MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties
over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in
R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm
that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out
basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of
such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them
in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international
law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION GR No. 139465, January 18, 2000

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice
is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to
him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the
extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty,
to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly
provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the
ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself.
It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely
an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to
make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to
outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is
politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 and Paragraph [3], Article
3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or
inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative
body’s quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of

evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order
or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993
ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also
known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the
records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).

In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise
judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in
respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties
before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it
based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make
a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment. The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to
evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and
obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to
determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial
and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be
effected. That is the role of the court. The body’s power is limited to an initial finding of whether
or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.

FACTS:

In accordance to “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Government of the United States of America” (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the
Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States attached with
 the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents on June 18, 1999. Mr. Jimenez was charged
with the following:

 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum
Penalty: 5 years/count)
 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than
1 year)
The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition documents based on the
following:

Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted
shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It merely
determines the compliance of the Requesting Government with the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law and treaty. After the filing of the petition for extradition, the person
sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition.

The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition. Thus, it must comply with the request of the United
States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.

Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “Every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”. Extradition is a
tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region a petition presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation:

mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition documents

certiorari to set aside Department’s letter dated July 13, 1999 denying his request

prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court

enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act
directed to the extradition

application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction

Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo by refraining
from committing the acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in connection with
the request of the United States Government, from filing the corresponding Petition with a
Regional Trial court and from performing any act directed to the extradition for a period of 20
days from service of the order.

Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon.
Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the order. Due to transcendental importance, the
Court brushed aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 99-94684 and the TRO and proceeded on the issues.

ISSUES:

Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
preliminary investigation of criminal cases

Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court on the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10
days from receipt is dispensable

Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted
under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is violated

HELD:

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which
to file his comment with supporting evidence.

1) NO. The evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases

Extradition Request

The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the

Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign
Affairs has the executive authority to conduct the evaluation process which, just like the
extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal
investigation but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions.
At such stage, the executive authority has the power:

to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in
form and substance

to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the
crimes indicated are not extraditable

to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is
a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.

The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise

of an administrative body’s quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to prosecution. The power of investigation
consists in gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency’s performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.

In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body
is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative
body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If the only purpose for investigation is to
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if
the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited
to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. The court has
the power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected.

The evaluation procedure (in contrast to ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation of
liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:

1) Provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request

This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60
days (Par. 4 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request is
submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5,
Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)

2) Temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition
petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).

The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:

1) There is yet no extradite; BUT

2) It results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration

The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the
filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial
of the right to notice, information, and hearing.

In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June
17, 1999 (the following day the Department of Justice received the request). Thus, the
Department of Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents.

Extradition Petition

After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
Justice, the latter shall designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case
(Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The attorney shall file a written Extradition Petition with the proper
regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration
(Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an order summoning the prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer the petition. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it
appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends
of justice or to prevent flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).

Extradition Hearing

The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the
summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9,
PD 1069) The attorney may represent the Requesting state. (Sec. 8, PD 1069). The Court’s
decision on whether the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality
rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty or whether or
not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-
US Extradition Treaty) shall be final and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and
appealable with the Court of Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply except for the required 15-day period
to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).

2) YES. The twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
on the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10
days from receipt is dispensable.

Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a
prospective extradite. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. Petitioner contends that United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Such argument, however has been
overturned by petitioner’s revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage
would be obtainable during trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy
cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. The constitutional issue in the case
at bar does not even call for “justice outside legality,” since private respondent’s due process
rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be
completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the
extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation,
and those that are not properly authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent. Therefore, notice
and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved
aside.

3) NO. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under Sec. 7
of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is not violated

During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as
yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of
the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our
government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.