernandez, on his part, insisted that Alfaro’s story was simply fabricated by
her "hidden mentors" who considered the sworn statement of Roberto D. Barroso taken
on November 4, 1991. Barroso was one (1) of the members of the "Akyat Bahay" gang
who were earlier charged before the Makati City RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 91-7135-
37 for Rape with Homicide and for Robbery with Homicide in connection with the
Vizconde killings. There is an uncanny congruence in the details of the incident as
testified to by Alfaro, with the sworn statement of Barroso particularly pertaining to the
manner by which the garage light of the Vizconde house was put out, the smashing of
the glass panel of the main door, and the appearance of a woman who opened the main
door saying "Sino kayo?"152
Such submissions are inane, in view of the dismissal of those cases filed against the
first set of suspects based on lack of evidence. Contrary to Fernandez’s insinuation of a
fabricated eyewitness account, Alfaro gave much more minute details than the limited
narration given by Barroso. More important, Alfaro’s testimony was sufficiently
corroborated on its material points, not only by the physical evidence, but also by the
testimonies of four (4) disinterested witnesses for the prosecution: White, Jr.,
Cabanacan, Gaviola and Birrer.
Fernandez also cited as among the reasons why Alfaro’s declarations were far from
positive, the non-recovery of the fatal weapons used in the killings. He contended that a
crucial link in the prosecution’s physical evidence was thus missing, as Alfaro could
not even say what was the "object" or "thing" which she saw thrown out of the Nissan
Patrol while the group was on their way to the BF Executive Village. Hence, her
suggestion that what she saw Ventura took from the kitchen drawer may have been
kitchen knives used to kill the victims must fail.153
Such proposition fails to persuade. The failure to present the murder weapon will not
exculpate the accused from criminal liability. The presentation and identification of the
weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused, much more so
where the perpetrator has been positively identified by a credible witness.154
Appellant Rodriguez denies being a conspirator with Webb’s group in the commission
of the crime, asserting that his presence and participation in the Vizconde killings, from
the time of its inception up to its consummation, was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. He cites the failure of Alfaro to mention his name as part of the "group" twice in
her testimony. These instances refer to Alfaro’s direct examination when she was asked
to name the persons riding the convoy of three (3) vehicles when they left Ayala
Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to proceed to the Vizconde residence at Pitong
Daan Subdivision,155 and the second time when she was asked to enumerate the
members of the "group" who were waiting along Aguirre Avenue during their second
trip to the Vizconde residence.156 Thus, when Alfaro testified that the rest of the group
acted as lookouts while she, Webb, Lejano and Ventura went inside the Vizconde
house, it must be understood as limited only to those she had previously enumerated,
which definitely did not include Rodriguez.157
The argument is untenable. The mere fact that Alfaro missed out naming Rodriguez in
two (2) instances during her direct examination does not give rise to the conclusion that
he was not positively identified by Alfaro as among those present and participated prior
to, during and after the commission of the crime as lookouts along with the rest of the
group. Contrary to Rodriguez’s claim, the first time that Alfaro referred to and
enumerated the members of the "group" which she had unexpectedly joined that night,
was at the beginning of her narration on how she met Ventura’s friends when she got
her order of shabu at the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot.
Q. And you said that Dong Ventura introduced you to this group, will you name the
group that was introduced to you by Dong Ventura?
A. First, he introduced me to Hubert Webb, then Fyke Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
and then Tonyboy Lejano, Michael Gatchalian.158
Alfaro was again asked to enumerate the members of the "group" when the prosecution
asked her to name the members of the group, in the later part of her direct examination
during the same hearing.159 She also testified that after everyone, including Rodriguez,
took part in a shabu session, they left the parking lot.160 It thus logically follows that
whenever Alfaro made reference to the "group" in her entire narration, it necessarily
included those she had enumerated she had met and had a shabu session with at the
Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot. This same group was with her from
their first trip to the Vizconde residence until the time they left Pitong Daan
Subdivision and retreated to a house at BF Executive Village early morning of June 30,
1991. Alfaro had specifically mentioned Rodriguez when asked by Prosecutor Zuño to
describe their relative positions at the lawn area of the BF Executive Village house,
thus establishing his presence during the "blaming session":
A. x x x kalat kami, sir, pero hindi kami magkakalayo x x x
xxxx
Q. How about Miguel Rodriguez, how far was he from Hubert?
A. Two meters away.
xxxx
A. Mike is very very near Ging Rodriguez.161
It must be stressed that Alfaro categorically declared it was Rodriguez who approached
her at Faces Disco on March 30, 1995 and told her to shut up or she would be killed.
Aside from making that threat, Rodriguez also offered Alfaro a plane ticket so she
could leave the country.162 Rodriguez’s bare denial cannot be given any evidentiary
weight. We have ruled that denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be
given greater weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on
affirmative matters.163
Rodriguez’s attempt to set up an alibi through the testimony of his cousin Mark Rualo
was equally frail. Even assuming as true Rualo’s testimony that he had indeed invited
Rodriguez to attend his birthday party on June 29, 1991 but Rodriguez opted to stay in
his house and even talked to him on the phone when he called Rodriguez to ask why he

was not yet at the party, it cannot serve as proof of Rodriguez’s whereabouts at the time
of the commission of the crime. It did not rule out the actual presence of Rodriguez at
the crime scene.
Appellant Estrada, just like Rodriguez and Fernandez, did not take the witness stand
and simply relied on the alibi defense of his co-accused, principally that of Webb.
Alfaro testified that it was Estrada, then her boyfriend, who was together with her in her
car throughout the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991. Estrada
was among those who acted as lookouts outside the Vizconde house after they all
concurred in the plan of Webb to gang-rape Carmela while they were still at the parking
lot of the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
Conspiracy among appellants duly proven
The existence of conspiracy between appellants Webb, Ventura, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Rodriguez and Filart was satisfactorily proven by the prosecution.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to actually pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence.164 Although only one (1) rape was actually proven by the prosecution, as
conspirators who mutually agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1) another in
its commission, on the occasion of which the rape victim Carmela, her mother Estrellita
and sister Jennifer, were killed, each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally liable
for rape with homicide.
Indeed, appellants by their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed that they were
acting in unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective, even if it was
only Webb, Ventura and Lejano who actually went inside the Vizconde house while
Estrada, Fernandez, Rodriguez, Gatchalian and Filart stood as lookouts outside the
house. Under these premises, it is not even necessary to pinpoint the precise
participation of each of the accused-appellants, the act of one being the act of all.165
One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or
lending moral support to the actual perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the
same extent as the latter. There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they
are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation.166
Biong guilty as accessory after the fact
Appellant Biong contends that he cannot be convicted as accessory to the crime of rape
with homicide because the acts imputed to him did not result in the hiding of the case.
There was no evidence that such indeed was his intent or motive. He points out that the
bodies of the victims were found at their respective places where they were assaulted
and there was no evidence that they had been moved an inch from where they breathed
their last. He asserts that non-preservation of the evidence is not an accessory crime
under the Revised Penal Code.167
The contentions have no merit.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge
of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or
accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1)
profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2)
concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in
order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape
of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to
39
take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.168
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there are two
(2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or
assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of
his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it
is not a light felony. Appellant Biong is one (1) such public officer, and he abused his
public function when, instead of immediately arresting the perpetrators of the crime, he
acceded to the bidding of appellant Webb to "clean the Vizconde house," which means
he must help hide any possible trace or sign linking them to the crime, and not
necessarily to prevent the discovery of the bodies in such actual condition upon their
deaths. Hence, such "cleaning" would include obliterating fingerprints and other
identifying marks which appellants Webb, Lejano and Ventura might have left at the
scene of the crime.
Contrary to Biong’s assertion, his failure to preserve evidence at the crime scene such
as fingerprints on the doors and objects inside the master’s bedroom where the bodies
were found, the bloodied floor of the toilet, the actual material used in gagging Carmela
and Estrellita, the bloodied blankets and bed sheets, the original condition of the broken
glass panel of the main door, the shoe print and foot prints on the car hood and at the
back of the house, fingerprints on the light bulb at the garage -- was a form of
assistance to help the perpetrators evade apprehension by confusing the investigators in
determining initially what happened and the possible suspects. Consequently, Biong’s
unlawful taking of the jewelries and Carmela’s ATM card and driver’s license, his act
of breaking the larger portion of the main door glass, the washing out of the blood on
the toilet floor and permitting the relatives to burn the bloodied bed sheets and blankets
-- had in fact misled the authorities in identifying potential suspects. Thus, the police
had a difficult time figuring out whether it was robbers who entered the Vizconde
house and perpetrated the rape-slay, or drug-crazed addicts on the loose, or other
persons having motive against the Vizconde family had exacted revenge, or a brutal
sexual assault on Carmela by men who were not strangers to her which also led to the
killings.
On the basis of strong evidence of appellant Biong’s effort to destroy crucial physical
evidence at the crime scene, I hold that the RTC did not err in convicting him as an
accessory to the crime of rape with homicide.
Penalty
The CA was correct in affirming the sentence imposed by the RTC upon each of the
accused-appellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, Fernandez and Estrada. The
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the death penalty under
the Revised Penal Code (in Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A. No. 2632 and R.A.
No. 4111, when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed), was
prohibited by the Constitution at the time the offense was committed.169 At any rate, the
subsequent passage of R.A. No. 9346 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June 24, 2006, would
have mandated the imposition on accused-appellants the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
As to the penalty imposed by the CA on appellant Biong as accessory after the fact to
the crime of rape with homicide, we find the same proper and in order.
DNA Testing
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates his and appellant Webb’s motion for DNA testing of the
semen specimen taken from the vaginal cavity of Carmela during the autopsy
conducted by Dr. Cabanayan, which motion was denied by the RTC for lack of
available scientific expertise and technology at the time.
With the great advances in forensic science and under pertinent state laws, American
courts allow post-conviction DNA testing when its application has strong indications
that the result could potentially exonerate the convict. Indeed, even a convicted felon
has the right to avail of new technology not available during his trial.
On October 2, 2007, this Court approved the Rule on DNA Evidence170 which took
effect on October 15, 2007.
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule, the court may at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing after due notice and hearing. Such order shall issue upon showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.171
By Resolution dated April 20, 2010, this Court granted appellant Webb’s request to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from the cadaver of Carmela
Vizconde under the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). We ordered
(1) the NBI to assist the parties in facilitating the submission of the said specimen to the
UP-Natural Science and Research Institute (UP-NSRI), Diliman, Quezon City; and (2)
the NBI and UP-NSRI to report to this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
regarding compliance with and implementation of the said resolution.
In his Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, Atty. Reynaldo O.
Esmeralda, NBI Deputy Director for Technical Services, informed this Court that the
semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and all
original documents (autopsy and laboratory reports, and photographs) are no longer in
the custody of the NBI as these were submitted as evidence to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274 by then NBI Medico-Legal Chief, Prospero A.
Cabanayan, M.D., when the latter testified on direct and cross-examination on January
30, 31, February 1, 5, 6 and 7, 1996. Attached thereto are certified true copies of
Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 (stating positive result for the presence of human
spermatozoa), Autopsy Report No. N-91-1665 (with remarks: "Smear for presence of
spermatozoa"), copy of the sworn statement of Dr. Cabanayan and certified true copy
of the envelope bearing his signed handwritten notation that all original photographs
have been submitted as evidence during the aforementioned hearing dates.172
On May 11, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution dated April 20, 2010 on grounds that (a) the DNA

testing order was issued in disregard of Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence which
requires prior hearing and notice; (b) a determination of propriety of DNA testing at
this stage under the present Rule, separate from that filed by Webb before the trial court
on October 6, 1997, is necessary as there was no opportunity back then to establish the
requisites for a DNA testing order under the Rule which took effect only in 2007; (c)
the result of the DNA testing will constitute new evidence, which cannot be received
and appreciated for the first time on appeal; and (d) this Court failed to elucidate an
exceptional circumstance to justify its decision to consider a question of fact, as this
Court itself acknowledged in its April 20, 2010 Resolution that the result of DNA
testing is not crucial or indispensable in the determination of appellant Webb’s guilt for
the crime charged.173
On May 21, 2010, Atty. Roberto Makalintal, Jr., Branch Clerk of RTC Parañaque City,
Branch 274, submitted his Comment on The Compliance and Manifestation Dated
April 27, 2010 of the NBI stating that: (a) There is no showing of actual receipt by RTC
Branch 274 of the specimen/vaginal smear mentioned in Dr. Cabanayan’s affidavit
dated April 27, 2010; (b) Based on available records such as the TSN of January 31,
1996 and February 7, 1996 during which Dr. Cabanayan testified, no such
specimen/vaginal smear was submitted to RTC Branch 274; (c) The TSN of January
31, 1996 on pages 57, 58 and 69 suggest that marked in evidence as Exhibits "S", "T"
and "U" by then Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño were only the photographs of
the three slides containing the semen specimen; (c) In the hearing of February 7, 1996,
Dr. Cabanayan’s last testimony before RTC Branch 274 in this case, he testified that
the last time he saw those slides was when he had the photographs thereof taken in
1995 (the first time was when he examined them in 1991), and as far as he knows
between 1991 and 1995, those slides were kept in the Pathology Laboratory of the NBI;
and (d) The entire records of the cases were already forwarded to this Court a long time
ago, including the evidence formally offered by the prosecution and the accused.174
Under our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we required the NBI to (a) show proof of the
release of the semen specimen to the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 274 in 1996; and
(b) comment on the alleged conflicting representations in its Compliance and
Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, both within ten days from notice. However, the
NBI has not complied with said directive.
In his Comment on the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, appellant Fernandez argued
that when this Court, in the higher interest of justice, relaxed the Rule on DNA
Evidence to afford Webb the fullest extent of his constitutional rights, the prosecution
was not thereby denied its equally important right to due process. Contrary to the
OSG’s claim that this Court immediately granted DNA testing without observing the
requisites under Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence, and without due notice and
hearing, appellant asserts that the Resolution dated April 20, 2010 clearly defines the
parameters of the DNA analysis to be conducted by the UP-NSRI assisted by the NBI.
Indeed, there are ample safeguards in the Rule to assure the reliability and acceptability
of the results of the DNA testing. Fernandez, however, objected to the statement of the
OSG that "in the light of positive identification" of appellant Webb by the principal
witness for the prosecution, Jessica Alfaro, the existing circumstances more than
warrant the affirmation of Webb’s guilt. Alfaro’s cross-examination exposed her as an
"out-and-out perjurer, a bold and intentional liar under oath" and a "fake witness"
whose account of the incident is "shot-through with fatal omissions, self-contradictions,
inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities."175
Appellant Lejano likewise filed his comment, pointing out that the trial court denied
Webb’s motion to direct the NBI to submit semen specimen for DNA analysis on
November 25, 1997 only after lengthy exchange of pleadings between the defense and
40
prosecution, the latter having properly opposed said motion. Hence, the People cannot
now rightfully claim that there was no notice or hearing on the issue of submitting the
semen specimen for DNA analysis. Citing Brady v. Maryland,176 Lejano contended that
the suppression of exculpatory evidence – or evidence that will show reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed –
grossly violates an accused’s right to due process. In this case, the evidence needs only
to be subjected to DNA analysis to establish the innocence of appellant Webb, as well
as of petitioner and appellant Lejano. It was further asserted that the semen specimen
was already existing at the time of the trial, and hence can hardly be considered as "new
evidence" and that DNA testing of said semen specimen taken from the victim Carmela
Vizconde "has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case" (Sec. 4 (d), Rule on DNA Evidence).177
On his part, appellant Webb stressed that there are exceptional circumstances that
justify this Court’s order to immediately conduct the DNA analysis. He has been
behind bars for more than fifteen (15) years. He has filed a motion for DNA analysis as
early as 1997 or thirteen (13) years ago. The result of such test could yield evidence
that could acquit him while no damage will be suffered by the prosecution considering
that this Court emphasized in its Resolution of April 20, 2010 that the prosecution’s
evidences and concerns regarding the proper preservation of evidence in the custody of
the NBI would have to be addressed in the light of the requirements laid down by the
Rule on DNA Evidence. As to the prosecution’s argument that this Court cannot
receive and appreciate "new evidence," Section 4 of the Rule states that "the
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing"; DNA testing is
even available post-conviction (Ibid, Sec. 6). This Court in accordance with proper
procedure thus decided to receive DNA evidence in order not to further delay the case,
appellants after all, were convicted more than ten (10) years ago in 2000 and have been
incarcerated for fifteen (15) years now.
Webb further underscored that where the evidence has not been offered, it is the
prosecution who should have the legal custody and responsibility over it.178 The NBI’s
letter dated April 23, 1997 confirmed that the semen specimen was in its custody. The
NBI’s repudiation of such fact is belied by the records; the Prosecution’s Formal Offer
of Evidence shows that Exhibits "S", "T" and "U" were merely photographs of the
slides containing the vaginal smear. Also, nowhere in the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during Dr. Cabanayan’s testimony was it shown that he turned over the
actual slides to the trial court. On the contrary, when Dr. Cabanayan was asked on
February 6, 1996 to produce the slides, which he had promised to bring during the
previous hearing, he admitted that he "forgot all about it" when he came to the hearing.
Thus, it appears from the record that from the time the semen specimen was taken from
Carmela Vizconde’s cadaver, it has always been in the custody of the NBI.179
Evidently, the NBI could no longer produce the semen specimen/vaginal smear taken
from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and consequently DNA analysis of said physical
evidence can no longer be done. Hence, this Court set aside the April 20, 2010
resolution and forthwith proceeded to resolve the present appeal on the basis of existing
evidence which have been formally offered by the parties and/or made part of the
records.
Appellant Webb’s Urgent
Motion To Acquit
With the recall of the order for DNA testing, appellant Webb moved for his acquittal on
the ground of violation of his constitutional right to due process by reason of the State’s
failure to produce the semen specimen, either through negligence or willful
suppression. Webb argues that the loss or suppression by the prosecution of the semen
specimen denied him the right to avail of the latest DNA technology and prove his
innocence. Citing American jurisprudence (Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari,180 California v.
Trombetta181 and Brady v. Maryland182), Webb contends that in disallowing the DNA
examination he had requested, the RTC denied him from presenting a "complete
defense" through that "singular piece of evidence that could have definitively
established his innocence," the trial court relying instead on the identification of Jessica
Alfaro, a "perjured witness." The constitutional duty of the prosecution to turn over
exculpatory evidence to the accused includes the duty to preserve such evidence.
Webb maintains that the semen specimen extracted from the cadaver of Carmela had
exculpatory value, as even NBI’s Dr. Cabanayan testified during the hearing of
February 7, 1996, that it was still possible to subject the same to DNA analysis to
identify the person to whom the sperm belonged. Thus, a DNA analysis of said semen
specimen excluding appellant Webb as the source thereof would disprove the
prosecution’s evidence against him. Further, Webb points out that the prosecution
considered the presence of spermatozoa on the body of Carmela as evidence that she
was raped, offering the photographs of the glass slides containing the sperm cells as
proof that she was in fact raped on or about the late evening of June 29, 1991 or early
morning of June 30, 1991. But the only evidence of the prosecution that it was Webb
who raped Carmela was the testimony of Alfaro which was given full credit by the
RTC and CA despite all its inconsistencies, and despite all documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by the defense proving that Webb was at the United States at the
time the crime was committed.
On the matter of preserving DNA evidence, Webb cites Section 12 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence which authorizes the court to order the appropriate government agency to
preserve the DNA evidence during trial and even when the accused is already serving
sentence, until such time the decision of the court has become final and executory.
While this Court has given Webb the best opportunity to prove his innocence in the
order granting DNA analysis of the sperm specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver,
such potentially exculpatory evidence could not be produced by the State. Webb now
claims that as a result of the destruction or loss of evidence under the NBI’s custody, he
was effectively deprived of his right to present a complete defense, in violation of his
constitutional right to due process, thus entitling him to an acquittal.
Loss of Semen Specimen Not Ground For Acquittal of Webb
Webb’s argument that under the facts of this case and applying the cited rulings from
American jurisprudence, he is entitled to acquittal on the ground of violation of his
constitutional right to due process,is without merit.
In Brady v. Maryland183 it was held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution." In said case, the petitioner was convicted of murder committed in the
course of robbery and sentenced to death. He later learned that the prosecution
suppressed an extrajudicial confession made by his accomplice who admitted he did the
actual killing. The US Supreme Court granted a new trial and remanded the case but
only on the question of punishment.
In Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari,184 the court ordered DNA testing of specimen taken from
a rape victim after the sexual assault and from the accused who was convicted, DNA
testing being unavailable at the time of the trial. Accused therein was identified by the
victim as her attacker. The court found the factual circumstances clearly showed that
the semen specimen could have come only from the accused. It noted that the witness
testified that accused acted alone, had ejaculated and she did not have sexual
intercourse with any other person within 24 hours prior to the sexual assault. DNA
testing ultimately revealed that petitioner’s DNA composition did not match with that

found on the victim’s underwear. Consequently, the court granted petitioner’s
subsequent motions to vacate the judgment of conviction.
In California v. Trombetta,185 a case involving the prosecution for drunk driving, the US
Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not require
that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath-
analysis tests at trial.
Given our precedents in this area, we cannot agree with the California Court of Appeal
that the State’s failure to retain breath samples for respondents constitutes a violation of
the Federal Constitution. To begin with, California authorities in this case did not
destroy respondents’ breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure
requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. In failing to preserve
breath samples for respondents, the officers here were acting "in good faith and in
accord with their normal practice." x x x The record contains no allegation of official
animus towards respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.
More importantly, California’s policy of not preserving breath samples is without
constitutional defect. Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve
evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a
significant role in the suspect’s defense.
To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, x x x evidence must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such
a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonably available means. Neither of these conditions is met on the facts of this case.
[italics supplied.]
From the above cases, it is clear that what is crucial is the requirement of materiality of
the semen specimen sought for DNA testing. Appellant Webb must be able to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the DNA sample would prove his innocence.
Evidence is material where "there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."186
In People v. Yatar,187 decided before the promulgation of the Rule on DNA Evidence,
the Court expounded on the nature of DNA evidence and the factors to be considered in
assessing its probative value in the context of scientific and legal developments. The
proper judicial approach is founded on the concurrence of relevancy and reliability.
Most important, forensic identification though useful does not preclude independent
evidence of identification.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A
person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s
lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal
and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can
assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed,
efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
41
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate
one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving
sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood,
or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber
from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s
body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was
physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the
victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place
the suspect at the scene of the crime.
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests
in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for
analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on
Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample
taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19,
TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found
in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology
in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively unchartered waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing
doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges,
under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow
at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is
one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at
bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s
vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being
sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife
were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2)
In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3)
Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in
the early morning of June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and
Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a
saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a
dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant
hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina
Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of
Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba,
lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes
scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the
victim’s vagina (Exhibits "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in
the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibits "J"
and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13)
Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.188 [emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, in other jurisdictions it has been recognized that DNA test results are not
always exculpatory.
Postconviction test results are not always exculpatory. In addition, exculpatory test
results will not necessarily free the convicted individual. If the evidence does exclude
the petitioner, the court must weigh the significance of the exclusion in relation to all
the other evidence. Convicted offenders often believe that if crime scene evidence does
not contain their DNA they will automatically be exonerated. Not finding the
petitioner’s DNA does not automatically indicate the case should be overturned,
however. In a rape case, for example, the perpetrator may have worn a condom, or not
ejaculated. In some cases, the absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of the
defendant’s absence or lack of involvement in the crime.189
We hold that the source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the deceased
victim is immaterial in determining Webb’s guilt. From the totality of the evidence
presented by both the prosecution and the defense, Webb was positively identified as
Carmela’s rapist.
As the records bear out, the positive identification of appellant Webb as Carmela’s
rapist satisfied the test of moral certainty, and the prosecution had equally established
beyond reasonable doubt the fact of rape and the unlawful killing of Carmela, Estrellita
and Jennifer on the occasion thereof. Even assuming that the DNA analysis of the
semen specimen taken from Carmela’s body hours after her death excludes Webb as the
source thereof, it will not exonerate him from the crime charged. Alfaro did not testify
that Webb had ejaculated or did not use a condom while raping Carmela. She testified
that she saw Webb rape Carmela and it was only him she had witnessed to have
committed the rape inside the Vizconde residence between late evening of June 29,
1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991. Moreover, she did not testify that Carmela
had no sexual relations with any other man at least 24 hours prior to that time. On the
other hand, a positive result of DNA examination of the semen specimen extracted by
Dr. Cabanayan from Carmela’s cadaver would merely serve as corroborative evidence.
As to the loss of the semen specimen in the custody of the NBI, appellant Webb’s
contention that this would entitle him to an acquittal on the basis of Brady v. Maryland
is misplaced.

In Arizona v. Youngblood,190 a 10-year old boy was molested and sodomized by the
accused, a middle-aged man, for 1½ hours. After the assault, the boy was examined in a
hospital where the physician used swab to collect specimen from the boy’s rectum and
mouth, but did not examine them at anytime. These samples were refrigerated but the
boy’s clothing was not. Accused was identified by the victim in a photographic lineup
and was convicted of child molestation, sexual assault and kidnapping. During the trial,
expert witnesses had testified that timely performance of tests with properly preserved
semen samples could have produced results that might have completely exonerated the
accused. The Court held:
There is no question but that the State complied with Brady and Agurs here. The State
disclosed relevant police reports to respondent, which contained information about the
existence of the swab and the clothing, and the boy’s examination at the hospital. The
State provided respondents’ expert with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by
the police criminologist, and respondent’s expert had access to the swab and to the
clothing.
xxxx
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Brady, makes
the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the
defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process Clause requires
a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary
material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests,
the results of which might have exonerated the defendant. x x x We think that requiring
a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the
police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that
class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in
which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a
basis for exonerating the defendant. We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant
can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.
In this case, the police collected the rectal swab and clothing on the night of the crime:
respondent was not taken into custody until six weeks later. The failure of the police to
refrigerate the clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be
described as negligent. None of this information was concealed from respondent at
trial, and the evidence – such as it was – was made available to respondent’s expert
who declined to perform any tests on the samples. The Arizona Court of Appeals noted
in its opinion – and we agree—that there was no suggestion of bad faith on the part of
the police. It follows, therefore, from what we have said, that there was no violation of
the Due Process Clause. [emphasis supplied.]
In this case, there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the police investigators,
specifically the NBI, for the non-production of the vaginal swab and glass slide
containing the semen specimen, during the trial and upon our recent order for DNA
testing. The prosecution did not conceal at anytime the existence of those vaginal swab
and glass slide containing the vaginal smear. Curiously, despite Dr. Cabanayan’s
admission during the hearing that it was still possible to subject the semen specimen to
DNA analysis, the defense never raised the issue thereafter and resurrected the matter
only in October 1997 when Webb’s counsel filed his motion.
It bears to stress that the vaginal smear itself was not formally offered by the
prosecution, but only the photographs of the glass slide containing the semen specimen
for the purpose only of proving that Carmela was in fact raped and not that Webb was
42
the source of the sperm/semen. As noted by the RTC when it denied Webb’s motion for
DNA on November 25, 1997, prevailing jurisprudence stated that DNA being a
relatively new science then, has not yet been accorded official recognition by our
courts. The RTC also considered the more than six (6) years that have elapsed since the
commission of the crime in June 1991, thus the possibility of the specimen having been
tampered with or contaminated. Acting on reasonable belief that the proposed DNA
examination will not serve the ends of justice but instead lead to complication and
confusion of the issues of the case, the trial court properly denied Webb’s request for
DNA testing.
We thus reiterate that the vaginal smear confirming the presence of spermatozoa merely
corroborated Alfaro’s testimony that Carmela was raped before she was killed. Indeed,
the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a prosecution for rape. The
important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the unlawful
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.191 On the other hand, a negative
result of DNA examination of the semen specimen could not have exonerated Webb of
the crime charged as his identity as a principal in the rape-slay of Carmela was
satisfactorily established by the totality of the evidence. A finding that the semen
specimen did not match Webb’s DNA does not necessarily negate his presence at the
locus criminis.
Civil Liability of Appellants
The Court sustains the award of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, pursuant to current
jurisprudence that in cases of rape with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of
₱100,000.00 should be awarded to the heirs of the victim.192 Civil indemnity is
mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victims without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. For the deaths of Estrellita and Jennifer, the award of civil
indemnity ex delicto to their heirs,  was likewise in order, in the amount of ₱50,000.00
each.193 Following People v. Dela Cruz,194 ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱75,000
moral damages in rape cases are awarded only if they are classified as heinous.195 As
the rape-slay of Carmela took place in 1991, R.A. No. 7659 entitled "AN ACT TO
IMPOSE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR
THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," which was approved on
December 13, 1993 and was to become effective fifteen (15) days after its publication
in two national newspapers of general circulation, was not yet effective.196
As to moral damages, recent jurisprudence allows the amount of ₱75,000.00 to be
awarded in cases of rape with homicide.197 We find the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 as
moral damages awarded by the RTC as affirmed by the CA, rather excessive. While
courts have a wide latitude in ascertaining the proper award for moral damages, the
award should not be to such an extent that it inflicts injustice on the accused.198 The
award of ₱2,000,000.00 as moral damages to the heir of the victims should accordingly
be reduced to ₱500,000.00. The rest of the awards given by the trial court are affirmed.
In view of the foregoing, I respectfully vote that the appeals in the above-entitled cases
be DISMISSED and the Decision dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00336 be AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only as to the
award of damages.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 72883 December 20, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. AURELIO ESPINOSA @ "ROLLY" and JESUS FLORO y JUNDOY,
accused. JESUS FLORO y JUNDOY, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Ariel Mamucod got a black eye and his father wanted to know why. But he never did
find out. On his way to the barangay chairman, he was accosted by two persons, who
hit him in the head and stabbed him in the chest and back. The following day, Jaime
Mamucod was dead.
The incident happened on May 6, 1981 but an information for murder was filed only on
July 19, 1983. 1 Accused were Aurelio Espinosa and Jesus Floro. Espinosa was never
tried and remains at large. Only Floro is appealing the decision of the trial court
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and payment of P 30,000.00 civil indemnity to the
victim's heirs. 2
The chief witnesses for the prosecution were the victim's two sons, Arnold and Ariel.
Both of them were with their father when the jeep he was driving was blocked by the
killers at Almeda Street, in Santa Cruz, Manila, at about 9 o'clock in the evening. The
brothers identified the culprits as Espinosa and Floro. It was Floro who first attacked
Jaime, hitting him in the head with a hard object about a foot long and wrapped in a
newspaper. When the victim fell off the jeep as a result of the blow, Espinosa stabbed
him repeatedly in the back with a fan knife. Floro, using an ice pick, stabbed Jaime
several times in the chest. Jaime ran for his life but his attackers pursued and continued
stabbing him until the latter fell into a ditch. The two assailants then walked away fast.
Ariel boarded his dying father on a tricycle and brought him to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital, where he expired from his wounds the next day. 3
The testimonies of the brothers were corroborated by Manuel Buenaventura, who said
he saw the stabbing while he was on a tricycle waiting to cross Abad Santos Street. He
also identified Jaime's killers as the two accused. 4 The necropsy report submitted by
Dr. Luis Larion, medico-legal officer of the Western Police District, (which was
admitted by the defense without his testimony) declared that Jaime Mamucod died as a
result of "profuse hemorrhage and shock due to multiple stab wounds penetrating the
chest and piercing the right lung and branches of the right pulmonary artery and
vein." 5 Another witness for the prosecution, Sgt. Juanita Yang of the Western Police
District, testified that it was he who investigated the killing and took the statements of
the victim's two sons implicating Espinosa and Floro. 6
The defense invoked alibi. Testifying for himself, Floro admitted that he was at the
basketball court earlier in the evening of May 6, 1981, as he was coaching one of the
competing teams. But he left later because the games had been called off and at the
time of the stabbing he was in his house on Almeda Street. On cross examination, he
declared that his house was only about two hundred meters or two or three minutes
walk from the scene of the crime. 7
A prosecution witness, Lilia Silva, was also asked to testify for the defense because she
said she saw Espinosa chasing and stabbing Jaime when the latter stumbled but made
no mention of Floro. When asked by defense counsel if she saw Floro stabbing the
victim, she said she did not. 8
The appellant's brief faulted the trial court for accepting the testimonies of the
Mamucod brothers despite their inconsistencies and contradictions. The defense
stressed that whereas Arnold said Floro hit Jaime in the nape of the neck, Ariel said it
was on the top of the head, and that while Arnold said Jaime was stabbed while lying
on the ground, Ariel said it was while his father was standing. It was also unbelievable
that after the stabbing Ariel should say, "Tatay, let us go home," when the natural thing
to do was to rush the dying man to the nearest hospital for immediate treatment.
Noting that the necropsy report spoke only of stab wounds and not punctured wounds,
the defense also stressed that this proved the brothers were lying when they swore that
their father had been stabbed by Floro with an ice pick.
 43

The Court has examined the evidence of the parties and sees no reason for overturning We agree that the killing of Jaime Mamucod was attended with treachery, qualifying
the findings of Judge Rosalio A. de Leon, who had the opportunity to observe the the crime to murder. The victim was totally defenseless. He was caught by surprise
witnesses on the stand and assess their credibility by the various indicia available to the when Espinosa and Floro, whom he considered his friends, suddenly attacked him.
trial court but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can Without warning, he was hit in the head, then stabbed in the back. Thus disabled, he
draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the was stabbed in the chest. And even as he ran for his life, he was pursued and stabbed
quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest some more when he stumbled. He never had a chance to save his life.
blush or the guilty blanch-these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying in What prompted the vicious attack must remain a mystery to this Court. Proof of motive
his teeth. Absent then a showing that the conclusions of the trial court are arbitrary or is, of course, not necessary for the conviction of the accused-appellant in view of his
without basis, they must be regarded with respect and accepted as conclusive on appeal. positive identification as one of the killers. Even so, one may well wonder why a
The discrepancies in the declarations of Arnold and Ariel are not unnatural or evidence human life was taken for no apparent reason and another life must now be needlessly
of perjury. When their father was attacked, Arnold was seated at the front of the jeep spent in the shadow of the prison bars.
beside Jaime and Ariel was sitting behind them. 9 The two brothers had therefore
different vantage points that gave each of them a separate view of the incident. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the
Moreover, it should also be considered that the man being stabbed before their very accused-appellant.
eyes was their father. Under this traumatizing and shocking circumstance, the two sons,
who were then only sixteen and fifteeen respectively, can hardly be expected to SO ORDERED.
remember the grisly stabbing in perfect detail.
As for Lilia Silva, her testimony is less than conclusive of Floro's innocence. The mere
fact that she did not see Floro at the scene of the crime does not prove he was not there
as she obviously was narrating only the latter part of the incident. Besides, she added
that there were many people around, which could be the reason she did not notice
Floro. At any rate, her testimony cannot cancel the sworn declarations of Arnold and
Ariel that they actually saw Espinosa and Floro killing Jaime Mamucod.
The two sons could hardly have made a mistake regarding this matter. Indeed, the
memory of these men is not easily blurred and must have been indelibly imprinted in
their young and impressionable minds. They had no motive for falsely Identifying
Espinosa and the accused-appellant. The only reason for naming them is the logical
one: that Espinosa and Floro were the men who killed their father.

The contention that the necropsy report did not mention any punctured wounds must be
rejected. The phrase "stab wounds" is used generically to include all wounds that may
be caused "by weapons such as knives, scissors, three-cornered files, or ice picks with a
circular shaft all possessing a sharp point but having blades of different
shapes." 10 Stabbing may be done with an ice pick and the puncture is correctly called a
stab wound.

The appellant's brief did not dispute the finding of the trial judge that Floro was in
hiding for more than two years, 11 which may explain why the information against him
could not be filed in 1981, when Jaime Mamucod was killed. It would also suggest that
the accused-appellant is not innocent as he claims, for as we have repeatedly observed,
unexplained flight is an indication of guilt. 12 "The guilty flee when no man pursueth
but the innocent are as bold as a lion."

Finally, there is the question of conspiracy. Floro would distance himself from
Espinosa and impute the whole blame to his absent co-accused for the killing of Jaime
Mamucod. The evidence shows, however, that they acted in concert in pursuit of a
common design. Floro and Espinosa together blocked Jaime's jeep and told him not to
disturb the basketball game (although there was none in progress). Floro first hit Jaime
with the foot-long stick or pipe earlier concealed in a newspaper. Then Espinosa drew
his fan-knife and stabbed Jaime in the back. Then Floro drew his ice pick and stabbed
Jaime in the chest. When Jaime ran away from them, they pursued him and continued
stabbing him. Finally, with their victim dying in the ditch, both assailants fled together
and disappeared. It is clear from their acts that the two had come to an agreement
concerning the attack on Jaime and decided to commit it. There was thus a conspiracy
that made each conspirator liable for the other's acts.