Soriano vs.

Dizon
A.C. No. 6792

FACTS:
A complaint-affidavit for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon was filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), alleging that the respondent has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, violative of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

On November 29, 2001, Dizon was convicted by the RTC of Baguio City for shooting
Roberto Soriano in the neck, causing paralysis on the left part of his body and disabling
him for his job as a taxi driver. On January 18, 2002, Dizon’s application for probation
was granted by the court on several conditions, which includes his satisfaction of "the
civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano."
Dizon did not comply with the undertaking and appealed the civil liability to the CA.

Commissioner Herbosa recommended in her report that Dizon be disbarred from the
practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Herbosa
found that respondent also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character.

An IBP Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, was received by the Supreme Court for action.

ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the Dizon’s crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
(b) Whether or not his guilt warrants disbarment.

RULING:
Soriano avers in his complaint-affidavit that Dizon had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and that the latter should be disbarred taking
into account his conviction for the crime of homicide, which involves moral turpitude.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction,
a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to
be no longer possessed of good moral character. What is left is for the court to
determine whether or not the crime committed by Dizon involves moral turpitude.
In IRRI vs. NLRC, moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." In light of this, the
determination of existence of moral turpitude is left to the discretion of the courts as it
frequently depends on all circumstances surrounding each case.

The instant case however, is different from that of the IRRI case. The IBP correctly
found that the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation
of Commissioner Herbosa as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors,
taking into account Dizon’s serious transgression of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Reesponsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and
his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

The Court maintains that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to the
good moral character of lawyers. As such, conduct outside of professional dealings
reflects fitness for the office and worthiness of the privileges of the profession. The acts
of the respondent reveal a basic moral flaw, thus the court finds the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

Respondent Manuel Dizon is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.