Preliminary Injuction

1. LTFRB vs DBDOYC Inc. GR 242860

Facts:

The DOTC issued DO 2015-11 which set the standard classifications for public
transport conveyances to be used as basis for the issuance of a Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC) for public utility vehicles. The new classifications,
namely, Transportation Network Companies (TNC) and Transportation
Network Vehicle Service (TNVS).

Under DO 2015-11, a TNC is defined as an "organization that provides pre-

arranged transportation services for compensation using an online-
enabled application or platform technology to connect passengers with
drivers using their personal vehicles.".

Meanwhile, DBDOYC registered its business and launched "Angkas," an online

and on-demand motorcycle-hailing mobile application that pairs drivers of
motorcycles with potential passengers without, however, obtaining the
mandatory certificate of TNC .

The LRFRB later considered Angkas as TNC, cannot legally operate. Despite such
warning, however, DBDOYC continued to operate sans any effort to obtain a
certificate of TNC accreditation.

DBDOYC,filed Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary

Injunction against petitioners before the RTC. The RTC issued the writ of
preliminary injuction.

The LTFRB questioned the order of the RTC. It alleged that there was grave
abuse of discretion by the RTC in issuing such writ. According to LTFRB,DBDOYC
is a transportation provider and its accredited drivers are common
carriers engaged in rendering public service which is subject to their
regulation. The regulatory measures against DBDOYC pertain to DOs 2015-11
and 2017-11.

The DBDOYC claims that they are not by the regulations, claiming that it and its
accredited drivers are not common carriers or transportation providers.

Issue: WON the issuance of the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction was
proper

Ruling:

No, the first and foremost requisite in the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is the existence of a clear legal right.
In DPWH v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, the Court explained that a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued to:

Prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their

claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully[.] Thus, it will be issued only
upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an
urgent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.
In Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., the Court held that "[t]he plaintiff praying
for a writ of preliminary injunction must establish that he or she has a  present and
unmistakable right to be protected; Thus, where the plaintiffs right is doubtful
or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary
injunction."
Here, the Court concludes that no clear and unmistakable right exists in DBDOYC's
favor since in DBDOYC’s operations is covered by the definition of common carriers for
the reason that it offers transportation services to wiling public consumers irrespective
of the Angkas app limited scope. The business of being a transportation service
provider, whether done through online platforms or not, appears to be one which is
imbued with public interest and thus, deserves appropriate regulations.

2. Cahambingvs Espinosa
GR 215807

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent Victor Espinosa are siblings and the children of deceased spouses
Librado and Brigida Espinosa, the latter bequeathing their properties, among which is Lot 354 to the
said siblings.

Deceased Librado and Brigida bequeathed their respective shares over Lot 354 to respondent Victor
Espinosa, however, Brigida subsequently revoked and cancelled her will, giving her one-half (1/2)
share over Lot 354 to petitioner.

Brigida Espinosa and respondent Victor Espinosa, after the death of Librado Espinosa, entered into
an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate subdividing Lot 354 into Lot 354-A adjudicated to Brigida
Espinosa, and Lot 354-B adjudicated to respondent Victor Espinosa

Not being included in the partition of Lot 354, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Victor
Espinosa for the annulment of the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Property.

Thereafter, a commercial building named as Espinosa Building stands on Lot No. 354. At the time of
the filing of the complaint, the same building had 12 lessees, four (4) of whom pay rentals to
petitioner.

In one of the pre-trial conferences, the Clerk of Court, acting as Commissioner, issued an Order
directing the parties to maintain the status quo.
Thereafter, respondent Victor Espinosa filed an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against petitioner alleging
that the latter violated the status quo ante order by allowing her sons to occupy the space rented by
Jhanel' s Pharmacy which is one of respondent Victor Espinosa's tenants. The RTC issued the writ
of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner claims that respondents failed to prove the elements before an injunction could be issued.
In particular, petitioner avers the following contentions:

(1) the damage claimed by respondents is quantifiable at ₱12,000.00 per month, hence, not
irreparable;
(2) Victor Espinosa’s right is not clear and unmistakable;
(3) there is no urgency involved because the application for injunction was filed more than one year
after the incident in question;
(4) contrary to the conclusion of the CA, the space occupied by Jhanel' s Pharmacy was voluntarily
surrendered to petitioner by the lessee; and
(5) the CA committed grave legal errors when it failed to correct the RTC's issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.

In their Comment, respondents argue that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was
strictly in accordance with the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

Issue: WON the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction of the RTC was proper

Ruling:

Yes, it was proper.

In Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation, et al.,  this Court
exhaustively discussed the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction, thus:

Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo
until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction  is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to judgment or final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a parti.cular
act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or
interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise,
the outcome of a litigation

For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present, to wit:

(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and

(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ
of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. The grant or
denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests in the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of
judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is
grave abuse of discretion.  Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law

Here, respondent court correctly found that private respondent Victor Espinosa had established a
clear and unmistakable right to a commercial space heretofore occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy. He
had an existing Contract of Lease with the pharmacy up to December 2009. As such, pursuant to the
status quo order, it is private respondent Victor Espinosa who must continue to deal with Jhanel's
Pharmacy. Correspondingly, the commercial space occupied by Jhanel' s Pharmacy must be
deemed to be under the possession and control of private respondent Victor Espinosa as of the time
of the issuance of the status quo order. The right of possession and control is a clear right already
established by the circumstances obtaining at that time. Hence, petitioner's act of entering the
premises of Jhanel's Pharmacy, through her sons, is a material and substantial violation of private
respondent Victor Espinosa's right, which act must be enjoined.

Further, it also shows the urgency and the necessity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction in order to prevent serious damage:

The court held that by allowing the plaintiff to disturb the status quo ante which, it would cause great
and irreparable injury since the respondent would be deprived of his right to collect rent from
Jhanel's Pharmacy.

EVY Construction and Development Corporation vs Valiant Roll Corp.

GR 207938

Facts:

Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 134890 from Linda N.
Ang and Senen T. Uyan. At the time of the sale, no lien or encumbrance was annotated
on the title. On September 04, 2007, the Register of Deeds annotated a Notice of Levy
on Attachment on TCT No. 134890. This annotation was by virtue of the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment issued by RTC of Pampanga in a Civil Case entitled Valiant Roll
Corporation v. Angeli Lumber and Hardware, Inc., and Linda Ang.

Evy Construction registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds on
November 20, 2007, however, it contained the annotation of the prior Notice of Levy on
Attachment dated November 8, 2007.

Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case in favor of Valiant Roll
Corporation. A Writ of Execution and a Notice of Levy were issued against the property
in question.

Thereafter, Evy Construction filed with the Regional Trial Court its Complaint for
Quieting of Title, Annulment of Execution Sale with application for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
The RTC and the CA denied the application for the issuance of a TRO. Hence, this
appeal.

Petitioner claims that it was denied due process when "no valid hearing for the
application for preliminary injunction was ever set" by the trial court and it "was NOT
even allowed to present its summary arguments and its witness in support of its
application for a [temporary restraining order].It explains that the doubt made by the
annotation to the title caused investors to withdraw their investments from petitioner's
project.Petitioner avers that the issuance of an injunctive writ is necessary to prevent
further damage since its "business reputation and goodwill as a real estate developer,
was damage.

On the other hand, respondent counters that the application for preliminary injunction
was never actually set for hearing or resolved by the trial court and the petitioner failed
to establish the requisites for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Issue:

1. WON Evy Constructionwas denied due process when its application for a writ of
preliminary injunction was denied.
2. WON the denial of the trial court of the writ of preliminary injunction proper

Ruling:

1. No, A trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior
hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. In this instance, a
summary hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary injunction, is
required only to determine if a 72-hour temporary restraining order should be
extended.

A trial court may also issue ex parte  a temporary restraining order for 20 days
"if it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice. The trial
court has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary
injunction. If no action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction
during this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have
expired.42 Notably, the Rules do not require that a hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction be conducted during this period.

While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary
hearing in every application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant
or denial, Rule 58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an application for
preliminary injunction is granted. Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined," Inversely stated, an application for preliminary
injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from
 that of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.

In this case, the November 9, 2009 hearing was denominated as a "hearing on

the application for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Petitioner's counsel was allowed to present its arguments 45 and its
witness but conceded that the issues before the trial court were legal in
nature. Thus, the trial court resolved that there was no need to present the
witness, which petitioner's counsel accepted without objection.

Petitioner cannot insist on a separate hearing for the application for preliminary
injunction, considering that it accepted that its application would be submitted
for decision without the presentation of its witness. The trial court did not find
any need to conduct a further hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction since petitioner was unable to substantiate its entitlement to a
temporary restraining order. In any case, even if a separate hearing was
granted, petitioner would have presented the same arguments and evidence in
the November 9, 2009 hearing. Thus, there can be no denial of due process if
the party alleging it has already been granted an opportunity to be heard.

2. Yes, An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing
substantial rights". Further, the applicant must show "that the invasion of the
right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage." 

In this case, petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the property, [i]t
has the undeniable right to the full use and possession [of it]. However,
respondent's attachment liens dated September 18, 2007, October 2, 2007, and
November 8, 2007, may have been superior to whatever right petitioner may
have acquired by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was only registered
on November 20, 2009. The grant of an injunctive writ could operate as a
prejudgment of the main case. Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending
a final determination of petitioner's actual and existing right over the property.

Further, even assuming that there is already a final determination of petitioner's

right over the property, petitioner still failed to prove the urgent and paramount
necessity to enjoin the Register of Deeds from making  further annotations on
TCT.

Petitioner prays for the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent grave and
irreparable damage to its reputation as a real estate developer. Indeed,
injunctive relief could be granted to prevent grave and irreparable damage to a
business entity's goodwill and business reputation.
Injury is considered irreparable if "there is no standard by which [its] amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy." The injury must be such that its
pecuniary value cannot be estimated, and thus, cannot fairly compensate for the
loss. For this reason, the loss of goodwill and business reputation, being
unquantifiable would be considered as grave and irreparable damage.
In applications for provisional injunctive writs the applicant must also prove
the urgency of the application. Here, Petitioner alleges that the execution sale
and the prior annotations on its title caused ''crucial investors and buyers” to
withdraw. This is the grave and irreparable damage it sought to be protected
from. However, the feared "damage" was caused by the execution sale and the
annotations already made on the title. It even admits that the annotations were
"impairing the progress of its housing development."In other words, petitioner
failed to establish the urgent and paramount necessity of
preventing further annotations on the title.

Thus, what petitioner actually seeks is the removal of the annotations on its title,
which is precisely what it asked for in its Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal
of Cloud, Annulment of Execution Sale and Certificate of Sale, and Damages
before the trial court.

Injunctive relief would have no practical effect considering that the purported
damage it seeks to be protected from has already been done. Therefore, its
proper remedy is not the issuance of an injunctive writ but to thresh out the
merits of its Complaint before the trial court.

Solid Builders vs China Banking Corp

GR 179665

Facts:

China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. To secure the
loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor real estate mortgage
over parcels of land the Loyola Grand and New Cubao properties

SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties and the
implementation of a dacion en pago of the New Cubao property.

CBC then agreed to restructure the loans. However, with regard to the dacion en pago, CBC
said that the concern should be approved first by the Executive Committee. Subsequently,
CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding account within ten days.

Thereafter, in order to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed
a Complaint "To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in the
RTC of Pasig City claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were
iniquitous and unconscionable. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that the records do not reveal a
clear and unmistakable right on the part of SBI and MFII that would entitle them to the
protection of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the denial of the CA of writ of preliminary injunction was proper

Ruling:

Yes, A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in
the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court is to determine
whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case. In this
 connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon
the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely:
(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.

Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from
foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by
CBC on the loans are iniquitous and unconscionable. However, SBI and MFII do not
have a right to prevent CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of
alleged "usurious rate of interest.". Even if the interest rate is usurious it does not affect the lender’s
right to recover the principal loan. Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the
mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay
the debt due.

The order of the trial court, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that the
parties still have to be heard on the alleged lack of "fairness of the increase in interests and
penalties" during the trial on the merits. Thus, the basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains
to be controversial or disputable as there is still a need to determine whether or not, upon
consideration of the various circumstances surrounding the agreement of the parties, the interest
rates and penalty charges are unconscionable. Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered
clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from
availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation
is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of the
equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.

As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by
SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a preliminary injunction has
not been satisfied. In the absence of any requisite, and where facts are shown to be wanting in
bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of injunction must be
struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of
such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a
court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

In the first place, any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment in a proper case
against CBC. Moreover, where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be
correctly claimed that the irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the application for
preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale.The alleged entitlement
of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral for the loans" they procured
from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law. Foreclosure of mortgaged
property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
Lerias vs CA
GR 193548

Facts:

The Spouses Yñiguez brought a complaint for quieting of title to property (with
application for the issuance of a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction)
against respondent Provincial Government of Southern Leyte in the RTC.

Spouses Yñiguez averred that they were the absolute owners of a parcel of commercial
land covered by a TCT; that Southern Leyte had annotated an adverse claim. The
Southern Leyte started building a multi-purpose center on the property without their
consent. Southern Leyte denied the alleged ownership of the Spouses Yñiguez. It had
owned the contested property since 1918 and had been in continued peaceful
possession of the same. Thereafter, compromise agreement was agreed upon by the
parties and was approved by the RTC. However, Southern Leyte, claiming that the
compromise agreement was without authority of the Provincial Governor, initiated its
action for annulment of the judgment in the CA. While the action for annulment of
judgment was pending in the CA, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution based on the compromisea agreement whereby they prayed that Southern
Leyte should vacate the property and deliver the same to the victors in the suit.

In order to thwart the implementation of the writ of execution, Southern Leyte applied
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction in the CA.
The CA then issued the TRO enjoining the execution of the questioned judgment by
compromise for 60 days. Hence, this appeal.

The petitioner avers that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion that Southern Leyte did not show its clear and
unmistakable right to be protected by the injunction; that its claim of ownership had
stemmed from the tax declaration made in 1918 as compared to her ownership as
borne out by her Torrens title; and that there was no necessity to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction inasmuch as Southern Leyte would not suffer any irreparable
injury.

Issue: WON he writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the CA

Ruling:

Yes, It is necessary for the applicant of the remedy of injunction to prove the following
in order to obtain injunctive relief, namely:

(1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

(2) the right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;

(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and

(4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent
serious and irreparable damage.

Of utmost importance is the existence of a clear and unmistakable right to be protected

on the part of the applicant. This is because injunction is not a remedy to protect or
enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights. The plaintiff praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction must establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable
right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such
right; and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the
plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. 

Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary

injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an
actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction. 

Here, Southern Leyte's right to be protected by injunction was not established, or was
not shown to exist. Southern Leyte's claim to have owned the property since 1918 was
supported only by the tax declaration. In contrast, the petitioner's ownership was
registered under the Torrens system (TCT No. T-9542). The latter should be preferred
because her Torrens certificate was evidence of her indefeasible title to property as the
person whose name appeared thereon. Indeed, the registration of title under the
Torrens system was a quieting of the title to the land in question.

It is worthy to note that Southern Leyte itself admitted the petitioner's ownership of the
property in the compromise agreement.

Injunction is the strong arm of equity. The power of the courts to issue injunctions
should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and
deliberation. The objective of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be fully heard. The injunction, being a preliminary remedy,
must not resolve the merits of the main case pending the trial, for it is not the function
of preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case or to decide controverted
facts.

Sumifru vs Spouses Cereno

GR 218236

Facts:

Sumifru is a domestic corporation engaged in the production and export of Cavendish

bananas. Sumifru entered into several growership agreements with respondents
spouses Cereño covering the latter's titled lands. Under their agreement, the spouses
Cereño, as growers, undertook to sell and deliver exclusively to Sumifru the bananas
produced from the contracted areas

Thereafter, Sumifru filed a Complaint for Injunction and Specific Performance with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against
the spouses Cereño before the RTC. The complaint alleged that the spouses Cereño
violated their agreement when they harvested the bananas without the consent of
Sumifru, packed them in boxes not provided by Sumifru, and sold them to buyers other
than Sumifru.

The RTC denied Sumifru's application for issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction for lack of merit. The CA, likewise denied the petition of
Sumifru. The CA held that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in not issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction since Sumifru did not satisfy all of the legal requisites for its
issuance. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the denial of the wirt of preliminary injunction was proper

Ruling:

Yes, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction, will
be issued:
(1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;
and (
4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.

A writ of preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong

arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, must be granted only in the face of injury to
actual and existing substantial rights.

Here, Sumifru failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right as to necessitate the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. As aptly found by the CA, the spouses
Cereño consistently disputed Sumifru's rights under the agreements by claiming that
the agreements were already terminated.

The CA likewise did not err when it found that there is no irreparable injury to be
suffered by Sumifru. Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which its
amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. In its Complaint, Sumifru alleged
that it has "released to [spouses Cereño] cash advances and farm inputs in the amount
of Php 720,189.81." Clearly, the injury alleged by Sumifru is capable of pecuniary
estimation, and any loss it may suffer, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. As
to Sumifru's allegations of potential suits and damage to reputation, these are
speculative at best, with no proof adduced to substantiate them.

Further, considering that Sumifru admitted that the GEPASAs on which it anchors its
right expired in 2015, there is even more reason not to issue the writ prayed for.
In Thunder Security and Investigation Agency v. National Food Authority,we held that
petitioner cannot lay claim to an actual, clear, and positive right as to entitle it to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction based on an expired service contract. No
court can compel a party to agree to a continuation of an admittedly expired contract
through the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction since a contract can be
renewed, revived, or extended only by mutual consent of the parties.
Nerwin Industries Corp vs PNOC
GR 167057

Facts:

The National Electrification Administration ("NEA") published an invitation to bid for a contract,
known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of 60,000 pieces of woodpoles and 20,000 pieces
of crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project. In response, bidders, such as
private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility together with their
technical proposals. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private
respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder of the contract.

However, NEA’s Board of Directors passed a Resolution reducing by 50% the material requirements
for IBP No. 80. Nerwin then protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to
accommodate a losing bidder.

In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation under the Department of Energy, issued an
invitation to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project ("O-ILAW
project").

Upon learning of the issuance of such invitation to bid, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC alleging
that Requisition was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another
bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden
poles.

Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case stating that the complaint violated the rule that
government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs. The RTC granted the TRO.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this appeal. The CA explained respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction
since the same is a violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already
existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29,
2003. Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:

No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction,
to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

Issue: WON the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the RTC Judge was improper

Ruling:

Yes, the RTC gravely abused its discretion. Section 3 of RA 8975 provides that “No court, except the
Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or
entity, whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or
compel (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project.

This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise.

Here, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence that would justify respondent Judge’s blatant
disregard of a "simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate prohibiting the issuance of
injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects." Respondent Judge did not even
endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single exception where
the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.

Further, a preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to

protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the case. The existence of a right to
be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to
be protected is not demanded, it is enough that for the court to act, there must be an existing
basis of facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not
be conclusively established.

In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not
be conclusive or complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of
the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This
should really be so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary
injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.

Universal Motors vs Rojas

A.M. RTJ 03-1814

Facts:

UMC is the exclusive assembler and distributor in the Philippines of Nissan light
commercial vehicles and spare parts. One of complainant's dealers was Nissan
Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC) covering provinces and cities in Northern
Mindanao.

NSSC ordered from complainant Nissan vehicles and spare parts worth P5,476,500.00.
NSSC issued several postdated checks in favor of complainant to pay for the purchases.
The checks, however, were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Complainant
demanded payment from NSSC but the latter repeatedly failed to comply. Hence,
complainant stopped transacting with NSSC. Complainant later appointed Nissan
Cagayan De Oro Distributors, Inc. (NICAD) to co-exist as dealer with NSSC to meet the
market demand in Northern Mindanao.

Because of NSSC's continued failure and refusal to pay its obligation, complainant
terminated BP 22 and/or estafa against the officers of NSSC.
NSSC then filed Civil Case for breach of contract against complainant and NICAD. The
case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Rojas. On March 1, 2002, respondent
judge issued an order setting a summary hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. NSSC thereafter filed an amended complaint inserted a
prayer for temporary restraining order which was not found in the original complaint.

Respondent Judge issued a TRO. Compliant filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bond for
Plaintiff and Approve/Admit Defendant's Counterbond with Prayer to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order.

The respondent judge then issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by the
plaintiff of a bond in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00). On appeal the
CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint against respondent judge for serious
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and grave abuse of
discretion. The OCA found the respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, this appeal.

Respondent Judge justified his order setting a summary hearing on the issuance of a
temporary restraining order by citing the caption of the complaint which stated that it
was for "breach of contract, damages, with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order." Respondent judge construed the same to mean that the plaintiff
therein expressly applied for a temporary restraining order

Respondent judge also stated that Sec. 2(b) of Rule 58 does not prohibit the issuance
of a temporary restraining order without bond. Besides, he later required the plaintiff to
post a bond of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) as a condition for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: 1. WON the judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered a
hearing on the issuance of a temporary restraining order although it was not
prayed for in the complaint.

2. WON the judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the
temporary restraining order without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond. 

Ruling:

1. Yes, the court was not impressed with respondent judge's argument that the
caption and the body of the complaint showed an intent to include a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was it
shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the plaintiff.

Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary

restraining order may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction
 could be heard. In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is
clear with regard to the procedure to be followed in the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order may be granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is
verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded. Here, the relief sought by NSSC in the original complaint consisted
mainly of its reinstatement as dealer of Nissan vehicles and spare parts in
Northern Mindanao, and the termination of the dealership agreement between
UMC and NICAD. NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue a
temporary restraining order to prevent any great or irreparable injury that it
might suffer while the preliminary injunction is being heard.

2. Yes, While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion to
require a bond before granting a temporary restraining order, the Rules did not
intend to give the judge the license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the
prejudice of the defendant. The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the
damages which the party or person against whom the temporary restraining
order or injunction is issued may sustain by reason thereof should the court
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Hence, it follows that
unless it appears that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the
presiding judge must require the applicant to post a bond.

Here, UMC and NICAD will suffer if the court orders them to freeze operations.
Not only will they be deprived of potential earnings from sales but they will also
have to expend for their overhead even if they are not able to do business. Any
fair judge would require the plaintiff in such case to ensure compensation to the
defendant if it is later found that the former is not entitled to the injunction. But
not respondent judge. He even rejected complainant's motion to fix the plaintiff's
bond, although complainant, as defendant, had clearly manifested its willingness
to post a counterbond.

Lago vs Abul
AMNo. RTJ-10-2255

Facts:

Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary Injunction, Easement of
Road Right of Way, and Attorney’s Fees, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), filed by Christina M. Obico (Obico) before the RTC, Gingoog City.

Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and that no notice of raffle
was ever served upon them, yet the case went directly to Branch 43, where respondent
judge is the acting presiding judge. He is also the acting executive judge of RTC, Gingoog
City. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO
"effective seventy two (72) hours from date of issue.. Complainants allege that at that time,
they were not yet in receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obico’s
affidavit and bond. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c) and (d) of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court.
On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order extending the 72-hour TRO, which had already
expired, "for another period provided that the total period should not exceed twenty days. In his
Resolution dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond by Obico. Complainants argue, however, that
said directive was violative of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court since they were not required
"to show cause, at a specific time and place, why the injunction should not be granted."

Respondent judge said that he explained in his July 14, 2009 Order that he extended the 72-hour
TRO to 20 days considering that the TRO previously granted was only for seventy-two hours, the
same can be extended for another period provided that the total period should not exceed twenty
days. With respect to the July 14, 2009 hearing for the TRO, respondent judge claims that it was
justified since he, as a mere acting presiding (and executive) judge of RTC, Gingoog City, conducts
hearings in that sala only on Tuesdays and Wednesdays because he has to travel about 144
kilometers from Butuan City, where he is actually stationed. Respondent judge asserts that the
conduct of the summary hearings on days other than Tuesdays and Wednesdays would cause
undue prejudice to the other cases already scheduled way ahead of the subject civil action.

The OCA ruled that that respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and rules of procedure.

Issue: WON the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and rules of procedure.

Ruling:

Yes, with respect to the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
it is clear that, on the matter of the issuance of an ex parte 72-hour TRO, an executive judge of a
multiple-sala court (applicable to respondent judge), or the presiding judge of a single-sala court, is
empowered to issue the same in matters of extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice
and irreparable injury to the applicant. However, it is also an unequivocal provision that, after the
issuance of the 72-hour TRO, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court is bound to comply with
Section 4(c) of the same rule with respect to the service of summons and the documents to be
served therewith.

Here, it clearly show that respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of the Civil Case since RTC,
Gingoog City, is a multiple-sala court, or to cause the notification and service of summons to
complainants after he issued the 72-hour TRO. Respondent judge’s July 7, 2009 Order was explicit
when the civil case was set for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine whether
or not the TRO issued could be extended for another period. Thus, it is manifest that respondent
judge had directly assumed jurisdiction over the civil action and all together disregarded the
mandatory requirements of Section 4(c), Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties,
and service of summons.

Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch 43, Gingoog City, the supposed extreme
urgency of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO on July 07 was belied by his setting of the required
summary hearing for the determination of the necessity of extending the 72-hour TRO to 20 days,
one week (July 14) after the issuance thereof.

Indeed, Section 5, Rule 58 is explicit that such summary hearing must be conducted within the said
72-hour period. Notwithstanding the explanation of respondent judge that he could not set the
required summary hearing except on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, it should be noted that July 7,
2009, the date of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, was a Tuesday, yet respondent judge could
have set the summary hearing on July 8, 2009, a Wednesday. He failed to do so on the mistaken
notion that he could, at any time, extend the 72-hour TRO for another period as long as the total
period did not exceed 20 days.

What is more awful is that respondent judge extended the 72-hour TRO, which had already and
obviously expired, into a full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended.
Respondent judge should have known that the TRO he issued in his capacity as an acting executive
judge was valid for only 72 hours. Beyond such time, the TRO automatically expires, unless, before
the expiration of the said period, he, supposedly in his capacity as presiding judge conducted the
required summary hearing in order to extend the TRO’s lifetime. Indubitably, a 72-hour TRO, issued
by an executive judge, is a separate and distinct TRO which can stand on its own, regardless of
whether it is eventually extended or not.

Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder when he ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction without the required hearing and without prior notice to the defendants, herein
complainants. Here, the only hearing conducted was the July 14, 2009 summary hearing for the
extension of the 72-hour.

Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of
the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the summary hearing
for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. The preliminary injunction prayed for by the applicant can only
be heard after the trial court has ordered the issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within that period of
20 days, the court shall order the party sought to be enjoined to show cause at a specified time and
place why the injunction should not be granted. During that same period, the court shall also
determine the propriety of granting the preliminary injunction and then issue the corresponding order
to that effect.

Here, respondent gravely failed to comply with rule to give complainants the opportunity to comment
or object, through a full-blown hearing, to the writ of injunction prayed for. Instead, respondent judge
railroaded the entire process by treating the summary hearing for the extension of the TRO as the
very same hearing required for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The requirement of
1av

a hearing is so fundamental that failure to comply with it not only amounts to gross ignorance of
rules and procedure, but also to an outright denial of due process to the party denied such a hearing.