Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA

[BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN]

RAYUAN SIVIL NO. J-01(A)-22-01/2019

ANTARA

COUNTRY GARDEN DANGA BAY SDN BHD

(NO. SYARIKAT: 1021190-K) … PERAYU

DAN

1. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH

2. HO CHEE KIAN … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN

[Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru

Dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, Malaysia

Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No.: JA-25-42-07/2018

Dalam perkara mengenai permohonan

untuk satu perintah certiorari untuk
membatalkan Award Tribunal Tuntutan
Pembeli Rumah Johor Bahru bertarikh
7.6.2018 dalam No. Tuntutan
TTPRZS/J/0001(T)/18

Dan

Dalam perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah-

kaedah Mahkamah 2012

Dan

1
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

Dalam perkara Seksyen 25 dan Jadual

Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964

Dan

Dalam perkara Akta Pemajuan

Perumahan (Kawalan dan Perlesenan)
1966 dan Peraturan-peraturan
Pemajuan Perumahan (Tribunal
Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah) 2002

Antara

Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd

(No. Syarikat: 1021190-K) ... Pemohon

Dan

1. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah

2. Ho Chee Kian ... Responden-Responden]

CORAM:

KAMARDIN HASHIM, JCA

HARMINDAR SINGH DHALIWAL, JCA
HANIPAH FARIKULLAH, JCA

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Introduction

[1] This is an appeal against the decision of the learned Judicial

Commissioner (‘the learned JC’) dated 27.12.2018 in dismissing the
appellant’s application for judicial review. The appellant’s application was

2
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal Tuntutan

Pembeli Rumah (‘the Tribunal’) made in favour of the second respondent
on 7.6.2018 (‘the impugned Award’). The Tribunal had allowed the second
respondent’s claim for damages for breach of the Sales and Purchase
Agreement entered into between the appellant and the second respondent
on 23.8.2013. Dissatisfied with the decision of the learned JC, the
appellant appealed to this Court.

[2] We heard the appeal on 11.12.2019. After due deliberation and

having carefully considered the submissions of all parties, we unanimously
found that there is no merits in the appeal. Thus, the appeal was dismissed
with costs. These are our reasons in dismissing the appeal.

Background Facts

[3] The appellant is a licensed housing developer under the Housing

Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (‘the Act’), and a developer
for a project known as Country Garden Danga Bay (‘the Project’). The
second respondent is one of the home buyer for one unit apartment of the
Project. The second respondent signed the Sale and Purchase Agreement
on 23.8.2013 (‘the original S&P’) with the appellant to purchase a unit
described as parcel Block 11-A-3402 on the 34th storey with a purchase
price of RM1,639,861.00 (‘the said unit’). The original S&P was
subsequently dated on 30.12.2012. Delivery of vacant possession of the
said unit within 36 months from the date of the original S&P, which is on or
before the 22.8.2016.

[4] However, vacant possession was only handed over on 25.9.2017.

The said unit, according to the second respondent should have a covered

3
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

balcony but when vacant possession been delivered, the balcony was not
covered. The second respondent lodged a complaint to the appellant vide
letter dated 4.12.2017. The second respondent filed a claim with the 1st
respondent. The second respondent claiming for RM50,000.00 as
compensation for the wrong unit that was given to him.

[5] The Tribunal found in favour of the second respondent and awarded
a damages in the sum of RM50,000.00, being the maximum award per
cause of action which can be handed by the Tribunal.

[6] The appellant sought the following reliefs from the High Court:

(a) that the Applicant be granted leave to apply for an order for
certiorari to quash the Johor Bahru Tribunal for Homebuyer
Claims’ Award dated 7.6.2018 in Claim No.
TTPRZS/J/0001(T)/18 (“Award”);

(b) that an order for certiorari be granted by this Honourable Court

to quash the Award;

(c) that the enforcement of the Award be stayed pending the full and
final disposal of this judicial review application before this
Honourable Court;

(d) that this Honourable Court makes a finding that the Tribunal for
Homebuyer Claims’ decision to grant the Award was tainted with
illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety;

4
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

(e) the costs of and/or occasioned by this application be cost in the

cause; and

(f) such further orders and/or other directions as may be given or

made as this Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the
circumstances.

[7] The grounds of the appellant in support of the judicial review as listed
in the Statement to Order 53 rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 are as
follows:

(a) The grounds on which the reliefs set out in paragraph 4 above
are sought by the Applicant are set out in the Affidavit of Loh Yen
Zin which is filed herein to support the Applicant’s Application for
Judicial Review. A summary of the grounds relied on by the
Applicant are set out below;

(b) The 1st Respondent had erred in law and in fact when the 1st
Respondent awarded the sum claimed by the 2nd Respondent
without stating any reasons or supporting grounds in the Award;

(c) The 1st Respondent had erred in law and in fact when the 1st
Responden failed to consider the fact that the Technical Report
concludes that the unit delivered by the Applicant to the 2nd
Respondent is in order and in compliance with the sale and
purchase agreement;

(d) The 1st Respondent had erred in law and in fact when the 1st
Respondent failed to consider the fact that there was not an iota

5
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

of evidence on the quantum of damages suffered by the 2nd

Respondent adduced before the 1st Respondent throughout the
proceedings of the Tribunal for Homebuyer Claims between the
Applicant and the 2nd Respondent (“Tribunal Proceedings”);

(e) The 1st Respondent had erred in law and in fact when the 1st
Respondent failed to consider the fact that its jurisdiction is
limited to cause(s) of action arising from the sale and purchase
agreement entered into between the Applicant and the 2nd
Respondent;

(f) The 1st Respondent had erred in law and in fact when the 1st
Respondent failed to confine the scope of the Tribunal
Proceedings within the 2nd Respondent’s Statement of Claim in
Form 1 pursuant to the Housing Development (Tribunal for
Homebuyer Claims) Regulations 2002 (‘the Regulations’);

(g) The 1st Respondent had erred in law and in fact when the 1st
Respondent failed to consider the fact that the statements made
by the 2nd Respondent in the course of the Tribunal Proceedings
are baseless allegations unsubstantiated by cogent evidence;

(h) The 1st Respondent had erred in law and in fact when the 1st
Respondent allowed the 2nd Respondent to produce a
photocopied sale and purchase agreement, the source of which
is highly suspicious, and to render the same admissible as
evidence in the Tribunal Proceedings;

6
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

(i) No reasonable President of the Tribunal for Homebuyer Claims

in similarly circumstance would have decided to allow the 2nd
Respondent’s claim against the Applicant; and

(j) At the substantive hearing of the Application for Judicial Review,

the Applicant will also rely on the grounds set out in length as
stated in the Affidavit of Loh Yen Zin filed herein.

[8] The second respondent in his Affidavit in Reply averred that he

signed the original S&P on 23.8.2013 but he received S&P which was full
of deletion, alterations and amendments sometimes in June 2014 which
was dated as 30.12.2013. The respondent further averred that he was
given a wrong unit as the unit he was given is without a covered balcony.

At the Tribunal

[9] After considering the facts and evidence, and the submissions of the
parties, the President of the Tribunal decided that the appellant was liable
to pay the second respondent the sum of RM50,000.00 as compensation.
The learned President found that there was sufficient evidence to support
the second respondent’s claim that there was unauthorised changes to the
specifications in the original S&P to which caused losses to the second
respondent for exceeds the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

[10] The learned President relied on the decision of this Court in the case
of Dr. S T Singham v. Lee Siew Leong [2007] 1 MLJ 1 where it was ruled
that in a case where unauthorised alteration of a contract made by a party
after it was signed by the other party is fatal for its validity. It was held:

7
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

“When a document or an instrument, on its production, appears to have

been altered, it is the general rule that the party offering it in evidence
must explain the alteration. Any material alteration in a written document
or instrument, whether made by a party or a stranger is fatal to its validity,
provided it was made after the document was executed and without the
privity of the party to be effected by it and with the additional proviso that
the alteration was made while the document was in the possession or in
the control or the supervision of the party seeking to enforce it. As such
the law on the material alteration of a document or deed is well settled in
that a party who has the custody of an instrument or document made for
his benefit is bound to preserve it in its original state and any material
alteration of it will vitiate the instrument, if it was done without the consent
of the other party. As that had actually taken place in this case, the
unilateral alteration in itself is sufficient to enable the landlord to treat D9
as being non-binding on him.”

At the High Court

[11] The learned Judicial Commissioner (‘the learned JC’) dismissed the
application for judicial review by the appellant with costs. The learned JC
agreed with the findings and decision of the learned President of the
Tribunal.

[12] The learned JC was of the view that the learned President of the
Tribunal was not in breach of the rules of natural justice as alleged by the
appellant. The learned JC also of the view that there was no element of
irrationality occurred in this case up till the eventual award. In the learned
JC grounds, his Lordship said, at pages 124-125 Appellant’s Core Bundle
of Documents:

“22. In effect, the Sale and Purchase Agreement produced by the said
witness of the 2nd Respondent had shown that the number of levels

8
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

of carpark had differed, where one had 7 levels and the other had 6
levels. This would validate the complaints of the 2nd Respondent that
due to an amendment of the building plans by the Applicant, the unit
that the 2nd Respondent had eventually received was one without a
covered balcony due to a reduction in the levels of carpark.

23. I do not find there to be any excess of jurisdiction, as the tribunal had
awarded RM50,000.00 which was what was sought by the 2 nd
Respondent and nothing was argued for the setting aside the Sale
and Purchase Agreement. The 2nd Respondent had renovated the
unit, and was not seeking to rescind the sale. Instead, compensation
RM50,000.00 for receiving the wrong unit had been sought, which
the 1st Respondent had seen fit to award.

24. It did not seem to be the case that the 2nd Respondent had claimed
to have spent RM50,000.00 for renovation leading to the maximum
award within the jurisdiction of the 1st Respondent of RM50,000.00
being awarded. That may have been a valid complaint to have been
made, but did not appear to be the case here.

25. I cannot detect any element of irrationality as the structure of the

claim had been consistent up till the eventual award.

26. As to the lack of natural justice, I find that procedurally, parties have
had their opportunity to make out their case and defence, where no
failure had arisen. The informal manner of production and
admissibility of documents cannot be faulted in a tribunal hearing.
No unfairness could be detected.”

[13] The learned JC relied on the case of R Rama Chandran v. Industrial

Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ145; [1997] 1 CLJ 147 where in
turn cited with approval the decision of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil

9
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

Service Unions & Ors v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 on
the principle of judicial review. The learned JC also cited the case of Ketua
Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Alcatel-Lucent Malaysia Sdn Bhd &
Anor [2017] 1 MLJ 563 and the case of Telekom Malaysia Bhd v.
Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna & Anor [2007] 1 CLJ 300 on the governing
principles of law applicable to the process of judicial review.

Our Decision

[14] Although the memorandum of appeal contains several grounds of

appeal, before us, counsel for the appellant canvassed the following two
grounds of appeal, i.e. (i) that there was a breach of the rules of natural
justice by the President of the Tribunal in handling the 2nd respondent’s
claims; and (ii) procedural unfairness.

[15] Learned counsel for the appellant, Dato’ Seri Gopal Sri Ram main
complaint was that the decision making process was flawed due to the
above two issues. On the issue of natural justice, it was submitted that
there was insufficient time for the appellant’s representative to prepare her
case given the voluminous exhibits and documents. Upon receiving all the
relevant materials, the appellant’s representative at the Tribunal’s hearing
was not given sufficient time or adequate opportunity to prepare her case.
The learned President only gave 15 minutes for her to prepare which was
not sufficient for the appellant to make informed representations.
Therefore, learned counsel argued that the appellant was not given a fair
opportunity to meet the case.

[16] On the issue of procedural unfairness, learned counsel submitted that

anything restricting or appears to restrict the other party’s ability to present

10
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

his case may be treated as procedural unfairness which warrants a judicial

review. This includes the right to access to all documents in a proceeding.
The appellant’s complaint was that the Technical Inspection Report was
not supplied to the appellant.

[17] The Federal Court in R Rama Chandran’s case held that the
decision of the interior tribunal may be reviewed on the grounds of illegality,
irrationality and possibly proportionality. In a recent Federal Court case of
Akira Sales & Service (M) Sdn Bhd v. Nadiah Lee bt. Abdullah and
another appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 513; [2018] 2 MLJ 537, the position of the
law on judicial review was extended that the court not only can review the
decisions making process but also merit of the decision. The courts are
permitted to scrutinise such decisions not only for the process but also for
the substance [see also: Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v. Zain Azahari
Zainal Abidin [1997] 2 CLJ 248 per Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was)].

[18] What constitute “illegality”, “irrationality” and “procedural impropriety”

had been explained lucidly by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service
Unions & Ors [supra] as follows:

“By ‘illegality’ as a ground for Judicial Review I mean that the decision
maker must understand directly the law that regulates his decision making
power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence
a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of a dispute, by those
persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is
exerciseable.

By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as

‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ (see Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision

11
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral

standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the
question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls
within this category is a question that judges by their training and
experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be
something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts’
exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount
Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, of
irrationality as a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing it
to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker.
‘Irrationality’ by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on
which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review.

I have described the third head as ‘procedural impropriety’ rather than

failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failing to act with
procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the
decision. This is because susceptibility to Judicial Review under this head
covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural
rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its
jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any
denial of natural justice.”

[19] In Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v. Transport

Workers’ Union [1995] 2 CLJ 748; [1995] 2 MLJ 317, Gopal Sri Ram JCA
(as he then was) on behalf of this Court decided that the Court should not
reverse an award of a tribunal unless there is proven a clear jurisdictional
error. The learned eminent judge in his eloquent judgment said this:

“In my judgment, the true principle may be stated as follows. An

inferior tribunal or other decision-making authority, whether exercising a
quasi-judicial function or purely an administrative function, has no
jurisdiction to commit an error of law. Henceforth, it is no longer of concern

12
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

whether the error of law is jurisdictional or not. If an inferior tribunal or

other public decision-taker does make such an error, then he exceeds his
jurisdiction. So too is jurisdiction exceeded, where resort is had to an
unfair procedure (see Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja
Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis [1995] 1 MLJ
308), or where the decision reached is unreasonable, in the sense that no
reasonable tribunal similarly circumstanced would have arrived at the
impugned decision.

It is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive

definition of what amounts to an error of law, for the categories of such an
error are not closed. But it may be safely said that an error of law would
be disclosed if the decision-maker asks himself the wrong question or
takes into account irrelevant considerations or omits to take into account
relevant considerations (what may be conveniently termed an Anisminic
error) or if he misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies
or misstates a principle of the general law.

Since an inferior tribunal has no jurisdiction to make an error of law,

its decisions will not be immunized from judicial review by an ouster clause
however widely drafted.”

[20] Finally, on the same issue, we are guided by the Federal Court
decision in Wong Yuen Hock v. Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn
Bhd & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 344 at page 348:

“In exercising judicial review, the High Court was obliged not to interfere
with the findings of the Industrial Court unless they were found to be
unreasonable, in the sense that no reasonable man or body of men could
reasonably come to the conclusion that it did, or that the decisions of the
Industrial Court looked at objectively, are so devoid of any plausible
justification that no reasonable person or body of persons could have

13
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

reached them (see Lord Denning’s judgment in Griffiths (Inspector of

Taxes) v. JP Harrison (Watford) Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 909 at 916, and
judgment of Lord Diplock in Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater
London Council and Anor [1983] 1 AC 768 at 821).”

[21] In the present appeal before us, the appellant wanted to quash the
decision of the Tribunal on the grounds that the rules of natural justice had
been breached and that there was procedural unfairness by the Tribunal.
In order to decide on the two issues, this Court must review the decision of
Tribunal to determine whether the decision was arrived at arbitrarily,
capriciously or mala fide or as a result of unwarranted adherence to a
principle or in order to further an ulterior or improper process, or
misconceived the nature of the discretion conferred and took into
consideration irrelevant issues or had blatantly ignored relevant ones.

[22] We had the opportunity to peruse the appeal records. It was not
disputed that after taking vacant possession, the second respondent
complained to the appellant that a wrong unit was given to him. In his letter
of 4.12.2017, the second respondent complaint:

“I have chosen level 34 in year 2013 before I signed the purchased

agreement. One level below the open balcony unit which I have
thoroughly checked and confirmed with your sales person before making
the purchase. Please refer to the attached photograph of official display
model. Upon collection of key, my unit turns out to be level 35 with an
open balcony. This unit has an open patio area that infringe my privacy
as well as design flaws as mentioned above.”

[23] On 2.1.2018 the second respondent filed a claim with the Tribunal in
Form 1 claiming for RM50,000.00. Second respondent repeated the same

14
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

complaint in the Claim Form. In his oral evidence during the trial before the
Tribunal, he repeated the same complaint. The appellant responded by
filing its defence in Form 2 on 22.1.2018, alleging amongst others that:

“Our company strictly denies the claimant’s allegation on sales

misrepresentation. It is untrue that the claimant’s unit turned out to be
level 35. At all material times the unit is still on level 34, reflected as level
42 in the SPA (with additional 7 levels of car park and 1 level of podium).
Further, the actual unit is in accordance with the plans in the Frist
Schedule of the SPA which the claimant is fully aware of.”

[24] The matter was fixed for first hearing on the 24.4.2018 but was
postponed at the request of the appellant for settlement purposes. The
matter was fixed for hearing on 15.5.2018. On that day, the second
respondent informed the Tribunal that the appellant had changed few
pages of the original S&P which was signed by the second respondent on
the 23.8.2013. The matter was then adjourned to 7.6.2018 to enable
parties to call witnesses. In his evidence, second respondent maintained
his allegation that the original S&P which he signed have significantly
changed without his knowledge and that 25 out of 26 pages have been
swapped as follows:

(i) Names of parties different. The copy I signed mentioned

Iskandar Waterfront Sdn Bhd as the Proprietor;

(ii) Original title is HSD 446608 PTB 22056. The stamped copy
has a different number;

15
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

(iii) Land size stated in the August agreement was 44,856 hectares.
In the stamped copy, the size was different, only 41,866 square
meters;

(iv) Land was not charged when I signed in August, but the
stamped copy shows land charged to Malayan Banking
Berhad;

(v) In Specifications of August copy “P6”, ceiling should have

included plaster board ceiling to tiles. In “P8”, only skim coat.
In my unit no plaster board ceiling, just bare cement. “Height
Solid Timber Door” changed to “Solid Timber Door” in “P8”;

(vi) In “P6” there were “wet kitchen” and “dry kitchen”, washer &
dryer, island kitchen, kitchen cabinet, air conditioner in dining
area, but in “P8” these items have been deleted…..

[25] Second respondent’s witness, Soh Hup Ping (SP2) produced two
sets of stamped S&P both dated 30.12.2013 one stamped as “ORIGINAL”
(P1) and the other “DUPLICATE” (P2) respectively. In P1, the
diagrammatic plan showed 8 levels consisting of 7 levels of car parks and
a podium level whilst in P2, the plan showed 6 levels of car parks and
podium level. However, the numbering of those levels remained the same.
The learned President of the Tribunal found that:

“[10]…..The Respondent had actually reduced the number of floors of

carparks, from seven to six floors without renumbering the levels. Hence
the highest floor of the carparks, which was still identified as “Level 7” is
in fact on the 6th Floor of the carparks. This was a case of actually
reducing the number of floors in Block 10A & B, 11A & B and 112A & B

16
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

(six blocks of condominiums) which share common carparks levels but

failing to re-number the levels accordingly….”

[26] After second respondent closed his case, the appellant called their
two (2) witnesses to rebut second respondent’s case. After hearing parties’
submission, the learned President delivered his decision after allowing 15
minutes for the appellant’s representative to state her case.

[27] Based on the above narrative, we disagree with the learned counsel
for the appellant contention that there was a breach of the rules of natural
justice. There were ample times given to the appellant to prepare their
case. It was also our view that no prejudice had occurred and the element
of surprise does not arise. The appellant was fully aware of the second
respondent complaint from the beginning and knowing what was the
second respondent claim against them. The claims had been dealt with by
the learned President in accordance to the normal procedure as spelt down
in the Act and the Regulations. There was no evidence of procedural
unfairness on the part of the learned President of the Tribunal. Right to be
heard was fully given and exercised by the appellant.

[28] Likewise, in our considered view, the learned JC had not committed
any appealable error when his Lordship dismissed the appellant’s
application for judicial review to quash the decision of the Tribunal. The
learned JC had fully appreciated the facts and the law applicable before
him. He had examined carefully the decision of the Tribunal not only in
relation to the process but also the substance to satisfy himself that the
decision of the Tribunal was not tainted with illegality, irrationality or
procedural impropriety.

17
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

[29] We unanimously agreed that the decision of the Tribunal was rational
and not acted in excess of its jurisdiction. We are satisfied that the decision
of the learned President of the Tribunal was not tainted with illegality,
irrationality or procedural impropriety.

[30] The Federal Court in Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd lwn.

Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah [2004] 4 CLJ 203 had laid down the
principle regarding the Tribunal proceedings that the relevant provisions of
the law should be interpreted in a liberal and purposive approach. The
provisions were loosely prescribed goes to show that Parliament’s intention
to provide a simple forum for homebuyers to file their claim.

[31] For the above stated reasons, we were of the unanimous view that
there was no merits in the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed
with costs of RM15,000.00 subject to payment of allocatur fees. Decision
of the High Court was affirmed.

Dated: 23 January 2020.

signed
(KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM)
Judge
Court of Appeal
Malaysia

18
 Rayuan Sivil No: J-01(A)-22-01/2019

Counsel

For the Appellant:

Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram

Leonard Yeoh
Chuah Chong Ping
Yasmeen Soh
Khalis Isma-Alif
Messrs. Tay & Partners

For the Second Respondent:

Viola Lettice De Cruz

Vinobha Anthony Doss
Chua Yi Xie
Messrs. VL Decruz & Co.

19