EDITORIAL
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
Claudio Colace, Ph.D.
INTRODUCTION
reams frequently show impossible
D and/or improbable aspects compared
with common life experiences, which have
been referred to as “dream bizarreness”.
Although the issue of dream bizarreness
has already been discussed by the
psychoanalytic dream theory, the first
systematic investigations on this aspect of
dreaming only began in the Sixties, when a
few authors started attempting to measure
dream bizarreness by objective indicators
(1-3).
The “activation-synthesis” model (4)
later proposed a first systematic attempt to
explain the causes of dream bizarreness
after Freud’s initial hypothesis. This model
was based on the neurobiological events of
REM sleep and opened a new perspective
to investigation. However, it automatically
invalidated the psychoanalytic approach
and therefore excluded any sort of analysis
of psychological or motivational
determinants. At the same time the
cognitive-psychological approach to
dreaming processes (5,6) was limited to
analysing dream bizarreness generation
mechanisms (i.e., “how”) rather than its
possible reasons and causes (i.e., “why?”).
Therefore, investigations on the causes of
dream bizarreness were restricted to the
neurobiological level alone.
Still according to the more recently
revised versions of the “activation-
synthesis” hypothesis, dream bizarreness
can be fully explained by the particular
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Dr. Vincenzo Natale for
critical reading and constructive comments on the earlier
version of this manuscript.
Address reprint requests to: Dr. Claudio Colace, Via Luigi
Volpicelli, 8, 00133 Roma, Italy
Phone: 3336148977
e-mail: claudio65@infinito.it
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
neurobiological conditions that are found
only in REM sleep (7-14). In addition, this
approach emphasizes the role of PGO
(ponto-geniculo-occipital) activity in
determining dream bizarreness, on which
two other neurobiological models, the
“reverse learning” theory (15) and
Seligman and Yellen’s model (16) are also
grounded.
This paper will review the literature on
dream bizarreness in order to demonstrate
that the current neurobiological approach
to dreaming, represented primarily by the
“activation-synthesis” hypothesis, is
reductive and not consistent with various
research data.
The paper, after an attempt to define
the term “dream bizarreness”, is structured
as follows: Theoretical Models (Part I),
Measuring Dream Bizarreness (Part II),
Empirical Data and Implications (Part III),
and Conclusions.
DEFINING DREAM BIZARRENESS
According to the Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary, there are two
features that define the word “bizarreness”:
1.Improbability (strikingly out of the
ordinary) and 2.Unusualness, oddness,
extravagance. Several terms have been
used in literature to describe bizarreness,
for example, “distortion from reality”,
“metamorphosis”, “implausibility”, but
many authors agree that the concept of
bizarreness includes both: a) Impossibility,
and b) Improbability and/or oddness
compared to “common daily experiences”.
The first dimension includes those
situations that are impossible from a
physical and/or logical point of view; the
second dimension implies statistical
improbability.
105
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
PART I: THEORETICAL MODELS
Psychoanalytic theory
According to psychoanalytic theory,
dream bizarreness is an expression of a
motivated effort to disguise unconscious
wishes that are unacceptable to the
conscience. The Ego and Superego
defensive mechanisms are responsible for
this effort to disguise latent dream
contents. For example, children do not
dream bizarre dreams because they have
not yet developed the superego which
enables these defensive changes of latent
dream contents (i.e. psychical censorship
functions) (17-21). In adults, bizarreness
may be present in direct relation to the
state of the individual’s superego at
particular moment in time (19). The
psychoanalytic theory even classifies
dreams according to bizarreness features.
Dreams may be as follows:
a. “Sensible, plausible and without
oddities” - these sort of dreams lack any kind
of “censorship” and dream-work activity;
b. “Sensible and consistent in itself but
odd compared to common life”;
c. “Senseless, inconsistent and bizarre”;
Types b and c show a moderate and high
degree, respectively, of “censorship” activity
(17). In Freud’s view, dream bizarreness is
not an invariant property of dreams, as
there are dreams that are typically non-
bizarre (e.g., young children’s dreams, and
adult dreams directly engendered by the
frustration of vital needs) (19,22). Bizarre
elements are psychologically meaningful,
and dreams do have a meaning.
Motivations play an important role in this
model, while other models reviewed give
little relevance to them.
Neurobiological approach
“Activation-synthesis” hypothesis
This model ascribes dream bizarreness
exclusively to the unique neurobiological
conditions of the brain during the REM
106
phase of sleep “dreaming is the cognitive
by-product of a physiological state, REM
sleep” (14, p. 202). The original theory
stated that bizarreness is the result of a
temporally random and non-cognitive
input from the brainstem (PGO spikes)
and that dreams are merely the product of
“the best of a poor job” that the forebrain
makes to give sense to this random
bombardment (forebrain synthesis) (4).
Later on, it was suggested that the
aminergic demodulation found in REM
sleep (or the lack of the inhibiting
influence of norepinephrine and
serotonin) causes defects in cognitive
functioning (e.g. attention, memory, etc.)
during forebrain synthesis, which
contributes to dream bizarreness (7,14,23-
24). More recently, Hobson and others
proposed an updated version of the
“activation-synthesis” hypothesis,
incorporated in a general brain/mind
model called AIM (9-10,12-13). According
to the AIM model, sleep and waking
thought vary in function of three
parameters: Activation level (A), Input
sources (I) and information-processing
Mode (M) (i.e., the aminergic to
cholinergic neuromodulation rate). REM
sleep is hypo-aminergic (compared to
waking state) and hypercholinergic. As in
the previous version, this model claims
that dream bizarreness is due to an
alteration of cognitive functioning caused
by the shift from a high level of aminergic
neuromodulation during waking state to a
low level of same during REM sleep.
In Hobson’s view, dream bizarreness is
a constant formal property of all dreams.
Bizarreness in itself has no particular
psychological significance. It is
motivationally neutral and its
interpretation is gratuitous and probably
hasty. Dream is inherently meaningless–a
state of the mind similar to delirium or
insanity (7,12,14,25-27).
“Reverse learning” theory
According to the “reverse learning”
theory, dreaming and bizarreness are
merely the result of the effort to erase from
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

memory redundant associations or
“parasitic” thoughts (i.e., information
causing an overload in the memory
system) during REM sleep. In other words,
we dream to forget, or to reduce fantasies
in the waking state. Random PGO spikes
impinge on the neocortex, resulting in the
erasure, or “unlearning”, of false
information. As in Hobson and McCarley’s
theory, in this model too random
subcortical PGO activity plays an
important role for bizarreness. Dream is
inherently meaningless (15,28).
Seligman and Yellen’s theory
This model is based on “activation-
synthesis” hypothesis and on previous
studies that had found a relationship
between tonic/phasic activities in REM
sleep and some aspects of dream mentation
(29-31). Seligman and Yellen (16)
suggested that dreaming consists of three
elements: (i) periodic, unrelated visual
episodes (REM burst), (ii) emotional
episodes, and (iii) the cognitive synthesis of
both of the episodes above during REM
quiescence. The bizarreness and
discontinuity found in REM dreams are due
to the “visual burst” (discharges of eye
movements) that supposedly cause
intrusions of inconsistent and
discontinuous images in the dream plot.
The authors suggest that there are two
separate forms of visual information/ dream
imagery. The first, generated by bursts, is
more vivid and disjointed from the
underlying plot while the second, generated
by cognitive synthesis, is less bizarre. As in
Hobson and McCarley’s model, Seligman
and Yellen attributed bizarreness to random
PGO activity (PGO spikes are commonly
associated with visual bursts) and therefore
to the difficulty in finding a sense in visual
bursts. However, the authors argued that
their model also accounts for the banality
and realism of certain dreams (32). In other
words, while bizarre dreams are due to
visual burst activity, realistic dreams are due
to a successful cognitive integration.
Furthermore, individual differences in
individual cognitive styles could explain the
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
differences in the frequency of
bizarre/realistic dreams.
Cognitive approach
The cognitive approach assumes that
dreaming is probably distributed along all
sleep stages (particularly–but not limited
to–the REM and 2-NREM stage) and that
there is a common generative system for
dreaming and waking fantasies. This
approach is principally interested in
studying dream production processes.
Foulkes’s cognitive model
Foulkes (5-6) indicates three
components in dream production: the
input, i.e. the activation of memory units,
their processing, known as “planner”, and
the output, i.e. conscious organisation.
The dream is an attempt to give a plausible
sense to input information. In Foulkes's
view this attempt is generally successful.
However this dream production
mechanism may be disturbed by the
presence of memory units with a higher
and more impinging level of activation
which the planner cannot exclude from
processing. This event translates into the
presence of thematic changes (i.e.,
discontinuity) and bizarre elements.
Therefore bizarreness is considered an
exception rather than the rule. Indeed
Foulkes, based on the results of previous
studies, suggests that the content of
representatively sampled dreams (REM
dreams) of both adults and children are
generally realistic and ordinary, rather than
fantastic and bizarre (32-35).
Antrobus’s General Cortical Activation/
Thresholds (GCAT) model
According to Antrobus and colleagues,
bizarre mentation is the product of two
factors: cortical/cognitive activation and
the level of environmental stimulation (or
auditory thresholds) (36-41, Klinger’s
study as cited in 39,42). Reinsel et al. (39)
found that bizarreness is maximal in
conditions of high to moderate
107
108
Table 1. Current models for dream bizarreness: Questions about dream bizarreness

Psychological Neurobiological Approach Cognitive Approach

Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered

Psychonalytic Activation- Reverse - Seligman and Foulkes’s Antrobus’s Hunt’s

Questions about dream bizarreness synthesis learning Yellen’s theory cognitive (GCAT) model phenomenological
hypothesis theory model perspective

Bizarreness is an invariant property no yes yes no no no no

of dreams

Bizarreness is exclusive to dream mentation no yes yes yes no no no

A generative system of dreaming and waking yes no / no yes yes yes

imagery, including bizarreness, is common

Bizarreness is present even when PGO / no no no / yes /

activity is notably reduced

Bizarreness is explained exclusively by / yes yes yes no no no

neurobiological events of REM sleep

Bizarreness has a psychological meaning yes no no no no no yes

Influences of motivations on dream yes no no no no no yes

bizarreness production

Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003


cortical/cognitive activation when
external stimulation is minimal (i.e., REM
sleep and relaxed waking). REM dreams
are not specifically more bizarre than any
other form of thought when the
environmental conditions and the length
of the dream report (i.e., rate of cognitive
activation) are under control. For
instance, the authors noticed that NREM
dreams happen to be more bizarre in
individuals with high activation levels
during NREM sleep (42). In addition,
Reinsel et al. show that bizarreness has
many dimensions that can differentiate
the quality of bizarre mentation across
sleep and waking conditions. Thus, the
types of bizarreness depend on the
variations of the two parameters above:
waking mentation bizarreness (i.e.,
discontinuity) is due to external stimuli
disrupting ongoing mentation (in Reinsel
et al.’s study (39) relaxed waking was
interrupted at varying intervals); while
bizarreness in REM dreams is associated
with the more genuinely “strange” nature
of the images (i.e., improbable or
impossible identities). Improbable
combinations (bizarre elements
regardless of context) increase and are
equally prevailing in relaxed waking
(without stimuli) and in dreams.
Phenomenological perspective
Hunt (43-44) elaborated a memory system” or “cognitive deficits” etc.
“phenomenological classification-ratings
system for formal anomalies in the
dreaming experience” (see Table 2) and
analyzed different samples of dream
reports. In particular, laboratory dreams,
home dreams, the “most fantastic” and the
“most realistic” of home dreams, and
dreams collected by Freud and Jung. In
Hunt’s view, “normative dreams” (i.e.,
laboratory and home dreams), albeit largely
realistic in content and plot (in the sense
that they reproduce typical waking
situations and capacities), may show
aspects of bizarreness that can be
assimilated to a mild clinical delirium,
namely: visual intrusion (e.g., visual
transformations of form and setting) and
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
cognitive confusion (e.g., deficiencies in
memory and reasoning). Vice versa,
dreams of Freud’s and Jung’s collections
were characteristically bizarre. This
approach does not consider bizarreness an
invariant property of dreaming. Bizarreness
is of great importance as an evidence of
creative symbolic imagination (visual-
spatial processes) and has a metaphorical
significance. In Hunt's view, dream
bizarreness should be interpreted from
several different levels of analysis and not
from a merely physiological standpoint.
PART II: MEASUREMENTS
At the beginning of the 1960s a few
authors attempted to measure the
frequency of bizarre elements in dream
contents by means of objective indicators.
Retrospectively, we can see now that the
terminology used by these scales of
contents was influenced by the then
prevailing theories. The measurement
created in the 60’s and 70’s used terms like
“distortion”, “metamorphosis”, “primary
process thinking”, reflecting psychoanalytic
concepts (e.g., “censorship”, “dream-work”,
etc.). On the other hand, after the
development of neurobiological and
cognitive approaches, terms such as
“discontinuities”, or “improbable
combinations”, was clearly influenced by
concepts like “random activity in the
The various scales of bizarreness may
be categorized as follows:
• general scales: these provide a
qualitative ranking of general classes of
bizarreness (e.g., discontinuity,
incongruity, etc.) (see Table 2);
• analytical scales: these provide a
qualitative ranking of more specific
kinds of bizarreness previously defined
by the author (e.g., “changes in sex and
identity”, “monsters”, etc.) (see Table 3);
• global scales: these rank dreams using
ordinal scales (e.g., various types of
bizarreness are considered together
without distinction in order to assign a
109
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered

Table 2. Bizarreness - “General” content scales

Scale Name Authors Brief Description

Scoring Reactive Rychlak & Brams (1963) (3) This scale scores the unusual content compared to
Content common expectation. Five categories: location,
actors, action, mood terms, implements.

Salience Cohen ’s study (as quoted in
Winget & Kramer, 1979) (45)
Salience is defined by 8 scales. Bizarreness is one of
these. Dreamer scores bizarreness as follows: settings
(objects, space) and events (behavior, experiences)
may be, 0-realistic likely, 1-unlikely, unexpected, but
possible, 2-impossible, ridiculous.

Discontinuities. Reinsel et al. (1992) (39) Discontinuities: when a part of mentation is

Improbable inconsistent with other parts according to common
combinations. daily experiences; Improbable combinations (e.g.
Improbable winged men); Improbable identities (e.g.
identities impossible or changing identities).

Classification- Hunt (1982) (43) Dimensions/changes: a. Competence functions,

ratingsystem b. performance (e.g. reasoning,memory attention),
of formal c. State of consciousness, d. Interpersonal relation
anomalies and personality identity. These dimensions are
divided into three stages: 1. Hypersensitivity to
“ordinary” subjective aspects of experience. 2.
Changes in awareness (e.g. derealization). 3. Specific
anomalies in each dimension.

Dream Hobson et al. (1987) (27) Two-stage scoring system. Stage 1 identifies
bizarreness Hobson (1988) (7) items as bizarre if they are physically impossible
or improbable (e.g. plot, characters, thoughts of
dreamer, etc.); Stage 2 characterizes items as
showing discontinuity, inconsistency or uncertainty.

Bizarre contents Cipolli, Bolzani, Cornoldi, De
Beni, and Fagioli (1993) (46)
Bizarreness is defined according to the following
criteria: a. physical impossibility, b. physical
implausibility c. behavioral implausibility, d. functional
implausibility and e. incongruity of dialogue, thought
and feeling with respect to the situation.

Continuity and Sutton, Rittenhouse, Pace- This scale attempts to measure continuity and
discontinuity Schott, Stickgold, and Hobson discontinuity in visual attention using the graphs
(1994) (47) theory. The sequence and developments of narrative
reports are presented in hierarchy graphs. Discontinuities
in temporal order are quantified by imposing a
weighted value to each transition within the graph.

Discontinuities Rittenhouse, Stickgold, and
Hobson (1994) (48)
This scale analyzes the "mode" of discontinuities
in settings, character and object. For example,
we can observe the "Insertion" (sudden appearance)
or "Removal" (sudden disappearance) of an
object and character or "Shift" (initial) or
"Return" (subsequent) in setting and plot.

Content Revonsuo & Salmivalli Dreams are classified into a two-stage scoring:
Bizarreness (1995) (49) 1. Element identification (14 categories, e.g. self,
Scoring actions, emotions) and 2. Content bizarreness
scoring: A. Non-bizarre element (consistent with
waking reality), B. Incongruous element (e.g.
impossible in waking reality), C. Vague element,
D. Discontinuous element.

Bizarreness Colace & Natale (1997) (50) This scoring scale classifies bizarreness as follows: 1)
Bizarre Elements (4 types), a. Improbable or
impossible characters, b. metamorphoses, c.
improbable or impossible actions/inappropriate roles
d. improbable or impossible objects; 2) Script
bizarreness (4 types): a. improbable or impossible
(physical) plot, b. improbable or impossible (logical)
plot, c. plot discontinuity, d. improbable or
impossible settings.

Bizarreness Bosinelli (1999) (51) Bizarreness is classified as: a. improbability, b. oddity

or a+b. c. physical impossibility, d. logical impossibility
or c+d.

110 Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003


Table 3. Bizarreness - “Analytical” content scales
Scale Name Authors
Bizarre Elements Domhoff & Kamiya (1964) (1)
Distortion from reality Sutcliffe, Perry, & Sheehan,
(1970) (52)
Setting and Hall & Van de Castle (1966)
characters distortion (53)
Dream Bizarreness McCarley & Hoffman
(1981) (54)
global score) (see Table 4);
These three types of scales measure the
quantity of dream bizarreness in different
ways: while general and analytical scales
score the frequency of bizarreness of
dream reports in single units or elements
(e.g., action or setting), global scales
frequently score dream bizarreness by
considering the dream as a whole.
A common problem associated with
many measurements is that some bizarre
elements may be estimated differently
without the help of the dreamer’s own
judgments (e.g., improbability and
implausibility in the light of their own
personal waking reality) (49, 60). For
example, Zepelin (60) compared the
dreamer’s and the judge’s bizarreness
ratings and concluded that the lack of
knowledge about the dreamer’s waking
experiences may lead the judge to
exaggerate his/her rating of bizarreness.
Future research should specify whether
the bizarreness scale adopted includes the
dreamer’s contribution or not1.
1
For the definitions and scales of bizarreness see also Hobson et al. (27) and, Bonato, Moffitt, Hoffmann, Cuddy & Wimmer (61).
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
Brief Description
This scale identifies 3 general classes of
bizarre elements: metamorphoses (4
categories), unusual acts (2 categories),
magical occurrences (4 categories).
This scale scores atypical aspects with
respect to the common experience
occurring in real world. Samples of
distortion considered are: changes in sex
and identity, false belief, implausible
behavior of an agent, alteration of typical
appearances or dimension of an agent, etc.
Metamorphoses of characters: changes in
sex, identity, or age. Changes from human
into animal or vice-versa. Setting
distortion: familiar settings indicated by
the dreamer have an element of peculiarity
or incongruity insofar as they differ from
the way the dreamer knows the setting to
be in his waking life.
Dream bizarreness is divided into
three major groups: a. animate characters,
6 kinds (e.g. monsters, alien beings),
b. inanimate environment, 3 kinds (e.g.
violation of physical laws), c. dream
transformations, 4 kinds (e.g. scene shift).
PART III: EMPIRICAL DATA AND
IMPLICATIONS
A. Frequencies
Bizarreness in REM dreams
Several studies have attempted to report
the frequency of bizarre REM dreams;
however, due to the different scales used,
the conclusions reached were conflicting.
Most of these studies agree in that
bizarre dreams are very frequent, about
74% of REM dream reports (46,50,54,
60,62-67) (see Table 5 and 6).
Less frequently, certain authors have
suggested that there are notably lower
percentages of bizarre REM dreams;
however, they generally used a different
definition of bizarreness (see Table 5) (32-
33). For example, in Snyder's study, an
element being "extremely unlikely from
the standpoint of waking reality" and yet
conceivable is not evaluated as bizarre
(p.146). Dorus et al. (33), who found little
bizarreness in REM dreaming, used a
content scale substantially different from
111
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
Table 4. Bizarreness - “Global” content scales
Scale Name Authors
Distortion Foulkes & Rechtschaffen’s
study (as quoted in Winget
& Kramer, 1979) (45)
Dream ratings Gooudenough, Lewis, Shapiro,
(bizarreness) and Sleser’s study (as cited in
Winget & Kramer 1979) (45)
Regressive dream Vogel, Foulkes, & Trosman’s
content study (as quoted in Winget
& Kramer, 1979) (45)
Child rating scales Foulkes, Pivik, Steadman,
/ distortion Spear, & Symonds (1967)
(55)
Scoring dream Koulack’s study (as quoted in
dimensions Winget & Kramer, 1979) (45)
Vivid fantasy Weisz and Foulkes (1970) (56)
Primary process Auld, Goldenberg, & Weiss
thinking (1968) (57)
Classification of Dorus, Dorus, &
novelty in Rechtschaffen (1971) (33)
dreams
Chicago sleep Rechtschaffen, Watson,
mentation scales Wincor, and Molinari’s study
(as quoted in Winget &
Kramer, 1979) (45)
Implausibility Breger, Hunter, &
Lane’s study (as quoted in
Winget & Kramer, 1979) (45)
Dream distortion Zepelin’s study (as quoted
in Winget & Kramer,
1979) (45)
Distortion/ Colace, Violani & Solano
Bizarreness (1993) (58)
Colace & Tuci (1996) (59)
112
Brief Description
Distortion is measured as follows: 1 extremely
distorted , 2 quite distorted, 3 fairly distorted,
4 somewhat distorted, 5 slightly distorted, 6 not
distorted at all.
A three-point scale of bizarreness/ rationality:
1= “most bizarre” (e.g. strange objects or events),
1/ = unusual elements or confused combinations of
2
ordinary elements, 0 = dreams with ordinary elements.
This scale classifies dreams as follows:Nonregressive
content dreams = plausible, realistic, consistent and
undistorted dreams. Regressive content dreams =
1 or more bizarre categories such as, bizarre
sequence of images, inappropriate or distorted
images, magical omnipotent thinking, etc.
Dreams are classified into four levels: level 0 – no
distortion (realistic recreation or anticipation of
upcoming event), 1- no distortion (plausible and
very probable event), 2- slight distortion (plausible
but not probable), 3- considerable distortion
(content is neither plausible nor probable but
contains certain elements of reality) 4- major
elements are neither plausible nor probable.
Dream bizarreness: this scale refers to the extent of
“unreality”. 1. Dream which is entirely true to life.
2. Dream containing both real and unreal
elements. 3. Dream which is totally unreal.
This scale measures the feeling of unreality (i.e.,
imagination and distortion) coupled with intensity
of experience (dramatization) (A 5 - point scale).
Starting from the psychoanalytic concept of
primary process, the authors focus on evaluating
the “mode of thinking”. A 7- point scale: 1) logical
vs. 7) bizarre and illogical thought.
This scale measures the novelty of elements (e.g.
setting, objects etc.) with respect to the experience of
each dreamer. 1. the dream element is an exact
replication of something previously experienced vs.
6. the dream element was not previously experienced
and it is extremely unlikely that such an element
could occur in the dreamer’s experience
The experimenter asks: How unfamiliar, strange, or
distorted was the very last experience in terms
of your waking experience? 1. almost exactly like
my waking experience vs 6. new and unfamiliar
and very unlikely to occur in my waking life.
This scale classifies dreams as follows: 1- quite
plausible (something that could well happen to
the dreamer) vs. 5-bizarre (something that is so
extremely unreal or fantastic that would be
unusual even in a dream report).
This scale measures the strangeness of dream
contents compared to waking experience. Level 0 =
the event of dream closely resembles recent waking
experience vs level 5 = major aspects of the dream
are impossible (i.e. combination of illogical or
improbable elements).
The authors attempt to formalize the original
classification of dream bizarreness in Freud’s view.
Dreams are classified as follows: 1 = “sensible,
plausible and without strange elements”, 2 =
“sensible, consistent in themselves but odd
compared to common life”, 3 = “senseless,
inconsistent and bizarre”.
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

Table 5. Percentages of bizarre dreams in REM sleep
Studies
McCarley & Hoffman (1981) (54)
Zepelin (1989) (60)
Zito, Cicogna & Cavallero
(1992) (67)
Cicogna, Cavallero &
Bosinelli (1991) (63)
Cavallero et al. (1992) (62)
Cipolli et al. (1993) (46)
Colace & Natale (1997) (50)
Cicogna et al (1998) (64)
Cicogna et al (2000) (65)
Natale & Esposito (2001) (66)
Snyder (1970) (32)
Dorus et al. (1971) (33)
1
See table 3 for detail
2
So, St 2, REM.
3
Average score REM 1, 2, 3, 4, cicle
4
L = Low, M = medium and H = high bizarreness
5
See table 4 for detail
more common bizarreness scales (see
Tables 2-4).
From a theoretical point of view, these
data are not consistent with the hypothesis
that REM dreams are generally realistic
compared to dreams derived from a
psychoanalytic setting or from a home
setting (70). Actually, as stated above, REM
dreaming often reveals bizarre features. On
the other hand, it may be observed that
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
No of Bizarre
Dreams REM Dreams Measurement
104 67 % reports containing at least one
element of bizarreness (e.g. monsters,
scene shift)1
322 91 % reports containing at least a number of
elements not true to life (scores:
“perfectly true to life” vs. “not at all
true” (ratings 1-6)
183 63 % reports containing at least one bizarre
element (physical and/or logical
impossibility, or improbability
(according to dreamer’s experience)
27 67 % reports were scored as “plausible”
or “implausible” according to waking
standards.
50 66% reports were scored as “plausible” or
“implausible” according to waking
standards.
110 79 % reports containing bizarre elements
(e.g. physical impossibility, behavioral
implausibility, etc.)
50 82 % reports containing at least one bizarre
feature (e.g. improbable or impossible
characters, actions, roles, etc.)
1442 84 % reports were scored as “plausible” or
“implausible”
20 75 % reports containing one or more
impossible or improbable elements
according to the subject’s waking
experience
342 70 %3 reports containing one or more
impossible or improbable elements
according to the subject’s waking
experience
635 L: 20-35% very improbable elements with respect
M: 5-15% to waking reality but yet conceivable
H: 2-7%4 are not necessarily evaluated as bizarre
119 16 % dreams with elements that are a
replication of something previously
experienced, but with major changes
from the original (level 3 of 6)5
dream bizarreness is not an invariant
formal property of all dreams. About 25%
of REM dreams among adults are not at all
bizarre. In addition, non-bizarre dreams
occur very frequently in young children
(see below). The non-invariant nature of
bizarreness in REM dreams cannot be
easily explained through approaches that
regard bizarreness as intrinsic to the
neurobiology of REM sleep (7,15).
113
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
Table 6. Percentages of bizarre dreams across sleep stages
Sleep Stages Bizarre Dreams / Range
Sleep onset min 33% - 43% max
NREM, stage 2 47% - 79 %
NREM, stages 3-4 and 4 48% - 54%
REM 63% - 91%
Comparing bizarreness in REM and
NREM dreams
Empirical evidence suggests that the
original “REM sleep=dreaming” hypothesis
and the rigid REM/NREM dichotomy
needs to be completely revised. In
particular, researchers have found that2:
• REM sleep, in itself is not a sufficient
condition for dreaming. Foulkes has
demonstrated that in children aged 3 to 5
REM dreaming is relatively absent; i.e. the
presence of REM sleep is not a guarantee
of concomitant dream activity (34-35,73);
• REM sleep is not a necessary condition
for dream production. Several studies
have shown that dreams can occur
during all the sleep stages
(6,62,63,67,70,74-83). In particular,
the work of the research group of the
Sleep and Dream Laboratory of the
Bologna University Department of
Psychology has shown that dream-like
mental activity is present also in slow
wave sleep (SWS) (from a physiological
point of view this sleep phase differs
greatly from the REM phase)
(65,66,69,72,84). These studies
2
On the REM//NREM current debate see Nielsen (71) and Cavallero (72)
114
Average STUDIES
38 % Cicogna, Cavallero & Bosinelli (1991) (63);
Cicogna et al (1998) (64); Zito, Cicogna &
Cavallero (1992) (67); Cicogna et al.
(1996) (68).
61 % Cicogna, Cavallero & Bosinelli (1991) (63);
Cicogna et al (1998) (64); Natale &
Esposito (2001) (66); M.Bosinelli (personal
communication).
51 % Cavallero et al. (1992) (62); Cicogna et al.
(2000) (65); Colace & Natale (1997) (50);
M. Bosinelli (personal communication);
Natale (2000) (69).
74 % Cipolli et al. (1993) (46); Colace & Natale
(1997) (50); McCarley & Hoffman, (1981)
(54); Zepelin, (1989) (60); Zito et al. (1992)
(67); Cicogna, Cavallero & Bosinelli (1991)
(63); Cavallero et al. (1992) (62); Cicogna
et al (1998) (64); Cicogna et al. (2000)
(65); Natale & Esposito (2001) (66).
support the hypothesis that the
underlying cognitive processes of dream
production mechanisms could be the
same through all sleep stages. However
this dream-generation system may be
associated to the quantity of mnestic
activation that is different between REM
and NREM sleep (i.e., different levels of
system engagement) (85);
• In agreement with the above,
Solms’neuropsychological studies
suggest that REM sleep and dreaming
are dissociable states, controlled by
different brain mechanisms (86-88).
Thus, dreaming is preserved even when
a major damage to pontine brainstem
eliminate REM sleep. Therefore, dream
mentation can occur without REM
sleep. Furthermore, forebrain damage
(dopamine circuit) would stop
dreaming but would not affect REM
sleep. Consequently, dreaming can be
initiated by the forebrain mechanisms
regardless of REM state.
These results open the field to
investigations on bizarreness in NREM
dreaming as well. As a further analysis of
dream bizarreness the following two
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

questions should be answered to:
1. Is bizarreness an exclusive feature of
REM dreaming?
2. Are REM dreams characteristically
(qualitatively and quantitatively)
more bizarre than NREM dreams?
The data found in literature demonstrate
that bizarreness is not exclusive to REM
dreaming, as bizarre dreams are frequently
present in NREM sleep. In particular, the
percentage of bizarre dreams is about 38%
in sleep onset, about 61% in NREM stage 2,
and about 51% in stages 3 and 4 (SWS) (see
Table 6). These results suggests that bizarre
mentation is not state-specific of REM sleep,
and its distinctive neurobiological events
(PGO activity and aminergic demodulation),
are not a necessary condition for bizarre
dreaming.
It could be hypothesized that there are
other causes of bizarreness, different from
the ones assumed in REM sleep. Thus, the
models that base their explanation of
bizarreness on REM neurobiological events
do not account exhaustively for the
explanation of dream bizarreness in other
phases of sleep.
The followings studies have compared
directly the frequency of bizarre dreams in
REM and NREM sleep and might
contribute to providing an answer to the
second question.
REM vs. sleep onset. Several studies
underlined the low frequency of bizarre
dreams in sleep onset stage compared to REM
sleep (63,64,67,76,82,89-91). A few authors
have suggested that the contents of mentation
at sleep onset are still strongly related to the
waking state, which supposedly limits the
presence of bizarreness (66,78).
REM vs. NREM, Stage 2. The studies
that have compared dream reports for
bizarreness in REM and NREM stage 2 are
controversial, and certain methodological
aspects should be viewed in deeper detail
before interpreting their results.
• Measurements. The differences found
between REM and NREM Stage 2
dreams depend much on the
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
measurement used for bizarreness. For
example, by applying “global” (ordinal)
bizarreness scales the REM dreams
observed are more bizarre than NREM
dreams, while “general” (qualitative)
scales applied to the same dream reports
do not lead to the same results (39,92).
• Correlation between length and
bizarreness of dream reports. The well-
known correlation between the length
of dream reports and their bizarreness
(36,54,57,93) may make the
differences between REM and NREM
dreams bizarreness scores less clear
(REM dreams are frequently longer).
Thus, the difference between REM and
NREM stage 2 dream reports vary
according to whether dream length is
controlled or not (39).
In general, authors suggesting that
REM–NREM mentation differ only in
quantitative terms but not qualitatively (i.e.,
the mechanisms of dream production are the
same across sleep stages) usually compare
REM and NREM dreams after dream report
length is controlled and find no difference
(39,66,69). These authors suggest that the
heightened frequency of bizarreness in REM
dreams is the result of the increased cortical
activation (memory systems included) found
in REM sleep (36,81). In other words, they
suppose that REM dreams are longer and
more bizarre because the underlying
cognitive processes operate on higher levels
of engagement than in NREM stage 2 sleep
conditions.
On the other hand, authors claiming
that the correlation between bizarreness
and length does not justify the differences
between in REM and NREM dream
bizarreness, (wrongly assumed only in
quantitative terms), maintain that the
difference remains even when length is
controlled, hence REM dreams are always
more bizarre than NREM, stage 2,
(12,92,94). These authors have
interpreted these results in support of the
activation-synthesis model.
The studies that analyzed REM vs.
NREM stage 2 differences in dream
115
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
bizarreness are still numerically insufficient
in order to draw any sort of general
conclusions. The evidence that emerges
from previous studies is insufficient to
conclude that REM dreams are more
bizarreness than NREM stage 2 dreams.
REM vs. NREM, stages 3 and 4. Very few
studies have compared REM and Stage 3
and 4 sleep mentation for bizarreness scores.
Cavallero et al. (62) used a measurement of
Plausibility/Implausibility and found no
significant differences in the frequency of
“plausible” dreams between REM and SWS
sleep (slow wave sleep). Colace and Natale
(50) compared REM and SWS sleep
mentation (Dreams Data Bank, Bologna
University, Department of Psychology, 95)
and found that REM dream reports were
significantly more bizarre than SWS dream
reports for “script bizarreness”, but no
significant differences were found when
looking at “bizarre elements” (see Table 2 for
detail). It is interesting to note that when
dream length was controlled, all REM/SWS
differences disappeared. Recently, Cicogna
et al. (65) found no significant differences in
“implausibility” (one or more impossible or
improbable elements) between REM and
SWS mentation.
Although the comparison between
REM and Stage 3-4 sleep mentation
should be examined more closely, the data
available seem to point to the conclusion
that there are not significant differences in
bizarreness between these two stages.
In conclusion, previous researches have
found no clear differences in bizarreness
between REM and NREM dreaming (with
the exception of sleep onset dreaming).
There is not enough evidence to support
the hypothesis that REM dreaming is
typically more bizarre than NREM
dreaming. The methodological issues of
the uniformity of the measures used, and
of whether it is appropriate or not to
correct report length are still open in
comparative analyses between REM and
NREM dreaming (96).
Bizarreness: dreams vs. waking mentation
The studies on bizarreness in relaxed
116
wakeful mentation may contribute to clarify
whether bizarreness is exclusive to
dreaming or not, and whether REM dreams
are typically more bizarre than waking
mentation (i.e. relaxed wakefulness,
"simulated dreams," daydreaming).
The findings in literature reveal that
bizarreness is also undoubtedly present in
relaxed wakeful mentation (97-99).
Furthermore, other studies have found
that relaxed wakeful mentation and
"simulated dreams” are equally–or perhaps
even more–bizarre than REM dream
reports (39,100). For example, Reinsel et
al. (39) compared REM dreams, NREM
stage 2 dreams, and relaxed wakeful
mentation (subjects were reclining in a
darkened room) and found that there is a
greater quantity of bizarreness in waking
thoughts. The authors suggested that these
results were consistent with the GCAT
model, according to which the higher
cortical activation level during waking
state (compared to REM and NREM sleep)
might increase bizarre contents.
The studies based on “home dreaming”
led to controversial results. Williams et al.
(99) compared “home dreaming” reports
to waking fantasies and showed that home
dreams were significantly more bizarre.
The authors claimed that their results were
consistent with the “activation synthesis”
hypothesis. Subsequently, Strauch &
Lederborgen (101) obtained comparable
results. On the other hand, Carswell and
Webb (102) compared home dreams and
“artificial dream reports” (i.e., subject-
developed summaries of a random
succession of photographs) and found no
difference in the rates of “implausibility”
and bizarreness used (“unusual acts” and
“magical occurrence”). The only category
found to be more frequent in home
dreams was the “metamorphosis”.
Since studies have revealed that there
were at least no significant differences
between REM dream reports and waking
mentation, the great quantity of bizarreness
found in home dreams by certain authors
could be due to the effects of a better recall of
bizarre elements after a longer time span since
dream generation (46). It is clear, from the
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

studies reviewed, that there is no distinctive
physiological property of REM sleep that can
explain bizarreness alone, because
bizarreness also occur in waking mentation
and because REM dreams do not seem to be
characteristically more bizarre than waking
fantasies. Vice versa, these results are more
consistent with those models that assume
qualitatively common processes during
dreams and waking fantasies.
B. Neurophysiological and
neurobiological factors
Phasic events
Several authors have focused on the
phasic events of REM and NREM sleep and
on the parallel presence of bizarre
elements in dream contents (103-105).
Bizarreness seems to be related to REMs
(Rapid eye movements) (106), with PIPs
(Periorbital Integrated Potentials, the
equivalent of PGO in humans) in REM and
NREM sleep (107-109) and with MEMA
(middle-ear muscle activity) in REM and
NREM sleep (110). However these data
were not always confirmed (111).
While there is no evidence supporting
that PGO spikes are a necessary cause of
bizarreness (see below) the possibility
remains that, phasic neural events
(intrusion), in general and not only at
PGO level, during REM and NREM sleep
may provide one source (i.e., correlate) of
bizarre mentation.
PGO activity
The hypothesis that dream bizarreness
may be attributed to the nature of pontine
PGO activity suggests that dream
bizarreness imagery might be due to: a)
non-cognitive (subcortical) and random
nature of eye movements and their
associated PGO spikes, and b) from the
fact that dreaming and dream bizarreness
could consist of associations and memory
units elicited from the forebrain in
response to random inputs from the
brainstem (PGO) (i.e., random processing
in memory system). Unfortunately, several
3
On this topic see also Mancia (117)
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
data do not support this hypothesis:
• bizarreness is also present in NREM
dreams where PGO activity is notably
reduced (39);
• there are insufficient data to support the
concept of random and non-cognitive
nature of pontine brainstem activation.
In fact the beginning of eye movement
(EM), its associated PGO activity, and the
resulting dream imagery might not be
totally independent from the prior
cortical/cognitive activity. In other words,
the cortex may have an important role in
initiating and creating the visual imagery
of dreaming. (38,112-116)3;
• Solms (88) suggested that dream imagery
is not generated by the brainstem’s chaotic
activation of the forebrain–on the
contrary, it is apparently built through
complex cognitive processes;
• various studies have shown that dreams
are meaningful rather than random
events. In particular, dream contents
are affected by gender, age, social status
and psychopatology (118-119,45).
• the data from studies on memory
consolidation during REM sleep clash
with the hypothesis of random
processing in memory system. Pavlides
and Winson (120-121) in an single-
unit experiment with rats found that
hippocampal neurons (CA1 “place
cell”), that had fired preferably in their
place fields during waking state, in
order to encode spatial information and
committing it to memory, fired
preferably in subsequent sleep states
(REM/SWS). This result was replicated
in another study with three rats (122).
Similarly, Skaggs and McNaughton
(123) found that the pattern of rat
hippocampal pyramidal cells during
sleep reflects the order in which the
cells fired during earlier spatial
exploration in a waking state. These
data imply the existence of a sort of
orderly processing of the memory
117
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
rather than a random activity during
sleep. In particular, Winson suggest
that in REM sleep types of memory that
are important for survival information
during waking state are selectively and
preferentially reprocessed (122,124).
This group of data is not consistent
with the models according to which PGO
random activation and its supposed
consequences in the memory system are
the cause of bizarreness. Specifically, these
studies show that PGO activity is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition of
dream bizarreness. More generally, these
data clash with the concept of dreams as a
chaotic and random product.
Aminergic demodulation
In Hobson’s view, the aminergic
demodulation of the brain in REM sleep
could be a cause of cognitive deficits that
contribute to dream bizarreness,
compared to waking state where aminergic
neuromodulation is high (12,14,125). For
example, aminergic demodulation might
predict an alteration in the strength of
associative links in memory (i.e.,
hyperassociative character) that would
explain the bizarre character of REM
dreaming (126). Recently this view has
been suggested also by Gottesman (127-
128) who claimed that the aminergic
demodulation in REM sleep (with the
exception of dopaminergic neurons) could
be responsible for unusual cognitive
functioning and for dream bizarreness.
These hypotheses seem scarcely
plausible, as long as we have seen that:
a) bizarreness is also present in waking
mentation and in NREM sleep, where
aminergic modulation is supposed to be
efficient (see above);
b) recent studies suggest that certain
cognitive abilities, e.g. attentional
processes, are not impaired during
dreaming compared to waking (129-131);
c) while, according to the “aminergic
demodulation hyphotesis”, bizarreness
should be a constant formal property of all
118
dreams, it has been found that young
children’s dreams are not bizarre at all (see
below);
On grounds of the above, aminergic
demodulation is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for dream bizarreness.
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex inactivity
Studies on dreaming with Positron
Emission Tomography (PET) show which
parts of the brain areas are active and
which are inactive during REM sleep. With
this method, some authors have
hypothesized that the deactivation of the
dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex during REM
sleep, which causes cognitive deficits (e.g.,
short-term memory, orientation, etc.),
would explain why dreams are so bizarre
and illogical (12, 23,127,132-136).
These approaches to the explanation of
REM dream bizarreness are inclined to
considering bizarreness as a constant
formal property; however, we have seen
that this is not true.
Cortical/cognitive activation
The hypothesis of Antrobus et al. (38-
39,112), i.e. bizarreness is due to an
overall increase in cortical and cognitive
activation, appears to be backed by the
following data:
a) Individuals with high cortical
activation in NREM sleep have shown a
greater amount of “dreaming” while
individuals with slow cortical activation
showed NREM mentation defined as
“thought-like” (42);
b) Dream reports of the second half of
night sleep (where it is supposed to be a
greater cortical/cognitive activation) are
generally more bizarre than in the first part
(66,70,94,114,137-139);
c) Waking and REM mentation (states
with higher activation), if report length is
not controlled, may appear more bizarre
than NREM stage 2 mentation (39).
Based on these data, the bizarreness of
REM dreaming could reflect persistent
cortical activation rather than specific
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

mechanism of REM sleep.
Frontal-limbic structures
Based on clinic/anatomical studies,
Solms (86,88) hypothesized that the
frontal–limbic structures (anterior
cingulate gyrus, anterior and dorsomedial
thalamus, basal forebrain nuclei, and
medial frontal cortex) would be implicated
in Freud’s “censorship” function. In fact
this region seems essential for the control
and regulation of emotions and impulses,
and for the reality monitoring system
through the inhibition of the motor system
during sleep. When this region is
functioning normally, arousal stimuli of
dream processes are deflected towards the
perceptive system (i.e., dream-work,
symbolic operation etc.); conversely, when
this region is damaged excessively
frequent and intense dreaming is triggered.
C. Individual factors
Age
Various studies have shown that dreams
of normal children of preschool age are often
simple rather than bizarre, even if collected
with different methodologies (family/non-
family interviewer) and/or in different
settings (dream laboratory, home, school)
(34,58,59,140-145). The frequency of non-
bizarre dreams is about 70%. These data
confirm previous anecdotal and quantitative
observation on the simplicity of children’s
dreams (146-148). Bizarreness seems to
occur more frequently starting from 5 to 6
years of age compared to dreams of younger
children (34,58,142,149).
These data suggest that dream
bizarreness should not be considered as an
intrinsic regular property of the dream
process. Indeed, in the light of children’s
dreams, it’s difficult to ascribe dream
bizarreness to a unique neurobiological
condition. In particular, why do random
PGO activity and aminergic demodulation
not cause bizarre features in children’s
dreams? Hobson’s colleagues also found
that children’s dreams are not bizarre, but,
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
quite surprisingly, no implications of this
finding were elaborated for their own
theory of dream bizarreness (12,145).
Finally, some preliminary systematic
observations in young children’s dreams
show that they are frequently a clear and
easily understandable wish-fulfillment
(142,150). From this point of view, dreams
cannot be characterized as meaningless,
the result of random nerve cell activity (7)
or as a mere activity aimed at reducing
spurious associations, fantasy and
obsession (15). Studies on formal aspect of
children dreams are fully consistent with
the psychoanalytic approach.
Personality development
The psychoanalytic model predicts that
children dreams are not bizarre because they
have not yet developed the superego
function that could permit the defensive
transformation of latent dream contents
(17,19-22). Certain studies have found
indications consistent with this hypothesis.
For example, Foulkes (34) has shown that
dream “distortion” is correlated to “social
comprehension” scores (Wechsler Test) (i.e.,
development of moral norms, adjustment to
reality). Colace et al. (58,141,142) suggest
that the appearance of bizarreness in
children’s dreams seems more related to
measures of the “capacity to experience guilt
feelings” (i.e., differentiation of the super- ego
function, interiorization of moral norms)
than to descriptive/linguistic abilities.
Furthermore, in agreement with Foulkes’
findings, these authors found that in children
of 3-6 years of age “social comprehension” is
correlated to scores of the “capacity to
experience guilt feelings” and that both these
variables are positively correlated with
measures of dream bizarreness (142).
Waking creativity
Several empirical studies have strongly
supported the hypothesis of a positive
relationship between dream bizarreness and
waking creativity (151-157). In a critical
review of these studies, Wood, Sebba and
Domino (93) suggested that dream
119
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
bizarreness might be primarily related to
vocabulary knowledge than to waking
creativity. According to Wood, Sebba and
Domino, the dream reports of verbally
intelligent people obtain higher bizarreness
ratings only because they are longer, and
not because they contain a higher “density”
of bizarre events. A similar result was found
by Livingston and Levin (158).
However, at least three facts should be
mentioned in opposition to these
statements: a) people with higher verbal
creativity do not always have longer dreams
(159), b) several studies have found that
non-verbal measures of imaginative ability
rather than verbal ability are excellent
predictors of dream bizarreness (160-164),
c) certain authors suggest and maintain
that, in observing the relationship between
bizarreness and creativity, to separate dream
length from bizarreness may be a
questionable practice (43,96,164).
In accordance with these data,
Hartmann’s group found that individuals
with “thin boundaries” property (i.e.,
flexible, imaginative and creative
individuals) report more bizarre dreams
than people with “thick boundaries”
property (i.e., solid, rigid and reliable
individuals) (165-169).
Psychopathology indices
Several studies have given good
support to the relationship between dream
bizarreness ratings and the degree of
psychological disturbance of the dreamer
measured with the MMPI test (total score
and/or scale of “hysteria” and Sc)
(2,3,171). Other studies have observed
that the dreams of schizophrenic patients
generally appear more bizarre (oddity,
implausibility) than those of normal
individuals (170,172-174). In addition,
the dreams of the schizophrenic are
frequently characterised as unrealistic
(175-180). Carrington (170) compared
the dream reports of schizophrenic and
nonschizophrenic individuals and showed
that the dreams of the former were more
bizarre than those of control subjects.
Furthermore, in the control group, dream
120
bizarreness was associated with well-
adjusted/maladjusted (MMPI) scores.
Carrington concluded that a high rate of
dream bizarreness might, on the basis of
further investigation, turn out to be at least
an important index of the degree of
maladjustment in the dreamer. It is also
worth noting that dreams are more
unrealistic among children suffering from
emotional disturbances (55). These results
are consistent with the psychoanalytic
view according to which the dreams of
maladjusted persons are generally more
bizarre (quantitatively) than those of
normal persons (18).
The results of studies on waking
creativity and psychopathology converge
together towards the following statements:
• NREM PIPs activity (correlate of
bizarreness), that vary from one
individual to another, is more frequent
in psychiatric patients and in
individuals who show a greater
imagination (correlates with dream
bizarreness) (181-184);
• NREM PIPs activity seems more frequent
in persons who have less control of over-
anxiety, fluid ego boundaries, less solid
sense of self , and with more imagination
(i.e., “thin boundaries” structure) rather
than in persons with better control of
anxiety, rigid ego boundaries and less
imagination (i.e., “thick boundaries”
structure) (182). We have seen that
“thin” persons are exactly those who
dream a greater number of bizarre
dreams (see above).
The data on the relationship between
dream bizarreness and waking creativity,
psychopathology degree, and types of ego
boundaries structure, suggest that dream
bizarreness is substantially and not negligibly
affected by individual differences. All those
models that ascribe dream bizarreness solely
to neurobiological events cannot explain the
effects of individual differences (Hobson,
Crick and Mitchison) or at least do not
explain how can these variables reconcile
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

with a neurobiological explanation.
CONCLUSIONS
The activation-synthesis hypothesis
and its updated versions, that attribute
dream bizarreness solely to the distinctive
neurobiological conditions of REM sleep,
can be essentially rejected on the basis of
the data found in literature.
This approach suggests that dream
bizarreness is a constant formal property of all
dreams because it is intrinsic to REM sleep
neurobiology, namely PGO random activity
and aminergic brain demodulation.
Moreover, as these neurobiological events are
not present in NREM dreaming and in
waking mentation, bizarreness is supposed to
be exclusive and peculiar to REM dreaming.
These assertions are not supported by
data. Indeed there is evidence that dream
bizarreness is a non-invariant, non-exclusive
and not peculiar feature of REM dreaming.
Particularly, although REM dreams are
frequently bizarre in adults, there are also
REM dreams that are not at all bizarre, and
non-bizarre dreams have been often
observed in young children. In practice,
the neurobiological events of REM sleep
are not a sufficient condition for the
occurrence of bizarreness.
The literature shows that bizarreness is
present also in NREM dreaming and in
some waking mentation (e.g., relaxed
waking, fantasies, etc.). In addition, it
cannot be clearly distinguished from REM
dreaming bizarreness. In other words, the
neurobiological events of REM sleep (PGO
activity, aminergic demodulation) are not
an essential requirement for bizarreness.
Results from other researches have cast
doubts on the role of PGO brainstem
activation as a cause of REM dream
bizarreness. Thus, the assumption that REM
dream bizarreness may be attributed to the
random and non-cognitive nature of PGO
activity is not supported by the following
data: in first place, dream imagery seems to
be actively constructed through complex
cognitive processes rather than generated
by brainstem chaotic activation of the
forebrain; secondly, experimental studies on
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
rat sleep suggest that during REM sleep the
processes in the memory system are orderly,
rather than random.
Most of these data, conflicting with the
“activation-synthesis” hypothesis, also
question the two other neurobiological
explanations of bizarreness, which are
largely based on the concept of PGO activity
and on the REM=dreaming equation (i.e.,
the “reverse learning” theory and Seligman
and Yellen’s model).
Apart from the evidence to the contrary at
neurobiological level, there is another major
reason for reconsidering the neurobiological
approach to dream bizarreness: the data on
the relationship between dream bizarreness
and waking creativity, psychopathology and
types of ego boundaries structure, suggest
that dream bizarreness is substantially
influenced by individual variables.
From this viewpoint, the studies on
children’s dreams have been quite useful in
reconsidering dream bizarreness. In
particular, they have shown that: (i)
bizarreness is not present in early forms of
dreaming, (ii) bizarreness seems to appear
at around 5 to 6 year of age, and (iii) it
seems to be related to the development of
moral norms.
While the literature data do not seem
consistent with the activation-synthesis
hypothesis and other neurobiological
approaches, they appear to be at least in
part consistent with other alternative
theories on dream bizarreness.
The non-invariant nature of bizarreness
seems more consistent with models that
do not regard bizarreness as intrinsic to
dreaming processes.
The presence of bizarreness in dreams
in all sleep stages and in some waking
mentation (e.g., fantasies) seems more
consistent with the concept of a common
dream generation system in the stages of
sleep and of waking fantasies that is typical
of cognitive approaches. On the other
hand, Foulkes’s claim of an essential
realism of REM dream reports does not
seems to be confirmed.
The evidence of more bizarreness in
dream reports of the second half of night
sleep than in those of the first part is
121
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
consistent with the GCAT model on the
role of cortical cognitive activation in the
increase of dream bizarreness.
While there is no evidence that PGO
spikes are fundamental for bizarreness, there
still is the possibility that, phasic neural
events (intrusion), in general and not only
PGO, during REM and NREM sleep may be
a source (i.e., correlate) of bizarre mentation.
From this viewpoint, Watson has shown
that PIPs activity varies individually and is
more frequent in psychiatric patients and in
persons with greater imaginative abilities;
exactly those people who apparently have
more bizarre dreams.
The data on the relationship between
dream bizarreness and psychopathology
are consistent with Hunt’s finding that
dream reports in a psychoanalytic setting
are more bizarre than home and laboratory
dreams. Together, these data seem to
confirm Freud‘s observation, i.e. that the
dreams of neurotic patients were more
bizarre than those of normal people. In
addition, the studies on the formal aspect
of children’s dreams are totally consistent
with the psychoanalytic approach.
REFERENCES
1. Domhoff B, Kamiya J. Problem in dream content
study with objective indicators. Arch Gen
Psychiatry 1964;11:519-532.
2. Foulkes D, Rechtschaffen A. Presleep determinants
of dreams content: the effects of two films. Percept
Mot Skills 1964;19:983-1005.
3. Rychlak JF, Brams JM. Personality dimension in
recalled dream content. Journal of Projective
Techniques 1963;27:226-234.
4. Hobson JA, McCarley RW. The brain as a dream-state
generator: Activation-Synthesis hypothesis of dream
process. Am J Psychiatry 1977;134:1335-1368.
5. Foulkes D. Cognitive-psychological model of REM
dream production. Sleep 1982;5:169-187.
6. Foulkes D. Dreaming: A cognitive-psychological
approach, Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1985.
7. Hobson JA. The dreaming brain, New York: Basic
Books Inc., 1988.
8. Hobson JA. Sleep, San Francisco: Freeman, 1989.
122
Briefly, the literature has highlighted a
need to reconsider dream bizarreness in a
more general way, including several levels of
analysis (neurobiological, cognitive and
psychological-motivational), rather than
taking only the neurobiological point of
view. Dream bizarreness cannot be
explained as a simple expression of
neurobiological facts, and, on the other
hand, individual determinants seem to play
an important role in its theoretical
explanation. From this perspective,
considering dream bizarreness as deprived
of any psychological significance and
dreams themselves as a meaningless by-
product appears to be premature. The
studies on dream bizarreness could
probably be supported by research work on
those forms of dreaming which, for reason
still unclear, do not show the presence of
bizarreness (e.g., children dreams, childish
adult dreams, etc.). On the other hand, the
clinical/anatomical method, which has
already proved to be useful somehow in the
study of dreams, might also contribute to
the research on the underlying factors of
dream bizarreness production.
9. Hobson JA. Activation, input source, and
modulation:neurocognitive model of the state of the
brain-mind. In: Bootzin RR, Kihlstrom JF, Schacter
DL, eds. Sleep and Cognition. University of
Arizona: American Psychological Association,
1990;25-40.
10. Hobson JA. A new model of brain-mind state:
Activation level, Input source, and Mode of
processing (AIM). In: Antrobus JS, Bertini M, eds.
The neuropsychology of sleep and dreaming.
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates Publisher, 1992;227-247.
11. Hobson JA. Sleep and Cognition (1999). Retrieved
from the Web 2/ 22/00.
http://www.websciences.org/worldsleep/cancun99/hobson99.html
12. Hobson JA, Pace-Schott EF, Stickgold R. Dreaming
and the brain: toward a cognitive neuroscience of
conscious states. Behav Brain Sci 2000;23:793-
842.
13. Hobson JA, Stickgold R. Dreaming: a
neurocognitive approach. Conscious Cognition
1994;3:1-15.
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

14. Mamelak A, Hobson JA. Dream bizarreness as the
cognitive correlate of altered neuronal behavior in
REM sleep. Journal Cogn Neurosci 1989;1:843-849.
15. Crick F, Mitchison G. The function of REM sleep.
Nature 1983;304:111-114.
16. Seligman M, Yellen A. What is a Dreaming? Behav
Res Ther 1987;25:1-24.
17. Freud S. The Interpretation of Dreams. In:
Strachey J, ed. The complete psychological works of
Sigmund Freud, London: Hogarth Press, 1900, vol
4-5.
18. Freud S. On dreams. In: Strachey J, ed. The
complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud,
London: Hogarth Press, 1901, vol 5.
19. Freud S. Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.
In: Strachey J, ed. The complete psychological
works of Sigmund Freud, London: Hogarth Press,
1915-17, vol 15-16.
20. Freud S. The dissolution of the Oedipus Complex.
In: Strachey J, ed. The complete psychological
works of Sigmund Freud, London: Hogarth Press,
1924, vol 19.
21. Freud S. Autobiography. In: Strachey J, ed. The
complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud,
London: Hogarth Press, 1924, vol 20.
22. Freud S. Jokes and their relation to the
Unconscious. In: Strachey J, ed. The complete
psychological works of Sigmund Freud, London:
Hogarth Press, 1905, vol 8.
23. Hobson JA, Stickgold R, Pace-Schott EF. The
neuropsychology of REM sleep dreaming.
Neuroreport 1998;9:1-14.
24. Kahn D, Pace-Schott EF, Hobson JA. Consciousness
in waking and dreaming: the roles of neuronal
oscilation and neuromodulation in determining
similarities and differences. Neuroscience
1997;78:13-38.
25. Hobson JA. How the brain goes out of its mind.
Endeavour 1996;20:86-89.
26. Hobson JA. Dreaming as delirium : a mental status
analysis of our nightly madness. Semin Neurol
1997;17:121-128.
27. Hobson JA, Hoffman SA, Helfand R, Kostner D.
Dream bizarreness and the activation-synthesis
hypothesis. Hum Neurobiol 1987;6:157-164.
28. Crick F, Mitchison G. REM sleep and neural nets. J
Mind Behav 1986;7:229-249.
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
29. Bosinelli M, Cicogna P, Molinari S. The Tonic-
phasic model and the feeling of Self-participation in
different stages of sleep. Giornale Italiano di
Psicologia 1974;1:35-65.
30. Foulkes D, Pope R. Primary visual experience and
secondary cognitive elaboration in stage REM: a
modest confirmation and extension. Percept Mot
Skills 1973;37:107-118.
31. Molinari S, Foulkes D. Tonic and phasic events
during sleep: psychological correlates and
implications. Percept Mot Skills 1969;29:343-368.
32. Snyder F. The phenomenology of dreaming. In: Madow
L, Snow LH, eds. The Psychodynamic implications of
the physiological studies on dreams. Springfield:
Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1970;124-151.
33. Dorus E, Dorus W, Rechtschaffen A. The incidence
of novelty in dreams. Arch Gen Psychiatry
1971;25:364.
34. Foulkes D. Children's Dreams, longitudinal studies,
New York: Wiley-Interscience Publication, 1982.
35. Foulkes D. Children’s dreaming and the
development of consciousness, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999.
36. Antrobus JS. REM and NREM Sleep Reports:
Comparison of Word Frequencies by Cognitive
Classes. Psychophysiology 1983;20:562-568.
37. Antrobus JS. Dreaming: Cortical activation and
Perceptual Thresholds. J Mind Behav 1986;7:193-
212.
38. Antrobus JS. Dreaming: Cognitive processes during
cortical activation and high afferent thresholds.
Psychol Rev 1991;98:96-121.
39. Reinsel R, Antrobus JS, Wollman M. Bizarreness in
dreams and waking fantasy. In: Antrobus JS,
Bertini M, eds. The neuropsychology of sleep and
dreaming. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Publisher, 1992;157-183
40. Reinsel R, Wollman M, Antrobus JS. Effects of
enviromental contex and cortical activation on
thought. J Mind Behav 1986;7:259-275.
41. Wollman M, Antrobus JS. Sleeping and waking
thought: effects of external stimulation. Sleep
1986;9:438-448.
42. Zimmerman WB. Sleep mentation and auditory
awakening thresholds. Psychophysiology
1970;6:540-549.
43. Hunt HT. Forms of dreaming. Percept Mot Skills
1982;54:559-633.
123
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
44. Hunt HT. The multiplicity of dreams, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1989.
45. Winget C, Kramer M. Dimension of dream,
Gainesville: Presses of Florida, 1979.
46. Cipolli C, Bolzani R, Cornoldi C, De Beni R, Fagioli
I. Bizarreness effects in dream recall. Sleep
1993;16:163- 170.
47. Sutton JP, Rittenhouse CD, Pace-Schott E, Stickgold
R, Hobson JA. A new approach to dream
bizarreness: graphing continuity and discontinuity
of visual attention in narrative reports. Conscious
Cogn 1994;3:61-88.
48. Rittenhouse C, Stickgold R, Hobson JA. Constraints
on the transformation of characters, objects, and
settings in dream reports. Conscious Cogn
1994;3:100-113.
49. Revonsuo A, Salmivalli C. A content analysis of bizarre
elements in dreams. Dreaming 1995;5:169-187.
50. Colace C, Natale V. Bizarreness in REM and SWS
dreams. Sleep Res 1997;26:240.
51. Bosinelli M. The study of Meta-Cognition during
Sleep Mental Experiences. Metodological Problems,
1999. Retriewed February 22, 2000, from:
http://www.websciences.org/worldsleep/cancun99/bosinelli2.html
52. Sutcliffe JP, Perry CW, Sheehan PW. Relation of some
aspects of imagery and fantasy to hypnotic
susceptibility. J Abnorm Psychol 1970;76:279-28.
53. Hall CS, Van de Castle RL. The content analysis of
dreams, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1966.
54. McCarley RW, Hoffman E. REM Sleep Dreams an
the Activation-Synthesis Hypothesis. Am J
Psychiatry 1981;138:904-912.
55. Foulkes D, Pivik T, Steadman HS, Spear PS,
Symonds JD. Dreams of the male child: an EEG
study. J Abn Psychol 1967;72:457-467.
56. Weisz RA, Foulkes D. Home and laboratory
dreams collected under uniform sampling
conditions. Psychophysiology 1970;16:155-156.
57. Auld F, Goldenberg GM, Weiss JV. Measurement of
Primary-Process thinking in dream report. J Pers
Soc Psychol 1968;8:418-426.
58. Colace C, Violani C, Solano L. La
deformazione/bizzarria onirica nella teoria
freudiana del sogno:indicazioni teoriche e verifica
di due ipotesi di ricerca in un campione di 50 sogni
di bambini. Archivio di Psicologia Neurologia e
Psichiatria 1993;54:380-401.
124
59. Colace C, Tuci B, Ferendeles R. Bizarreness in early
children’s dreams collected in the home setting:
preliminary data. Sleep Res 1997;26:241.
60. Zepelin H. Bizarreness in REM dreams. Sleep Res
1989;18:161.
61. Bonato RA, Moffit AR, Hoffmann RF, Cuddy MA,
Wimmer L. Bizarreness in dream and nightmares.
Dreaming 1991;1:53-61.
62. Cavallero C, Cicogna P, Natale V, Occhionero M,
Zito A. Slow Wave Sleep Dreaming. Sleep
1992;15:562-566.
63. Cicogna P, Cavallero C, Bosinelli M. Cognitive
aspects of mental activity during sleep. Am J
Psychol 1991;104:413- 425.
64. Cicogna P, Natale V, Occhionero M, Bosinelli M. A
comparison of Mental Activity During Sleep Onset
and Morning Awakenings. Sleep 1998;21:462-470.
65. Cicogna P, Natale V, Occhionero M, Bosinelli M.
Slow Wave and REM Sleep Mentation. Sleep
Research Online 2000;3:67-72.
66. Natale V, Esposito MJ. Bizarreness across the first
four cycles of sleep. Sleep and Hypnosis 2001;3:18-
24.
67. Zito A, Cicogna P, Cavallero C. Sogni REM e sogni
di addormentamento:in che termini è ancora
legittimo parlare di differenze?. Ricerche di
Psicologia 1992;2:7-18.
68. Cicogna P, Natale V, Occhionero M, Bosinelli M.
Comparing dreams at onset and end of sleep. J
Sleep Res 1996;5(Suppl. 1):33.
69. Natale V. Slow Wave Sleep Mentation: A
Comparison Between the First and the Second
Sleep Cycle. Sleep and Hypnosis 2000;2:84-89.
70. Foulkes D. Dream Research: 1953-1993. Sleep
1996;19:609-624.
71. Nielsen TA. A review of mentation in REM and
NREM sleep: “Covert” REM sleep as a possible
reconciliation of two opposing models. Behav Brain
Sci 2000;23: 851-866.
72. Cavallero C. REM sleep=dreaming: The never-
ending story. Behav Brain Sci 2000;23:904-907.
73. Foulkes D. Dreaming and REM sleep. J Sleep Res
1993;2:199-202.
74. Bosinelli M. Impressione di realtà e proprietà
percettive nella fenomenologia onirica. In: Gerbino
W, ed. Conoscenza e struttura. Bologna: Il Mulino,
1985;107-118.
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

75. Bosinelli M, Molinari S. Contributo alle interpretazioni
psicodinamiche dell'addormentamento. Rivista di
Psicologia 1968;62:369-393.
76. Bosinelli M, Cavallero C, Cicogna P. Self
representation in two different psychophysiological
contidions: the analysis of dream experiences
during sleep onset and REM sleep. Sleep
1982;5:290-299.
77. Brown J, Cartwright R. Locating NREM dreaming
through instrumental responses. Psychophysiology
1978;15:35-39.
78. Cicogna P, Bosinelli M, Occhionero M. (1992).
Processi ed esperienze mentali in sonno a onde
lente. In: Smirne SL, Ferini Strambi L, Zucconi M,
eds. Il sonno in Italia. Milano: Poletto Edizioni,
1992;55-59.
79. Foulkes D. Dreams report from different stages of
sleep. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
1962;65:14-25.
80. Foulkes D, Vogel G. Mental activity at sleep onset.
J Abnorm Psychol 1965;20:231-240.
81. Foulkes D, Schmidt M. Temporal sequences and
unit composition in dream reports from different
stages of sleep. Sleep 1983;6:265-280.
82. Foulkes D, Spear PS, Symonds JD. Individual
differences in mental activity at sleep onset. J
Abnorm Psychol 1966;71:280-286.
83. Moffitt A. Dreaming: Functions and meanings.
Impuls 1995;3:18-31.
84. Occhionero M, Cicogna P, Natale V, Esposito MJ,
Bosinelli M. A comparison of mental activity during
slow wave and REM sleep. J Sleep Res
1998;7(suppl 2):190.
85. Bosinelli M, Cicogna P. REM and NREM mentation:
Nielsen’s model once again supports the supremacy
of REM. Behav Brain Sci 2000;23:913-914.
86. Solms M. The neuropsychology of dreams: A
clinico-anatomical study, Mahwah, New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1997.
87. Solms M. New findings on the neurological
organization of dreaming: implications for
psychoanalysis. Psychoanal Q 1995;64:43-67.
88. Solms M. Dreaming and REM sleep are controlled
by different brain mechanisms. Behav Brain Sci
2000;23:843-50.
89. Bosinelli M. Recent research trends in sleep onset
mentation. In: Ellman S, Antrobus JS, eds. The mind
in Sleep, 2nd ed. New York: Wiley, 1991;137-142.
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
90. Rowley JT, Stickgold R, Hobson JA. Eyelid
movements and mental activity at sleep onset.
Conscious Cogn 1998;7:67-84.
91. Vogel GW. Sleep onset mentation. In: Arkin AM,
Antrobus JS, Ellman SJ, eds. The mind in sleep:
psychology and psychophysiology. Hillsdale, New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlabaum Associates Publishers,
1978;113-140.
92. Porte H, Hobson JA. Bizarreness in REM and
NREM reports. Sleep Res 1986;15:81.
93. Wood JM, Sebba D, Domino G. Do creative people
have more bizarre dreams? A reconsideration.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality 1989;9:3-
16.
94. Casagrande M, Violani C, Lucidi F, Buttinelli E,
Bertini M. Variation in sleep mentation as a
function of time of night. International. J Neurosci
1996;85:19-30.
95. Zito A, Cicogna P, Cavallero C. DDB: una banca
dati per la ricerca sulla fenomenologia del sogno.
Giornale Italiano di Psicologia 1991;18:781-786.
96. Hunt HT, Ruzycki-Hunt K, Pariak D, Belicki K.
The relationship between dream bizarreness and
imagination:artifact or essence? Dreaming
1993;3:179-199.
97. Foulkes D, Fleischer S. Mental activity in relaxed
wakefulness. J Abnorm Psychol 1975;84:66-75.
98. Foulkes D, Scott E. An above zero baseline for the
incidence of momentarily hallucinatory mentation.
Sleep Res 1973;2:108.
99. Williams J, Merritt J, Rittenhouse C, Hobson JA.
Bizarreness in dreams and fantasies:implication for
the activation-synthesis hypothesis. Conscious Cogn
1992;1:172-185.
100. Cavallero C, Natale V. Was I dreaming or did it
really happen? A comparison between real and
artificial dream reports. Imagination, Cognition
and Personality 1988-89;8:19-24.
101. Strauch I, Lederbogen S. The home dreams and
waking fantasies of boys and girls between ages 9
and 15: a longitudinal study. Dreaming
1999;9:153-161.
102. Carswell CM, Webb WB. Real and artificial dream
episodes: Comparison ofreport structure. J Abnorm
Psychol 1985;94:653-655.
103. Grosser GS, Siegal AW. Emergence of a tonic-
phasic model for sleep and dreaming. Psychol Bull
1971;75:60-72.
125
Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
104. Pivik T. Tonic states and phasic events in relation to
sleep mentation. In: Arkin AM, Antrobus JS,
Ellman SJ, eds. The mind in sleep: psychology and
psychophysiology, Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlabaum Associates Publishers, 1978;245-271
105. Rechtschaffen A. The Psychophysiology of mental
activity during sleep. In: McGuigan FJ, Schoonover
RA, eds. The psyschophysiology of thinking. New
York: Academic Press, 1973;153-205.
106. Goodenough DR, Lewis H, Shapiro A, Jaret L,
Sleser I. Dream reporting following abrupt and
gradual awakenings from different types of sleep. J
Pers Soc Psychol 1965;2:170-179.
107. Bliwise D, Rechtschaffen A. Phasic EMG in human
sleep: III. Periorbital potentials and NREM
mentation. Sleep Res 1978;27:58.
108. Rechtschaffen A, Watson R, Wincor M, Molinari. S,
Barta S. The relationship of phasic and tonic
periorbital EMG activity to NREM mentation.
Sleep Res 1972;1:114.
109. Watson, RK. Mental correlates of periorbital PIPs
during REM sleep. Sleep Res 1972;1:116.
110. Ogilvie RD, Hunt HT, Sawicki C, Samanhalsky J.
Psychological correlates of spontaneous middle-ear
muscle activit during sleep. Sleep 1982;5:11-27.
111. Watson RK, Bliwise DL, Friedman L, Wax D,
Rechtschaffen A. Phasic EMG in human sleep:II.
Periorbital potentials and REM mentation. Sleep
Res 1978;7:57.
112. Antrobus JS. The neurocognition of sleep mentation:
rapid eye movements, visual imagery, and
dreaming. In: Bootzin RR, Kihlstrom JF, Schacter
DL, eds. Sleep and Cognition. Washington DC:
American Psychological Association, 1990;3-24.
113. Antrobus JS. How does the dreaming brain explain
the dreaming mind? Behav Brain Sci 2000;23:904-
907.
114. Antrobus JS, Kondo T, Reinsel R, Fein G. Dreaming
in the late morning: summation of REM and
diurnal cortical activation. Conscious Cogn
1995;4:275-299.
115. Antrobus JS, Conroy D. Dissociated neurocognitive
processes in dreaming in sleep. Sleep and Hypnosis
1999;2:105-111.
116. Herman JH. Transmutative and reproductive
properties of dreams: evidence for cortical
modulation of brain-stem generators. In: Antrobus
JS, Bertini M, eds. The neuropsychology of sleep
and dreaming Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publisher, 1992;251-262.
126
117. Mancia M. Dream production is not chaotic. Behav
Brain Sci 2000;23:967-968.
118. Kramer M. Do Dreams have meaning? An empirical
inquiry. Am J Psychiatry 1976;133:778-781.
119. Kramer M. Dreaming has content and meaning not
just a form. Behav Brain Sci 2000;23:959-961.
120. Pavlides C, Winson J. Influences on hippocampal
place cell firing in the awake state on the activity of
these cells during subseguent sleep episodes. J
Neurosci 1989;9:2907-2918.
121. Winson J. The biology and function of rapid eye
movement sleep. Curr Opin Neurobiol 1993;3:243-
248.
122. Wilson MA, McNaughton BL. Reactivation of
hippocampal ensemble memories during sleep.
Science 1994;265:676-679.
123. Skaggs W, McNaughton BL. Replay of neuronal
firing sequences in rat hippocampus during sleep
following spatial experience. Science
1996;27:1870-1873.
124. Winson J. The meaning of Dreams. Sci Am 1990;
Nov,263:88-88,90-92,94-96.
125. Fosse R, Stickgold R, Hobson JA. Brain-mind states:
reciprocal variations in thoughts and
hallucinations. Psychol Sci 2001;12:30-36.
126. Stickgold R, Scott L, Rittenhouse C, Hobson JA.
Sleep-induced Changes in Associative Memory. J
Cogn Neurosci 1999;11:182-193.
127. Gottesman C. Hypothesis for the Neurophysiology
of Dreaming. Sleep Research Online 2000;3:1-4.
128. Gottesman C. Each distinct type of mental state is
supported by specific brain functions. Behav Brain
Sci 2000;23:941-943.
129. LaBerge S, Kahan T, Levitan L. Cognition in
dreaming and waking. Sleep Res 1995;24A:239.
130. Kahan TL, LaBerge S, Levitan L, Zimbardo P.
Similarities and differences between dreaming and
waking cognition: an exploratory study. Conscious
and Cogn 1997;6;132-147.
131. Hartmann E. The waking-to-dreaming continuum
and the effects of emotion. Behav Brain Sci
2000;23:947-950.
132. Braun AR, Balkin TJ, Wesenten NJ, Carson RE,
Varga M, Baldwin P, Selbie S, Belenky G,
Herscovitch P. Regional cerebral blood flow
throughout the sleep-wake cycle. Brain
1997;120:1173-1197.
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003

133. Braun AR, Balkin, TJ, Wesensten NJ, Gwadry F,
Carson RE, Varga M, Baldwin P, Belenky G,
Herscovitch P. Dissociated pattern of activity in
visual cortices and their projections during human
rapid eye movement sleep. Science 1998;279:91-
95.
134. Gottesman C. Neurophysiological support of
consciousness during waking sleep. Prog Neurobiol
1999;59:469-508.
135. Hobson JA, Pace-Schott, EF, Stickgold R. Dream
science 2000: A response to commentaries on
Dreaming and the brain. Behav Brain Sci
2000;23:1019-1035.
136. Maquet P, Peters J, Aerts J, Delfiore G, Degueldre
C, Luxen A, Franck G. Functional neuroanatomy
of human rapid-eye-movement sleep and
dreaming. Nature 1996;383:163-166.
137. Cohen DB. Changes in REM dream content during
the night: implications for a hypothesis about
changes in cerebral dominance across REM
periods. Percept Mot Skills 1977;44:1267-1277.
138. Pivik T, Foulkes D. NREM Mentation: relation to
personality, orientation time, and time of night. J
Consult Clin Psychol 1968;2:144:151.
139. Rechtschaffen A. Stimulus Determinants of
Dreaming, Mimeographed, 1962.
140. Colace C, Tuci B. Early children’s dreams are not
bizarre. Sleep Res 1996;25:147.
141. Colace C, Violani C. La bizzarria del sogno
infantile come correlato della capacità di provare
sensi di colpa. Psichiatria dell'infanzia e
dell'adolescenza 1993;60:367-376.
142. Colace C. I sogni dei bambini nella teoria
psicodinamica: un contributo teorico e
sperimentale. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Psychology, Università degli Studi di Bologna,
1997.
143. Colace C, Tuci B, Ferendeles R, Testa A, Celani G,
Gasparini S. Uno studio sul sognare in età
evolutiva attraverso un questionario compilato dai
genitori: dati preliminari. Psichiatria dell’Infanzia
e dell’adolescenza 2000;67:559-570.
144. Levi G, Pompili E. La narrazione del racconto del
sogno in bambini in età prescolare. Psichiatria
dell'infanzia e dell'adolescenza 1991;58:517-525.
145. Resnick J, Stickgold R, Rittenhouse C, Hobson JA.
Self-representation and bizarreness in children's
dream reports collected in the home setting.
Conscious and Cogn 1994;3:30-45.
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003
C. Colace
146. Ablon SL, Mack JE. Children's dreams
reconsidered. Psychoanal Study Child
1980;35:170- 217.
147. Kimmins CW. Children's Dreams, Longman's
Green, 1920.
148. Despert JL. Dreams in children of preschool age.
Psychoanal Study Child 1949;3-4:141-180.
149. Colace C, Doricchi F, Di Loreto E, Violani C.
Developmental qualitative and quantitative aspects
of bizarreness in dream reports of children. Sleep
Res 1993;22:57.
150. Colace C. Wish-fulfillment in dream reports of
young children. Sleep 1998;21 (Suppl. 3):286.
151. Adelson J. Creativity and the dream. Merril Palmer
Q 1960;6:92-97.
152. Caan DR, Donderi DC. Junghian personality
typology and the recall of everyday and archetypal
dreams. J Pers Soc Psychol 1986;50:1021-1030.
153. Domino G. Primary process thinking in dream
report as related to creative achievement. J Consult
Clin Psychol 1976;44:929-932.
154. Gaines R, Price-Williams D. Dream images as a
technique for the study of the creative process.
Percept Mot Skills 1990;70:540-542.
155. Schechter N, Schmeidler GR, Staal M. Dream
reports and creative tendencies in student of the
arts, sciences, and engineering. J Consult Psychol
1965;29:415-421.
156. Sylvia WH, Clark PM, Monroe LJ. Dream reports
of subjects high and low in creative ability. J Gen
Psychol 1978;99:205-211.
157. Sladeczek P, Domino G. Creativing, Sleep and
Primary Process Thinking in Dreams. J Creat
Behav 1985;19:38-55.
158. Livingston G, Levin R. The effects of dream length
on the relationship between primary process in
dream and creativity. Dreaming 1991;1:301-310.
159. Schredl M. Dream length and creativity: an opposite
finding. Percept Mot Skills 1994;78:1297-1298.
160. Belicki K, Bowers P. The role of hypnotic ability in
dream recall. Sleep Res 1981;10:155.
161. Belicki K, Belicki D. Predisposition for nightmares:
A study of hypnotic ability, vividness of imagery
and absorption. J Clin Psychol 1986;42:714-718.
162. Gackenbach J, Bonsveld J. Control your dreams,
New York: Harper and Row, 1989.
127
 Dream Bizarreness Reconsidered
163. Hunt HT, Popham C. Metaphor and states of
consciousness: A preliminary correlational study of
presentational thinking. J Mind Behav 1987;11:83-100.
164. Spadafora A, Hunt H. The multiplicity of dreams:
Cognitive-Affective correlates of lucid, archepital,
and nightmare dreaming. Percept Mot Skills
1990;71:627-644.
165. Kunzendorf R G, Hartmann E, Cohen R, Cutler J.
Bizarreness of the dreams and daydreams reported
by individuals with thin and thick boundaries.
Dreaming 1997;7:265-271.
166. Hartmann E. Outline for theory on the nature and
functions of dreaming. Dreaming 1996;6;147-170.
167. Hartmann E, Elkin R, Garg M. Personality and
dreaming: the dreams of the people with very thick or
very thin boundaries. Dreaming 1991;1:311-324.
168. Schredl M, Schafer N, Hoffman F, Jacobs S.
Dream content and personality: thick vs. thin
boundaries. Dreaming 1999;9:257-263
169. Zborowski M, McNamara P, Hartmann E, Murphy
M, Mattle L. Boundary structure related to sleep
measures and to dream content. Sleep
1998;21(Suppl):474D, 284.
170. Carrington, P. Dreams and Schizophrenia. Arch
Gen Psychiatry 1972;26:343-350.
171. Cartwright RD, Ratzel R. Effects of dream loss on
Waking Behaviors. Arch Gen Psychiatry
1972;27:277-280.
172. Fisher S, Greenberg RP. The scientific credibility of
Freud's theories and therapy, New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1977.
173. Kramer M, Baldridge BJ, Whitman RN, Ornstein
PH, Smith PC. An exploration of the manifest
dream in schizophrenic and depressed patients. Dis
Nerv Syst, 1969;30(Suppl.):126-130.
174. Richardson G, Moore R. On the manifest dream in
schizophrenia. J Am Psychoanal Assoc
1963;11:281-302.
128
View publication stats
175. Boss M. Psychopatology of dreams in schizophrenia
and organic psychoses. In: De Martino MF, ed.
Dreams and personality dynamics. Springfield, Ill.:
Charles C Tomas Publisher, 1959;156-175.
176. Cappon, D. Morphology and Other Parameters of
Fantasy in the Schizophrenics. Arch Gen
Psychiatry 1959;1:17-34.
177. Doust-Lovett J. Studies in the physiology of
awareness: the incidence and content of dream
patterns and their relationship to anoxia. In: De
Martino MF, ed. Dreams and personality
dynamics. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Tomas
Publisher, 1959.
178. Freedman N, Grand SE, Karacan I. An Approach
to the study of dreaming and changes in
psychopathologic states. J Nerv Ment Dis
1966;143:399-405.
179. Kant, O. Dreams of schizophrenic patients. J Nerv
Ment Dis 1942;95:335-347.
180. Kramer M. Manifest Dream Content in Normal
and Psychopatological States. Arch Gen Psychiatry
1970;22:149-159.
181. Rechtschaffen A, Bliwise D, Litchman J. Phasic
EMG in human sleep: V. PIPs and MMPI scores in
normals. Sleep Res 1978;7:60.
182. Watson RK. Phasic integrated potentials and ego
boundary deficits. In: Antrobus JS, Bertini M, eds.
The neuropsychology of sleep and dreaming.
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates Publisher, 1992;247-250.
183. Watson, RK, Liebmann K, Watson S. Comparison
of NREM PIP frequency in schizophrenic and non-
schizophrenic patients. Sleep Res 1976;5:154.
184. Watson RK, Buttler S, Liebmann K. Individual
differences in the Rorschach M response and the
distribuition of phasic integrated potentials (PIPs)
during sleep. Percept Mot Skills 1983;57:507-514
Sleep and Hypnosis, 5:3, 2003